

**From *Cosmopolis* to *Globopolis*:  
The Ramifications of Kantian Thought on the  
Foundations of the World Order—Communitarianism,  
Impartialism, Accommodationism**

**Joanna K. Rozpedowski**  
University of South Florida, USA

**Abstract**

Organizational dimensions of globalization suggest patterns of global stratification; as globalization transforms the organization, distribution and exercise of power, it creates hierarchies and asymmetries of power and control of access to global networks and infrastructures. Concurrently, transnationalization of political activity itself, takes place in the context of greater internationalization of the state. In view of this, political space and political community are no longer defined and limited by the national, statist-oriented framework. Increasingly the phenomenon of power diffusion signifies emerging multilayered governance, marked by development of regional and global institutions and laws governing the administration and management of globalization. What impact then, do processes of globalization have on the citizen-subject, who is increasingly defined in terms of a socio-cultural cosmopolitan framework? It is important to underscore that the framework is not, in itself, a consensus-inducing paradigm, under the auspices of which citizens come to theorize and reify their [global] identities. It is ideologically fractured into two contentious theories, communitarianism and impartialism. The former, as the name suggests, argues for a value-laden, community-oriented identity, whereas the latter, calls for a moratorium on sentimental historicism in the name of reasoned and self-enacting neutrality. In this paper, I contend for an ‘accommodative’ notion of cosmopolitanism, grounded in the substantive context of Kantian politico-philosophical thought, as most appropriate for harmonizing the amorphous processes of globalization vis-à-vis citizen-subject.

*Homo sum: Humani nihil a me alienum puto.*<sup>1</sup>  
-Terence

---

<sup>1</sup> “I am a human being: I think nothing human alien to me.” (From Terence’s “The Self-Tormentor”).

As contemporary debates about cosmopolitanism suggest, questions concerning processes of globalization and the embodied, ontological character of a cosmopolitan citizen, are key to understanding the shifts and transformations in the scale and quality of inter-human and state vis-à-vis citizen relations. The spread of transplanetary and increasingly supraterritorial connections between people (Scholte 2005), and a transformation in spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generate unprecedented transcontinental and interregional flows and new networks of activity, interaction as well as new sources and contests of power (Held 1999). The growing enmeshment of the local and global blurs distinctions between strictly domestic and global affairs. Likewise, the decisional, institutional, distributive, and structural impacts (Held 1999) of distant events have significant consequences for the socio-cultural and political-economic dynamics of the local social order, and the citizen subject embedded within their increasingly non-statist oriented framework of governance.

Globalization, and alongside it, cosmopolitanism, as the two conceptually contested concepts, are essentially appraisive, internally complex and relatively open to disputes about the proper standard of meaning and use. One may come to restrict cosmopolitanism to an ontological plane reified by an existential paradox, that is, a dynamic state of being enmeshed in and yet standing apart, ethically, from the parochial, rooted and static identity. The concept is conceived in the context of and often accompanied by the phenomenon of globalization. Held et al. in *Global Transformations* capture a three-fold internal dynamic of the process of globalization. The authors' articulated perception of globalization centers on widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness visible in all aspects of contemporary social life.<sup>2</sup> As a process which lacks precise definition, the sheer impact of the scale of social and economic change leads some to develop a sense of political fatalism and chronic insecurity, as the tempo and ubiquity of change seem to outstrip the capacity of national governments and individual citizens to control, contest and resist it. Further, organizational dimensions of globalization suggest patterns of global stratification; as globalization transforms the distribution and

---

<sup>2</sup> Globalization as a corpus of ideas, processes, and interactions embodies a substantial transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, assessed in terms of their increasing (i) extensity of regularized interactions and networks of social relations, (ii) intensity of global interconnectedness, (iii) velocity and institutional, structural, and distributive impacts of global flows, which collectively generate [unprecedented] transcontinental and interregional flows, [new] and more diffused modes and nodes of activity and interaction, and provide [new] opportunities for the exercise and contestation of power (Held, David. 1999. *Global Transformations*).

exercise of power, it creates hierarchies and asymmetries of power and control of access to global networks and infrastructures. Concurrently, transnationalization of political activity itself, takes place in the context of greater internationalization of the state. It is seen by proliferation of social movements, associations, and ‘citizen democracy’ by means of which the populous comes to exert power across national borders. In view of this, political space and political community are no longer defined and limited by the national, statist-oriented framework. Increasingly the phenomenon of power diffusion signifies emerging multilayered governance, marked by development of regional and global institutions and laws governing the administration and management of globalization.<sup>3</sup>

