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**PLSC 130. GLOBL 260. Nuclear Politics**

Spring 2019

Syllabus (this draft: April 15, 2019)

Professor Alexandre Debs

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Class: MW 2.30-3.45pm, Luce Hall, 34 Hillhouse Avenue, Room 202  
Office Hours: MT 4-5pm, Rosenkranz Hall, 115 Prospect St., Room 311  
Book directly at <https://calendly.com/alexdebs/15min/>.

Teaching Fellow:

Tyler Bowen, tyler.bowen@yale.edu

This course is an introduction to the history of nuclear crises and nuclear proliferation. Why were nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What is the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate crises? Why do states acquire nuclear weapons? Students will gain a better understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the history of the Cold War, and new challenges in nuclear politics. Some of the references use game theory or statistics, but no prior knowledge of such methodologies is required.

***Texts and References***

Reading assignments are listed below. Here are three books that are especially relevant for the course. They are available for purchase at the Yale Bookstore, 77 Broadway at York Square, and will also be put on reserve at Bass Library, for 24-hour loans.

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2012. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*. (3rd Edition). New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 2008 [1966]. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Debs and Monteiro (2017) and Schelling (2008 [1966]) are *required* for the course. Large sections of these books will be required reading in the course of semester. Sagan and Waltz (2012) is *recommended* for the course. No part of the book is required reading in the semester, but it is a very valuable resource that touches

on important debates in nuclear politics. Other references below will be available as electronic resources on the Canvas website. Students are expected to read the materials prior to class. Note also that the use of any electronic devices, including laptop computers, tablets, and phones is not allowed during lectures or sections. Please plan to take notes using pen and paper. Lecture slides will be made available on Canvas shortly after class, at the latest.

### ***Course Requirements***

The course grade breaks down as follows:

**Participation** (10%): Students are expected to attend lectures and actively participate in discussions in class.

**Response Memos** (5%): Students are expected to write about two response memos, assigned at the end of shopping period. A memo should present an opinion about the reading assignment for a particular meeting. How did the actors described in the readings tackle the strategic challenges posed by nuclear weapons? Do you find the argument/evidence presented in the readings convincing? Each memo should be about one page in length, single-spaced (500-750 words). Students must submit their memo on the Canvas website by 12noon on the day before class. Response memos get a late penalty for missing the deadline, and cannot be accepted after class.

**Debate statement** (15%): In groups of two or three, students must write a statement on one of two questions, tentatively: ‘Should the United States adopt a policy of no-first use?’ and ‘Should the United States do more to achieve a goal of Global Zero?’ Groups will rank their preferences for their preferred question, and will be randomly assigned the position they will have to defend. The statement should be no longer than 15 pages, double-spaced (including footnotes but excluding references). Statements will be due, respectively, on Wednesday February 27 and Monday April 15, and will be debated in class the following week, respectively Wednesday March 6 and Monday April 22.

**Position Memo** (10%): There will be a simulation of a National Security Council Meeting on Wednesday April 10, to discuss the best way to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. Each student will be randomly assigned a position to defend, and must write a position memo detailing the policy that he/she would recommend at the meeting. The position memo should be about two pages in length, single-spaced (1000-1500 words). Students must submit their position memo on the Canvas website by 12noon on the day before class, Tuesday April 9. Position memos get a late penalty for missing the deadline, and cannot be accepted after class.

**Mid-term** (25%): The mid-term is scheduled for Monday March 4.

**Final exam** (35%): The final exam will be held on Saturday May 4, 9am-12noon, 109 Grove Street, Rosenfeld Hall.

### ***Academic Integrity***

Students should be familiar with the University's policies on academic integrity and disciplinary action, as cheating will be dealt with severely.

## **Course Outline**

### **1. Introduction**

(a) *Overview of the Course* (Wednesday January 14)

(b) *The Manhattan Project* (Wednesday January 16)

Required Reading

- Sherwin, Martin. 2003. *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 13-63).

Other Reading

- Schroerer, Dietrich. 1984. *Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race*. New York, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons. Chapter 2: "The Fission Bomb" (pp. 14-57).

(c) *The Nuclear Attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (Friday January 18)

Required Reading

- Sherwin, Martin. 2003. *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapters 8 and 9 (pp. 193-238).

