1. What is dogmatism?: Broad vs. Narrow


-We’ll use “narrow dogmatist” to denote someone who gives Pryor’s answer to the question: “How do we know that radical skeptical hypotheses are false – e.g., how do you know that you’re not a BIV?”, which answer seems to be: via a simple inference from our perceptual beliefs about the external world. Here is an array of positions one might take on whether, and, if so, how, we know that we’re not BIVs:

![Diagram](image.png)

(Narrow) dogmatism is there on the bottom, right portion of the chart, right next to my position, on which we know ~BIV a priori. We may have occasion to talk of these options later. For now, if you’re really interested, see Chapter 7 of *The Appearance of Ignorance*.

-Now on to broad dogmatism, which doesn’t go by one’s answer to the particular, odd question of how we know that radical skeptical hypotheses are false. We can start with Siegal’s characterization at p. 208t of our Reading 11:

“Dogmatism is called ‘dogmatism’ because of the response to skepticism that it recommends. It consists of two main claims. First, absent defeaters, having a perceptual experience with content p suffices to give you justification for believing p. Second, when a subject S’s experience justifies believing p, the justification is immediate”

-but we need to specify the nature of some of the p’s: perceptual beliefs about the external world

-and we need to specify some of the things that don’t count as successful defeaters: skeptical hypotheses, in normal circumstances
-I think Siegel may be worried mostly about evidentialist skeptics (like Berkeley), in which case, dogmatism’s claim that the justification for our perceptual beliefs is immediate cuts off the evidentialist skeptical argument. But once we start worrying about skeptics who use arguments from skeptical hypotheses, the dogmatist also needs that immediate justification not to be killed via a defeating skeptical hypothesis

2. Siegel’s “attack on [broad] dogmatism”: “This paper addresses these questions by concentrating on a simple and popular theory of perceptual justification known as dogmatism. I will argue that there are cases in which dogmatism predicts that a cognitively penetrated visual experience can elevate the subject from an epistemically bad situation to an epistemically better one, yet in which it is implausible to suppose that such epistemic elevation takes place” p. 202.8

-warm-up: gossip circle, p. 202.5


Next time... more Siegel, on to readings 12 and 13