“Migration and Reformation in Early Modern Germany”

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Introduction

Most contemporary discussions of migration in the German context focus on the current refugee crisis and its implications for Germany’s political situation or its potential for reshaping the country as a thoroughly multicultural society. Meanwhile, the vast majority of historical studies of German migration deal with the mass overseas emigration of the nineteenth century or the movement of displaced persons in the postwar period. Recently, scholars have begun to acknowledge that migration was a major force in German history in the early modern period as well. The Reformation had a major impact on migration within Germany, not only prompting the forced migration of religious nonconformists, but also fostering increasing intolerance towards the mobile poor.

Migration in Early Modern Germany

Having debunked the myth of preindustrial Europe as static and sedentary, historians now recognize that migration was a prominent feature of early modern European society. Recent studies have demonstrated that throughout the period a substantial proportion of European men and women relocated temporarily or permanently at some point in their lives.¹ According to a recent estimate, at least 42 million Europeans migrated between 1501 and 1650, with an increasing migration rate that likely topped 20 percent of the total population by the years 1601-1650.² In the German-speaking lands, at least one-third of the population migrated at some point in their lives during this period.³ These high levels of mobility were prompted by both push and pull factors. Many migrants took to the roads by choice, seeking economic opportunity, to
acquire training or education, or to find a spouse. Others fled their homelands in the face of war, famine, disease, or religious persecution.

Migration took many forms during the early modern era, as traditional forms of migration intensified in response to widespread economic change and new modes of overseas migration appeared. Men and women migrated seasonally, for a set term, or permanently in search of economic opportunity. Labor mobility was prominent across the entire economic spectrum: rural and urban, agrarian and artisanal, skilled and unskilled. One prominent example of this sort of labor migration is provided by the large numbers of Westphalians, known as *Hollandsgänger*, who helped provide the seasonal labor necessary to maintain Holland’s growing commercial empire in the seventeenth century. By 1700 as many as 15,000 of these laborers traveled to Holland each year. The growth of European militaries also prompted young men to sign on as soldiers and sailors. Still others migrated to Europe’s overseas colonies.

**Migration and the Reformation**

The Protestant Reformation had a dramatic effect on migration patterns, prompting the expulsion of religious nonconformists and hardening attitudes towards the wandering poor. The Reformation built upon late medieval efforts to curtail begging by the able-bodied poor, who moved along Europe’s roads seeking sustenance, their ranks swollen by the economic downturns and religious unrest of the period. Undermining the spiritual benefits of almsgiving and emphasizing the sanctity of work, it at once reflected and amplified traditional hostilities toward vagrants. Informed by these theological currents, early evangelical church ordinances in Germany outlawed begging by foreign vagrants or able-bodied locals. The city of Wittenberg, for example, issued a poor law in 1521 that outlawed all begging and ordered that the “worthy” poor should be supported from a community chest instead. Throughout Germany, authorities
embraced similar policies, restricting poor relief to local paupers and calling for the summary expulsion of foreign vagrants. Viewing the unemployed as shiftless idlers, authorities sought to distinguish between the “deserving” (aged or infirm local indigents eligible for poor relief) and the “undeserving” (able-bodied and foreign migrants without steady employment). While the former might draw support from the community chest, the latter, labeled “sturdy beggars,” faced expulsion. Meanwhile, as rural impoverishment spread after 1550, paupers who could not secure a livelihood in their home parish were often forced to practice “subsistence migration,” relegated to the ranks of the hungry beggars on Europe’s roads.\(^5\)

Amid the confessional upheavals of the Reformation and the Wars of Religion, the migration of religious non-conformists intensified throughout Europe. Whether they were pushed out through expulsion or prompted to move to find safety among their co-religionists, thousands of religious refugees left their homelands in the wake of the Reformation. These changes caused Protestants and Catholics alike to migrate. In the wake of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, for example, the principle of *Cuius regio, eius religio* authorized territorial princes in the Holy Roman Empire to enforce confessional conformity within their realms and permitted nonconformists to relocate. In response, Protestants and Catholics living under a prince who adhered to a rival confession often faced the prospect of rebuilding their lives in another territory. Calvinists, excluded from the religious compromise reached in the Peace of Augsburg and particularly threatening to Catholic authorities, are the era’s most famous religious refugees.\(^6\) After the start of the Thirty Years’ War in 1618, many thousands of Protestants from Bohemia and Austria, many of them Calvinists, were forced to relocate to friendly refuges in Germany. A recent estimate suggests that as many as 100,000 refugees left the Habsburg Crown lands for central and southern Germany in the 1600s alone.\(^7\)


Borders. Territory. Space.

Borders have played a central role in the political history of the Federal Republic. As the postwar demarcation lines between the western occupation zones withered away, they gave shape to the territory that the Federal Republic came to occupy. Over the course of the 1950s, the one demarcation line that did not wither away was transformed into the central icon of the Cold War, the Iron Curtain. Whereas this eastern border was upheld by a militarized border regime, the borders to Germany’s western neighbors grew increasingly permeable and eventually came to signify a process we tend to call European integration. A border also stands at the center of Germany’s least expected postwar transformation: the fall of the Berlin Wall. Borders matter, especially now that they are “back” with such force in contemporary European events.

How can we gain fresh perspectives on the history of the Federal Republic by focusing on borders, territory and space?

Borders delimit the political territory within which a government exerts its jurisdiction. Territory is not a “natural” category but the result of delimiting geographical space for the purpose of governing it. It is thus a concept generated by people who organize space with specific aims in mind. Where early modern European states were still tolerant towards fluid border zones that separated one sovereignty from another, borders grew into relatively sharp lines during the modern era. Yet the production of political spaces, or territorialization, does not exhaust itself in the delimitation of territory through border markers on the ground or lines on a map, both of which are complex activities in and of themselves. Rather, territorialization entails the administrative, economic, institutional, infrastructural and also symbolic appropriation of space.

As historians, we frequently analyze processes of territorialization without necessarily being aware of it. We describe historical instances of territorialization in political, economic, social and cultural terms. We are attuned to the symbolic appropriation of space through e.g. map making, and we are aware that perceptions of space can have “real life consequences” over time. For instance, the interlocking developments of industrialization, population growth, labor migration and urbanization in Germany hastened an apperception of space as shrinking, i.e. the sense that Germany was getting crowded and needed more space. Ulrike Jureit argues for a tangible link between the perception and metaphors of shrinking space and colonial land grabs. Colonial spaces, in turn, were regularly conceptualized as “empty”. Her argument proceeds to relate the changing sense of space born by modernity to völkisch and racist theories in order to explain the appeal of the Lebensraum idea that moved from metaphor to brutal reality during the Second World War.

The history of the Federal Republic strikes me as a rich example for an analysis attuned to borders, territory and space for the simple reason that it was a new state with fresh and contested borders. One may assume that the new state engaged in various territorialization strategies to
respond to the postwar upheaval of displacement from former German territories and the ideological competition with a neighboring German state. What comes into view if we read familiar instances in West German history with a sensitivity towards their spatial and territorial dimension? Here’s one example ~

The term “Rhenish capitalism” customarily refers to the West German economic order, a form of state-regulated capitalism with institutionalized social partnerships. Rhenish capitalism has an obvious spatial dimension – it’s on the Rhine. Beyond the pun, however, lies an issue that merits attention. The territorial outcomes of WWII brought about a spatial realignment of German industry that was undergirding West German economic recovery and moved economic productivity westward. Reduced by the eastern territories and with the “rump” cut in two, industrial gravity shifted to and conglomcrated in the Rhine and Ruhr region and in the orbit of cities like Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Ludwigshafen or Mannheim, slicing the Federal Republic somewhat diagonally into a more industrially developed southwestern part and a more agriculture-oriented northeastern part. It is worth noting that the “economic miracle,” so central to West German identity, has a strong spatial dimension. Growing aware of this dimension is one thing, assessing its deeper consequences quite another. I give it a try ~

As the freshly divided country adjusted its economic capacities to a reduced space, processed an unprecedented in-migration of expellees and refugees, and coped with war damages to housing, traffic infrastructure and public works, spatial planners assumed a central role as policy experts, despite (or perhaps, perversely, because of) their deep involvement in Nazi policies in occupied eastern territories. Once postwar economic growth kicked in at an unexpected pace, the growth processes posed new challenges since they unfolded in spatially uneven and “unhealthy” ways. The country was in obvious disarray, and spatial planners were perceived as the experts who held the knowledge to restore order. This matters because spatial planners moved into a position to define what “order” was supposed to look like.