Other Reading

- Alperovitz, Gar. 1995. "Hiroshima: Historians Reassess." *Foreign Policy*. 99 (Summer): 15-34.
- Bernstein, Barton J. 1995. "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered." *Foreign Affairs*. 74(1): 135-152.
- Hersey, John. 1966. *Hiroshima*. New York, N.Y.: A. A. Knopf.
- Rhodes, Richard. 1986. *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*. New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster. Chapter 19 (pp. 679-747).
- Stimson, Henry L. 1947. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb." *Harper's Magazine*. 194 (1161): 97-107.
- Walker, J. Samuel. 2005. "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground." *Diplomatic History*. 29(2): 311-334.

Monday January 21: no class (Martin Luther King, Jr. Day).

(d) *Nuclear Deterrence and the Nuclear Revolution* (Wednesday January 23)

Required Reading

- Schelling, Thomas C. 2008 [1966]. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-91).

Other Reading

- Brodie, Bernard. 1959. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. pp. 223-264.
- Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter 3 (pp.58-113).
- Jervis, Robert. 1989. *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Chapter 1.
- Wohlstetter, Albert. 1959. "The Delicate Balance of Terror." *Foreign Affairs*. 37(2): 211-234.

2. Nuclear Crises and Nuclear Control

(a) *A Nuclear Arms Race, 1945-1953* (Monday January 28)

Required Reading

- DeGroot, Gerard J. 2005. *The Bomb: A Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 10 "To Little Boy, a Big Brother." (pp. 162-183).
- Holloway, David. 1994. *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 10 (pp. 196-223).

Other Reading

- Craig, Campbell and Sergey Radchenko. 2008. *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 5 (pp. 111-134).
- Fischer, David. 1997. *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years*. Vienna, Austria: IAEA. Part I: The Creation of the IAEA (pp. 9-67).
- "General Advisory Committee's Majority and Minority Reports on Building the H-Bomb." October 30, 1949. [available on PBS.org here].
- Holloway, David. 1994. *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 11 (pp. 224-252).
- "Race for the Hydrogen Bomb" at the Atomic Archive. [available here].
- Medhurst, Martin J. 1997. "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign." *Armed Forces and Society*. 23: 571-593.

- Scheinman, Lawrence. 1987. *The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order*. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. Chapter 2: 'From New York to Vienna: The Genesis of the IAEA' (pp. 49-80).
- Schroerer, Dietrich. 1984. *Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race*. New York, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons. Chapter 3: 'The Fusion Bomb' (pp. 58-81).
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1953. "Atoms for Peace," Speech Text. December 8. [available here].

(b) *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961* (Wednesday January 30)

Required Reading

- Schlosser, Eric. 2013. *Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident, and the Illusion of Safety*. New York, NY: Penguin Press. "The Brink." (pp. 276-289).
- Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter 8 (pp. 283-351).

Other Reading:

- Gavin, Francis J. 2012. *Nuclear Statecraft. History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Chapter 3 (pp. 57-74).
- Kaplan, Fred. 1983. *The Wizards of Armageddon*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ch.17-22 (pp. 258-327).
- Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter 7 (pp. 251-282).

(c) *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (Monday February 4)

Required Reading

- Dobbs, Michael. 2008. *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War*. New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 3-57).
- Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. 1997. "One Hell of a Gamble": *Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy. 1958-64*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton and Co. Chapter 14 (pp. 257-289).

Other Reading

- Allison, Graham and Philip D. Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York, N.Y.: Longman.
- Blanton, Thomas. 2012. "The Cuban Missile Crisis Just Isn't What It Used to Be." in *The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at*

50: *New Evidence from Behind the Iron, Bamboo, and Sugar-cane Curtains, and Beyond*. James G. Hershberg and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.). Wilson Center. Cold War International History Project. Issue 17/18: 11-18.

- May, Ernest R. and Philip D. Zelikow (ed.). 1997. *The Kennedy Tapes. Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- “Memorandum of a Conversation, A.I. Mikoyan with Oswaldo Dorticos, Ernesto Guevara, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.” November 5, 1962. [available at the Digital Archive of the Wilson Center here].

