Armed conflict and the community development:
A case study

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Introduction

Fatima was a young girl when Joseph Stalin, the head of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union evicted tens of thousands of Ingush and Chechen families to Kazakhstan. Upon returning to their homeland, her family settled in Grozny, where she found work, married and began her new family. In 1994, when the first war broke out, Fatima lost most of her relatives, including her son and daughter-in-law in an air-strike. Five years later, she fled with her husband and granddaughter to neighboring Ingushetia. They settled in the Severny refugee camp, and lived in a small corner of an abandoned railway carriage where, during the winter, the temperature often dropped below zero. In the summer, the heat of the scorching metal was excruciating.

In 2000, Fatima's husband died of tuberculosis, and she was left alone with her six year old granddaughter. "I have lived only because of this little girl," Fatima said as she pointed at her granddaughter. “I hope that maybe she will go to school again. I want her to grow up and live a normal life. I have traded all my valuables for food, and sometimes my little girl cries because she is hungry and I have nothing to give her. Do you know how it feels when your child cries because of the pain in her empty stomach?” (Islamic Relief 2003).

Fatima's story is not an exception, many Chechen families suffered from the war and dreadful relocation. In fact, armed conflict, inter- or intrastate, is most likely to lead to catastrophic consequences for the civilian population. Though the civilians are oftentimes the least responsible for such conflict, they are often, if not always, the most vulnerable to its disastrous ramifications. Watching the news, we hear about different armed conflicts throughout the world: Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Sudan, Indonesia and Afghanistan, former Yugoslavia, and last but not the least, Iraq. These do not make up even half the list of countries involved in armed conflicts during the last two decades around the world. Thus, although exceptionally shocking to us, Fatima's story is almost a rule in a number of countries.
Various non-governmental agencies (NGOs) persistently try to address the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) by providing different types of aid, from emergency relief to rehabilitation and development programs. What do these programs look like? How do they affect refugees and IDPs? What are the short and long-term results of the international community’s efforts on this matter?

This essay explores the development of the internally displaced community in the Republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and the Russian Federation (Russia) by focusing partly on the activities of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), NGOs, and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). More specifically, the methods these various organizations have employed over the past three years, their relationships with one another, and with local governments, will be examined.

The essay is divided into four parts. The first part focuses on non-profit sector participants, both local and international, and their goals and activities as perceived by one another. Although the focus of this essay is mainly on the INGOs and the CBOs, it is important to distinguish these “third sector” participants from NGOs, and grassroots support organizations (GRSOs). This essay will discuss the different types of INGOs and their various functions, in comparison to CBOs. My intention is to illustrate which type of organization can better address the needs of the community, as well as to discuss viable ways of collaborate between organizations.

The second section of the paper provides a historical background on humanitarian aid in Russia. This will include a description of the political, economic, and social situations in the Ingushetia and Chechnya republics. Finally, the third section will analyze the current programs undertaken by the INGOs, and their relationships with the local communities and authorities. In reviewing the current INGO projects in these two republics, my goal is to assess the extent to which they apply the community-based approach, and if this approach is supported by the community, government authorities, and donors.

In the conclusion, I will discuss some of the model programs promoted by a few INGOs with limited support from their donors. CBOs exist, but their limited number, as well as the lack of the professional staff, leads most INGOs to prefer cooperation with each other rather than
CBOs. However, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), one of the biggest donors and service providers in the region, agrees that INGOs have to focus more on a community-based approach (Hirvonen 1997). Finally, the relationship between the non-profit sector and the government continues to present challenges. INGOs often lack adequate support from government officials who are more likely to impose heavy fees, and even sue them for not following local policies. On the other hand, INGOs refuse to provide adequate information about their activities to their host governments, on the basis of inflexibility and alleged state corruption.