Simply put, the ideal order consisted of an even distribution of people, economic resources and economic activity within the remaining space of the bisected country, ensuring comparable living conditions (gleichwertige Lebensbedingungen) across the country. Economic activity, especially industrial manufacturing, had to be decentralized across the country, not clustered within a few industrial centers. This, in turn, would lead to an even distribution of people, reduce stark differences between urban areas and the countryside, and ultimately lead to spatial harmony and social peace, the latter a central aim of the social market economy. Since the private economy did not appear to act according to the desired distribution principles – processes of economic agglomeration were still poorly understood at the time – the state had to intervene within the parameters of prevailing ordoliberalism. Embedded in this vision of order were anti-modern and anti-urban ideological tenets that had accompanied spatial planning since its inception after World War I. Urban agglomerations of industrial production and people (Ballung), so the thinking went, exposed residents to the dangers of “massification” (Vermassung) that cut their ties to the soil and made them politically susceptible to communist ideas. Gleichwertige Lebensbedingungen became the guiding principle (Leitbild), if not mantra, of spatial planners and policy makers alike. In the complex web of West German federalism, it was invoked as a constitutional mandate by those who stood to gain from it. Yet Ariane Leendertz has convincingly argued that the connection between the guiding principle of comparable living
conditions and the constitution was one of legal interpretation. While a few GG articles did reference this goal, the constitution served spatial planners rather as a justification for their pre-conceived general principle than as its root cause. Leendertz traces the enthusiasm for this Leitbild back to the anti-modern quest for order in the 1920s and 30s: comparable living conditions were the embodiment of spatial harmony.\textsuperscript{10}

Yet neither the role nor the principles of spatial planners remained static over the years. The onset of economic stagnation in the early 1970s checked much of the planning optimism of prior years. The local government reform of the 1970s confronted planning experts with larger and more confident municipalities, undermining any remaining attitudes that the spatial organization of the country could be effected at the drawing board. The environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s led to an “ecologization” of spatial planning during the 1980s. The new guiding principles, enshrined in the Federal Spatial Order Law of July 1989, now placed the free development of the individual, the protection of natural resources, and the open-ended use of spaces alongside the established goal of creating comparable living conditions.\textsuperscript{11} Perhaps the most profound challenge occurred in 2004 when Federal President Horst Köhler (CDU) stated in an interview that differences in living conditions needed to be accepted, prompting a renewed engagement of spatial planners with the concept.\textsuperscript{12} The issue may prove consequential in the long run since it triggers the normative question of whether sparsely populated regions should maintain an infrastructure of schools, hospitals etc. comparable to more densely populated ones.\textsuperscript{13}

If the above example is any good, then a case could be made that the spatial realignment of the founding years rippled through the history of the Federal Republic not merely in terms of economic geography (which industry is where and why) but also in terms of public social policy. One could read the goal of \textit{gleichwertige Lebensbedingungen} as a territorialization strategy that not only sought to integrate the new state territory but was also a core element in the inter-German competition, especially since the GDR’s primary promise was one of social harmony.

A spatial perspective on the history of West Germany brings other examples to mind. For instance, the history of mapping the Federal Republic strikes me as a rich vein that could be tapped as a window onto “mental maps” in a country where the representation of Germany in the borders of 1937 was ubiquitous in public space for at least two decades, thus rendering territorial aspirations unclear. Combining a spatial with an environmental perspective, the West German territory can be broken down into bioregions (\textit{Naturräume}), a step that not only creates an unfamiliar map but also makes unexpected connections across borders since, as the saying goes, nature knows no boundaries.\textsuperscript{14} The history of unification, too, has many spatial dimensions beyond the obvious fact that the Berlin Republic now occupies an enlarged territory. The economic geography shifted one more time through internal migration and the widespread deindustrialization of East Germany. The very process of unification was arduously mapped to measure whether material and habitual differences between east and west eventually dissipated. And the optimistic post-Cold War discourse about the “return of the center” in Europe still awaits critical analysis. ~ I could develop more examples but I seem to have run out of space…

The Relationship between War, Migration, and Writing in Barbara Honigmann’s Oeuvre

This paper brings together two of this workshop’s themes: “war & culture” and “mobility, borders, and migration.” In fact, I would rearrange them as such: The Second World War precipitated mass migrations throughout Europe and beyond, which have in turn left a mark on German culture. Second-generation authors have been prolific on the war they did not directly experience but that nevertheless deeply affected them. I investigate texts by German-Jewish author Barbara Honigmann to explore the ways in which writing about the past entails a different kind of migration into a different place, time, and generation.

Using Astrid Erll’s “travelling memory,” I propose, through what I call the “poetics of the search,” that writing about the past is itself a form of migration in the general sense. According to Erll, not only people or “carriers” of memory travel, but so do “media, contents, forms, and practices of memory” because “memories do not hold still—on the contrary, they seem to be constituted first of all through movement” (2011: 11). The writing process for many second- and third- generation German authors is an ongoing search for connections to the past and is therefore a form of movement that we can read in their literature. Novels about wartime migration thus engage in a sort of migration as well. Migration is inherent to the “poetics of the search”—a type of traveling memory work that authors perform in the writing process. It is an open-ended, self-reflexive engagement with the past through writing, whereby authors negotiate connections to the past. As Barbara Honigmann writes about others’ wartime experiences, she negotiates Jewish identities on both personal and broader, transnational levels. At stake in the articulation of the relationship between wartime memory and migration is the ability to move Jewish identities beyond their reduction to the Holocaust. Viewed through a memory studies lens, Honigmann’s texts engage with and empower memories of forced wartime migration, namely by reimagining Jewish identities as productive, itinerant forces of connection among disparate memory narratives.
Barbara Honigmann was born in 1949 in East Berlin to Jewish Communists exiles who had re-emigrated there after the war. She emigrated from the former East Berlin to France in the mid-1980s where she began writing prose. Given Honigmann’s background, scholarship has been preoccupied with how to classify her, whether as a German writer (Bannasch 2013), European Jewish writer (Nolden 2013), or even a global Jewish writer (Eshel 2013), indicating her work’s resonance from national to global scales and for religious as well as national identities. *Eine Liebe aus Nichts* (1991) and *Soharas Reise* (1998), for instance, invite us to consider the relationship between writing and Jewish identity and, more broadly, the relationship between war, migration, and their continued relevance in cultural memory as evidenced by literature.

Migration is built into Honigmann’s work. She writes in France about Germany and in the German language and, through the writing process itself, migrates into other experiences at a generational, social, cultural, or religious remove. Judith Butler captures the kind(s) of migration that occurs in writing:

> An encounter with an other effects a transformation of the self from which there is no return. What is recognized about a self in the course of this exchange is that the self is the sort of being for whom staying inside itself proves impossible. One is compelled and comported outside oneself, one finds that the only way to know oneself is through a mediation that takes place outside oneself, exterior to oneself, by virtue of a conversation or a norm that one did not make, in which one cannot discern oneself as an author or an agent of one’s own making (2005: 28).

*Eine Liebe aus Nichts* migrates outward from a specific family past into a larger network of Jewish diaspora. Similarly, in *Soharas Reise*, Honigmann explores another facet of Jewish identity through her Algerian Jewish main character and thereby, on a broader level, provocatively decenters European Jewishness and the experience of the Holocaust.

In *Eine Liebe aus Nichts* the written negotiation of Jewish identity breaks out of the specificity of family memory and places it within the longue durée of transnational, transcultural, Jewish diasporic
memory. The autobiographical protagonist leaves East Berlin in the 1980s to emigrate to Paris where, as it turns out, her father had fled Nazi Germany. Yearning to start a new life in France, the protagonist nevertheless reflects on her elusive understanding of her Jewish identity and family past.

