In an overlapping generations economy with (incomplete) financial markets but no intermediaries, there is underinvestment in safe assets. In an economy with intermediaries and no financial markets, accumulating reserves of safe assets allows returns to be smoothed, nondiversifiable risk to be eliminated, and an ex ante Pareto improvement compared to the allocation in the market equilibrium to be achieved. In a mixed financial system, however, competition from financial markets constrains intermediaries so that they perform no better than markets alone.

I. Introduction

In the early 1970s, most industrialized countries were adversely affected by a sharp rise in oil prices. This “oil shock” had a dramatic effect on the value of U.S. firms. As illustrated in figure 1, the real value of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange fell by almost half compared to their value at the peak in 1972. This collapse in...
share prices had a severe negative impact on the wealth of any investor whose portfolio contained a significant amount of stocks. Any investor who was forced to liquidate stocks after market prices fell would have suffered from lower consumption over the remainder of his or her life. Retirees in particular might have been affected in this way.

In Germany, where savings are mostly placed with intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies and assets are not marked to the market, the effect was rather different. Since their claims on intermediaries were fixed in nominal terms, these individuals did not suffer a fall in wealth as their counterparts in the United States and would not have been forced to reduce their consumption. Somehow the German financial system was able to smooth the oil price shock rather than pass it on to investors.

In the 1980s, the situation was reversed. The economies of most industrialized countries performed relatively well. In the United States, the stock market boomed, as shown in figure 1. Investors who held stocks were able to achieve higher than expected returns and could use these returns to finance a higher level of consumption. The dissaving generation in Germany did less well, by comparison. Since Germans' savings were placed with intermediaries, such as banks, on which they held fixed claims, there was no windfall gain for them.
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The effect of the "oil shock" on the U.S. market is an example of what is usually considered a nondiversifiable risk. The shock causes highly correlated changes in most asset values, so investors cannot avoid the risk by holding a diversified portfolio. Nonetheless, these episodes illustrate that the risks borne by individuals in two countries may be very different, even though the countries are subjected to similar shocks. This raises the interesting question of whether and how different financial systems can cope with this sort of risk.

Traditional financial theory has little to say about hedging nondiversifiable risks. It assumes that the set of assets is given and focuses on the efficient sharing of these risks through exchange. For example, the standard diversification argument requires individuals to exchange assets so that each individual holds a relatively small amount of any one risk. Risks will also be traded so that more risk-averse people bear less of the risk than people who are less risk-averse. These strategies do not eliminate macroeconomic shocks, which affect all assets in a similar way. We call this kind of risk sharing cross-sectional risk sharing because it is achieved through exchanges of risk among individuals at a given point in time.

Departing from the traditional approach, this paper focuses on the intertemporal smoothing of risk. Risks that cannot be diversified at a given point in time can nevertheless be averaged over time in a way that reduces their impact on individual welfare. One hedging strategy for nondiversifiable risks is intergenerational risk sharing, which spreads the risks associated with a given stock of assets across generations with heterogeneous experiences. Another strategy involves asset accumulation in order to reduce fluctuations in consumption over time. Both of these strategies are examples of the intertemporal smoothing of asset returns.

In standard financial models with fixed asset supplies and a single period, it is usually argued that somebody must bear the nondiversifiable risk. Such models implicitly overlook possibilities for intertemporal smoothing. At the other extreme, in an ideal, Arrow-Debreu world, cross-sectional risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing are undertaken automatically because markets are complete and there is complete participation in those markets. Neither the standard financial models, which assume a fixed set of assets, nor the idealized Arrow-Debreu model, which does not explicitly deal with institutions, provides much insight into the relationship between the structure of a country's financial system and the stock of assets accumulated. In particular, they do not tell us how a country's reliance on financial markets or intermediaries affects its ability to smooth asset returns by changing its dynamic accumulation path.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the consequences of inter-
temporal smoothing for welfare and for positive issues such as asset pricing in a model with incomplete markets. In practice, markets may not be complete in the Arrow-Debreu sense for a wide variety of reasons, including moral hazard, adverse selection, transaction costs, and incomplete participation. For simplicity we consider an economy with an overlapping generations structure, which results in incomplete participation. This is a tractable paradigm for the analysis of intertemporal smoothing and captures many of the features common to a wide range of models of market incompleteness.

Our analysis is related to a number of strands of the literature. First, Scheinkman (1980), McCallum (1987), and others have shown that incorporating a long-lived asset rules out the possibility of overaccumulation. These papers are not concerned with risk. In contrast, our paper analyzes how the risk arising from the dividend stream of long-lived assets is not eliminated by financial markets but can be eliminated by an intermediary. Second, Qi (1994) extends the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model to an overlapping generations context. In his model there is no aggregate risk and no role for intertemporal smoothing. Fulghieri and Rovelli (1994) and Battacharya and Padilla (1996) also compare the performance of markets and intermediaries in achieving an efficient intertemporal allocation of resources in an overlapping generations model. There is again no aggregate uncertainty in their models, and they do not consider intertemporal smoothing. Third, Gordon and Varian (1988) consider how governments can implement policies such as social security to allow intergenerational risk sharing in the context of a model with a single asset. They do not consider market allocations and asset pricing or the role of intermediation, which are the focus of the present paper.

In Section II, we describe a standard overlapping generations (OLG) model with two assets, a risky asset in fixed supply and a safe asset that can be accumulated over time. In Section III, we show that under certain conditions the safe asset is never held in the market equilibrium; in fact, it is dominated by the risky asset. Then we show, in Section IV, that intertemporal smoothing can lead to a higher level of average expected utility than is possible in the market equilibrium. Section V shows that the market equilibrium is in fact ex ante Pareto inefficient: there exist allocations with intertemporal smoothing that make all generations better off ex ante compared to the market equilibrium. We suggest that intertemporal smoothing could be implemented by a long-lived intermediary. In Section VI, we show that this mechanism is fragile and that competition from financial markets can lead to disintermediation, which causes the
smoothing mechanism to unravel. Section VII contains concluding remarks. Formal proofs are contained in the Appendix.

II. The Model

As a vehicle for the analysis of intertemporal risk smoothing, we use a standard, infinite-horizon, OLG model. Time is divided into a countable number of dates \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \), and a new generation is born at each date \( t \). Each generation consists of an equal number of identical agents, so there is no loss of generality in treating each generation as though it consists of a single representative agent. There is an initial old generation that lives for one period; each subsequent generation lives for two periods.