Background: “Third Sector” Voluntary Organizations

The 1970s witnessed the creation of non-profit organizations that brought empowered civil society in opposing local governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The rapid growth of this “third sector” created relationships between the local professionals and other members of society. In many developing countries these professionals were able to establish GRSOs with the goal of securing funds and support for grassroots organizations (GROs) or CBOs. GROs or CBOs are the locally based organizations that support and develop communities by improving the lives of its residents.\(^1\) NGO is a broader notion, which includes both CBOs and the national NGOs, whereas the INGOs are organizations acting on the international level and usually established outside of a particular state. The INGOs also differ from nation efforts by focusing on the emergency relief aid or on the different sectors of the long-term development.

In this paper two types of non-profit organizations will be highlighted with the goal of understanding the extent of their activities in Chechnya and Ingushetia. There is no doubt that the INGOs are the most developed agencies in the region. Although most national NGOs are managed by local residents, they are often created or strongly supported by INGOs. Thus, they act as partners to INGOs and usually reflect their interests. The CBOs are the local organizations generated by the community with or without the support of the international humanitarian

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\(^1\) Although some authors identify the differences between the CBOs and GROs in this paper these terms are interchangeable.
sector. Although I wish to emphasize the importance of GRSOs, I do not review them closely due to a limited number of such organizations in Russia, and their absence in the Republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya.

While CBOs are created or strongly supported by the community, and act as its representatives, INGOs attempt to influence the development of democratic institutions from the outside. Some scholars support the idea of bringing in democracy by replicating the systems of developed countries. However, others find this idea irrelevant as many developing countries do not have traditional non-profit and volunteer sectors and thus, lack the appropriate legal framework to support this sector (Mendelson and Glenn 2002, 6). The INGOs often do not explore the issues raised by the residents of the community. Although the INGOs sometimes support the GRSOs and consequently, the CBOs, many of the projects are created and managed without any reference to CBOs. Some donors and INGOs create or initiate the formation of the CBOs trying to empower the people “from the top.”

The relationship between CBOs and INGOs with the local government is not easy to evaluate. Large donors have been criticized for programs that force cooperation between CBOs with the local; the donors place the blame on CBOs for having ties with the corrupted government. Often, the government tends to ignore CBOs while often confronting INGOs. However, in some countries (Philippines and Indonesia) the GRSOs and CBOs remained independent from the government (Fisher 1993, 22-32).

In addition to the vertical networks with the government, community, and INGOs, the CBOs create horizontal networks with other CBOs in the region, such as economic networks and “amorphous grassroots movements” (Fisher 1993, 57). The economic networks that link the CBOs may be organized both locally and from the outside, whereas the amorphous movements are generated locally. Since the economic sustainability of CBOs and INGOs is uncertain, the economic networks are particularly important. The sustainability of the CBOs and INGOs depends on the creation and maintenance of strong ties among these actors and the donors (Fisher 1993, 57-59). The ability of non-profit organizations to provide adequate services depends on funding. This
means that the quality of services provided by these organizations is likely to drop when their budgets are disrupted.

The environments in which these organizations work change rapidly; the success or failure depends on the ability to adapt quickly. The INGO is placed into the extremely tough environment of another country. Oftentimes the country may have an inadequate legal system, an infrastructure that lacks the ability to properly address hunger and basic medical care, and an oppressive regime that lacks respect for human rights. The ability to immediately respond to the changes of such environment is of great importance, as failure can cause not only the collapse of the INGO's activities, but also the injury and even death of its employees.

In contrast to the INGOs, CBOs are established by the local community and tend to understand, predict, and respond to the local environment better and more efficiently than the INGOs. At the same time, being close to the local community and government, the CBOs in developing countries often lack adequate assessment and evaluation. They may become corrupted, or limited to serving only specific groups within the total population.

The importance of the political changes and support of democracy in the developing countries is based on the argument that the developed civil society leads to sustainability (Mendelson and Glenn 2002, 6). Over the past 20 years, the importance of community participation in sustaining development and delivering public services has been noted by a number of scholars (Lyons and Smuts 1999, 2151). CBOs aim to empower its citizens by allowing them to create and manage the community's development projects, as an alternative to the state or INGOs (Fisher 1993, 47).