In Paris, the protagonist meets Jean-Marc, an American Jew who challenges her to articulate her Jewish identity and thus situate it within a broader, multi-faceted post-war European Jewish population. Jean-Marc is the child of Holocaust survivors who escaped to New York from Eastern Europe. Though revealing different spatial trajectories, the Paris sections of the novel contain intragenerational dialogue about related, but different, narratives of migration within a cosmopolitan network of Jewish diaspora.

The protagonist’s conversations with Jean-Marc about Jewish identity break down because of her national origin and what Jean-Marc points out as a contradiction: her parents’ choice to return after the war to Berlin, “wo alles begonnen hatte, an den Ort, von dem aus Hitler ihnen nachgesetzt hatte” (Honigmann 1991: 33). Jutta Gsoels-Lorensen notes the “failed conversations” in Honigmann’s oeuvre where each party tends to “remain in, rather than voyage out from, their respective affective, epistemological, cultural, historical and social territories” (372). Yet, these failed dialogues actually indicate the future element of Honigmann’s work, as she seeks out other strands of Jewish diaspora and engages them in her writing.

*Soharas Reise* reflects the multi-faceted Jewish population in Europe and beyond. The main character, Frau Serfaty, is a religious Jewish woman from North Africa who emigrated to France with her missionary rabbi husband and their six children. She befriends her neighbor Frau Kahn who is a German-Jewish survivor of the Holocaust. In this way, Honigmann approaches the German-Jewish past at two removes: through a main character from North Africa and within a French setting.

In this text as well, we observe barriers between the two women. For instance, Frau Kahn exhibits her ignorance by claiming it was “bei euch in Afrika…nicht so schlimm” (Honigmann 1998: 24), not realizing that Frau Serfaty and her family moved to France because of Jewish persecution in Algeria. Likewise, to Frau Serfaty, the Holocaust is “eine einzige große Erzählung” (Honigmann 1998: 24) that
has become the ultimate Jewish experience of suffering, but it is not her story. We are therefore viewing the Holocaust from a non-Euro-centric Jewish perspective, as Honigmann experiments with a view of the Holocaust from the (out)side as a North African Jew. The text therefore provocatively decenters the Holocaust as the Jewish experience, but this arguably constitutes the text’s future orientation because the women’s common yet different experiences of war and migration is ultimately a source of connection rather than competition for them: “…das [hat] aber keine Rolle gespielt, daß sie aschkenasisch und ich aus Nordafrika bin. ... Wir sind zwei Frauen, die ziemlich allein dastehen, und deshalb haben wir uns ein bißschen zusammengetan” (Honigmann 1998: 24). The friendship transcends the past as a determining factor for relations in the present. In this way, Honigmann introduces a new, perhaps liberating, model of Jewish identity through Frau Serfaty whose Jewish identity is unencumbered by the Holocaust as a defining trait of Jewishness.

Viewing literature about wartime migration through a memory studies lens reveals a more abstract form of migration. In the written process of negotiating her Jewish identity, Honigmann draws various memory narratives into an exchange that only seems to come about through migration. In one of her essays, Honigmann explains that, for her, writing confirms her existence in the name of posterity, through which she can still make “outward connections,” which, to me, suggests connections into the future (Honigmann 2006a: 29). What is stake for articulating the relationship between war, migration, and literature is the ability to move Jewish identities beyond their reduction to the Holocaust. Honigmann’s texts render Jewish identities as productive, itinerant forces of connection among disparate memory narratives.
Bibliography


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Upper Silesia as Border Region: Conditions and Contingencies in the Past and Present

Szczepan Twardoch’s novel *Drach* (Polish: 2014; German translation 2016) provides a compelling source for examining the historical as well as the current manifestations of Upper Silesia as a border region.\(^1\) During the interwar period, Upper Silesia constituted the southeastern border region of Germany and Poland. The border divided communities, and ethnic Germans and Poles lived on both sides. The Polish Uprisings in the 1920s, the German reprisals, and the eventual German invasion in 1939 demonstrated how fraught with ethnic tension the region was. Today, the entire region has been under Polish control since 1945, with native Germans seemingly expelled in the initial years after WWII. However, the region’s ethnic diversity continues, and categorical labels overlook the multiplicities and mixing of identities in the region. While some residents identify clearly as Poles, others may identify as Silesian (who may speak the local Slavic dialect related to Polish). These Silesians may still see themselves as Polish, or they may not; a movement for Silesian autonomy continues to receive significant, if not majority support, in the region. The German minority, once deemed the “autochthons” who were defined as Polish and not forced to emigrate, mostly speaks Polish as its first language, but leaders of the minority work to promote bilingual language instruction and the cultural legacy of Germans in the region.

The PiS government in Warsaw largely looks suspiciously at Upper Silesia precisely because of the Silesian autonomy movement as well as the continuing efforts of the German minority there to receive greater recognition. Polish nationalist politicians view residents of the region as disloyal Silesians or, worse, irredentist Germans who want to erase the crimes of

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Germany against Poland. Twardoch, in of his online responses to such critics, writes: “The Polish mainstream always will place Silesians in the role of conditional Poles of the worst kind, who should aspire to Polishness and dream about it.”² For Twardoch, however, all identities always seem to be conditional, based on varying and sometimes conflicting and contradicting factors.

This historical, cultural, and political context helps explain the significance of Twardoch’s novel *Drach*. The novel thematizes the complex ethnic diversity of Upper Silesia over the centuries, and in ways that intriguingly combine the mundane with the violent. The novel chronicles the family history of Josef Magnor and his ancestors and descendants, moving back and forth over time (within chapters). For instance, one paragraph will depict the experiences of Josef in the early 1920s, while the next paragraph will shift to the life of his grandson Nikodem at that same location in 2014. This narrative structure effectively demonstrates family interconnections as well as the changes and disruptions so evident in the region. History is ever present, but also often not consciously so. Nikodem, for example, has little knowledge about his grandfather and what happened decades earlier, yet he traverses the same territory, and the reader, thanks to the novel’s narrative structure, can see the implicit and unconscious connections.

Moreover, because the novel spans so much time, the reader also learns much about how varying political regimes (from Germany before WWI, to Poland and Germany in the interwar period, and then the Communist and eventual democratic regimes in Poland after 1945) affected individuals and families. In addition, whereas Josef does not claim any specific ethnic identity, others in his family and social circle to varying degrees assume German or Polish or Silesian

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ethnic identities. Nikodem, in turn, is largely oblivious to the ethnic complexities of his ancestors, and instead operates as a product of post-Communist Poland [unhappily] focused on the trappings of success than on any ethnic considerations of identity.

These interplays of political and apolitical attitudes, behaviors, and identities over generations not only portray the richness and diversity of experience in Upper Silesia, but also undercut efforts to appropriate or stigmatize the region and its residents in any particular way. Indeed, the novel takes no sides in its depictions. Poles are no better or worse than Germans and vice versa. The earth serves as narrator in the novel, and this decision not only provides an omniscient and impersonal narrator, but one that is ever present with a memory of what happened and a premonition for what will come. As the earth states:


The result of such a narrative structure with an impersonal earth as narrator highlights the arbitrary nature of fate. Humans may think they can control events, but are really powerless to determine what happens. The novel thus reads very pessimistically about the potential of human agency. There are no heroes in the text. Instead, violence among and between ethnic groups and individuals as well as self-inflicted violence (such as alcohol and drug abuse) form the constant defining element of life across generations. Further, although inter-ethnic violence largely ceased after the expulsions, the fact that the lack of effective human agency and continuing mental anguish continues into the present day suggests that the region overall remains beset by tensions and the traumas of memory.
The novel’s disquieting and disrupting narratives and pessimistic tones that cut across periods and ethnicities show how Upper Silesia very much remains beset by characteristics of border regions. We often speak of such areas as liminal spaces, those characterized and burdened by a state of “in-betweenness.” But such a label suggests that the region is located between at least two more secure areas whose certainty of identity then only exposes the uncertain identities found in the border region. Twardoch’s novel, however, raises questions about the assumptions of any kind of stability anywhere.