What impact, then, do processes of globalization have on the citizen-subject, who becomes increasingly responsive to and defined in terms of a socio-cultural cosmopolitan framework? It is important to underscore that the framework is not, in itself, a consensus-inducing paradigm, under the auspices of which citizens come to theorize and reify their [global] identities. It is ideologically fractured into two contentious theories: communitarianism and impartialism. The former, as the name suggests, argues for a value-laden, community-oriented identity, whereas the latter calls for a moratorium on sentimental historicism in the name of reasoned and self-enacting neutrality which requires a self-referential medium of deliberation, whereby agents constitute themselves and are constitutive of a bifocal normative standpoint. In this paper, I contend for an ‘accommodative’ notion of cosmopolitanism grounded in the substantive context of Kantian politico-philosophical thought, as most appropriate for harmonizing the amorphous processes of globalization vis-à-vis citizen-subject. The indeterminate, yet, all-pervasive nature of globalization problematizes the condition of being and feeling a citizen. It creates a fertile ground for the enactment of cosmopolitan citizenship directed at agents, whose political, social and cultural loyalties, by definition, no longer rest exclusively within a fixed territorial and institutional framework from which laws and political rights traditionally emanated. Finally, it anticipates and provokes questions on the relevance of *de jure* citizenship itself, in a world characterized by an increasingly pluralistic, often displaced and discontinuous, and largely itinerant human existential experience. It is essential to

---

<sup>3</sup> Increasingly, transnational processes of and contests to globalization extend themselves beyond national borders, and ensue in what is referred to as a ‘transnational civil society.’ On the basis thereof, Held concludes that the idea of democracy can no longer be based on atomistic and sheltered political communities or territorial nation-states, and that citizenship in a democratic polity itself must involve a mediating role. (Held, David. 2000. “The Changing Contours of Political Community”).

underscore, however, that neither globalization nor cosmopolitanism have dissolved the functional basis of the organizing principle - the state - the very structure which their most avid followers purport to increasingly marginalize, initiating thus a process of gradual withering way of the state, and by extension, a withering away of nation-bound identities reinforced by a citizen status. A question arises, therefore, as to the extent to which the global citizen-subject, and on this reading, the self-enacting cosmopolitan citizen,<sup>4</sup> ought to rely upon the state for her political identity, socio-cultural guidance, and moral fruition.

The point of my argument will be, first, to illustrate with an aid of Kant's political texts and contemporary literature on the subject that cosmopolitanisms can accommodate the notion of individual state-subject sovereignty that needs not be threatened, compromised nor subsumed by the ideal, and that the procedures for world-citizenship and national citizenship, both *de facto* and *de jure*, can be brought into agreement in the normative politico-ethical context without admitting of mutual exclusion. Contending further that the assumed coexistence of *feeling a citizen* and holding a visceral sense of *loyalty* toward one's *patria* provides a substantive context for individual self-determination, which does not obstruct, mitigate or encroach upon civic obligations to the *summum bonum* of humanity, nor must necessarily precipitate into nationalistic sentiment, but rather, enhances the morale of the cosmopolitan effort itself and defines the very parameters of the global order. The cultivation of a virtuous disposition and a rational love of culture peculiar to a given nation or state from which the very sense of esteem, respect and loyalty are derived, I contend, instills within individual beings, global citizens, a higher moral obligation to civil society in general.

The *de facto* citizenship exercised beyond and above the *de jure* legitimized boundaries of nations and states, and in accord with prescripts of universal normativity, which sanction loyalty and duty to common humanity, can be, I contend, pragmatically realized without annihilating norms and mores particular to individual agents and states. This does not mean, however, that the effort aimed at 'accommodating' particularism in the name of cosmopolitan tolerance will necessarily result in moral relativism. *A contrario*, a commitment ought to be made to assert the value of a person not on the grounds of conformity to the external

---

<sup>4</sup> Contemporary accounts of cosmopolitan democracy consist in articulating conditions for cosmopolitan citizenship *qua* multiple citizenship. Thus, Held's account of cosmopolitan democracy, for instance, implies the demand for multiple citizenships in (i) the geographically local communities, (ii) the country or region-based communities, and (iii) the inter-national or cosmopolitical communities. (Held, David. 2000. "The Changing Contours of Political Community").

skeleton of cosmopolitan margins of tolerance, but to internal truths which emanate from the condition of the being herself, the universal values grounded in reason; alone, capable of “generous imaginings”<sup>5</sup> and empathy inducing *ethos* of acknowledging otherness. Accommodationism, is thus a negotiation between the inner absolutes, the being’s “essentials,” and the external, the world of the “encountered” and the “entered into.” It promotes a dissolution of specious apparitions of divided humanity and boundaries enacted between the familiar “I” and the estranged “thou.” It is, above all, the exorcism of the esoteric traditionalism designed to exclude and, as such, serving as the exclusionary and marginalizing principle of the political and social identity against anything that is unlike itself in all aspects of life; and the acceptance of, through reconciliation or bridging, the esoteric and exoteric features, conditionalities, and constructs of existence. An identity constructed, accommodationist view holds, is neither inherently essential nor authentic, and both reason and active moral deliberation denude it of its borrowed clothes.