There is a single good available for consumption in each period, and an agent born at date \( t \) has an endowment of \( e \) units of the good when young and nothing when old.

There are two types of assets, a safe asset and a risky asset, which are held to provide for future consumption. The supply of the risky asset is normalized to unity and is initially owned by the old generation. The risky asset lasts forever and pays a dividend of \( y_t \) units of the consumption good at each date \( t \). The only exogenous uncertainty in this economy comes from the stochastic process \( y_t \). We assume that \( y_t \) is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and nonnegative, with a positive and finite expectation and variance.

The safe asset is represented by a storage technology, which converts one unit of the consumption good at date \( t \) into a unit of consumption at date \( t + 1 \). None of the safe asset is owned by the initial old generation, so \( s_0 = 0 \).

Agents choose their investments to maximize their von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility. Their risk preferences are represented by the additive utility function

\[
U(c_1, c_2) = u(c_1) + v(c_2),
\]

where \( c_i \) is the agent's consumption in the \( i \)th period of life. The functions \( u(\cdot) \) and \( v(\cdot) \) satisfy the usual properties: both are twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.

The special features of this model are chosen for the sake of simplicity. In particular, the OLG structure is a metaphor for all the other sources of market incompleteness that may arise in practice. Extensions are discussed below.

III. Market Equilibrium

Let \( x_t \geq 0 \) denote the amount of the risky asset and \( s_t \geq 0 \) the amount of the safe asset held by the young generation at date \( t \). For simplic-
ity, we do not allow short sales, but nothing is changed in equilibrium if short sales are allowed, as we explain at the end of the section. The agent’s first-period budget constraint restricts the sum of his first-period consumption and the value of his portfolio to be equal to his first-period endowment:
\[ c_{1t} + s_t + p_t x_t = e_t, \]
where \( p_t \) is the price of the risky asset at date \( t \). The second-period budget constraint restricts his second-period consumption to be equal to the portfolio’s liquidation value plus the dividend on the risky asset:
\[ c_{2t+1} = s_{t+1} + p_{t+1} x_{t+1} + y_{t+1} x_t. \]
At every date the agents know the present and past values of asset returns. In other words, the (common) information set is \( y^t = \{ y_1, \ldots, y_t \} \). Since an agent’s decision can at most depend on the information available to him, his choice of \( (x_t, s_t) \) is a function of \( y^t \); that is, it is adapted to the stochastic process \{\( y_t \)\}. Asset prices and consumption satisfy the same condition since they are functions of the agents’ portfolio decisions. At each date the representative agent chooses his portfolio to maximize his expected utility, conditional on the available information and subject to the period budget constraints.
An equilibrium consists of a sequence of portfolios \{\( (s_t, x_t) \)\} and prices \{\( p_t \)\}, adapted to the stochastic process \{\( y_t \)\} and satisfying the following conditions. First, at each date \( t \), the portfolio \( (s_t, x_t) \geq 0 \) chosen by the representative young agent solves the problem
\[
\max \quad E_t[u(c_{1t}) + v(c_{2t+1})]
\]
subject to \( c_{1t} + p_t + s_t = e_t \),
\[ c_{2t+1} = s_{t+1} + (y_{t+1} + p_{t+1}) x_t. \]
Second, the market for the risky asset must clear; that is, \( x_t = 1 \) for every date \( t \). In what follows, we focus our attention on Markov equilibria, that is, equilibria with the property that the endogenous variables \( (p_t, s_t, x_t) \) are functions of the contemporaneous shock \( y_t \). A Markov equilibrium is said to be stationary if this functional relationship is time-invariant: \( (p_t, s_t, x_t) = f(y_t) \), for all \( t \).
Although the safe asset would seem to be a useful hedge against the uncertainty generated by the risky asset, it turns out that this is not the case. Since the returns to the risky asset are assumed to be i.i.d., the representative young agent in a stationary Markov equilibrium solves the same decision problem at each date, regardless of the state in which he is born; and since the old supply the risky asset
inelastically, the equilibrium price is constant and nonstochastic. The net return from holding the risky asset in such an equilibrium is 

\[ r_t = y_{t+1} + p_{t+1} - p_t = y_{t+1}, \]

and since \( y_{t+1} \) is nonnegative and sometimes positive, the safe asset is clearly dominated and will never be held in equilibrium.

**Proposition 1.** There exists a stationary Markov equilibrium \( \{ (p_t, s_t, x_t) \} \) in which the price of the risky asset is a constant \( p_t = \bar{p} \) and the demand for the safe asset is \( s_t = 0 \) at every date \( t \) if \( \sup u'(\cdot) > \inf v'(\cdot) \).

The assumption that \( \sup u'(\cdot) > \inf v'(\cdot) \) is needed to ensure that there exists a positive rate of return at which the representative young agent wants to transfer wealth from the first to the second period of his life. Otherwise, there is no (constant) asset price at which the young agent is willing to hold the risky asset and a stationary equilibrium cannot exist.

To illustrate the operation of the market equilibrium, consider the following example:

\[ U(c_1, c_2) = \ln(c_1) + \ln(c_2), \]

\[ e = 1, \]

\[ y_t = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{with probability } .5 \\
1 & \text{with probability } .5. 
\end{cases} \]

For this case it can be shown that the stationary equilibrium price is \( p_t = 0.5 \) and the allocation of consumption in equilibrium is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( y_t )</th>
<th>( c_{1t} )</th>
<th>( c_{2t} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The levels of expected utility attained are \( E[u(c_{21})] = -0.14 \) for the initial generation and \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})] = -0.84 \) for each subsequent generation. The long-run average expected utility is therefore also \(-0.84\).

In this example the risky asset is very attractive. It can be bought in youth for 0.5 and sold for the same amount in old age; it also pays nonnegative dividends, which are 1 half of the time. Since the risky asset is so attractive, investors sacrifice consumption in youth in order to be able to consume in old age. They consume only 0.5 in youth but in old age consume 0.5 or 1.5 with equal probability, or 1 on average.

It has been assumed so far that no short sales are allowed. This assumption can be dropped at no cost, however, since the equilib-
rium allocations would be exactly the same if short sales were al-
lowed. The existence of a representative agent and the fact that net
asset holdings must be nonnegative in equilibrium together ensure
that no short sales can actually take place in equilibrium, even if
they were allowed. Furthermore, market clearing requires $x_i = 1$, so
the short-sale constraint is never binding for the risky asset. The
short-sale constraint $s_i \geq 0$ for the safe asset may be binding in equi-
librium. If it is, then we need to introduce a price $q_i < 1$ for claims
to the safe asset in order for the market to clear at zero net supply.

