A Conversation with Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik

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Terri Gordon-Zolov: Thank you both for taking the time to talk with me about your important, new collected volume, *Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender* (2009).¹ As the title suggests, the volume is concerned primarily with movement, with contemporary migrations and mobility beyond or within national borders. In its focus on gender, *Migrations and Mobilities* pays particular attention to the status of migrant female workers, invisible caregivers, family units, the rights of children, and women’s second-class citizen status in various regions of the world.

What was the impetus behind this collected work?

Seyla Benhabib: The immediate occasion for it was the conference “Citizenship, Borders, and Gender” that Judith and I organized at Yale in May 2003. But the main issue was that the gender question was not at the center of the growing field of migration and citizenship studies.

Judith Resnik: There is a lovely, feminist story to the genesis and production of the conference and then to the book as well. A group of us at Yale formed a collective called the Women’s Faculty Forum (WFF). This forum came together because in 2000, Yale was organizing to celebrate its three hundredth birthday without a formal way of marking one of the transformations of the past century for Yale University—that it too had new citizens, which is to say, women had become eligible to function in all roles within the university. Of course, women had been at Yale—as workers—since its inception, but in the twentieth century, women become participants as students throughout the university as well as faculty and senior administrators.
With the support of the university, the WFF organized a conference as part of the many events to celebrating Yale's three hundred years. Our event, held in 2001, was called “Gender Matters,” and a monograph of that name appeared soon thereafter. The WFF has continued to work on scholarship and university practices, considered from the standpoint of gender equity and gender discrimination. In 2003, with support from the WFF and several other segments of Yale, Seyla and I convened a conference that aspired to have the many academic sites of concerns around citizenship come together, to meet each other under a framework marked by gender. We sought to engender the citizenship conversations around us.

TG-Z: The work has an international scope and includes contributions from leading political scientists, law professors, historians, and sociologists, among others. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this volume, do you hope to reach a larger audience than a scholarly one? Do you think that the work could effect national or international change within the areas of politics, law, or human rights?

JR: Well, it depends on how one measures change. Do we want the conversation to change in all those areas so that people, whether they’re thinking politics or theory or policy in different venues, will be engaging these questions? Yes.

SB: Yes, particularly as the discussion about immigration and crossing borders continues intensely in this country. Immigration policy has become part of the larger debate about national security. The Department of Immigration has been swallowed by Homeland Security, and it doesn’t seem as if that’s going to be changing any time soon. However, this situation creates profound distortions and injustices by criminalizing immigration, rather than viewing it as part of the human condition in the twentieth-first century to which we must seek a humane and just answer. Hopefully the volume will stimulate some new kinds of thinking about these issues. As to the audience, I do hope that the work gets picked up by some circles that are interested in thinking critically about how to move away from the national security paradigms we inherited from the previous Bush administration.

TG-Z: In one of the opening essays in the volume, “The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other,” Linda Kerber provides some deeply troubling statistics. According to recent estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are currently 20.8 million indi-
viduals—refugees, asylum seekers, displaced persons, and stateless people living in a “Kafkaesque legal vacuum”—in irregular citizenship situations. Refugees make up the largest category, and women and children constitute 80 percent of this population (Benhabib and Resnik 2009, 87–88). What would you consider to be the most pressing issues in the area of citizenship today, particularly in regard to the question of gender?

JR: Let me begin by talking about the United States; since the mid-1990s, we’ve shifted to a paradigm of detention. The estimates are that, annually, about 325,000 people are detained, including people of all ages and in all different kinds of family configurations. On average, on any given day, about 31,000 people are held, based on immigration charges, by the federal government in detention centers.

The shared impulse across a variety of countries is to shore up borders and boundaries by, literally, holding at bay people who are seeking to enter their gates. The transnational problem is how to enable needy people to enter a country without that country seeing itself as utterly flooded. As the book explains in the introduction, no international regime insists that everybody have an unconditional right of entry. One of the current problems is that, in many places around the world, human beings are confined in detention centers either within a country or outside its shores. Such confinement is not just simply containing but also debilitating.

TG-Z: Do you see a contrast in the European Union’s move toward more porousness and the United States’ attempts to shore up its boundaries since 9/11?

SB: Absolutely no, I don’t. The tendency within the European Union—and this started even under the Tony Blair government—has been to try to create what they call “transit processing centers” in countries like Libya before refugees can even step onto the territory of the European Union. So the EU is trying to prevent the emergence of detention centers within territorial Europe by moving them offshore. I don’t see any liberalization in this process. Quite to the contrary, I think, with the worsening economic situation, there is going to be more intense and efficient control of the borders of the European Union.

