

**When Government Subsidizes Its Own:  
Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization\***

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## **Abstract**

We investigate an understudied component of the policy feedback literature by arguing that government policies can lead to increased citizen political participation when government policies directly subsidize interest groups' organizational efforts to mobilize supporters. To test this theory, we examine the effect of public sector mandatory collective bargaining laws in the American states, one prominent example of governments enacting policies that provide specific organizational advantages to interest groups. Exploiting variation in the timing of laws across the states and using data on the political participation of public school teachers from 1956 to 2004, we find that the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law significantly boosted subsequent political participation among teachers. We also identify increased contact from organized groups seeking to mobilize teachers as a mechanism that explains this finding. These results suggest that public policies can have enduring (and often unanticipated) implications for interest group organization and citizens' political participation.

Keywords: policy feedback; political participation; public policy; collective bargaining laws; labor unions; interest group mobilization

In recent years, organized labor has faced growing political opposition in the United States (Freeman and Han 2012; Saltzman 2012). Between 2009 and 2012, a dozen states passed legislation uprooting an equilibrium in public sector labor relations that had, since the late 1970s, granted government employees in the majority of states the right to bargain collectively for wages and benefits (Wieder 2012). Most notably, in 2010, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker's Budget Repair Bill (Act 10) severely curtailed collective bargaining rights for public employees whose unions have historically been strong supporters of the Democratic Party (e.g., teachers and state, county, and municipal employees) while leaving the state's more Republican-friendly police and firefighter unions intact. This targeted curtailment is unsurprising given the well-documented ability of labor unions to rally support for preferred candidates and mobilize their members for political action (Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Sorauf 1988; Asher et al. 2001; Radcliff 2001; Leighley and Nagler 2007; Flavin and Radcliff 2011).

To date, however, the effect that government policies have in promoting and subsidizing the efforts of unions to mobilize their supporters in politics has received little scholarly attention. In this paper, we argue that the decision by many state governments in the 1960s and 1970s to mandate public sector collective bargaining has had unanticipated and enduring consequences for American electoral politics. Drawing on recent evidence that government policies can encourage citizen participation in politics (Campbell 2002, 2003; Mettler 2002, 2005) and recognition by interest group scholars that the formation and maintenance of organized interests are often related to the patron support they receive from government itself (Walker 1983, 1991), we hypothesize that the enactment of public sector collective bargaining laws increased the political activity of the citizens who were their chief beneficiaries: government workers and the public employee unions that represent them.

We test our theory that mandatory collective bargaining boosted public employees' political participation by examining the political activity of K-12 public school teachers. As the most numerous group of civilian public employees, teachers constitute an ideal group for testing this theory (National Center for Education Statistics 2011).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the rate at which teachers have participated in politics has varied dramatically over the past fifty years. During the 1950s, a majority of teachers opposed their colleagues participating in political activities beyond voting;<sup>2</sup> however, by the late 1970s teachers had evolved into one of the most active and influential constituency groups in American politics (Hrebenar and Thomas 2004; Moe 2011).<sup>3</sup> Using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1956 to 2004, we exploit variation in the timing of collective bargaining laws within states and find that the political activity of all

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<sup>1</sup> Although we considered examining the relationship between collective bargaining laws and the rate of political participation among other public employee groups, data limitations precluded us from broadening our analysis. First, there were simply too few non-teacher public employees in the American National Election Study (ANES) to gain any analytic leverage on our research question. Moreover, the ANES does not identify police, firefighters, and municipal workers in a consistent manner across the time series. For further explanation about why we confined our analysis to the ANES, see Footnote #19.

<sup>2</sup> In 1957 the National Education Association (NEA) surveyed a representative sample of the American teacher workforce and found that two thirds of teachers believed that they should not participate in any type of political activity beyond fulfilling their basic civic duty to vote. Just one in five thought that their colleagues should engage in common forms of political participation such as volunteering for a campaign. Even with regards to school board elections that directly affect a teacher's personal livelihood, fewer than one in 20 teachers reported trying to encourage and/or persuade colleagues to vote for their preferred candidate for school board (Briney 1958).

<sup>3</sup> Today, teachers routinely comprise the largest share of Democratic Party convention delegates (Moe 2011). Their unions' state affiliates consistently rank first or second in surveys gauging the most effective statehouse lobbies (Hrebenar and Thomas 2004; Nownes, Thomas, and Hrebenar 2007). In local politics, school board members typically classify teachers as the most politically active group (Hess and Leal 2005).

teachers (not simply union members) significantly increased after enactment of a mandatory bargaining law. We then investigate our theory that mandatory bargaining laws conferred special advantages that subsidized labor organization and mobilization efforts in electoral politics and uncover evidence that teachers (but not other citizens) were significantly more likely to report being asked to participate in politics by an outside (non-party based) group in election periods held after the adoption of mandatory bargaining.

These findings contribute to three different literatures. First, by establishing that mandatory collective bargaining laws increased the rate of political participation among teachers, we contribute to a growing body of “policy feedback” research linking public policies to mass behavior (Soss 1999; Campbell 2003; Mettler 2002, 2005; Mettler and Welch 2004). However, our analysis shows that government policies can activate a political constituency not simply by providing material resources to, or altering the interpretive experiences of, *individual* citizens (Pierson 1993; Mettler 2002), but also by directly subsidizing the efforts of previously established interest *groups* to mobilize their supporters in politics. Second, by providing evidence that state governments played a critical role in catalyzing teacher political participation, our findings provide insight into the causes and consequences of political activism among street-level bureaucrats more generally (Lipsky 1980). Third, the education politics literature typically assigns significant explanatory power to the role of organized teacher interests when seeking to explain myriad outcomes including poor student achievement (Chubb and Moe 1990; Moe 2009, 2011), party positioning on K-12 policy (Rhodes 2011, 2012; West, Henderson, and Peterson 2012; Wolbrecht and Hartney, forthcoming), and the adoption of education reform policies (Mintrom 1997, 2000; Hartney and Flavin 2011). Given the theoretical and empirical evidence on the centrality of teacher interests for the entire education politics subfield, our finding that

mandatory bargaining policies served as an agent of political mobilization for teachers has manifold implications.

