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Acknowledgements

I have been intermittently obsessing over the issues covered in this book since my second year of graduate school. (In fact, though I haven’t checked this, I suspect that I composed some of the sentences in this book over 20 years ago, as bits of my grad school papers were incorporated into my dissertation, then into early papers, and now into this book.) During that long time, I have greatly benefited from many discussions – in person, by e-mail, sometimes on-line at philosophical weblogs, and even occasionally by old-fashioned mail – with many excellent philosophers. I know I am forgetting many, but I thank all those who have helped me with these ideas, including the following people, whose kind help I do recall right now: Bob Adams, Kent Bach, Matt Benton, Michael Bergmann, Paul Boghossian, David Braun, Jessica Brown, Tony Brueckner, Stewart Cohen, Earl Conee, Troy Cross, Rachel DeRose, Keith Donnellan, Delia Graff Fara, Richard Feldman, Graeme Forbes, Alvin Goldman, Richard Grady, John Greco, John Hawthorne, Richard Heck, Chris Hitchcock, Thomas Hofweber, Larry Horn, Michael Huemer, Ernie Lepore, David Lewis, Peter Ludlow, Bill Lycan, John MacFarlane, Michael McGlone, Matt McGrath, Ruth Millikan, Jennifer Nagel, Ram Neta, Michael Nelson, Duncan Pritchard, Patrick Rysiew, Jonathan Schaffer, Stephen Schiffer, Ernie Sosa, Robert Stalnaker, Steve Stich, Zoltan Szabo, Ted Warfield, Brian Weatherson, and Timothy Williamson.

I also thank the audiences at and the organizers of the following events where I gave talks in which I floated some of the ideas that appear here: the 1997 International Colloquium on Cognitive Science in San Sebastian, Spain; the 20th World Congress of Philosophy in Boston, Massachusetts; the Fifth Annual Franklin & Marshall College Symposium in Metaphysics and Epistemology; the 1999 Spindel Conference at the University of Memphis; the 2002 Rocky Mountain Student Philosophy Conference at the University of Colorado at Boulder; the 2002 "Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond" conference at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst; the 2003 University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Colloquium; the 2004 conference on "Epistemological Contextualism" at the University of Stirling; the 2005 Rutgers Epistemology Conference; and colloquia for the philosophy departments at Tulane University; Temple University; University of Connecticut, Storrs; University of California, Los Angeles; C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center; Fordham University; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; University of Virginia, Charlottesville; Rice University; Syracuse University; Yale University; Rutgers University; University of Vermont; University of
Notre Dame; New York University; Brown University; University of Miami; Cornell University;
Saint Louis University; and University at Buffalo—SUNY.

I owe special thanks to a few philosophers who have helped me the most. My first job after receiving my PhD was as an assistant professor at the philosophy department at New York University. Happily for me, the environment there was a great and supportive one for doing good philosophical writing, and my philosophical education continued during the three formative years I spent there. This was largely due to my extremely helpful colleagues, John Carroll and Roy Sorensen, who were two of my main teachers during that time. In more recent years, I have profited much from many discussions, and even more e-mail exchanges, with Jon Kvanvig and Jason Stanley.

My greatest philosophical debts are to Rogers Albritton and Peter Unger. It was in discussions with my teacher and dissertation advisor at UCLA, Rogers Albritton, that my thinking on the topics of this book began and began to take shape. I was very fortunate to be among the many philosophers to benefit so much from long discussions with the Socrates of our age. Perhaps my greatest thanks are due to my friend, Peter Unger, for his important writings on knowledge and skepticism, from which I learned much; for three years of almost daily philosophical discussions, many of which were on the topics of this book, and almost all of which were enjoyable and enlightening; and for his many comments on various drafts of early papers of mine on these topics. There is a lot of material in here that would or will be very new to Peter and my other old NYU colleagues, John and Roy, and even more in here that would be new to Prof. Albritton, were he still alive to read it; my thinking on these matters has come a long way since I worked with them. But it would not have gotten anywhere close to where it is were it not for the jump-start their help gave me early in philosophical career.

Material from the following papers of mine has been incorporated into this book:


