The Influence of Recruitment on the Structure of Power in the U. S. House, 1870-1940
Author(s): Peter Swenson
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This is a study of the relationship between the recruitment of congressmen and the evolution of the power structure in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1870 to 1940. The thesis is that during the late 19th century increasingly strong political party organizations at the state and local level were able to dominate the recruitment process and selected party careerists as congressmen, who were willing to accept the discipline imposed by a series of increasingly powerful Speakers. As party organizations declined and their control over recruitment faded, a new generation of more independent congressmen rebelled against strong party controls, and congressional power became more dispersed, during the 1910 to 1940 period. The thesis is supported particularly by roll-call data from the 1910 fight over limiting the Speaker's power.

Introduction: Recruitment and Legislative Evolution

During his intermittent travels and study of American politics in the 1880s and 1890s, Russian sociologist Moisei Ostrogorski observed an advancing centralization of control over House proceedings. He later wrote that “Congress has ceased to be a deliberative assembly,” and that in the House of Representatives, in particular:

discussion has been rendered superfluous or impossible by the committee system and by the discretionary power of the Speaker, who appoints the members of the committees by his sole authority and curtails at his pleasure the debates in the House by refusing any member on the floor. But if this dictatorial organization has been thrust on the House, it is precisely because the latter is so recruited . . . as to be filled with men incapable of constituting a deliberative assembly worthy of the name (Ostrogorski, 1902, p. 281).

After almost a century, Ostrogorski's observation, that it was “primarily the character of the men whom the party organization installs in Congress” which determined the turn of the century scheme of things, is ripe for revival and reconsideration.
While Ostrogorski's view about developments in Congress before the turn of the century may be shared today by some—most notably historian David Rothman in his book on the Senate (1966)—a consensus exists by no means. For example, George Galloway (1976, p. 167), another congressional historian, recently argued that the growth of the Speaker's power in the 1880s and 1890s was a response not to a change in recruitment, but to critical public opinion and was an "inevitable reaction against earlier decentralization of power." H. Douglas Price (1971 and 1975) has argued that the mass electoral shifts of the 1890s led to a more stable partisan composition of the House and therefore "permitted" centralization as a solution, (albeit an "unstable" one) to the problems of congressional anarchy. But if changing congressional recruitment practices were in fact responsible, as Ostrogorski thought, then the centralized system in the House would have been neither "inevitable" in Galloway's terms, nor "an aberration which could not last" as Price would maintain.

A first step in resolving this controversy is to examine why recruitment practices could or should lead to changes in the institutional structure of the House or any other legislative body. The political science literature lacks a systematic approach for dealing with this question, despite a more or less extensive coverage of recruitment in the literature. Robert Putnam (1976, pp. 68-70) offers a lead, however, in proposing that analysis of recruitment should be broken down into its selection effects, socialization effects, and incentive effects. What remains to be demonstrated is some possible causal relationship between recruitment (processes of selection and socialization, and the structure of incentives) and the structure of a political institution such as a legislature.

Figure 1 represents a possible framework for investigation of causal links between recruitment and structure. It reads: through socialization, selection, and its incentive structure, any particular recruitment process acts to teach, select out, and create a particular set of orientations toward authority, a set of distinct political skills, and finally a particular set of electoral needs that legislators will want to have accommodated. If the institution does not fit their attitudes, skills, and concrete electoral needs, the consequence may be adaptation of congressmen to their environment. On the other hand, discordance may also lead to high voluntary turnover resulting from dissatisfaction with the institution, involuntary turnover due to electoral defeat, or most important, efforts to alter the institutional structure. In particular, patterns of authority relations, the legislative division of labor, and the means for creating and distributing resources within the institution will become objects of reform.
Socialization and selection processes normally work in a mutually supportive way during recruitment (hence inclusion within the same box) in producing both authority orientations and political skills. Successful political advancement requires the objective manifestation of certain attitudes toward authority or the learning of them in order to get along with and influence important figures in the process of gaining attention, confidence, and constituencies and in mobilizing organizations behind election campaigns. Often attitudes toward authority, as Harry Eckstein and Ted Gurr (1975, p. 456) would argue, will affect a politician’s future behavior and ability to cope with a new political environment; a disjunction between authority relations experienced during recruitment stages and those in the institution might produce emotional strain or a sense of anomie—and as I would argue, a desire to retreat from, or to actively reform the authoritative environment. Moreover, the political skills used and learned in the process of getting elected, or as Mattei Dogan would argue, the skills developed along the career pathway traveled in the pre-election stages of a political career (1979) will also have great consequences on a legislator’s behavior, functioning, and possibly demands on their institution.² The political “personae” for example of party stump speakers, ideologues, demagogues, and modern “image” marketers, or legislative researcher-experts, organizational managers, and interest-coalition...
brokers will all develop in part through exercise of certain skills during recruitment stages, and will differ to a large degree in terms of the kinds of institutions that can provide accommodating roles for them. Moreover, as James D. Barber (1965, pp. 116-162) has shown in his study of the Connecticut state legislature, differential recruitment patterns experienced by members within a single legislature can have significant consequences for the legislative division of labor. The division of labor in a legislature will therefore never be the object of indifference to politicians who during the course of their careers learn to compete successfully with one another—with a limited set of skills, and who desire institutional arrangements that facilitate political activity and competition on the basis of those skills they know best.

The division of labor in a legislature is moreover of critical importance in providing electoral politicians with symbolic benefits for and visibility to local voters and constituents. Equally important is the way institutional units and practices create and distribute resources (patronage, "pork" and others that can be translated into votes) which legislators utilize in the perpetual task of getting reelected. For example, David Mayhew's (1974, pp. 81-105) analysis of Congress shows quite convincingly how its salient structural units (congressional offices, committees, and parties) and the roles played within them are conveniently "arranged to meet electoral needs." Presumably, then, if Mayhew is correct, when recruitment and the structure of incentives associated with it changes over time, so will the drive for institutional forms allowing activities and producing resources that facilitate efforts for reelection. Thus the causal connection (and its motivational basis) between incentive structure and institutional structure is clear and direct.

To introduce a broader controversy, I advance the thesis that long-term trends in the structural evolution of Congress, to the extent that they impinge on general authority patterns, the nature of legislative roles, and mechanisms for resource distribution, will be largely the result of changing patterns of recruitment. Since any particular institutional arrangement is subject to constant scrutiny and possible challenge by a continuously changing membership (as characterized by political skills, orientations toward authority, and structured motivations), changes in recruitment patterns are likely to lead to demands for structural reform of the institution. Moreover, to the extent that impulses other than recruitment changes motivate structural alterations, the exact form of the chosen alternatives will be determined and constrained by the compelling demands created by dominant recruitment patterns. Hence, the argument suggests that one should look first to congressional recruitment practices as the single most important explanation of broad institutional change in Congress over time, that is, of changes undertaken autonomously by the membership and its leaders.
This paper will interpret and analyze the evolution of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1880 to about 1940, which should serve to support the analysis above. Changes occurring in local and state party structures before the turn of the century brought about a fundamental change in prevailing recruitment patterns, and therefore in the nature of congressmen's demands and expectations from the institution. More specifically, the emerging party "machines" produced indirectly a "machine Congress"—an autocratic, centralized, and therefore radically different institution that met the needs and expectations of a new breed of politician. Later, in the early 20th century, social and political changes associated with "professionalism" and "progressivism" led to the breakdown of party machinery and a rearrangement of the American occupational structure. New recruitment patterns introduced yet a new breed of politician with the political skills, attitudes toward authority, and finally, electoral needs calling for a "modernized," "professionalized," and "institutionalized" House. But first a short review of what actually took place in the House during these years is in order, considering, the remaining controversy about the character of its evolution.