As for INGOs, their implicit and explicit goals are often difficult to assess. On the one hand, they focus on relief emergency assistance, and on the other, establish long-term development projects for the community, while involving the citizens in the implementation of these projects. In comparison to the CBOs, the number of tasks covered by INGOs is enormous. As an integral part of the international community, their goal may include promoting peace, providing education and medical care, and addressing hunger.
Non-profit organizations in the Russian Federation

The non-profit sector in the Soviet Union was originally established and controlled by the government. With the fall of the communist regime in Russia, many of its organizations were dismantled and eventually replaced by new ones at the beginning of 1990s. During Russia’s economic crisis, “many [Russian NGOs] survived off of the enthusiasm and charisma of the leader, who often worked tirelessly for little or no pay, when time permitted” (Henderson 2002, 146). These INGOs were born out of Russia’s need for assistance in a number of sectors beginning with food distribution, medical care, and ending with education and legal system adjustments. The government however, did not welcome foreign aid. Lacking the legal framework to support INGOs, “poorly functioning and incomplete institutions and the government officials follow Western political rules only in an uneven and often superficial way” (Mendelson and Glenn 2002, 11).

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), one of the largest donors, distributed approximately $92 million to civic initiatives and the NGO sector with additional support from private foundations such as the Soros, MacArthur, and Ford Foundations (Henderson 2002, 147). Consequently, the aid provided by the international donors soon became the main source of funding both for international and local NGOs. Being dependant on the politics of Congress, the U.S. donors, such as USAID, became the facilitators of the interests of the United States in Russia.

Although humanitarian aid differs from businesses, by its goals and means, it is still a business that is wealthy enough to pay for “thousands of program assistants, consultants, academics, and bureaucrats from developed countries.” In addition, humanitarian aid is often broken down into a variety of “mandates” instead of being simply given to “deserving” organizations (Henderson 2002, 148). Therefore, the short-term goals of the donors are limited to produce qualitative results rather than support the progress of society in Russia.
The armed conflict between Russian federal forces and the opposition of the Republic of Chechnya, which started in 1994, led to the relocation of the majority of the Chechen population to the Republic of Ingushetia (OCHA 2003). Having started as a movement for the independence of the Chechen Republic it turned out to be a perpetual war between Chechen rebels and Russian Federal forces. The conflict led to the relocation of 215,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) to the neighboring region of Ingushetia. At the recommencement of the conflict in 1999, the Ingushetia was the only region to welcomed Chechens.

During the winter of 1999-2000, the Ingushetian communities and government made a lot of efforts to support the IDPs. However Russian Federal government failed to provide additional subsidies to the region when these IDPs moved from Chechnya to Ingushetia, doubling the population of the region. Therefore, by the end of 2001 the local conflicts between Ingushs and Chechens came out on the Ingush territory, although these conflicts never turned to violence.

In 1999, when the IDPs were pushed to Ingushetia, the INGOs stepped in to assist them. The INGOs and the local department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation (EMERCOM RF) were providing Chechens with basic assets. The lack of food, water, medicines, adequate shelter, and warm clothing in the refugee camps in Ingushetia was an absolute calamity that required serious attention (Hunter 2000).

A number of refugee tent camps were built with the support of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With donations from UNICEF, a few INGOs created schools for the Chechen children to compensate for the inability of local schools to accommodate additional students. Other INGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders, MSF) set up temporary clinics in the neighborhoods in order to prevent the spreading of epidemic diseases. The

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2 The term “internally displaced people” or IDPs is used when the relocation of the population is limited to the territory of the country whereas the refugees are the ones that cross the board of the other state during the process of the relocation.
International Rescue Committee (IRC), funded by the UNHCR provided clean drinking water to the sites, while the Danish Refugee Committee (DRC), Islamic Relief and a number of others were bringing food packages to the schools and to the camps.

Although the INGOs accomplished an enormous amount of work in the region, they were and still are dependent on funding from UNHCR, UNICEF, DFID, USAID and other donors. By the end of 2001, most of the INGOs experienced budget cuts as other conflicts around the world led to the reallocation of their resources. At the same time, the situation in Chechnya was far from stable. The IDPs in Ingushetia were still surviving but with insufficient resources to meet their basic needs.