And in that sense, there isn’t much of a contrast between the United States and Europe. If anything, the United States is a bit more lenient about illegal labor, or undocumented labor, because this coun-
try’s economy has so widely benefited from it. The attempt to find the ten million so-called undocumented workers seems to proceed in fits and starts, simply because there is some resistance to it in the American population. As long as someone is a good neighbor, co-worker, parent, et cetera, their papers do not matter—this is a thought in the minds of many, which even Lou Dobbs could not change! Having said this, I should also add that the European Union is more conscientious about respecting international conventions with regard to refugees and asylum seekers, whereas in the United States, there is some disregard for international requirements, for example, in the treatment of Haitian refugees under the Clinton administration, who were summarily deported.

JR: One of the efforts of the book is to remind readers that many people feel themselves a part of countries called “nations,” but that those configurations are themselves relatively recent and remarkably fluid. Some of the boundaries that we hold dear (as if they existed forever) have been recently made. The Louisiana Purchase, for example, changed the United States in the nineteenth century; Hawaii and Alaska changed the United States in the twentieth century.

We’re aspiring for people to understand that the configurations claimed to be immovable are political artifacts. We want to remind readers to ask questions about the making and remaking of borders, and at what price to what human beings.

TG-Z: That brings me to a question of rights. Hannah Arendt’s formulation of a “right to have rights” stands behind much of the thought in this volume, a formulation that Seyla has developed at length in her work *The Rights of Others* (2004) and elsewhere. How might either of you conceptualize the primary barriers to this “right to have rights” in a transnational, global world?

SB: The formula itself contains a tension that Arendt was aware of: it seems that the “right to have rights” is meaningless unless one has the right of political membership or the status of citizenship. And for her the paradox is that when human beings, let’s say, refugees, are simply entitled to human rights, there is no larger public political entity protecting them. Who is to get guarantees for those who are not members or for those who are seeking membership and who are on the outside? For Arendt this was primarily the problem of statelessness. I mean, how is the right to be recognized as a member of a nation guaranteed at a
very concrete level? There is still no mechanism for asking states to naturalize immigrants or to grant entry to refugees—even those states that are signatories of the Geneva Refugee Conventions violate these. Naturalization and granting refuge, et cetera, are the fundamental prerogatives of sovereignty in the state system as we know it and paradoxes about which Hannah Arendt thought very deeply.

Article 15 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the individual against denaturalization. It holds that states must not arbitrarily deprive their citizens of their nationality. But there is no legal statute whereby in fact the claim to citizenship of migrants, refugees, and asylees must also be respected.

So one question that comes to mind—and this is addressed in a number of the essays—is whether forms of citizenships are being transformed such that the right to have rights is not only the right of those who have full political membership, but also the right of those who are, let’s say, permanent residents, denizens, or even undocumented migrants for whatever reason but who might have been living in a city or locality for ten, fifteen, twenty years.

This question of citizenship of place rather than citizenship of the nation-state comes up in several of the essays. Sarah van Walsum’s essay on transnational mothering and immigration policy and Linda Bosniak’s essay on transnational domestic work, among others, raise the question of whether we should understand this “right to have rights,” to use the term that I’m fond of, as a disaggregated bundle. Individuals may be residents of localities where they are in fact entitled to a large bundle of rights, with the exception of electing and running for office, and this forms a citizenship of sorts.

We see now more and more regional rights regimes where, in effect, permanent residents, even undocumented migrants, have the right to vote in parent-teacher associations and other organizations. In the European Union, for legal permanent residents of third-country nationals (that is, those who are not EU members), these rights are even more extensive and cover certainly all human and civil rights, as well as social and cultural rights. Entitlement to rights and membership status are increasingly dissociated from one another.

So, in short, the right to have rights is itself being transformed as a result of institutional practice. And a major trend we are seeing is a move toward citizenship of place or locality for the city or the region
instead of just the nation-state. Yet, at the same time, we also have the vulnerability of those who are migrants and refugees and who still are aspiring to citizenship because the state system does not provide them with the rights or options to naturalize.

