"We're mad as hell and we're not going to take it anymore": Anger self-stereotyping and collective action
Diana J. Leonard, Wesley G. Moons, Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith
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Imagine a female student who has decided to unwind by taking a kickboxing class at the campus gym. As her workout ends, she overhears the male instructor make a discriminatory comment to another woman in the class. What determines whether our protagonist merely shrugs and walks away, or drops her gym bag and confronts the male instructor on behalf of her fellow ingroup member and in defense of the ingroup as a whole?

Denying that discrimination has occurred or “going along to get along” with prejudiced others are frequent reactions to instances of possible and obvious discrimination (Foster, 2000; Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009; Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997). However, given the important benefits for the individual, group and society

Abstract
What can motivate members of disadvantaged groups to take action on behalf of their group? This research assessed a model in which measured perceptions of (study 1) and manipulated information about (study 2) other women’s anger influenced female participants’ group-based anger, their subsequent appraisals of instances of possible discrimination, and finally their collective action tendencies. Consistent with Intergroup Emotions Theory, the results suggested that emotional self-stereotyping is one mechanism by which group members can become motivated to respond to possible discrimination, a process supported by group-based anger-driven appraisals about specific discrimination events.

Keywords
collective action, gender stereotyping, intergroup emotion, group-based emotion, self-stereotyping, discrimination, social identity

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Imagine a female student who has decided to unwind by taking a kickboxing class at the campus gym. As her workout ends, she overhears the male instructor make a discriminatory comment to another woman in the class. What determines whether our protagonist merely shrugs and walks away, or drops her gym bag and confronts the male instructor on behalf of her fellow ingroup member and in defense of the ingroup as a whole? Denying that discrimination has occurred or “going along to get along” with prejudiced others are frequent reactions to instances of possible and obvious discrimination (Foster, 2000; Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009; Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997). However, given the important benefits for the individual, group and society

1 Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara
2 Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis
3 Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Indiana, Bloomington

Corresponding author:
Diana J. Leonard, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660, USA. [email: leonard@psych.ucsb.edu]
that can follow from proactive responses to
discrimination (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006;
Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006), we
investigated the role of group-based emotion in
facilitating collective action. That is, when our
group is “mad as hell”, are we as group members
not willing to take discrimination anymore?

Collective action has been defined as any
action in which a group member engages to
improve the condition of his or her ingroup
(Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zeller, 1987).
Thus action taken, either individually or in
concert with others, in pursuit of better out-
comes for the group as a whole qualifies as col-
lective action. Historically, such activities have
been an important catalyst for social change. In
the case of voting rights for women in the
USA, for example, female activists acted alone
or with their group, writing essays to spread the
word on the “women’s issue” and marching the
streets in solidarity, enduring setbacks and cel-

What can motivate people to act on behalf of
a devalued ingroup? Recently, several social iden-
tity-based theories have argued that membership-
triggered processes are important precursors to
the commitment to act on behalf of the group
(Kramer, 2009; Simon, Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008;
Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears,
Fischer, & Leach, 2004). These models converge
in arguing that self-categorization processes pro-
duce commonalities or shared properties among
group members that in turn motivate and enable
collective action. Particularly important is deper-
sonalization, a process by which the self takes on
group-prototypic qualities and becomes inter-
changeable with other group members (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).
Therefore, the degree to which our protagonist is
affected by these processes will have important
implications for whether she stands up to the
male instructor. For example, Thomas et al. (2009)
have demonstrated that group identity enables
the formation and adoption of group norms that in
turn produce and maintain sustained commitment
to action by those already involved in coordinated
social movements. Moreover, there is an emerg-
ing consensus that the processes most crucial to
collective action are affective ones (van Zomeren
et al., 2008)