In the following sections I would like to concentrate upon contemporary accounts of cosmopolitanism centering, in particular, upon the Kantian conception of citizenship and identity, elemental to the ongoing communitarian-impartialist debate. I will briefly outline the respective stances, while formulating a workable ‘accommodative’ notion of cosmopolitanism.

First, however, I will briefly outline Kant’s farsighted, cosmopolitical conception of a universal civic society as found in his tractate, *Toward Perpetual Peace*. Kant’s cosmopolitan project, encapsulated in his ethical and political writings, presents a significant and multidimensional challenge to the human race, as it asks individuals to enter into a civil condition premised upon obedience, commitment to, and respect for the state’s legal order, while remaining committed to the unifying principles of shared humanity that are to transcend cultural, national, and political borders. The *de jure* citizen, as postulated by Kant, ought to conform to a generic moral disposition of willing to subject oneself, by reason of agent’s own, to the state, which is obligated, for the moral education of its citizen-subjects, to balance and harmonize the decrees of positive law with the laws of nature.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> “Generous imaginings” refer to a framework of cosmopolitan largesse that relies on the population to spontaneously and generously imagine other persons, and to do so, on a day-to-day basis in order to eliminate the ‘inherently aversive structural position of ‘foreignness.’ (Scarry, Elaine. 2002. “The Difficulty of Imagining Other People.”).

<sup>6</sup> Here, positive law appertains to the expression of the general will of the citizen body, which by means of a public and open participation within the state has the capacity to become an embodied instantiation of the state’s legal precedent. However, Kant did not consider the state as adequately sufficient medium for the fulfillment of the human

However, by virtue of being a *de facto* citizen of the world, an individual agent must, by necessity, rationally and under strict guidance of the moral law, reach beyond the constraints of the state in order to grow attuned to, and in time, more inclusive of humanity in general.

The aforementioned two forms of citizenship do not present, for Kant, an obstacle on the road to cosmopolitanism. The *de jure* citizenship, as a binding legal precedent can be, by all means, reconciled with its open-ended and all-inclusive counterpart, by reference to forms of cosmopolitan moral governance that adequately recognize the facticity of the human condition. That Kantian inspired cosmopolitan morality contemporaneously presupposes: (i) that each person in an equal manner ought to a subject of moral law and commitment; (ii) that, in propounding policies and promulgating laws, the interests of each person ought to be accounted for in an equal and impartial manner irrespective of border demarcations; (iii) that there ought not be a moral discontinuity between different societies, rather, a universally shared basic morality or an ethical minimum ought to be articulated and established (Beitz 1998).

Further, Kant did not seek to impose a limited participatory conformity to the state, but intended to create conditions within the bounds of a constitutional republic that would enable individuals to reach their *telos*, grounded in universal human dignity, by recourse to a common moral sense and self-legislating practical reason. Sharon Anderson-Gold in her book *Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights* suggests that as far as individual citizens and states coexist in a state of mutual external influence, citizens are not completely subordinated to states in their claims to legal standing, and their legal personality is neither expressed nor exhausted by their nationality (2001). Nevertheless, an agent's national condition, her proximity and intimate first-person knowledge of its social climate, brought about and historicized by an instituted ruling political decree, seek expression and substantiation in the definitives of national law. In resolution to arising contradictions within the *de facto* and *de jure* forms of citizenship, Kant recognized that states cannot assume the responsibility for constructing the identity of its citizens solely upon the contingencies and constraints of national descent, but must

---

condition, but rather envisioned a collective unity of civic organizations implanted with the spirit of republicanism. Only such an association could facilitate the realization of the ethical cosmopolitan entity dedicated to the observation of, and respect for the (i) legal doctrine, (ii) citizens' motivations and aspirations, (iii) maintenance of peaceful relations, and (iv) recognition of an unconditional 'duty to realize the condition of public right' in comportment with the decrees of the moral law. (Kant, Immanuel. 1991. *Toward Perpetual Peace*).