In conclusion, Drach portrays Upper Silesia as a permanent border region in which histories, ethnicities, narratives, and individuals have always intermixed and always will. Yet, these portrayals of complexity are simultaneously not a celebration of the region’s multicultural past in service of a progressive present and future. They are just there in all of their normalcies, tensions, conflicts, and contradictions.
“Once we had an assembly in the village. A party functionary explained that it was now possible to emigrate, but there was no reason to do so. Everything was good here, things in the Federal Republic were bad, and this village had no Germans. Then I stood up angrily and told him that I am German, and I want to leave. When he asked me why, I told him that I want to live among Germans,” explained Stefan K., a 46-year-old from the Silesian town Kreisstadt, in a January 1976 Hannoversche Allegemeine Zeitung article. Stefan K. and approximately 1,372,000 other ethnic German Aussiedler or “resettlers” left Poland for West Germany between 1950 and 1990, often citing the desire “to live as Germans among Germans” (als Deutsche unter Deutschen zu leben). This paper will analyze how the “return migration” process often challenged and reshaped the resettlers’ self-described German national identity.

Whereas being “German” in postwar Poland was a liability, as the expulsions and aggressive re-Polonization policies painfully underscored, the Warsaw Treaty (1972) and subsequent Helsinki Accords (1975) turned this paradigm on its head. Thanks to the latter agreement, which allowed 125,000 Germans to emigrate between 1976 and 1980, “Germanness” became social capital which could translate into an exit visa. Overseen by the German Red Cross and the West German Embassy in Warsaw, this emigration process often fell under the rubric of “family reunification” (Familienzusammenfuehrung), with the goal of reuniting families separated by the war and expulsions. Even after the agreement’s lapsing in 1980, almost 620,000 resettlers successfully “returned to Germany.”

Although these successful Aussiedler and would-be Aussiedler cited a wide variety of reasons for emigration—from improving material prospects to helping sick family members—50.4% of those surveyed in 1976 listed their “right to live in Germany” as their “predominant motive” (ueberwiegendes Motiv) for migration: “According to the Basic Law […] we are German nationals (Staatsangehoerige) and have a right to live in Germany.”

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4 “Wir sind nach dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland deutsche Staatsangehoerige und haben ein Anrecht darauf, in Deutschland zu leben.” This wording comes from a November 1977 report by Dr. Gerhard Reichling, the leader of the German section of the Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem (AWR). The German AWR surveyed thousands of Aussiedler between 1976 and 1979 as part of a four-stage research project on integration. In the same survey, 25.9% listed family reunification as their reason, 9.6% cited “Freiheit und Ordnung”, 8.5% answered “eigene berufliche Interessen und Ruecksicht auf die Zukunft der Kinder”, and the remaining 5.6% categorized their motives as “other.” Dr. Gerhard Reichling, “Die Startsituation der Spaetaussiedler
spoke little to no German claimed a connection toward their fatherland when emigration became a possibility. For instance, in a 1971 interview with a German journalist, one family near Wroclaw claimed to “feel German” (czuje sie Niemcem), even though the teenage sons only spoke Polish. The journalist noted that several other families with similarly abysmal language skills were slated to emigrate soon, likewise under the pretext of being German.5

While most resettlers ostensibly viewed themselves as German, many of them struggled to be accepted after arriving in West Germany. According to researchers at the German section of the Association for the World Refugee Problem (AWR), the cause of discontent among 80% of the Aussiedler surveyed in 1977 was not financial but psychological.6 Many Aussiedler expressed concern that their West German neighbors did not “recognize them as equals” (nicht als gleichwertig anerkannt). The AWR report interpreted the Aussiedlers’ experiences as the German minority as the primary cause of the problem, concluding that “this stance is probably due to the fact that, for thirty-one years after the war, these Germans (i.e., the Aussiedler) had to defend their belonging to the German people”. Those who had only enjoyed national-majority status in West Germany simply could not understand.7 The Aussiedler often voiced these frustrations in interviews with the press, as newspaper articles titled “Foreign in the Homeland” and “There We Were German, but Here We Are Polish” poignantly underscore.8

The experiences of ethnic German Aussiedler have significant implications for understanding ethnic identity and national belonging. As the post-arrival disappointments of many resettlers suggest, belonging is not a direct product of a shared national history or the same imagined ethnic heritage. Ultimately, shared experiences carry greater emotional and psychological weight than a shared imagined or learned history. In the Aussiedler case, the understanding of Germanness was indelibly shaped by experiences as a national minority. From this perspective, it is little wonder that so many resettlers felt confused or disconnected upon reaching their ancestral homeland. The radically different trajectories of the preceding three decades had altered their conceptions of Germanness—and their views of themselves as Germans.

5 Report by Witold Zadrowski (Polish radio) about West German journalist Peter Braun’s trip to the Wroclaw, Opole, and Katowice regions in early 1971. (IPN 0825/9 t.10)
6 The report noted that 20% of the Aussiedler responses fell between having “no worries” (Keine Sorge) and “exuberantly happy” (uebergluecklich) and credited the government’s monetary assistance with mitigating many of the resettlers’ hardships. (Bundesarchiv B106-97096)
7 „Diese Einstellung rueht wahrscheinlich daher, dass die Aussiedler 31 Jahre lang nach dem Kriege ihre Zugehoerigkeit zum deutschen Volk in ihren Heimatgebieten zaeh verteidigen mussten, was von den einheimischen Deutschen mangels entsprechender eigener Erfahrungen gar nicht in vollem Umfange gewuertigt werden kann.“ AWR Arbeitsstelle fuer Aussiedlerfragen, “Mitteilung an die Presse”, 12. September 1977 (Bundesarchiv B106-97096).
The Reformation began, for all intents and purposes, over a Vatican home improvement project. After years of neglect, St. Peter’s Basilica, the centerpiece of the Holy See, was falling apart. Pope Leo X needed money to build a newer and bigger building. His first thought was to step up the sale of Indulgences. So he sent back to Germany one of his most effective “salesmen,” the Dominican-monk-turned- fundraiser, Johannes Tetzel. Like his rival, Martin Luther, Tetzel was a Saxon, born in Pirna—barely one hundred miles from Luther’s hometown of Eisleben. Unlike Luther, however, Tetzel spent much of his life outside Germany, not only in Rome, but Poland, where he served as inquisitor. Now that he needed money, the pope named Tetzel commissioner for indulgences in his native land. Outraged by Tetzel’s venality, on October 31, 1517, Luther presented the council at Wittenberg with his Ninety-Five Theses protesting the sale and legitimacy of indulgences. Though generated by a (relatively) local conflict between two German theologians, the ensuing Reformation spread well beyond the borders of Saxony. It also generated new forms of mobility, transcended numerous geographic, political and social boundaries, and contributed to an era of vast migration.

