Building Resilient Communities through an Understanding of White Ethnocentrism in the US

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Abstract
This paper analyzes experimental survey data from a convenience sample of white American undergraduate students from Illinois State University in order to assess the relationship between respondents’ intensity of ethnic identity and their support for a community development program that disproportionately benefits white residents and harms black residents. Two of my key hypotheses are that white respondents will show increasing in-group favoritism as their scores on the Ethnic Identity Scale increase and that white respondents whose Ethnic Identity Scale scores are low will show less in-group favoritism when the same policy is framed in a way that harms black residents. The results support these hypotheses and indicate that the impact of white ethnocentrism varies in intensity and that that intensity can predict in-group favoritism. This information can guide policy makers at multiple levels who are interested in eliminating structures of white supremacy and building more equitable and resilient communities.
Growing social justice movements led by ethnic minorities in the US, like the Movement for Black Lives, and the increasing vocalization and media attention given to white supremacist groups have brought conversations about race and society to the forefront in the US. People on both the left and the right accuse people on the other end of the spectrum of being racist (Mathis-Lilley and Mathis-Lilley 2017; Ingraham n.d.). Terms like “racial justice,” “white privilege,” and “white supremacy” often evoke strong, emotional reactions from white Americans across the political spectrum. In general, white Americans remain uncomfortable with confronting the ways in which they continue to benefit from slavery and the genocidal policies against people of color in our country’s past and to perpetuate white supremacy through “silent racism” (Trepagnier 2001).

A Pew Research Center Poll from 2014 found that political polarization in the US goes beyond politics and affects the types of places and communities liberals and conservatives wish to live in. While people across the political spectrum valued access to quality education, outdoor spaces, and being near their family members, liberals were more likely to want to live in diverse cities. Conservatives were more likely to want to live in more homogeneous rural areas. People who were strong liberals or strong conservatives were more likely to want to live in places where people had similar political beliefs to their own (Pew Research Center et al. 2014). Commentary on the 2016 US election has also consistently raised the specter of polarization in the rural, urban divide with white people tending to be more conservative and living in rural areas and a mix of races and ethnicities composing the liberal, urban demographic (Bacon Jr. 2016). At a time when both rural and urban localities in the US have to compete globally for economic investment opportunities to help provide for the needs of their residents, research has shown that cooperating with other local and regional governments is one way to become more economically competitive (Lombard and Morris 2010). The desire among white Americans to become more insular and their tendency towards ethnocentrism may undermine localities’ ability to thrive in a changing world. In order to adapt to and address the changes in society and the
workplace brought on by technology and globalization, communities must be able to work together across difference in order to ensure positive outcomes for all citizens, not just the ones that fall within their ideological or ethnic group.

As white Americans continue to hold the majority of positions of power within business and government, it is important to ask how their in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism relate to or potentially undermine the development of community within localities. To answer this question, an understanding of in-group/out-group behavior, ethnocentrism, the construction of whiteness, and how to define community is needed. Understanding these concepts allows for analysis of whether white ethnocentrism is likely to undermine community development.

Within the paper, I define community as a place, a set of shared ideas or values, a network of social ties, and a collective framework. Within my literature review, the characteristics of in-group/out-group behavior and ethnocentrism will provide a framework for assessing whether ethnocentrism and in-group favoritism undermine “community” as defined. The second half of the paper outlines an experiment used to test hypotheses drawn from my theory. My findings suggest that white ethnocentrism does play a role in the ways in which white Americans support community development programs. That ethnocentrism is not universal, though. White people’s level of ethnocentrism impacts their support for certain programs in different ways. I conclude by pointing out that understanding how ethnocentrism affects support for public policy at various levels can help guide policy makers and implementers as they work to build more resilient communities that have more positive outcomes for all residents.

**Defining Community**

When one thinks of “my community,” images of a physical space or specific territory filled with fellow community members come to mind. It
may be the town of one’s childhood, the neighborhood one resides in now, or the site of their last gathering with community members. As Suzanne Keller (2003, 6) writes, “Community as captured, delimited space shapes the scale of the collective life and the patterns of life created therein.” The borders and demographics of our communities influence who we interact with regularly and how we interact with one another. Although some suggest that territory is not essential to a community, the reality is that the majority of people live and experience much of their lives within a given locality (Wilkinson 1991). Facets of modern life, like digital social networks, have provided platforms through which people from disparate locations can interact, but evidence suggests that resilient communities, strong in trust, are formed by person-to-person interaction at the local level (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 9).

Communities are also defined by the shared ideas and values of its members as well as the members’ social networks. Shared values could be in the form of shared reciprocity or moral sentiments that help build an identity and understanding of what defines a particular community (Keller 2003, 6–7). Having shared values allows members within a community to more easily build trust with one another. Such interactions are defined as “bonding social capital.” Social capital is understood as “norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and trustworthiness” (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 2). Bonding social capital happens through interactions among people who are similar in important ways and its focus is on the internal well-being of the group (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 2).

Community members, of course, each have their own social networks as well. They typically interact with people outside of their locality and some of those people may be different from them and from their community in crucial aspects. These acquaintances may have different ethnic backgrounds, practice different religions, or come from different countries. Interactions between a member of an in-group with people from out-groups are defined as “bridging social capital” and such interactions are often motivated by shared goals or a common enterprise (Keller 2003, 7; Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 2). Bridging social capital is critical for a strong,
resilient social network in an inclusive society (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 3). While bonding social capital is essential to community identity, communities are weaker when they lack the ability to interact with and create relationships of mutual respect and trust with people who are different. These weak bonds make them less resilient to change and less able to resolve hostilities between their own community and other communities.

Finally, community requires a collective framework or local society, which provides environments and opportunities for members to interact in. Within a local society, community members can help meet their needs through interactions with one another. They can express their ideas and values and work together to create common goals (Wilkinson 1991). Local institutions of government, business, faith-based organizations, and nonprofits are included in this collective framework and often facilitate environments within which individuals interact (Keller 2003, 7; Wilkinson 1991).

There are also prerequisites to the formation of community. The development of community relies on individuals’ abilities to meet their most basic needs, like food, water, breathable air, and rest. If those basic needs are not met for individuals within a territory, then the development of community cannot happen (Wilkinson 1991).