The Evolution of the House of Representatives: 1880-1940

Between Reconstruction and the turn of the century, the dominant character of American politics—from city councils to state legislatures, and all the way to the U.S. Congress—underwent a thoroughgoing organizational transformation. The corpulence of the emerging industrial plutocracy was mirrored by and in no small way contributed to the growing influence of city, county, and state party machines in the politics of the nation. The end of the century was the era of the famous "Reed Rules" and autocratic "Cannonism," when the lock-step of party voting reached its peak, and when unprecedented order was achieved without the professional protections and comforts offered the late 20th century American legislator. The "vulgar demeanor" of representatives that struck Tocqueville in the 1830s had been replaced by the compliance and regularity of party loyalists whose occasional obstreperousness and outbursts were more often guided by organizational allegiances and institutionalized leadership than by fiery individualism and the charismatic ad hoc leadership of the decades surrounding the Civil War.4

Apparently the changes in the House were abrupt. A seasoned congressional correspondent wrote in 1906 that in the 1880s he had to know what almost every member in the House thought about a bill in order to predict its passage or defeat, requiring about 16 hours a day of hustling just to keep up. But since the 1890s, he wrote,
all that a newspaper man has had to do in order to keep informed on the progress of legislation was to keep in touch with the three members of the House constituting the majority of the Committee on Rules . . . . These men, so long as they hold their present positions, will always be able to tell what Congress will do on any important question pending, or rather they will tell you what they propose to allow Congress to do (Stealey, 1906, pp. 2-3).

Equally telling is the complaint of the old-fashioned lobbyist in 1906 that although there were just as many “claims and schemes before Congress” as before, he was recently short of work because they were “managed and expedited now by the insiders” (Stealey, 1906, p. 24). These observations are quite consistent with the studies of roll-call voting in those years, which show a steep rise and peak in party voting in the 1890s, and then a marked decline after 1910 (Lowell, 1901; Burnham, 1975; Brady, et al., 1979).

The abrupt rise in party voting and the increasing predictability of the legislative process in the 1890s were, however, manifestations of a trend toward organizational centralization that had begun at least ten years earlier when the House rules were revised under Democratic Speaker Samuell Randall. With these revisions, the House Committee on Rules was turned into a standing committee (chaired by the Speaker), and thus began its transformation into a powerful instrument for centralized partisan control over the House. Randall also established a precedent for what would soon become an “absolute power of recognition” (in parliamentary procedure) in the Speaker’s hands. Randall’s successor, John Carlisle, also a Democrat, continued with other innovations, such as requiring private and direct submission to the Speaker of unprivileged public bills (e.g., public works for individual constituencies). Thus ended the riotous practice of jockeying for attention and recognition on the floor for “unanimous consent” and “suspension of the rules” (Alexander, 1916, pp. 60-61).

The combination of this new practice with the Speaker’s now unchallengeable right to recognize members on the floor forced the average member, hat-in-hand, to seek a private audience in the Speaker’s office in advance in order to get anything considered at all. Not surprisingly, future Speakers would use this practice to make friends, favor friends, and punish enemies; understandably, Republican “insurgents” in the first decade of the 20th century would decry this practice as humiliating and unprincipled. Furthermore, under Carlisle’s regime (1883-1889), the small Rules Committee was given increased authority over the flow of legislation, at the same time that the House as a whole, or a majority thereof, was divested of the power to instruct committees on the disposition of any matter in its domain, thus closing off yet another means of bypassing the central leadership (Ripley, 1967, p. 18; Cooper, 1960, p. 7).
Thus the adoption of the "Reed Rules" in 1890—masterminded now by a Republican Speaker, Thomas Reed—represented only a crowning of a ten-year trend. The Reed Rules gave the Speaker the sole power to refer bills to committees, and therefore the power to bury them when he wished. In addition to other significant innovations, Reed succeeded in augmenting Randall's absolute power of recognition: "For what purpose does the gentleman rise?" was a question first and often heard during the Reed periods (1889-1891 and 1895-1899), which allowed Reed to take the floor away from a member after already recognizing him (Alexander, 1916, p. 59; Galloway, 1976, p. 56). While in the minority, the Democrats resisted the changes which had robbed them of the power to obstruct Republican legislation, but quickly reinstated them when back in control (under Charles Crisp, 1891-1895). Crisp also managed during this time to extend the Rules Committee's jurisdiction, and thus his own authority as Speaker (Ripley, 1967, p. 19).

Hence, by the time Republican Speaker Joseph Cannon took over (1903-1911), an extremely autocratic House structure was already in place: the Speaker plus a few lieutenants in the Rules Committee could control all committee placements (of majority members), all "pork, patronage, and party funds," floor debate, referral of legislation to committees, and therefore, the flow of all major legislation. Furthermore, the Speaker's "cabinet," the chairmen of major committees, had gained since 1880 a corresponding degree of power over their committees (Cooper, 1960, p. 13).

The dismantling of this arrangement seemed almost as abrupt as its introduction, but in fact took as long or longer to carry out. The "revolt" against Cannon in 1910 by a coalition of insurgent Republicans with the Democratic minority, in which the Speaker was removed from the Rules Committee and the committee was enlarged from five to ten members, set the pattern for future developments—multiplication and separation of positions of authority into autonomous and functionally distinct structural units. By the late 1920s, the formal powers that had in the heyday of Cannonism been vested in at most four or five members (one of which was indisputably dominant) were now distributed among at least 62 members of the majority, for example, at least 34 on the Republican Committee on Committees (now responsible for committee assignments), 14 on Rules, 12 on the Steering Committee (responsible for legislative strategy), in addition to the Speaker and Floor Leader.

The Democrats as well as Republicans followed this trend, and thereby introduced in the 1930s an increasingly unwieldy and uncontrollable hierarchy. The great expansion of the whip system in the 1930s was a belated but telling recognition that the final and most important leverage remaining in the hands of the formal partisan leadership lay in the ability to collect information and
control intra-party communication. Meanwhile, the development of the seniority system during this period further insulated members from central party and institutional authorities, while the stepwise enlargement of powerful exclusive committees (e.g., Ways and Means, Appropriations, Rules) meant the transfer of substantive authority to autonomous committee chairmen. By the 1940s, then, individual congressmen had more opportunities, resources, and security to act as autonomous legislators within a decentralized committee system, and within a functionally fragmented, and in some respects, collegial hierarchical structure.