First, the Reformation both shaped and was shaped by German-speaking Central Europe’s growing entanglement with the non-European world. While the Habsburg monarchs who ruled the Holy Roman Empire were afraid of the Ottoman Empire’s advance, some German Protestant princes did not hesitate to forge alliances with the Turks against Francis I and Charles V. The Habsburgs worked in turn to build an anti-Ottoman alliance with their enemy’s enemy, the Persian Empire of Shah Ismail I. Extra-European events such as the Ottoman expansion and
the Spanish conquest of the Americas are connected with the Germany’s internal religious, social, and political conflict. By pulling soldiers and monies away from Central Europe, Charles V’s need to fight the French king and the Ottoman Sultan contributed to the survival of the Protestant Reformation.⁶

All Central Europeans, regardless of confession, benefitted from their connections to the Habsburg Empire and by extension, a global web of Iberian (Spanish and Portuguese) trade networks.⁷ The Welser banking house funded the expedition of Little Venice in the new world, for example, tempted by the recent extremely lucrative conquest of Moctezuma’s Aztec Empire. Led by the Bavarian conquistador Ambrosius Ehinger, who founded Maracaibo in 1529 on the South American coast of new Granada (what would become Venezuela and Colombia), the German-financed and led fleet had dreams of finding the gold-paved streets of the city of El Dorado.⁸ Meanwhile German craftsmen and women attracted buyers outside Europe. The Mughal Emperor Jahangir, for example, gave the German-crafted Diana Automaton, a small moving statue depicting the goddess Diana riding on a stag, as a special gift to Persian Shah Abbas.⁹ Through cartography Martin Waldseemüller and Matthias Ringmann served the cause of European exploration, trade, and missionary work.¹⁰

In fact Reformation-era Germans were as likely to travel to the Far East as West. Johann Albrecht von Mandelslo was part of a legation by the Duke of Holstein to Persia in 1635. After spending three years at a trade mission in Ispahan, Mandelslo arrived in Surat, India, via an English ship. After exploring bazaars along the Indian western coastline, including those in Ahmadabad, Cambay, and Goa, Mandelslo wrote an account of his travels. Adam Olearius, secretary to the Persian embassy of Holstein and librarian of the Holstein ducal court, edited and somewhat embellished Mandelslo travel narrative, which became a well-known depiction of
India in the era. Meanwhile German missionaries, such as Adam Schall von Bell, scrambled to convert the young Shunzhi Emperor—and with him much of China—to Christianity. It is no coincidence that the first wave of German emigrants left from the Palatinate, followed shortly thereafter from neighboring regions. The Palatinate had been the region most devastated by the Thirty Years’ War. Millions had died—more than half the population in some regions of Germany. But the Palatinate was also the region to experience the first and arguably most rapid population recovery after 1648, which combined with a dearth of arable land to encourage many thousands of Germans to leave for America. By 1717, when the Duke of Württemberg passed regulations on emigration, the German population had recovered from an Early Modern low of 16 million in 1648 to well over 20 million (on its way to more than 23 million three decades later). The period of the Reformation and its immediate aftermath was one of profound socioeconomic and demographic change across Central Europe, change which was tied to new economic forces—such as global trade with India and East Asia and opportunities like emigrating to America—that had not existed in earlier centuries.

The critical attitude toward religious authority, post-1648 agreements and the scientific revolution, introduced a new level of religious toleration, including a new interest in Christianity’s theological commonalities with Judaism, Islam, and even Hinduism. The influx of reform-minded Calvinists from France and Switzerland into parts of Germany, Prussia in particular, had an important cultural effect as well. Indeed, the late seventeenth-century Pietist movement constituted an important link between seventeenth century confessionalization and eighteenth century Enlightenment. If seventeenth-century Germans were embracing a new sense of secular time, this period
also introduced a dynamic understanding of political, cultural, and geographic space. German-speaking Central Europe, unlike Italy, France and Britain, had no natural frontiers and possessed an immense number of internal linguistic and cultural differences. The framework of the Holy Roman Empire meant little to Germans in terms of identity, guaranteeing cultural diversity, not unity. When 17th century theorists talked of fatherland, it consequently meant belonging to a town; a cultural fatherland; or to the state that citizens chose for their own good, per Samuel Pufendorf. This conception of territorial identity was neither oppressive nor narrowly confessional but “rooted and entrenched in service to the territorial church and state, and based both on wider German and on territorial networks.” For if German identity was “intensely local,” the very diversity and multiplicity of spaces in Central Europe meant that Reformation-Era Germans were constantly bumping up against the realities of mobility, migration, and borders.

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1 I want to thank my co-authors on Modern Germany: A Global History, Dr. Bernd Grewe and Dr. Douglas McGetchin, on whose work I am, in part, drawing for this paper.
4 Stephen E. Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism. Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1959; In: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/gurkane-2010-en
10 Johannes Ruysch (1460-1533) from Utrecht, Netherlands created a well-publicized World Map (1507), showing projection from the top of the globe and the continents splayed outward towards the edges. The same year Martin Waldseemüller (1470-1520) and Matthias Ringmann (1482-1511) made a global map with Europe and Africa in the center, the Americas to the left/west, and the rest of Asia to the right/east.
In 1717 the Duke of Württemberg alerted his officials to a pressing crisis: too many of his subjects were becoming “infected” by a “pernicious desire” to emigrate to the “English province” of America. Did they not recognize the “madness” of this idea? Did they not realize that they “must sustain themselves through difficult work of building and cultivating barren fields as well as the misfortune and hardship they and their kin would face, based on the experience and example of those who immigrated to the American lands from the Palatinate and elsewhere”? Some Germans were already complaining about the “difficult trip, owing to the dangerous sea, low quality of the air, lack of food and discomfort of the climate” in the Americas. As a result of this emigration crisis to the New World, which the Duke did his best to portray as dangerous and foolhardy, he urged his officials to pass laws making it difficult for his subjects to leave Württemberg. “Der Herzog von Württemberg erschwert die Auswanderung nach Amerika,” in Grewe, et. al.


Clark, Preussen, 154.


Robert von Friedeburg, “Origins,” in Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, ed. Smith, pp. 30-44; 31-32; People thought not in terms of nations, but fatherland [Faterland], countryman [Landsmann], and German [Teutsche] or as Swabian, Bavarian, Frank, or Saxon [“Schwob”, “Bayer” “Franke”, “Sax”]. Others were defined by confession, as “Jesuits, Martinists and Papists.” Axel Gotthard, “Gibt es eine typisch frühneuzeitliche Raumwahrneumung?”, pp 308-311.

The ancien regime was “peculiarly German in that it was emphatically both part of a wider German culture and part of the life of relatively small territorial state.” Friedeburg, “Origins,” in Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, ed. Smith, 30-44.

That one, by language or custom, was ‘German’ entailed few, if any, consequences, especially in view of the marked differences—spurring rivalries and reciprocal deprecation—among religious confessions, regional dialects, habits of dress, and social customs.” Hagen, German History, 39.
In recent years, some scholars have discussed West Germany’s transformation into a *Rechtsstaat* after the 1972 Munich Massacre.¹ That trajectory did not, however, come from a void. Immediately after the Second World War, the concept of Europe was in flux both geographically and conceptually. Mass devastation across the continent, followed by the beginning of the Cold War and anti-colonial struggles, meant that many state leaders had to redefine their economic and political relationships. From two decades following the Second World War, the concept of a common European Community (EC, later Union) hinged partly on the idea of a shared past and common economic concerns. Slowly, borders between these neighbors opened, promoting European communication and interaction.² On the flip side, however, border controls and securities between European and so-called Third Countries (non-European Community Member States) tightened, limiting and contentiously regulating migration. While approved “European” individuals could move without visas, individuals moving through and from countries like Turkey and Morocco (as well as across the Global South) faced steep fees and long waiting periods, often to meet denial.

The young West German state took a rather curious position within this story in part because of its need to deal with its connections to the Nazi past. Immediately after the war, the Allied High Command controlled the devastated German borders as maps were redrawn in the name of establishing peace and as the early Cold War boundaries appeared. In the decade after the Second World war, with the conquering powers controlling borders and pushing repatriation, the (re)forming state (*Länder*) governments did not have to worry over-much about border controls.³ Without clear laws in place, state governments fell back on issuing visas (residence and work) to new migrants who presented themselves at the appropriate offices after arrival. That was particularly true regarding migrants from former colonial countries, whose states did not yet have old treaties or agreements with older German governments (Empire, Republic, or Reich).⁴

Through the early 1960s, for example, individuals from Morocco (which became an independent state in 1956) frequently arrived in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) in a slow trickle from France looking for work. Following the same pattern as the Dutch arriving from the Netherlands, these prospective workers could (and did) present themselves at an appropriate government building in the low thousands. There, the individual (usually male) received residence and/or

work permits. At that time, a Moroccan citizen was not breaking the law to enter West Germany without a visa as there was no law preventing it.

