Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects

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Abstract

Local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to recipient jurisdictions but disperse costs, creating incentives for legislators to increase own-district spending but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs. While these common pool incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses, which tend to predict inefficiencies in the allocation of public goods, there is little direct evidence that individual legislators respond to such incentives. To test for reactions to such incentives, this paper analyzes 1998 Congressional votes over transportation project funding. The empirical results provide evidence that legislators respond to common pool incentives: the probability of supporting the projects is increasing in own-district spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending. Having found that legislators do respond to such incentives, I use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level of public goods, which suggest over-spending in aggregate, especially in politically powerful districts, and large associated deadweight loss.

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Mississippi is getting tired of dirt roads; we want some asphalt.


The only guarantee that donor states should expect from this legislation is that they will continue to subsidize road projects in other states.


An earlier version of this paper was titled “The Advantage and Disadvantages of Centralized Provision of Public Goods Evidence from Congressional Voting on Transportation Projects”.

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1. Introduction

In the United States, the federal government provides funding for many types of public goods that are primarily local in nature. Examples include highways, bridges, water projects, and airports. Such spending programs provide geographically concentrated benefits to recipient jurisdictions but disperse costs due to a national, or common pool, tax base. In central legislatures with locally-elected representatives, such as the US Congress, this geographic disconnect between program benefits and costs creates incentives for legislators to increase own-district spending because the district bears only a small share of the associated tax costs. Countering this bias towards higher spending, each legislator has an incentive to restrain spending in other districts due to the associated tax costs.

This characteristic of centrally-provided local public goods, concentrated benefits and dispersed tax costs, is central to models of legislative behavior. Weingast et al. (1981) focus on the first incentive created by common pool tax bases, namely the preference to expand own-district spending. In their model, legislatures operate according to a cooperative, or universalistic, norm under which each legislator independently chooses own-district spending, leading to inefficiently high spending in every district and hence in aggregate. In non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining, such as that of Baron and Ferejohn (1987, 1989), both the incentives to expand own-district spending and to restrain aggregate spending are present, and the legislative outcome is one in which public spending is misallocated: public goods are over-provided in jurisdictions with political power and under-provided elsewhere. The recent literature on political federalism has applied these models of legislature behavior in order to re-address a classic question in public economics: within a federation, which level of government should provide public goods? By incorporating spillovers into these models of legislative behavior, this literature has identified a trade-off between the ability of centralized governments to internalize cross-jurisdiction spillovers and its tendency towards pork-barrel over-spending, particularly in politically powerful districts.1

While the incentives created by national financing of local public goods underpin these theoretical analyses, there is little direct evidence that legislators respond to such incentives. In order to test for such common pool incentives, this paper uses 1998 Congressional votes over transportation project funding; this empirical voting analysis is shown to be consistent with the two most commonly-used legislative processes in the theoretical literature and is thus quite general. The empirical results demonstrate that legislator choices reflect these common pool incentives: the probability of supporting funding for the projects is increasing in own-district spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending. These results are robust to several alternative specifications, although the tax cost relationship is statistically insignificant in several cases. Having found that legislators do respond to such incentives, I then estimate the underlying theoretical parameters and use these in order to calculate the degree of inefficiency associated with the common pool problem. These calculations suggest over-spending in aggregate, particularly in politically powerful districts, and large associated deadweight loss.

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1 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a,b), Besley and Coate (2003) and Lockwood (2002).
2. Related literature

The vast majority of empirical research on common tax pool incentives has used legislatures as the empirical unit of analysis. Inman (1988) attempts to measure the over-provision of federal grants in the US Congress by using a 1972 shift in Congressional norms from one of decision-making by strong political parties towards one of decentralized decision-making in which each legislator internalizes only his district’s share of the tax costs. Inman attributes a significant portion of the increase in grants after 1972 to this shift and predicts that a decentralized Congress would have spent almost 50% less were they forced to fully internalize tax costs, implying a deadweight loss of 17 cents for every dollar allocated. A related literature uses variation in the size of legislatures, and hence the degree of the common pool problem, across municipalities (Baqir, 2002), US states (Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995; Crain, 1999), and countries (Bradbury and Crain, 2001). These studies have documented a positive relationship between the size of legislatures and government spending.

Since these analyses rely on both a specification of the legislative process and maintained behavioral assumptions on the part of legislators, analyses at the legislator level, which rely on less stringent assumptions, are a useful complement. The only such analysis of which I am aware is DelRossi and Inman (1999), who use variation in local cost sharing rules for water projects to gauge the extent to which legislator demands for spending respond to the share financed by the federal government. The estimated price elasticity of demand is large, ranging from $-0.81$ to $-2.55$. Relative to DelRossi and Inman, my paper makes several contributions. First, while DelRossi and Inman focus on the first incentive created by a common tax pool, namely a preference to expand own-district spending due to common pool tax bases, my analysis incorporates both this first incentive as well as a second key incentive, a preference to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax liabilities. Second, I provide a welfare analysis, which includes estimates of the efficient allocation of public goods and the deadweight loss associated with this common pool problem. Finally, while the analysis of DelRossi and Inman relies on exogenous policy shocks, my methodology, which can be implemented using widely-available data on voting records and the benefits and costs of legislation, has broader application.

