

PLSC 533. Formal Models of International Relations

Fall 2019

Syllabus (this draft: September 26, 2019)

Professor Alexandre Debs

www.alexandredebs.com

alexandre.debs@yale.edu

Class: W 1.30-3.20pm, Rosenkranz Hall, 115 Prospect St., Room 202.

Office Hours: TW 3.30-4.30pm, Rosenkranz Hall, 115 Prospect St., Room 311.

Book directly at <https://calendly.com/alexdebs/15min/>.

This course offers a survey of game-theoretic models of international relations for advanced graduate students. Students will learn how to evaluate and present existing models, and how to develop their own research projects. Topics covered include nuclear deterrence theory, war duration, the democratic peace, militarization and war, mediation, and mutual optimism. A pre-requisite for the course is PLSC 518. Introduction to Game Theory or the equivalent.

Texts and References

References discussed in class (and labeled as ‘required’ below) will be available on Canvas and should be read prior to coming to class. For a discussion of some of the themes below in a textbook format, you may consult:

- Kydd, Andrew H. 2015. *International Relations Theory: The Game-Theoretic Approach*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Note that the use of any electronic devices, including laptop computers, tablets, and phones is not allowed during our meetings.

Course Requirements

The course grade is a combination of participation (10%), presentations (15%), two referee reports (30%), and a research paper (45%).

Participation (10%): Students are expected to actively participate in class, preparing questions on the required readings and sharing their thoughts on the topics of discussion.

Presentations (15%): Each meeting is divided into two parts. First, we discuss a few papers (typically, three), in the format of a conference panel. Second, we choose a few results to be covered in greater depth. Each student is responsible to present around three papers in the course of the semester. A presentation should introduce the paper's research question, its proposed answer, its main results and the basic intuition behind these results, and lay out some questions for future discussion. Students should also be prepared to answer questions on the papers they presented. Presentations will be randomly assigned at the start of the semester and will begin in week three.

Referee Reports (30%): Students will write two referee reports in the course of the semester, on any game-theoretic paper listed in the set of recommended readings. A referee report should summarize the paper's contribution, evaluate its importance, and highlight its strengths and weaknesses. The report must be at least three pages long, single spaced, using 12-point font. Students may submit a list of 4-5 papers which they would like to cover in a referee report. Such a list is due on September 4.

Research Paper (45%): Students will work on their own research paper throughout the semester. This assignment is broken down into three parts. First, students must submit a proposal, listing a topic and research question, as well as three relevant papers to be covered in the literature review. Any topic in international relations, whether it is listed here or not, is appropriate. Any paper, other than those listed in the required reading, may be used for the literature review, whether or not it is game theoretic. The proposal should be at most one-page long, single spaced, using 12-point font. It is due on September 11 and it is not graded. Second, students must submit a research plan, including a well-refined research question, a literature review, as well as the outline of a game-theoretic model. The research plan should be at most three pages long, single spaced, using 12-point font. It is due on October 9 and it counts for 10% of the course grade. Third, students must submit the research paper itself. It should be 10-15 pages long, single-spaced, using 12-point font. It is due on December 18 and it counts for 35% of the course grade.

Academic Integrity

Students should be familiar with the University's policies on academic integrity and plagiarism (consult the relevant section of the Yale College Writing Center here).

Course Outline

1. Introduction

- **The Role of Game Theory in International Relations** (August 28)

Required Reading

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*. Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 379-414.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1999. "War is in the Error Term." *International Organization*. Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 567-587.
- Powell, Robert L. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 23-39.
- Walt, Stephen. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security*. Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 5-48.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization*. Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 169-203.
- Debs, Alexandre. 2018. "The Empirical Promise of Game Theory," *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations*, William Thompson, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Vol. 1, pp. 737-755.

Recommended Reading

- Powell, Robert. 1999. "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies." *International Security*. Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 97-106.
- MacDonald, Paul K. 2003. "Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory." *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 551-565.
- Clarke, Kevin A., and David M. Primo. 2012. *A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of Representations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Goemans, H.E., and William Spaniel. 2016. “Multimethod Research: A Case for Formal Theory.” *Security Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 25-33.
- Lorentzen, Peter, Taylor M. Fravel, and Jack Paine. 2017. “Qualitative Investigation of Theoretical Models: The Value of Process Tracing.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 467-491.