### **Prior Research**

In recent years, political participation scholars have sought to understand the role government policies play in motivating citizens' political behavior (Mettler and Soss 2004; Campbell 2012). For instance, Mettler (2002, 2005) found that the G.I. Bill increased political involvement among its participants by more fully incorporating them into the political system and promoting civic norms, or what Pierson (1993) called an "interpretive effect." Similarly, Campbell (2002, 2003) found that Social Security policy has had a significant effect on the political participation of senior citizens, primarily because it gave this group a larger personal stake in national politics. When Social Security has been threatened in the form of lower benefits or more restrictive eligibility requirements, seniors have responded with increased participation which has had important effects on subsequent policy outcomes.<sup>4</sup>

However, political scientists have rarely evaluated the role that government policies play in shaping the political incentives and participatory behaviors of citizens, like public school teachers, who occupy important street-level positions within government bureaucracy itself (Lipsky 1980, 3).<sup>5</sup> This is an important omission in the policy feedback literature given

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<sup>4</sup> Other scholars have shown how governmental policies can also construct a relationship between citizens and the state that leads certain groups to disengage from politics (Soss 1999; Weaver and Lerman 2010).

<sup>5</sup> A few exceptions deserve mention. Anzia's (2011, 2013) work on election timing draws attention to the way in which governments' use of "off-cycle" municipal elections advantages organized interest groups including teachers and other public employees unions. Similarly, Berry (2009) has shown that the growth of special purpose governments, when combined with higher rates of political participation among public employees (what Berry calls

widespread recognition that government employees are more likely to participate in politics than their private sector counterparts (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Johnson and Libecap 1991). For example, Downs' (1957, 254) assertion that, "those who stand the most to gain [from voting] are the men [sic] who earn their incomes there [from the government]" was empirically validated in a recent study by Moe (2006) that shows teachers are far more likely to vote in school board elections when they live within the boundaries of the school district where they work and can thus affect their occupational outcomes at the ballot box.

Prior studies also focus heavily on the role recruitment and mass mobilization play in motivating citizens to participate in politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 271) famously noted, citizens forgo participating in politics, "because they can't, because they don't want to, or because nobody asked." Given the waning role of party-based recruitment and the ascendance of interest group politics in the U.S. (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991), teacher union interest groups in mandatory bargaining states are well positioned to mobilize teachers residing neatly in school district bargaining units. Despite the fact that existing accounts of interest group formation, maintenance, and growth frequently acknowledge the role played by government in these processes (Walker 1983, 1991; Judd and Swanstrom 1994; Nownes and Freeman 1998), scholars have rarely validated these assertions empirically, particularly for public employee interest

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"selective participation"), can result in higher rates of local government spending. Finally, Moe (2006) argues that the political activity of public employees contributes to a previously unrecognized aspect of principal-agent dilemmas within public sector bureaucracies whereby the balance of power between principals (elected officials who represent the interest of the mass public) and agents (street-level bureaucrats in government tasked with implementing the principals' agenda) favors the bureaucrats/agents due to their ability to help select their principals at the ballot box.

groups who represent street-level bureaucrats.<sup>6</sup> By analyzing patterns in teacher political activism, and by extension union efforts to encourage that activity, we are able to evaluate a key claim in the interest group literature that governments are often be an important “patron” in the origin and ultimate success of organized groups (Walker 1991).

### **A Theory of Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization**

We begin with a puzzle. Using an additive index of five participation items asked about by the ANES, we find that the rate of political participation among teachers in the 1950s and early 1960s was relatively modest.<sup>7</sup> In fact, from 1956-1962 teachers reported rates of participation that were only slightly higher than non-teachers, a somewhat surprising fact when one considers that teachers, on average, have higher levels of education than the general public. However, starting in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, teachers begin to participate in politics at rates significantly higher than non-teachers.

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<sup>6</sup> In his opinion surveys of interest groups, Walker (1991, 4-5) notes that he was unable to assess the role of government as a patron for labor organizations because these groups rarely completed his surveys.

<sup>7</sup> Activities included in the five-item index are whether a respondent reported (1) trying to influence the vote of others by talking with them, (2) working for a political campaign, (3) displaying a button or sign in support of a particular candidate, (4) donating money to a candidate’s political campaign, and (5) attending a meeting or rally in support of a particular candidate. Among teachers in the sample, the mean number of activities engaged in during the 1956-1962 election cycles was .85. By way of comparison, non-teachers participated (as expected) at somewhat lower rates with a mean of .62. However, when computing participation levels for the late 1960s and into the early 1970s (the 1968-1974 election cycles), the difference between the two groups increases considerably with teachers reporting a mean of .99 and non-teachers a mean of .52.




What explains this teacher-specific rise in political activism? In searching for a theory that can explain such a significant change in the political activity of one particular occupation group, a likely candidate emerges: the enactment of state mandatory collective bargaining laws that require school districts to collectively bargain with teachers once a majority of teachers request to do so. By the final quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – precisely the time in which teachers and their unions began cementing their place as one of the most active groups in politics – teacher unionization rates soared across U.S. states on the heels of new laws guaranteeing public employees bargaining rights (Saltzman 1985; West 2008).<sup>8</sup> In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to enact mandatory bargaining for state and local government workers. By 1966, three other states – Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Michigan – joined Wisconsin in requiring that school districts bargain collectively with their teacher employees over salaries and working conditions. By 1980, 29 states had enacted public sector labor bargaining laws mandating that school districts bargain collectively with their teacher employees. A map illustrating the variation in the time at which states adopted mandatory bargaining laws is presented in Figure 1.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In practice, such laws almost always translate into teachers being covered by a collective bargaining contract (CBA). According to the National Center for Education Statistics' 2003-04 and 2007-08 Schools and Staffing Survey, on average 93.5 percent of teachers in mandatory bargaining states were covered by a CBA compared to just 16.7 percent of teachers in states without such laws. See Saltzman (1985) for a detailed analysis demonstrating that these laws were an independent cause of increased unionization among public employees.