be bound to incorporate and propagate a duty-based respect for the *ius cosmopolitanum*, under which all rational agents are *de facto* subjects.<sup>7</sup> However, as Hannah Arendt argued (1968), a “citizen is by definition a citizen of a country among countries” and cannot simultaneously hold dual and often conflicting loyalties, and be thought to honor them equally well, for “nobody can be a citizen of the world as he is the citizen of his country” (84). Since, as Kant assumed, human race is constantly advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end), and as such is also ‘conceived as progressing toward what is better with respect to the moral end of its existence’ any process designed to create conditions for just exercise of political and legal authority with respect to individual civic identity, without encroaching upon the well-being of common humanity, constitutes the essence of a cosmopolitan ethic of citizenship. On Kantian reading, cosmopolitanism is able to reconcile and accommodate the universal *de facto* citizenship with its legitimized and particular *de jure* instantiations by treating them as matters of historical course, and subjects to political and intellectual evolution of humankind, perpetually amenable to reform.

### Modern Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism, as a moral construct and a normative ideal, which is inextricably bound and structurally realized through the all-pervading processes of globalization, is said to promote a moral-ideological disassociation from tradition, religious belief, and familial directives and prescripts, and move toward a narrower form of individualism reflected in agent’s ability to reason autonomously, and thus prescribe and employ the means toward one’s own self-determination. The context and substance provided by the community, communitarians contend, as the foundations from which individuals derive their initial identity and proper moral aptitude, are subject to increasing translation and universalization. The permeability of borders and internationalization of norms of national society imply that dignity of individuals is no longer solely linked to their particular place in a constricted and bounded statutory group, but progressively more to their character as moral and

---

<sup>7</sup> The etymological derivivative of cosmopolitanism, *kosmou polites*, where *kosmou* denotes the universe or cosmos, and *polite*, the citizen, on this reading, further implies human boundedness to binary forms of citizenship: (i) *natural* citizenship in the grand universe of the human race in which the “universe is a city and the stars citizens” (Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis*), and (ii) *artificial* citizenship contingent upon the ‘accidental’ circumstances or geographical location of one’s birth.

universally-oriented human beings and citizens. It is this very collectivity of citizens that enacts newer and more distinctive sets of identities, open to and “conscious of cosmopolitan solidarity” (Balibar 2004, 55). In addition, an expansion of social citizenship that is accompanied by a displacement of sentiment for communal and national belonging, increasingly calls for institutional expression on a supra-national level.

One such undertaking, which aims to de-territorialize and eradicate fixed national loyalties and boundaries, while institutionalizing strict legal divisions between the state and the civil society can be seen in the geographically regional, yet morally cosmopolitical initiatives of the European Union.<sup>8</sup> Here, the concept of cosmopolitan paradox, which is characterized by a distinct divorce between the communitarian inclinations of national governments and the universal politico-economic aspirations of consolidating a continental and cosmopolitically-conscious citizen-subject, makes the communitarian-impartialist debate all the more relevant and multiplex. In this context, the EU’s community-oriented framework requires for its effective transcommunitarian functioning, an impartialist rudder and an accommodative stance, rather than a selective recourse to historical contingencies and nationalistically engineered human consciousness; as it involves a kind of impartial commitment to respecting and furthering fundamental, universally shared, human and citizen rights, irrespective of their locus of origin. From this point of view, the EU-based political cosmopolitanism extrapolates and pragmatically employs the Kantian inspired moral maxims.

### **Communitarian-Cosmopolitan Reconciliation**

In *Toward Perpetual Peace* Immanuel Kant conceived of the state within the federated union as a paradigmatic instantiation of a moral person. Since individual agents, Kant contended, have a moral obligation to other moral beings and are duty-bound to mold a firm sentiment and respect for law, they must necessarily, by virtue of equating state with a moral person, maintain active obligations to the state of which they remain citizens. It is not the case that the cosmopolitan order asks of individuals to retribute or deny their loyalties to their places of origin. The

---

<sup>8</sup> The EU’s legal value encapsulated in what is conceived as a form of *metaconstititutionality*, which is to ensure political cohesiveness of the Union, should be emphasized here. In line with Habermas’ thinking, the broader purpose of the *metaconstititutional* structure is not a creation of anything beyond the historical capacity of the human intellect, but a conservation of the ‘great democratic achievement of the European nation-state, beyond its own limits’ (Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”), as well as preservation of its social cohesion, social equality, and consensual representation.