Community and In-Group/Out-Group Behavior Hostility or Self-Esteem as Catalysts
The territorial requirement of community in this definition is one way in which in-group/out-group behavior could be sparked. In realistic group conflict theory, for example, in-groups who perceive out-groups to be competing with them for local resources can create a sense of out-group hostility and result in intergroup conflict (Sherif 1961, 210). Such conflict could help communities define their shared sense of values. In-group members, for example, could champion their own behaviors or
characteristics that differentiate them from the out-group. Demeaning or demonizing the behavior or people in the out-group can help define the in-group identity and also reiterate their values.

This conflict, however, would undermine their perceived need and ability to engage in diverse interactions required for bridging social capital. Competition and a perception among white people that non-white people may have beneficial access to such desirable resources is clearly evident in the case of college admissions (Long 2015). White people have long cited the application of affirmative action policies in the workplace and educational institutions as instances in which they perceive discrimination against white people (Gonyea 2017). College admissions, in particular, may be seen as a local, community issue because most colleges and universities receive public funding and draw largely from local student populations. Such competition between an ethnic white group with out-groups in a locality would make it difficult to build community among the white people feeling discriminated against and the non-white people who may benefit from this policy aimed at promoting racial equity.

In terms of building social capital and norms of reciprocity, “organizing some people in and others out… can sometimes have negative effects on the “outsiders” (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 3). Realistic group conflict theory supports this as explained above. If groups are competing for limited, desirable resources, conflict and violence can occur as a result (Sherif 1961, 210). Other theories, such as social identity theory and optimal distinctiveness theory, also provide evidence of negative outcomes for out-group members even when there is not overt hostility towards the out-group. Social identity theory posits that humans naturally seek membership in a group in order to gain greater self-esteem and that there need not exist explicit competition between groups for in-group favoritism to arise. Simple categorization of people into groups can trigger in-group favoritism even without structures of conflict involved (Tafjel and Turner 1979).

Experiments exploring the minimal group paradigm within social identity theory provide evidence that when individuals are assigned a
minimal group status they will favor their in-group when they are asked to allocate rewards to others. In one experiment, for example, minimal groups were randomly assigned on the basis of an arbitrary task that held no obvious benefits for belonging to one group or the other. They had the option of allocating a series of rewards to two anonymous individuals. Subjects did not have a previous relationship with each other and they did not know the specific identities of the individuals they could allocate rewards to. They only had group affiliation information for themselves and the two individuals. For example, the subject only knew that they themselves were in group T and that the individuals they could allocate rewards to were in group H and group T, respectively. Group affiliation, therefore, was the only possible association they could have with the individuals they were allocating rewards to. Even under these conditions of minimal group identity, subjects showed in-group favoritism. They gave more rewards to people in the same group as them. The authors theorized that they were motivated to favor their own group because by elevating the status of others in their group, they were simultaneously enhancing their own self-esteem through their membership to that group. Even though they personally were not receiving the rewards directly, they were motivated to favor their own in-group because they would receive indirect benefits if their in-group were to be perceived as successful or more successful (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979).

Given the history of race and race relations in the US, it would be difficult to argue that any American would not meet this very minimal definition of group membership based on their ethnic identity. The US government places value on racial identity as evidenced by the racial categorization question on US Census forms. Society places emphasis on racial identity by racializing such things as beauty (Tate 2007). Given examples like these and the pervasive discourse on racial identity in the US, ethnic group identity likely exceeds the arbitrary, largely meaningless
minimal group standards defined by this experiment in nearly every case, and, therefore, would trigger in-group ethnic favoritism in most cases.

**Filling the Gaps of Social Identity Theory**

Social identity theory seems to be consistent with human nature in that we typically want groups (or communities) that we are members of to succeed because we are perceived to be more successful just by being a member of that group. It does, however, leave some big holes in our understanding of intergroup behavior. Fortunately, more contemporary research on social identity provides a more rounded context. There are three specific features of these other in-group theories that are essential to understanding intergroup behavior that can be applied to certain in-group tendencies of communities: 1) in-group favoritism is rooted primarily in an evolutionary human need for security, not just a desire for enhanced self-regard (Brewer 2007); 2) discrimination helps maintain intergroup distinctiveness and is not necessarily correlated to hostility (Brewer 1999, 2007); 3) while bestowing positive rewards on the in-group seems natural, people are less willing to disproportionately allocate negative outcomes on out-groups (Mummendey et al. 1992).

The evolution of human species offers an important explanation for what motivates in-group favoritism. Rather than self-esteem triggering in-group favoritism as outlined by social identity theory, the human need to organize in-groups for security offers a compelling alternative. Essential tasks, like finding or growing food and organizing defense from predators, were more efficient and more effective for early humans when done as part of a group. Additionally, social groups were able to build collective knowledge and diversify roles within the group that helped them better adapt to different environments. Because this dependence on others was essential to survival, basic human characteristics like cognition and emotion that supported social group organization also evolved in a way that supported the group structure and enabled humans to survive (Brewer 2007). In the context of in-group favoritism in modern American communities, this finding is important to framing policies and goals in
order to build bridging social capital. If favoritism is rooted in the fundamental need for security, not the desire for greater self-esteem or merely because of the perceived competition for scarce resources, policymakers should consider this when framing policies or goals that aim to build bonds across group differences.

This also offers an explanation for why bridging social capital is harder to create than bonding social capital. If, on an evolutionary and instinctual level, humans seek to support groups that they can easily identify with and in the US ethnicity is an important group distinction, then humans will find it easier to trust others who identity with the same ethnic group and will be more likely to support policies that support that group. As positive interactions among diverse groups are becoming more and more essential to democratic stability and community resilience, understanding the drivers of the divisions between such groups is important for community leaders working to bridge those divides (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 279, 282).

This theory is also consistent with the definition of community outlined previously. Security is a lower level need in Maslow’s hierarchy, just above food, water, rest, and breathable air. If individuals must have their security ensured before they can move on to the business of social interaction and engaging in work towards collective goals, then it makes sense that when individuals feel a need for more security, it triggers in-group favoritism, which emphasizes interactions that promote bonding social capital. If these needs are not met, it would discourage openness and willingness to engage in the building of social capital across differences that may threaten in-group cohesion.