The model can also be extended to allow for (random) endow-
ments $(e_1, e_2)$ in both periods of an agent’s life. In this case, the
safe asset may sometimes be used in equilibrium. However, it is al-
ways true that $s_i = 0$ with positive probability in a stationary Markov
equilibrium. Furthermore, by restricting the distribution of $e_1 u$, we
can ensure that the conclusion of proposition 1 continues to hold.
In any case, financial markets do not eliminate the risk created by
random fluctuations in endowments and asset returns. Similarly, if
the return on the safe asset is positive or it is possible that $y_t < 0,$
the yield on the risky asset will no longer be uniformly higher than
the yield on the safe asset and some of the safe asset may be held
in equilibrium. Again, however, financial markets will not eliminate
risk. In the next section, we shall see that there exist feasible alloca-
tions in which risk is almost entirely eliminated in the long run.

IV. Intertemporal Smoothing

In a stationary Markov equilibrium, the safe asset is not used to
hedge against the uncertainty of the risky asset’s return. However, in
an infinite-horizon economy, almost all of the risk can be eliminated
through a program of accumulating buffer stocks of the risk-free
asset. This is simply an application of a well-known theorem of
Schechtman (1976). He considered the problem of an individual
who has a risky income $\omega_t$ and wants to maximize the expected value
of his long-run average utility:

$$E \left[ \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} u(c_t) \right].$$

The individual cannot borrow but is able to self-insure by investing
in a safe asset (storage technology). Consider the following policy:
at each date $t$, the individual, who has accumulated savings $s_{t-1}$, con-
sumes $E \omega_t$ if this is feasible and $\omega_t + s_{t-1}$ otherwise. Then the individ-
ual’s savings at date $t$ will be
\[ s_t = \max\{\omega_t + s_{t-1} - E\omega_t, 0\}. \]

Let \( M_T = \#\{t \leq T|s_t = 0\} \) be the (random) number of periods that this process spends at the boundary in the first \( T \) periods. The renewal theorem tells us that if the random variables \( \{\omega_t\} \) are i.i.d., then with probability one, \( M_T/T \) converges to zero as \( T \) approaches infinity. Since the individual's consumption is less than \( E\omega_t \) only when \( s_t = 0 \), this implies that his consumption is equal to \( E\omega_t \) for all but a negligible fraction of the time, and his long-run average utility will converge to \( u(E\omega_t) \) almost surely.

The same policy works in the present framework. Suppose that a planner wants to maximize the long-run average of the expected utilities of the different generations. To this end, the planner accumulates part of the economy's total endowment using the storage technology. Let \( s_t \) denote the accumulated savings at the end of date \( t \) and let \( \omega_t = e + \gamma_t \) denote the total endowment of the economy at date \( t \). Then by following the policy of setting

\[ s_t = \max\{\omega_t + s_{t-1} - E\omega_t, 0\}, \]

we can provide the two generations at each date with a total consumption equal to \( \bar{\omega} = E\omega_t \) in almost every period, with probability one. The planner will divide the consumption between the two generations in a way that maximizes the typical generation's utility. If we let

\[ (c_1(w), c_2(w)) = \arg\max_{c_1+c_2=w} u(c_1) + v(c_2) \]

and put \( U^*(w) = u(c_1(w)) + v(c_2(w)) \), then we have shown that the planner can achieve

\[ E \left[ \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} u\left( c_1(\min\{\bar{\omega}, \omega_t + s_{t-1}\}) \right) + v\left( c_2(\min\{\bar{\omega}, \omega_{t+1} + s_t\}) \right) \right] = U^*(\bar{\omega}). \]

**Proposition 2.** There exists a feasible policy \( \{s_t\} \) that ensures with probability one that all but a negligible fraction of generations are able to achieve the expected utility level \( U^*(\bar{\omega}) \).

The utility level \( U^*(\bar{\omega}) \) is at least as great as the level achieved in the market equilibrium on average. In fact, this must be true for any feasible allocation in which the long-run average consumption levels
of the old and young are well defined. Let \( \{ (c_{1t}, c_{2t}) \} \) be a feasible consumption process and suppose that

\[
\bar{c}_i = \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} c_{it}
\]

is well defined. Then, by concavity,

\[
E \left[ \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} [u(c_{1t}) + v(c_{2t+1})] \right] \\
\leq E \left[ u\left( \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} c_{1t} \right) + v\left( \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} c_{2t+1} \right) \right] \\
= E[u(\bar{c}_1) + v(\bar{c}_2)] \\
\leq u(E\bar{c}_1) + v(E\bar{c}_2).
\]

Now, we have assumed that \( \{ (c_{1t}, c_{2t}) \} \) is feasible, so with probability one,

\[
T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (c_{1t} + c_{2t}) \leq T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_t \to \bar{\omega}.
\]

From this it follows that \( E\bar{c}_1 + E\bar{c}_2 \leq \bar{\omega} \), which in turn implies that \( u(E\bar{c}_1) + v(E\bar{c}_2) \leq U^*(\bar{\omega}) \). From this we conclude that

\[
E \left[ \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} [u(c_{1t}) + v(c_{2t+1})] \right] \leq U^*(\bar{\omega}).
\]

The inequality will be strict when \( \{ (c_{1t}, c_{2t}) \} \) corresponds to the market allocation, since the agents’ risk preferences are strictly concave in old age and the variance of \( \gamma_t \) is strictly positive. This result can be summarized as follows.

**Proposition 3.** For any feasible allocation \( \{ (c_{1t}, c_{2t}, s_t) \} \) for which long-run average consumptions are well defined,

\[
E \left[ \lim_{T \to \infty} T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} [u(c_{1t}) + v(c_{2t+1})] \right] \leq U^*(\bar{\omega}),
\]

and the inequality is strict if \( \{ (c_{1t}, c_{2t}, s_t) \} \) is the market equilibrium allocation.

In the example from the previous section, \( \bar{\omega} = 1.5 \), and the additive logarithmic utility function implies that the long-run average expected utility is maximized by setting \( c_1(w) = c_2(w) = \bar{\omega}/2 = 0.75 \). In this case, \( U^*(\bar{\omega}) = -0.58 \), which compares favorably
with the long-run average expected utility in the market equilibrium, 
\[ E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})] = -0.84. \]

Propositions 2 and 3 extend immediately to the case in which there are both random endowments \( (e_{1t}, e_{2t+1}) \) and random asset returns \( y_t \), as long as we assume that the aggregate endowments \( \omega_t \equiv e_{1t} + e_{2t} + y_t \) are i.i.d.