The gradualism and bipartisan nature of this evolution—from the anarchy of the post-Civil War House, to the authoritarianism of both Democratic and Republican Speakerships, to the post-1910 pseudo-collegial caucus rule, and finally to the modern fragmented and professionalized House of the 1940s—contradict some impressions one finds in the political science literature. For example, some authors fail to see the 20 to 30 years of centralized authority around the turn of the century as a separate and stable period in its own right. Morris Fiorina (1977, p. 6), for one, divides the history into the “unstable Congress of the nineteenth century” and the “professionalized Congress of the twentieth.” H. Douglas Price (1971, pp. 24-25), too, distinguished without any explicit justification the authoritarianism of Republican rule under Reed and Cannon, and the intervening and following Democratic control under Crisp and Underwood. Moreover, in doing so, Price probably exaggerates the instant and independent effects of the Reed rules changes in 1890 and the overthrow of Cannonism in 1910. It is perhaps this overestimation of the independent effect of leaders and rules changes, that is, independent of the character of politicians who must live under them, that leads Price to regard the 15 year period of authoritarian Republican control (1895-1910) as, under the circumstances, an “aberration which could not last.”

In fact, the gradualism of, and the bipartisan participation in the long-term trend suggest that this was neither an unstable situation, nor an aberration, but a potentially permanent and extremely workable arrangement which suited the needs and attitudes of a critical majority of congressmen at the time. The above cursory analysis of the structural evolution of the House thus indicates that the turn-of-the-century authoritarian House deserves to be regarded as a separate and distinct period in its development. The following analysis of changing congressional recruitment patterns as the cause of its development and the reason for its breakdown will give further support to this interpretation.
Recruitment and Structure

Congressional Recruitment and Its Consequences: 1880s through the 1930s

The "Machines": 1880 to 1910

In the concurrent historical development of Congressional recruitment and the structure of Congress during the late 19th century, one can see a striking parallel: a concentration and consolidation of organizational control over local and state nominations in step with an advancing authoritarian control over the membership, resources, and processes of the House. This was the period of growth and consolidation throughout large parts of the nation of so-called party "machines"—relatively stable (although often not faction-free), hierarchical associations of professional politicians, public officials, and organizational activists allied to one another for all the mutual and especially particularistic benefits gained through control over local, county, and state governments.

Not only was the machinery of consolidated and centralized party organizations daily gaining ground in developing areas of the country in the 1890s as Ostrogorski reported (p. 216): even in a highly developed state like New York, where Tammany Hall and other organized factional groupings had flourished since the 1830s, it was not until the late 1880s that Tammany defeated competing factions and extended a near monopoly of control over Democratic nominations at every level, including the state (Shefter, 1973, p. 20). Furthermore, contrary to some popular misconceptions, turn-of-the-century machines were not primarily limited to northern, urbanized areas inundated by immigrants who "needed" to be assimilated into American society and politics. For example, powerful Republican party machines in Rhode Island and Connecticut were "based on the support of countryfolk" and depended on local party organizations in small, rural towns (Lockard, 1959, pp. 176-245) which were often more easily controlled than cities beset by labor unrest, ethnic rivalries, and "middle-class reformers." Some Southern states also began developing their statewide machines—most notably that of Thomas Martin in Virginia who built up an organization in the 1890s that weathered severe challenges from "progressive" Andrew Jackson Montague, and secured tight control after 1901 (Moger, 1968). Southern cities developed their powerful machines too, such as the famed "Choctaw Club" in New Orleans, which after 1900, under the collegial leadership of the "city caucus," tamed the flamboyant factionalism of the 1890s (Reynolds, 1936). Others developed in Savannah, Augusta, Jacksonville, Chattanooga, Montgomery, and San Antonio (Key, 1949, p. 397). In the 13-county Rio Grande valley in Texas,
an ex-Army colonel with experience in the New York Tammany organization used techniques observed there to create a machine with the idle Mexican vote (Shelton, 1974).

Most remarkable was the simultaneity of machine development across the country. Already mentioned was the consolidation of the Tammany machine after the late 1880s. Destined to be forgotten are smaller yet increasingly powerful party organizations like the one formed by the Ermentrout brothers in the 1880s and 1890s in the Berks County, Pennsylvania congressional district—a Democratic enclave within a Republican-controlled state (Fryer, 1939, pp. 203-209). The New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut all saw the emergence of machines of varying, but unprecedented strength late in the 19th century (Lockard, 1959). In the 1880s, for example, Democrat Pat Maguire of Boston managed to pull together a relatively weak organization against all odds, including in the brittle coalition Irish Catholics and anti-papist Italians, Jews, Yankees, and even some reformers against the city's radical, militant workers (Blodgett, 1966). Maryland was controlled by Democrat Senator Arthur Gorman, who began consolidating his hold late in the 1870s—in cooperation with Baltimore's Democratic boss Isaac Freeman Rasin, who himself managed by the mid-1880s to rid his city's politics of factional leaders and to replace them with loyal ward lieutenants (Bain, 1970, pp. 142-143; Crooks, 1968, pp. 10-13). In Cincinnati, Ohio, Republican George Cox became by the late 1880s undisputed boss over a tight organization built from the organized and warring factions of the early 1880s, and in 1887 defeated for good the threat posed by a nearly successful Union Labor Party (Miller, 1968, pp. 72-92).

In New Jersey, Republicans first took hold of the state in the 1890s, led by their boss, William J. Sewell (Fleming, 1977, pp. 147-149). Sewell was just one of a number of powerful Republican state party leaders such as Thomas C. Platt of New York and Matthew Quay of Pennsylvania. These figures were all well acquainted with one another through national party conventions and, equally important, in the Senate. In fact, the Senate at the turn of the century "resembled a sort of federation of state bosses" who often controlled and were elected to the Senate by state legislatures (Dobson, 1972, p. 33). A notable example of such a boss was New York Senator Thomas Platt; less known were Senators John Logan of Illinois and Oliver Morton of Indiana who headed the dominant machines in their home states. Their contemporary, Senator James McMillan was Michigan's strongest party boss ever. The relative stability of many party organizations of the time allowed, for example, Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin, co-senator, political lieutenant, and heir apparent of Philetus Sawyer, to take unchallenged control over the state party after Sawyer's retirement in 1893. Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island handed over his
control over state politics to subordinates in return for security of reelection to the Senate (Dobson, 1972; Rothman, 1966).

Consolidation of state party control plus frequent contact at presidential nomination time and within the Senate's inner circle of state leaders (led by Senators Allison of Ohio and Aldrich of Rhode Island) accompanied evidence that conditions were nearly ripe for nationwide machines—or at least a Republican one. Mark Hanna, a multi-millionaire industrialist from Ohio, undertook the first (and last) efforts in the 1890s to forge a national machine that could control the presidential nominating process and orchestrate orderly and predictable presidential nominating conventions in a manner familiar to state and local bosses (Josephson, 1938).

What kind of politician produced these machines and what kind of congressman did these party organizations recruit and send to the House? In answer to the first question, it is clear that the founders of many of the tight and stable party machines came out of the expanding corporate industrial world, and not a few of them were multi-millionaires, e.g., Mark Hanna of Ohio and James MacMillan of Michigan. Most important, they were extremely skillful organizers and managers of organizations—hardworking, innovative, but seldom highly visible and ideologically motivated popular leaders (Keller, 1977, pp. 238-287; Rothman, 1966, pp. 187-190). Typical was the innovativeness of railroad president John Barbour of Virginia (Martin's predecessor) who responded to, and controlled, a small-farmer electorate increasingly mobilized by Populist rabble rousers (often in reaction against black participation in politics). He did this by taking over party leadership from the relaxed, aristocratic landed elite and organizing the state's first highly detailed district canvassing operations (Moger, 1968, pp. 53-54).

