Different types of theodicies (section II, pp. 151.5-152)

- Plantinga’s distinction of “theodicy”: the attempt to solve the problem of evil by specifying what God’s reason for causing/allowing evils actually is vs. “defense”: attempts to solve the (logical form of) the problem of evil by showing that that there is no inconsistency between the existence of an OOPG God and evil by specifying some reason for allowing evils that an OOPG God logically might have had (Lewis, p. 151.6 and following) [in both cases, these terms can be applied either to the abstract form of the problem of evil, or to various concrete forms]

- Lewis (152.7) thinks Plantinga misses the best option: “tentative, even speculative theodicy” (using “theodicy” more broadly, and more normally, that Plantinga

A defense (building on Lewis’s remarks) of the role of “speculative theodicy” in providing relief from the toughest forms (evidential forms, focused on the most horrific suffering) of the problem of evil.

“Significant freedom”: section III (pp. 153-155) of Lewis

- Lewis uses the phrase to mean “freedom in choices that matter” (153.2), and by this he seems to mean choices in which one option is very good/beneficial and/or the other is very bad/harmful
- but in the same spirit, we can also mean: choices where it isn’t easy to do the right thing
- Is freedom worth all the pain? Lewis’s “God’s answer to a prayer from the Gulag,” pp. 154-5

Section IV (p. 155-158): The value of incompatibilist freedom

- the compatibilist objection
- Plantinga’s attempted terminological reply (156.5); his “unfettered” maneuver.
- Lewis replies: “But of course the issue is one of value, not terminology” (156.6).
- Let’s go back to the 1980s, and see how this plays out...
From Alvin Plantinga (D. Reidel, 1985), first Robert Adams (pp. 227-8):

Plantinga discusses two objections to the Free Will Defense as a solution to the abstract logical problem of evil. One is the compatibilist objection. As Plantinga observes, "some philosophers say that causal determinism and freedom ... are not really incompatible" ([8], p. 31). Their claim involves an analysis of the notion of freedom according to which I perform an action freely if I do it because I choose to, even if my choosing to perform it was causally determined. At least one compatibilist, Antony Flew, has argued that if freedom really is compatible with causal determinism, then the Free Will Defense collapses because God could have had free creatures even if He caused them never to do anything wrong ([2], quoted in [7], p. 133). Plantinga regards compatibilism as "utterly implausible" ([8], p. 32). But he does not leave the Free Will Defense entirely dependent on the correctness of his judgment on this point. His innermost defense against the compatibilist objection is simply to stipulate that 'free,' 'freedom,' and 'freely' are being used in an incompatibilist sense in the Free Will Defense.

The free will defender can simply make Flew a present of the word 'freedom' and state his case using other locutions. He might now hold, for example, ... that God made men such that some of their actions are unfettered (both free in Flew's sense and also causally undetermined) ... By substituting 'unfettered' for 'free' throughout his account, the free will defender can elude Flew's objection altogether ([7], p. 135).

Since this can be done at any time, it need not be done; and Plantinga continues to use 'free' in the incompatibilist sense, having left instructions for compatibilists on how to replace 'free' with 'unfettered.' "So whether Flew is right or wrong about the ordinary sense of 'freedom' is of no consequence; his objection is in an important sense merely verbal and thus altogether fails to damage the free will defense" ([7], p. 135).

Plantinga cannot be denied the right to use 'free' in a stipulated, incompatibilist sense; but there is another issue to be explored before the compatibilist objection to the Free Will Defense can be laid to rest. The Free Will Defense depends crucially on the ethical assumption that free will, at least when used virtuously, is a great good and worth sacrificing for. Few will reject this assumption if it is agreed that 'free' is being used in its ordinary sense. But suppose the ordinary sense of 'free' were a compatibilist sense; what reason would we have to maintain, as Plantinga acknowledges the free will defender must, "that a world in which men perform both good and evil unfettered actions is superior to one in which they perform only good, but fettered, actions" ([7], p. 135)? If all the values of freedom in the ordinary sense can be realized in causally determined actions, why should God permit any evil in order to get actions that are causally undetermined?

Plantinga's Reply: But first I must acknowledge that, as Adams points out, my way with the compatibilist objection to the free will defense (in God and Other Minds) is too short. Some philosophers - Hume for example - hold that an action can be both free and also determined by causal laws and antecedents outside the agent's control. I defined the term 'unfettered' as 'free in the ordinary sense and not determined by causal laws and antecedent conditions outside the agent's control.' I then proposed to side-step the compatibilist objection to the Free Will Defense by replacing 'free', where it occurs in the Free Will Defense, by 'unfettered'. Adams points out quite properly that this maneuver is too quick. It presupposes both that the' property being free (in the ordinary sense) but not causally determined is possibly exemplified (that the property expressed by 'is a free action' doesn't entail the property of being a causally determined action) and that it is possible, in the broadly logical sense, that God should place great value on there being persons who are free in this sense and freely do what is right. I believe both these assumptions are obviously true; but in God and Other Minds I didn't so much as mention them. Part of the problem is that I find it hard to take compatibilism with the seriousness it no doubt warrants: surely Benson Mates, for example, is completely correct in saying "In order for the act to be free, in the relevant sense, he [the actor] must have done it of his own free will ... Thus, for the agent's act to be free, it does not suffice that it results from his own choice; for if he did not choose freely, then the chosen course of action cannot be considered free either."

Nevertheless, my way with compatibilism was too short.