


**When Politicians Cede Control of Resources:
Land, Chiefs and Coalition-Building in Africa
On-line Supplement**

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I. Map Displaying Power of Traditional Leaders over Land by Sub-National Region

The figure below (omitted from the main manuscript for reasons of space) indicates the percentage of respondents in different regions of the Afrobarometer countries that said traditional chiefs, rather than the national or local government, had primary responsibility for administering land in their community.



II. Effects of Traditional Leaders' Support by Ethnic Alignment: Evidence from Zambia

Table 1 provides evidence supporting the manuscript's claim that individuals who are ethnically aligned with major political parties are less influenced by their traditional chiefs than individuals who are ethnically unaligned, drawing on evidence from Zambia. The models in table 1 examine the effect of chiefs' relationships to parliamentary candidates on electoral support for these candidates in the 2006 Zambian parliamentary elections. Three major parties competed in the 2006 elections in Zambia: the governing MMD, whose candidate - Levy Mwanawasa - was from a tiny ethnic group and did not have a clear group of coethnics, the UPND, whose candidate - Hakainde Hichilema - was a Tonga speaker, and the PF, whose candidate - Michael Sata - was a Bemba speaker. The models test whether the effect of chiefs' relationships to parliamentary candidates was larger in chiefdoms where voters were not co-ethnics of the UPND or the PF leaders using a chiefdom-level data set that includes all of the chiefdoms in Zambia's Eastern, Luapula and Southern provinces (There are multiple chiefdoms per parliamentary constituency).

The models are OLS models in which the dependent variable is the proportion of votes for the incumbent candidate in each chiefdom. In cases where the incumbent candidate did not run for office again, the dependent variable is equal to the proportion of votes for his or her successor as the local incumbent party's candidate. This measure was constructed by matching polling district maps with chiefdom boundaries, and then aggregating polling district results to the chiefdom level. The independent variable of interest in these models is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the incumbent party's candidate had a stronger relationship to the chief than the candidate from the other major party in the area. This information was collected as part of a survey of chiefs administered in 2007. The models also include controls for the incumbent party's vote share in 2001, whether the incumbent candidate was running, which party was the local incumbent party, the number of candidates for the parliamentary seat, and whether the incumbent and opposition party candidates were from the chiefdom.

Table 1. Effect of Chief's Support by Ethnic Alignment

	Not ethnically aligned	Ethnically aligned
Effect of Chief's Support	.079 (.042)	.036 (.053)
N	52	34
Table displays coefficients from OLS models with standard errors in parentheses.		

The first model shows the effect of chiefs' relationships to MPs in chiefdoms that did not have clear ethnic cues in the election (i.e. places where neither Bemba speakers nor Tonga speakers made up a majority of the population). Across places where voters were *not* ethnically aligned with a major political party, the candidate with the closer relationship with the chief received

an average of 8 percentage points more votes, an effect size that is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The second model shows the effect of chiefs' relationships to MPs in chiefdoms that had a clear ethnic alignment (i.e. either Bemba speakers or Tonga speakers made up a majority of the population). In these locations, the candidate preferred by the chief received an average of just 3.6 percentage points more votes, an effect size that is not statistically significant. Thus, the electoral effects of chief's relationships with candidates is more than twice as large in communities without clear ethnic alignments.

III. Robustness Test 1: Results without Lesotho

Lesotho is the only country in the analysis that is ethnically homogenous. All of the other countries contain multiple ethnic groups competing for power, but in Lesotho, virtually the entire population identifies as Basotho. Politics is not divided along ethnic cleavages, and thus the multi-ethnic coalition-building theory should have limited relevance.

Table 2. Results without Lesotho

	Results without Lesotho
Country Predictors	
British Colony	.133 (.083)
Area (log)	-.073 (.044)
Non-Compactness	-.132 (.121)
Sub-National Predictors	
Population Density	-.064 (.026)
Distance from Capital (log)	.018 (.010)
Quality of Land	.032 (.009)
Centralization	-.036 (.051)
Proportion Decade (or Population) without Political Alignment	-.047 (.048)
Centralization without Political Alignment	.107 (.063)
N	168
Country	17
AIC	-173.0
Table displays coefficients from multi-level models with standard errors in parentheses.	

It follows that support for the theory should be as strong (or stronger) if Lesotho is dropped from the sample, and the results in table 2 show that this is correct. The table shows that centralization has no effect when areas are ethnically aligned with major political parties, but it has a positive effect (significant at the 95 percent confidence level) when areas are non-aligned politically. Similarly, the effect of non-alignment is not statistically different from zero when groups are not centralized, but it is positive and statistically significant at the 90 percent level when groups are centralized.

IV. Robustness Test 2: Influence of Traditional Leaders on Local Governance

Table 3. Dependent Variable is Traditional Leaders' Power over Local Governance

	DV=Power Over Governance
Country Predictors	
British Colony	.037 (.071)
Area (log)	-.059 (.031)
Non-Compactness	-.037 (.082)
Sub-National Predictors	
Population Density	-.119 (.031)
Distance from Capital (log)	.020 (.011)
Quality of Land	.002 (.010)
Centralization	-.040 (.055)
Proportion Decade (or Population) without Political Alignment	-.100 (.052)
Centralization without Political Alignment	.112 (.068)
N	189
Country	19
AIC	-145.6
Table displays coefficients from multi-level models with standard errors in parentheses.	

The multi-ethnic coalition building theory outlined in the paper could in theory apply not just to the power of traditional leaders are allowed over land but to the amount of power ceded to

them more generally. To test whether the theory explains traditional leader's levels of power more generally, table 3 re-runs model 2 from the main manuscript but using the proportion of the population who said that traditional leaders had "a great deal" of influence in governing their local community as the dependent variable.