By the beginning of 2003, the Russian Federal Government proclaimed the war to be over and tried to reinforce the IDPs to return back to Chechnya. During this time however, periodic fighting still occurred, terrorist acts had not ended, and land mines not completely removed. One of the terrorist acts at the end of 2002 happened in the center of Groznyy, the capital city of Chechnya in the building of the local government where about 200 people were working. About forty of them were wounded.3

After being partly restored after 1993-1994, the Chechnya’s capital city Groznyy, the 1999-2000 bombings brought the city in ruins again, destroying the housing sector and city facilities. In 2002, when initiating the resettlement of the IDPs in Chechnya, the Russian Federal Government intended to provide financial aid to families that had lost their homes. However, because of the delays, bribes, and bureaucratic obstacles, most of these families have yet to receive the promised financial aid.

As the conflict was not over, the INGOs developed a new strategy. This involved empowering the community and implementing the participation of CBOs and NGOs in order to build a relatively sustainable community in a number of neighborhoods and refugee camps in Ingushetia. The strategic goal of the INGOs was to decrease the international humanitarian aid after a certain time by making the

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communities relatively self-efficient. However, these goals were not reached and a number of NGOs failed even in providing the assistance. Some efforts of other INGOs in rebuilding community networks were successful.

**War and Its Psychological Influence on the Community**

War has a tremendous impact on the community. In Chechen communities, villages and families, the way of life and environment provided strong roots and ties creating a sustaining system of support and the network of relationships. These local traditions, structures, and ties were the base for the daily life. Consequently, the war influences the life of an individual as well as the life of the nuclear and extended family, community, village, city, and nation by disrupting the social network. In the case of Chechnya, the war that has lasted nearly ten years affected the whole nation. One of the phenomena of war is that it soon becomes part of normal life.

The relocation and settlement in refugee camps and spontaneous settlements took a mental and physical charge. Sufferings from a range of human rights violations (i.e. torture, rape, deprivation of needs, the loss of homes, persecution, and harassment) created short and long-term mental problems (Jong 2002, 6). The psychological issues, however, are not the priority to address for the humanitarian aid organizations. The critical issues include water and sanitation, food and nutrition, shelter, emergency health problems, and education (Jong 2002, 7). However, cases of traumatic stress caused by the war recently increased the understanding and reevaluation of the importance of people’s mental health problems by the international community.

Living as an IDP creates trouble for communities and families where women, children, and the elderly tend to suffer most of all. Women still have to maintain their social role, the elderly find it particularly difficult to adjust to new social values, and children do not receive psychological support from their parents, especially if the parents have died or suffer from mental trauma themselves.
Northern Caucasus Today: Current programs in Ingushetia and Chechnya

Food distribution, shelter, health, water sanitation, and education projects are currently active in Ingushetia and Chechnya. The organizations involved range from; the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders, MSF), International Rescue Committee, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, Chechen Refugee and Displaced Persons Council (CRDPC), Polish Humanitarian Organization (PHO), the Voice of the Mountains (VoM), Islamic Relief, International Medical Corps (IMC), and a number of other organizations coordinated by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). As it was noted above, there are local NGOs that operate in Ingushetia and Chechnya, such as Druzhba, Memorial, and Vesta, but they are partners of the INGOs and UN agencies and thus cannot be considered the CBOs. More important, the NGO contact list recently published by OCHA includes only two local CBOs. All other local organizations are created, managed, and controlled by the INGOs (OCHA 2003).

The programs of the emergency relief INGOs such as International Rescue Committee (IRC) focus mainly on the emergency assistance, not on the development. Furthermore, even recognizing the importance of the development of the sustainable communities and being in the region for a number of years, the involvement of the local community with the project is not seen as a goal and the residents are not welcomed to the organization, even as volunteers.

