1. Pre-Established Harmony between Mind & Body [A, D33, M78-81]: Why?
   --materialism inconceivable [M17—the “mill argument”]
   --interaction inconceivable [D33 (2nd sentence), A]
   --interactionism and esp. occasionalism ugly; p-eh “the most beautiful and the most worthy” way [A]

2. Idealism
   --Why simple substances are mind-like monads, not bodies [M1-14, esp. 1-3, 12-14]
   --types of monads: souls vs. “bare monads” [M19, M24 and between; D34-35]: souls have distinct perceptions accompanied by memory, bare monads in a state of “stupor”

3. Status of Bodies
   --“result from” monads and are “well-founded phenomena” [B, C]
   --picture
   --represent the physical universe by representing one’s own body [M62, D33]
   --real bodies, common bodies [D14 (2nd par.), G]

4. Pre-Established Harmony among Monads [D13-14, M56-57]
   --Why? In M1-11 (esp. 1, 7, 11), it seems to be concluded from their simplicity
   --Why?: From PCP, D8
   --Why? Speculation: Hard to understand minds interacting w/o going through bodies, and m/b interaction has been ruled out

5. God and the “Best of all Possible Worlds” – “most perfect world” [D-F, D6 (esp. last par.)]
   --Since God is perfect, this is the best of all possible worlds [D1-3]
   --In what ways best?
      --metaphysical perfection and moral perfection [E]
      --happiness of minds [D5:end of 2nd par.]
      --world “at the same time simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena” [D6: last par.; cf. D]
   --Really?!! [D3:1st par., D5:1st par., F]

6. Freedom & Necessity
   --Leibniz’s Compatibilism: Why too much freedom jeopardizes pre-established harmony [D13, 1st. par.: “Everyone grants…”]
   --Leibniz’s account of freedom as consisting in:
      1. Intelligence: understanding your options
      2. Spontaneity: the source of the action comes from within the agent, who is not influenced by another creature [D30:3rd sent]
      3. Contingency: Your course of action is not absolutely necessary (necessary in itself), though it can be hypothetically necessary. (Hypothetical upon what?) Other courses of action are possible (in what sense?) in themselves: D13:4th par.]
7. Super-Essentialism?
   --“otherwise it would not be this man” [D30: 3rd par.] suggests some strong form of essentialism
   --some passages suggest that not all properties are essential: G, H
   --an attractive reading: Perceptual Essentialism: Each monad’s complete history of perceptions is essential to it.

8. Skepticism about whether bodies are Real: L relies on God’s goodness [H, toward end], but his reply to the problem of evil [D3:1st par., F] causes trouble here.