Given that both shared group membership
and shared affect play such crucial roles in collec-
tive action, we approached the question of how
to motivate people to confront discrimination
from an Intergroup Emotions Theory perspec-
tive (IET; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith,
1993; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). According
to IET, which is also derived from social identity
theory, one of the consequences of categoriza-
tion is that group members experience emotions
based on group membership (see also Gordijn,
Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Yzerbyt, Dumont,
Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). For example,
Smith et al. (2007) demonstrated that physically
separated participants asked to consider them-
selves as members of an ingroup all reported
similar emotions (group emotion) that differed in
content from the emotions that they reported
when thinking of themselves as unique individu-
als (individual emotion), or as members of a dif-
ferent ingroup. The extent to which such emotion
sharing occurred depended on members’ identifi-
cation with the currently activated ingroup. Thus,
people thinking about themselves as members of a
particular group experience different emotions
than they do if and when they are thinking about
themselves as members of a different group or as
unique individuals.

demonstrated that just as self-stereotyping pro-
duces convergence in group-prototypical attitudes,
norms, and traits, self-stereotyping processes are
sufficient to produce such sharing of emotion
among isolated ingroup members. In four stud-
ies, participants received false information about
an ingroup’s typical emotional experience (with
no reference to any emotion-triggering event).1
When self-categorized as members of that ingroup,
participants reported emotions that converged
toward the ingroup emotion stereotype or norm.
Such emotional self-stereotyping followed self-
categorization into national, gender, ethnic, and

1
minimal groups, occurred for positive and negative emotions, and did not influence emotions reported under alternative (including individual) self-categorizations. Importantly, such effects were heightened by a manipulation known to increase self-stereotyping, a threat to optimal distinctiveness (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002). In demonstrating that information about an ingroup’s typical emotion can trigger emotional self-stereotyping, which in turn effectively induces group-based emotion, these studies also provide a strategy for facilitating group-based action. For example, imagine what would happen if we told our protagonist that her group is high on an action-consistent emotion? We argue that she may engage in emotional self-stereotyping and converge on the emotion in question. Since affect is such a strong predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), this might be an especially effective way to get the college student to stand up for her ingroup.

What kind of group-based emotion seems best suited to motivating such collective action? Intergroup anger has been identified in several studies as facilitating confrontational action on behalf of the ingroup (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004). For example, the more group-based anger that college students experienced in response to a proposed increase in requirements, the more they wanted to engage in collective action opposing the increase (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Thus the induction of group-based anger seems particularly well suited to motivate collective action when a group-relevant event occurs.

Once activated, how might shared anger motivate reactions to group relevant events? Although most research in the group-based tradition has assessed emotion as a proximal antecedent of behavior (Crisp et al., 2007; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; Mackie et al., 2000), group-based emotions also influence a range of downstream cognitive processes including judgements and appraisals (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2006). In one study, for example, group members who learned that their group was generally angry were significantly more likely to make risky decisions in a supposedly unrelated experiment than those who believed that their group was less angry (Moons et al., 2009). Other evidence demonstrates that group-based anger influences subsequent appraisal of events (Gill & Matheson, 2006; Iyer & Leach, 2008). Thus, just as individual anger makes appraisals consistent with that anger more likely (Dodge & Somberg, 1987; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), so too might baseline levels of group-based anger operate to make appraisals of group relevant events more consistent with the experience of that anger. If so, an angry group member may be more likely to perceive an intergroup situation as discriminatory in light of his or her emotional state, and as a result be more likely to act. Such a chain of psychological events is consistent with recent suggestions from emotion researchers that cognitive appraisals play an important role in directly predicting behavior when emotions are activated (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007).

In light of these ideas, we examined how information about ingroup anger stereotypes could trigger the experience of context-free anger shared by fellow group members via self-stereotyping, which in turn might influence appraisals of a situation in ways that make collective action more likely. Returning to our original example, we might expect the sexist nature of the male instructor’s comments to be much more evident to an already-angry female college student, which would in turn make her more likely to react confrontationally. Thus we suggest that stereotype-based general emotions, although not about specific events or targets, can affect the construal of incipient events, result in emotion-consistent responses, and thus make emotion-consistent behavior on behalf of the group more likely.