Optimal distinctiveness theory also offers an important way to understand discrimination among groups. This theory states that individuals have opposing desires to be a unique individual while at the same time wanting to be included in a group. At the extremes, being completely unique and individual leads to social isolation and stigma while being
completely assimilated provides no opportunity for self-definition. In social
environments, we strive to balance our individuality with our conformity
(Brewer 1991). There is evidence that this plays out in reality as white
people are simultaneously able to claim a general “European-American”
etnic identity and a specific ancestral ethnic identity within the European-
American context, like that of German-American, when it is desirable or
convenient (Waters 1990, 147). Optimal distinctiveness is also important at
the group level. If groups become too inclusive and in-group members can
no longer see what makes their in-group distinctive, then they will often
splinter away from the larger, inclusive group in order to position
themselves as more unique from other groups (Brewer 1991). This theory
allows greater insight into the potential reasons for dissatisfaction within
inclusive communities. If members of a community do not feel like their
community is distinct or united by shared ideas and values as described
above, then community no longer exists.

According to optimal distinctiveness theory, “discrimination
between in-group and out-groups is a matter of relative favoritism toward
the in-group and the absence of equivalent favoritism toward out-groups.
Within this framework, out-groups can be viewed with indifference,
sympathy, even admiration, as long as intergroup distinctiveness is
maintained” (Brewer 1999). From this perspective, it seems reasonable that
communities would tend towards in-group favoritism and may see societal
policies or norms as discriminating against their own community since it is
a natural function of in-group/out-group behavior. The theory also
provides an explanation for why members of a community made up of all
or majority white members, for instance, who favor their in-group do not
see themselves as racist because favoring the in-group does not require
hostility or negative attitudes towards out-groups (Brewer 1991). White
people who favor their in-group, therefore, may not understand how
policies that also favor their in-group are hostile towards out-groups. They
may not feel that is the intention or they simply may not be alerted to out-
group discrimination in the same way that they are inherently predisposed
to recognize discrimination against their in-group.
Further evidence that in-group favoritism is not essentially linked to out-group hostility or negativity can be found in experiments that test in-group favoritism when subjects are tasked with allocating undesirable items rather than desirable items. In their study that demonstrated social identity theory is inconsistent when subjects are asked to allocate undesirable tasks rather than positive rewards, Amelie Mummendey and their co-authors (1992) provide a more holistic understanding of intergroup behavior. As discussed above, when subjects were allocating desirable rewards, in-group favoritism was rampant (Tajfel 1974). When subjects of a minimal group experiment were instructed to allocate undesirable tasks, however, in-group favoritism was eliminated and a more equal distribution of these tasks were allocated (Mummendey et al. 1992). When white Americans espouse support for policies that are framed in a way that would lead to positive outcomes for white people or majority white communities, then, they may (knowingly or not) be ignorant of the negative effects those policies have on members of out-groups, such as black Americans or Hispanic/Latinx Americans. Reframing policies in ways that explain those negative effects may then alter white Americans’ support for these policies.

**Community and Ethnocentrism**

Understanding what motivates or limits in-group favoritism through these theories, empowers us to seek ways to apply that knowledge to the development of community in the US. When ethnicity becomes a salient shared feature or a specific ethnic heritage becomes important to a community, a tendency towards ethnocentrism can begin to infiltrate the community identity. An excellent framework on ethnocentrism that builds off of social identity theory and optimal distinctiveness theory is laid out in *Us Against Them*. This text bases the definition of ethnocentrism on William Sumner’s assertion that ethnocentrism is the assumption that a given in-group’s way of doing things is superior to other groups’ methods (Kinder and Kam 2010). Ethnocentrism is “a mental habit. It is a predisposition to
divide the world into in-groups and out-groups. It is a readiness to reduce society to... us *versus* them” (Kinder and Kam 2010, 8). The ethnocentric framework laid out in the book is broad, clearly organized, and aims to reveal the ways in which ethnocentrism is expressed politically in the US. It suggests that ethnocentrism is not a monolithic behavior that individuals either exhibit or do not; rather people vary in their degree of ethnocentric behaviors and attitudes. It is a normal way to organize the social world and is not inherently malevolent. The findings in *Us Against Them* indicate that ethnocentrism is motivated by both the human need for security and the desire for greater self-esteem (Kinder and Kam 2010).

Ethnicity can provide a shared identity around which community can be built. If ethnocentrism is a natural habit of humans borne out of the need for security and a way to distinguish oneself from others to gain greater self-confidence, building a community around ethnic identity could offer a greater sense of security and a greater sense of well-being and self-esteem. Shared ethnic identity alone, however, does not automatically create a community. Again, ethnocentrism is not monolithic, so the ways in which people identify with their ethnicity varies (Kinder and Kam 2010). In order for ethnic social identity to be a foundation for community, it must also have a shared sense of belonging, experience, or future through which individuals adhering to that identity can interact around in order to become a community (Keller 2003, 266–68).

Since degrees of ethnocentrism vary among people, communities defined by a high level of ethnocentrism would tend to threaten the cohesion of modern communities since modern towns and cities tend to be less ethnically homogeneous than in the past (Kinder and Kam 2010). Viewing the world from an extremely ethnocentric lens would limit an individual's ability to build meaningful relationships across difference and thereby limit their ability to facilitate the bridging of their social capital. Such ethnocentrism has ripped entire countries apart in genocidal conflicts, such as in Rwanda. Ethnocentrism of Western Europeans who identified as white and saw their whiteness as a mark of superiority led to genocide against indigenous people, slavery, Jim Crow, and other types of...
discrimination and violence that continue today in the US. This discrimination can be seen in structures of racism and white supremacy that have been built into our legal and educational systems (Alexander 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2013, 35, 42–53).