The regularizing of migration and deportation to Morocco was part of the reason West Germany signed its 1963 Bilateral Labor Agreement (guest worker agreement) with the Kingdom of Morocco. Yet, even as the Moroccan state became an official guest worker country, the West German state governments (which had control over borders and naturalization) took a decidedly different view of migrants from Morocco than migrants from the new European Economic Community Member States. Although the migrant from Morocco was not breaking the law, in entering the state without a visa, said individual did not clearly fall under a specific law. In consequence, the West German states often viewed these individual as only semi-legal. Without a clear legal framework, states like NRW used the excuse to handle these migrants harshly and, by 1966, newspapers across the state reported overly-aggressive behavior from the NRW state department targeting individuals from countries like Morocco on account of their status as “black workers” from a “black continent.”

Within five years, the behavior that many members of the local presses decried normalized. In response to the Munich Massacre in 1972, the West German Foreign Office and Ministry of the Interior enacted “protective measures against similar attacks in the future” from “Arab states.” The new measures required potential tourists and/or migrants with Moroccan citizenship (as well as citizens from specific other so-called Arab, African, and South American states) to undergo invasive screening. These new, restrictive measures included immediate deportation for all irregular migrants from any Arab state or against whom stood any reason for expulsion.

The crackdown was so intense that the Moroccan Ambassador formally expressed concern. The Moroccan Embassy in Bonn had received multiple complaints about mass deportations. Contravening the 1963 West German-Moroccan Bilateral Labor Agreement, the North Rhine-Westphalian government demanded Moroccan citizens working in the country without valid papers pay a 400-500 Deutsch Mark fine before deportation. In addition, the Moroccan Legates reported that West German officials not only refused Moroccan citizens entry, but treated Moroccan citizens “with severe intimidation and even humiliation.” The Moroccan Ambassador asked the West German Ministry of the Interior to at least implement regulations requiring the

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5 Meincke, “Erteilung von Aufenthaltserlaubnis gemäß deutsch-marokkanischer Anwerbevereinbarung” (Bonn: Auswärtiges Amt, February 2, 1967), 2, B 85, Bd. 880, PA AA.
8 Auswärtige Amt and Dreher to alle diplomatischen und berufskonsularischen Auslandsverträgen, “Behandlung von Sichtvermerksanträgen von Staatsangehörigen der arabischen Staaten,” October 20, 1972, B 85, Bd. 1051, PA AA. See also Slobodian, “The Borders of the Rechtsstaat in the Arab Autumn.”
humane treatment of Moroccan citizens at the border, as the West German Diplomat Paul Frank had promised earlier that year.\footnote{L’Ambassadeur du Royaume du Maroc to Auswärtiges Amt, “Note Verbale: AA/CS No. 3777,” November 30, 1972, PA AA, PA AA, B 85, Bd. 1051. Paul Frank (1918-2011) worked in the West German Foreign Office from 1950-1974.}

This is only a brief overview of West German legal relationship with one specific state. These stories about differentiation and frequent discrimination in relation to border crossing (including e/immigration and deportation) are not confined to specifically West German-Moroccan relations. Migrants from across the Global South face challenges entering countries across the European Union from Germany (now (re)unified) to Denmark and Spain. I argue that in our (scholars) ongoing discussions about legality and immigration status, we need to take treatment at and around the idea of borders into account. Many scholars study (il)legality, but we also need to consider the lengths to which a state goes to promote that status in order to have greater control over arguably unwanted individuals. Part of the point here is that not only does the imposition of an “illegal” status on some migrants influence a migrant’s choices, but it also impacts their engagement with and understanding of that space and the people in it. The clear third person status at the border informs the migrant of an unwelcome that frequently persists through their residence in the country. If stability and peace continue to be part of the goal of a united “Europe,” how does differentiated treatment fit into that?
Borders & Migrations Session: “Nineteenth-Century Tourism and the Rhenish Casino”

The Rhineland was a transcultural zone oriented around heterosocial leisure. With the establishment of François Blanc’s resort casino at Bad Homburg in the 1840s a new culture of leisure and play was built upon an existing infrastructure dedicated to what might be called health tourism. Resort casinos like the ones at Bad Homburg or Wiesbaden attracted a clientele made up of transnational elites from across Europe. The resorts allow us to imagine the Rhineland before German Unification as a cultural center of Europe precisely because of its polynational character. Gambling in the Blanc mode was a supremely transnational industry. The historical development of the casino in the nineteenth century occurred first in Rhenish spa towns like Bad Homburg or Wiesbaden because they were long associated with leisure and health that appealed to a wide strata of wealthy Europeans who were accustomed to travelling in order to pursue those things.

The resort town was built by its connections both to a pleasant environment and climate but also to the rail lines that connected Europeans in Paris or Berlin to the centers of luxury and leisure at Bad Homburg or (later) Monte Carlo. Writing in 1860, George Augustus Sala produced in his book *Make Your Game* an extended travelogue that described, as the front piece to the book mentions, a “narrative of the Rhine and thereabouts.” The book provides depictions of spa towns frequented by a transnational class of tourists and gamblers. Bad Homburg, constructed in the 1840s as a newly-imagined resort town dominated by casino gambling, is described as an impressive sight:

> a broad, handsome, well-paved street, of seemingly interminable length. No gas-lamps on the pavement, but a profusion of big oil *revéseres* hung from ropes stretched high across the thoroughfare; plenty of shops, however, brilliantly lighted with gas—shops, too, gaily decorated and handsomely stocked. There were jewellers, watchmakers, milliners, stay-makers, confectioners, tobacconists, stationers, print-sellers, venders of toys and knicknacks. Jewels gleamed, waxen “dummies” simpered from hair dressers’ shops; the air was redolent of the fumes of expensive cigars, the odour of genuine eau-de-Cologne and patchouli; and the foot pavement was thronged with groups of dandies, in waxed moustaches and patent leather boots, and ladies with ravishing bon nets and cavalier-hats, and whose crinoline rustled in the autumn night breeze. So many large white buildings, too, with jalousied windows, on whose entablatured friezes you might read “Banque de Commerce,” “Banque du Landgrafschaft,” “Banque d'Escompte,” “Banque et Bureau de Change.”

Bad Homburg bustled, stocked with a deep supply of luxury goods catering to a well-heeled bourgeois clientele. The built environment – well-kept, well-lighted, and well-organized – presents a pleasing view of a clean and commercially viable resort.

Sala’s description of Bad Homburg makes clear the ways that spa towns developed in tandem with a culture of tourism among well-off Europeans. We see the creation of a transnational elite who crossed borders in the search for novel sensations, new experiences, and a
chance to rub shoulders with others of the same social position. European tourism in mid-nineteenth century was not simply a recreation of aristocratic Bildungsreisen or grand tours. This novel mode of tourism that developed in the mid-nineteenth century was enabled, in part, by the creation of a new market for tourist-related guides. Baedekers began publishing famous travel guides in the 1850s (the first, written in German, guided travellers through Switzerland). Baedeker guides published in the 1860s, as was Sala’s Make Your Game, included English-language guides to Switzerland, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Sala coached readers seeking guidance on how to locate, travel to, and then participate in the social life of spa towns. Sala’s characters travel up the Rhine to Bad Homburg by steam ship; other visitors to spa and resort towns like those on the Rhine or, later, Monte Carlo, came by railroad. In this way, the creation of rail lines and the use of steam ships along river routes facilitated European tourism, and help build the gambling resorts of the nineteenth century. Travelers to resort towns could blend the curative process with the other social and cultural attractions of a particular region. In other words, it did not all have to be cold water and wheat germ; as Sala’s description of Bad Homburg shows, there were plenty of diversions and amusements for those who were inclined. François Blanc used Bad Homburg’s water as a way of marketing the resort throughout Europe. Submitting samples of the water for chemical analysis, he promoted its healthful benefits as a way of making Bad Homburg more attractive to his international clientele. Indeed the promotion of Bad Homburg as a health resort was carried out at the highest levels of the Landgrave’s court and in close coordination with the Blancs. Frederick Müller, personal physician to the Landgrave, wrote a Treatise on the Use of the Mineral Waters of Homburg, to describe more precisely how the waters from the various springs around Bad Homburg could be used for healthful effect. The text, which went through several editions in multiple languages, offers insight into the ways in which health resorts leveraged their natural environment to expand the circle of potential visitors and to promote directly visits to the casino. Müller -- as the reader is told in the preface -- from recurring constipation. Luckily, “the sufferings inseparable from those ailments and the relief afforded by the use of the waters strongly impressed him with the duty of making known the valuable properties of the Homburg springs.”