JR: A few different variables are at work here. One is how to categorize persons in terms of their relationship to the nation-state. Who should be deemed a “citizen” or a “denizen” or an “alien” or a “migrant”? When are different degrees or kinds of documentation and of status appropriate? Another set of questions relates to the level of government empowered to make decisions: Should localities make decisions about the status of individuals? Should the European Union? A state or the United States? And a third kind of inquiry is about the bundle of rights that attaches when one is a “citizen” or “denizen” or a “permanent resident.” One could delineate among rights to participate in political elections, as contrasted with rights to obtain social services and rights to pass rights on to children. There are a number of different “rights” that could be entailed, or not.

The book offers yet more frames for considering the interrelationships among persons, sovereignties, and rights. During the past fifty years, we have seen the reconfiguration of authority augmenting both the local and the transnational levels. There is an interesting book by Jean-Marie Guéhenno called (in English translation), The End of the Nation-State (1995). His book speaks to the question of whether the nation-state can function as a vehicle for the provision of goods and services and security in a world in which global currents (of the economy, climate, and the like) are powerful, but local experiences also have life-organizing impact. The challenge Guéhenno raises toward the end of his discussion is that the nation-state has been a place where we have created the political theory (and sometimes the practices) of providing people within its community some level of security and protection.

So if one says, Let’s abandon that form, then the question is, How will we achieve some of what it does and with what mechanisms? One of my concerns is that as we move to global claims, we don’t have a way to implement them. Important and moving transnational proclamations state that all of us are equally dignified and entitled to decent treatment, but the experiences of those rights depend on what happens when I walk out my door—whether or not I can safely move on
the street, and if the electricity works, and if I have some way to seek redress if someone seizes my belongings—or me.

That’s the level at which small localities are critical. One needs some mechanism for the provision to and protection of humans in their daily activities, in fostering their capabilities and the like. The question for a much more mobile world is who will understand themselves as a “we” to offer care generously to others.

TG-Z: Let me see if I can unpack a bit what you have said here. You mention an area of disagreement in the introduction to the volume concerning the role to be played by law and the nation-state in mitigating the status of those who are marginalized or at risk. And that disagreement actually plays out in various essays in the work. Different authors would rely more or less heavily on international treaties or NGOs or international human rights or laws in a nation state, et cetera. Do you want to elaborate a bit on this debate?

SB: I think that the debate is taking place now also in many fields, as Judith mentioned. The last six months I’ve been looking at the literature on global constitutionalism, which is forcing the whole idea of the constitution that has been bound up with the experience of the nation-state beyond the experience and jurisdiction of the nation-state, toward the possibility of something like a global constitution.

I am open to reconfiguring different frameworks at different levels—global, national, and regional. The discussion that Judith and I have concerns our assessments of the role of the nation-state. I think that the nation-state itself, as we also see in the case of the recent global economic crisis, is so embedded in larger transnational frameworks that it cannot even deliver the promise of welfare to its own people unless it acts more and more transnationally. Of course, the size of the players makes a difference. China and the United States may have more leverage in being able to act alone, but even then, not infinitely and not forever—as we see in the case of recent negotiations, with each country hectoring the other about what it should or should not do.

So a large conceptual question is the degree to which the nation-state is so embedded in transnational and global frameworks that it really cannot deliver on promises of social distributions and justice without converting to more global activity. The paradox is this: the nation-state is both indispensable and at the same time in need of deep repair or transcendence—this is the disagreement.
JR: One easy way to capture the concerns is by describing me as something of a federalist, which is to say that I see multiple layers of government as important to each other. The United States has enormous numbers of interactions with countries all over the world. But so do the subnational level governments, states and cities within the United States. We need to pay more attention to such activities, occurring translocally and transnationally. During the past few years, such transnational, federated and supranational activities and entities have multiplied. One could describe those activities as the disaggregation of the nation-state or as a reconfiguration that entails different forms of power. (“Rescaling” is a term sometimes used.) I would like more focus on the lively set of activities taking place at the city and county level, transnationally, as well as within a country. I should add that such organizations and interactions have been the sources of policies both progressive and nonprogressive.

SB: That’s very well put. I just want to add one thing. On a theoretical level, I find something that Judith has called “the law’s migration” (see Resnik 2006) extremely useful for my own work. I talk about “democratic iterations,” which is very much in line with this idea of federalism. Those involved may be nation-states, in terms of a global federalist framework, or regions, or smaller units, or units within units. But the whole idea is the movement of law and discourses that crosses boundaries.