<sup>9</sup> Because our goal is to identify the consequences of bargaining laws on teacher political participation, we are necessarily concerned with understanding what caused the spread of these laws in the first place. While we take formal steps to deal with the concern of endogeneity in our empirical models, it is worth noting here that prior research on the origins of states' public sector collective bargaining laws does not support the conclusion that these laws were endogenous to our outcome of interest: the political activism of rank-and-file teachers. As Freeman and Ichniowski (1988, 4) stipulate in their widely cited volume on public sector labor relations: "Different states moved

**Figure 1: Timing of Enactment of Mandatory Collective Bargaining Laws**



**Source:** Author's updated analysis of NBER Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set (Freeman and Valetta 1988)

Why would we expect public sector collective bargaining laws to galvanize teacher political participation? One possible explanation is that collective bargaining activated a link in teachers' own minds between political participation and their own professional interests. Indeed, the growing "policies makes citizens" literature provides evidence supporting this explanation (e.g., Campbell 2002, 2003). However, another possible explanation that has received less scholarly attention is that government policies can confer targeted advantages to organized

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at different speeds toward comprehensive public sector labor laws, apparently for 'idiosyncratic' political reasons involving patronage, personalities, and union rivalry rather than broad economic or social factors... Viewed positively, the finding suggests that treating the timing of the laws as exogenous does not create significant biases in analyzing the impact of laws on bargaining and thus strengthens the conclusion that laws can be treated as an independent cause of the growth of collective bargaining."

interest groups better equipping them to mobilize their supporters for political action.<sup>10</sup> In the context of collective bargaining laws and teacher political participation, we posit that teacher unions were the primary recipients of organizational advantages that greatly strengthened their ability to mobilize teachers for political action.

Specifically, Moe's (2011, 38) argument about why teacher unions sought mandatory collective bargaining legislation in the first place – their organizational need to solve collective action problems – offers a promising starting point for theorizing the relationship between collective bargaining laws and teacher political engagement. Prior to the advent of mandatory bargaining, individual teachers had few incentives to bear the costs of union membership (both time and money) and the unions' state affiliates were challenged to coordinate mobilization among teachers scattered across hundreds of school districts. Indeed, Olson (1965) devotes significant space in his classic, *The Logic of Collective Action*, to theorizing about the importance of mandatory bargaining and closed shop policies to the successful establishment and maintenance of labor union organizations.

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<sup>10</sup> For example, Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1973) make a broader argument about the ways in which different types of policies structure patterns of political conflict and shape interest group behavior. However, within the more specific policies shaping mass behavior (i.e., “policies making citizens”) literature, the argument that the resources conferred by government policies can boost subsequent political participation (Skocpol 1992; Pierson 1993) is almost always conceptualized as operating at the individual-level, rather than as a formal subsidy from the state to already established interest groups. For example, while Social Security created a constituency ripe for mobilization (Campbell 2003) and indirectly led to the creation of the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), it did not confer special organizational benefits to the AARP in the same way that mandatory collective bargaining laws did for teachers unions (a process we elaborate on below).

Teachers unions became explicitly advantaged (from an organizing standpoint) when state governments passed laws mandating that school districts bargain collectively with their employees. Perhaps the most obvious advantage is the fact that these laws created powerful incentives for teachers to join their local union, almost always either an NEA or American Federation of Teachers (AFT) affiliate.<sup>11</sup> We have already referenced research showing that, all else equal, union members are more likely to participate in politics than non-members (Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Asher et al. 2001; Radcliff 2001; Leighley and Nagler 2007; Flavin and Radcliff 2011). When considered alongside other studies showing that mandatory bargaining laws were a cause (and not simply a consequence) of higher union membership rates across the states (Saltzman 1985, 1988; Freeman 1986), one connection between these laws and higher levels of subsequent political activity is quite obvious. However, our core argument is not that mandatory bargaining laws simply increased the percentage of teachers who were unionized, which in turn led to greater political activity among teachers on account of their newfound status as union members. Instead, we hypothesize that mandatory collective bargaining laws had a strong causal effect on the political participation of all teachers, both union members and non-members alike.

In short, our argument is that one unanticipated consequence of mandatory collective bargaining was that it decreased the costs for teacher union interest groups to mobilize teachers to participate in coordinated political activity. In states with mandatory bargaining, the local teachers union is empowered as the exclusive representative of all teachers employed by the

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<sup>11</sup> Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has held that government employees cannot be compelled to join labor unions, it has allowed states to maintain so-called “agency fee” provisions in their collective bargaining statutes – provisions that require state employees to pay a fee to the union that represents them (*Abood v. Detroit Board of Education* 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).

school district ensuring that all educators inside the bargaining unit (even those who, for whatever reason, elect not to join the union) will routinely have professional contact with the union that represents their occupational interests. For example, the teachers union is typically afforded a complete list of all employees (including non-members) listing contact and demographic information that can then be used to identify and contact teachers more easily.<sup>12</sup> It is also quite common in mandatory bargaining states to grant local teachers unions the equivalent of congressional “franking” privileges so they can post announcements or leave mailings in the teachers’ lounge for all school employees.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, teachers unions are typically afforded the privilege of using school facilities and supplies to hold meetings and coordinate union-specific activity.<sup>14</sup> Finally, school districts in mandatory bargaining states routinely subsidize the local union president’s salary so that she can focus her efforts on union business. In other words, many school districts effectively pay for the equivalent of a full-time lobbyist for the head of the local union interest group.<sup>15</sup> These examples illustrate how mandatory collective bargaining laws conferred an assortment of benefits (often formal and contractual) to teachers unions at the organizational level, benefits that we hypothesize had the unintended effect of making it easier

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example, the 2010-2012 contract between San Francisco Unified School District (California) and United Educators of San Francisco (Section 5.1, p. 3).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid (Article 5.1 p. 2).

<sup>14</sup> See for example the 2011-2014 contract between the Portland (Maine) Education Association and the Portland Board of Education (Article 6, Sections F, G, & H, p. 10).

<sup>15</sup> See for example the 2011-14 contract between the Montgomery (Maryland) County Education Association and the Board of Education of Montgomery County (Article 3, Sections E1 and E2, p. 3).

for teachers unions to mobilize rank-and-file teachers in electoral politics.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, we suspect that if you asked any number of aspiring policy entrepreneurs intent on founding a successful interest group what assortment of start-up provisions would be most useful in helping them mobilize prospective supporters, the type of advantages mentioned above would rank highly on most every list. For public sector employee unions then, the decision of state governments to establish mandatory collective bargaining laws provided “patron-like” support (Walker 1983, 1991) that subsidized their efforts in the political arena.