Müller’s text tells us much about the ways that resorts like Bad Homburg could frame an appeal to health in ways that did not preclude one’s enjoyment of the casino. Indeed, the text serves as a lengthy advertisement not only for the waters around Bad Homburg, but also for books that would serve to educate would-be gamblers on the rules, norms, and customs of casino games. A Dr. Gardey, who touted the mineral water of the spa town in one publication from 1851, confirms the argument that the logic of the entire casino was to funnel people toward the gaming tables. “From morning till night,” Gardey wrote, “the powerful lure of the tables is felt, dazzling piles of gold and heaps of banknotes, these thrilling games in which, by abandoning some of its advantages, the casino has given players an equal chance again the bank....Thus life in Homburg can be briefly summed up as passing one’s time in the pleasantest possible fashion, restoring one’s health, resting from the cares of politics and business worries, meeting the most distinguished people from every capital in Europe and making friendships which will be a pleasant and enduring memory.” Other contemporary descriptions of Baden-Baden focus on similar themes, noting not only the “seductions” of the place, but also indicating the heterosocial nature of the gambling hall: “But among the seducing attractions of Baden-Baden, and of all German bathing-places, the Rouge-et-noir and Roulette-table hold a melancholy pre-eminence,— being at once a shameful source of revenue to the prince,— a rallying point for the
gay, the beautiful, the professional blackleg, the incognito duke or king,--and a vortex in which the student, the merchant, and the subaltern officer are, in the course of the season, often hopelessly and irrevocably ingulfed [sic]. The lure of the casino generated the experience of a diverse range of people from across the social spectrum and from many different origins.

Descriptions of Bad Homburg confirm these observations about the transnational qualities of the Rhenish resort. One long passage from Sala’s *Make Your Game*, which must be quoted in its entirety for the effect it produces, provides a fascinating description of the human diversity on display in the casino at Bad Homburg. “For I never,” Sala writes,

saw such a sweeping and raking together of people from all the five corners of the earth, and from the uttermost ends thereof, in my peaceful, but not altogether devoid of experience, days. Russian boyards, Wallachian waywodes, and Moldavian hospodars; Servian kaimakans, Montenegrin protospathaires, Bulgarian Bey-oglous, Turkish pachas, effendis, naiks, and reis (strict fact, all in their national costume, consisting of ill-made European clothes, patent leather boots, white kids, and red fezes with blue tassels, which [the former] make them look like poppies in a field of corn); Tartar khans and Livonian Ritterschaft-Herren; North German counts and barons ad infinitum; Lubeck and Bremen burgomasters and ship-chandlers; Dantzic spruce merchants; Berlin glovers; stalwart Austrian and Prussian life-guardsmen; French marquises, viscounts, and chevaliers of industry and of idleness; New York stock brokers and dry goods importers (tremendous dandies these); New Orleans and South Carolina cotton and sugar planters (ineffable and haughty exquisites these, with exuberant coats of arms on their visiting cards and cigar-cases, claiming descent from ancient English families, indulging, not unfrequently, in covert sneers at republicanism, and not caring to mix much with the men from the north); West Indian Creoles, shivering in the genial autumnal sunshine; swarthy Spanish dons, from old and new Spain, livid, as to their finger nails, with the sangre azul, and smoking paper cigars eternally; vivacious Swedes — the French men of the north, those blue-eyed, hospitable, courteous, much-bowing Swedes; sententious Danes; gesticulating Italians; silent and expectorating Dutch men; and Great British people!

Sala’s unnamed narrator provides in the passage a long checklist of national types who have descended on the casino. Sala uses this opportunity to note the “universal character of the Hombourg visitors,” and he reproduces a section of the *Fremdenblatt* (the “foreign news”) that contained a list of prominent visitors and their home towns. In Sala’s assessment, the “universal” nature of leisure life in Bad Homburg was entirely due to the Blancs, whom he declared “have metamorphosed a miserable mid-German townlet into a city of palaces.”

What emerges from these depictions a sense of the Rhinish casino-resort in the mid-19th century as a polynational leisure center. Perhaps the unacknowledged capital of a cosmopolitan Europe, the Rhineland was a novel invention of nineteenth century. As spa towns took on casino gambling they were able to leverage the social connections of their clientele. And in this sense too, spa towns like Bad Homburg or Wiesbaden, appealing both to aristocrats but also to wealthy bourgeois, represented a transnational and trans-class zone of privileged leisure.
2 Sala, Make Your Games, Or, The Adventures of the Stout Gentleman, the Slim Gentleman, and the Man with the Iron Chest, 151.
3 Frederick Müller, Treatise On the Use Of the Mineral Waters of Homburg, trans. C. Murphy Mortimer, 3rd ed. (Louis Schick, 1865).
4 Müller, Treatise On the Use Of the Mineral Waters of Homburg, iv.
7 Sala, Make Your Games, Or, The Adventures of the Stout Gentleman, the Slim Gentleman, and the Man with the Iron Chest, 162–63.
8 Sala, Make Your Games, Or, The Adventures of the Stout Gentleman, the Slim Gentleman, and the Man with the Iron Chest, 163.
9 Sala, Make Your Games, Or, The Adventures of the Stout Gentleman, the Slim Gentleman, and the Man with the Iron Chest, 168.
Situated in the center of the new Europe,” or why national borders still matter to Eisenhüttenstadt

During the anniversary celebrations of the German Democratic Republic’s “first socialist city” on June 27, 1980, General Secretary Erich Honecker remarked on the astounding transformation of Eisenhüttenstadt over the past 30 years. “Your city is a persuasive example of this great change that has taken place over the past three decades under the socialist conditions in our country and for the welfare of the people.”¹ This compliment was not merely empty political rhetoric. Before 1950 the region along the Oder river and the new Polish border was among the least economically developed in all of Germany, and suffered from poor social and cultural conditions as well.² Besides the small towns of Fürstenberg and Schönfließ, an empty grüne Wiese dominated the landscape upon which the Eisenhüttenkombinat Ost, or EKO, and its accompanying settlement would come to be built. Only three decades later, however, Eisenhüttenstadt represented the regime’s best efforts in industrial production, urban planning, and modern living.

Over the course of the next three decades, Eisenhüttenstadt and EKO would undergo yet another transformation, this time from a privileged, socialist model-city to a declining, eastern German town on the Polish border. In this multifaceted story of transition from socialism to capitalism and democracy, and from a divided to a unite Germany, the location of Eisenhüttenstadt on the periphery of the now united Federal Republic plays a significant role. As consequences of political and economic unification residents have experienced unemployment,

¹ SAPMO-BAarch, DA 5-10502, speech by Erich Honecker, read by Klaus Sorgenicht on June 27, 1980.
outmigration, and demolition of parts of their city. Paradoxically, however, these processes coincided with further strides towards European economic and political integration, as evidenced by the expansion of the European Union throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as well as EKO’s own privatization process, which witnessed it change hands between several European and eventually global steel conglomerates. Taking the example of Eisenhüttenstadt, in this position paper I aim to draw attention to the tension between political and economic integration, both European wide and globally, and the continued salience of national borders.

The East German regime’s initial decision to build a new iron and steel combine on the Oder River was born out of economic and political necessity. In the material devastation following World War II, the Soviet occupation zone (Sowjetische Besatzungszone, abbreviated SBZ) inherited a relative abundance of machine, munitions, and vehicle manufacturing factories, but lacked the raw material processing capabilities to be able to use them. Following the Stalinist example, at the Third Party Congress in July 1950 the SED decided to focus their efforts and resources on building up an independent, nationally owned, heavy industry. Based on several structural and economic factors, like transportation considerations regarding the origin of the ore and coke needed for various stages of the steel production cycle, they ultimately chose the large, empty grüne Wiese for the location of this new iron and steel combine.