We conducted two studies to evaluate a model of collective action facilitation via group anger self-stereotyping (see Figure 1). In the first part of the process, we expected ingroup anger stereotypes to influence group members’ actual experience of anger via self-stereotyping, as demonstrated by Moons et al. (2009). We expected
this stereotype-driven emotional experience then to influence how group members appraised ambiguous discrimination towards a member of their ingroup. Finally, we expected these appraisals to motivate group members to take collective action to resolve this intergroup situation.

Study 1

We assessed this model in study 1 using women’s idiosyncratic perceptions of their ingroup’s anger emotion stereotype: how angry their gender group feels on average. We expected participants to be able to easily provide such ratings since people can estimate (with reasonable accuracy) the emotions experienced by members of social groups (Seger, Smith, Kinias, & Mackie, 2009). When we later confronted them with a fictitious situation of possible discrimination, we expected their perceptions of their ingroup’s general level of anger to influence their own reported group-based anger, their responses to the fictitious situation, and their desire to take action regarding it.

Method

Participants, design, and procedure

The participants were 58 female students (age \( M = 18, \ SE = .33 \)) from the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) who completed the study for partial course credit.

Assessment of ingroup anger stereotype

Participants completed an online survey that asked them, among other items, to respond to the question “How angry do ___ feel on average?” (where not at all = 1 to very = 7) for two groups: Americans and women.

Assessment of experienced group-based anger

Participants came into the laboratory approximately two to four weeks later in groups of up to seven, and were seated by a female experimenter in individual cubicles with desktop computers. After reporting their gender (increasing the salience of this membership), participants rated the extent to which they felt several emotions when thinking about themselves as members of their gender group (where not at all = 1 to very = 7). Responses to three items were averaged: angry, irritated, and mad (\( \alpha = .88 \)).

Presentation and assessment of discrimination event

Participants were instructed to read and vividly imagine a situation in which a kickboxing instructor makes a comment to a female student in his class (adapted from Inman & Baron, 1996). Specifically, participants read:

In a kickboxing class with mostly male students, the instructor comments that he has decided to gear the sessions towards strength training. Afterwards, he calls Jessica over to tell her that she should really consider transferring into an aerobics class.

This vignette was intended to represent an ambiguous instance of discrimination so that participants would vary in their interpretation of the comment. Participants’ appraisals of the event were assessed using a single discrimination measure: “How likely is it that the event was due to gender prejudice or to other factors?” (where due to factors other than gender prejudice = 1 to completely due to gender prejudice = 7). We characterize these responses as appraisals since they are interpretations of possible threat to a self-relevant group.
Collective action tendencies  Participants then indicated how likely they were to respond to the situation with action on behalf of the group, whether taken alone or with other group members (where not at all likely = 1 to extremely likely = 7). The scale (adapted from Gill & Matheson, 2006 and van Zomeren et al., 2004) consisted of two items at the individual level (“I would take some form of personal action to stop this event from happening again”, and “I would demand an explanation from the kickboxing instructor”), and two parallel items at the group level (“I would join with other members of my gender group to stop this event from happening again” and “I would join with other members of my gender group to demand an explanation from the kickboxing instructor”). A four-item composite ($\alpha = .88$) thus depicted interest in using collective action to address the discriminatory event.

Finally, the participants completed a demographic survey and were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results and discussion
We expected that the participants’ perceptions of their ingroup’s anger, assessed earlier in a separate session, would be uniquely associated with the group-based anger that they reported when self-categorized as female during the laboratory session. As predicted, perceptions of the female anger stereotype were positively associated with self-reported group-based anger, $\beta = .33, p = .01$. The angrier that women perceived their ingroup to be, the angrier they reported feeling while thinking of themselves as members of that group. Further, this relation remained significant when the American anger stereotype was included as a covariate ($\beta = .29, p = .047$). Perceptions of how angry another ingroup (Americans) felt on average did not explain significant independent variance, $R^2$ change = .01, ns, $\beta = .10$, ns.