Constructing Whiteness
To understand how Americans who identify as ethnically white and have greater ethnocentric tendencies affect community, we must understand how whiteness has been constructed in the US. Whiteness "is a location of structural advantage, of race privilege" (Frankenberg 1993, 1). It provides white people with a context through which they see themselves, others, and society and whiteness is cultural practices that often are the default or are seen as neutral (Frankenberg 1993; Kinder and Kam 2010). Whiteness is the privilege that white people can see racism as a form of politics and not part of their daily-lived experience. Many white people have a greater understanding that racial oppression shapes the lives of non-white people than they do of understanding that racial privilege shapes their own lives (Frankenberg 1993).

Whiteness has been constructed overtime through colonialism and segregation. Claiming that practices or beliefs of contemporary members of ethnic minority groups are not valid or are less authentic than that of their ancestors who truly represent the “authentic culture” of Latinx or indigenous Americans undermines their modern cultural practices (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Frankenberg 1993). This is part of the white colonial mindset, which placed white supremacy at its heart. When white people, or even those within the group, claim that these modern cultural practices are not valid because they have lost their ancestral authenticity, it frames those cultures and practices as static and monolithic when white culture and cultural practices are constantly changing and such change is not questioned. This tendency to reject modern cultural identities and practices as inauthentic undermines the power and identities of the people who
practice them. This is another tool of white supremacy since white culture does not face the same challenge.

Whiteness also is constructed through the mapping of racial social geography seen in racially segregated neighborhoods or schools (Coates 2017; Frankenberg 1993). It is in the creation and maintenance of areas that are off limits to non-white people whether that be within public office, positions within a business, or in entire communities (Bonilla-Silva 2013, 36, 38, 55; Loewen 2005).

Whiteness is perpetuated by white people adhering to the norms of whiteness and rejecting or being fearful of others who do not adhere to those norms. People of color may be perceived as more violent, less civilized, and fundamentally “other” based simply on the clothes they wear, their presence in certain areas, or their expressions of joy or anger (Bonilla-Silva 2013, 49; Frankenberg 1993; Jung 2015). Whiteness is enshrined in the criminal justice system that systematically privileges white defendants over non-white defendants or victims. It is also pervasive in the education system in which the gap between the quality of education that white students and non-white students receives continues to persist (Alexander 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2013, 35, 47; Jung 2015).

Whiteness means that the choice of where to live, which friends you have, or what job you have is not limited by your ethnicity. It also means that racial discrimination will not be a facet of your daily life in the US (Waters 1990, 147). What this makes clear is that people of color, especially black people, are limited by their ethnicity in those ways. In fact, whiteness has long been defined in opposition to blackness. This facet has allowed it to be dynamic and to redefine who is included in the white ethnic group over time (Warren and Twine 1997).

By the 1980s and 1990s, the transformation of ethnicity among white Americans with European heritage was complete. While various European ethnicities, like Italian, German, or Polish, were an important part of society in the past, by this time, a trend towards a new, broader ethnic European-American identity had been secured (Alba 1990). Historically, German-Americans and Italian-Americans were seen as
culturally and ethnically distinct. In modern times, however, these groups can claim an overarching “European-American” ethnic identity which grants whiteness to all individuals who can claim it (Alba 1990).

Even groups like the Irish had once been highly stigmatized and even considered “black.” As newer immigrants from Eastern Europe began to arrive in the early 1900s, however, the Irish became more accepted by white American society. They were seen as more culturally similar to “whites” than these new arrivals whose languages and cultures were seen as even more exotic. As this shift occurred, the Irish were able to position themselves in contrast to the newer immigrants and, as always, to African-Americans to move into the “white” ethnic category in the US (Alba 1990).

Evidence of this new, broader ethnic identity is found in the results of a 1990 survey of 524 subjects from the Capital Region of New York. This region was composed of a heterogeneous population of white Americans with European ancestry, especially that of English, German, Irish, French, Italian, Scot, Dutch, and Polish. The findings indicate that as the social mobility and intermarriage among Americans of differing European ancestry increased and distinct ethnic identity became less socially prominent, a new ethnic identity, that of European-American, began to take hold. This more general ethnic identity allowed white people to consciously choose when and whether to make their specific ancestral identity, as a Polish-American, for example, an important facet of their identity. Intermarriage of white Americans with different European ancestry also resulted in children and grandchildren being able to claim multiple European ethnic identities and, thereby, having the flexibility to apply those diverse heritages to make their own characteristics more authentic (Alba 1990). One person, for example, may claim their love of opera or Italian cuisine is authentic because a grandparent was Italian. That same person may feel a more authentic connection with a St. Patrick’s Day celebration because another grandparent was Irish. In this way, white Americans became able to embrace the facets of different European ethnic
identities that they favored. They could put on or take off the mantle of ethnicity in a way that their ancestors were not able to do and which Hispanics/Latinxes and non-white people are still unable to do in the US (Alba 1990).

This concept of choosing when and which ethnic identities white people are able to use and their ability to claim a general “European American” identity provides them with a greater ability to live out the optimal distinctiveness theory described above. Based on 1980 census data, the desire to be part of a community while at the same time desiring to be uniquely individual is what drives white people to claim an ethnic identity even though the distinction among various white ethnic identities based on European ancestry is no longer prominent (Waters 1990, 147, 150). This is the optimal distinctiveness theory playing out in real life.

Symbolic ethnicity among white Americans may also persist because it allows them to construct a narrative of discrimination about their own families and ancestors that allows them to reject their own complicity in historic discrimination against people of color. The impact is that because white people experience their own ethnicity as symbolic and can choose which ancestral ethnicities to embrace, they are less able to empathize with the lived (non-voluntary) ethnic experiences of people of color who cannot simply choose their ethnicity or when to apply their ethnicity. The ethnicities of people of color are imposed on them and have very real social and political consequences, like what jobs they can access, who they can marry, and how much education they can attain (Waters 1990, 147). US society has been stratified along ethnic lines since its inception. As policy makers and community developers work to reduce that stratification and improve outcomes for all, understanding how ethnically white Americans perceive policies and how they behave in relation to their ethnocentrism could be a key factor in policy development.