(d) *The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968* (Wednesday February 6)

Required Reading

- Bunn, George. 1992. *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 4: ‘The NPT: Banning Transfer of Nuclear Weapons Takes Two Decades’ (pp. 59-82).

Other Reading

- Adler, Emanuel. 1992. “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control.” *International Organization*. 46(1): 101-145.
- Full text of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. [available here].
- Gavin, Francis J. 2012. *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Chapter 3.
- Maddock, Shane J. 2010. *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. Chapters 1 and 9 (pp.1-9, 251-284).
- Sokolski, Henry D. 2010. “What Does the History of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Tell Us About its Future.” in *Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty*. Henry D. Sokolski (ed.). Chapter 3 (27-63). [available here].
- Schelling, Thomas C. and Morton H. Halperin. 1961. *Strategy and Arms Control*. New York, N.Y.: The Twentieth Century Fund. Chapter 1 (pp. 9-24).
- Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. 2008 [1966]. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. pp. 248-259.

- Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. *Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

(e) *Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the Madman Strategy* (Monday February 11)

Required Reading

- Sagan, Scott D. and Jeremi Suri. 2003. "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969." *International Security*. 27 (4): 150-183.
- Kimball, Jeffrey B. and William Burr. 2015. *Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Chapter 2. The Madman Theory [available here].

Other Reading

- Jervis, Robert, Mark Atwood Lawrence, William Burr, and Jeffrey P. Kimball. 2017. "Nuclear Weapons, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War: Perspectives on *Nixon's Nuclear Specter*." *Journal of Cold War Studies*. 19(4): 192-210.

(f) *Reagan, Star Wars, and the Able Archer Exercise* (Wednesday February 13)

Required Reading

- Green, Brendan R. and Austin Long. 2017. "The MAD Who Wasn't There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance." *Security Studies*. 26(4): 606-641.
- Adamsky, Dmitry Dima. 2013. "The 1983 Nuclear Crisis - Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 36(1): 4-41.

Other Reading

- National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 647. "The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare." ed. Nate Jones. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University. Available here.
- Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press. 2006. "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy." *International Security*. 30(4): 7-44.

(g) *India, Pakistan, and the Nuclear Tests of 1998* (Monday February 18)

Required Reading

- Kapur, S. Paul. 2008. "Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia." *International Security*. 33(2): 71-94.
- Narang, Vipin. 2010. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability." *International Security*. 34(3): 38-78.

#### Other Reading

- Narang, Vipin. 2014. *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*. Chapter 2 (pp. 13-54) and Chapter 10 (pp. 253-282) [available here].
- Sagan, Scott D. 2009. "The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine." in *Inside Nuclear South Asia*. Scott D. Sagan (ed.). Chapter 6 (pp.219-263).

#### (h) *Nuclear Balance and Crisis Outcomes* (Wednesday February 20)

##### Required Reading

- Kroenig, Matthew. 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes." *International Organization*. 67(1): 141-171.
- Sechser, Todd S. and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail." *International Organization*. 67(1): 173-195.
- Sechser, Todd S. and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2017. *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 133-142, 147-155, 200-210.

#### (i) *Nuclear Taboo* (Monday February 25)

##### Required Reading

- Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." *International Organization*. 53(3): 433-468.
- Press, Daryl G., Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino. 2013. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons." *American Political Science Review*. 107(1): 188-206.

##### Other Reading

- Avey, Paul C. 2015. "Who's Afraid of the Bomb? The Role of Nuclear Non-Use Norms in Confrontations between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Opponents." *Security Studies*. 24(4): 563-596.
- Paul, T.V. 2009. *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 2 (pp. 15-37).
- Sagan, Scott. 2004. "Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction." In Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee (eds). *Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 73-95. [available here].



(j) *Nuclear Terrorism* (Wednesday February 27)

Required Reading

- Mueller, John. 2010. *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. Chapters 12 to 15 (pp. 161-233). [available here].

Other Reading

- Allison, Graham. 2004. "How to Stop Nuclear Terror." *Foreign Affairs*. 83(1): 64-74.
- Potter, William C., Charles D. Ferguson, and Leonard S. Spector. 2004. "The Four Faces of Nuclear Terror: And the Need for a Prioritized Response." *Foreign Affairs*. 83(3): 130-132.
- Bunn, Matthew. 2009. "Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism." *Daedalus*. 138(4): 112-123.
- Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press. 2013. "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists." *International Security*. 38(1): 80-104.

