
PLSC 163. PLSC 663. Domestic Politics and International Conflict

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Course Info:
Spring 2010
M 9:20–11:10
Rosenkranz Hall 202

We study the relationship between domestic political institutions and war-proneness, looking at the question of the democratic peace, diversionary use of force, etc. Basic knowledge of game theory is required.¹

Each lecture is centered around a couple of research articles or books/book chapters. With this course, students should become acquainted with the core theories and sets of facts on the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict. They will develop their skill in analyzing pieces of research in international relations, especially in a game-theoretic framework.

Course Requirements

Students are expected to participate in class and do the required reading prior to coming to class. Required reading items are starred (*). Other pieces are recommended. There is no required textbook for the class. References below are either available as e-reserve from the Classesv2 website (ER) or electronically from the Orbis catalog (E).

Students must also complete the following assignments. First, there is a problem set on the basic game-theoretic concepts necessary for the course. Second, on any given week, starting from the 4th lecture (February 1), a few students submit an essay discussing the material to be covered in the lecture. More precisely, the essay should cover the required reading and one piece from the list of recommended items, summarizing the main findings and discussing the limitations of each piece. The essay should be 3-4 pages long (single-spaced) and must be submitted by 12noon on the Friday before the lecture. Graduate students must submit an essay for each lecture. Undergraduate students must submit an essay for 4 lectures, determined at the start of the semester. Third, students are expected to work on their own research project. They must submit a written outline of their project (no longer than 6 pages, single-spaced). A few students will then be chosen to present their work during the last lecture. Fourth, there is a final exam. Numerically, the course grade is broken down as follows: 10% for participation, 10% for the problem set, 25% for the essays, 25% for the project outline, 30% for the final exam. Please see the end of the syllabus for a complete schedule of assignments. This schedule will be updated as the semester progresses on the course website. Late submissions will be penalized at a rate of 10% per day.

¹Last revised March 24, 2010.

Academic Integrity

Students should be familiar with the University's policies on academic integrity and disciplinary action: <http://www.yale.edu/yalecollege/publications/uregs/appendix/cheating.html>. Violators of University regulations on academic integrity will be dealt with severely.

Course Outline

1. Basic Concepts

(a) **Introduction to the Problems and to Game-Theoretic Tools** (Monday January 11)

- *Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York, N.Y.: Basic Books. 73-87. (ER)
- Bull, Hedley. 1966. 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach.' *World Politics*. 18(3): 361-377. (E)
- Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. 'The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.' *International Organization*. 32(4): 881-912. (E)
- Milner, Helen V. 1998. 'Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics.' *International Organization*. 52(4): 759-786. (E)
- *Osborne, Martin J. 2004. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 13-28, 35-37, 45-47, 153-180. (ER)
- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations.' *World Politics*. 14(1): 77-92. (E)

Application to Deterrence (Friday January 15)

- *Schelling, Thomas. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3-20. (ER)
- *Huth, Paul K. and Bruce Russett. 1984 "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900-1980." *World Politics*. 36(4): 496-526. (ER)
- Huth, Paul K. and Bruce Russett. 1990. "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference." *World Politics*. 42(4): 466-501. (E)
- *Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1990. "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." *World Politics*. 42(3): 336-369. (ER)
- Huth, Paul K. 1996 *Standing Your Ground*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Monday January 18: No class (Martin Luther King, Jr. Day)

(b) **Rationalist Explanations for War** (Monday January 25)

- *Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War.' *International Organization*. 49(3): 379-414. (ER)
- Fearon, James D. 1997. 'Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 41: 68-90. (E)
- *Powell, Robert. 2006. 'War as a Commitment Problem.' *International Organization*. 60(1): 169-203. (ER)
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 2001 [1954]. *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis*. New York, Columbia University Press: chapters VII and VIII.