In Cincinnati and New York City, the rampant factionalism associated with the independent clout of "bummers," ward heelers and saloon keepers disappeared with an organizational innovation: the development of "political clubs" which took advantage of the "economies of scale of political entrepreneurship" and prohibited the entry of independent political contenders with small personal followings into city politics. The political club became in these cities a major point of entry and primary building block in organizational politics, not the saloon or neighborhood gang, which had smaller bases and were of course not part of an institutionalized hierarchy (Shefter, 1973, p. 20; Miller, 1968, pp. 77-92). William Lorimer of Cook County, Illinois, a strong Republican faction leader, induced the county central committee to adopt a reform in the 1890s calling for a hierarchical party structure composed of precinct and ward clubs topped by a central committee. He subsequently took control of the Cook County organization (after having centralized control over patronage) by using the clubs as instruments for patronage distribution,
canvassing, registration, naturalization, and other political duties. Although Illinois apparently never developed a well-integrated statewide machine, Lorimer, from his Cook County base, became congressman and then senator, controlled the state legislature for a time, and carried some clout at Republican national conventions (Tarr, 1971, pp. 24-47).

These examples show that the formation of party machines required great skill, enterprise, and innovativeness. The organizations also required a vast amount of concentrated resources that were not available before. In particular, the advancement of corporate capitalism in the late 19th century in large statewide and increasingly nationwide ventures often provided a centralized and carefully directed flow of financial resources, as well as the organizers, for large party machines. Indeed, in California, for example, the Southern Pacific Railroad, or more precisely its political department, was the state machine (McWilliams, 1949, pp. 178-180). Under its head (who was also its chief legal counsel), there was a railroad “political manager” in every county in the state (Democrat or Republican, depending on the dominant local party), and with the help of this organization, he “usually had the power to name the governor, or any other public officer in California” (Bean, 1978, p. 258).

In other states, the identity was less complete, and party bosses and their organizations maintained a large degree of institutional autonomy from the monopolies. But the literature shows that almost without exception, some organizational or financial connection was there between the railroad, timber, manufacturing, and oil interests and state (especially Republican) bosses. For example, Henry C. Payne, Republican boss in Wisconsin, submitted in 1895 to strong pressure for—and then even championed—civil service reform in Milwaukee, believing that he “might even be able to tighten his hold over the aldermen if the city spoils were removed, because his corporations could then provide jobs for faithful party workers” (Thelen, 1972, p. 163). Payne recognized that the concentration of resources for party consolidation, made available through corporate capitalism, helped reduce party leaders’ reliance on decentralized organizational resources that hindered the development of well-integrated organizations, and fueled the factionalism of the 1870s and 1880s.

The answer to the question of what kind of politician these well-integrated party machines produced can also be found in the literature. Martin Shefter (1973, p. 21), in his study of the changing Tammany organization during the 1880s and 1890s, writes that as Tammany consolidated its control over the nomination process, nominations could be extended as rewards to those, no matter how personally colorless they might be, who had labored long and hard for the Tammany cause; Tammany no longer found it necessary to accommodate leaders with personal followings. Rather, the
Recruitment and Structure

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process of political recruitment in New York came to benefit individuals who were willing
to take a back seat for a number of years while they proved their worth, their loyalty to
the superiors.

In the words of Ostrogorski (1902, pp. 203, 209) machine-produced politicians were “docile instruments” with primary responsibility to the organ-
ization; their leaders were those who triumphed with one supreme quality—
“skill in the management of men.” About the recruitment practices of the
Michigan state Republican machine, Millspaugh (1917, p. 175) wrote that the
party “preferred a conforming man, a regular, sometimes a silent man,” and
that the act of nomination was “a final act of party policy, the rerooting of an
old organization in new electoral soil.” In other words, the candidate was not
only supposed to win the election, he was also required in the process to
“repair and strengthen the party structure without altering its foundations.”
This meant, of course, recruiting his own supporters and underlings from
among loyal, predictable regulars who showed abilities as good, behind-the-
scenes “managers of men.” The purpose and often the effect of such practices
was to produce nominating conventions that were “brief and decorous”
(Miller, 1968, p. 93), although not without well-organized and loud demon-
strations of “spontaneous” support and, if possible, with results determined
before the balloting started. In Michigan, where delegates to congressional
district conventions were usually chosen in county conventions, the latter
would be arranged to take place on different days so that skilled party managers
could travel across the state pulling wires in the interest of favored congressional
and state senatorial candidates (Millspaugh, 1917, pp. 40, 92-93). According
to nostalgic reports of Michigan politicians who had seen the pre-1890s
conditions, the result was a decline of the convention as “deliberative” bodies.
Pre-convention dealing and parliamentary manipulation replaced deliberation
and when these broke down (especially in local conventions), brawling and
mayhem might ensue (Millspaugh, 1917, p. 52).

This fits well with Ostrogorski’s observation (1902, p. 158) that “with
the advent of the Machine, which filled [Congress and state legislatures] with
inferior men, these bodies had ceased to be deliberative assemblies; it was no
use making a display of eloquence when the vote was decided beforehand by
the resolution of the party caucus or of the committee; the most cogent
reasoning, the most solid debate, was of no avail against the word of command
of an influential boss.” Thus at least one astute observer of the time observed
a marked change in the character of congressmen, and ascribed it to party
machine recruitment. Unfortunately, however, there is little concrete evidence
available in the secondary literature to compare the “machine congressman”
with his predecessors in the middle of the 19th century. Already mentioned is
the decline in flamboyance, substantive oratory, and ideological leadership of
the 1860s and 1870s and increasing adherence to partisan values as ends in themselves. We can also see a trend toward longer congressional careers that began in the middle 1880s, after a period since the 1830s when the average length of House tenure had remained fairly steady. In the 50 years between 1835 and 1883, the average proportion of first-term congressmen in any one Congress hovered around 50 percent. Between 1885 and 1893, it declined to 38.7 percent; between 1895 and 1903 it continued down to 34.5 percent, and in the next ten years it declined further to 25.7 percent (Polsby, 1968).

This steady increase in "careerism" coincides exactly with the emergence of strong party machinery in many states and with the centralization process in the House. While an increasing proportion of congressmen chose to run for reelection during this period (Price, 1975, p. 11), it is also quite likely that secure party organizations could more reliably nominate and return the same candidates to office. As mentioned before in the case of Tammany Hall, strong party machines that were able to control nominations and regularly win elections no longer needed to rely on or deal with maverick and fly-by-night politicians with independent followings. Thus careerism in Congress at this time in its history may well have to do with the kind of individual recruited by the machine (organizational careerists) and with the machine's ability to keep its people in office.