The results are mainly consistent with the expectations of the multi-ethnic coalition building theory. As expected, the centralization of ethnic groups only has a significant positive effect when these groups are not ethnically aligned with political parties. Interestingly, non-ethnic alignment has a significant negative effect on power in the cases of non-centralized groups and has a positive (but statistically insignificant) effect in the case of centralized groups.

V. Full Description of Cross-Sectional Data Set

The unit of analysis in the data set is generally the first administrative level below the country level. These subnational units were chosen mainly because they are the smallest unit at which the Afrobarometer surveys were designed to be representative. Many of the sub-national variables were constructed in ArcGIS using regional boundary maps that identified the location of each of the regions in the Afrobarometer data. Wherever possible, I used boundary maps available from Map Library (<http://www.maplibrary.org/>), but at times I needed to adjust these boundary maps in order to reflect the regional units included in the Afrobarometer survey.

Country-level Variables

British Colony: This is a dichotomous measure coded based on Englebert's measure of colonial identity.

Area (log): This is equal to the log of the area of the country (measured in decimal degrees squared).

Non-compactness: This measures the country's compactness using a measure proposed by Schwartzberg. It measures compactness as the ratio of the country's perimeter to the length of the perimeter of a circle of equal area. Specifically, this measure is calculated as $p/(2\sqrt{A\pi})$ where p is a country's perimeter and A is a country's area. The area and perimeter measures were calculated in ArcGIS.

Sub-national Variables

Chief's Power over Land: This measure was constructed from q58f of the Afrobarometer Survey (Round 4). This question asked respondents, "Who do you think actually has primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks. Is it the central government, the local government, traditional leaders, or members of your community? Allocating land." Respondents were divided into two categories - those that said that traditional leaders were primarily responsible and those who said the central or local government was primarily responsible. (In Nigeria, respondents could also answer "state government", which was included with the latter category.) Only 7 percent of respondents answered "members of the community" and these observations were dropped. The Afrobarometer data was weighted to

ensure representativeness and then aggregated at the sub-national level so that the final measure equals the number of respondents who said traditional leaders have primary responsibility for allocating land over the number of respondents who said traditional leaders or the central government or the local government (or the state government in Nigeria) have primary responsibility for allocating land.

Chief's Power in Community: This measure was constructed from q65 of the Afrobarometer, which asked respondents "How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community? None. A small amount. Some. A great deal." The variable indicates the proportion of respondents in each sub-national unit who responded "a great deal."

Population Density: This measure equals the average population density (in thousands of persons per kilometer squared) in the sub-national unit in 1990, as measured by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN).

Distance from Capital (log): This measure is equal to the logged distance of the centroid of the region from the country's capital (in tens of kilometers).

Quality of Land: This measure is based on a metric created by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and IIASA which rates the suitability of land for agriculture on a scale of 1 to 8 (plate 46 of the Agro-Ecological Zone CD-Rom). The measure indicates the average quality of the land on this 8-point scale in each sub-national unit.

Centralization: This is a binary variable indicating whether or not the largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit is "centralized", which means that it has chiefs with significant jurisdictional power above the village level. Wherever possible, this is coded based on the "jurisdictional hierarchy" score reported in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas. All ethnic groups that scored 1.5 or higher on jurisdictional hierarchy are coded as hierarchical. Where an ethnic group in the Afrobarometer data is composed of more than one group from the Murdock data, the measure reflects the average degree of hierarchy among the sub-groups. A complete list of the data sources used to code this variable is explained later in the on-line appendix.

Proportion Decade without Political Alignment: This variable indicates the proportion of years between 1998 and 2007 in which neither the president/prime minister nor the leader of the major opposition party were from the largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit. The largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit was identified by tabulating q79 of the Afrobarometer by sub-national unit. Question q79 asked respondents "What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group?" The number of years in the previous decade in which the president/prime minister or the leader of the major opposition party was from that ethnic group was coded by determining the ethnicity of the president/prime minister and the leader of the biggest opposition party. The biggest opposition party in a particular year is coded as the party of the opposition candidate that won the second most votes in the previous presidential election (or parliamentary election, in the case of parliamentary systems). This was determined using the African Election Database (<http://africanelections.tripod.com/>). In cases where no opposition candidate won more than 15 percent of the vote (in the first round), there is not considered to be a major opposition party in the country. The ethnicity of the president/prime minister and the leader of the biggest opposition party was coded from a variety of sources indicated later in the appendix.

Proportion 1980s without Political Alignment: This variable indicates the proportion of years between 1980 and 1989 in which neither the president/prime minister nor the leader of the major opposition party were from the largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit. The ethnicity of the president/prime minister and the leader of the biggest opposition party was coded from a variety of sources indicated later in the appendix.

Centralization without Political Alignment: This variable is equal to Proportion Decade without Political Alignment \times Centralization.

Centralization without Political Alignment (1980s): This variable is equal to Proportion 1980s without Political Alignment \times Centralization.