2. Power, Deterrence, and War

- **Nuclear Deterrence Theory** (September 4)

Required Reading

- Powell, Robert. 1987. “Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 717-736.
- Powell, Robert. 1989. “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 83, No. 1, pp. 61-76.
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1991. “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World.” *World Politics*. Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 313-335.

Recommended Reading

- Ellsberg, Daniel. 1968 [1959]. *The Theory and Practice of Blackmail*. No. RAND/P-3883. Rand Corporation. Santa Monica: CA. available at [here](#).
- Schelling, Thomas C. 2008 [1966]. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 1-91.
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1986. “Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 19-30.
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1988. “Minimal Nuclear Deterrence.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 411-425.
- Powell, Robert. 1988. “Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 155-178.
- Powell, Robert. 1989. “Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 503-519.

- Jervis, Robert. 1989. “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.” *World Politics*. Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 183-207.
- Langlois, Jean-Pierre P. 1989. “Modeling Deterrence and International Crises.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 67-83.
- Geller, Daniel S. 1990. “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 291-310.
- Langlois, Jean-Pierre P. 1991. “Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 801-832.

• **Power, Interests, and Deterrence** (September 11)

Required Reading

- Fearon, James D. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 68-90.
- Fearon, James D. 2002. “Selection Effects and Deterrence.” *International Interactions*. Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 5-29.
- Powell, Robert. 2015. “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Nuclear Power.” *International Organization*. Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 589-626.

Recommended Reading

- Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1984. “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980.” *World Politics*. Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 496-526.
- Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal. 1989. “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies.” *World Politics*. Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 143-169.
- Jervis, Robert. 1989. “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.” *World Politics*. Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 183-207.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1990. “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable.” *World Politics*. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 336-369.
- Huth, Paul K., and Bruce Russett. 1990. “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference.” *World Politics*. Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 466-501.

- Kilgour, Marc D., and Frank C. Zagare. 1991. “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 305-334.
- Carlson, Lisa J. 1995. “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 511-534.
- Huth, Paul. 1999. “Deterrence and International Conflict.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 2, pp. 25-48.
- Tingley, Dustin H. and Barbara F. Walter. 2011. “Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 996-1020.

• **Power and Reputation in Asymmetric Conflicts** (September 18)

Required Reading

- Powell, Robert. 1996. “Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 749-764.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2004. “Rational Appeasement.” *International Organization*. Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 345-373.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2006. “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 313-330.
- Sechser, Todd S. 2010. “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.” *International Organization*. Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 627-660.

Recommended Reading

- Kreps, David, and Robert Wilson. 1982. “Reputation and Imperfect Information.” *Journal of Economic Theory*. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 253-279.
- Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1982. “Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence.” *Journal of Economic Theory*. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 280-312.
- Alt, James E., Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes. 1988. “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 82, No. 2, pp. 445-466.

- Paul, T. V. 1994. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kadera, Kelly M. 1999. “The Power-Conflict Story: A Synopsis.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 149-174.
- Langlois, Jean-Pierre P. and Catherine C. Langlois. 2005. “Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 503-527.
- Langlois, Catherine C. and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. 2006. “Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence: Trading the Risk of War for the Promise of a Better Deal.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 159-180.
- Tingley, Dustin H. and Barbara F. Walter. 2011. “The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach.” *International Organization*. Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 343-365.
- Yoder, Brandon. 2019. “Hedging for Better Bets: Power Shifts, Credible Signals, and Preventive Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 923-949.
- Yoder, Brandon. 2019. “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 130-145.

- **War Duration** (September 25)

Required Reading

- Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002. “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 819-837.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 621-632.
- Powell, Robert. 2004. “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 344-361.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2008. “Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 533-553.