In summary, there are strong theoretical reasons to anticipate that mandatory collective bargaining laws increased the rate of political participation among teachers, chiefly by conferring special benefits on teacher unions who were then more effectively able to mobilize teachers. In what follows, we take advantage of the fact that different states adopted mandatory bargaining laws at different times over the last fifty years to evaluate the effects of these laws on teachers’ subsequent political participation.

## **Data and Empirical Strategy**

To measure variation in state collective bargaining laws over time, we use a database originally constructed by Freeman and Valletta (1988) that codes bargaining laws for various classifications of public employees from 1955 to 1985. This dataset was subsequently extended

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<sup>16</sup> States with mandatory bargaining laws are significantly more likely to confer these sorts of benefits to teacher unions than states without mandatory bargaining. For example, according to the National Council of Teacher Quality’s database of teacher labor agreements (which includes contracts from the nation’s 50 largest school districts and the largest district in each state) districts located in mandatory bargaining states are approximately 30 percentage points more likely to subsidize the salary of the local teacher union president while she is on leave conducting union business.

by Rueben to 1996, and then to 2004 by the authors. We code states' bargaining laws for teachers dichotomously: state-years with a mandatory bargaining law are coded as a one and those without are coded as a zero. One particularly useful aspect of this dataset is that 34 states enacted a mandatory bargaining law at varying times during the period we study, which allows us to examine within state effects and offers additional analytic leverage for identifying any possible causal effects of laws on political participation.<sup>17</sup>

To measure political participation, we use the ANES cumulative file, which pools across years from 1956 to 2004 leaving us with a sample of over 1,300 teachers.<sup>18</sup> We focus on teacher participation in electoral and campaign related political activities separate and apart from voting because voting is neither theoretically nor empirically linked to the central puzzle that we seek to explain: the fact that teachers became active in electoral politics whereas they once remained on the sidelines. As previously discussed, teachers have always voted at consistently high rates whereas they participated minimally in other political activities, such as campaign work, in earlier decades (Briney 1958). Indeed, with such little variation in teacher voting rates across the ANES series (reported turnout typically exceeds 80 percent in midterm elections and 90 percent

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<sup>17</sup> We have political participation data for teachers from the ANES for both before and after the change for 26 states.

<sup>18</sup> Teachers are identified using that survey year's specific occupation code from 1956 to 1982, and by using the 71-category occupation code (VCF0154a) in the cumulative file from 1984 to 2004. Unfortunately, the ANES occupation codes do not indicate whether a teacher is employed by a public school or a private school (whose teachers would not be subject to a state's mandatory bargaining law). This means that private school teachers (who between 1955 and 2004 comprised, on average, 13.8 percent of the U.S. teaching workforce (Synder and Dillow 2012)) are lumped in with public school teachers in our analysis. This has the practical effect of excluding a portion of our sample from actually receiving the "treatment" (a mandatory bargaining law) even though they are coded as such, and would ultimately understate any possible relationship between mandatory bargaining laws and political participation among teachers.

in presidential elections), there is simply little to explain empirically as it relates to voting. On the other hand, the rate of teacher participation for non-voting political activities varies significantly across the time series.<sup>19</sup>

The ANES have been asking a consistent battery of political participation items for over fifty years.<sup>20</sup> For each teacher, we compute their score for an additive (0-5) participation index using self-reports to five survey items that ask whether they engaged in the following activities during the election season:

- (1) trying to influence the vote of others by talking with them,
- (2) working for a political campaign,
- (3) displaying a button or sign in support of a particular candidate,
- (4) donating money to a candidate's political campaign, and
- (5) attending a meeting or rally in support of a particular candidate.

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<sup>19</sup> Even though it has a larger number of teachers surveyed, we do not use the Current Population Survey (CPS) in our analysis because it asks only about voting and our principal focus is on other forms of electoral activity. Moreover, the CPS only began identifying the state of residence for each respondent consistently in 1978, after the majority of states had already enacted their collective bargain laws (thus making a comparison of participation rates before and after implementation within states impossible).

<sup>20</sup> All participation items were asked in all survey years except: working for a political campaign, displaying a button or sign, and attending a meeting were not asked in 1958 and 1966; and donate to a political campaign was not asked in 1958 and 1970. Because respondents were not asked about all five participatory acts, survey responses for 1958, 1966, and 1970 are dropped from the analysis. However, we uncover substantively identical results to those presented if we instead use a "percentage of possible acts engaged in" index that divides the number of acts a respondent engaged in by the total number of acts that were asked about in that survey year (which allows us to include 1958, 1966, and 1970 in the analysis).



Among teachers in the sample, the mean for the participatory index is .92 and a standard deviation of 1.21. By way of comparison, non-teachers participated (as expected) at lower rates with a mean of .54 and a standard deviation of .94.

Our estimation strategy is to model political participation as a function of whether there is a mandatory collective bargaining law in a teacher's state the year of the survey and a series of individual level control variables including whether a respondent is a union member, the intensity of their political partisanship,<sup>21</sup> their level of education, income, age,<sup>22</sup> gender, and dummy variables for whether a respondent is African American, Hispanic, or an "other" race<sup>23</sup> (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Accounting for whether a teacher is a union member or not is especially important because it allows us to evaluate whether a mandatory bargaining law has an independent effect on the political participation of teachers above and beyond the fact that (1) a mandatory bargaining law makes it more likely that teachers will join a teacher union and (2) union members are generally more likely to participate in politics than non-members (Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Asher et al. 2001; Radcliff 2001; Leighley and Nagler

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<sup>21</sup> Intensity of partisanship is constructed by folding the ANES seven point partisanship scale with strong Democrats/Republicans coded as a 4, weak Democrats/Republicans coded as a 3, leaning Democrats/Republicans coded as a 2, and independent and/or apolitical respondents coded as a 1.

<sup>22</sup> We include a term for age and age squared because of our expectation that the relationship between age and participation is curvilinear.