This paper is also related to a broader literature on the determinants of roll-call voting behavior in Congress. Peltzman (1985) finds that, after controlling for persistent regional differences in ideology, Senators from states reaping the largest net benefits from federal spending programs were more likely to support expansions of such programs, as captured by an aggregate voting index constructed by the National Taxpayers Union. In an examination of the electoral benefits of securing pork, Sellers (1997) finds an interesting interaction between Congressional voting records and pork. In districts receiving substantial pork, incumbents with fiscally liberal voting records perform better electorally than do fiscal conservatives. In low-pork districts, by contrast, fiscal conservatives perform better. Stein and Bickers (1995) note that, while many federal spending programs are concentrated in a minority of Congressional districts, such programs are often approved by overwhelming majorities in Congress. They argue that, in order to guarantee passage, special interest groups benefiting from such programs tend to make campaign contributions to a large group of representatives. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) downplay the role of
economic factors, arguing that a single dimension, which can be interpreted as ideology, explains nearly all of variation in roll-call votes in Congress since the 1970s.

3. Theoretical framework

This theoretical section serves two purposes. First, it formally documents the common pool incentives facing legislators to increase own-district spending but to restrain aggregate spending. Second, the theoretical model provides a framework for measuring legislator responses to such incentives. Given this empirical focus, the model is kept simple, focusing on local public goods funded from a national tax base and abstracting from other potentially important factors in the centralized provision of local public goods, such as spillovers, heterogeneity in preferences, and economies of scale.

3.1. Setup

Consider a legislature with \( J \) (odd) members, or jurisdictions, which are indexed by \( j \) and are of equal population \( N \). The economy has \( J + 1 \) goods, a private good \( (c) \) and a vector of local public goods \( \mathbf{g} = (g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_J) \), one for each jurisdiction. For simplicity, individual preferences are assumed identical within and across jurisdictions. Individual utility over the local public good and private goods is assumed quasi-linear:

\[
U(g_j, c_{ij}) = h(g_j) + c_{ij}
\]  

Utility from local public goods \( h(g_j) \) is assumed increasing and concave and is normalized such that zero utility is obtained from zero spending \( h(0) = 0 \). Finally, each resident in jurisdiction \( j \) is endowed with \( m_j \) units of the private good, which can be converted into public goods at a dollar-for-dollar rate.

Given this setup, consider a normative benchmark, which will be used to evaluate the performance of centralized governments in providing public goods. The Samuelson provision of public projects \( g^S_j \) can be characterized as follows:

\[
Nh'(g^S_j) = 1, \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, J
\]

This expression equates the total willingness to pay across constituents to the marginal cost of provision. While the Samuelson level of public goods would be that chosen by a national planner, centralized legislatures consist of elected representatives, who face incentives to serve local, rather than national, interests. The remainder of this section documents the effects of this divergence between national and local interests on the level and cross-jurisdiction allocation of public goods.

A key feature of centralized provision is that tax financing is assumed to be shared equally across the federation. That is, total jurisdiction tax liabilities are given by \( \tau = G/J \).
where $G$ is total federal public spending. This common pool feature of centralized tax systems will play an important role below.

A legislature, consisting of one representative from each jurisdiction, chooses both the aggregate supply of public goods ($G$) as well as the distribution of this budget across jurisdictions. I abstract from agency considerations and simply assume that each representative seeks to maximize the utility of a representative constituent:

$$U(g_j, g_{-j}) = h(g_j) + m_j - \frac{G}{NJ}$$

I next consider two commonly-studied political processes in the theoretical literature: legislative bargaining and universalism.

3.2. Legislative bargaining

Consider first a two-stage version of the legislative bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1987, 1989). In the first stage, an agenda-setter ($j = a$), whose identity is determined exogenously, proposes a distribution of public spending ($g^L$). In the second stage, each legislator votes on the proposed budget. If the proposal receives a majority of votes, it is implemented; otherwise, a reversion distribution of zero spending is implemented ($g^R = 0$).

Using the normalization that constituents receive zero utility from public goods under the reversion budget [$h(0) = 0$], legislators will support the proposal if the total benefits accruing to the district exceed its share of the tax costs:

$$h(g^L_j) \geq \frac{\tau}{N}$$

Incorporating the voting rule of each legislator, given in Eq. (4), the proposer will maximize the utility of his representative constituent, subject to the constraint that at least $(J - 1)/2$ other representatives support the proposal. Given majority rule and the common pool tax base ($\tau = G/J$), the proposer has an incentive to form a majority coalition $M$, not including the proposer, of minimum size $(J - 1)/2$. This optimal proposal ($g^L$) can be characterized as follows:

$$Nh'(g^L_j) = \left[1 + \frac{\lambda}{J} \frac{(J - 1)}{2}\right], \quad j = a$$

$$\lambda Nh'(g^L_j) = \left[1 + \frac{\lambda}{J} \frac{(J - 1)}{2}\right], \quad j \in M$$

$$g^L_j = 0, \quad j \notin M, \quad j \neq a$$

where $\lambda$ is the Lagrange multiplier on the proposal support constraint given by Eq. (4). As characterized in Eq. (5), the proposer internalizes both his district’s share of the tax costs