‘collectivist’ or ‘communitarian’<sup>9</sup> approaches to cosmopolitanism, that emphasize the psycho-social and ethical importance of belonging to communities, claim that cultures are ‘hermetically sealed’ one from another; where ‘same culture’ implies the same ‘self-understanding’ embedded in the social and historical context (Palmer 2003). Indeed, shared identity, that is, such as derived from common ethnicity, history, and tradition, it may be argued, evokes shared degrees of sentimentality. Sentiment alone, however, in the context of Kantian ethics, is not a motivating element but reason alone, to which any passion must remain subservient. As such, the establishment of an individuated ‘self-understanding’, on this reading, must not solely emanate from subjective emotive perspectives, such as, self-love or self-conceit, which tend to isolate and ‘hermetically enclose’, but from objective ends to which peculiar cultural context contributes by way of reason. That is, the faculty of reason, for Kant, is the sole human capacity, which alone can guarantee the autonomy, freedom and objectivity, or moral universality in thought and action.

Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) argues that to divest oneself of context, or “moral starting points” and thus transcend the dimensions of local and communal identity, inevitably leads to individual moral vacuity. For when the fundamental grounds and instruments for proper moral flourishing provided by the community are eliminated, the possibility of holding any reason for maintaining a moral disposition toward humanity is extinguished. An individual being upon transcending the dimensions of the local-communal identity, MacIntyre argues, in seeking and “aspiring to be at home anywhere” becomes a “citizen of nowhere” (156) - a persona of displaced moral obligations, devoid of any grounding moral constitution and instruments for personal ethical flourishing. An individual, when the need shall arise, and upon conspiring to sublimate any patriotic volitions, may thus elect to acknowledge and privilege abstract and distant interests of humanity over the immediate interests of the state [nation-state] of which she remains a *de jure* citizen - as an entity *sine qua non* that encapsulates, communitarians hold, the only substantive and normative prescriptions for a genuine exercise of moral concern. This view, however, can be reconciled without being compromised by the liberal character of cosmopolitanism. In other words, communitarianism vis-à-vis impartialism can be ‘accommodated’ contextually with the framework of the cosmopolitical order without dispossessing individuals of their sense of ‘rootedness’ and moral substance, nor necessarily leading to cultural particularism,

---

<sup>9</sup> Communitarianism denotes “a perspective on ethics and political philosophy that emphasizes the psycho-social and ethical importance of belonging to communities, and which holds that the possibilities for justifying ethical judgments are determined by the fact that ethical reasoning must proceed within the context of a community’s traditions and cultural understandings.” (Buchanan, Allen. 1998. “Community and Communitarianism”).

solipsism, or relativism, as some communitarians contend, in moral judgment and action. The theories that follow point to the elasticity of the concept of cosmopolitanism and its tolerance for the multifariousness of affinities individuals may elect to represent in the global political, social, and cultural setting.

The consolidation of a more inclusive ethical community, impartialists hold, ought to take under consideration the significance of national, social, political and cultural “borders” in forming an ethical agency, without imposing, however, a necessary demand for their enforcement. The legitimacy of the state, Onora O’Neill argues in “Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism” (1988), does not depend upon the presence or evocation of particular components of identity (border identity), but rather, upon recognition of the unqualified, indeterminate and complex sets of identities that exist within the bounds of a political entity, however, not exclusively limited to them. For while states occupy a spatial and territorial dimension, impartialists argue, agent’s allegiances and sentiments need not reflect or be contingent upon geographic location or specific national enclosure. Therefore, to have a sense of identity, O’Neil stipulates, “is to have a certain constellation of oneself” (98) and a developed ability to recognize and pragmatically deploy its multifaceted nature.

It is often argued that the enclosure made up of a rigid and imposing structure of the community itself, along with its reifying historical burdens, insist on perpetuating and protecting traditional social roles that are largely unreflective of the socio-culturally and ethnically diverse citizen body, and as such, promotes social exclusion that runs counter to any morally justifiable effort of espousing collective claims to humanness, irrespective of national identity. The impartialist prescription thus holds that in order to transpose the static affiliations to the situated and static “communities of place” (Friedman 1989, 649) a formation of multiple affinities and associations with other non-territorial communities must be a requisite first step and a necessary component of the cosmopolitan ethic. The initiative of this kind is decisive to the maintenance of a broader, “intellectualized” cosmopolitan view and the preservation of moral aptitude that does not, necessarily, require substantiation for its existence in agent’s recourse to an exclusive and esoteric nature of abstract traditionalism. The concept of embedded ‘impartialist’ cosmopolitanism locates an individual agent within the communities which do not aim to impose any stifling contextual foundations, but rather seek to enhance member’s receptivity to ethical concerns through reasoned discourse and norm establishing consensus, and thus extend individual’s sense of obligation to humanity beyond the particular and immediate surroundings.