If in fact the expansion of machines across the country was responsible for producing increasing numbers of tame, careerist politicians—politicians of the sort that Ostrogorski and Shefter described—then the consequences seem clear: to these relatively docile and malleable politicians a stable and centralized authoritarian structure would be a natural if not desirable political environment. In other words, the House of Representatives at the turn of the century, under the severe authority of a Thomas Reed or Joseph Cannon, and under their particularistic, discretionary mode of distributing resources and positions, would provide the right conditions for the machine-recruited politician's approach to competition over political prizes and advancement. Members would compete with each other to demonstrate exemplary, not exceptional qualities, in expectation of due advancement and rewards over time. A stable hierarchy and widespread norms of partisan loyalty within the institution would be to the machine breed sufficient if not subjectively necessary conditions for a regular and predictable flow of rewards administered by House leaders.

As James Bryce (1904, v. 1, p. 200) would observe in the 1890s, American party politicians and party politics were, to the European, surprisingly devoid of ideological and programmatic tendencies:

Toil for the public is usually unfruitful in the House. . . . But toil for the pecuniary interests of one's constituents and friends is fruitful, for it obliges people, it wins the
The currency of political competition was predominantly particularistic: office for the office-seeker, patronage for the party, and local benefits for local constituents. In competition with each other, members of the House did not need to traffic in ideological or symbolic returns. The power to do so would have required widespread positions of visibility and pivotal influence over the legislative process. Instead, members of the House needed only to act cooperatively with the central leadership on major legislative matters in return for a moderate flow of benefits from particularistic legislation needed by the organization and constituents in the districts. The skills of a machine politician would have been especially suited to this business—silent cooperation in the open, bargaining and negotiation in the back rooms. If ambitious, machine congressmen could demonstrate skills in coordinating and managing others in support of a candidate for the Speakership, and not so much in advocacy on substantive matters of legislation and organization of legislative coalitions.

Moreover, the competition over particularistic benefits—committee seats and influential positions in the party hierarchy, party funds, federal patronage, post offices and bridges—was muted and contained by the fact that the failure to get reelected spelled no great disaster for a loyal party careerist with a strong organization behind him, as the party could provide a soft landing in one of the many local or state positions over which the party organization in many places had virtually complete control. Hence the structure of electoral incentives in the recruitment process meant that immediate advancement and visible positions of influence within the House, for the purpose of getting reelected, would not have been regarded as preconditions for what was often a voluntarily short tenure in the House.

Strong parliamentary leaders such as those chosen by congressmen at the turn of the century could then deal with eager, compliant, and not-so-demanding members, trained and ready to be managed by those above them. The gradual fusion of partisan leadership with hierarchical authority was granted the Speaker and Rules Committee by machine-style congressmen willing to delegate the task of managing legislative business, and above all, as in the case of the 1890 rules change, of taming the minority party, and excluding it from the fruits of congressional office. These congressmen volunteered their autonomy in exchange for order, regularity, and suppression of the minority, all of which suited their material and psychological needs as machine-made politicians.

In sum, by the late 19th century, when machine-style politicians were far more numerous in the House than ever before and ever again, it stands to reason that the authoritarianism of a Reed, Crisp, Cannon, or Underwood
would be acceptable if not even desirable to a critical number of representatives. Congressmen in this period were of a different stamp from their predecessors. Their dispositions toward authority were those of men trained and selected to seek advancement within a multi-layered system of suzerainty, and to suppress demands for power. Their few demands, corresponding to the structure of incentives presented by the party organization back home, expressed themselves mostly in competition over patronage. This kind of competition offered no threat to the stability of the hierarchy, and in fact, provided the best conditions for building one. Moreover, the skills and techniques congressional candidates needed and learned in order to get elected through the party machinery were especially effective in obtaining a flow of rewards from "bosses" in the House. Quiet, behind-the-scenes bargaining and logrolling, private audiences and arrangements with the Speaker and his coterie, stable bloc-formation under intermediate figures (state delegation leaders or committee chairmen)—instead of fiery oratory, ad hoc coalition formation behind personal legislative causes, and open confrontation with institutional authorities—were the proper, and due to the party's recruitment practices, the most familiar skills and techniques for achieving a congressman's political goals.

Reform and Breakdown of the Machines, 1900-1940

Not surprisingly, the growth of centralized party machines at the turn of the century was followed by vocal and organized resistance to them. A growing professional middle class, often aligned for the first time with labor and farmer groups (Thelen, 1972) provided the ideas, leadership and reforms that would shatter many carefully assembled party machines. The causes of the reaction were many, but clearly one was the open and unabashed alliance between many a party boss and the increasingly unpopular capitalist and his mushrooming corporation. Some machines collapsed instantly under the onslaught of electoral, municipal, and civil service reforms in the first decade of the 20th century; others absorbed reformist elements and voluntarily changed their practices, perhaps saving themselves in a weakened form for a time. Some, like Henry Roraback's Republican machine in Connecticut survived through the late 1930s (Lockard, 1959, p. 245); a few others, like the Cook County (Chicago) Democratic party organization and Frank Hague's Democratic machine based in Jersey City, New Jersey developed after the reform movements had more or less spent themselves. In fact, Hague rode to power as a reform mayor during the Wilson era, and only subsequently built a machine that would survive through the 1940s, all the while keeping the corporations at arm's length (Fleming, 1977, pp. 173-191).

But by and large, these were exceptions. More typical was the Michigan Republican machine, which was a fairly early victim of the direct primary
Recruitment and Structure

election laws adopted there between 1905 and 1909. Direct congressional primaries robbed the party of its direct control over the recruitment process, and turned it into a mere source of personnel and expertise for more independent politicians. In 1917, historian Arthur Millspaugh (p. 126) wrote in his enlightening survey of changes in the Michigan party during the period discussed in this paper,

In some districts the congressional [party] committee makes on paper an impressive appearance of dignity and strength, but the congressional candidate or his private secretary usually directs the fight. There is little connection between the state and the congressional campaigns and little communication between the two organizations. The township committees have had little to do with campaigns beyond occasionally reporting to the county chairman on local conditions or sending in lists of voters.

By 1917, no longer was the “professional manager” in the party organization superior to the candidate, for the direct primaries had “taken from him his most prized powers and have made him the appointee of the candidate, thus reversing the former relation” (Millspaugh, 1917, p. 173). The effect on the party was devastating:

Since the candidate is simply a self-assertive individual who steps out of the ranks and gathers around him a following which is one of the several factions and often merely a minority of the party membership, his control is ephemeral and decentralizing and encourages insubordination.

And not surprisingly, party politicians trained in the days of the machine were in 1917 “in many cases not only unused but hostile to the new order” (Millspaugh, 1917, p. 91).

The nature of campaigning also changed drastically after the reforms. It became “more personal, more direct, more educative”; candidates underwent longer and more strenuous speaking tours and did the speaking themselves. They aimed “to get into personal relationships with voters, at considerable expense of time and money—generally unnecessary under the convention system” (Millspaugh, 1917, p. 91). Evidently then, the breakdown of party machinery made way for a relatively independent, entrepreneurial, and energetic candidate who relied more on his own resourcefulness and magnetism to attract voters, faced them directly instead of as an ornament on the facade of a strong organizational edifice, and dealt from above with a plurality of decentralized party units, instead of from below within a single hierarchy. Thus while party organizations across the country, especially at the city and county level, had much life left in them, their role in actively recruiting and training congressmen would decline.

