

**Authoritarian Spells, 1946 – 2008**  
**Authoritarian Spells, country-year format, 1946 – 2008**  
**No-Authority Spells, 1946-2008**  
**Regime Type and No-Authority Periods, 1946-2008**  
**Regime Type and No-Authority Periods, country-year format,**  
**1946-2008**

**Codebook**

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**Authoritarian Spells**

An *authoritarian spell* is an uninterrupted period of dictatorship in an independent country. Authoritarian spells thus do not include:

- i. periods of “no authority” (foreign occupation, the collapse of state authority, or a major civil war); and
- ii. periods of democracy.

See Chapter 2 in *Politics of Authoritarian Rule* for a further discussion. When listing authoritarian spells in the relevant datasets and the book we ignore short periods of democracy or no authority that lasted for less than a year.

**Coding Rules for Determining “No Authority” Periods**

A country is considered for inclusion in the data if it listed in the Correlates of War State System Membership Dataset (Sarkees 2000).

I employ three sets of rules for determining periods with the lack of authority (“no authority” periods), depending on whether the primary reason for the lack of authority is i) a civil war over government control, ii) a civil war over territory, or iii) foreign occupation. The distinction between civil wars over government control and civil wars over territory comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen 2011). The coding for periods of foreign occupation is based on the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2008).

If the primary reason for the lack of authority is a civil war over government control, then the period counts as no authority if the following holds:

- i) it is a high-intensity conflict as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (with at least 1,000 data battles in a single year); and
- ii) the conflict lasts at least 12 consecutive months; and
- iii) the conflict is coded as either a conflict over the control of the government or both a conflict a war over the control of the government and territory by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

If the primary reason for the lack of authority is a civil war over territory, then the period counts as no authority if the following holds:

- i) it is a high-intensity conflict as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (with at least 1,000 data battles in a single year); and
- ii) the conflict lasts at least 12 consecutive months; and
- iii) the contested territory (territories) represent at least 25% of the country’s territory; and
- iv) the conflict is coded exclusively as a conflict over the control of territory by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

If the primary reason for the lack of authority is foreign occupation, then the period counts as no authority if the following holds:

- i) the country has either been occupied by a foreign power or a foreign power imposed a government upon the country (a case of “foreign interruption” according to the POLITY IV dataset); and
- ii) the occupation lasts for at least 12 months.

## **Coding Rules for Determining Regime Type**

A dictatorship as an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative elections and (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems. By identifying the allocation of executive and legislative powers by competitive elections as the principal difference between dictatorships and democracies, I am following Schumpeter's (1950) and Dahl's

(1971) procedural approach to the classification of regime types and build on its operationalization by Alvarez et al. (1996), Boix (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010).

I nonetheless do depart from Alvarez et al. (1996), Boix (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010) in two ways. First, I exclude from the data any “no authority” periods (as I just discussed above.) Second, I do not require that the incumbent and the opposition alternate in power before a country is considered democratic. Instead, in order to determine when elections are sufficiently free and competitive for a country to be considered a democracy, I build on the fact that *the measurement problem involved in such endeavor systematically differs between transitions from dictatorship to democracy and transitions from democracy to dictatorship.*

In the case of transitions from dictatorship to democracy, the measurement problem in ascertaining whether elections are genuinely competitive is most severe when the authoritarian incumbent allows for multi-party elections but gets himself or a candidate he supports elected. The measurement problem is less severe when an opposition candidate wins – in these cases we can be confident that the election was genuinely competitive.

In the case of transitions from democracy to dictatorship, the measurement problem in ascertaining whether elections are genuinely competitive is most severe when an incumbent gets re-elected by significantly manipulating competition in his favor without abolishing multi-party elections. The measurement problem is less severe when an unelected actor (typically the military) replaces or abolishes multi-party elections, the legislature, or the executive – in these cases we can be confident that the country seized to be a democracy.