### **Concentricity of Cosmopolitan Patriotism**

The philosophical perspective of cosmopolitanism thus rests upon the “understanding of morality that binds a universal scope of inclusion inextricably to an account of agency, according to which moral deliberation requires one to abstract from the perceived prejudices of particular ties and loyalties.” (Erskine 2002, 460). Agent’s moral independence from distinctive social contexts and attachments minimizes the importance of a monolithic structure of the state as an entity, conceived of by Immanuel Kant, as formed out of the unity of a group of human beings under laws, and mutually affirmed customary relations. The individuals’ recognition of impartial allegiance to the established structures of the state, and extension of moral obligations beyond the boundaries of one’s immediate environment, as well as exclusion of preferential considerations for one’s compatriots, universalizes the scope of moral duties. The expansive “global moral horizon” (Erskine 2002, 464) transcends borders, it renounces any affirmation of social identity that imposes any limitations upon individual’s ethical behavior, and regards the structure of the state, on Kantian reading, as existing solely for the purposes of protecting the capacity of an agent to exercise moral disposition. As such, it leaves relative freedom for consolidating an individualist perspective with a universalist and humanist viewpoint, which aims at developing an inclination for treating every human being *qua* human being, as a *de facto* member of the ethical *cosmopolis*, and respectively “thinks no human, alien.” The cosmopolitan perspective of this kind, Anthony Appiah asserts in “Cosmopolitan Patriots” (1998), remains committed to the existence of universal standards and respect for objective values that each individual, via the use of autonomous reason, necessarily identifies with and internalizes. Cosmopolitanism believes in the individual capacity to reason, that is expressive of the Kantian belief, which eventuates in the discernment of *equal dignity* of all people and their *equal entitlement* to respect. This impartially-oriented notion, cosmopolitans believe, constitutes the primal principle that ought to help guide and direct human inclination and moral orientation within the heterogeneous framework of the global order.

The heterogeneity and the pluralistic nature of the cosmopolitan order, in and of itself, do not deny, however, the right to contextual foundation from which self-determination and identity unfold. It is, after all, the normative identity that provides the language and the historical background that prove elemental to the sharing in the ‘full richness’ of the cosmopolitan social life. As autonomous agents and citizens elect to become transposed geographically, they inevitably “take their roots with themselves.” As individuals accept and grow cognizant of the moral responsibility to “nurture the culture and the politics of their homes” (Appiah 1998, 92) they become better disposed to mold a more pronounced unity with humanity, rather than attach a superficial and arbitrary significance to the notion of sharing in common humanism. The proposed ‘accommodative’ notion of

cosmopolitanism embraces cultural heterogeneity, making allowances for patriotic sentiment. Humanism, on the contrary, attempts to reduce the privileges of diverse and complex affinities to one cohesive and homogenous whole. It is not to say, however, that the two concepts constitutive of the ideal are mutually exclusive or alternative and hence not easily reconcilable, rather, they ought to be conceived as supplementary and, therefore, mutually necessary elements which promote social principles illustrative and essential to the cosmopolitan order.

The attitude formation for which national culture is held responsible, the 'accommodative' argument for cosmopolitanism holds, does not attempt to form a hermetical enclosure around individual's viewpoint, but rather, gives the primary impetus which moves the agent toward wider understanding of history, culture, tradition, and socio-political standards one's country holds dear, and through them allows the agent to cast judgments of indignation and rebuke or acceptance and conformity with its ways. However, an intellectual approach involved in agent's attempt at understanding one's country, as an active and cognitive exercise and not a mere emotive or sentimental component of one's conscious awareness, contributes to a more steadfast maturation in the rational affection for such cultural and social particularities. This is not to say, however, that one submits to the ethnocentric, nationalistic and thus isolationist tendencies, which prove detrimental to the consolidation of cosmopolitan orientation. Rather, to the contrary, only through proper, that is, rationally based understanding of the country and its traditions, customs, history, one is predisposed to capably broaden one's social and political spectrum and thus encompass with one's thought not only the peculiar nature of one's immediate locality, but more importantly, capably transcend it. After all, it may be argued, one successfully interacts and knows other human beings through a gradual emergence of, and an intimate knowledge of one's own self first, and the development and enhancement of one's degree of self-awareness. In other words, the existential truth of internal self-determination or self-definition requires understanding and feeling oneself an individual saturated with reason and emotion, before being ready to capably relate to the many and to society (Bukdahl 2001, 1). Thus, by extension, one knows the cosmopolitan way of being and faring in the international, cross-cultural and linguistically diverse world through practical guidance and education received via national linkages and affirmation of one's native "roots" first, only later to sufficiently outgrow and disseminate them around the globe.