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3 This section follows Persson and Tabellini (2002).
1/J, as well as the shadow cost λ/J for each district in the size (J − 1)/2 coalition. While jurisdictions excluded from the coalition are under-provided, public goods are over-provided for either the agenda-setter (j = a), members of the winning coalition (j ∈ M), or possibly both.\textsuperscript{4} Due to the incentives created by national tax financing of local public goods, the proposer uses his agenda-setting powers in order to misallocate resources for the benefit of his home jurisdiction and/or those jurisdictions represented in the majority coalition. This misallocation comes at the expense of those jurisdictions excluded from the coalition.

3.3. Universalism

Consider next the legislative model of universalism due to Weingast et al. (1981). Given the empirical focus on voting decisions, the model is adapted to incorporate this aspect of the political process. In the first stage, the legislature operates under a mode of universalism; each representative independently chooses spending for their district. Taken together, these choices on the part of representatives form a proposal (g\textsubscript{U}). In the second stage, each representative votes over whether or not to accept this proposal, relative to a zero reversion distribution.

Given a proposal, representatives follow voting rules identical to those of the legislative bargaining model. That is, representatives support proposals under which the benefits accruing to the jurisdiction exceed the tax costs associated with aggregate provision:

\[ h(g_{j}^{U}) \geq \frac{\tau}{N} \]  

(8)

Taking these voting rules as given, each representative chooses spending levels in order to equate marginal jurisdictions benefits and marginal jurisdiction costs:

\[ Nh' (g_{j}^{U}) = \frac{1}{J} \]  

(9)

Thus, as shown in Eq. (9), public goods are over-provided, relative to the Samuelson condition, in every jurisdiction. Due to concentrated project benefits and dispersed tax costs, each representative internalizes only their jurisdiction’s share of the tax costs.

4. Empirical model

This section tests for the common pool incentives documented above using the representative voting decision rule in Eqs. (4) and (8). As demonstrated, this voting rule is consistent with both the legislative bargaining and universalism models and thus does not rely upon either of the assumed underlying political process. More generally, this voting rule is consistent with any political process in which representatives, through

\textsuperscript{4} Specifically, there is no shadow cost λ such that both the proposer and winning coalition members are under-provided, relative to the Samuelson conditions. In order for both to be underprovided \([Nh (g_{j}) \geq 1]\), one can show that \(2 \leq \lambda \leq 2/J + 1\), an obvious contradiction.
majority voting, have the final authority within the legislature over proposed project allocations.

For estimation purposes, consider the following utility specification:

\[ h(g_j) = \gamma g_j^x \]  

(10)

where \( x \in (0, 1) \) captures the marginal utility in own-district project spending. The utility parameter \( \gamma \) captures preferences for public goods and, while assumed homogenous in the theoretical section, is allowed to vary across jurisdictions empirically:

\[ \gamma_j = \exp(\theta X_j + \sigma \xi_j) \]  

(11)

where the vector \( X_j \) and scalar \( \xi_j \) represent observed and unobserved preferences for public spending. Using these two parameterizations in the proposal support condition, given by Eqs. (4) and (8), and allowing population \( N_j \) and federal tax burdens \( \tau_j \) to vary across jurisdictions, representative \( j \) will support the proposal if the utility benefits accruing to the district exceed its share of the total tax cost:

\[ \exp(\theta X_j + \sigma \xi_j)g_j \geq \frac{\tau_j}{N_j} \]  

(12)

Next, assume that, conditional on observed preferences, population, own-district spending and tax costs, unobserved preferences are distributed standard normal \([\xi_j|X_j, N_j, g_j, \tau_j \sim N(0, 1)]\). In this case, representative voting decisions can be expressed as a familiar probit model:

\[ \Pr(\text{support}) = \Phi \left[ \frac{\theta X_j + \xi_j \log(g_j) - \frac{1}{\sigma} \log \left( \frac{\tau_j}{N_j} \right)}{\sigma} \right] \]  

(13)

where \( \Phi \) is the standard normal distribution function. Typically, the standard deviation of unobserved preferences (\( \sigma \)) is normalized to one in Probit models; I have chosen instead to estimate \( \sigma \) and to normalize utility to be measured in dollars, as expressed in Eq. (1).

This voting rule in Eq. (13) highlights, in a very simple way, the common pool incentives facing legislators. Conditional on tax costs (\( \tau_j \)), the probability of supporting the proposal is increasing in own-district spending (\( g_j \)). Countering this preference for higher spending, the probability of supporting the proposal is decreasing in the tax costs associated with aggregate spending (\( \tau_j \)), conditional on own-district spending (\( g_j \)).