<sup>23</sup> For race/ethnicity, "white" serves as the reference category in all models.

2007; Flavin and Radcliff 2011).<sup>24</sup> Using these variables we then estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{t_{sy}} = \beta_0 + \text{BargainingLaw}_{t_{sy}} \beta_1 + X_{t_{sy}} \beta_2 + \text{NonTeacher}_{t_{sy}} \beta_3 + \mu_{sy} + \varepsilon_{t_{sy}} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{t_{sy}}$  is a measure of political participation for individual teacher  $t$  in state  $s$  in year  $y$ ,  $\text{BargainingLaw}_{t_{sy}}$  is a dummy variable for whether there was a mandatory collective bargaining law in state  $s$  during year  $y$ ,  $X_{t_{sy}}$  represents a vector of individual teacher characteristics discussed above,  $\mu_{sy}$  are state and year fixed effects respectively, and  $\varepsilon_{t_{sy}}$  is the error term. The inclusion of state fixed effects allows us to account for all of the other ways in which states are different from one another that are constant over time (history, culture, etc.) and estimate the effect of law changes within states. Including the year fixed effects allow us to account for events that might affect participation rates in all states uniformly in a given year. Both the state and year fixed effects are accomplished by including a dummy variable for every state and for every year in the sample (excluding one as a reference category).<sup>25</sup> Importantly, we also include the control variable  $\text{NonTeacher}_{t_{sy}}$  represented by  $\beta_3$  in Equation 1 which measures the mean level of

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<sup>24</sup> As a second way to confirm that the effect of mandatory bargaining laws on teacher political participation is not confined only to union members, we ran the model presented in Table 1 only for teachers who did not report being a union member. We find the same positive and statistically significant effect for a mandatory bargaining law.

<sup>25</sup> The inclusion of state and year (i.e. two-way) fixed effects creates a potential degrees of freedom concern with our sample of just over 1,000 teachers (though it also biases against us finding a coefficient that is statistically different from zero for state mandatory collective bargaining laws). To investigate this concern, we ran an additional analysis on the entire sample of ANES responses (teachers and non-teachers) and included an interaction term for teacher x mandatory bargaining law. The interaction term is (as expected) positive and statistically different from zero, indicating that teachers are more likely to participate in politics when their state has a mandatory bargaining law.

political activity reported by non-teachers in each teacher respondent's state-year to control for any idiosyncratic events that might have led to higher or lower than average political participation for individuals residing in a particular state during a particular election year. For all models, we cluster standard errors by state-year to account for the fact that respondents nested within the same state-year are not statistically independent from one another (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009).

### **Empirical Analysis**


As discussed above, there is evidence of a significant uptick in the political participation of teachers toward the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s when more than half of all states adopted mandatory public sector collective bargaining laws. However, our goal is to identify whether this well documented increase in teacher political participation was concentrated among teachers in those states that established mandatory collective bargaining laws for teachers, and whether those laws were, in fact, the cause of that increase in participatory behavior. Before turning to our multivariate analysis, we present an initial examination of the raw data on teacher participation in states that adopted mandatory bargaining laws by comparing participation rates before and after law enactments. Figure 2 displays the average number of political acts registered on the ANES five-item index for teachers and for non-teachers before and after a mandatory collective bargaining law was enacted in their state of residence.<sup>26</sup> The figure reveals that, in the two subsequent elections following the passage of a bargaining law in their state, and especially

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<sup>26</sup> Because Figure 2 displays the difference in political participation before and after a state implemented a mandatory collective bargaining law, only the 26 states that changed their laws during the time period were included in the figure.

the third and fourth elections after the law went into effect, teachers reported a sharp increase in their rate of political participation. By contrast the political participation of non-teachers does not appear to be related to changes in their state’s public sector collective bargaining law.

**Figure 2**



**Source:** Authors’ analysis of American National Election Study Cumulative File descriptive statistics.

Next, we evaluate the relationship between mandatory bargaining laws and teacher political participation more rigorously by modeling political participation as a function of state collective bargaining laws and the host of control variables discussed above. Because our index of political participation is a count (0-5) of the number of participatory acts a teacher engaged in and is over dispersed, we use a negative binomial regression estimator. In Table 1, we present the results of modeling political participation among teachers as a function of whether that teacher’s state-year has a mandatory collective bargaining law or not, individual level control

variables for union membership, strength of partisanship, education, income, age, gender, and race, the average number of participatory acts for non-teachers in a teacher's state-year, and state and year fixed effects. Column 1 reports that the coefficient for a mandatory collective bargaining law is positive and bounded above zero at conventional levels of statistical significance ( $p < .05$ ), indicating that teachers participate in politics at higher rates after their state implements a mandatory bargaining law. Simply put, a mandatory bargaining law appears to boost subsequent political participation among teachers in the ANES sample. In addition, we find that, as expected, self-identified union members participate at higher rates than non-members and partisans participate at higher rates than non-partisans.

As a way to check the robustness of our results and confirm that the effect of a mandatory bargaining law on political participation is isolated only to teachers, we also conduct a placebo test. Specifically, we run the same model specification reported in Column 1 for non-teachers in the ANES sample. If mandatory bargaining laws boost political participation among non-teachers in the same way as teachers, then it is likely that the boost in participation among teachers is caused by some other factor we have not accounted for. However, if a mandatory bargaining law has no effect on the political participation of non-teachers, that evidence would provide additional confidence that the effect we find for teachers is not spurious. Column 2 reports the results of the estimation for non-teachers and reveals that a mandatory bargaining law has no effect on the political participation of non-teachers (the coefficient is actually negative, though not statistically different from zero). This null result for non-teachers provides additional confidence that the effect of state collective bargaining laws we observe for teachers is not spurious and is consistent with the hypothesis that these laws had the effect of motivating occupation-specific political activity.