The content provided by one's locality, the accommodative view holds, if properly rationalized, ought not to infringe upon the international aptitude. It supplies, rather, the cosmopolitan perspective with the necessary and indispensable context and narrative from which moral agents incessantly extract counsel and enact their personal and human identity and ethical sensibility. To exclude,

therefore, the substantive specificity of cultural particularism in the name of cosmopolitan radicalism that advocates a specific form of “identity amnesia” would amount to enacting an ontological entity, i.e. the cosmopolitan individual, out of non-contextualized and minimally understood cultural and moral directives and deny the philosophical truism of *ex nihilo, nihil fit*, thus, echoing the communitarian trepidation against moral vacuity. In line with this form of argument, historical and personal functions of coextensive ontological memory assume a civilizational value in its “ability to preserve promises and potentialities which are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, civilized individual, but which had once been fulfilled in his dim past and which are never entirely forgotten” (Dollimore 1998, 223). The challenge then, the accommodative stance holds, is neither to dehistoricize one’s identity, nor regress by affirming or remaining subservient to narrowly conceptualized belief systems formative of that identity, but to progress through commitment to unbiased and ingenious exploration of ideas and modes of thought, and thus gain the ability to make free choices via use of one’s autonomous reason in comportment with the moral law.

### **Cosmopolitan Identity and Individuality**

As individual’s morality is shaped by familial ties and proper moral upbringing at home, the place of origin for the ensuing personal and moral maturation and enculturation that are subsequently utilized for and inscribed into the broader collective inter-personal communication, interaction and being. Likewise, one’s nation is the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) of any human inclination, which commands and grounds specific forms of respect and loyalty. The individual thus progresses from ‘centered’ family commitments to national loyalties in order to partake fully and proficiently in the shared humanity. Martha Nussbaum’s reverberation of Hierocles’ “concentric circles” metaphor is apt here. The idea behind the concept is very suggestive in its distinctive orientation toward one’s allegiance to humanity, as a fundamental requirement, if not a Kantian duty, imposed upon individual agents by cosmopolitanism. The local affiliations, according to Nussbaum (1997), are surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first circle is drawn around the self; the next takes on one’s immediate family; then, follows the extended family; then, in order, one’s neighbors, local group, one’s fellow city-dwellers, and one’s fellow countrymen. Outside of these circles is the largest one, that of humanity in general (32). The preparatory path that is to lead to a holistic recognition of one’s primal loyalty to humanity must first include firm and solidly grounded moral precepts that eventuate from the individual, familial and local foundations. In the latter stages of the cosmopolitan effort and processes of its consolidation within the realm of globalized order, these moral

precepts develop fully into a concern for general human condition. Thus, the affection for the self, one's locality as well as one's country serve as rational means toward the ultimate and unwavering end - a disinterested, rational ethics of care for the general human capacity itself - devoid of hierarchical orderings of preference structured in accordance with nominal distinctions of national citizenship.

Any moral deviations, on this account, such as ethnic cleansings, religious persecutions or totalitarian rules, must be conceived as nothing more than radical extremes of the intellectual and emotional affection one shares for his or her country's political and social symbols and embodiments, along with its cultural particularities. Like the anomalies and aberrations of the human faculties of thought and emotion, the above polymorphous and multifaceted demonstrations of nationalistic sentiment exemplify a tendency that exceeds the norm and intelligibility of patriotic affection. It is only when reason falls victim to the corruption of misguided impulses and intentions, accommodative notion holds, be they political or social in content, that threaten to deface the moral *provisia* and universal codes of conduct, both in concept as well as in practice, and exclude them from the sphere of state's and citizens' civic activities, as well as delimit their effectiveness and potential in the international arena.

The presence of irreconcilable antinomies – internationalism *versus* nationalism, globality *versus* locality, universality *versus* particularity, suggests a perpetual condition of struggle between the general interests of humanity and the imminent interests of local community, as well taxes the moral legitimacy of agent's extended plurality of loyalties. The *prima facie* exegesis of cosmopolitanism may well point to a conceptual utopian "thinness"<sup>10</sup> the ideal appears to convey. Yet, in contending for recognition of the tangible and multidimensional forms of human existence within the context of multilingual, multicultural, and hetero-political aspects of the world order, it is essential to underscore the instrumentality of national belonging, moral stance and civic responsibility that emanate from the personal experience of 'rootedness,' and which the accommodative notion of cosmopolitanism identifies as fundamental to the wider cosmopolitan effort itself. The optical illusion of "thinness" dissipates, once cosmopolitanism becomes supplemented with a multiplicity of particularities, *in concreto*: cultural, political, historical as well as social, juridical, legal, moral and rational contexts and principles. The actualization and active exercise of the aforementioned particularities cannot be of an inconsequential value, as they constitute the

---

<sup>10</sup> Benjamin R. Barber's phrase directed against Martha Nussbaum's purported misunderstanding and underestimation of American patriotism. (Found in Verotvec, Steven. et al. 2001. *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*).

threshold at which ideational opposites of communitarianism and impartialism meet and can be conceptually and pragmatically bridged and accommodated.