VI. Sub-National Units in Data Set

Country Name	Name of Administrative Unit	Number of Units
Benin	Department	7
Botswana	District	9
Burkina Faso	Region	13
Ghana	Region	10
Kenya	Province	8
Lesotho	District	10
Liberia	County	15
Madagascar	Province	6
Malawi	Region	3
Mali	Region	9
Mozambique	Province	11
Namibia	Region	13
Nigeria	Zone	6
Senegal	Department	11
South Africa	Province	9
Tanzania	Region	26
Uganda	Province	4
Zambia	Province	9
Zimbabwe	Province	10

VII. ETHNICITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS 1998-2007

Country	Years	Leader	Ethnicity	Party	Source	Opp Leader	Ethnicity	Party	Source
Benin	1998-2006	Kerekou	Otamari	Independent; Action Front for Renewal and Development	Wantchekon et Vermeersch 2005.	Soglo (1996, 2001)	Fon	Parti de la Renaissance du Benin	FKL
	2006-2007	Boni Yayi	Nagot (Yoruba)- Peuhl/Bariba (Coded as Nagot/Yoruba)	Independent	BBC News On- line, March 23, 2006; Martin and Seely 2007	Houngbedji (2006)	Goun	Parti de la Renaissance du Benin	Martin and Seely 2007
Botswana	1998-2004	Mogoe	Motalatoe	BDP	Nyamnjoh (2003)	Koma (1994, 1999)	Tswana/ Mongwato	BNF	Makgala 2009; personal
	2004-2007	Mogoe	Motalatoe	BDP	Nyamnjoh (2003)	Moupo (2004)	Tswana/ Mongwato	BNF	Makgala 2009; personal
Burkina Faso	1998-2005	Compaore	Mossi	Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès	FKL	Ouédraogo (1998)	*Not 15%	RDEB	
	2005-2007	Compaore	Mossi	Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès	FKL	Sankara (2005)	*Not 15%	Alternance 2005	
Ghana	1998-2000	Rawlings	Ewe	NDC	FKL	Kufuor (1996)	Akan	NPP	FKL
	2001-2007	Kufuor	Akan	NPP	FKL	Atta-Mills (2000, 2004)	Akan	NDC	FKL
Kenya	1998-2002	Moi	Kalenjin	KANU	FKL	Kibaki (1997)	Kikuyu	Democratic Party	FKL
	2003-2007	Kibaki	Kikuyu	National	FKL	Kenyetta	Kikuyu	KANU	FKL

				Rainbow Coalition		(2002)			
Lesotho	1998-2002	Mosisili	Sotho	LCD	FKL	Molapo Qhobela	Sotho	BNP	<i>Assumed</i>
	2002-2007	Mosisili	Sotho	LCD	FKL	Lekhanya	Sotho	BNP	<i>Assumed</i>
	2007	Mosisili	Sotho	LCD	FKL	Manyeli	Sotho	NIP	<i>Assumed</i>
Liberia	1998-2002	Taylor	Americo-Liberian	NPP	FKL	Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson	Kru/Gola	UP	YOU
	2002-2003	Blah	Gio	-	EIU	NA	-		
	2003-2006	Bryant	Grebo	-	EIU	NA	-		
	2006-2007	Sirleaf-Johnson	Kru/Gola	UP	YOU	Weah (2005)	Kru	Congress for Democratic Change	WK
Madagascar	1998-2001	Ratsiraka	Betsimisaraka	AREMA	FKL	Zafy (1996)	Tsimihety	National Union for Development and Democracy	Library of Congress
	2002-2006	Ravalomana	Merina	TIM	FKL	Ratsiraka (2001)	Betsimisaraka	AREMA	FKL
	2007	Ravalomana	Merina	TIM	FKL	Lahiniriko (2006)	*Not 15%	Independent	
Mali	1998-2002	Konare	Bambara	Adema	FKL	NA	-		
	2002-2007	Toure	Sonrhai	Independent	Bleck (2010)	Cisse	Sonrhai	Adema	Personal communication
Malawi	1998-1999	Muluzi	Yao	UDF	FKL	Banda	Chewa	MCP	FKL
	1999-2004	Muluzi	Yao	UDF	FKL	Chakuamba Phiri	Sena	MCP	Personal communication
	2004-2007	Mutharika	Lomwe	UDF	YOU	Tembo	Chewa	MCP	Wikipedia
Mozambique	1998-2005	Chissano	Changana	Frelimo	FKL	Dhlakama (1994, 1999)	Ndau	Renamo	Hall and Young (2003)
	2005-2008	Guebuza	Changana	Frelimo	FKL	Dhlakama	Ndau	Renamo	Hall and Young (2003)
Namibia	1998-1999	Nujoma	Ovambo	SWAPO	FKL	Muyongo (1994)	Mafwe (v. small ethnic	Democratic Turnhalle	Forrest (2004) - subnational

							group)	Alliance	
	1999-2005	Nujoma	Ovambo	SWAPO	FKL	Ulenga (1999)	Ovambo	Congress of Democrats	Africa Confidential April
	2005-2007	Pohamba	Ovambo	SWAPO	YOU	Ulenga (2004)	Ovambo	Congress of Democrats	Africa Confidential April
Nigeria	1998	Abubaker	Hausa	-	Reuters, Jan. 12, 2011	NA	-		
	1999-2003	Obasanjo	Yoruba	PDP	FKL	Falae (1999)	Yoruba	APP	Wikipedia
	2003-2007	Obasanjo	Yoruba	PDP	FKL	Buhari (2003)	Hausa	ANPP	FKL
	2007	Yar'Adua	Hausa	PDP	YOU	Buhari (2007)	Hausa	ANPP	FKL
South Africa	1998-1999	Mandela	Xhosa	ANC	FKL	De Klerk (1994)	NP	Afrikaaner	FKL
	1999-2007	Mbeki	Xhosa	ANC	FKL	Leon (1999, 2004)	DP	Afrikaaner	Assumed
Senegal	1998-2000	Diouf	Serer	PS	EB	Wade (1993)	Wolof	PDS	FKL
	2000-2007	Wade	Wolof	PDS	FKL	Diouf (2000)	Serer	PS	EB
	2007	Wade	Wolof	PDS	FKL	Seck (2007)	*Not 15%	Rewmi	
Tanzania	1998-2005	Mkapa	Makua (v. small)	CCM	personal communication from Julius Nyang'oro (Dec. 23, 2010)	Mrema (1995)	Chaga	NCCR	Wikipedia
	2005-2007	Kikwete	Mkwere (v. small)	CCM	YOU	Lipumba (2000, 2005)	Nyamwezi	CUF	Personal communication
Uganda	1998-2001	Museveni	Bunyankole	NRM	FKL	Ssemogerere (1996)	Buganda	Democratic Party	Personal communication
	2001-2007	Museveni	Bunyankole	NRM	FKL	Besigye (2001, 2006)	Bunyankole	FDC	The Observer, Jan 13, 20
Zambia	1998-2001	Chiluba	Bemba	MMD	personal knowledge	Mungomba (Dean) (1996)	*Not 15%	ZDC	
	2002-2006	Mwanawasa	Lenje (v. small)	MMD	personal knowledge	Mazoka (2001)	Tonga	UPND	personal knowledge
	2006-2007	Mwanawasa	Lenje (v.	MMD	personal	Sata (2006)	Bemba	PF	personal knowledge