We also expected this self-stereotyping-driven emotional experience to then influence how group members appraised possible discrimination towards a member of their group. As predicted, self-reported group-based anger was positively associated with appraisals of discrimination, $\beta = .26, p = .047$. Also, these appraisals of discrimination were positively associated with participants’ interest in taking collective action to resolve the intergroup situation that they had read about, $\beta = .51, p < .001$ (see Table 1 for correlations among these variables).

Model of collective action
We tested the hypothesized model in Figure 1 using path analysis. As shown in Figure 2, the hypothesized model fit the data reasonably well, $\chi^2 (3, N = 58) = 6.49, p = .09$.

No additional direct path from group-based anger to collective action was necessary to achieve acceptable model fit. Thus, the data supported a model in which perceptions of the ingroup’s stereotypic anger influenced members’ experienced group-based anger, which in turn shaped perceptions of discrimination that drove collective action. The fact that all participants completed the same anger items embedded in the emotion survey eliminated any explanation of the results based on differential priming. The fact that the ingroup emotion stereotype was assessed as part of a lengthy survey completed two to four weeks before participation assures that the data reflect the participants’ self-reports of their perceptions and experiences within the laboratory session.
prior to the experimental session made demand an equally unlikely explanation for the results. Thus women’s beliefs about how angry their gender group feels predicted the group-based emotion that they later reported feeling. In contrast, their beliefs about how angry an unrelated ingroup (American) feels did not predict gender group-based anger. These data are consistent with other evidence that self-categorization itself can induce “context-free” group-based emotions, that this experience is specific to the categorized group and the stereotyped emotion, and that one way in which this process operates is via emotional self-stereotyping (Moons et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007). However, these results provide the first evidence that naturally occurring perceptions of emotion stereotypes can influence the experience of group-based emotions. They also provide evidence of an alternative route by which group-based anger can influence behavior: women were more likely to appraise a subsequent intergroup situation in a way that was consistent with the group-based anger that they were experiencing, and this mediated the positive relationship between group-based anger and collective action tendencies. There was no support in these data for a direct impact of the stereotype-induced group-based anger on interest in collective action.

Of course these data are correlational, and there may be systematic differences between women who believe their gender group is angry and those who do not. For example, angry individuals might be more likely to perceive other women to be angry and more likely to perceive discrimination to be widespread, as well as being more willing to engage in collective action. A control measure assessing individual emotion would have helped to rule out this possibility. In addition, the relatively small sample in this study may have contributed to inaccurate statistical estimates of model fit. We attempted to eliminate these possibilities in study 2.

Study 2
In study 2 we experimentally manipulated the emotion stereotype with a larger sample to demonstrate the causal effect of anger stereotypes on group-based emotion, intergroup appraisals and collective action. We also added a measure of individual emotions to control for idiosyncratic emotional experiences not due to shared group membership. By disentangling individual emotions from group-based emotions in this way, we can specifically examine the effects of changes in group-based emotion. Female participants were provided with false information about the average level of anger experienced by their gender group. After reporting their emotions, participants reported their appraisals of possible instances of discrimination and their interest in engaging in collective action in response to them.

Method
Participants, design and procedure
Participants were 89 female UCSB students (age $M = 20$, $SE = .37$) who completed the study for partial course credit. Participants reported their gender (making this category salient) and were randomly assigned to either a high-anger stereotype or low-anger stereotype condition.
Manipulation of ingroup anger stereotype
Following Moons et al. (2009), participants were told that the study investigated how people feel, and that members of each gender group typically share certain personality, behavioral, and emotional characteristics. An example showing women’s alleged average level of anger depicted on a scale (anchored by not at all angry = 1 to very angry = 7) was shown. In the high-anger stereotype condition, the number six was circled (indicating that women on average felt considerable anger), whereas in the low-anger stereotype condition, the number two (indicating very little anger) was circled.

Assessment of group-based and individual anger
We used the same three items (assessed among others) as in study 1 for the composite of group-based anger ($\alpha = .86$). In addition, the participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt several emotions when thinking about themselves as unique individuals (where not at all = 1 to very = 7). Responses to the same three anger-related emotions (angry, irritated, and mad, $\alpha = .86$) were averaged to index individual anger.