Recommended Reading

- Wittman, Donald. 1979. “How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 743-763.
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. “Fighting Battles, Winning Wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 301-320.
- Werner, Suzanne. 1998. “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 321-343.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Stergios Skaperdas. 2000. “Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 44, No. 6, pp. 793-807.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 97, No. 1, pp. 123-133.
- Fearon, James D. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 275-301.
- Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2004. “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 296-313.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2004. “How Initiators End their Wars: The duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 813-829.
- Langlois, Catherine C. and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. 2006. “When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War: Rational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining.” *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 645-669.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2007. “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 755-771.
- Langlois, Catherine C., and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. 2009. “Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 1051-1073.

- Langlois, Jean-Pierre P., and Catherine C. Langlois. 2011. “Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining.” *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 511-536.
- Wolford, Scott, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2011. “Information, Commitment, and War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 556-579.
- Powell, Robert, 2012. “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 620-637.
- Powell, Robert, 2013. “Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. 128, No. 2, pp. 807-859.
- Barnett, Michael, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher. 2014. “Compromised Peacebuilding.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 608-620.
- Krainin, Colin, Caroline Thomas, and Thomas Wiseman. 2018. “Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available here.

3. Domestic Politics and International Conflict

- **Audience Costs** (October 2)

Required Reading

- Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 577-592.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 829-844.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. “Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 419-433.
- Debs, Alexandre, and Jessica Chen Weiss. 2016. “Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 403-433.

Recommended Reading

- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization*. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-460.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1997. “Linkage politics.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 38-67.
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. “International Crises and Domestic Politics.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 623-638.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. “Looking for Audience Costs.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 32-60.
- Tarar, Ahmer. 2001. “International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 320-340.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. 2002. “Honest threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 175-200.
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2004. “Politics at the Water’s Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 459-486.
- Johns, Leslie. 2006. “Knowing the Unknown: Executive Evaluation and International Crisis Outcomes.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 228-252.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2006. “Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 445-477.
- Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” *International Organization*. Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 35-64.
- Tarar, Ahmer, and Bahar Leventoğlu. 2009. “Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 817-839.
- Snyder, Jack, and Erica Borghard. 2011. “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 105, No. 3, pp. 437-456.
- Downes, Alexander B., and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. “The Illusion of

Democratic Credibility.” *International Organization*. Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 457-489.

- Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis.” *Security Studies*. Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 3-42.
- Acharya, Avidit, and Edoardo Grillo. 2019. “A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 159-190.

- **The Democratic Peace** (October 9)

Required Reading

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 93, No. 4, pp. 791-807.
- Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. 2007. “Political Bias and War.” *American Economic Review*. Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 1353-1373.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. “The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 304-321.
- Debs, Alexandre, and H. E. Goemans. 2010. “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 430-445.

Recommended Reading

- Kant, Immanuel. 2006 [1795]. “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Pauline Kleingeld (ed.), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 67-109.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 1151-1169.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 1994. “Domestic Politics and International Conflict.” *The American Economic Review*. Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 1294-1309.
- Farber, Henry S., and Joanne Gowa. 1995. “Politics and Peace.” *International Security*. Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 123-146.

- Ray, James Lee. 1998. “Does Democracy Cause Peace?” *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 1, pp. 27-46.
- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Kadera, Kelly M., Mark J. C. Crescenzi, and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. “Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 234-247.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 166-191.
- Fearon, James D. 2008. “A Simple Political Economy of Relations among Democracies and Autocracies.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available here.
- Dafoe, Allan. 2011. “Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 247-262.
- Baliga, Sandeep, David O. Lucca, and Tomas Sjostrom. 2011. “Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?” *Review of Economic Studies*. Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 458-486.
- Krainin, Colin, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2018. “Dyadic Conflicts: Elites, Citizens, and War.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available here.

October 16: no class (October Recess).

4. Commitment Problems, A Reevaluation

- **Militarization and War** (October 23)

Required Reading

- Fearon, James. 1996. “Bargaining Over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power.” Annual meeting of the APSA, Washington, DC. Available here.
- Meirowitz, Adam, and Anne E. Sartori. 2008. “Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 327-352.

- Debs, Alexandre, and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2014. “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War.” *International Organization*. Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 1-32.
- Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. 2019. “The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 269-285.