## Conclusion

It should be acknowledged, that the dynamics of attachment to values and principles autonomously chosen by free agents, as the foundations upon which the pillars of civilization are enacted, cannot be forcefully nor authoritatively coerced into or imposed, but sensibly and thoughtfully “accommodated.” For, although, a forced attachment to fine principle does not alter or diminish the principle itself, the application of force makes the attachment unworthy (Appiah 1998, 102). The national focus or “cultural context” need not necessarily lead to “false air of moral weight and glory” (Nussbaum 1994, 12) and a sense of inauthentic idealism. To the contrary, the context so derived ought to solidify the very substance, purpose, and cultivation of being human within the realms of political, cultural, legal and moral responsibility. It is, after all, through the “enlightenment of the images of rational and moral humanity that we bring to our mutual encounters” (Nussbaum 1997, 48) as particularly situated human beings, a Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus once said, that humanity divests itself of destructive passions detrimental to constructive and peaceful social cohabitation, the ultimate and transcendent *telos* of cosmopolitan humanism.

The proposed interexchange of values and reciprocity in dialectical disclosures, advocated by accommodative stance, neutralize cultural idealisms and any claims to superiority in historical narratives and tradition. They make, at the same time, no concessions for ‘rootedness’ or ‘thinness’ of one’s allegiances to come into play in the sphere of public and interpersonal encounters. This in itself upholds the Kantian directive of treating another as a rational end, imbued with dignity and worth without regard to situational determinants or socio-cultural standing, which the undeniably ubiquitous and uncertain processes of globalization make increasingly salient. Cosmopolitanism finds its center of gravity in the transcendent nature of its ideals, which expand the imaginative horizons of civilizations. Human connectedness and significance of collective endeavors, when prudently and wisely oriented toward the actualization of objective moral principles, will unravel and test the possibilities of reason in solidifying a more pronounced humanistic, cosmopolitan, and cosmopolitical consciousness.

## References

Anderson-Gold, Sharon. 2001. *Unnecessary Evil*. New York: State University of New

York Press.

Appiah, Anthony K. 1998. "Cosmopolitan Patriots." In *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, ed. Pheng Cheah, et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Arendt, Hannah. 1968. *Men in Dark Times*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.

Balibar, Etienne. 2004. *We the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beitz, Charles. 1998. "Philosophy of International Relations." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig. London: Routledge.

Buchanan, Allen. 1998. "Community and Communitarianism." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig. London: Routledge.

Bukdahl, Jorgen. 2001. *Soren Kierkegaard and the Common Man*. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Cheah, Pheng. 1998. "Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism." In *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, ed. Pheng Cheah et al. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Dollimore, Jonathan. 1998. *Death, Desire, and Loss in Western Culture*. New York: Routledge.

Erskine, Toni. 2002. "'Citizens of Nowhere' or 'the Point Where Circles Intersect'? Impartialist and Embedded Cosmopolitanisms." *Review of International Studies* 3 (July): 457-478.

Friedman, Marilyn. 1989. "The Impracticality of Impartiality." *The Journal of Philosophy* 86: 646-656.

Habermas, Jurgan. 2001. "Why Europe Needs a Constitution." *New Left Review* 11 (September/October): 5-26.

Held, David. 2000. "The Changing Contours of Political Community." In *Global Democracy*, ed. Barry Holden. London: Routledge.



- Held, David et al. 1999. *Global Transformations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1996. "On the Common Sayings That May Be Correct In Theory." In *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1991. *Toward Perpetual Peace*. In *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H.S. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London: Duckworth Press.
- Nussbaum, Martha C. 1997. "Kant and Cosmopolitanism." In *Perpetual Peace – Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman et al. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Nussbaum, Martha C. 1994. "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism." *Boston Review* 19:5.
- O'Neill, Onora. 1988. "Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism." *Ethics* 98: 705-722.
- Palmer, Tom G. 2003. "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Personal Identity." *Politica & Etica* 2: 1-15.
- Scarry, Elaine. 2002. "The Difficulty of Imagining Other People." In *For Love of Country?*, ed. Martha Nussbaum. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Scholte, Jan Art. 2005. *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vertovec, Steven et al. 2002. *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.