Their programs target individuals living under the worst conditions in both Ingushetia and Chechnya. The IRC’s shelter program works in 60 sites and includes reconstruction of building, distributing stoves, upgrading gas and electrical systems, and supervising self-help projects (International Rescue Commission 2003). The water and sanitation sector targets approximately 65,000 IDPs, as well as the surrounding community, by delivering potable water, collecting garbage daily, constructing latrines, bathing facilities, and water points, distributing public health guides, hygiene materials, and conducting health sessions. The education program of the IRC operates 15 schools in Ingushetia, which offer both the standard...
Russian curriculum as well as psychosocial support components including youth clubs and parent Education Committees. The distribution program has delivered clothing, bedding, household goods, hygiene items, water filters, mine-awareness materials, and other goods to families in both Ingushetia and Chechnya (International Rescue Commission 2003).

The People in Need Foundation (PINF) is one of the IRC partners that have worked alongside IRC since January 2000, and is funded by the World Food Program (WFP), UNHCR, and private Czech sources. PINF’s programs include delivering food and non-food items to 50,000 people every month in Groznyy, as well as IDPs in 17 camps in Ingushetia. In addition PINF provides roofing material to over 4,000 family homes in Groznyy and outlying villages, distributes educational kits to 33 classrooms in Ingushetia, and operates five schools and two mobile clinics (People in Need Foundation 2002).

In the focus of the sustainable community, the most important are the education programs, which emphasize the strength of the community links, youth empowerment, and psychosocial support through Parent Education Committees, youth leaders in the classrooms (who are extremely helpful for the youngest and special-need students), and youth clubs. Because many students are behind in their studies from years of disorder, these INGOs offer a catch-up summer session and recreational activities to provide relief from the camp environment.

In the current IRC schools, experts in Chechen culture and customs rotate among the schools teaching Chechen language, literature, arts, and history through theatrical shows, book clubs, and lectures. These sessions are extremely popular and are attended by all camp residents as well as by members of the surrounding community. The creation of a cultural center in 2002 expanded the audience, and serves as a training center for teachers to learn how to teach aspects of local culture, remedial education, non-formal education techniques, etc.

In order to address the mental traumas caused by the war, some INGOs have continued the programs providing the psychological consultancy to the residents. Although the long-term programs are often unavailable due to the lack of funding, the INGOs make efforts to continue these programs that are integral to the community’s healthy future. Although children seem to be affected less by the war than adults, war
consequences still influence them. The family support has the protective effect on children; however, the loss of the family members and friends during the war causes the opposite effect (Jong 2002, 16).

The Center for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD) has been working in Chechnya during last seven years, offering psychological rehabilitation to children traumatized by war through the “Little Star” program in Grozny (Hunter 1999). In Ingushetia, “having their own tents in the camps with wood stoves and electricity, a team of psychologists and therapists organized simulation games and art and drama therapy activities for children as well as offered individual consultations” (Hunter 1999). “These sessions give children the opportunity to forget about the misery of their everyday lives, and play as children their age should; during the sessions the kids were so absorbed that they didn't hear the bomb explosions across the border in Chechnya, nor the military planes flying overhead” (Hunter 1999). Psycho-social centers operate in five PINF-rehabilitated schools in Grozny. In all centers, professional psychologists carry out therapeutic sessions and provide individual consultations to students, parents, and teachers. Group and individual therapy sessions are conducted in the centers, concentrating mainly on post-traumatic problems (PINF, 2002).

The participation of the community and the involvement of the local government agencies are important as the goal is to create the vertical relationships with the local authorities and even with agencies from higher levels of government (Lyons and Smuts 1999, 2154). However, the relationships between the CBOs, INGOs, and the local authorities remain complex, inconsistent and contradictory, which “need not be the case” (Lyons and Smuts 1999, 2155).