Recommended Reading

- Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow. 1992. “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 896-922.
- Glaser, Charles L. 2000. “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 3, pp. 251-276.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. “Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 228-244.
- Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjoström. 2004. “Arms Races and Negotiations.” *Review of Economic Studies*. Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 351-369.
- Glaser, Charles L. 2004. “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming.” *International Security*. Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 44-84.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 533-547.
- Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjoström. 2008. “Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation.” *Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. 116, No. 6, pp. 1023-1057.
- Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. 2009. “Strategic Militarization, Deterrence, and Wars.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 279-313.
- Bevia, Carmen, and Luis C. Corchon. 2010. “Peace Agreements Without Commitment.” *Games and Economic Behavior*. Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 469-487.
- Benson, Brett, and Quan Wen. 2011. “A Bargaining Model of Nuclear Weapons Development and Disarmament.” in *Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation*, Robert Rauchhaus, Matthew Kroenig, and Erik Gartzke. New York: Routledge, pp. 45-62.

- Chadeaux, Thomas. 2011. “Bargaining Over Power: When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War?” *International Theory*. Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 228-253.
- Fearon, James D. 2011. “Arming and Arms Races.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available [here](#).
- Arena, Philip, and Scott Wolford. 2012. “Arms, Intelligence, and War.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 351-365.
- Bas, Muhamet A., and Andrew J. Coe. 2012. “Arms Diffusion and War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 651-674.
- Coe, Andrew J., and Jane Vaynman. 2015. “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 77, No. 4, pp. 983-997.
- Bas, Muhamet A., and Andrew J. Coe. 2016. “A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War.” *International Organization*. Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 655-685.
- Debs, Alexandre, and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2017. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jelnov, Artyom, Yair Tauman, and Richard Zeckhauser. 2018. “Confronting an Enemy with Unknown Preferences: Deterror or Provocateur?” *European Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. 54, pp. 124-143.
- Coe, Andrew J. 2018. “Containing Rogues.” *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 1197-1210.
- Spaniel, William. 2019. *Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

• **Economic Growth, Militarization, and War** (October 30)

Required Readings

- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 1990. “Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium.” *American Economic Review*. Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 50-68.
- Powell, Robert. 1993. “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 115-132.
- Fearon, James D. 2018. “Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy.” *International Organization*. Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 523-559.

- Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexandre Debs. 2018. “An Economic Theory of War.” *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming).

Recommended Readings

- Polachek, Solomon W. 1980. “Conflict and Trade.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 55-78.
- Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights.” *American Economic Review*. Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 720-739.
- Morrow, James D. 1999. “How Could Trade Affect Conflict?” *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 481-489.
- Kadera, Kelly M., and Daniel S. Morey. 2008. “The Trade-Offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 152-170.
- Coe, Andrew J. 2011. “Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available [here](#).
- Garfinkel, Michelle R., Stergios Skaperdas, and Constantinos Syropoulos. 2015. “Trade and Insecure Resources.” *Journal of International Economics*. Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 98-114.
- Herrera, Helios, Massimo Morelli, and Salvatore Nunnari. 2019. “A Theory of Power Wars.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available [here](#).

5. Information Problems, A Reevaluation

• Diplomacy (November 6)

Required Readings

- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation.” *International Organization*. Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 325-357.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2002. “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes.” *International Organization*. Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 121-149.
- Trager, Robert F. 2011. “Multidimensional Diplomacy.” *International Organization*. Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 469-506.

Recommended Readings

- Crawford, Vincent P., and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information Transmission.” *Econometrica*. Vol. 50, No. 6, pp. 1431-1451.

- Morrow, James D. 1994. “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information.” *International Organization*. Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 387-423.
- Trager, Robert F. 2010. “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 347-368.
- Slantchev, Branislav. 2010. “Feigning Weakness.” *International Organization*. Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 357-388.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2013. *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Joseph, Michael. 2018. “A Little Bit of Cheap-Talk is a Dangerous Thing: States Communicate Intentions Persuasively and Induce War in the Processes.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available here.

- **Mediation** (November 13)

Required Readings

- Kydd, Andrew. 2003. “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility and Mediation.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 597-611.
- Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. “Asymmetric Information, Mediation and Conflict Management.” *World Politics*. Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 207-241.
- Favretto, Katja. 2009. “Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion and Bias.” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 103, No. 2, pp. 248-263.
- Crescenzi, Mark J. C., Kelly M. Kadera, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Clayton L. Thyne. 2011. “A Supply Side Theory of Mediation.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 1069-1094.