The remainder of this paper uses evidence from Congressional voting over transportation projects to empirically document the responsiveness of legislator choices to such incentives. To the extent that legislators do respond, I will then use the estimated underlying utility parameters (\( x, \sigma, \theta \)) to uncover the efficient, or Samuelson, project sizes and the deadweight loss associated with this common pool problem.

\[ ^5 \] Since this probit equation includes the natural log of own-spending, $1 is added to public spending in all districts to account for zero spending in some districts.
5. Transportation projects

Implementation of this empirical model requires data on legislator voting records, district-specific public spending, and the distribution of tax liabilities across jurisdictions. While Congressional votes on authorization or annual appropriation bills seem likely candidates, there are several problems with this approach. First, these types of legislation often have non-fiscal policies attached to public spending provisions. These provisions tend to have differential effects across jurisdictions and thus induce both specification and measurement error. Second, in the case of authorization or appropriation bills, the assumption of a zero-spending reversion budget is suspect. When these bills fail to pass, spending is typically supplemented by continuing resolutions at prior year levels, while Congress continues the bargaining process. Thus, when deciding whether to support a proposal, legislators trade off the provisions of the bill under consideration with both temporary spending under continuing resolutions and future provisions likely to emerge from ongoing negotiations. Third, federal tax incidence data across geographic entities, such as states or congressional districts, are not readily available. The Tax Foundation (2000) has attempted to estimate the cross-state distribution of total federal tax liabilities. However, in doing so, one encounters thorny issues regarding economic incidence. For example, are the burdens of the corporate income tax borne by its shareholders, customers, or employees, each of whom may reside in different states?

To overcome these obstacles, I focus on votes over an amendment in the US House of Representatives designed to strip away 1653 transportation projects (totaling $9.5 billion) from the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), which was passed in 1998 and authorized transportation spending for 1998–2003. This stripping amendment failed by a 79–337 vote and the earmarked projects were included in the final authorization bill. For consistency with the theoretical model, I will refer to the 337 no votes on the stripping amendment as votes in support of the projects and the 79 yes votes on the stripping amendment as votes in opposition of the projects. Regarding the first problem described above, this amendment within the authorization bill had narrow

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6 For example, the 1998 transportation reauthorization contained ethanol tax breaks, drunken driving prevention incentives, air bag policies, and a ban on certain trucks.

7 The amendment also stripped away $2 billion in funding for rail transit projects, although the bill did not earmark these funds for specific projects. Rather, the bill listed projects that would be eligible to apply to the Department of Transportation for funding. The Department would then have discretion in allocating these funds. Due to this lack of information, I simply exclude these transit funds from the analysis.

8 Given that the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of supporting the projects, votes by representatives over this amendment may have been one of “position-taking”. More specifically, knowing that the amendment would fail, representatives used their votes to signal to constituents whether or not their district was a net beneficiary from the funding of these projects. So long as these signals are accurate, however, votes over the amendment will reflect the costs and benefits of these projects. Of course, representatives may use the vote as an opportunity to signal the benefits and costs of not only the stripping amendment but also of the larger transportation bill. Unfortunately, most of the funds in the larger bill were transferred to state governments, which then decided how to allocate the resources across projects within the state. Thus, it is difficult to measure the benefits of the larger bill across Congressional districts. In the end, this is an empirical question; to the extent that the empirical results do not provide evidence that votes reflect the costs and benefits of these projects, one interpretation is that representatives were sending signals to voters on the larger transportation bill.
language, restricting consideration to public spending provisions. Second, lending support
to the zero spending reversion assumption, had the amendment passed, the projects would
likely have not been included in the final legislation, since the Senate version contained no
earmarked projects and President Clinton had publicly opposed them. Of course, were the
amendment to pass, these projects could have been included in future legislation, such as
the transportation appropriations bill. Since such future legislation is unobserved, we view
these considerations as beyond the scope of this study and regard the zero reversion
assumption as a reasonable approximation. Regarding the third complication, measure-
ment of tax burdens at the jurisdiction level, transportation projects are funded through a
single tax, the federal gasoline tax, and the cross-state distribution of such tax liabilities is
readily available. While there is little formal evidence on the economic incidence of
gasoline excise taxes, Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) find a strong
relationship between after-tax consumer prices and sales taxes, suggesting that residents
of a jurisdiction in which commodity taxes are collected bear a substantial, if not complete,
share of the incidence.

6. Data

Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. As predicted by the theoretical model,
support for funding of these projects is increasing in own-district spending and
decreasing in tax burdens. Those districts supporting the projects tend to be smaller,
more urban and have longer commute times. Regarding industrial composition, those
supporting the projects tend to represent districts with employment in transportation and
communications and services, which is the omitted category in Table 1, although these
differences are quantitatively small. The remainder of this section describes the
construction of the two key variables in the empirical analysis: own-district spending
and tax costs.