V. Ex Ante Efficiency and the Genesis of Intertemporal Smoothing

In the preceding section, we saw that a long-lived agent, or a planner who maximized the long-run average of expected utility, might behave very differently from the successive generations in the OLG model, who maximized their own expected utility over a two-period horizon. The former would have an incentive to accumulate large stocks of the safe asset in order to provide insurance against rate of return risk, whereas the latter have no incentive to hold the safe asset at all in a stationary Markov equilibrium.

This raises the question of whether there is some sort of market failure, some form of inefficiency, in the equilibrium described in proposition 1. Before we can answer this question, we have to be more precise about how we define the welfare of an individual agent. There are two salient definitions. The first identifies the individual’s welfare with his expected utility \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})|y'] \), conditional on the information that is available when he is born. In effect, it treats the “same” individual born at two different information sets as two different individuals. The second definition identifies the individual’s welfare with his unconditional expected utility \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})] \), implicitly assuming that there is only one individual born at any date, regardless of the information available at that date.

Correspondingly, there are two notions of Pareto efficiency, ex ante and ex post, depending on whether or not we take into account the state in which an agent is born. A feasible allocation is ex post efficient if it is impossible to increase the ex post expected utility, \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})|y'] \), of some generations without reducing the ex post expected utility of other generations. On the other hand, a feasible allocation is ex ante efficient if it is impossible to increase the ex ante expected utility, \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})] \), of some generations without reducing the ex ante expected utility of other generations. We consider efficiency initially using the ex ante notion and then using the ex post notion.

It is easy to see that a market equilibrium allocation will not be ex ante efficient in general, because agents are not allowed to trade before they are born. Hence, all trades are undertaken by an agent
after the state in which he is born has been revealed. In other words, the birth state \( y' \) is a “preexisting condition,” against which an agent cannot insure. However, a planner could provide such insurance by making appropriate transfers between the old and the young at each date. Thus, even without making use of the storage technology, the planner could achieve a Pareto improvement from the ex ante point of view. However, the expected utility of the typical generation will be even higher if intergenerational smoothing is carried out, accumulating reserves of the safe asset and using them to smooth fluctuations in consumption. Intergenerational risk sharing by means of transfers between the old and young at each date does not remove the aggregate uncertainty caused by the randomness of the aggregate endowment. Intertemporal smoothing eliminates this uncertainty, at no cost in terms of long-run average consumption.

Although it is easy to see that intertemporal smoothing can increase long-run average expected utility, some care must be taken about the way in which intertemporal smoothing is introduced in order to ensure that each generation is better off ex ante compared to the equilibrium allocation. Consider the policy described in Section IV. Under that policy, \( c_{1t} + c_{2t} = \bar{\omega} \) when \( \omega_t + s_t \geq \bar{\omega} \) and \( c_{1t} + c_{2t} = \omega_t + s_t \) otherwise. In the market equilibrium, \( c_{1t} + c_{2t} = e + y_t \) in all periods. Since \( s_0 = 0 \), it follows that if the intertemporal smoothing scheme were implemented at the first date, either the initial old generation or the initial young generation or both would be worse off in an ex ante sense compared to the market allocation. A similar argument applies in subsequent periods. In order to achieve an ex ante Pareto improvement, intertemporal smoothing has to be introduced in two stages. The first stage achieves an increase in expected utility by means of intergenerational risk sharing (transfers), which allows the planner to accumulate some of the endowment in the form of reserves of the safe asset without making any generation worse off. Once reserves are sufficiently large, it is possible to switch to a policy of intertemporal smoothing and make every generation better off ex ante than it would be with intergenerational risk sharing alone.

To see how the first stage is implemented, consider some necessary conditions for ex ante efficiency. If the equilibrium is ex ante efficient, it must be impossible to make both generations at date \( t \) better off by reallocating consumption at that date. That means that the equilibrium consumption allocation \((c_{1t}, c_{2t})\) must solve the maximization problem

\[
\max \quad E[\lambda u(c_{1t}) + (1 - \lambda) v(c_{2t})] \\
\text{subject to} \quad c_{1t} + c_{2t} = \omega_t = e + y_t,
\]
for some constant \(0 \leq \lambda \leq 1\). A necessary condition for this to be true is that \(u'(c_{1t}) / u'(c_{2t}) = \text{constant with probability one}\). In the market equilibrium, \(c_{1t} = e - p_i\) is nonstochastic, whereas \(c_{2t} = p_i + y_i\) is stochastic; so the necessary condition for ex ante Pareto efficiency cannot be satisfied and the market equilibrium is ex ante inefficient. In fact, it is possible to find an ex ante Pareto-preferred allocation by making stationary transfers contingent on the contemporaneous asset returns. Let \(\tau(y_i)\) be the transfer from young to old at period \(t\) when the asset return is \(y_i\), and define the new consumption allocation by putting \(\hat{c}_{1t} = c_{1t} - \tau(y_i)\) and \(\hat{c}_{2t} = c_{2t} + \tau(y_i)\). For an appropriate specification of the transfer function \(\tau(\cdot)\),

\[
E[u(\hat{c}_{2t})] > E[u(c_{2t})]
\]

and

\[
E[u(\hat{c}_{1t}) + u(\hat{c}_{2t+1})] > E[u(c_{1t}) + u(c_{2t+1})]
\]

for every date \(t\). By continuity, the same will be true if we reduce the consumption of the young at each date by a constant amount \(\eta > 0\) and add this amount to the stock of the safe asset, so that by period \(t\) we have accumulated \(s_t = \eta t\). Hence with intergenerational transfers, an arbitrarily large level of reserves can be built in preparation for switching to the intertemporal smoothing program.

Let \(S\) denote the target level of reserves accumulated in the first stage and let \(T\) denote the end of the first stage; that is, choose \(T\) so that \(s_T = S\). To show that a Pareto-improving scheme with intertemporal smoothing can be implemented, the following lemma is needed.

**Lemma 1.** For any \(\epsilon > 0\), there is a level of initial reserves \(S\) sufficiently large that, when the intertemporal smoothing plan starts at date \(T\), the probability of \(s_t = 0\) at any \(t \geq T\) is less than \(\epsilon\).