Moreover, a continually declining number of congressmen were to remain “small” figures relative to a party organization encompassing in scope a region larger than their own districts. Instead, though often the product of
smaller and weaker local organizations, once they reached the congressional level, they would have to develop and exercise new political skills to form and manage from above their own ad hoc organizational coalitions of support. Far more than the previous requirements of reliability, compliance, and patience were required for such a task. New, more informal and fluid relations of authority in district party politics surely produced congressmen with a new sense of their political identity, expectations about their roles, and dispositions toward hierarchical authority. Now more accustomed to dealing with, appeasing, reciprocating, and controlling diverse and divided organizational authorities from a position of external independence, the new congressmen had to be able to function happily in a relatively more unpredictable environment, and to develop more refined skills of persuasion and self-assertion to advance in their electoral careers.

The breakdown and dispersion of central authority, and the expansion and increased autonomy accorded the system of standing committees in the House developed in tempo with the parallel development in parties at the local level. Strong authority remained in the hands of committee chairmen but, as mentioned before, these authorities were more numerous, less distant, and more accessible to the give-and-take of bargaining within a smaller unit. House members once “bucked and gagged” and thrown “voiceless and helpless at the Speaker’s feet” (Atkinson, 1911, p. 88) had untied their own bonds and begun speaking out with increasing autonomy as independent legislators who could take a more direct and active hand in the writing of legislation, forming of coalitions, and managing of the entire legislative process.

While the socialization and selection of authority orientations and political skills changed with the dismantling of party machines, so did the structure of incentives operating on the behavior and demands of incumbent congressmen seeking reelection. In conjunction with the direct primary, which took almost complete hold from about 1903 to 1912, local and state municipal and civil service reforms gradually reduced the flow of resources and control over political offices in the hands of party organizations: no longer could the party act as a protective fraternity for professional partisans or as an immense employment agency for defeated congressmen.

Furthermore, the occupational structure and patterns of mobility in elite occupations were also undergoing radical change at this time. If one can picture elite society of the 19th century as a set of intersecting and intertwining conveyor belts, across which a rising politician, industrialist, lawyer, banker, journalist, or educator could step from one to another without losing forward momentum, then in the 20th century these conveyor belts gradually disentwined and separated, isolating professionals in each of their respective lines of politics, business, education, and journalism. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “sturdy lad” who “tries all the professions, who teams it, farms it, peddles, keeps a
Recruitment and Structure

school, preaches, edits a newspaper, goes to Congress, buys a township, and so forth, in successive years, and always like a cat falls on his feet” was quickly becoming an anachronism (quoted in Bledstein, 1976, pp. 225-226). (A quick comparison of biographies of 19th and 20th century congressmen in the Congressional Directory will confirm this impression.) These changes in the occupational structure occurred for many reasons, among them the “administrative revolution” which produced the large corporation as a dominant organizational form emerging between 1890 and 1910, and professionalization and bureaucratization in fields ranging from the military, medicine, law, education, and even labor. In the words of Samuel Hays (1972, pp. 12-14), “the new organizational society” developing between the 1890s and 1929 displayed a marked vertical order, a hierarchy of domination and subordination.” According to sociologist T.H. Marshall (1939, p. 339) professionalization of occupational life meant that “mobility between generations is increased, but mobility during the working life of one generation is diminished.”

Both of these changes—the breakdown of large party organizations and the change in the occupational structure—meant that while congressional candidates were making greater and greater investments of psychic energy and independent initiative (if not personal financial resources) in order to get nominated and elected, the costs of failure to get reelected increased simultaneously. Less expected career security after electoral loss probably meant greater attention to reelection than in the past, and it is argued here, more attention to obtaining resources from the institution that could aid in the reelection process.

Thus the 20th century congressman, lacking easy mobility within as well as outside of politics, at the mercy of a relatively unpredictable electorate in direct primary elections, sought to turn the occupation of congressman into a protected profession. Thus we see after the 1920s increasing evidence of behavior and arrangements in the House that have been called “legislative professionalism” (Price, 1975). Where once congressmen were usually career politicians, they were by the 1930s becoming career legislators, or more precisely, professional congressmen. The length of congressional careers continued to increase even more rapidly than in the period of strong party machinery (Polsby, 1968) since the increasingly rigid occupational structure probably led to declining voluntary retirement from congressional seats, and in part, since increasing care was being paid to the creation of tangible and intangible campaign resources for more reliable reelection. Through the implementation of the “seniority rule” or “seniority system,” which did not take permanent hold until the 1930s and 1940s, a returning congressman was given the security of knowing that reelection would be worth the trouble; through the expansion of powerful “exclusive” committees, there would be more institutional roles and resources to go around, and thus more currency for ad hoc
individual and bloc-organized bargaining and logrolling in the effort to produce results for reelection campaigns. Finally, since the authority of steering committees, party caucuses, and the Speaker were reduced, members could not be forced to acquiesce and commit themselves to acts that would be detrimental to their reelection.

Summing up, as historian George Rothwell Brown (1922, p. 246) argued, the abandonment of party government and loyalty in the House followed as a direct result of the direct primary and other electoral reforms, which meant that now each member “paddles his own political canoe.” Freed from subordination under large party organizations, congressmen sought a less stifling authoritarian environment, with fewer of the indignities associated with serving oneself by serving the Speaker and his lieutenants first. An expanding and developing committee system, autonomous from centralized party authority, called into use skills of political persuasion and independent initiative in forming ad hoc organizational coalitions from smaller local party organizations. The newer congressional recruits demanded a dispersion of authority among a large number of functionally differentiated and non-overlapping units to divide up the resources as well as allow for increased flexibility for individual parliamentary maneuver, and possibly for more mobility within the institution. Finally, the seniority system, plus application of other “universalistic” decision rules for dividing institutional resources, provided a secure flow of benefits independent of abject submission and loyalty to other representatives to make up for an incentive structure involving an increasingly insecure electoral base and rising costs of electoral failure.

In the previous two sections I have shown how changes in patterns of recruitment, especially associated with the ascendance and decline of party machines, can explain the simultaneous long-term trends in the evolution of the House. In the following, an examination of the parliamentary battle that inaugurated the gradual trend away from the authoritarian House toward its modern form will show that analysis of the differential recruitment patterns faced by members of a single Congress can also shed light on the reasons for institutional change, and in this case, support the longitudinal argument presented above.

The Revolt Against Cannon: March, 1910

The removal of the Speaker from the Committee on Rules and the election of its expanded membership by party caucus marked the beginning of the end of autocratic party rule in the House. Forty-one “insurgent” Republicans voted with 151 Democrats against 156 Republican stalwarts, thus inaugurating the 20th century trend toward decentralization and “professionalization” of the House. Many accounts of the event, in particular Kenneth
Hechler's study (1940, pp. 11-26) of "the Insurgency," choose to interpret it as a factional dispute—between Midwestern proto-Progressives and the stalwart Republicans, whose Speaker, "Uncle Joe" Cannon, had so successfully thwarted attempts at reducing the tariff, regulating the railroads, and other reforms in the interest of the agrarian Midwest. Clearly, this was a motivating factor. But an analysis of the 43 insurgents and comparison with the 156 stalwarts suggest that there was more to it than that.