6.1. District project spending

In order to match each of the projects with a Congressional district, I relied on the
project description in the bill. These descriptions provide a city or county name, which
could be matched with a district in the Congressional District Atlas (1998). For those cities
or counties with multiple districts, I used a variety of additional sources, including maps
from the Atlas, testimony before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, and press
releases from representatives’ websites. Approximately 10% of project spending could not
be assigned to a specific district, either due to the project being located in multiple districts
or insufficient information in the project description. Given this lack of information, I

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10 Federal gasoline tax revenues are deposited into the Highway Trust Fund. The 1998 reauthorization
discontinued the use of this fund for general deficit reduction, effectively creating a trust fund “firewall”, a dollar-
for-dollar correspondence between gasoline tax revenues and transportation spending.
simply exclude these projects from the analysis. Finally, since projects are funded over the 1998–2003 horizon, spending is converted into 1998 dollars using a discount rate of 2.7%, the average rate of inflation between 1990 and 1999.

6.2. Tax costs

While the theoretical model assumed that public spending was financed exclusively through central government tax revenues, these transportation projects were funded through a 80% federal share and a 20% state share; each district’s share of the total tax costs of the proposal can thus be expressed as follows:

$$\tau_j = \left( \frac{1}{5} \right) s_{j/s} \left[ g_j + \sum_{i \in S_j} g_i \right] + \left( \frac{4}{5} \right) s_{j/s} s_{j/l} G$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

11 As an alternative measure, I included multiple-district projects but, somewhat arbitrarily, equally allocated the spending between the relevant districts. Results using this measure, not reported here, are similar to the baseline results in this paper.
where $s_{j/s}$ is the district’s share of the state costs, $s_{s/f}$ is the state’s share of the federal taxes, and $S_j$ is the set of other districts within the state. Each state’s share of the federal costs ($s_{s/f}$) can be calculated using state-specific trust-fund receipts, which are available in Highway Statistics (1998) (US Department of Transportation, 1999). Unfortunately, each district’s share of state revenues ($s_{j/s}$) are not available.

I make two attempts to resolve this data limitation. The first approach, described more fully in the next paragraph, uses the cross-state variation in tax liabilities ($s_{s/f}$) to estimate the within-state variation ($s_{j/s}$). The second approach simply aggregates the two key district-level variables, voting decisions and project spending, from the Congressional district-level to the state-level. After matching these measures with the state-level data on tax liabilities, I estimate a grouped linear probability model for the sample of 50 states.

In order to estimate the within-state variation in gasoline tax receipts, I use state-level variation in tax receipts to predict district-level receipts. More specifically, state trust fund receipts are regressed on exogenous state characteristics, and the resulting coefficients are then matched with exogenous district characteristics to predict receipts at the district level. The results from this regression are provided in Table 2. Given my goal to predict aggregate receipts at the district level, which are then converted into shares, all regressors are measured as state aggregates. Only two coefficients are statistically significant, likely reflecting the small sample of 50 states. However, the $R$-squared of the regression is 0.9645, suggesting strong predictive power. Using the predicted district receipts, each district’s share of state receipts is given by:

$$s_{j/s} = \frac{\text{receipts}_j}{\text{receipts}_j + \sum_{l \in S_j} \text{receipts}_l}$$

Although the within-state variation in state tax liabilities is generated from these predicted gasoline tax receipts, it is important to note that two other sources of variation in district gasoline tax receipts in Eq. (14), namely cross-state differences in project spending and cross-state differences in tax liabilities, are taken from data sources and are thus independent of the results of this prediction approach regarding variation in tax liabilities within states.

Given that users of transportation services pay a disproportionate share of gasoline taxes, unobserved preferences for transportation services may be positively correlated with these measured tax liabilities. To address this concern of benefits taxation, the econometric analysis includes controls for observed preferences for transportation services, such as area, percent urban, commute times, and the composition of employment across industries. However, some preferences for transportation, such as geography, are difficult to measure. While this positive correlation between unobserved preferences and gasoline tax liabilities

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12 This expression implicitly assumes that state governments finance their 20% share through gasoline tax revenues. Per Table SF-1 of US Department of Transportation (1999), Highway Statistics (1998), gasoline tax revenues represent 52% of own-source revenues attributable to highway spending. Further, the two other largest revenue sources, vehicle taxes (26%) and tolls (8%), should have incidence distributions that are similar to the distribution for gasoline tax revenues since all three sources tax highway users.

13 Thus, the receipts equation represents an underlying individual demand for gasoline, which has been aggregated by summing across all state residents. Results from a per-capita specification, not reported here, provide similar results.
may lead to biased parameter estimates, this bias with respect to the tax costs coefficient should, if anything, be upwards and thus against measuring a negative relationship between tax costs and support for funding of these projects.