**Table 1: Mandatory Collective Bargaining Laws Increase Political Participation among Teachers**

	(1)	(2)
<i>Sample</i>	Teachers	Non-Teachers
Mandatory Collective Bargaining Law	0.347* [0.137]	-0.004 [0.023]
Union Member	0.244* [0.093]	0.093* [0.027]
Strength of Partisanship	0.268* [0.046]	0.304* [0.012]
Education	0.083 [0.051]	0.183* [0.007]
Income	0.064 [0.048]	0.127* [0.010]
Age	0.019 [0.015]	0.016* [0.004]
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000* [0.000]
Female	-0.047 [0.090]	-0.196* [0.021]
African American	-0.301* [0.151]	-0.024 [0.037]
Hispanic	-0.081 [0.204]	-0.172* [0.057]
Other Race	-0.186 [0.194]	-0.096 [0.063]
Average # of Acts for Non-Teachers in State-Year	0.357 [0.229]	1.522* [0.057]
Constant	-2.959* [0.684]	-3.639* [0.117]
State Effects?	Y	Y
Year Effects?	Y	Y
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.05	.07
N	1,133	28,979

Dependent variable: 0-5 political participation index. Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state-year reported beneath in brackets. \* denotes  $p < .05$  using a two-tailed test.

Substantively, the effect of a mandatory collective bargaining law on political participation among teachers is quite large. Table 2 reports the predicted change on the five item participation index when manipulating the independent variable as indicated and holding all other independent variables in the model at their mean value. The top row of the table reveals that enacting a mandatory collective bargaining law leads to a predicted increase of .27 on the participation index. By comparison, this is larger than the difference between a teacher who is not a union member compared to a teacher who is a union member, a teacher with some college compared to a teacher with an advanced degree, a teacher in the lowest income quintile compared to a teacher in the highest income quintile, and nearly as large as the difference between a teacher who is non-partisan compared to a teacher who identifies with a political

**Table 2: Comparing Substantive Effects on the Political Participation of Teachers**

<b>Explanatory variable</b>	<b>Predicted increase on participation index</b>
<i>Mandatory Collective Bargaining Law</i> No → Yes	.27 [.05, .48]
<i>Union Member</i> No → Yes	.20 [.04, .37]
<i>Strength of Partisanship</i> Non-partisan → Partisan (weak)	.33 [.24, .41]
<i>Education</i> Some college → Advanced degree	.12 [-.02, .27]
<i>Income</i> Bottom quintile → Top quintile	.20 [-.10, .49]

Cell entries are the predicted change on the 0-5 participation index when varying the independent variable as specified and holding all other variables at their mean values (generated using CLARIFY from the model specification in Table 1, Column 1). 95% confidence interval for the predicted change reported in brackets beneath the estimate.

party. In sum, when compared to traditional predictors of political participation, the effect of a mandatory collective bargaining law on teachers' political activity is substantively large.

Throughout this paper we have posited that the enactment of mandatory bargaining laws led to an increase in the political participation of rank-and-file teachers. However, an alternative interpretation of the findings we present in Table 1 is that the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction. Specifically, it is possible that teachers ratcheted up their political participation with the expressed aim of securing a mandatory bargaining law in their state that would benefit them professionally. In other words, the boost in participation among teachers may be a cause (and not an effect) of a change in state collective bargaining laws. To probe this possibility, we run a series of models where we examine if political participation among teachers increased in the years immediately preceding a change in a state's collective bargaining law. Specifically, we "lead" the mandatory collective bargaining law variable for one and two elections before the law actually changed in a state and compare the results to those displayed in Table 1.

Table 3 reports the results of these two models with the number of elections the mandatory bargaining law measure is led indicated at the top of the column. We find that the coefficient for a mandatory bargaining law is not statistically different from zero when it is led one or two elections. In other words, political participation among teachers was not higher in the years immediately before the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law in their state. We interpret these results as evidence that the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law temporally precedes an increase in political participation among teachers and not the other way around. Simply put, there is no evidence that rank-and-file teachers were especially politically active or clamoring for a mandatory bargaining law in the years leading up to its enactment.



**Table 3: Political Participation among Teachers Does Not Increase Prior to the Enactment of a Mandatory Collective Bargaining Law**

	(1)	(2)
<i>Sample</i>	Teachers	Teachers
<i>Law change is led...</i>	1 Election	2 Elections
Mandatory Collective Bargaining Law	0.130 [0.155]	0.004 [0.174]
Union Member	0.244* [0.094]	0.245* [0.094]
Strength of Partisanship	0.263* [0.046]	0.261* [0.046]
Education	0.082 [0.051]	0.082 [0.051]
Income	0.064 [0.049]	0.063 [0.048]
Age	0.019 [0.015]	0.019 [0.015]
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]
Female	-0.055 [0.091]	-0.055 [0.091]
African American	-0.317* [0.152]	-0.318* [0.152]
Hispanic	-0.098 [0.205]	-0.102 [0.205]
Other Race	-0.212 [0.195]	-0.218 [0.195]
Average # of Acts for Non-Teachers in State-Year	0.339 [0.229]	0.326 [0.230]
Constant	-2.890* [0.682]	-2.869* [0.683]
State Effects?	Y	Y
Year Effects?	Y	Y
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.05	.05
<i>N</i>	1,133	1,133

Dependent variable: 0-5 political participation index. Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state-year reported beneath in brackets. \* denotes  $p < .05$  using a two-tailed test.

In addition, although we have presented evidence that state governments' decisions to enact sweeping statewide public sector bargaining legislation (for multiple occupations) was not likely a response to politically active rank-and-file teachers, we might be concerned that mandatory bargaining laws emerged (and were thus endogenous to) strong and influential state-level teacher union interest groups. This concern would be especially problematic for our theory that the chief mechanism linking newly adopted mandatory bargaining laws to increased political activity among rank-and-file teachers was the fact that such laws conferred important organizational advantages to teachers unions that in turn helped them mobilize rank-and-file teachers in politics.

To investigate our concern that laws may have been adopted in response to the prior existence of a strong teacher organization within a state, we analyze a survey of state legislators conducted in 1963 by Wayne L. Francis. State legislators were asked, "One hears a lot these days about the activities of interest groups and lobbies. Which would you say are the most powerful organizations of this kind in your state?" and could rank up to six different groups in order of their influence. We calculated (1) the average ranking of teacher interest groups or teacher associations among legislators in each state, (2) the percent of legislators in each state mentioning a teacher group at all, and (3) the percent of legislators in each state that ranked a teacher group as most powerful. We then separately used each measure as a predictor of whether a state implemented a mandatory collective bargaining law in the subsequent decade. In all three probit models, the coefficient for perceived teacher interest group power in a state is not statistically different from zero (i.e. none of the measures predict whether a state implements a mandatory collective bargaining law in the near future).<sup>27</sup> We interpret these null findings as

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<sup>27</sup> Results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request.

further evidence that mandatory bargaining laws led to an increase in political activism among teachers as opposed to the laws being enacted in response to the strength and political clout of teacher organizations beforehand.