Appraisal of discrimination events
After ostensibly starting a second study, participants reported their gender and rated two vignettes involving a male authority figure making a possibly discriminatory remark to a female. Participants read the vignette used in study 1 and for generalization purposes, a similar vignette in which a woman buying a car is told that her “type” does not like to negotiate (adapted from Inman & Baron, 1996). Participants’ appraisals of these events were assessed using two items presented in random order following each vignette. In addition to the discrimination measure used in study 1, participants also rated whether the situation would have a severe impact on the target female’s life (where not at all = 1 to very much = 7; a discrimination appraisal adapted from Eccleston & Major, 2006). Both items were averaged across the two vignettes to create a four-item discrimination appraisal composite ($\alpha = .50$).

Collective action
After each vignette, participants completed the same four collective action items used in study 1. These items were averaged across the two vignettes to create a composite of collective action ($\alpha = .82$).

Manipulation check
Finally, participants reported the ingroup anger stereotype, “On average, how angry do members of your gender group feel?” (where not at all = 1 to very = 7), and were debriefed.

Results and discussion
Effect of the emotion stereotype manipulation
Manipulation check As intended, participants in the high-anger stereotype condition estimated anger in the group to be significantly higher ($M = 4.07, SE = .22$) than participants in the low-anger stereotype condition ($M = 2.86, SE = .18$), $t(87) = 4.24, p < .001$.

Emotional self-stereotyping
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant impact of the emotion stereotype on reported group-based anger, $F(1, 87) = 11.67, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .12$. Participants who received the high-anger stereotype reported experiencing significantly more group-based anger ($M = 3.33, SE = .19$) than participants who received the low-anger stereotype ($M = 2.41, SE = .19$), confirming our expectations. This result held when controlling for individual anger, $F(1, 86) = 4.43, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .05$. The fact that the anger stereotype uniquely impacted group-based anger was confirmed by an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) showing no impact of the stereotype on individual anger when controlling for group-based anger, $F(1, 86) = 1.19, ns$.

Appraisals of discrimination
Although the means were in the expected direction, the manipulation of emotion stereotypes did not differentially impact appraisals (low anger, $M = 4.27, SE = .15$; high anger, $M = 4.50, SE = .14$).
F(1, 87) = 1.23, p = .27. Presumably the low reliability of the appraisal measure is partly responsible for this outcome, although disentangling the composite does not strengthen these results.

Collective action Participants in the high-anger stereotype condition were more interested in engaging in collective action in response to the discrimination vignettes (M = 4.62, SE = .17) than participants in the low-anger condition (M=4.01, SE=.18), F(1, 87) = 6.20, p = .02, η² = .07.

Model of collective action
As predicted, the dummy coded manipulation (0 = low-anger stereotype, 1 = high-anger stereotype) was positively associated with self-reported group-based anger, β = .34, p = .001; self-reported group-based anger was positively associated with appraisals of discrimination (β = .21, p = .045; and these appraisals of discrimination were positively associated with participants’ interest in taking collective action, β = .36, p < .001 (see Table 2). Despite the weak impact of the group emotion manipulation on appraisals, the significant effect of the manipulation on the final dependent variable (collective action) encouraged us to test the hypothesized model in Figure 1 using path analysis, as in study 1. To evaluate our model while controlling for individual anger, we partialled the shared variance with individual anger out of each of our continuous variables to yield residualized group-based anger, discrimination appraisals, and collective action (χ² (3, N = 89) = 2.54, p = .47, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (90% CI = .00–.17). + p < .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001; two-tailed.

![Figure 3](image-url)
shared variance with individual anger. Moreover, a meta-analysis examining the effect across both studies revealed that, even when individual anger is partialled out of study 2, the correlation between group-based anger and appraisals is reliable, $Z = 2.626, p = .009$. Overall, the results of study 2 are consistent with study 1, even when the effect of individual anger is removed.