			small)		knowledge				
Zimbabwe	1998-2002	Mugabe	Shona/Zesuru	ZANU-PF	Africa Confidential, Nov. 17, 2006	Muzorewa (1996)	*Not 15%	UP	
	2002-2007	Mugabe	Shona/Zesuru	ZANU-PF	Africa Confidential, Nov. 17, 2006	Morgan Tsvangirai	Shona/Karanga	MDC	Africa Confidential - Wh

VIII. ETHNICITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS 1980-1989

Country	Years	Leader	Ethnicity	Party	Source	Opp Leader	Ethnicity	Party	Source
Benin	1980-1989	Kerekou	Otamari		Wantchekon and Vermeersch 2005.				
Botswana	1980	Khama	Tswana/Bangwato	BDP	Makgala 2009	*Not 15%			
Botswana	1981-1984	Masire	Tswana/Ngwaketse	BDP	Makgala 2009	*Not 15 %			
Botswana	1985-1989	Masire	Tswana/Ngwaketse	BDP	Makgala 2009	Koma	Tswana/Mongwato	BNF	Makgala 2009; personal communication from Ma (2010)
Burkina Faso	1980	Lamizana	Samo	NA	Zongo 1998	Ouédraogo	Mossi	UNDD	<i>Assumed from last name</i>
Burkina Faso	1981-1982	Zerbo	Samo		Zongo 1998	*Not 15%			
Burkina Faso	1983	J. P. Ouedraogo	Mossi		FKL				
Burkina Faso	1984-1987	Sankara	Fulani (Peul)		FKL				
Burkina Faso	1988-1989	Campaore	Mossi		FKL				
Ghana	1980-	Limann	Sissala	PNP	Kelly 2005	Owusu	Akan	PFP	Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 1994.

	1981						(Ashanti)		
Ghana	1982-1989	Rawlings	Ewe		FKL				
Kenya	1980-1989	Moi	Kalenjin		FKL				
Liberia	1980-1985	Doe	Krahn		FKL				
Liberia	1986-1989	Doe	Krahn	NDPL	FKL	Jackson Doe	Gio	LAP	Africa South of the Sahara 2003, pg. 564.
Lesotho	1980-1985	Jonathan	Sotho	BNP	FKL				
Lesotho	1986-1989	Lekhanya	Sotho		FKL				
Madagascar	1980-1982	Ratsiraka	Betsimisaraka		FKL				
Madagascar	1983-1989	Ratsiraka	Betsimisaraka	AREMA	FKL	Monja Jaona	Antandroy	MONIMA	Thomas and Adloff 1965, pg. 103.
Malawi	1980-1989	Banda	Chewa		FKL				
Mali	1980-1989	Traore	Bambara		FKL				
Nigeria	1980-1983	Shagari	Hausa-Fulani	NPN	FKL	Awolowo	Yoruba	UPN	Bienen 1987, pg. 212.
Nigeria	1984-1985	Buhari	Hausa-Fulani		FKL				
Nigeria	1986-1989	Babangida	Gwari		Mathews 2002, pg. 122.				
Senegal	1980	Senghor	Serer		FKL	Wade	Wolof	PDS	FKL
Senegal	1981-1982	Diouf	Serer		EB	Wade	Wolof	PDS	FKL
Senegal	1983-1987	Diouf	Serer		EB	*Not 15%			

Senegal	1988-1989	Diouf	Serer		EB	Wade	Wolof	PDS	FKL
South Africa	1980-1986	Botha	Afrikaner		FKL	Frederik van Zyl Slabbert	Afrikaner	PFP	Self-evident
South Africa	1987-1989	Botha	Afrikaner		FKL	Andries Treurnicht	Afrikaner	CP	Self-evident
Uganda	1980	Muwanga	Baganda		FKL				
Uganda	1981-1985	Obote	Lango	UPC	FKL	Paul Ssemogerere	Buganda	DP	Personal communication, Jeff Conroy-Krutz (Jan.
Uganda	1986-1989	Museveni	Ankole		FKL				
Tanzania	1980-1985	Nyerere	Zanaki		Mwakikagile 2010, pg 374.				
Tanzania	1986-1989	Mwinyi	Zanzibar Islands		FKL				
Zambia	1980-1989	Kaunda	Nyanja		FKL				
Zimbabwe	1980-1989	Mugabe	Shona/Zesuru	ZANU	Africa Confidential, Nov. 17, 2006	Nkomo	Kalanga	ZAPU	Libby 1979.