In the short run, this is obvious because it will take some time to run down the reserves to zero. In the longer run, it is not so obvious that the probability of running out of reserves is uniformly small at all future dates. The lemma follows from the fact that reserves follow a "random walk" when \(s_t > 0\) and are expected to increase when \(s_t = 0\). This means that reserves are expected to increase, on average, without limit under the intertemporal smoothing policy. Even though the event \(s_t = 0\) will occur infinitely often, the probability that it happens at any fixed date \(t\) is becoming vanishingly small as \(t\) approaches infinity.

The fact that the probability of the event \(s_t = 0\) is bounded by \(\epsilon\) for each future generation means that the ex ante expected utility of any generation living after date \(T\) is at least \((1 - \epsilon) U^*(\omega)\), which is greater than the equilibrium ex ante expected utility
When \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})] \) for \( \epsilon \) sufficiently small. Thus generations \( t \geq T \) will prefer the intertemporal smoothing plan ex ante to their market allocation. There is a problem with the generation born at date \( T - 1 \) since this generation does not get the full benefit of intergenerational risk sharing but has its second-period consumption reduced on average. To compensate this generation, we make a one-time transfer out of the reserves. With this adjustment, every generation is ex ante better off.

Furthermore, since the first stage with intergenerational sharing is finite in length, the analysis in Section IV shows that the long-run average expected utility will converge to \( U^*(\bar{\omega}) \). All this can be summarized in the following result.

**Proposition 4.** The market equilibrium allocation is ex ante Pareto-inefficient. There exists an attainable allocation with intertemporal smoothing that provides every generation with higher ex ante expected utility and achieves the long-run average expected utility \( U^*(\bar{\omega}) \).

The existence of an allocation that ex ante improves welfare for all generations compared to the market equilibrium can be illustrated in the context of the numerical example used above. In the initial stage, the market allocation is altered by intergenerational transfers:

\[
\tau(y_i) = \begin{cases} 
0.1125 & \text{if } y_i = 0 \\
-0.275 & \text{if } y_i = 1.
\end{cases}
\]

When \( y_i = 0 \), the old receive a transfer of 0.1125 from the young; when \( y_i = 1 \), the young receive a transfer of 0.275 from the old. These transfers ensure that the expected utility of the initial generation is greater than the market equilibrium level of \(-0.84 \). They also allow an addition to reserves of 0.028 to be extracted each period from each generation except the initial one, while still leaving them slightly better off than the market allocation.

To see how the second stage operates, consider the effect on the ex ante expected utilities of the generations around date \( T \) if intertemporal smoothing were implemented at date \( T \) and there were no reserves at that date, as shown in table 1. We assume that the generation born at date \( T - 1 \) simply receives the market allocation when it is young. The generation born at date \( T + 1 \) is clearly better off than in the equilibrium, but generations \( T - 1 \) and \( T \) are worse off. If there were positive reserves at date \( T \), \( s_t > 0 \), the generations born after \( T \) would be even better off. For the generation born at \( T - 1 \), a transfer of 0.21 in their youth at date \( T - 1 \) would be sufficient to make them better off than in the market equilibrium.
For the generation born at date \( T \), a transfer of 0.03 would be sufficient. Hence the total reserves at the time of the transition must be at least 0.24. Remember that the initial generation and generation \( T - 1 \) do not help build reserves; this implies that the initial stage must last at least six periods, so \( T = 7 \).

Comparing the paths of utility in this ex ante Pareto-superior allocation with that in the market equilibrium, we can see that the first six generations in this example have slightly higher utility, but all subsequent generations are significantly better off. The long-run average expected utility is \(-0.58\), compared to \(-0.84\) in the market equilibrium. Note also that the average expected utility is also significantly greater than what can be achieved with intergenerational transfers alone. The consumption allocation that maximizes long-run average expected utility through intergenerational transfers with no accumulation of reserves is

\[
    c_{it} = \begin{cases} 
    .5 & \text{with probability .5} \\
    1.0 & \text{with probability .5} 
\end{cases}
\]

for \( i = 1, 2 \), which gives expected utility of \( E[U(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})] = -0.69 \).

At the start of the section it was pointed that there exist two notions of efficiency depending on whether we take into account the state in which an agent is born. Ex ante efficiency, which proposition 4 focused on, takes the expectation of utility across all possible states. An alternative view is ex post efficiency in which an individual’s welfare is conditional on the information available when he is born. The discussion of lemma 1 provides insights into ex post expected utility in the model in which intertemporal smoothing is adopted. Aggregate consumption is \( \bar{c} \) if and only if \( s_t > 0 \) and \( \Pr[s_t = 0] \to 0 \) as \( t \) approaches infinity. Hence, ex post expected utility will converge to \( U^*(\bar{c}) \) in probability as \( t \) approaches infinity. In other words, except when reserves are low, the ex post expected utility of each generation will be \( U^*(\bar{c}) \), which is higher than in the market.
equilibrium. As $t$ becomes large, the probability that reserves will be low and that a generation will be worse off ex post than in the market equilibrium becomes vanishingly small. In fact, in the long run, all but a negligible fraction of generations can be made better off ex post.

We have so far studied the existence of allocations that allow the introduction of intertemporal smoothing and an ex ante Pareto improvement over the market allocation, without specifying the institutional framework that implements them. The existence of such allocations suggests a story of how intertemporal smoothing by intermediaries might come into existence. Given the opportunity to make individuals better off, some institution will try to exploit that opportunity and capture part of the surplus. One possibility is that a long-lived intermediary is set up to provide insurance against uncertain returns by averaging high and low returns over time. Such an intermediary could hold all the assets and offer a deposit contract to each generation. Initially, the intermediary offers intergenerational insurance. Later on, after accumulating large reserves, the intermediary can offer almost all generations a constant return on deposits, independently of the actual returns.

Some degree of market power will be required to ensure that individuals participate in this scheme, as we shall see in the next section. This market power may arise naturally or it may be the result of government intervention. For example, the government may give the intermediary an exclusive license in order to achieve an ex ante Pareto improvement.

Of course, we do not suggest that intertemporal smoothing would always occur in this way, merely that the introduction of intertemporal smoothing is consistent with market incentives.