7. Empirical results

7.1. Probit results

The results in Table 3 provide the first evidence that legislators respond to common pool incentives to support own-district spending but to oppose tax costs associated with aggregate spending. The first column of Table 3 presents the results of a Probit voting model that includes only the two key independent variables from the theoretical model: log own-district spending and log tax costs.\textsuperscript{14} As predicted by the theoretical model, the coefficient on own-district spending is positive and statistically significant. While

\begin{table}[h!]
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Variable & Coefficient \\
\hline
Population & 0.0731 \\
& (0.0825) \\
Area & 3800.984 \\
& (81 005.33) \\
Urban & $-0.0853^a$ \\
& (0.0514) \\
Commute time & $-0.0052$ \\
& (0.0055) \\
Agriculture and mining & 2.3447\textsuperscript{b} \\
& (0.6365) \\
Construction and manufacturing & 0.1143 \\
& (0.2208) \\
Transportation and communication & 1.7484 \\
& (1.3181) \\
Trade & 0.7066 \\
& (0.7976) \\
Constant & $-12 301.83$ \\
& (35 102.25) \\
$R$-squared & 0.9645 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{flushleft}
Note: all variables measured as totals across state population. \\
\textsuperscript{a} 90\% significance. \\
\textsuperscript{b} 95\% significance.
\end{flushleft}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{14} Bootstrap standard errors, which are provided in Table 3, reflect the additional uncertainty arising from the inclusion of log tax costs, which is a generated regressor. One hundred replications were taken from the set of Congressional districts, and these observations were used in both the first-stage state-level tax receipts regressions and in the second-stage Probit model. To reflect the composition of the bootstrap sample of Congressional districts, state-level observations in the tax receipts regressions were weighted, with the weights equal to the number of within-state Congressional districts that were represented in the bootstrap sample divided by actual number of Congressional districts within the state.
legislators support higher own-district spending, they attempt to restrain aggregate spending and the associated tax costs, as the coefficient on tax costs is negative and statistically significant. These results demonstrate that legislators do act on incentives, which are inherent in a system of local public goods financed from a national tax base, to boost own-district spending while restraining the tax costs associated with aggregate spending. The remainder of this paper provides evidence on the robustness of this result and then, having found that legislators respond to common pool incentives, estimates the efficient allocation of public goods and the deadweight loss associated with this common pool problem.

While the theoretical model does not incorporate heterogeneity in preferences for public goods, such heterogeneity may cast doubt on the assumption that unobserved preferences $\xi_j$ are independent of spending proposals. In particular, both legislative processes that were examined predict a positive correlation between preferences for public spending ($\xi_j$) and own-district public spending ($g_j$), leading to an upward bias in the project spending coefficient. Under legislative bargaining, proposers have an incentive to form coalitions that consist of those districts with a stronger preference for public services. $^{15}$ Under a norm of universalism, each representative chooses spending such that the marginal jurisdiction benefit equals the marginal jurisdiction cost; thus, districts with a strong preference for public goods will demand higher spending in their district.

$^{15}$ See, for example, Chari et al. (1997) and Coate (1997).
Two approaches are taken to address such endogeneity: inclusion of observable measures of preferences for transportation services and a state fixed effects model. First, the second column of Table 3 reflects the results of a Probit model that includes the following exogenous district characteristics: area, percent urban, commute times, and industry employment composition variables. The inclusion of these district characteristics, which capture observable heterogeneity in preferences for transportation projects, changes the coefficients on the two key budgetary variables, own-district spending and tax costs, only slightly. Further, none of these preference measures are statistically significant.

### 7.2. Fixed effects logit results

To the extent that unobserved preferences for transportation services vary only across states, the inclusion of state fixed effects will correct for any endogeneity. Although incorporating fixed effects into probit models is not feasible, Chamberlain (1980) provides a fixed effects logit estimator and the third column of Table 3 provides such estimates. Since the estimator uses only variation in votes within states, 126 observations from states without such variation are dropped. Including these fixed effects, the own-spending coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. While the coefficient on tax costs remains negative, it is statistically insignificant, perhaps reflecting the loss in power from both dropping observations and relying exclusively on tax cost variation within states, which is constructed from the state-level tax receipts regressions in Table 2. Finally, the district characteristics are all statistically insignificant in this case.

### 7.3. Goodness of fit

Representative voting decisions may reflect considerations other than the project benefits and associated tax costs. For example, representatives whose districts fared poorly under the proposed allocation of funds may have still supported the committee and its proposal in the hopes of securing funds for their district in future legislation. To address this issue, three measures of predictive power, or goodness of fit, are provided. The pseudo $R^2$, presented near the bottom of Table 3, ranges between 0.1836 in the fixed effects logit model to 0.2700 for the probit model with exogenous variables. Second, Table 4 provides marginal effects for the two key independent variables. In the Probit model with exogenous variables, a one-standard deviation increase in the log of own-spending increases the probability of voting yes by 16 percentage points. For tax costs, a one-standard deviation increase decreases the probability of voting yes by 7 percentage points. Finally, the Probit model with exogenous variables correctly predicts

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16 Alternatively, one could use a simultaneous equations probit model. However, it is difficult to identify variables that affect federal spending within the district but not voting decisions of federal representatives. See Knight (2002) for an analysis using the characteristics of federal representatives as an instrument for federal spending in an analysis of spending decisions by state officials.

17 Marginal effects are not available for the fixed effects logit model since the state fixed effects are not uncovered in the estimation procedure.
the votes for 87% of representatives.\textsuperscript{18} In summary, while these project spending and tax cost measures certainly do not explain all of the variation in voting behavior, these three tests suggest that such measures do have effects that are both economically and statistically significant.