Hypotheses
Researchers have shown that group identity and cues given by the media and politicians related to the tension between in-groups and out-groups can
manipulate the ways that individuals evaluate policies (Edelman 2013; Kinder and Kam 2010; Winter 2008, 2–3). By using racial frames and language to link policies that are not explicitly racialized to an individual’s racial biases, political elites can influence and direct the way that that individual evaluates those policies. Such frames help build support or opposition for certain policies that individuals may not be very familiar with and may otherwise be ambivalent about (Winter 2008, 7). Given that people tend to show in-group favoritism even in minimal circumstances (Kinder and Kam 2010; Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979) and that whiteness is an unavoidable part of white Americans’ experience and identity (Frankenberg 1993), it follows that white Americans would naturally support programs that benefit their ethnic in-group.

**Hypothesis 1a**: Americans who identify as white will show in-group favoritism by indicating greater support for policies that are framed in a way that show disproportionate benefit to white people.

Additionally, because people who strongly identify themselves as part of an in-group are motivated to enhance the success of that group (Brewer 2007), it follows that those who see their ethnicity as a salient feature of their identity will provide even higher support than others in their ethnic group for programs that benefit their ethnic group.

**Hypothesis 1b**: As white subjects’ ranks on the Ethnic Identity Scale increase, the level of in-group favoritism they show for programs that benefit white people will increase.

In general, people are less likely to disproportionately allocate negative tasks to out-groups (Mummendey et al. 1992) so it seems probable that when the same policy (as in Hypotheses 1a and 1b) is framed as harming out-groups as well as disproportionately benefiting the in-group,
then support for such a policy will diminish among white people who see their ethnicity as less important. Although among white subjects who see their ethnicity as important to their identity, in-group favoritism may increase based on realistic conflict theory’s assertion that competition for resources triggers out-group hostility (Sherif 1961, 210).

**Hypothesis 2a**: In-group favoritism of white subjects who rank low on the Ethnic Identity Scale will diminish when the same policy is framed in a way that shows harm towards non-white or Hispanic/Latinx out-groups.

**Hypothesis 2b**: In-group favoritism of white subjects who rank high on the Ethnic Identity Scale will remain the same or increase when the same policy is framed in a way that shows harm towards non-white or Hispanic/Latinx out-groups.

To test these hypotheses, I collected data using a survey-based experiment that provided quantitative data for difference of means testing and OLS regressions across groups.

**Experimental Design**
I conducted a survey-based experiment to collect data on individuals to test my hypotheses. The test subjects were 252 undergraduate students drawn from courses in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University. Participating students received course credit for their participation. The experimental manipulation was implemented through Qualtrics software. Instructors sent students a link to the survey and students were able to complete the survey on any computer with internet access within the eleven days that the survey was open.

Random assignment to the control or treatment groups was fairly balanced on all demographics with the exception of ideological moderates (see Table A1). This is likely due to the smaller sample size of 154. If more responses had been gathered, this discrepancy would have likely been
resolved. Additionally, convenience samples of undergraduate students tend to be over represented by women and liberals, so these discrepancies in the totals could be a result of this common bias (Kam, Wilking, and Zechmeister 2007, 427). Fortunately, because all participants were randomly assigned and had an equal chance of being placed into any of the groups, these discrepancies should not exert significant bias in the results.

**Experimental Manipulation**

For the policy focus of the community development program used to test my hypotheses, I selected one that is not controversial nor one that is well known with most people having a predetermined opinion about it. I chose an economic policy implemented by a city government to increase jobs because the concept is easily accessible and does not require extensive description or understanding of the details to form an opinion. Access to high-wage jobs is a popular topic in media and politics today. It is also an issue that undergraduate students should feel a personal connection to since they will be seeking such jobs when they complete their degrees. These facets eliminated the need to describe the utility of such programs as it should be intuitively understood what the benefits of high-wage work are for individuals and a community within our society.

Respondents were asked to imagine they were a member of the Springview community as they read a vignette about the community and its successful pilot program to increase high wage jobs in the community. After reading their randomly assigned vignette, respondents were asked to indicate how much they would support continuing the program. The control group respondents read about the program and learned it was successful. Treatment Group 1 read the same vignette as the control with the added detail that the high wage jobs disproportionately benefited white people in Springview. Treatment Group 2 read the same vignette as Treatment Group 1 with an addition that described that black people in Springview were harmed by the program.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is respondent’s level of support for continuing the jobs program in Springview. An ordinal, five-point scale measured how much respondents favored continuing the program. This variable was coded one to five where one represented strong opposition and five represented strong favor. I rescaled this variable to run zero to one for the OLS regressions.

Independent Variables
Because being ethnically white is an independent variable in each of my hypotheses, participants self-reported their ethnic identity as part of the demographic section of the survey. The focus of the analysis is on respondents who self-identify as white, non-Hispanic Americans. Inherent in this choice is the assumption that in-group favoritism of non-white and Hispanic/Latinx people will not be triggered by policies that benefit white people as will be described to Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group 2. International students who identify as white may also not have the same associations with their whiteness as white Americans do, especially if they are from more racially or ethnically homogeneous nations. Responses from white, non-American students, therefore, were not included in the analysis. When limiting my observations in this way, my data provided 154 responses of white Americans.

An independent variable in Hypotheses 1b, 2a, and 2b is importance of white ethnicity to an individual’s identity. To gauge the strength of whiteness of the respondent's identity and their affinity for their ethnic in-group, respondents answered questions from the Ethnic Identity Scale. The scale is composed of 20 questions with responses based on a five-point Likert-type scale that asked respondents to indicate how much they supported statements about ethnicity (see the Appendix for the full question battery) (Valk and Karu 2001). I expect that the higher white respondents rate on this scale, the more likely they will be to favor programs that disproportionately favor white people. To test Hypothesis
I added the responses to all of the Ethnic Identity Scale questions together so that each respondent had one number that represented their rank on the Ethnic Identity Scale. Lower numbers represented weaker importance of ethnic identity and higher numbers represented stronger importance of ethnic identity to the respondent. I also created a dichotomous variable split at the mean of overall ethnic identity scores for the sample where respondents who were at or below the mean were coded as zero and those above the mean were coded as one for intense ethnic identification. This dichotomous variable allowed me to assess Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Results
This design allowed me to test the hypotheses by running difference of means tests and OLS regressions across the different groups. Hypothesis 1a asserted that white people would show in-group favoritism by showing higher support for the program if it was framed in a way that disproportionately benefited their ethnic group. This was assessed by considering the extent to which the mean value of support for continuing the program in Treatment Group 1 differed compared to the control group mean. In this hypothesis, the independent variables, white ethnic identity and programs that disproportionately benefit white people, were triggered by the fact that the subject self-identified as white and that the reading prompt describes that the program states that 90% of the benefits of the program went to white people even though white people made up less than 90% of the city. I, therefore, anticipated that subjects in Treatment Group 1 would express higher levels of favoritism to the program than the control group.