**Conclusion**

We examined self-stereotyping of group-based emotions as an antecedent to collective action. In both a correlational and experimental design, we tested a model in which an ingroup emotion stereotype increased shared group-based anger, which in turn influenced appraisals about discrimination, which then increased collective action. Although each study had its unique strengths and weaknesses, their results converge: self-stereotyping-induced group-based emotion can instigate collective action. These results have several theoretical and practical implications.

First, the results extend our understanding of self-stereotyping and group-based emotion. Whereas the results of study 2 replicated Moons et al. (2009) in demonstrating the power of manipulated ingroup emotion stereotypes, the results of study 1 showed for the first time that idiosyncratic perceptions of an ingroup’s emotion stereotype predicted the category-based emotions reported in a different time and setting. Together these findings further underscore the powerful role that categorization processes play in triggering emotional processes via self-stereotyping.

Second, these findings demonstrate a novel way in which categorization might influence reactions to specific group-relevant events. Previous research has shown that changing an individual’s self-categorization can influence the emotion that he or she feels about a specific event (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Moreover, evidence has emerged that self-categorization alone can cause participants to converge on unique event-free, group-prototypical profiles of emotions (Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009; Seger et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007). The present findings put these pieces together to show that group-based emotions can be induced via self-stereotyping and, in turn, can influence responses to a specific event. Thus emotion generated without regard to a specific event can result in emotion-consistent behavior in response to that specific event, just as people high in trait anger, anxiety and so forth, are especially vulnerable to experiencing those emotions in specific situations (Rusting, 1998; Watson & Clark, 1992). Our participants’ anger was not caused by the potentially discriminatory event, but because they felt angry in general as group members, they ended up reacting to the event in a way consistent with feeling angry about it.

We characterize our participants as feeling angry “in general” because these data are most consistent with the idea that via self-stereotyping, mere categorization can generate event-free group-typical emotions, just as it apparently activates context-free group-typical norms, attitudes and traits (indeed the information that we provided could be thought of as a descriptive emotion norm). Just as adoption of those norms routinely reflects internalization rather than mere compliance (Turner et al., 1987), there is little reason to suggest that adoption of the emotion norms in our paradigm reflect either public conformity or demand rather than genuine changes in emotional experience. Group-based anger induced by information about ingroup emotion stereotypes influences risk-taking and is moderated by identification with the ingroup, both theoretically expected consequences of experienced anger that participants are unlikely to anticipate (Moons et al., 2009).

Third, our findings demonstrate a novel route by which group-based emotions can influence behaviors. Consistent with accumulating evidence in the broader emotions literature (Baumeister et al., 2007), the group-based emotions reported by our participants did not directly predict their intergroup behaviors, but worked through situation-specific appraisals. Although the mediating role of appraisals was weak in study 1 and non-significant in study 2, path analyses indicated that adding a direct link between group-based emotions and...
action would not improve model fit. Moreover, in study 2 the correlation between group-based anger and collective action was non-significant (see Table 2), further suggesting that the influence of anger on action in this study worked indirectly via appraisals. Therefore, although the data may not conclusively demonstrate this effect, we propose that self-stereotyped emotion can act as a lens through which group members interpret intergroup events.

Similar results were reported by Gill and Matheson (2006), who found that a composite of perceived personal and group discrimination partially mediated the relation between self-reported anger and collective action tendencies. Our research extends their work by showing that group-based anger can influence collective action quite independently of the influence of individual emotion (and indeed, even with individual anger statistically controlled in study 2). This is critical because it suggests that a shared group membership can determine how someone feels over and above the impact of his or her idiosyncratic emotional experiences.

It is important to note at this point that classic appraisal theories of emotion would predict that emotion mediates the effect of appraisals on behavior, and not the other way around (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, Van Zomeren, Fischer and Spears (2007) demonstrated that the relationship between situation-specific appraisals and offensive intergroup action tendencies was mediated by intergroup anger following a fictitious intergroup event. Because we did not measure emotion about our discrimination scenarios in this way, we cannot determine whether situation-specific emotion was the proximal antecedent of intergroup behavior in our studies. Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence from the two studies suggests that context-free emotion can influence how a group-relevant event is perceived and, in this indirect way, facilitate action.