### 7.4. Additional robustness checks

While project spending and tax costs are both economically and statistically significant determinants of voting behavior, legislator characteristics may also play a role in voting decisions. Table 5 provides results from a Probit model that includes the following legislator characteristics: an indicator variable for party affiliation, tenure (defined as the number of years the representative has served in the US House), and an indicator for chairing a non-transportation committee, which may capture whether or not the representative is a House leader.\textsuperscript{19} As shown, Republicans were significantly less likely to support funding for these projects, suggesting that ideology played an important role. Neither tenure nor chairing a committee significantly affected the results. While party affiliation certainly plays an important role in voting decisions, the coefficient on own-spending remains positive and statistically significant in all cases and the coefficient on tax costs remains negative, although it is statistically insignificant in two out of the three specifications in Table 5.

Having found evidence consistent with the common tax pool problem, a key hypothesized disadvantage to the centralized provision of local public goods, a natural question is whether there are potentially offsetting advantages to centralization. The federalism literature has focused on the ability of centralized governments to internalize cross-jurisdiction spillovers.\textsuperscript{20} Consider next an extended specification of utility from

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\textsuperscript{18} Using standard procedures, this analysis predicts that a representative will vote yes if the predicted probability exceeds one-half.

\textsuperscript{19} Representation on the transportation authorization committee could not be included in the Probit model because all committee members voted in favor of funding the projects. Rather than including this variable, I estimated the Probit model using only non-committee members in order to evaluate the role of committee membership. The results, not reported here, were qualitatively similar to those in the baseline results, suggesting that committee membership alone is not driving the results.

\textsuperscript{20} Previous empirical analyses of spillovers include Case et al. (1993), who examine state government spending in a decentralized setting and find strong evidence of spillovers, even after allowing for common random shocks among neighbors.
public goods, which allows constituents to receive utility from spending in neighboring jurisdictions:

\[ H(g_{j}, \mathbf{g}_{-j}) = \gamma g_{j}^{2} \prod_{l \in I_{j}} g_{l}^{\beta} \]  

(16)

where \( \Gamma_{j} \) denotes the set of neighbors and \( \beta \) captures spillover benefits.\(^{21}\) Incorporating spillovers, the Probit model can be expressed as follows:

\[ \Pr(\text{support}) = \Phi \left[ \frac{\theta}{\sigma} X_{j} + \frac{\alpha}{\sigma} \log(g_{j}) + \frac{\beta}{\sigma} \sum_{l \in I_{j}} \log(g_{l}) - \frac{1}{\sigma} \log \left( \frac{\tau}{N_{j}} \right) \right] \]  

(17)

Neighbors are defined as the set of districts sharing a common border. These borders were identified using the map Congressional Districts of the 105th Congress of the United States (1998). As shown in Table 5, the coefficient on spending in border districts is small and statistically insignificant across all three specifications, suggesting that project spillovers across congressional districts are not substantial. The coefficients on the two key measures, own-district spending and tax costs, are similar to those in the baseline results of Table 3.

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\(^{21}\) One drawback of this Cobb–Douglass specification is that utility is zero when spending is zero in any of the neighboring jurisdictions. To address this issue, I tried an alternative specification \( H(g_{j}, \mathbf{g}_{-j}) = \gamma g_{j} G_{-j}^{\beta} \), where \( G_{-j} \) is sum, rather than the product, of spending in all neighboring districts. Results using this specification were similar, with \( \beta \) positive, but small and statistically insignificant.
7.5. State-level analysis

As noted above, data on gasoline tax liabilities are available only at the state level. To address this data limitation, this section provides an analysis in which all three key variables, voting decisions, project spending, and tax liabilities, are measured at the state level. Relative to the analysis at the Congressional-district level, this state-level analysis has several advantages. First, the state-level analysis avoids the need to predict tax liabilities at the district level. Second, even with accurate measures of district tax payments, shopping across Congressional district borders for gasoline may create a divergence between district payments and district incidence. While consumers certainly shop for gasoline across state boundaries, this cross-state shopping is surely less pervasive than cross-border shopping at the Congressional-district level. These advantages of the state-level analysis, however, should be weighed against two possibly offsetting disadvantages, relative to the analysis at the district level. First, there is a loss of information in aggregating data on voting decisions and project spending from the district-level to the state-level. Second, there is a loss in statistical power from the reduction in the sample size from 416 Congressional districts to 50 states.