As the results in Table 1 indicate, there was no statistically significant difference in the mean level of support for the program between Treatment Group 1 and the control group. The null hypothesis could, therefore, not be rejected. This means that among this sample, white people
did not show in-group favoritism at a statistically significant rate when the program was framed as disproportionately benefiting white people compared to when there was no detail about any specific group that benefited. These results could show that in-group favoritism simply was not triggered by the vignette or that the control group assumed that white people were most benefiting from the successful program even though it was not specifically stated. It could also be the case that the extreme nature of the ethnic inequity in the program outcome implied in the Treatment Group 1 vignette triggered a sense of unfairness or “white guilt” among some respondents that overpowered the tendency towards in-group favoritism.

Table 1: Difference of Means Among Control and Treatment Groups for Policy Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Group Mean</th>
<th>Treatment 1 Group Mean</th>
<th>Difference Treatment 1 vs. Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.404 (0.100)</td>
<td>3.222 (0.123)</td>
<td>0.182 (0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The DV, program support, was measured on a 5-point scale where 1 was strongly oppose and 5 was strongly favor. +: p<0.10; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01

Hypothesis 1b was evaluated by looking at the relationship between scores on the Ethnic Identity Scale and level of support for continuing the program in Treatment Group 1 compared to Treatment Group 2 because only respondents in these categories were given a policy frame that showed that white people disproportionately benefited from the program. This frame was intended to trigger in-group favoritism among the respondents.
Based on this hypothesis, I expected that as Ethnic Identity Scale scores increased, the level of support for continuing the program would also increase. The additive ethnic identity scale score was used as the independent variable, which provided a continuous scale by which to assess the relationship.

As the data in Table 2 indicate, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. There was not a statistically significant relationship between the ethnic identity scores of respondents in the two treatment groups and their support for continuing the program. Because of the slight unbalance of moderates among the treatment groups as noted above, I also ran a multivariate model including ideology. As expected, this imbalance among the groups was not dire enough to make ideology a significant variable influencing the ethnic identity score in the treatment groups. These results mean that among this sample, there was not a statistically significant relationship between the strength of a respondent’s ethnic identity and that person’s level of support for continuing the jobs program.
Table 2: Ethnic Identity Scale Score Predicting Support for Program Continuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bivariate Model</th>
<th>Multivariate Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity Scale Score</td>
<td>0.237 (0.186)</td>
<td>0.127 (0.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.102 (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Cell values are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. +: p<0.10; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01. Ideology was included in the second model because of the distribution of moderates across groups was not quite balanced.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b were assessed by considering the extent to which support for continuing the jobs program differed between respondents with high ethnic identity scores and those with low ethnic identity scores. Specifically, respondents in Treatment Group 2 were compared to respondents in the control group. The independent variables in these hypotheses, importance of ethnic white identity and programs that harm an ethnic out-group, should have been triggered by the subject’s self-reported white, non-Hispanic/Latinx ethnic identity and by the program description that states that the program harms black people. For Hypothesis 2a, I expected that respondents in Treatment Group 2 who had at or below mean Ethnic Identity Scale scores would show lower levels of favoritism for continuing the program than the control group. For Hypothesis 2b, I expected that respondents in Treatment Group 2 who scored above the mean on the Ethnic Identity Scale scores would show
higher levels of favoritism for continuing the program than the control group.

Table 3 and Graph 1 show the results of the OLS regression for these hypotheses. In this model, the control group was used as the reference group and an interaction term was used to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The interaction term compares the effect of Treatment Group 2 to the control group while simultaneously comparing respondents with low Ethnic Identity Scale scores to those with high Ethnic Identity Scale within each group.

Table 3: High and Low Ethnic Identity Scale Scores Predicting Support for Program Continuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity Score</td>
<td>-0.446</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>-0.196**</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1 x Ethnic Identity Score</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2 x Ethnic Identity Score</td>
<td>0.189*</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.095

N 154

Note: Cell values are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. +: p<0.10; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01.
Respondents in Treatment Group 2 who had low ethnic identity scores, shown in the third column of Graph 1, reported lower levels of support for continuing the jobs program compared with the respondents in the control group with low Ethnic Identity scores (statistically significant at $p<0.000$). This indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2a. Respondents whose ethnic identity scores suggested low salience of ethnicity to their identity and who read the program framed as disproportionately benefiting white people and harming black people, were statistically less likely to support continuing the program.

Note: DV is coded as individual level of support for continuing the jobs program. $+ : p<0.10$; $*: p<0.05$; $** : p<0.01$. 

Graph 1
Intensity of Ethnicity and Response to Outgroup
When considering respondents in Treatment Group 2 with high Ethnic Identity Scale scores, the results show that these respondents were different from respondents in Treatment Group 2 with low Ethnic Identity Scale scores (statistically significant at p=0.03). Further investigation, however, is required to say more about the direction and magnitude of this difference. Table 5 shows the results of OLS regressions comparing the groups of people with high and low Ethnic Identity Scale scores in the Treatment 2 Group and the control group.

**Table 3: Group Level Comparison in Program Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Support for Program Cont.</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low EIS</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.196**</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High EIS</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.151**</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low EIS</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High EIS</td>
<td>-0.196**</td>
<td>-0.151**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.144*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low EIS</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.144*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High EIS</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cell values are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*: p<0.05; **: p<0.01.
The results indicate that those with a high Ethnic Identity Scale score in Treatment Group 2 showed more support for continuing the jobs program framed as harming the out-group compared to those in Treatment Group 2 with a low Ethnic Identity Scale score (statistically significant at p<0.05). This indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2b. Respondents in this sample whose ethnicity was salient to their identity were statistically more likely to support continuing the jobs program than those whose ethnicity was less important.