In fact, I think this volume exemplifies very well how debates about rights and claims get picked up across boundaries. One of the essays that I have used in subsequent work is by Valentine Moghadam, about the impact of CEDAW [the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women] and other international agreements on movements for women’s rights in their own countries. Moghadam talks about the groups Women Living Under Muslim Laws and the Women’s Learning Partnership, which are already transnational networks. There are about eight countries involved in this framework of Women Living Under Muslim Law, whose members communicate with each other about the status of private law and family law and exchange strategies and so on.

There is also the essay by Audrey Macklin in our volume, discussing whether there should be Sharia-like or Islamic arbitration courts in Canada. This debate took place in the province of Ontario, where
Canadian Muslim women then turned to Women Living Under Muslim Law in order to defuse the claims of the Islamic Sharia courts to emerge as legal arbitrators of Muslim women’s rights.

So here you see a powerful process of iteration across borders and across continents. Canadian Muslim women were able to influence the process in Ontario to reduce Islamic arbitration courts to an advisory, as opposed to legally binding, status. This is then a kind of world migration of the law and legal practices around and across borders. In that sense, I think the volume is very exciting because it’s capturing many processes that are very actual and relevant to the lives of millions of people.

TG-Z: To pick up on this idea of cosmopolitanism or the end of the nation-state, Linda Kerber’s essay ends on an optimistic note. She concludes her piece with the possibility of what she calls a dream of a meaningful cosmopolitanism. “Is it possible to end not with the nightmare, but with the dream?” she asks. “Is it possible, still, to imagine a citizenship of the world?” (Benhabib and Resnik 2009, 107) I’d like to raise this question of a citizenship of the world, particularly in terms of those who are on the margins: illegal aliens, migrant workers, refugees, etcetera. What kinds of solutions do you or the authors in the volume envision for improving the status of effectively stateless persons?

JR: One basic thrust that I think cuts across the book is the notion that it’s not an all-or-nothing proposition. Proposition one is that citizenship isn’t the only way to be a rights-holder in the twenty-first-century social order. Proposition two, on the cheerful side, is that virtually all countries make claims of protecting both citizens and noncitizens and, moreover, have some notion that they have to explain their exercise of power. This precept intersects with the idea that power ought to take human life seriously and think about women and men as holders of some form of rights, although the applications vary. You can use the example of CEDAW. A remarkable number of countries have signed onto that proposition, even if we can critically say that some of them don’t mean that they support equality in the way many think is entailed in the concept of equality.

SB: There are 184 or so countries that have signed. It’s amazing.

JR: Yes, that everyone is pledging allegiance to the proposition of women as rights holders is something that we should cheer. We should also pause to appreciate what a remarkable achievement this is. Trans-
national conventions may not always be materialized on the ground, but the fact that so many organizations, institutions, nation-states, and the like want to speak to precepts of women’s equality is a remarkable shift in recent decades.

TG-Z: Do you see any other important shifts in recent years concerning citizenship discourse and practices?

JR: Trafficking and asylum are two areas to consider, and the attention paid to them comes from human rights and feminist work. Consider the deployment of the word “slavery.” Attention, over the past few decades, has brought that word back into common usage, as a term that aptly describes conditions, often entailing sexual abuse, to which women, men, and children are subjected.

TG-Z: I would like to elaborate on this category of women’s work in the global market. The volume itself provides startling material. Some twenty-seven million people are estimated to work in deplorable labor conditions (Benhabib and Resnik 2009, 88). Linda Bosniak emphasizes the importance of recognizing both the home and the workplace as sites of citizenship practice. So there is a general movement in citizenship discourse toward a right to work or to have dignified labor. In her essay on Filipina and Indonesian domestic workers in Southeast Asia, Aihwa Ong considers the condition of work of exported maids to be tantamount to neoslavery. Her solution is interesting in that she suggests a new moral economy in the place of an abstract rights discourse.

SB: The discourse of citizenship has for a long time been caught between two paradigms. One is the paradigm of liberal citizenship, which emphasizes private autonomy; the other is the paradigm of republican citizenship. What many of these essays are showing is the inadequacy of a paradigm of liberal citizenship or negative freedom. Even economic citizenship has to be understood in a much more robust way.

In many countries in the world, we are beginning to see also a profound shift in the persona of the migrant. With the move to a post-Fordist economy, the woman is emerging as the paradigmatic migrant worker because the service industries, be they hospitality industries, childcare, or elderly care, are moving to the center. The migrant is now more and more a woman between the ages of eighteen and forty who herself employs people at home to take care of her children, et cetera. So there is a kind of profound shift in the nature of migration itself,
and a lot of the essays are thinking about this shift both in analytic and normative terms.