(c) **Theories of Democracy** (Monday February 1)

- Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 2000. *Positive Political Theory I. Collective Preference*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press: 26-34.
- Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de. 1776. 'Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making (1785)' in Keith Michael Baker (ed.) *Condorcet: Selected Writings*. Indianapolis, IN: 52-57.
- *Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 1. (E)
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, N.Y.: Harper. 170-194.
- Popper, Karl R. 1963. *The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. I. The Spell of Plato*. New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row Publishers. Chapter 7.
- *Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- *Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1950. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. 3rd edition. New York, N.Y.: Harper and Brothers Publishers. Part IV: Socialism and Democracy. 232-283. (ER)

2. **War and Regime Type**

(a) **Fundamentals**

Democratic Peace (Monday February 8)

- *Doyle, Michael W. 1986. 'Liberalism and World Politics.' *American Political Science Review*. 80(4): 1151-1169. (ER)
- *Farber, Henry S. and Joanne Gowa. 1995. 'Politics and Peace.' *International Security*. 20(2): 123-146. (ER)
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. 'The Capitalist Peace.' *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(1): 166-191. (E)
- Kant, Immanuel. 2006 [1795]. 'Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch'. In *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Pauline Kleingeld (ed.), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 67-109.
- Lai, Brian and Dan Slater. 2006. 'Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992.' *American Journal of Political Science*. 50(1): 113-126. (E)
- Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. 'The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.' *International Studies Quarterly*. 41(2): 267-293. (E)
- Owen, John. 1994. 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.' *International Security*. 19(2): 87-125. (E)
- Peceny, M., Caroline C. Beer, and S. Sanchez-Terry. 2002. 'Dictatorial Peace?' *American Political Science Review*. 96(1): 15-26. (E)
- Ray, James Lee. 1998. 'Does Democracy Cause Peace?' *Annual Review of Political Science*. 1: 27-46. (E)
- Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.' *American Political Science Review*. 97(4): 55-602. (E)

- *Russett, Bruce. Forthcoming. ‘Democratic Peace.’ In *International Encyclopedia of Peace*. Nigel Young (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (ER)

Mixed Regimes and War (Monday February 15)

- *Baliga, Sandeep, David O. Lucca and Tomas Sjoström. 2007. ‘Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?’ Northwestern University Mimeo. (ER)
- *Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2005. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go To War*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 1 and 3. (ER)
- Narang, Vipin and Rebecca M. Nelson. 2009. ‘Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War.’ *International Organization*. 63: 357-379. (E)
- Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc: Chapter 3.
- Snyder, Jack. 2003. ‘Imperial Temptations.’ *The National Interest*. 71: 29-40.

Regime Type and the Process and Outcome of War (Monday February 22)

- Desch, Michael C. 2002. ‘Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters.’ *International Security*. 27(2): 5-47 (E)
- *Lake, David A. 1992. ‘Powerful Pacifists: Democratic State and War.’ *The American Political Science Review*. 86(1): 24-37. (ER)
- Lake, David A. 2003. ‘Fair Fights: Evaluating Theories of Democracy and Victory.’ *International Security*. 28(1): 154-167. (E)
- *Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam. 2002. *Democracies at War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. chapters 1, 2 and 5. (ER)
- Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2009. ‘The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation.’ Yale University Mimeo.

(b) **Further (Formal) Theories**

Audience Cost I (Monday March 1)

- Ashworth, Scott and Kris Ramsay. 2009. ‘Optimal Domestic Constraints in International Crises.’ University of Chicago Mimeo. (ER)
- Berinsky, Adam. 2007. ‘Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict.’ *Journal of Politics*. 69(4): 975-997. (E)
- *Fearon, James D. 1994. ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.’ *American Political Science Review*. 88(3): 577-592. (ER)
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.’ *International Organization*. 42(3): 427-460. (E)
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2004. ‘Politics at the Water’s Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition.’ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 48(4): 459-486. (ER)
- *Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. ‘Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises.’ *American Political Science Review*. 92(4): 829-844. (ER)
- Tarar, Ahmer and Bahar Leventoglu. Forthcoming. ‘Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining.’ *International Studies Quarterly*. (ER)
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. ‘Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.’ *International Organization*. 61: 821-840. (E)