VI. **Competition between Intermediaries and Financial Markets**

A commonly heard argument is that financial markets are desirable because of the risk-sharing opportunities they provide. It is well known that this is correct as far as cross-sectional risk-sharing opportunities are concerned, but the results of the preceding sections suggest that this argument ignores the possibilities for intertemporal risk smoothing. We have shown in the context of a simple OLG model that an intermediated financial system can make every generation better off than it would be with financial markets alone. Note that, in this interpretation, financial markets and intermediaries are not simply veils thrown over a fixed set of assets. They actually determine, in conjunction with other factors, the set of assets accumu-
lated by the agents in the economy. By adopting one or another set of institutions, the economy is placed on a different trajectory, with important implications for risk smoothing.

A natural question that arises is whether it is possible to combine the cross-sectional risk-sharing advantages of financial markets with the intertemporal risk-smoothing advantages of an intermediated system. There is a significant obstacle in the path of trying to combine the two types of systems. Risk sharing of the kind discussed in the last few sections implies some form of arbitrage opportunity. Taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities is rational for the individual, but it undermines the insurance offered by the intermediary. For this reason, an open financial system may not be able to provide intertemporal risk smoothing, although it provides a tremendous variety of financial instruments.

One way to illustrate the effect of competition from financial markets is to consider the effect of opening up a relatively small, closed, and intermediated financial system to global financial markets. Initially, the small country’s financial system is monopolized by a cartel of banks that engage in intertemporal smoothing without the threat of competition. After opening the small country’s financial system, the banks now face the constraint that individuals can opt out and invest in global markets instead. The assumption that the country is small relative to the rest of the world implies that prices in the global market are not affected by the financial system of the small country or its investors’ decision to participate in the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the intermediary.

Let \( \{ (p_b^*, s_b^*, x_b^*) \} \) be the equilibrium in the global market and let \( \{ (c_{b}^{*}, c_{b}^{*}, s_{b}^{*}) \} \) be the optimal allocation implemented in the small country. The global equilibrium represents a benchmark for the welfare of investors in the absence of a long-lived intermediary, as well as an outside option for the individuals when the intermediary is in operation. We assume that all investors in the small country make use of the intermediary. Since the intermediary can always replicate the investment opportunities available through the market, there is no loss of generality in this assumption.

Disintermediation can take several forms, depending on whether investors are able to make side trades while taking advantage of the intermediary. We assume that the intermediary can enforce exclusivity, which means that an agent who wants to trade in the market is unable to make use of the intermediary at all. This assumption makes disintermediation less attractive and hence produces a weaker constraint on the intermediary’s problem of designing a risk-smoothing scheme. We can show that even this weak constraint on the intermediary is sufficient to rule out any welfare improvement
from intertemporal risk smoothing. Alternative (stronger) specifications of the disintermediation constraint would only strengthen this result.

The disintermediation constraint, which ensures that people do not abandon the small country’s risk-sharing mechanism once they have access to global markets, can be stated as follows: for any history \( y^t = (y_1, \ldots, y_t) \), the allocation \( \{(c'_{1t}, c'_{2t}, s'_t)\} \) satisfies

\[
E[u(c'_{1t}) + v(c'_{2t})|y^t] \geq \max_{(x,t) \geq 0} E[u(e - p_l) + v(x(y_t + s))|y^t].
\]

The expression on the right is the maximum expected utility an agent born at date \( t \) could obtain from trading on the open market. The expression on the left is the expected utility offered by the risk-sharing mechanisms. The crucial point is that both expressions are conditioned on all the information available at date \( t \). An agent makes his decision whether to join the risk-sharing mechanism after he has observed \( y^t \).

The possibility of disintermediation implies that an intermediated financial system in a small open country does not allow any improvement in expected utility over that obtained by investors in global financial markets. To prove this result, we need two additional assumptions. The first rules out the possibility of a welfare-increasing Ponzi scheme: we assume that there exists a constant \( K \) such that if \( U(c'_{1t}, c'_{2t+1}) \geq U(e, 0) \), then \( c'_{1t} \geq -K \) and \( c'_{2t+1} \geq -K \) with probability one. Since the utility level \( U(e, 0) \) is always attainable, an agent’s expected utility must be at least this high in equilibrium, which means that his consumption will be bounded below with probability one. The second assumption is purely technical: we assume that the random asset return \( y_t \) assumes a finite number of values. Under these assumptions we can show that the equilibrium allocation is ex post Pareto-efficient, and so there is no feasible allocation that makes any generation better off without making some generation worse off ex post. The disintermediation constraint requires each generation to be at least as well off ex post as it was under the equilibrium allocation and hence no better off.

**Proposition 5.** If the allocation \( \{(c'_{1t}, c'_{2t}, s'_t)\} \) is feasible and satisfies the disintermediation constraint, then each agent is ex post no better off under \( \{(c'_{1t}, c'_{2t}, s'_t)\} \) than he would be in the market equilibrium \( \{(p_n, s_n, x_t)\} \).

To understand proposition 5, it is helpful to think about the policy described in proposition 2. That policy provides the two generations at each date with a total consumption equal to the lesser of \( \bar{w} \) and the sum of the actual return and the reserves held by the intermediary, so that the total amount consumed each period is

\[
c'_{1t} + c'_{2t} = \min\{\bar{w}, y_t + s'_{t-1} + e\}.
\]
If the reserves held by the intermediary endowment are very low (close to zero), the expected utility of an agent must be lower than in the market equilibrium. In comparison with the equilibrium allocation, he loses the high returns from the risky asset when $y_t > \bar{w}$ and still suffers the probability of loss when $y_t < \bar{w}$. So any generation will be better off only if it inherits a large reserve from the previous generation. This will be true most of the time, but occasionally a generation will be born when reserves are low, and that generation will be worse off ex post. If that generation can opt out of the risk-sharing mechanism, the whole scheme will break down, leaving us in the situation described by proposition 5.

To see this in the context of the numerical example, suppose that reserves are at zero at date $T^*$. If intermediation is initiated or continued and intertemporal smoothing were implemented, the allocation of consumption would be as shown in table 1 in the previous section with $T = T^*$. The young generation (born at $T^*$) would obtain $E[U(c_{1T^*}, c_{2T^*+1})] = -0.88$. However, with markets they would obtain the usual market allocation, which gives $E[U(c_{1T^*}, c_{2T^*+1})] = -0.84$. Hence when there are no reserves, the young generation will prefer the competitive market allocation and will defect if given the opportunity. This is why some monopoly power is important in establishing and maintaining intermediation as discussed in the previous section. Building up the reserves necessary to start intertemporal smoothing requires intergenerational transfers initially. Access to competitive financial markets ensures that this type of insurance will not be feasible. Any allocation of consumption offered by an intermediary must match the market and give the young generation $E[U(c_{1T^*}, c_{2T^*+1})] = -0.84$. This means that an intermediary cannot improve on the market.