IX. Full Citations for Ethnicity Data

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Notes on abbreviations: FKL stands for Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007), YOU stands for Young (2009), EB stands for Encyclopedia Britannica, WK stands for Wikipedia

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X. Coding Hierarchy of Groups

Country	Group	Gr_perc	Hierarchy	Source	Notes
BEN	Fon	32	1	EA (1967)	3
	Adja	17	0	den Ouden (1995)	A
	Yoruba	14	1	EA (1967)	3
	Bariba	12	1	Lombard (1965)	B
	Otamari	6	0	Ethnology (66/3)	0
BOT	Mongwato	13	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mongwaketse	9	1	EA (1967)	2

	Mokwena	9	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mokgatla	9	1	EA (1967)	2
	Bakalanga	14	0	Werbner (2002)	A
	Bakgaladgadi	7	0	Kent (1993)	A
	Mombuhushu	2	1	Larson (1966)	B
GHA	Akan	45	0	EA (1967)	1
	Ewe	15	1	EA (1967)	2
	Dagomba	7	1	Ethnology (66/3)	3
	Dagate	2	0	Ethnology (66/3) - "Dagari"	1
	Frafra	2	0	EA (1967) - "Grusi" cluster	0.25
KEN	Kikuyu	18	0	EA (1967)	0
	Luhya	14	0	EA (1967) - "East Nyanza"	0.33
	Luo	13	0	EA (1967)	1
	Kalenjin	12	0	EA (1967)	1
	Somali	4	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mijikenda	4	1	EA (1967) - "Nyika"	1.67
	Meru	8	0	EA (1967)	0
LIB	Kpelle	22	0	EA (1967)	1
	Bassa	12	0	Liebenow (1969)	A
	Grebo	12	0	Liebenow (1969)	A
	Mano	9	0	Liebenow (1969)	A
	Kru	6	0	Ethnology (66/3)	1
	Gola	7	0	Ethnology (66/3)	1
	Kissi	5	0	EA (1967)	1
	Krahn	3	0	Ethnology (66/3)	1
MAD	Merina	32	1	EA (1967)	3
	Betsileo	19	1	Evers (2002)	B
	Betsimisaraka	15	0	Cole (2001)	A
	Vezo	3	0	Astuti (1995)	A
MLI	Bambara	32	0	EA (1967)	1
	Senufo/Mianka	11	1	EA (1967)	1.5
	Soninke/Sarakoll	7	1	EA (1967)	2
	Sonrhai	7	1	EA (1967)	3
	Dogon	7	0	EA (1967)	1
	Arabe	0.5	1	EA (1967) - Bedouin Arabes	2
MWI	Chewa	38	1	EA (1967)	2
	Lomwe	18	0	Ethnology (68/4) "Ngulu"	0
	Tumbuka	11	1	EA (1967)	2
MOZ	Makua	25	1	Whiteley (1954)*	A/B
	Changana	11	1	EA (1967) - "Tsonga"	2
	Sena	7	0	Ethnology (66/3)	1

	Lomue	7	0	Ethnology (68/4) - "Ngulu"	0
	Bitonga	3	0	EA (1967) - "Lake Tonga"	0
	Manhungue	4	1	Malamusi (1992) - "Nyungwe"*	A/B
	Ndau	4	1	MacGonagle (2001)*	A/B
NIG	Hausa	24	1	EA (1967)	2.5
	Yoruba	22	1	EA (1967)	3
	Igbo	17	0	EA (1967)	1
	Ijaw	5	1	Ethnology (66/3)	2
	Tiv	3	0	EA (1967)	1
SAF	Zulu	22	1	EA (1967)	3
	Xhosa	15	1	Ethnology (68/2)	3
	Tswana	8	1	EA (1967)	2
	Sesotho	7	1	EA (1967)	3
	Pedi	7	1	Ethnology (63/1)	2
	Coloured	5	0	Hendricks (2005)	A
SEN	Wolof	45	1	EA (1967)	2
	Pulaar/Toucouleur	26	0	EA (1967)	1
	Serer	14	1	EA (1967)	2
	Diola	5	0	EA (1967)	1
	Mandinka/Bambara	7	0	EA (1967)	1
TAN	Msukuma	17	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mgogo	4	0	EA (1967)	1
	Mpare	3	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mzigua	2	0	Ethnology (68/2)	0
	Mmwera	2	0	Sakamoto (2008)	A
	Mmakonde	3	0	Ethnology (66/1)	0
	Mbena	2	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mnyiramba	2	0	Mawhood and Wallis (1993)**	A
	Mwiraqi	4	0	EA (1967)	1
	Mfipa	2	1	EA (1967)	2
	Muha	5	1	EA (1967)	2
	Mjita	3	0	Mawhood and Wallis (1993)**	A
	Mzaramo	2	0	Mawhood and Wallis (1993)**	A
	Mndendeule	1	0	Mawhood and Wallis (1993)**	A
	Mahaya	2	1	EA (1967)	2
UGA	Muganda	22	1	EA (1967)	3
	Munyankole	11	1	EA (1967)	3
	Musoga	13	1	Ethnology (68/2)	2
	Langi	10	0	EA (1967)	0
ZAM	Bemba	26	1	EA (1967)	2
	Tonga	15	0	EA (1967)	0