**Discussion**

The surprising part of these results is that this sample did not show statistically significant rates of in-group favoritism. This tendency has been studied extensively in various fields since Tajfel’s first study in the 1970s. Given the established nature of in-group favoritism among the social sciences, it does not seem likely that this study has revealed that the theory is unfounded. Rather, the null results in the present case could mean that the difference in the vignettes for the control group and Treatment Group 1 were not sensitive or specific enough to pick up this tendency. Those in the control group, for example, may have assumed that white people benefited disproportionately from the successful jobs program because they were the majority in the community and because our society historically and to today largely structures public programs in a way that disproportionately benefit white people (Coates 2017, 186). An improvement would be to state in the control group vignette that the community is 50% white and 50% black and that the benefits of the program were shared equally among those groups.

An alternative explanation for why I could not reject the null hypothesis for Hypotheses 1a and 1b is that I did not gauge baseline support for government programs that increase the number of high-wage jobs. From a strictly rational perspective, I had assumed that subjects would be more supportive of programs that had positive outcomes. Respondents, however, could have had a negative affiliation with jobs programs or government spending on jobs programs because of ideology or personal
experiences. Given the relatively small sample size, if several respondents were opposed to such programs regardless of the vignette they received, they could skew the results. Outside of collecting more data in order to ensure that this feature would be balanced among the randomly assigned groups, an improvement would be to include such a question well before the manipulation to ensure that respondents with such a tendency were evenly dispersed among the groups.

Embedding this study into part of a larger survey could also greatly enhance the reliability of the results. Because the survey only included a demographic battery, the Ethnic Identity Scale battery, and the manipulation with its associated questions, respondents may have been triggered to think more about the consistency of their answers across the Ethnic Identity Scale and the manipulation questions. If the survey had been part of a larger study where the respondents were asked questions about a variety of subjects and scenarios, they would be less likely to have been primed by the ethnic identity questions. An alternative improvement would have been to embed distraction questions into the survey so that the point of the study did not seem to be so focused on ethnicity.

Having potentially primed respondents on ethnicity is a weakness of the current study because respondents may have felt social desirability bias and, therefore, responded in a way that they believed others would favor. Depending on their perceptions of what would be favorable, that could have triggered a feeling of “white guilt” (Swim and Miller 1999). Although the responses were anonymous, such a sense of guilt by respondents could have still made them respond in a way they felt was politically correct rather than indicating their own personal feeling about continuing the program. If the questions from the Ethnic Identity Scale primed them to think more specifically about their own whiteness or role in racial inequality, this could have been compounded.

In fact, the reason that the data showed evidence to support Hypothesis 2a, may provide support to such an argument. Hypothesis 2a
asserted that respondents that had low ethnic identity scores would show lower support for continuing the program when it was framed to harm the out-group, i.e. black people in the community. Respondents with low ethnic identity scores may have been feeling a sense of white guilt when responding to the questions asking specifically about their beliefs about ethnicity. Such respondents would have likely continued to feel that guilt if they read the prompts in Treatment Group 1, which described disproportionate benefit going to white people, or in Treatment Group 2, which coupled those benefits with harm towards black people.

Hypothesis 2a was largely based on the study by Mummendey et al. (Mummendey et al. 1992) that showed people with minimal group association were less likely to disproportionately allocate negative tasks to out-group members. This is consistent with white guilt. Perhaps a general sense of guilt is one of the underlying reasons why respondents in that study behaved in a more egalitarian manner when the outcomes were negative. Additionally, it seems likely that white Americans see their own ethnic identity as more than a “minimal group” characteristic. Having a deeper group association, such as that of race or ethnicity in American society, would likely affect behavior involving allocation of negative outcomes differently than a minimal group association. More research in this area would be needed, however, to make a more informed conclusion.

Although there are limitations to the current study, the findings suggest a need for more research into support for programs and policies that have negative externalities to ethnic out-groups. Future studies may assess whether the trends from this study hold across different regions in the US. They may also look at whether there is a difference in the ethnic out-group selected in the experimental manipulation. Perhaps a group that is less stigmatized by white Americans, like Asian Americans, would trigger a different level of support among white respondents than a manipulation that states harm to black or Latinx people. Studying how ethnocentrism of non-white Americans relates to their policy support for programs framed as benefiting or harming various in-groups and out-groups could also increase our understanding of the best way to increase support for various policies
among non-white Americans. There will also be a need for future research on whether the ethnic identity of policy makers influences their policy decisions in the same way that an average person’s ethnicity influences their policy preferences. Do policy makers’ greater engagement with politics and civic society generally have a different effect on the way their ethnocentrism influences their policy preferences for example? These and other important questions can build off of the insights and conclusions established by these findings. Such answers will offer information that can guide policy makers at multiple levels who are interested in eliminating structures of white supremacy and building more resilient communities.

Conclusion
Although progress has been made in some aspects of racial inequality in the US since the Civil Rights Movement, we are far from living in a post-racial society. There are policies at all levels of government that inherently work to ensure racial disparities persist. Eighty percent of the 2017-2018 US Congress is white even though white people make up only 62% of the US population (Bialik and Krogstad 2017). In 2015, which provides the most recent data, 82% of state legislators were white (National Conference of State Legislatures 2016). In the 2016 General Election, 69% of eligible voters were white while 71% of actual voters were white (CNN n.d.; Krogstad 2016). Given these facts, white people remain disproportionately represented in the electorate and in positions of political power. Because humans naturally have a tendency towards ethnocentrism and ethnic in-group favoritism (Brewer 2007; Kinder and Kam 2010; Mummendey et al. 1992; Tajfel 1974; Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979), understanding how their ethnicity affects how likely they are to support different policies is crucial if society truly wants to achieve the equitable society that our national myths purport.

Overall, if policy makers and social justice advocates want to better understand how they can frame policies to build strong, inclusive
communities, knowing how their white constituents will respond to programs that harm minorities is important as they create education and awareness campaigns. Typically, public discussions around racism, white supremacy, and ethnocentrism have been framed as a morality issue. My finding in support of Hypothesis 2a indicates that policy makers who frame the discussion around the actual outcomes for ethnic minorities could influence some white community members, namely those who see ethnicity as a low salience feature of their identity.