Proposition 4 implies that ex ante expected utility will be higher for all generations in an intermediated economy than in an economy with financial markets only. Incomplete financial markets do not allow intertemporal smoothing, but intermediaries in principle can, provided that investors do not have ready access to financial markets. This suggests that economies that are intermediary-based may be worse off by allowing access to financial markets. As discussed below, this result may have important policy implications for the European Union and other regions considering liberalizing access to global financial markets.

VII. Concluding Remarks

Our formal analysis has focused on a simple overlapping generations model. This benchmark is meant to illustrate the absence of intertemporal smoothing that can result from incomplete markets and
to show how an intermediated financial system can eliminate the resulting inefficiencies. It is important to stress that the overlapping generations structure is chosen because of its tractability. We believe that there are many other types of incompleteness that lead to the absence of intertemporal smoothing.

In our model, investors have a short time horizon; this means that they do not self-insure. Individuals live more than two “periods,” but whether self-insurance can realistically be achieved in a single individual’s lifetime is questionable. In the first place, the number of independent shocks may be small. We can think of the Great Depression as being one shock and the boom of the 1950s and 1960s as another. With this interpretation, the number of periods each generation lives through is small. In addition, there are life cycle considerations that may prevent households from self-insuring. For example, the desire to purchase a house and provide an education for their children means that many households do not start saving for retirement until fairly late in life. For both these reasons, the possibilities for self-insurance may be limited.

Finally, note that incomplete market participation will not be a problem when agents have a bequest motive that causes successive generations to act like a single infinitely lived individual. There is some evidence that in the general population, bequest motives and risk sharing within extended families are limited (see Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff [1992], Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff [1996], and the references cited therein). The issue here is whether the wealthy, who own most of the capital, have a sufficient bequest motive for intertemporal smoothing not to be a problem. Altonji et al. (1992) point out that wealthy individuals are underrepresented in the data sets most commonly studied in this area, and we are unaware of any evidence regarding this group specifically.

In the Introduction, we used the comparison of Germany and the United States to suggest that different financial systems deal with nondiversifiable risk in different ways. The model shows that it is theoretically possible for an intermediated financial system to achieve a higher level of welfare than a market-based system. It is tempting, then, to compare the U.S. and German financial systems in the light of this example. It is often suggested that German banks hold high levels of hidden reserves, which they rely on when asset returns are low. Even if this form of intertemporal smoothing is limited by comparison with the theoretical schemes considered above, it may nonetheless be an improvement over competitive financial markets in terms of reducing nondiversifiable risk. Thus the German financial system, with its reliance on financial intermediaries, may have some advantages over the United States, which relies more on financial markets.
Given this interpretation, proposition 5 has important policy implications. It suggests that opening the German financial system to foreign competition—for example, by creating a single European market in financial services—could threaten intertemporal smoothing and make Germans worse off in the long run. Of course, risk sharing is not the only consideration in the choice of optimal financial systems. Other important issues are discussed in Allen and Gale (1995).

Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 1

Suppose that \((s_t, x_t) = (0, 1)\) for every \(t\). Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of this portfolio are

\[
\begin{align*}
    &u'(e - p_t) p_t = E_t[v'(p_t + y_t)(p_t + y_t)], \\
    &u'(e - p_t) \geq E_t[v'(p_t + y_t)].
\end{align*}
\]

If these conditions are satisfied with \(p_t = p_{t+1} = p\), then \(\{(s_t, x_t, p_t)\}\) is a stationary Markov equilibrium. If we substitute \(p_t = p_{t+1} = p\) in the first-order conditions, it is clear that the first condition implies the second. Hence, we need only to find a solution to the equation

\[
    u'(e - p) = E_t \left[ \frac{v'(p + y_t)(p + y_t)}{p} \right] \leq E_t[v'(p + y_t)] E_t \left[ \frac{p + y_t}{p} \right].
\]

Since \(u'(\cdot), v'(\cdot) > 0\), the left-hand side is clearly less than the right when \(p\) is sufficiently small. On the other hand, for \(p\) sufficiently large, the right-hand side must exceed the left; otherwise, taking the limit as \(p \to \infty\) and noting that \(E[(p + y_t)/p] \to 1\), we have \(\sup u'(\cdot) \leq \inf v'(\cdot)\), a contradiction. Thus, for some intermediate value of \(p\), the first-order condition must be satisfied, and this value of \(p\) is the equilibrium asset price. Q.E.D.

B. Proof of Lemma 1

Recall that \(s_{t+1} = \max\{0, s_t + \omega_t - \bar{\omega}\}\), so that \(E[s_{t+1}|s_t] \geq s_t\). Define \(f(s) = 1/(s + 1) \in [0, 1]\) for any \(s \geq 0\). Then

\[
    E[f(s_{t+1})|s_t] \geq f(E[s_{t+1}|s_t]) \geq f(s_t)
\]

since \(f\) is convex and decreasing. With \(F_t = f(s_t), \{F_t\}\) is a bounded supermartingale. So by the martingale convergence theorem, \(F_t \to F_\infty\) almost surely as \(t \to \infty\). Since \(\omega_t\) has positive variance, it is clear that \(F_\infty = 0\), almost surely. Convergence almost surely implies convergence in measure, so for any \(\epsilon > 0\), there is a finite \(T\) such that

\[
    \Pr[F_t < \epsilon] > 1 - \epsilon \quad \forall \ t > T.
\]
Suppose that we want to start the intertemporal smoothing plan at date \( T \) when the reserves have grown to \( s_T = S \). We have shown that for any \( \epsilon > 0 \) there is a \( T' > T \) such that \( \Pr[s_t = 0] < \epsilon \) for all \( t > T' \). Keeping \( \epsilon \) and \( T \) fixed, we see that when \( S \) is made sufficiently large, the probability that \( s_t = 0 \) for any \( T \leq t \leq T' \) can be made less than \( \epsilon \). Then we have shown that for any \( \epsilon > 0 \) there is a level of initial reserves \( S \) sufficiently large that when the intertemporal smoothing plan starts at date \( T \), the probability of \( s_t = 0 \) at any \( t \geq T \) is less than \( \epsilon \) as required. Q.E.D.