Finally, why does political participation among teachers increase after the enactment of a mandatory collective bargaining law? Above, we theorized that the introduction of mandatory bargaining policies in the teaching profession provided subsidy-like benefits from the state to teacher interest groups that desired to organize their members in the political arena. In the case of public school teachers, the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law chiefly advantages teacher unions by making it much easier for them to organize and contact teachers whose salaries and benefits are now negotiated by the teacher union (regardless if a teacher is a union member or not). Because of the unique professional relationship where teachers have the opportunity to help select their bosses by electing school board members and other education officials (Moe 2006, 2011), teachers unions have a strong interest in capitalizing on the law change by mobilizing this newly organized group.

We evaluate the plausibility of this mechanism by investigating whether the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law increased the likelihood of teachers being a target of non-political party related electoral mobilization efforts. Relying on the very same model specification<sup>28</sup> that we have used to identify the effects of bargaining laws on individual teacher participation throughout this paper, in Table 4 we examine whether teachers were more likely to report being

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<sup>28</sup> Instead of controlling for the average number of participatory acts among non-teachers in a teacher respondent's state-year, we instead control for the percent of respondents contacted (Columns 1-4) and the mean level of interest (Columns 5-6) among non-teachers in a teacher respondent's state-year. Like before, this variable is intended to control for any idiosyncratic events that might have led to higher or lower than average contacting by groups or political interest in a particular state during a particular election year.

targeted for mobilization by the Democratic Party (Column 1), the Republican Party (Column 2), and someone other than the parties<sup>29</sup> (Column 3) after the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law. We find that neither political party is more likely to contact teachers after they have been organized into bargaining units under a statewide mandatory bargaining law; however, we do find a strong relationship between mandatory bargaining laws and the likelihood of a teacher being the mobilization target contacted by some other (outside) group.<sup>30</sup>

Although the ANES question wording does not specify the identity of the contacting group, we strongly suspect that for most teacher respondents the group they are reporting contact from is the teacher union. One way to empirically test our suspicion that these outside mobilization contacts are coming at the bequest of a teachers union is to replicate the analysis (using the same model specification) for non-teachers. We report the results of this analysis in Column 4 of Table 4 and find no evidence that non-teachers were more likely to report being contacted by an “other” non party-based organization after the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law in their state. Instead, the effect is confined only to teachers.

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<sup>29</sup> The N is smaller in this model compared to the models evaluating contact from a political party because this item was not asked in the ANES prior to 1980. Descriptively, 18% of teachers were contacted by an outside group in state-years with a mandatory bargaining law compared to only 11% of teachers in state-years without a mandatory bargaining law.

<sup>30</sup> As a further way to evaluate contact by an outside group as a mechanism, we modeled political participation among teachers with the same specification in Table 1 but also added in an indicator for contact by an outside group. With this contact indicator added to the model, the coefficient for mandatory bargaining law is no longer statistically different from zero, indicating that contact (from an outside group) mediates the relationship between a mandatory bargaining law in a teacher’s state and higher levels of political participation.

**Table 4: Evaluating Mechanisms Linking Mandatory Bargaining Laws and Participation**

<i>Sample</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent Variable</i>	Teachers Contact – Democrats	Teachers Contact – Republicans	Teachers Contact – Other Group	Non-Teachers Contact – Other Group	Teachers Interest in elections	Teachers Interest in politics
Mandatory Collective Bargaining Law	0.144 [0.235]	-0.261 [0.202]	4.226* [0.472]	0.113 [0.068]	-0.096 [0.147]	-0.111 [0.179]
Union Member	0.132 [0.122]	-0.020 [0.140]	0.241 [0.160]	0.128* [0.044]	0.143 [0.093]	0.053 [0.092]
Strength of Partisanship	0.053 [0.053]	-0.030 [0.054]	-0.112 [0.071]	0.020 [0.015]	0.200* [0.041]	0.209* [0.042]
Education	0.106 [0.062]	0.022 [0.065]	0.036 [0.081]	0.074* [0.010]	0.043 [0.042]	0.128* [0.041]
Income	0.113* [0.057]	0.111 [0.063]	0.200* [0.080]	0.039* [0.015]	0.000 [0.044]	-0.029 [0.043]
Age	0.033 [0.017]	0.047* [0.020]	-0.005 [0.025]	0.015* [0.005]	0.005 [0.014]	0.030 [0.015]
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]	-0.000* [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]
Female	-0.003 [0.103]	0.115 [0.119]	0.136 [0.147]	-0.004 [0.030]	-0.246* [0.086]	-0.483* [0.087]
African American	0.404* [0.158]	-0.367* [0.169]	0.011 [0.243]	-0.045 [0.053]	0.028 [0.133]	-0.081 [0.121]
Hispanic	0.353 [0.241]	-0.213 [0.316]	0.591* [0.264]	-0.017 [0.072]	-0.080 [0.248]	-0.165 [0.168]
Other Race	-0.290 [0.244]	-0.596 [0.305]	0.122 [0.306]	0.055 [0.076]	-0.438* [0.180]	-0.425* [0.157]
Average Interest/% Contacted for Non-Teachers in State-Year	3.012* [0.577]	2.983* [0.646]	1.530 [0.952]	4.992* [0.175]	0.114 [0.265]	-0.087 [0.232]
Constant	-3.252* [0.660]	-3.680* [0.740]	-1.614 [0.972]	-2.958* [0.148]	--	--
Cut Point #1	--	--	--	--	0.487 [0.786]	0.593 [0.762]
Cut Point #2	--	--	--	--	1.962* [0.783]	1.552* [0.759]
Cut Point #3	--	--	--	--	--	2.762* [0.763]
State Effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.11	.14	.12	.07	.08	.10
N	976	1,018	638	14,809	1,152	1,044

Dependent variable listed above each column. Cell entries are probit (Columns 1-4) and ordered probit (Columns 5-6) coefficients with standard errors clustered by state-year reported beneath in brackets. \* denotes  $p < .05$  using a two-tailed test.

