Introduction

-Kant’s Big Question: “How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?” (55.3)
-This is important to metaphysics (46.3), the fate of which Kant is concerned about in his Preface (starting at 21.1) as well as here in the Intro (46.3), where we see Kant’s interest in “God, freedom, and immortality”; and is a problem from Hume (55.5). With regard to the middle item (freedom), that ‘Everything which happens has its cause’ (50.7) is threatening
-The a priori/a posteriori distinction (41-45)
- Necessity and universality as marks of the a priori: 43.8-44.6
-The analytic/synthetic distinction (48-51)
-Kant and Hume (55, and see Hume, below): How does Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction match up with Hume’s relation of ideas/matter of fact distinction? The case of mathematics (starting at 52). Does Kant have an answer to Hume’s argument in section IV of the Inquiry? Here’s Hume, from the second paragraph of that section: “The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise.”
-Kant’s Big Answer (in brief): Synthetic a priori knowledge of the empirical world is possible, because certain synthetic propositions must be true of any empirical world by virtue of the necessary conditions for any possible experience. Huh?

Preface (to the B edition)

-Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” (esp. 22-23, see also 25n): “Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means on concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.” (22.3)
-“We can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them” (23.3). This includes propositions about space and time (27.3), and causality (28.0-3).
-But this limits us to knowledge only of appearances, leaving the things in themselves behind (24): the Phenomena/Noumena distinction
-Does Kant mean to be denying that things in themselves have the spatial, temporal, and causal properties we experience them as having, or merely to be agnostic about whether they have those properties? Difficult question, but looking ahead, there are at least hints of the more aggressive (denying) stance at 82.6, 71.4,.6, 76.7-77.0.
-But “though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves” (27.7)
-Thus taking the object “in a twofold sense” saves the thought that we are free, because the principle of causality applies to us only as objects of experience (28): “But though I cannot know, I can yet think freedom” (28.7)
-More generally, with regard to thoughts of God and immortality, as well as of freedom (29.7), Kant says he has “found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith” (29. 8)
-Indeed, Kant presents his critical philosophy as the only antidote to a host of unsavory enemies: materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, superstition, idealism, skepticism (32.2)