First, the Midwest was the region earliest and hardest hit by Progressive and municipal reform movements at the turn of the century. For example, Wisconsin led the way with municipal reform and then with the LaFollette Progressives' takeover of Wisconsin state politics (Thelen, 1972) and sent 7 of the 22 most implacable insurgents to the 61st Congress. By 1911, 49 cities and towns in the Midwest had adopted the Commission Plan of city government compared to only 11 in the North and East, excluding 18 cities in Illinois that had adopted the plan (Woodruff, 1911, pp. 289-294). Indeed, the Midwest had long been the soft underbelly of Republican machine control outside the South. The Grange, Farmer's Alliance, Third Party, Greenback, Populist, and finally Progressive movements from the 1870s on constantly threatened mainstream Republicanism and machine control where it took hold in the Midwest (Nye, 1959). This long tradition of popular mobilization and radicalism facilitated disparate efforts to sabotage the local base of the machine before the direct primary, and to completely destroy it afterwards.

One possible and perhaps likely effect of the changing fortunes of party machines in and outside the Midwest is a change in pre-congressional political backgrounds over time. Figure 2 offers evidence of just such a relationship: in at least two states, the extent of Republican congressmen's pre-congressional political backgrounds rose and fell respectively during the periods of development and breakdown of political machines. One plausible reason for this would be the nature of statewide party organizations and machine recruitment: politicians would move from job to job in the process of being "tested" for reliability, and this was made possible by a relatively well-integrated network of party leaders at different levels of state politics. The absence of a similarly marked trend in Wisconsin, as compared to Connecticut and Michigan, squares well with the observation that the latter two experienced less Populist and Progressive opposition to machine domination during the period between 1880 and 1910.

A look at the pre-congressional political careers of the 1910 insurgents and their Republican opponents also produces some interesting results. In particular, anti-Cannonism, or the desire to change the authoritative structure in the House bears a distinct relationship to previous political experience, and thus by reasoned assumption, to recruitment experiences in and outside of the local political machine. Figure 3 shows that Republican stalwarts had on average
filled more official (elective or appointive) and partisan posts in their pre-congressional careers than insurgents. Especially worth noting is the fact that this relationship appears as strong, if not stronger, outside the Midwest, i.e., in Northern and Eastern states where “occasional” insurgents showed less experience than stalwarts, but more than the regular insurgents. (There were, however, only two regular insurgents from this region; the other insurgents did not as a rule vote in line with the Midwesterners.) Thus, the fact that insurgency was associated with pre-congressional political backgrounds even when the regional factor is, so to speak, controlled for, indicates that the marked regional nature of the struggle against authoritarianism in the House may have concealed other factors.
For this reason it is probably unjust to call those "regular" Republicans who made a "wild scramble... to line up with the insurgents" on the last roll call for the rules change "opportunist" as Hechler (1940, p. 72) does in his interpretation of the parliamentary battle. These "occasional" insurgents, as I have called them, were probably in part the product of changing recruitment conditions—just like the 20 regular Midwestern insurgents.11

In conclusion, Hechler's claim that the battle against Cannon was above all a regional one deserves qualification. As Hechler himself wrote (1940, p. 30) about Cannon, "'Uncle Joe' nursed along the members of Congress as carefully as a precinct boss would take care of the voters in his district, and employed strikingly similar methods." The reaction against
Cannon would develop as a new breed of congressman began to chafe at the subjectively perceived indignities and the material electoral disadvantages associated with this kind of machine leadership. In short, the revolt was not simply the result of a successful coalition of Democrats with an ideologically alienated wing of the Republican party intending to break Cannon’s hold over House proceedings and therefore the content of legislation. The causes probably went deeper than that: a plausible interpretation, supported by the data and complemented by the earlier longitudinal argument, is that the revolt prefigured the ultimate demise of partisan centralism, and that the Republican insurgents acted as the tip of the wedge of increasing numbers of similarly recruited congressmen who would over time destroy the old order. If this is correct, the 1910 insurgents, or a large proportion of them, were the first of the professional congressmen.

Conclusion: Recruitment and the Institutionalization Issue

Between 1870 and 1940, the House underwent profound alterations in its internal hierarchical structure, in the character of its structural units, and in the manner in which resources were distributed to its members. In the first half of this period, increasing authority was concentrated in the hands of the Speaker under both Republican and Democratic majorities; after 1910, this authority was gradually dispersed, and the institution was adapted to the political skills, attitudes toward authority, and electoral needs of a newly emerging breed of independent, professional legislators.

It would be wrong, or at least misleading, to see the evolution of the House during this period as a unilinear one, as is suggested in studies by Polsby (1968) and Price (1971, 1975) on the “institutionalization” and “professionalization” of the House. For example, one of the indicators of modernization mentioned by both Polsby and Price is the use of the seniority rule to distribute committee seats and chairs, Polsby, et al. (1969) show in their study quite clearly that between 1883 and 1963 seniority was used with increasing frequency as a decision rule to distribute positions, but Polsby fails to emphasize elsewhere in his study of institutionalization (1968) that seniority in the first period was an integral part of an order entirely different from its successor. In fact, changes in the way it was used as a decision rule speaks of a clear discontinuity in the development of the institution and not of a unilinear development. Seniority was not applied systematically or mechanically to promote congressmen within committees until the 1930s and 1940s; before that it was used with more and then less discretion by party leaders just as party leaders in the states and localities would try to use it as a general rule for loyal and reliable subordinates.
Another supposed indicator of the unilinear professionalization and institutionalization of the House is the length of House careers (Polsby, 1968; Price, 1971). As I argued earlier, the trend toward lengthy careers coincided closely with the growth and consolidation of party organizations and with increasing centralization in the House, and then increased rapidly thereafter, but for entirely different reasons. In the first period, party consolidation led to the recruitment of more regular organizational careerists without independent followings who could often get elected with more certainty than their more independent predecessors. In the following period, the length of congressional careers increased due to two factors: a disentwining of political and other careers due to changes in the occupational structure, and a further disentwining of strictly political careers due to Progressive reforms and the breakdown of party organizations. Professional politicians were replaced by professional legislators who would attend more carefully to getting reelected, and who would thereby alter the institution so as to provide the political resources to make that task easier, and to reduce the risks of a political career.

Unless one accepts this interpretation of events, then the familiar argument that the increasing “careerism” of congressmen up to 1910 partly explains the revolt against Cannon and his regime does not stand up to the evidence (e.g., Polsby, et al., 1969). Brady (1973, p. 186), for example, argues that “the most obvious explanation for the transition from a centralized to a decentralized structure seems to have been the increasing number of safe seats in the House,” and thus longer careers. But if the increasing careerism of the two periods is regarded as a single undifferentiated phenomenon, then careerists were at least in one important case the most loyal to the old order—not, as some would suggest, the ones most impatient with centralization. Of the 197 Republicans voting in 1910 on the rules change, the stalwarts had already served an average 4.5 terms (nine years) in the House, while the insurgents had served only 2.9 terms. If one regards the insurgents as the first of the new careerists—the professional legislators—then the careerism argument would still hold true. Although the insurgents’ tenures had been shorter than those of the loyal Cannonists, they were less likely to put up with the indignities and uncertainties associated with Cannon’s authoritative discretion (and indiscrétion) that the latter could tolerate and even thrive under. The new congressmen were professional legislators, not highly mobile, compliant, and professional party men who happened to be at the same time serving longer and longer terms as their organizational bases in their respective states became stronger.