Now, whether we need a new moral economy, I don’t know. I mean, that's certainly a very suggestive idea. The kind of culture of upper-class consumerism that Aihwa Ong discusses in her essay is profoundly alienating and shocking in some cases. It’s clear that the Filipino state (and not only this one) is also exploiting its women citizens because they are producers of remittances. And this is a chip in the global market. You can’t just engage this morally or symbolically. I think you also have to go to the institutions of the Filipino state and take measures against them for putting their own citizens in harm's way. This is a major, major human rights issue.

JR: I would like to add a couple of comments. The example of wage work, in and outside households, is in some ways a potentially easy illustration of the obligation of countries to provide security for persons within their borders. One may not need to call the persons so protected “citizens” but in fact they are “rights-holders.” The strands of discourse running under the terms “legal,” “political,” and “moral” all require that the workers within a country's borders not be exploited in certain ways, no matter what their status—and even if one thinks they shouldn’t be there. Such persons still can’t be subjected to horrific conditions. That’s the insight of trafficking that needs to be expanded and articulated more clearly.

I wanted to give you another example of an important positive trend, which is the interaction between gender and asylum. The United States has recently accepted the notion that gender grounds exist for asylum. A number of essays in the volume, such as Talia Inlender’s “Status Quo or Sixth Ground? Adjudicating Gender Asylum Claims,” address this issue. What we’re seeing in many countries is the possibility that women, in the particular circumstances organized by gender, are found to be eligible for asylum. The new understandings of what are the sources of “persecution” that make one eligible for asylum is another example of a migratory, transnational discourse that takes the categories that feminism underscores and turns them into legal rights for women.

TG-Z: There is another major area in the volume concerning the developments and recognition of rights, which is that of recognizing the integrity of family units and children’s rights. In her essay, “The ‘Mere
Fortuity of Birth? Children, Mothers, Borders, and the Meaning of Citizenship,” for example, Jacqueline Bhabha suggests that birthright citizenship—and she is concerned with the United States primarily—should ensure non-deportability. This is a move that would effectively enable citizen children to confer something akin to citizenship status on their parents were the latter in danger of being deported.

The question that arises here is how we might negotiate the competing demands of the state and the rights of children and family units.

**JR:** Jacqueline Bhabha’s essay points out that in many countries, a child can’t confer the rights of citizenship on parents, but a parent can confer such status on a child. So there is a lopsidedness (and an intellectual tension) in the notion that citizenship rights can descend through parents but not ascend through children. If family units generate citizenship rights, why make such provisions one-way rather than reciprocal?

One response is that countries do not want to create incentives for noncitizens to dash into the country, give birth, and then gain citizenship rights by virtue of their child’s right to citizenship. Given that concern, one would not want to insist on policies that would create incentives to put up more borders and increase our already fortress world. Before advocating that a child citizen beget a parent citizen, one has to consider whether the result will be a hardening of the border or more efforts aimed at preventing entry in the first place.

**SB:** Or an elimination of *jus soli* [birthright citizenship]. The reason why we have these cases of children citizens whose parents are noncitizens is because of the practice of territorial citizenship for children, actually one of the most liberal and advanced forms of citizenship. So a conservative backlash may be trying to get rid of *jus soli*, which is territorial birthright citizenship for children of noncitizen parents.

One has to develop concepts about the virtues of birthright citizenship and particularly about the enormous social cost of splitting up the family units eventually—the moral, the social, and the political cost. In this country, a Mexican child whose mother is not a Mexican citizen, not born on this side of the border, becomes an American citizen. And what we are seeing now is that Mexican mothers are being deported. Is this a just and humane method of treatment?

**JR:** What one needs to mention here is, of course, the “not all or nothing” proposition. For example, one could create a premise or presumption
that until the child is eighteen, the parents have a right to be in the same country in order to protect the well-being of the household.

TG-Z: That’s an interesting solution.

JR: The family can then make some choices about where and how to live.

TG-Z: There is a final area that is treated at length in the book, which is that of multiculturalism. I was very interested in the positions put forth by Audrey Macklin and David Jacobson. They have different views concerning the issue of multiculturalism, or what has been called in the volume “women’s rights versus culture.”

Macklin’s essay, which treats the case studies of female genital mutilation in the Canadian criminal code and Islamic faith-based family law arbitration, is critical of the normative power exercised by Western liberal norms.