Restating the cooperation and coordination between the INGO community, local authorities, UN agencies, Russian military authorities, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), and the Chechen civil administration, the INGOs still avoid dealing with the federal and local government, and military authorities. The relationships are mainly based on the imperative policies issued by the government authorities. As for the local CBOs, the INGOs often try to minimize the cooperation with them, being afraid of the corruption on one hand, and for the security reasons on another one.
An example of the sour relationship between the government and the non-profit sector was noted in one of the PINF reports. Referring to the Federal regulation according to which all schools in the Russian Federation are obliged to be equipped with fire boards, water tanks, and sand boxes, fire-safety authorities of Ingushetia issued a threatening ultimatum which stated that all IDP schools will be closed if the fire regulations are not observed (PINF 2002). At several locations, threats to switch off gas and electricity were made by the owners of the territory, as the Migration Service of Ingushetia does not cover costs of these utilities, while it has to do so in case of the IDPs’ individual dwellings (PINF 2002).

Building the democracy?

As noted in one of the UNICEF reports, “the complexity of the emergencies, the nature of the assistance needs and the potential for future crisis and population displacement in the region have forced a re-evaluation of assistance and contingency planning” (Hirvonen 1997). Current programs undertaken by the INGOs community reflect a developmental approach: low-cost, empowering, preventive and focusing on capacity building and community level activities. However, the professional skills of the refugee community residents are often unutilized in the community because of the inadequate infrastructure and low wages. In addition, the INGOs are able to provide only basic supplies to the refugees as their funding does not cover the project costs beyond the emergency assistance. Finally, however, UNICEF notes that some assistance was linked to empowering women’s groups in the IDP centers “in the hope that this would provide them with valuable skills to use in strengthening their own communities once back in Chechnya” (Hirvonen 1997).

Realizing that the emergency aid for the IDPs will not last forever, a few INGOs try to involve the IDPs in their projects. The Community Mobilization Program (CMP) of International Medical Corps (IMC) built the local teams of "community mobilizers" that consisted of two members and the construction and engineering specialist. The program implementation process included an introduction, an election of a Community Action Group or CAG, a situational assessment to identify the community’s problems and resources, project design, implementation,
monitoring including a maintenance plan, and evaluation. The beginning program consisted mainly of environmental projects aiming to improve the living conditions for the residents and to bond the GAG into a cohesive working group. Another part of the CMP intended to emphasize the self-sufficiency of the IDP community by identifying their needs, which was the deficit of nutritional balance. The solution found by the community included the construction of a greenhouse. IMC supported the project by providing materials and managerial support, while community members handled the majority of the actual coordination of labor and output. After the greenhouse was finished, the community members generated a distribution list to serve the residents. The excess of the vegetables was taken to the market and sold to generate income to purchase seeds for the next planting season. The last aspect of the project creates a new level of responsibility for the members of the community. In addition, the program has supplied community members with a set of skills that are transferable to many work situations and environments (International Medical Corps 2003).

PINF and Berkat, the two Czech INGOs opened “Iman,” a women’s vocational training center, in Chechnya, providing educational opportunities such as basic training in computers, English, sewing, bookkeeping, and traditional handcrafts skills with a further plan to partly develop the center’s programs into small income-generating activities (PINF, 2000). The center also has a small library, childcare facility and provides psychological consultations and therapy sessions. In cooperation with a local NGO, Lamanan Shovda, they launched a special carpentry workshop for youth to combine theoretical knowledge with practical craft; all production is distributed to mine survivors in Ingushetia and Chechnya (PINF, 2002).

The hopeless future?

As poor people can better assess their own social needs and problems, and have insights on how to solve them, it is expected that the participation of the poor in the projects design will be an integral element of INGO, donor agency, and government work (Long 2002, 64). However, only a small number of INGOs try to implement the projects that involve the local
community. Furthermore, major humanitarian aid sectors are now divided between the UN agencies and a few INGOs, excluding local CBOs and local government (see Table 1).

The research of the donor agencies published by Long (2002), however, shows that some efforts were made to involve the poor in projects and policy-making processes. Long argues that although such participation of the local community is not the norm, the practices still exist, and that donors must continue to enable the poor to participate (89). Long’s research highlights the guidelines that donors have to follow in order to involve the local community “to participate in the policy making processes:

- Share the information about projects and policies on the relevant languages, in the right time and with all the parties.
- The project development has to be carried out with the flexibility and necessary adjustments to the external environment.
- Donors and INGOs need to adopt a learning approach and facilitative attitude towards their work with the poor.
- Increase the quantity and improve the quality of participation by the poor” (91).