My findings in support of Hypothesis 2b, however, indicate the complicated nature of such an approach. In my study, such framing triggered out-group hostility among white Americans who see ethnicity as a highly salient feature of their identity. In the age of micro-targeting, perhaps policy makers in the future will be able to consider the individual level ethnocentric tendencies of each of their constituents in order to frame policies in ways that highlight how specific programs affect outcomes that are important to them. Until such tools and data are more widely available, though, policy makers could use the findings here and apply it more broadly to groups and communities in which they are working. For example, if a community tends to have strong ethnocentric tendencies, they may avoid framing a policy as causing harm to an out-group even if that is the case. Instead, they may find ways to frame policy outcomes in a way that reduces resource scarcity and competition among such constituents.

Additionally, because white voters make up the majority of the electorate, using strategies that undermine their natural tendencies towards white favoritism could help build more consensus for policies that lead to more equitable outcomes across ethnicity. This is also true at the local level where populations of given localities are majority white. In order to develop resilient communities in multiracial, multiethnic localities, city leaders and community developers would see better outcomes if they encourage or incentivize their residents to create bridging social capital across ethnic and racial differences within their communities. They should actively shape and frame policies in ways that inhibit the ethnocentric tendencies of their
specific communities and the bodies and agencies that write and implement their public policies.

Appendix I

Table A1. Demographics of Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment Group 1</th>
<th>Treatment Group 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix II

Ethnic Identity Scale
(r) denotes reversed items; these items were reverse coded in order to create an accurate additive variable for the Ethnic Identity Scale score. Numbers preceding questions indicate the order in which they are asked.

Please indicate if how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. In the next 20 questions, ethnicity refers to the general ethnic category of Americans, such as black, white, Latinx, indigenous, etc...
(0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree)

**Ethnic Pride and Belonging Questions**
2 I am proud of my ethnic group membership.
3 Being conscious of my ethnic background increases my
6 I respect the traditions of my ethnic group.
7 I am greatly interested in the history of my ethnic group.
9 I feel a strong inner connection with my ethnic group.
11 I enjoy taking part in events of my ethnic group.
12 I am conscious of my ethnic background and of what it means to me.
14 I feel good about my ethnic background.
16 Knowing the history of my ethnic group teaches me to value and understand my fellow ethnic group members and also myself better.
18 I take pride in achievements of my fellow ethnic group members.

**Ethnic Differentiation Questions**
1 It is important for me which ethnic group a person belongs to.
4 Ethnic background does not matter in choosing a spouse. (r)
5 It is nicer to commune with somebody from my own ethnic
8 Ethnicity should not play any role in evaluating a person. (r)
10 All my close friends belong to the same ethnic group as I do.
13 I do not find a person’s ethnic background important. (r)
15 It would be neither easier nor harder for me to live with a person from an ethnic group other than my own. (r)
17 There are several foreigners among my close friends. (r)
19 Spouses/partners should belong to the same ethnic group.
20 I like to get to know people from other ethnic groups. (r)

**Appendix III**

**Control Group Vignette**
Please read the information below about the imaginary community of Springview and answer the questions that follow.
The city of Springview is a town of 90,000 residents. The median age is 27 and the town has a poverty rate of 18%. The population is 55% percent female and 45% male. White residents make up 60% of the population, followed by black residents at 30%, and all other ethnicities at 10%. The Springview city council has long championed programs that increase access to jobs for their residents. Two years ago, the city council implemented a pilot program that aimed to increase the number of high-wage jobs in their city. They funded the program from the part of the city budget used to attract new businesses or expand existing businesses. A recent assessment report found that the first two years had been very successful. The program had achieved its 5% growth target for high-wage jobs.

Based on what you’ve read about Springview’s high-wage jobs pilot program, please indicate how much you would favor the city council continuing this program if you were a resident of this community.

1. Strongly Oppose
2. Oppose
3. Neither Favor nor Oppose
4. Favor
5. Strongly Favor

Treatment 1 Group Vignette

Please read the information below about the imaginary community of Springview and answer the questions that follow.

The city of Springview is a town of 90,000 residents. The median age is 27 and the town has a poverty rate of 18%. The population is 55% percent female and 45% male. White residents make up 60% of the population, followed by black residents at 30%, and all other ethnicities at 10%. The Springview city council has long championed programs that increase access
to jobs for their residents. Two years ago, the city council implemented a pilot program that aimed to increase the number of high-wage jobs in their city. They funded the program from the part of the city budget used to attract new businesses or expand existing businesses. A recent assessment report found that the first two years had been very successful. The program had achieved its 5% growth target for high-wage jobs with 90% of those jobs going to white residents.

Based on what you’ve read about Springview’s high-wage jobs pilot program, please indicate how much you would favor the city council continuing this program if you were a resident of this community.

1. Strongly Oppose
2. Oppose
3. Neither Favor nor Oppose
4. Favor
5. Strongly Favor

Treatment 2 Group Vignette
Please read the information below about the imaginary community of Springview and answer the questions that follow.

The city of Springview is a town of 90,000 residents. The median age is 27 and the town has a poverty rate of 18%. The population is 55% percent female and 45% male. White residents make up 60% of the population, followed by black residents at 30%, and all other ethnicities at 10%. The Springview city council has long championed programs that increase access to jobs for their residents. Two years ago, the city council implemented a pilot program that aimed to increase the number of high-wage jobs in their city. They funded the program from the part of the city budget used to attract new businesses or expand existing businesses. A recent assessment report found that the first two years had been very successful. The program had achieved its 5% growth target for high-wage jobs with 90% of those jobs going to white residents. The program did have the unintended
consequence of increasing unemployment among the city’s black residents because funding for programs that had supported minority job training and entrepreneurship decreased in order to provide funds for the new program.

Based on what you’ve read about Springview’s high-wage jobs pilot program, please indicate how much you would favor the city council continuing this program if you were a resident of this community.

1. Strongly Oppose
2. Oppose
3. Neither Favor nor Oppose
4. Favor
5. Strongly Favor

References


Warren, Jonathan W., and France Winddance Twine. 1997. “White Americans, the New Minority?: Non-Blacks and the Ever-