	Lozi	9	1	EA (1967)	3
	Nsenga	6	1	EA (1967) - "Chewa"	2
	Lunda	3	1	EA (1967)	1.5
	Chewa	6	1	EA (1967)	2
BFO	Mossi	54	1	EA (1967)	3
	Peul	6	0	EA (1967) - "Pastoral Fulani"	0.5
	Bobo	6	0	EA (1967)	0
	Karaboro	1	0	Hagberg (2004)*	A
	Dagari	2	0	Ethnology (66/3)	1
LES	Basotho	100	1	EA (1967)	3
NAM	Wambo	51	1	EA (1967) - "Ambo"	2
	Kavango	10	1	Eckl (2004)*	B
	Damara	9	0	EA (1967) - "Hottentot"	1
	Nama	6	0	EA (1967)	1
	Subia	2	0	Flint (2003)*	A
	Coloured	3	0	Hendricks (2005)	A
ZIM	Shona	32	1	67 At	2
	Sezuru	14	1	67 At (Shona subgroup)	2
	Ndebele	12	1	67 At	3
	Karanga	11	1	67 At (Shona subgroup)	2
	Korekore	8	1	67 At (Shona subgroup)	2
	Maniyka	6	1	67 At (Shona subgroup)	2
*indicates uncertainty in coding					
**I could not find information specific to these tribes, so they are presumed to follow the general patterns described in this article					
Notes: The coding indicates whether or not an ethnic group is organized into petty chiefdoms. Wherever possible, this is coded from the jurisdictional hierarchy scores in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas; all ethnic groups that scored 1.5 or higher were coded as hierarchical. In some cases, ethnic groups referred to in the Afrobarometer were "cluster names" in the ethnographic Atlas. In this case, I assigned the average jurisdictional hierarchy score to the ethnic group					
Sources: EA (1967) refers to Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, Ethnology (Year/Edition) refers to an edition of the periodical Ethnography.					

XI. Full Citations for Hierarchy Data

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Whitely, Wilfred. 1954. "Modern Local Government among the Makua." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 24 (4).

XII. Rules for Coding Increases and Decreases in Chiefs' Power over Land

1. DEFINITIONS/CODING RULES

Laws are coded as *decreasing* the power of traditional chiefs if:

- (a) the law decreases the power of chiefs (or their appointees) over the allocation of land from the previous law/official policy (i.e. by setting up other bodies to take over land allocation functions) OR
- (b) the law abolishes chiefs who previously had a role in allocating land
 - i. by removing recognition from them OR
 - ii. by preventing customary chiefs from becoming administrative chiefs¹ OR
- (c) the law decreases the amount of land of which chiefs are trustees

Laws are coded as *increasing* the power of traditional chiefs if:

- (a) the law increases the power of chiefs (or their appointees) over the allocation of land from the previous law/official policy OR
- (b) the law provides formal recognition to previously unrecognized traditional authorities and gives them a role in administering land OR
- (c) the law increases the amount of land of which chiefs are trustees OR
- (d) the law reverses a decrease in power as described in part 1.

2. RESEARCH PROTOCOL

The project collected information on formal increases and decreases in the power of chiefs over the administration of land in each country between the year of independence to 2005. In order for a practice to constitute a formal increase or decrease in the power of chiefs, it must be enacted via a law or a government decree. Decreases in the power of chiefs prior to independence are not included in the study.

The following three sources provided the main evidence on relevant land policy in each country:

1. Bruce, John W. 1998. "Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996." Land Tenure Center, Working Paper No. 130, December 1998.
2. USAID. 2010. Property Rights and Resource Governance Country Profiles. Available on-line at <http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltpproducts/country-profiles> (Accessed January 2011).
3. Wily, Liz Alden. 2003. *Governance and Land Relations: A Review of Decentralisation of Land Administration and Management in Africa*. London: IIED.

In addition, many country-specific sources were consulted and are referenced in the footnotes below.

¹ I have not counted laws which stipulate chiefs must be popularly elected or approved by the government as abolishing traditional chiefs *unless* they also stipulate that customary leaders are ineligible for appointment. In French West Africa, the government has frequently changed the exact process of appointing village and canton chiefs. See for example the Senegalese legislation reproduced in Alexandre, Pierre. 1970. "The Problems of Chieftaincies in French-Speaking Africa." *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule*. Ed. By Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation.

3. INCIDENCES OF LEGAL CHANGES IN THE POWER OF CHIEFS OVER LAND

Benin (1960-2005)

Decrease – Decret de April 14, 1960 – eliminated canton chiefs' administrative power (those canton chiefs who died not replaced).²

Decrease – Reforme territoriale de 13 fevrier 1974; Ordonnance 73-63 du 14 Nov 1973 – set up revolutionary committees to govern villages; government banned traditional leaders from standing for public positions (no new installations took place between 1974-1985).³

Botswana (1966-2005)

Decrease – Tribal Land Act, 1968 – established land boards, which took over the administration of land from chiefs; chief initially a member of the board.⁴

Decrease – Tribal Land Act (Amendment), 1989 – removed chiefs from positions on land boards.⁵

Burkina Faso(1960-2005)

Decrease – Decret de Jan. 26, 1962; Circularie de Dec. 27, 1963; Circulaire de Sept 3, 1964 –first decree outlawed all traditional insignia; second circulaire got rid of the position of canton chiefs; third said that that traditional chiefs could not run for village chief.⁶

Increase –Decret de Feb. 6, 1968 - Chefs de canton recognized as part of the administration and provided a salary.⁷

Decrease – Reorganisation agraire et fonciere, 1984 – Comites pour la defense de la Revolution given

² Bako-Arifori, Nassirou and Pierre-Yves Le Meur. 2003. "La Chefferie Au Bénin: Une Résurgence Ambiguë." In *Le Retour Des Rois: Les Autorités traditionnelles et l'Etat en Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: Editions Karthala, pg. 128.

³ A. Felix Iroko. 2003. "Rois et chefs en République du Bénin." In *Le Retour Des Rois: Les Autorités traditionnelles et l'Etat en Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: Editions Karthala, pg. 115-116. & Bako-Arifori, Nassirou and Pierre-Yves Le Meur. 2003. "La Chefferie Au Bénin: Une Résurgence Ambiguë." In *Le Retour Des Rois: Les Autorités traditionnelles et l'Etat en Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: Editions Karthala, pg. 129.