The underdevelopment of the CBOs in Ingushetia and Chechnya may be partly caused by the lack of the GRSOs and their networks, which are more effective than other “third sector” participants in increasing the sustainability of the CBOs and emphasizing the traditional, cultural practices, whereas the INGOs promote the practices of the developed countries (Fisher 1993, 157).

Defining sustainable development as “a process that does not compromise the resources needed for the future development,” and empowerment as the process of “enabling the powerless to become the subject of their own and the society’s development,” Fisher highlights the importance of the causal relationship between the participation of the community to their own socioeconomic, which may emerge from the community or may be promoted by the donors, INGOs, or GRSOs (1993, 166). As a large percentage of the IDPs currently work for different INGOs, there is hope that in a few years young professionals will be able to participate in the local non-profit sector and create the CBOs essential in
bringing in peace and stability to Ingushetia and Chechnya and improving lives of Chechens who have suffered and continue to suffer tremendously.

**Conclusion**

Once starting the activities in the new country or community, the INGO focuses its activities on providing the basic needs and services for residents of the community. Later, when the political situation in the area becomes less vulnerable, the INGO changes its goals, concentrating more on the development programs. The INGO enlarges its activities in the community, receiving more funds and adding staff members, and end up with the effect of “industrialization of services,” loosing the close relationship with community members (Zimmerman 1999, 599). The corrupted government, politically inactive citizens, and low-quality services of the INGOS as well as constant confrontation between all these actors are not a surprise in any country.

However, the case of Chechnya is different because Chechens are “excluded” from the people of the Russian Federation. Being kicked out from their own land four years ago, they are currently being pushed back to Chechnya as officially the war is over. In reality, it is not over for the families who lost their relatives and homes. Even if Groznyy and the surrounding villages are not bombed every night anymore, the war is not over for the twelve year old children who never saw anything other than terror, torture, and murders.

Today, the matter is not about who is right or wrong, it has been a humanitarian catastrophe for many years. Lack of food, water, medicines, adequate shelter, and warm clothing in the refugee camps in Ingushetia called for a serious attention of the international community. Being able to

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4 The concept of the industrialization and standardization of services is described by Horst Zimmerman in his article “Innovation in nonprofit organizations” (1999) as the result of the third phase in the process of the innovation of nonprofit organizations. The three phases identified by Zimmerman are the pioneer phase, where the relations between the customers and the service providers are close, the second phase enhances the differentiation and specialization of the organizational structure, and the third one includes standardization of products and services.
continuously address some of the IDP’s needs, the INGOs generally refuse to change the focus of their activities from the emergency aid to the development programs, in order to involve local residents in program design and evaluation, and confront the intervention of the state authorities.

Even the oldest INGOs that were traditional proponents of the need-based approach and had previously focused on the relief activities have begun to devote more attention to the development projects (Fisher 1993, 22). However, the representatives of the biggest relief and development INGOs, such as CARE and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) still do not prioritize development as the goal of their organizations (Smith 1990, 114). The private donors prefer to give the resources to the large organizations as opposed to the local CBOs. A number of scholars argue that the INGOs tend to bring in democracy to developing countries, whereas others agree that the INGOs intend to pursue the interests of donors’ and foreign governments financing and implementing programs that will ensure little interference or supervision from the local government (Smith 1990, 112-120; Fisher 1993, 32).

Although the situation in Ingushetia currently allows the “third sector” to switch to the community-based approach, a number of INGOs and donors try to achieve the development of the community by only supplying health, shelter, and other sectors on the temporary basis. Building the causal relationships between social-economic, and political development often takes many years (Fisher 1993, 168). However, it is still worth it. Over generations these relationships create for the community members the understanding of the necessity to construct a strong and powerful civil society.
Table 1
Sector Focal Point

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**Source:** Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Chechnya and Neighboring Republics (Russian Federation); OCHA. (2003).
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