C. Proof of Proposition 5

Index the values of \( y_t \) by \( s = 1, \ldots, S \) and let \( c_1 \in \mathbb{R} \) and \( c_2 \in \mathbb{R}^S \). Then we can write the expected utility of an agent who consumes \( c_1 \) in the first period and \( c_{2s} \) in the second period if state \( s \) occurs as \( u(c_1) + V(c_2) \), where \( V(c_2) = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s v(c_{2s}) \). Let \( C \subset \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^S \) be a compact set such that \( c \in C \) implies that

\[
u'(c_1) \geq \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s v'(c_{2s}),
\]

and for any \( c \in C \), let

\[
\Delta(c) = \{ \delta \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^S | u(c_1 + \delta_1) + V(c_2 + \delta_2) \geq u(c_1) + V(c_2) \}.
\]

From the concavity of \( u(\cdot) \) and \( v(\cdot) \) and the gradient inequality, it follows that

\[
u'(c_1) \delta_1 + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s v'(c_{2s}) \delta_{2s} \geq 0.
\]

Then \( c \in C \) implies that \( \max \delta_{2s} \geq -\delta_1 \). We now prove a slightly stronger result.

**Lemma 2.** For any \( \epsilon > 0 \), \( c \in C \), and \( \delta \in \Delta(c) \), there exists \( \lambda > 1 \) such that \( \delta_1 \leq -\epsilon \) implies that \( \delta_{2s} \geq \lambda \delta_1 \).

**Proof.** The lemma is proved by contradiction. Suppose that, contrary to what we want to prove, for some \( \epsilon > 0 \) and any \( \lambda > 1 \), we can find \( c \in C \) and \( \delta \in \Delta(c) \) such that \( \delta_1 \leq -\epsilon \) and \( \delta_{2s} < \lambda \delta_1 \). Then we can find a sequence \( (c_k, \delta_k) \) such that, for each \( k \), \( c_k \in C \), \( \delta_k \in \Delta(c^k) \), \( \delta_k^1 \leq -\epsilon \), and

\[
\lim_{k \to \infty} \frac{\max \delta_{2k}^1}{|\delta_k^1|} = 1.
\]

The set \( C \) is compact, so there exists a convergent subsequence of \( \{\delta_k\} \). Since \( u \) and \( v \) are concave, there is no loss of generality in assuming that \( \delta_k^1 = -\epsilon \). Then \( \{\delta_k\} \) is bounded above; \( \delta_k \in \Delta(c^k) \) implies that it is bounded below as well, so \( \{\delta_k\} \) has a convergent subsequence as well. There is no loss of generality, then, in taking \( \{c^k, \delta^k\} \) to be a convergent sequence with a limit \( (c^0, \delta^0) \), say. By continuity,

\[
u'(c_1^0) \geq \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s v'(c_{2s}^0),
\]

\[
u(c_1^0 + \delta_1^0) + V(c_2^0 + \delta_2^0) \geq \max_{c \in C} \{ u(c_1) + V(c_2) \},
\]

Q.E.D.
and \( \max \delta_{2t}^0 = -\delta_1^0 \). However, the second inequality and the strict concavity of \( u \) and \( v \) imply that

\[
\left( c_{1t} \right)^0 \delta_1^0 + \sum_{i=1}^S \pi_i v' \left( c_{2i}^0 \right) \delta_{2i}^0 > 0,
\]

which contradicts the other two relations. This completes the proof of the lemma. Q.E.D.

Now, turning to the proof of proposition 5, let \( \{(c_{1t}, c_{2t}, s_t)\} \) denote the equilibrium allocation and let \( \{(c_{1t}', c_{2t}', s_t')\} \) denote another feasible allocation that satisfies the disintermediation constraint. Suppose to begin with that \( s_t = s_t' = 0 \) for every date \( t \). Let \( \delta_t = (c_{1t}', c_{2t}') - (c_{1t}, c_{2t}) \) denote the difference in generation \( t \)’s consumption in the two allocations. The equilibrium allocation satisfies

\[
u'(c_{1t}) \geq E[v'(c_{2t+1})|y], \quad (c_{1t}, c_{2t+1}) \geq 0, \quad c_{1t} \leq e, \quad c_{2t} \leq e + y_t.
\]

The first inequality is the first-order condition, the second holds by assumption, and the last two follow from the budget constraints and the fact that \( p_t = p_{t+1} \). If we define \( C \) as

\[
C = \{(c_1, c_2) \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^S | u'(c_1) \geq E[v'(c_2)], \ c_1 \leq e, \ c_2 \geq e + \max y_t\},
\]

then it is clear that \( (c_{1t}, c_{2t+1}) \in C \) for every \( t \). Furthermore, \( \delta_t \in \Delta(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1}) \) for each \( t \). Hence, the conditions of the lemma are satisfied.

Suppose that, contrary to what we want to prove, some generation is ex post better off under the alternative allocation than it would be in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we can assume that generation 1 is better off. Since the initial generation is no worse off and there is no possible gain from using the storage technology, the improvement in generation 1’s welfare must come from a transfer from generation 2, which implies that in some state(s), \( \delta_{12} < 0 \). Since generation 2 is ex post no worse off, there must be some state in which \( \delta_{22} \geq -\lambda \delta_{12} \) for some \( \lambda > 1 \). The increase in generation 2’s second-period consumption can come only from a reduction in generation 3’s first-period consumption, and since \( \delta_{13} = -\delta_{22} \geq \delta_{12} \), our lemma implies that \( \delta_{23} \geq -\lambda \delta_{13} \geq -\lambda^2 \delta_{12} \) in some state(s). Continuing in this way, we can find a sequence of states \( (y_1, y_2, \ldots) \) such that, at each date \( t \), generation \( t \) reduces its first-period consumption by \( -\lambda^{t-1} \delta_{12} \) and increases its second-period consumption by at least \( \lambda^t \delta_{12} \). Since \( \lambda > 1 \), this will become infeasible in finite time.

Now suppose that there may be changes in the holding of the safe asset. Other things being equal, an increase in storage will have the effect of reducing the first-period consumption and increasing the second-period consumption of a given generation by the same amount, but will not reduce the ratio \( \lambda \) in the inequalities above. The preceding argument will continue to hold, with \( \delta_{2t+1} \) interpreted as the transfer of consumption between generations \( t + 1 \) and \( t \). Again, there is no feasible sequence of transfers that will make some generation better off ex post without making some other generation(s) worse off. Q.E.D.
References