⁴ Quan, Julian. 2000. "Land Boards as a Mechanism for the Management of Land Rights in Southern Africa." In *Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa*. London: DFID/IIED/NRI.

⁵ Quan, Julian. 2000. "Land Boards as a Mechanism for the Management of Land Rights in Southern Africa." In *Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa*. London: DFID/IIED/NRI.

⁶ Somé, Magloire. 2003. "Les chefferies mossé dans la vie politique du Burkina Faso depuis 1945." In *Le Retour des Rois: Les Autorités traditionnelles et l'Etat en Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: Kathala. & Elliot Skinner. 1970. "The Changing Status of the 'Emperor of the Mossi' Under Colonial Rule and Since Independence." *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule*. Ed. By Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation.

⁷ Somé, Magloire. 2003. "Les chefferies mossé dans la vie politique du Burkina Faso depuis 1945." in *Le Retour des Rois: Les Autorités traditionnelles et l'Etat en Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: Kathala. & Elliot Skinner. 1970. "The Changing Status of the 'Emperor of the Mossi' Under Colonial Rule and Since Independence." *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule*. Ed. By Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation.

the power to allocate land.⁸

Ghana (1957-2005)

Decrease – Ashanti Stool Land Act, 1958; Akim Abuaka Act, 1958; Stools Land Act, 1960; Administration of Lands Act, 1962 – first two acts vested the land of the Ashanti and the Akim Abuaka stools in the central government; last two acts made revenue from all stool lands government property.⁹

Increase – Constitution, 1969 – stool lands once again vested in stools in southern Ghana, chiefs regained power to allocate land in southern Ghana.¹⁰

Increase – Constitution, 1979 – lands in northern Ghana no longer considered public lands; vested in skins and original owners.¹¹

Kenya(1963-2005)

No formal changes in the power of chiefs since independence

Lesotho (1966-2005)

Decrease: Land Act, 1979 – land committees took over land allocation functions from chiefs; committees continue to be chaired by chiefs.¹²

Decrease: Land (Amendment Order), 1992 – village development committees took over land allocation functions from chiefs.¹³

Liberia (1960-2005)

No formal changes in the power of chiefs since 1960

Madagascar(1960-2005)

No formal changes in the power of chiefs since independence

Malawi (1964-2005)

Decrease: Land Act of 1965; Registered Land Act 1965; Local Land Boards 1967 – 1965-1957; all public land and customary land (formerly trust land) vested in the Head of State; provided for the registration of customary land under private title in designated areas; provided for establishment of administrative bodies in each district to oversee customary land transactions, with land sales subject to their approval

⁸ USAID, *USAID Country Profile Property Rights and Resource Governance Burkina Faso*. Accessed on-line Jan. 2011.

⁹ Kasanga, Kasin and Nii Ashie Kotey. 2001. *Land Management in Ghana: Building on Tradition and Modernity*. London: IIED. & Rathbone, Richard. 2000. *Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951-1960*. Oxford: James Currey.

¹⁰ Berry, Sara. 2001. *Chiefs Know their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996*. Oxford: James Currey, pg 168; 1969 Constitution.

¹¹ Pul, Hippolyt. 2003. "Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and Triggers in Northern Ghana's Konkomba-Dagomba Wars." *The African Anthropologist* 10, no. 1: 39-82.

¹² Government of Lesotho, Lands Act, 1979.

¹³ Government of Lesotho, Land (Amendment) Order, 1992.

(Note: The provisions in these acts were never implemented in rural areas).¹⁴

Mali (1960-2005)¹⁵

Decrease: Law No. 95 (Collectivités Territoriales - CT), 1995 – devolved power to communes; gave the responsibility to manage resources to communes, rather than villages.¹⁶

Mozambique (1975-2005)

Decrease - Decree No. 6/78, 1978 – traditional leaders formally abolished¹⁷

Increase – Municipalities Law, 1994 & Decree 15/2000 – Municipalities Law (1994) states that municipal organs will listen to traditional authorities, specifically in areas of land management (though revoked and replaced by another version in 1997 that says municipal organs will listen to traditional authorities without specifying specific areas); Decree 15/2000 recognizes traditional authorities as one of three categories of “community authorities” and tasks them with delegating land.¹⁸

Namibia (1990-2005)

Decrease – Traditional Authorities Act, 1995 ; Communal Land Reform Act, 2002 – traditional authorities act recognizes traditional leaders and provides them with compensation, but no longer recognizes kingdoms; creates communal land boards which must sign off on the allocation of land, in addition to chiefs.¹⁹

Nigeria(1960-2005)

¹⁴ Bruce, John W. 1998. “Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996.” Land Tenure Center, Working Paper No. 130, December 1998.

¹⁵ Note: Canton chiefs were eliminated just prior to independence in Mali, and replaced by administrators. As a result, this decrease is not included in the list of increases or decreases. For the precise date, see Sissoko, Sékéné Mody. 1996. *Tombouctou et l'Empire Songhay: Epanouissement du Soudan Nigérien aux XVe-XVIe Siècles*. Paris, L'Harmattan. See also Seely, Jennifer. 2001. “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 39, no. 3: 499-52 & Lima, Stéphanie. 2008. “L'émergence d'une Toponymie Plurielle au Mali.” *L'Espace Politique* 5, no. 2 & Chenexix-Trench, Pippa, Moussa dit Martin Tessougué and Philip Woodhouse. 1997. “Land, Water and Local Governance in Mali.” IDPM Working Paper 6/1997.