Politically, the choice of this location was also inflected by burgeoning Cold War politics. In July 1950 the GDR officially recognized the Oder-Neiße-Friedensgrenze as the border

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3 While many factories had been relocated from western Germany in order to escape Allied bombing raids, the SBZ did not have the raw material processing capabilities of the Ruhr, the Saar, or Silesia, for example. Moreover, the challenge of economic rebuilding was exacerbated by the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany and the reparations that the Soviets took, first in the form of entire factories, which were dismantled and moved east, and later in the form of reparations in kind. See Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University press, 1995).

between the GDR and what would become the Republic of Poland. This move was intended as a symbolic gesture of friendship and trust between the socialist “brother lands.” Moreover, the placement of the factory in the eastern-most parts of the GDR’s territory indicated a shift away from ties to the old German industrial center in the Ruhr and Lower Rhine. Instead, the new steel combine was oriented towards the Soviet Union, from whom the East German regime would receive material and technical support. This strategic and symbolic orientation towards the east would come to have significant implications for the city’s location in a united Germany and increasingly integrated Europe.

Over the course of 1990, as leading East German functionaries’ dreams of a successful socialist economic reform faded, EKO’s fate was equally uncertain. Indeed, this uncertainty would be characteristic for the steel mill and its employees for the better part of a decade. The steel mill went through many stages of ownership and operation, including incorporation into EKO Stahl AG, oversight by the Treuhandanstalt, partial privatization with Krupp Stahl AG, full privatization under Belgian steel manufacturers Cockerill-Sambre, and later under the multinational steel manufacturing corporation ArcelorMittal. This uncertainty and changing management wrought consequences in the steel mill’s production output. Iron ore production did not reach GDR levels until after 2000, and cold and warm rolled flat steel did not reach their pre-1989 production levels until 1997. In an effort to make the steel mill more attractive to foreign investors, promotional material such as the 1997 English-language “Eisenhüttenstadt Foreign Investors Guide” touted the city and its industry as “situated in the center of the new Europe,”

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5 Richter, et al, Stalinstadt – Eisenhüttenstadt, 20. It was not until the Constitution of 1952 that the name became the Polish People’s Republic.
6 Ibid., 21.
8 Ibid., 375.
and boasted about its political and economic stability within the European Union.\textsuperscript{9}

Despite these claims, which imaged Eisenhüttenstadt as an appealing location for investors and residents alike, the new political borders meant that the city and its factory found themselves on the periphery of a united Germany, both literally and figuratively. In my larger dissertation project, I investigate Eisenhüttenstadt’s transformation from socialism to capitalism and democracy by exploring the interrelated processes of privatization in EKO and exposure to the global market economy—which necessitated extensive layoffs in the steel mill—population shrinkage to nearly half the city’s population in 1989, and strategic demolition of abandoned buildings and empty apartment complexes. While it is only one thread of the story, here I suggest that despite some strides in economic and political integration, national borders still matter to Eisenhüttenstadt because they are a contributing factor in its decline. The city is both physically removed from the attractions and economic opportunities of the Berlin metropolitan area, not to mention a full 2-hour train ride away, but is likewise JWD, or “janz weit draußen” in the minds of many Germans.

Recent events throughout Europe and the world have made even more apparent this tension between increasingly integrated and globalized political and economic relationships on the one hand, and the continued salience and power of national borders, physically and in the minds of individuals, on the other hand. How these issues intersect with national and local politics, regional economic development, and the integration of over one million refugees into Germany in general and Eisenhüttenstadt in particular, provide many a fruitful avenue for further research and discussion.

Thinking about cultural exchanges, cultural transfer, and the flow of ideas as shaping influences on German and European culture has tended to focus on processes of reading, translation, and correspondence within a “Republic of Letters,” but increasingly travel, migration, and exile have entered the picture as well. Such exchanges have also usually been thought of as extending from country to country in bilateral relationships. I suggest that cultural exchanges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should in part be conceived as embedded within broader European networks, in which the connections and the processes of transfer and translation need to be analyzed as multilateral rather than solely bilateral in nature. Not all Franco-German contacts, for example, took place within France or the German lands. Diplomatic and salon networks among men and women of the social and political elites, ties among academic and cultural figures, and links between religious communities and political groupings all point to larger European webs of exchange that were multinational rather than transnational in a bilateral sense. Hence the experience of travel and face-to-face encounters in places like Paris, Vienna, Rome, and Geneva promoted the flow of ideas not just between Germany and the specific land visited but also between both and the homelands of others visiting and entering into exchanges at the same time. Whether considering their geographic and institutional locations, the persons involved, or the processes of communication and mediation that shaped them, cultural exchanges emerged from and fed back into more complex historical contexts.

Michel Espagne already indicated the need to consider broader relationships, triangular or even “quadrilateral,” and the idea has been explored further in a recent collection on “Kulturelle Dreiecksbeziehungen” among French, German, and Danish figures. Sites of exchange could lie outside the bi- or even trilateral locations of interest. Scandinavian-German transfers occurred in Paris and Madame de Staël’s Coppet, and those that took place in the German or Scandinavian lands could affect Scandinavian-
Francophone exchanges and mutual perceptions in Paris or Copenhagen.\(^1\) Anglo-Franco-German exchanges crystallized in Florence and Rome as well as in the respective countries, and French, German, Polish, and Russian conversation partners mingled while taking the waters in Central European spas.

But this shift of perspective is not just a matter of where exchanges happen or who is doing the exchanging. A turn to networks also addresses deeper methodological issues and highlights the level of the processes involved in exchange that authors like Espagne want to emphasize. Although open to expanding beyond bilateral frameworks, Espagne and Karin Hoff and Udo Schöning warn against adducing a generalized entanglement or “métissage” behind transfers, as being true at some level but unhelpful; they suggest that it would then be impossible to model or to localize and study actual transfers in a concrete way.\(^2\) Instead, they stress empirical concentration on processes and outcomes in a manageable number of cases as the key to research. Networks, however, also offer a way to illuminate processes, as well as locations and relationships, in ways going beyond national frameworks, or beyond even the transnational understood as the cumulative sum of bilateral national relationships. Networks as emergent structures often include actors from multiple national backgrounds, and serve as concrete venues for cultural exchange (or political, culture and politics being hard to separate in many contexts). This was particularly the case for salon networks at the European level in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as in my work on the Congress of Vienna, with numerous expats, travelers, exiles, and cosmopolitan border-crossers at home in multiple locales. The number of nations or national cultures represented in a network becomes less of an issue in this perspective, not insignificant or incidental, but no longer the prime consideration.


Studying networks can also help take us beyond a concentration on translation, and concomitantly on reading, as the paradigm case of processes of exchange. Mediation, and at a general level communication across several potential media and venues, need to be set alongside translation as vehicles for cultural transfer. In this approach, the participants in cultural networks become intermediaries between cultures, without necessarily translating concepts, much less whole texts, in a technical sense. They take on ideas or practices from some person or group with whom they come in contact, and then pass them on to others in their circles, from their own or other nations. With mediation too one of the main research questions remains that of how and how far the elements communicated are altered, that is, modified in the process of being transposed from one context to the next. The spatial sense of the term translatio is, significantly, still preserved in the notion of mediation, in the movement from one context and location to another. This is all the more true as focusing on mediation places renewed emphasis on the physical movement of interlocutors in travel, rather than seeing the ideas or texts themselves as the sole elements being shifted.

Taking members of networks as cultural intermediaries in a mediation paradigm also highlights the cultural hybridity of these European spaces, as well as the changes in the individuals who thus operate across the soft or permeable borders of national cultures (understood in non-essentialist ways, as themselves cultural composites). Transnational networks in this way function not unlike the “contact zones” of colonial and postcolonial studies, or the “portals of globalization” invoked by Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann. Focusing on mediation at the same time helps emphasize the two-way nature of exchanges, even in asymmetric situations, as opposed to the often more one-way traffic of translation. And finally, mediation in the context of mobility and face-to-face exchanges puts the spotlight on orality rather than only on texts and reading. Authors and conversation partners could come together and talk about things they had read, heard about, or seen in other national contexts. Transfer was thus also a dialogic process.