This interpretation of legislative careerism in the 19th and 20th centuries also conflicts with Polsby’s argument (1968) that increasing professionalization and institutional complexity gave congressmen greater incentive to stay in the institution, and that these phenomena explain the striking
increases in long congressional careers. Instead, the recruitment argument would suggest that the increasing desire and need to stay in the institution led to demands for institutional changes that could make longer careers both desirable and possible. Polsby argues, too, that the consequences of the various elements of institutionalization in the House have been a dispersion and fragmentation of authority. Instead, the argument should be inverted: increased complexity of the House role structure, increased legislative resources, use of universalistic rules for distributing positions and resources, and coordination of the institution without punitive sanctions were in part means to eliminate the old-fashioned style of authority relations which the new congressmen found distasteful and less congenial to their career needs. The recruitment-conditioned demand for and choice of decentralized control were the cause of Polsby's indicators of institutionalization; institutionalization was not the "cause" of decentralized and fragmented authority.

Finally, contrary to Polsby's argument—adopted by Brady and Althoff (1974, p. 775)—the increased workload of Congress in the 20th century was not something thrust upon its membership, forcing congressmen to resort to a highly differentiated structure of institutional forms. The argument advanced here is that 20th century congressmen, because of the conditions of recruitment they faced, and therefore their unique character, chose to enlarge their own agenda and further develop the institution in order to divide power. Legislatures elsewhere in the world did not choose the same course, but handed most tasks over to the cabinet and bureaucracy. In the House, expanding resources for the exercise of influence over a voluntarily expanded agenda were complemented by individual expertise developed within a highly differentiated and active internal committee structure. Securing individual control with individual expertise and committee resources was one means, among several, of breaking down the earlier form of centralized control. Furthermore, "professionalized" positions, independent influence, and protected legislative resources helped congressmen secure greater prestige and material results for the purpose of renewing their support for renomination and reelection.

In conclusion, changing recruitment processes and conditions experienced by congressmen over half a century in advancing their political careers provides a source of explanations for institutional change in the House, explanations which are more convincing than those advanced by recent theories. The structure of legislative institutions is in part the result of choices and demands of the institution's members who are in turn the product of their recruitment and socialization.

Peter Swenson is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.
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1. According to Price (1975), the electoral realignment of the 1890s led to a relative permanence of partisan (Republican) control of the House, and obviated the need for a new "scramble for leadership" at each change, wherein contending candidates for the Speakership bartered promises of committee seats and chairmanships in exchange for votes. "In summary," Price writes (1971, p. 24), "the nineteenth-century pattern of flexibility reflected both the lack of continuity of structure within the House (resulting from frequent alternation of party and movement of party leaders to the Senate). A change in the latter factor permitted a unique centralization of power under Reed and Cannon, but the situation was not as stable as it looked."

2. See also Sisson (1973, pp. 29-30).

3. Davidson and Oleszek (1976) seem to discover this quite clearly in their analysis of the primacy of "consolidative" problems over "adaptive" problems as determinants of the structural form of successful institutional reforms in the House in the 1970s.

4. See Keller's study of this period (1977, pp. 238-287).

5. Price (1971, pp. 24-25) writes, "The Democrats had never accepted the idea of a presiding 'czar' (indeed, they had even opposed the Reed rules)." Price fails to mention that the Democrats under Crisp actually used Reed's rules and techniques in mostly unadulterated form (see Ripley, 1967, pp. 18-19).

6. The last "uncompensated" violations of seniority took place in the 1940s; the last "compensated violation" in the early 1950s. Before that, even in the days of Reed, Crisp, Henderson, and Cannon, seniority operated as a norm for loyal and regular partisans, as no doubt it would in a strong and secure party machine in the state or district. Most of those discriminated against in Cannon's time were "insurgents"—indicating that Cannon used the seniority rule in a purposive way (see Jones, 1968).

7. Previous political background is probably not a good direct measure of state party strength, and even less a reliable basis for comparison of state parties. At this point, the best one can do is posit a relationship, and show that the relationship seems to square with observed voting for and against Cannon. Therefore, this analysis should not be interpreted as an attempted proof of the larger argument. A better indicator of party strength in the states would be the average number of ballots required in congressional or state senatorial nominating conventions. According to the discussion earlier, the fewer the ballots, the more secure the party's hold over the nominating process.

8. The data is from the Congressional Directory for the 61st Congress, and was collected for all Republicans voting either yea or nay on March 19, 1910 on the resolution (61st Cong., 2d sess., 1910:3436). All political and partisan offices or functions were counted (local and state offices only). Each separate elective or appointive office was counted once, regardless of length of tenure. Typical elective or appointive offices were county prosecuting attorney, mayor, city councilor or the equivalent, state legislator, state senator, postmaster, state tax commissioner, superintendent of schools, etc. Service as speaker or president of a state legislature was also counted once. Party activity of any sort mentioned was counted once each time the post or function was mentioned. For example, each time a congressman served as a delegate to national party conventions or as a presidential elector was counted once. The same went for service as chairman of a party convention, chairman or member of party convention credentials committees, or member or officer in state or local party committees, etc.
9. The 24 regular or reliable insurgents were Norris, Nelson, Madison, Murdock, Poindexter, Lindbergh, Haugen, Cooper, Gardner, Lenroot, Morse, Woods, Hubbard, Kopp, Gronna, Davidson, Volstead, Cary, Kinkaid, Hinshaw, Kendall, Hayes, Davis, and Fowler, as determined by Joseph Cooper from House votes in *Congressional Record*, 61st Cong., 1st sess., 1909:33, 61; and 61st Cong. 2d sess., 1910:3428, 3436 (Cooper, 1960, footnote 2). The 19 “occasional” insurgents were all those Republicans who voted for the rules change, but who were not included in this list.

10. The Northern and Eastern states were Michigan, Ohio, Vermont, New York, Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Maine, West Virginia, New Hampshire, Delaware, Connecticut, Maryland, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. The Midwestern states were Wisconsin, North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Kansas, and South Dakota.

11. The other four regulars were from New Jersey, Massachusetts, California, and Washington.

12. Price, in one place (1975, pp. 17-18) asserts that the insurgency had nothing to do with careerism, and points out correctly that the 1910 revolt did not touch Cannon’s power to name committees (except for Rules); however, he indicates elsewhere (1977, p. 60, Figure 1-4) that increasing careerism leading to resentment and a desire for seniority were in part responsible for the revolt of 1910 and other procedural reforms.

13. This relationship also holds true outside and inside the Midwest. Surprisingly, though, reliable insurgents tended to have longer tenures than “occasionals”; this may have had something to do with the degree of electoral security that reliables had already achieved, and therefore their ability to challenge Cannon with impunity.

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