¹⁶ Benjamin, Charles. 2008. “Legal Pluralism and Decentralization: Natural Resource Management in Mali.” *World Development* 36, no. 11: 2255-2276.

¹⁷ Meneses, Maria Paula. 2007. “Pluralism, Law and Citizenship: Mapping the Complexity.” CES Oficina No 291, Nov. 2007.

¹⁸ Alexander, Jocelyn. 1997. “The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas About Authority.” *Africa* 67, no. 1: 1-26. & West, Harry G and Scott Kloeck-Jenson. 1999. “Betwixt and Between: ‘Traditional Authority’ and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique.” *African Affairs* 98: 455-484. & Buur, Lars and Helene Maria Kyed. 2006. “Contested Sources of Authority: Re-claiming State Sovereignty by Formalizing Traditional Authority in Mozambique.” *Development and Change* 37, no. 4: 847-869.

¹⁹ Keulder, Christiaan. 2000 “Traditional Leaders.” In *State, Society and Democracy*. Namibia: KAS. & Werner, Wolfgang. 2003. “Land Reform in Namibia: Motor or Obstacle of Democratic Development.” Paper presented at a Meeting on Land Reform in Southern Africa held under the auspices of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin, 28 May 2003.

Decrease – Land Use Act, 1978 - removes traditional leaders from their position in managing land.²⁰

Senegal (1960-2005)

Decrease –Loi sur le Domaine National, 1964 – state formally appropriated all power to distribute land; state’s power to allocate land devolved to elected Rural Councils.²¹

South Africa (1990-2005)

Increase – Ingonyama Trust Act, 1994 – 2.8 million of hectares of land in Kwa-Zulu (1/3 of province) put in trust under the trusteeship of the Zulu king (though in 1998 a board was established to help the king manage the land).²²

Increase – Traditional Leaders and Governance Framework Act, 2003 & Communal Land Rights Act, 2004 – traditional councils, who must be traditional chiefs where they exist, ultimately responsible for the allocation of land (not subject to approval of district magistrates). (Note: this law was legally challenged in 2006 and 2009, and has not yet been implemented).²³

Uganda (1962-2005)

Decrease – Constitution of Uganda, 1967 – abolishes traditional chiefdoms (Article 118 (1)).²⁴

Increase – Traditional Rulers (Restitution of Assets and Properties) Statute of 1993 – restoration of the monarchy and its private land.²⁵

Tanzania (1961-2005)

Decrease – African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act No 13, 1963 – abolished the chieftaincy.²⁶

Zambia (1964-2005)

²⁰ Oshio, P. Ehi. 1990. “The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria.” *Boston College Third World Law Journal* 10: 43. & Arua, Emea O. and Eugene C. Okorji. 1997. “Multidimensional Analysis of Land Tenure Systems in Eastern Nigeria.” *FAO Land Reform Bulletin* 2. & Adedipe, N. O., J. E. Olawoye, E.S. Olarinde and A. Y. Okediran. 1997. “Rural Communal Tenure Regimes and Private Ownership in Western Nigeria.” *FAO Land Reform Bulletin* (2).

²¹ USAID, USAID Country Profile Property Rights and Resource Governance Burkina Faso. Accessed on-line Jan. 2011. & Boone, Catherine. 2003. *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. NY: Cambridge.

²² Beall, Jo, Sibongiseni Mkhize and Shahid Vawda. 2005. “Emergent Democracy and ‘Resurgent’ Tradition: Institutions, Chieftaincy and Transition in KwaZulu-Natal.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31, no. 4: 755-771 & Beall, Jo and Nduduzi Ngonyama. 2009. “Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: The Case of Greater Durban, South Africa.” Working Paper No. 55, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2.

²³ Ntsebeza, Lungisile. 2005. *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa*. Leiden: Brill. & Cousins, Ben. “The Politics of Communal Tenure Reform: A South African Case Study.” In *The Struggle Over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics and Change*. Eds Ward Anseeuw and Chris Alden, Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2010.

²⁴ Johanneseen, Cathrine. 2006. “Kingship in Uganda: The role of the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda Politics.” CMI Working Paper (8).

²⁵ Englebert, Pierre. 2002. “Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3: 345-368.

²⁶ African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act No 13 of 1969.

Decrease – Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970 – All land in Western Province (previously held by the Litunga in trust for the people) vested in the President.²⁷

Increase – Land Act, 1995 – chiefs must give their approval before land can be converted from customary to leasehold tenure (This procedure was first outlined in Circular No 1 of 1985).²⁸

Zimbabwe (1980-2005)

Decrease – Communal Land Act, 1982 – shifted authority to allocate land from the chiefs to district councils.²⁹

Increase – Traditional Leaders Act, 1998 – village headmen (rather than villagers themselves) responsible for selecting village heads, who are in charge of allocating land.³⁰

²⁷ Adams, Martin. 2003. "Land Tenure Policy and Practice in Zambia: Issues Relating to the Development of the Agricultural Sector." Oxford: Mokoro Ltd: 6.

²⁸ Adams, Martin. 2003. "Land Tenure Policy and Practice in Zambia: Issues Relating to the Development of the Agricultural Sector." Oxford: Mokoro Ltd.

²⁹ Tshuma, Lawrence. 1998. "Colonial and Post-Colonial Reconstructions of Customary Land Tenure in Zimbabwe." *Social and Legal Studies*. 7, no. 1: 77-95. & Spierenburg, Marja. 2005. "'We Fought the War to Return to the Old Ways.' Conflicts about Land Reforms in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe." In *Competing Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa*. Leiden, Brill.

³⁰ Kinsey, Bill. 2005. "Fractionating Local Leadership: Created Authority and Management of State Land in Zimbabwe" in *Competing Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa*. Leiden, Brill.