Monday March 8, Monday March 15: No class (Spring break)

Audience Cost II (Monday March 22)

- Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Gary M. Segura. 1998. 'War, Casualties, and Public Opinion.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 42(3): 278-300. (E)
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2008. 'Ties to the Dead: Connections to the Iraq War and 9/11 and Presidential Approval.' *American Sociological Review*. (E)
- *Snyder, Jack and Erica Borghard. 2009. 'The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, not a Pound'. Columbia University Mimeo. (ER)
- *Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. 'Looking for Audience Costs.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 45(1): 32-60. (ER)
- *Weeks, Jessica. 2008. 'Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.' *International Organization*. 62(1): 35-64. (ER)
- Weiss, Jessica. 2009. 'Powerful Patriots: Anti-Foreign Protest in Authoritarian Regimes.' Yale University Mimeo.

Diversionsary War and Gambling for Resurrection (Monday March 29)

- Chapman, Terrence and Dan Reiter. 2004. 'The United Nations Security Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 48: 866-909. (E)
- Downs, George and David M. Rocke. 1994. 'Conflict, Agency and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War.' *American Journal of Political Science*. 38(2): 362-380. (E)
- *Gaubatz, Kurt. 1991. 'Election Cycles and War.' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 35(2): 211-244. (ER)
- Gaubatz, Kurt. 1999. *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gelpi, Christopher and Joseph M. Grieco. 2001. 'Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 45(6): 794-817. (E)
- *Goemans, H.E. and Mark Fey. 2009. 'Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble.' *Journal of Politics*. 71(1): 35-54. (ER)
- Goemans, H. E. 2000. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Mueller, John. 2002. 'Public Support for Military Ventures Abroad: Evidence from the Polls' in John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner (ed.) *The Lessons of the Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.
- Oakes, Amy. 2006. 'Diversionsary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands.' *Security Studies*. 15(3): 431-463. (E)
- Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young. 1993. 'Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionsary Use of Force'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 37(3): 504-536. (E)
- *Smith, Alastair. 1996. 'Diversionsary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems.' *International Studies Quarterly*. 40(1): 133-153. (ER)

War and the Fate of Leaders (Monday April 5)

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2006. 'Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace.' *American Political Science Review*. 100(4): 637-642. (E)
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. 'War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.' *American Political Science Review*. 89(4): 841-855. (E)
- *Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 1999. 'An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.' *American Political Science Review*. 93(4): 791-807. (ER)
- Chiozza, Giacomo and H.E. Goemans. 2004. 'International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is Was Still Ex Post Inefficient?' *American Journal of Political Science*. 48(3): 604-619. (E)
- *Debs, Alexandre and H. E. Goemans. 2009. 'Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders and War.' Yale University mimeo. (ER)
- Jackson, Matthew O. and Massimo Morelli. 2007. 'Political Bias and War.' *American Economic Review*. 97(4): 1353-1373. (E)

3. Revisiting Domestic Politics (Monday April 12)

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 2 and 8.
- Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi and James Vreeland. 2009. 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.' Mimeo. (ER)
- *Debs, Alexandre. 2009. 'Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships.' Yale University mimeo. (ER)
- *Geddes, Barbara. 1999. 'What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?' *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2: 115-144. (ER)
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press. esp. chapters 1-3.

Student Presentations: Monday April 19.

Final exam: Tuesday May 11, 9am-11am.

Schedule of Assignments

Problem set: Posted on January 18. Due February 1.

Essays: TBA.

Project outline: Due Monday April 5 in class.

Final Exam: Tuesday May 11, 9am-11am.