Recommended Readings

- Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” *International Organization*. Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 335-364.
- Werner, Suzanne. 2000. “Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 720-732.
- Smith, Alastair, and Alan Stam. 2003. “Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War.” *International Studies Review*. Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 115-135.

- Werner, Suzanne, and Amy Yuen. 2005. “Making and Keeping Peace.” *International Organization*. Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 261-292.
- Yuen, Amy. 2009. “Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 745-773.
- Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2010. “When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation.” *World Politics*. Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 529-560.
- Hörner, Johannes, Massimo Morelli, and Francesco Squintani. 2015. “Mediation and Peace.” *Review of Economic Studies*. Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 1483-1501.
- Ramirez, Shawn L. 2018. “Mediation in the Shadow of an Audience: How Third Parties Use Secrecy and Agenda-Setting to Broker Settlements.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 119-146.

● **Mutual Optimism and War** (November 20)

Required Readings

- Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2007. “Mutual Optimism and War.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 738-754.
- Slantchev, Branislav L., and Ahmer Tarar. 2011. “Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 135-148.
- Debs, Alexandre. 2019. “The Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available on Canvas.

Recommended Readings

- Aumann, Robert J. 1976. “Agreeing to Disagree.” *The Annals of Statistics*. Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 1236-1239.
- Milgrom, Paul, and Nancy Stokey. 1982. “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge.” *Journal of Economic Theory*. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 17-27.
- Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. “Bargaining and the Nature of War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 783-813.
- Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2006. “Divergent Beliefs in ‘Bargaining and the Nature of War’: A Reply to Fey and Ramsay.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 614-618.

- Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2006. “The Common Priors Assumption: A Comment on “Bargaining and the Nature of War”.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 607-613.
- Wittman, Donald. 2009. “Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?” *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 588-602.
- Kydd, Andrew H. 2015. *International Relations Theory: The Game-Theoretic Approach*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, pp. 104-110.
- Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2016. “Mutual Optimism in the Bargaining Model of War.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available here.
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2017. “Information, Uncertainty, and War.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 20, pp. 505-527.

November 27: no class (November Recess).

6. Conclusion

- **The Bargaining Model, A Reevaluation** (December 4)

Required Readings

- Fearon, James D. and Xin Jin. 2018. “Armed Conflict Bargaining.” Stanford University working paper.
- Schultz, Kenneth A., and Henk E. Goemans. 2019. “Aims, Claims, and the Bargaining Model of War.” *International Theory* (forthcoming). Available here.
- Fey, Mark, and Brenton Kenkel. 2019. “Is an Ultimatum the Last Word on Crisis Bargaining.” *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming). Available here.

Recommended Readings

- Hart, Oliver D., and Jean Tirole. 1988. “Contract Renegotiations and Coasian Dynamics.” *Review of Economic Studies*. Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 509-540.
- Fearon, James D. 2013. “Fighting rather than Bargaining.” Unpublished Manuscript. Available at here.

- Fey, Mark, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher Ramsay. 2013. “Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining.” *Political Science Research and Methods*. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 27-52.

Additional Topics in International Security

- **Alliances**

- Morrow, James D. 1994. “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 270-297.
- Kadera, Kelly M. 1998. “Transmission, Barriers, and Constraints: A Dynamic Model of the Spread of War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 367-387.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 2004. “On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 43-68.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 2004. “Stable Alliance Formation in Distributional Conflict.” *European Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 829-852.
- Fang, Songying, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2010. “Outside Options and Burden Sharing in Nonbinding Alliances.” *Political Research Quarterly*. Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 188-202.
- Christia, Fotini. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.
- Fang, Songying, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2014. “To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances.” *International Organization*. Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 775-809.
- Wolford, Scott. 2015. *The Politics of Military Coalitions*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolford, Scott, and Emily Hencken Ritter. 2016. “National Leaders, Political Security, and the Formation of Military Coalitions.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 540-551.