While we have focused on an organization-based explanation of increased political participation among teachers, it is also possible that mandatory bargaining laws activated a psychological link between participation and advancing occupational interests in teachers' minds. This would be consistent with prior studies that demonstrate how public policies (and the material incentives they provide) can activate previously unengaged citizens and motivate them to political action (Campbell 2002, 2003). To test this possibility, we use the same model specification as before to examine the effect of a mandatory bargaining law on the interest of teachers in elections (Column 5) and in politics in general (Column 6).<sup>31</sup> In both models, the coefficient for a mandatory collective bargaining law is not statistically different from zero, indicating that teachers do not report being more interested in elections or politics in general after the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law in their state. This analysis suggests that mandatory bargaining laws did not activate citizens to be more interested and engaged with politics in the way that other policy changes have. In addition, these results suggest that collective bargaining laws did not, in and of themselves, do very much to reverse the individual-level reticence that teachers reported having about engaging in partisan political activity in surveys from prior decades. When considered in tandem with the null results in the political interest models, these estimations suggest that the primary mechanism behind the boost in

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<sup>31</sup> Interest in elections is measured using this survey item: "Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been/were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in (1952-1998: following) the political campaigns (so far) this year?" General political interest is measured using this survey item: "Some people seem to follow (1964: think about) what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?"

political participation among teachers is the greater likelihood of teacher unions and other affiliated groups contacting and mobilizing them to political action after the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law.

## **Conclusion**

E. E. Schattschneider (1935, 288) famously declared that “new policies create a new politics.” In this paper, we extend Schattschneider’s insight to consider how governments help subsidize the political activity of their own workers by adopting mandatory collective bargaining laws that decrease the costs for public sector employee unions to successfully organize and mobilize workers in the political arena. Exploiting variation in the timing of mandatory bargaining laws across states, we find that the political activity of rank-and-file teachers (both union members and those who decided not to join the union) significantly increased after enactment of a mandatory bargaining law in their state. We then investigate our theory that bargaining laws conferred special advantages that subsidized labor organization and mobilization and uncover evidence that teachers (but not other citizens) were significantly more likely to report being asked to participate in electoral activity by an outside (non-political party) group after their state adopted a mandatory bargaining law.

These findings contribute to important theoretical debates within several scholarly literatures including policy feedback, the political activity of street-level bureaucrats, and the origins and maintenance of interest groups. For example, policy feedback studies frequently consider how the state structures relationships between different citizen groups (Schneider and Ingram 1993), which in turn can either enhance or deter certain individuals from participating in politics (Soss 1999; Campbell 2002, 2003, 2012; Mettler 2002, 2005; Mettler and Welch 2004).

We extend the logic behind this “policies make citizens” thesis beyond the unit of the individual citizen to examine how “policies make interest groups.” In doing so, we show that policies can influence mass behavior not only by altering individual citizens’ attitudes or perceptions about the merits of their own political engagement, but also by constructing privileged relationships between government and organized interests that can help those privileged groups mobilize their supporters for political action (Walker 1983, 1991).

Traditionally, scholars of the public bureaucracy have focused on the ways in which structural and informational constraints (i.e. expertise resulting in information asymmetry) shape the efficiency, accountability, and overall responsiveness of public agencies. For example, Lipsky’s (1980) seminal work highlighted how the working conditions and discretion afforded to “street-level” bureaucrats (including teachers) influences the delivery of public services, and by extension public policy outcomes as citizens experience them in daily life. It is only recently that political scientists have begun to acknowledge the centrality of rank-and-file bureaucrats as influential political activists in their own right (Moe 2006; Berry 2009). Our findings contribute to these emerging debates by drawing attention to how governments’ decisions to mandate collective bargaining in the public sector shapes the overall balance of power between principals and agents in public sector bureaucracies.

Our analysis also helps to answer an empirical puzzle that has had significant implications for contemporary American politics: the rise in influence of teachers and the unions that represent them. Political scientist Alan Rosenthal (1966, 85-86) noted that during the 1950s and 1960s, “few observers of the [American] educational scene thought very much of, or even thought at all about, the potency of teachers or their organizations. A decade ago, one expert characterized their influence rather briefly: ‘Teachers as a group have little or no say in the



formulation of school policy.” Yet by 1976, the NEA drew national attention when it sent 265 of its members as delegates to that year’s Democratic National Convention and saw its congressional endorsees win 291 of 349 races (Methvin and Herndon 1979). Additionally, for the first time in the organization’s history, the NEA endorsed a Presidential candidate that election season (Jimmy Carter). Four years later, Vice President Walter Mondale told a reporter, “I’ve learned that if you want to go somewhere in national politics these days, you better get the NEA behind you” (Merry 1980).

What caused this significant change where in just a few short decades teachers emerged as one of the most active and influential groups in American politics? Our analysis suggests that the answer lies, in part, in the decision by state governments to adopt mandatory collective bargaining in the public sector. In fact, it is not a stretch to suggest that the political power of teacher unions and the political activism of teachers would likely be much less today if mandatory bargaining laws were never enacted by state governments. Yet, as Moe (2009, 156) rightly notes, “Students of American politics have had little to say about the rise of public sector unions, and in particular about the impact of collective bargaining on the structure and performance of government.” This is despite the fact that there are strong theoretical reasons to anticipate that collective bargaining will have important consequences for an array of political phenomena, consequences that likely extend widely to other public employee groups ranging from police and fire protection to county and city maintenance workers.<sup>32</sup> In the midst of current efforts to curtail public sector collective bargaining rights in several states across the U.S. (e.g., Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana), these findings provide an important reminder that the laws

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<sup>32</sup> See Anzia and Moe (2012) for one such analysis examining the consequences of public sector bargaining for the cost of government in other (non-teaching) public sector professions.

governments enact can have enduring and often unanticipated implications for interest group organization and citizens' political participation.

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