**Midterm Exam:** Monday March 4

(k) *Debate: 'Should the United States Adopt a Policy of No First Use?'*  
(Wednesday March 6)

Required Reading

- Sagan, Scott D. 2009. "The Case for No First Use." *Survival*. 51(3): 163-182. *Survival*. 51(5): 17-46.
- H-Diplo. 2016. Policy Roundtable 1-4 on U.S. Nuclear Policy. [available here (pp. 1-24)].

Other Reading

- Cartwright, James E. and Bruce G. Blair. 2016. "End the First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons." *The New York Times*. August 14. Available here.
- Halperin, Morton H. 1961. "A Proposal for a Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons." 6 October 1961. [available here].
- Halperin, Morton H., Bruno Tertrais, Keith B. Payne, K. Subrahmanyam, and Scott D. Sagan. 2009. "Forum: The Case for No First Use: An Exchange."
- Lanoszka, Alexander and Thomas Leo Scherer. 2018. "Nuclear Ambiguity, No-First-Use, and Crisis Stability in Asymmetric Crises." *Nonproliferation Review*. available here.
- Lewis, Jeffrey G. and Scott Sagan. 2016. "The Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of War." *Daedalus*. 145(4): 62-74.
- Ullman, Richard H. 1972. "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons." *Foreign Affairs*. 50(4): 669-683.

Monday March 11, Wednesday March 13, Monday March 18, Wednesday March 20:  
no class (Spring recess).

### 3. Nuclear Proliferation

#### (a) *Demand-Side Approaches* (Monday March 25)

##### Required Reading

- Sagan, Scott D. 1996-1997. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” *International Security*. 21(3): 54-86.
- Solingen, Etel. 1994. “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint.” *International Security*. 19(2): 126-169.
- Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2006. *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation. Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 (pp. 16-46).

##### Other Reading

- Hymans, Jacques E.C. 2012. *Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 (pp. 41-78).
- Rublee, Maria Rost. 2009. *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press. Chapter 3 (pp. 53-98). [available here].
- Sagan, Scott D. 2011. “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. 14(1): 225-244.
- Solingen, Etel. 2007. *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-22).
- Way, Christopher and Jessica Weeks. 2014. “Making it Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 58(3): 705-719.

#### (b) *Supply-Side Approaches* (Wednesday March 27)

##### Required Reading

- Singh, Sonali and Christopher R. Way. 2004. “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 48(6): 859-885.
- Fuhrmann, Matthew. 2009. “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.” *International Security*. 34(1): 7-41.
- Montgomery, Alexander H. 2013. “Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs.” in Adam Stulberg and Matt Fuhrmann (eds.). *The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 177-202.

#### Other Reading

- Jo, Dong-Joon and Erik Gartzke. 2007. “Determinants of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Model.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 51(1): 167-194.
- Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance.” *American Political Science Review*. 103(1): 113-133.
- Kroenig, Matthew. 2010. *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Fuhrmann, Matthew. 2012. *Atomic Assistance: How ‘Atoms for Peace’ Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Montgomery, Alexander H. and Scott D. Sagan. 2009. “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 53(2): 302-328.

#### (c) A Strategic Approach

##### i. Introduction (Monday April 1)

###### Required Reading

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Logic of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

###### Other Reading

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Logic of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.
- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. “Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. 20: 331-349.
- Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexandre Debs. 2014. “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation.” *International Security*. 39(2): 7-51.

##### ii. Proliferation and Enemies: Theoretical Framework (Wednesday April 3)

###### Required Reading

- Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization*. 49(3): 379-414.
- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2014. “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War.” *International Organization* 68(1): 1-15.

###### Other Reading

- Powell, Robert. 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem.” *International Organization*. 60(1): 169-203.

iii. *Proliferation and Enemies: Iraq, Iran* (Monday April 8)

Required Reading

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-175.