Jacobson, on the other hand, in “Multiculturalism, Gender, and Rights,” suggests that “postcolonial sensibilities have, in effect, trumped women’s rights” in regard to immigration cases concerning violent acts such as honor killings and ritualized rape (Benhabib and Resnik 2009, 304). He proposes that we take an institutional perspective, relying on a robust system of international law and judicial rights, on what he’s calling a postnational world in which personhood transcends states.

I’m particularly interested in Jacobson’s claim in that he calls for a postnational position over a postcolonial one. And my question is, Do you think he is articulating a larger shift in the academic or political climate from the postcolonial to the postnational? Or is the multicultural debate alive and well?

SB: Jacobson’s essay was probably one of the most provocative in the volume. I wouldn’t stylize it as a shift from the postcolonial to the postnational. But what I think has been articulated through his essay is an awareness about the potentially naive, globalizing language of multiculturalism. The consequence of naive multiculturalism was ignoring gender hierarchies within the cultures themselves. Susan Moller Okin was the first to raise this question with her essay “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” (1997).

That essay was quite early. But it in turn gave rise to the paradox that Ayelet Schacher called “my rights or my identity,” referring to the situation of women who are members of cultural groups who do want to retain their identities as, say, Pakistani women, Orthodox Jewish
women, or Inuit Indian women and yet, at the same time, are confronting hierarchical regimes inside their own communities.

I would argue for accepting the critique of naive multiculturalism, but also for seeing the dangers of criminalizing and marginalizing vulnerable communities. There has to be another discourse beyond saying, “Pakistani groups in London want Sharia; therefore, we will add Sharia,” on the one hand, and saying, “These groups need to be criminalized and brought before the court because they are reactionary and violating women’s rights,” on the other.

I think that Macklin is dialectically struggling with this in her essay. Obviously one way to think about this issue—and this is only the beginning—is to ask women to try to empower themselves and to articulate their own internal points of view. Hence you may end up having voices from within groups that are critical of their own traditions, as we see in the case of Canadian Muslim women militating against Islamic arbitration courts. But you also have to encourage the dialogue within, and this cannot simply be constructed as “the backward, reactionary migrant community” versus “the progressive, universalist human rights discourse” of the state and international human rights groups. We have to think beyond this dichotomy. Angelia Mean’s essay, “Intercultural Political Identity,” also deals with this. She uses the concept of strong democracy to try to articulate the notion of people empowering themselves to talk about these issues without giving up their own identities.

JR: I think that the real concern is also the flattening out of the word “woman,” the “minority community,” and that community’s practices. As we know from Moghadam and others, Sharia and practices within it can vary. We don’t want to ignore that there can be tremendously oppressive constraints on people within communities. We also don’t want to ignore that those communities are communities of identity that are affiliative and that the people within them, women and men, deserve to be heard for the positions that they’re taking. And then, we need to examine the various choices about whether the authority of the state should or should not be exercised. Throughout, one needs to focus on power—the power of the insular community as well as of the nation-state, and of the individuals interacting under both structures. Just as some people criticize the critique of multiculturalism for being
insufficiently nuanced, one could also criticize the critique against it for being insufficiently nuanced.

TG-Z: Thank you again for contributing to this special issue of WSQ. I hope that this conversation will engender many others like it and that the collective efforts of scholars working in the area of citizenship and gender will help to enable new paradigms of citizenship for the twenty-first century.

Seyla Benhabib is the Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale. She has written on critical theory, feminism, ethics, democratic theory, migration and citizenship rights, and Hannah Arendt. Her work has been translated into twelve languages, and in 2009, she received the Ernst Bloch Prize of the city of Ludwigshafen, one of Germany’s most distinguished philosophical awards.

Judith Resnik is the Arthur Liman Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where she teaches about courts, democracy, federalism, and equality. Her book, Representing Justice: From Nascent City States to Democratic Courtrooms and Guantánamo Bay (with Dennis E. Curtis), will be published in fall of 2010 by Yale Press; recent articles include “Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite” and “Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level” (with Joshua Civin and Joseph Frueh). She is a member of the American Philosophical Society, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the founding director of Yale’s Liman Public Interest Program.

For a biography of Terri Gordon-Zolov, please see page 22.

Note

1. This interview, which was conducted by Terri Gordon-Zolov on August 4, 2009, has been condensed and edited.

Works Cited