I therefore employ two sets of coding rules:

The emergence of democracy (transitions *from dictatorship to democracy*): The country establishes multi-party legislative and multi-candidate executive elections (where applicable) and at least one of the following two conditions is satisfied:

- i. A former or current opposition candidate becomes chief executive; or
- ii. The authoritarian incumbent (or a candidate supported by the former authoritarian incumbent) gets elected as chief executive but there is a consensus among outside observers that the elections were free and fair.

The breakdown of democracy (transitions *from democracy to dictatorship*): At least one of the following two conditions is satisfied:

- i. An unelected actor replaces or abolishes an election, the legislature, or the executive; or
- ii. An incumbent (or a candidate supported by the incumbent) gets elected as chief executive but there is a consensus among outside observers that the elections were not free and fair.

See Chapter 2 in the *Politics of Authoritarian Rule* for a further discussion.

### **Variables in the “Authoritarian Spells, 1946-2008” and “Authoritarian Spells, country-year format, 1946-2008” datasets**

<b>spell_id</b>	Spell identifier
<b>cabb</b>	Country name abbreviation from the Correlates of War (2005)
<b>ccode</b>	Country code from the Correlates of War (2005)
<b>cname</b>	Country name
<b>start_year</b>	The year the authoritarian spell begins (the first calendar year that the country enters as a dictatorship)
<b>origin</b>	The manner in which the authoritarian spell originates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>i. continuance (if the authoritarian spell existed prior to 1946)</li><li>ii. democracy (if the authoritarian spell originates after a democratic breakdown)</li><li>iii. independence (if the authoritarian spell originates at the same time as the country (re)gains independence)</li><li>iv. no authority (if the authoritarian spell originates after a period of no authority)</li></ul>
<b>o_event</b>	A brief description of the event leading to the origin of the authoritarian spell
<b>o_leadid</b>	The identification number of the country’s effective chief executive at the time of the spell’s origin (from the dataset “Leadership Change in Dictatorships, 1946-2008”)
<b>o_leader</b>	The country’s effective chief executive at the time of the spell’s origin (may differ from the nominal chief executive)
<b>o_startdate</b>	The date of entry into office of the country’s effective chief executive at the time of the spell’s origin
<b>end_year</b>	The year the authoritarian spell ends (the last calendar year that the country entered as a dictatorship)
<b>end</b>	The manner in which the authoritarian spell ends:

- i. continuance (if the authoritarian spell exists after 2008)
- ii. democracy (if the authoritarian spell ends in a transition to democracy)
- iii. independence (if the authoritarian spell ends because of loss of the country's independence)
- iv. no authority (if the authoritarian spell ends due to the onset of a period of no authority)

<b>e_event</b>	A brief description of the event leading to the end of the authoritarian spell
<b>e_leadid</b>	The identification number of the country's effective chief executive at the time of the spell's end (from the dataset "Leadership Change in Dictatorships, 1946-2008")
<b>e_leader</b>	The country's effective chief executive at the time of the spell's end (may differ from the nominal chief executive)
<b>e_enddate</b>	The date of exit from office of the country's effective chief executive at the time of the spell's end
<b>year</b>	Current year (in the country-year format dataset)

### **Variables in the "No-Authority Spells, 1946-2008" dataset**

<b>cname</b>	Country name
<b>ccode</b>	Country code from the Correlates of War (2005)
<b>start_year</b>	The year no authority period began
<b>end_year</b>	The year no authority period ended
<b>na_type</b>	Type of no authority period: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. civil war over government control</li> <li>ii. civil war over territory</li> <li>iii. foreign occupation</li> </ul>
<b>description</b>	A brief description of the primary event responsible for classifying the period as "no authority"
<b>source</b>	Dataset for classifying the period as "no authority"

## **Variables in the “Regime Type and No-Authority Periods, 1946-2008” and “Regime Type and No-Authority Periods, country-year format, 1946-2008” datasets**

<b>cname</b>	Country name
<b>ccode</b>	Country code from the Correlates of War (2005)
<b>regime</b>	Regime type: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>i. democracy</li><li>ii. dictatorship</li><li>iii. no authority</li></ul>
<b>start_year</b>	The year the regime or no authority period began
<b>end_year</b>	The year the regime or no authority period ended
<b>year</b>	Current year (in the country-year format dataset)

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