Other Reading

- Brands, Hal and David Palkki. 2011. "Why did Saddam Want the Bomb?" Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Research Institute.
- Brands, Hal and David Palkki. 2011. "Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb. Nuclear Alarmism Justified?" *International Security*. 36(1): 133-166.
- Braut-Hegghammer, Malfrid. 2016. *Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons*. Ithaca: Cornell. Available here.
- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2014. "Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War." *International Organization*. 68(1): 15-28.
- Debs Alexandre, Nuno P. Monteiro, and David A. Lake. 2013. "What Caused the Iraq War? A Debate." Duck of Minerva online. July 30 - August 6.
- Duelfer, Charles. 2004. *Key Findings of the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD*.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2009. *Channels of Power: The U.N. Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Chapter 4 (pp.86-132).
- Jervis, Robert. 2010. *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapter 3 (pp. 123-155).
- Lake, David A. 2010/2011. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security*. 35(3): 7-52.
- Woods, Kevin M., David D. Palkki and Mark E. Stout. 2011. *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahl, Colin H. 2012. "Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should be a Last Resort." *Foreign Affairs*. 91(2): 166-173.
- Kroenig, Matthew. 2012. "Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option." *Foreign Affairs*. 91(1): 76-86.
- Perkovich, George, Mark Hibbs, James M. Acton, and Toby Dalton. 2015. *Parsing the Iran Deal: An Analysis of the*

*Iran Deal from a Nonproliferation Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Samore, Gary. 2015. *The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 2012. "Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability." *Foreign Affairs*. 91(6): 2-5.

iv. *Simulation: How Should the United States Deal with the North Korean Nuclear Threat?* (Wednesday April 10)

Required Reading

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 277-297, 377-394.

Other Reading

- Case materials at the Council of Foreign Relations. Available [here](#).
- Cha, Victor D. and David C. Kang. 2003. *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*. New York: Columbia University Press, Chapter 5 "Hyperbole Dominates: The 2003 Nuclear Crisis" (pp. 107-133). Available [here](#).
- Chinoy, Mike. 2008. *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lewis, Jeffrey. 2018. *The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States: A Speculative Novel*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.
- Richelson, Jeffrey. 2006. *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea*. New York: W. W. Norton, Chapter 14 "Trouble Waiting to Happen: Iran and North Korea, from the 1990s to today" (pp. 517-536).
- Sigal, Leon V. 1998. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Chapter 4 "A "Better than Ever" Chance of Misestimation" (pp. 90-123). Available [here](#).

v. *Proliferation and Loose Allies: China, South Africa* (Monday April 15)

Required Reading

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Logic of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5, pp. 177-8, 196-219, 258-277.

Other Reading

- Lewis, John W. and Xue Litai. 1988. *China Builds the Bomb*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- van Wyk, Martha S. (Anna-Mart). 2007. "Ally or Critic? The United States' Response to South African Nuclear Development, 1949-1980." *Cold War History*. 7(2): 195-225.

vi. *Proliferation and Close Allies: Japan, France* (Wednesday April 17)

Required Reading

- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Logic of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6, pp. 357-377, 418-435.

Other Reading

- Goldstein, Avery. 2000. *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century. China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 6.
- Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2006. *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation. Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4. The struggle over the bomb in the French Fourth Republic.
- Rublee, Maria Rost. 2009. *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. Chapter Three: Japan.
- Solingen, Etel. 2007. *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter Three: Japan.

(d) *Debate: 'Should the United States Do More to Achieve a Goal of Global Zero?'* (Monday April 22)

Required Reading

- Glaser, Charles L. 1998. "The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament." *Survival*. 40(1): 112-128.
- Taubman, Philip. 2012. *The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. pp. 3-36.

Other Reading

- Daalder, Ivo and Jan Lodol. 2008. "The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons." *Foreign Affairs*. 87(6): 80-95.
- Drell, Sidney D. and Raymond Jeanloz. 2011. "Nuclear Deterrence in a World Without Nuclear Weapons." in *Deterrence, Its Past and Future*. George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby (eds.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 3 (pp.99-129).

- Ford, Christopher and George Perkovich. 2017. “Briefing on Nuclear Ban Treaty by NSC Senior Director Christopher Ford.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. August 22. Available here.
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#### 4. Conclusion

- *Review Session* (Wednesday April 24)

**Final exam:** Saturday May 4, 9am-12noon, 109 Grove Street, Rosenfeld Hall.