Thus, these data indicate an additional route by which group-based emotions can influence action. Since group-based anger can influence collective action tendencies directly (via situation-specific emotion, e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004) and indirectly (via emotion-consistent appraisals of events as demonstrated here, perhaps with an interceding role of situation-specific anger), future research should examine the intergroup context and stereotype accessibility conditions under which intergroup emotions and intergroup appraisals might operate separately, in concert and in different temporal sequences to influence behavior.

Our results also demonstrate the practical value of ingroup emotion stereotypes in motivating members of disadvantaged groups to confront discrimination. Indeed, self-stereotype-induced change in emotions has many advantages: as Smith et al. (2007) showed, other group members do not have to be physically present for self-stereotyping to occur; as Moons et al. (2009) demonstrated, such processes are group and emotion specific; and as our results suggest, they can become activated in the appropriate intergroup context. Thus, providing information, whether accurate or not, about ingroup emotion stereotypes could be applied strategically to encourage collective action in response to a wide range of group-relevant events across time and contexts among members of even widely dispersed social groups.

Further, our evidence that how people “do” feel influences collective action fits nicely with evidence that how people “should” feel promotes activism by members of opinion-based groups (Normative Alignment Model, Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009). Thomas et al. (2009) highlight the importance of using such injunctive norms to direct ingroup interaction in such a way as to create consensus about a particular situation – thus they use injunctive norms to create descriptive norms. However, our findings suggest that the opposite direction of influence also might be useful. For example, context-free emotion norms or stereotypes might act across situations to “release” emotions and behaviors that otherwise might be suppressed within a group (so descriptive norms create injunctive norms). The communication of an ingroup anger stereotype, for example, may be especially useful for groups that have norms against expressing emotions associated with power, as may be the case for women and members of collectivist cultures (Fischer, Manstead, Evers, Timmers, & Valk, 2004; Gill & Matheson, 2006; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead,
2003). Knowing that other group members feel angry may enable group members to express these emotions and enjoy associated benefits, such as the conferral of status that has been shown to follow anger displays (Tiedens, 2001).

Taken together, these lines of research suggest that intergroup emotions can be a useful tool in encouraging action toward social justice. Since self-categorization as a group member occurs when social identity is highly salient, and since this is especially likely during intergroup encounters, group-based emotions are likely to be particularly useful for inducing intergroup action. When members of disadvantaged groups witness ambiguous discrimination, it may not be clear how to react to such events. However, when our group is “as mad as hell”, we are more likely to appraise these situations as discrimination. As a consequence, we will not take this discrimination anymore, but instead will be motivated to act collectively to counter it.

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Note

1. Although such emotion is generated without explicit provision of an event, self-stereotyping could involve generating or recalling relevant or typical events or objects that explain or justify an emotion, consistent with traditional appraisal theories. When those events and objects are common across group members, emotion in response to them is also shared.

References


**Biographical notes**

DIANA J. LEONARD is a Doctoral Candidate in Psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research focuses on the role of intergroup emotions in determining responses to intergroup conflict.

WESLEY G. MOONS is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at UC Davis, recently a University of California President's Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Psychology at UCLA. His research explores the role of emotions in interpersonal and intergroup relations as well as the effects of emotion on cognitive, behavioral and biological processes.

DIANE M. MACKIE is Professor of Psychology and Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara. The author of more than 100 articles and chapters, she is particularly interested in the interplay of emotional and cognitive processes in all aspects of intergroup relations, as well as in evaluation, persuasion, and social influence.

ELIOT R. SMITH is Chancellor’s Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University, Bloomington. With long-term collaborator Diane M. Mackie, he has an extensive program of research on the role of emotions in prejudice and intergroup behavior. He also has research interests in socially situated cognition, including the impact on person perception of gossip passing through the social network.