The following state-level grouped linear probability model is estimated:

\[
E[\text{proportion}(\text{support})_{s}] = \theta \frac{X_s}{N_s} + \alpha_1 \frac{g_s}{N_s} + \alpha_2 \frac{\tau_s}{N_s}
\]

where the left-hand side variable is the proportion of representatives from state \(s\) supporting the projects and the two key right-hand side variables, state project spending and state tax costs, are at the state level and are measured in per-capita terms.\(^{22}\)

As shown in Table 6, the simplest specification, which includes only a constant term in the vector of observable characteristics \((X_s)\), is consistent with the results from the Congressional district analysis. Support for funding of the projects among Congressional delegations is increasing in own-state spending but is decreasing in state gasoline tax costs associated with aggregate spending. As a robustness check, column 2 controls for observable state characteristics (area, percent urban, commute times, and the cross-industry composition of employment). In this case, own-spending within the state continues to have a positive and statistically significant effect on Congressional delegation support for the proposal; tax costs continue to have a negative effect, although this result is statistically insignificant, perhaps reflecting the loss in power from the reduction in the sample size from 416 Congressional districts to 50 states. Columns 3 and 4 control for delegation characteristics (proportion Republican, average tenure, and the proportion chairing non-transportation committees). As shown, delegation support for the projects is increasing in state spending in both columns, and this result is statistically significant. The measured relationship between tax costs and delegation support is negative, although

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\(^{22}\) This model is consistent with the following underlying linear probability model: \(\Pr(\text{support}) = \theta (X_s/N_s) + \alpha_1 (g_s/N_s) + \alpha_2 (\tau_s/N_s)\). Taking state averages of both sides of this linear probability model, and noting that Congressional district populations within states are equal, one can derive the grouped linear probability model in Eq. (18).
the result in the final column, which controls for characteristics of the state as well as characteristics of Congressional delegations, is statistically insignificant.

8. Welfare analysis

Theoretical analyses have focused on political inefficiencies in the allocation of local public goods resulting from common tax pool incentives in central legislatures. Having found evidence that representatives respond to such common pool incentives at both the Congressional-district level and the state-level, this section uses the parameter estimates from the preceding empirical analysis to test for the existence of and to gauge the magnitude of such inefficiencies in the allocation of public goods.

8.1. Estimates of underlying parameter

Using Eq. (13), Probit coefficients can be converted into estimates of the underlying parameters of the theoretical model. For example, the implied value of $\sigma$ is given by inverting the tax cost coefficient and switching the sign. Using the baseline Probit coefficients in Table 3, these implied parameters are given in Table 7. The implied $\alpha$ ranges from 0.0790 to 0.1318, suggesting significant diminishment in marginal utility from these transportation projects. Taken together, these implied parameter estimates support the model specification, as $\sigma$ is positive, and $\alpha$ is both positive and lies between zero and unity. Note that these restrictions on the parameter set were in no way imposed by the Probit estimator.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key parameters, grouped (state-level) linear probability models</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State characteristics</td>
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<td>Delegation characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Own-spending (per-capita)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(per-capita)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax costs (per-capita)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(per-capita)</td>
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<td>$R^2$-squared</td>
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Table 7

<table>
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<th>Implied parameters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probit</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Implied $\alpha$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implied $\sigma$</td>
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</table>
8.2. Estimates of Samuelson funding levels

Using parameter estimates from the baseline probit model with exogenous variables, I next calculate the efficient distribution of highway projects. Abstracting from the stochastic component ($\xi_j = 0$), the Samuelson condition in Eq. (2) is given by:

$$N_j \exp(\theta X_j) x g_j^{2-1} = 1 \quad (19)$$

Solving Eq. (19) for own-district spending ($g_j$) yields the Samuelson project sizes:

$$g_j^S = \left[ N_j x \exp(\theta X_j) \right]^{1/(1-\alpha)} \quad (20)$$

These Samuelson project sizes can also be interpreted as those chosen by individual representatives forced to fully internalize the tax costs of public spending in their district.

As shown in Table 8, while those districts represented on the transportation authorization committee received nearly three times the level of spending in other districts, the welfare-maximizing levels are only a fraction higher. Further, while 47% of those districts without committee representation were under-provided, only 10% of those with committee representation were under-provided. If committee representation confers political power, this welfare analysis confirms the theoretical prediction of the legislative bargaining model, which demonstrated a misallocation from politically weak to politically powerful districts. While several jurisdictions are under-provided, the majority are over-provided and, therefore, aggregate actual spending of $7.5 billion significantly exceeds the $5.0 billion aggregate efficient spending.

8.3. Deadweight loss estimates

For these over-provided districts, the marginal national costs of provision exceed the marginal national benefits, while the opposite holds for under-provided districts. Fig. 1 depicts the deadweight losses associated with this misallocation. This deadweight loss can be expressed analytically as follows:

$$\text{DWL} = N_j \exp(\theta X_j) [(g_j^S)^2 - (g_j)^2] - [g_j^S - g_j] \quad (21)$$

The estimated deadweight loss, provided in Table 8, totals $7.2 billion, or 96 cents for every dollar spent on these transportation projects. Even under the maintained assumption

<table>
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<th>Welfare analysis (district averages)</th>
<th>Committee representation</th>
<th>No representation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Actual spending</td>
<td>$38 460 510</td>
<td>$13 881 810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuelson spending</td>
<td>$12 472 150</td>
<td>$11 880 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent over-spend</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadweight loss</td>
<td>$14 509 140</td>
<td>$17 769 970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-spenders</td>
<td>$13 015 350</td>
<td>$32 855 960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-spenders</td>
<td>$14 670 010</td>
<td>$4 341 781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of legislators perfectly representing constituent preferences, there is significant deadweight loss from a national perspective due to the incentives created by concentrated project benefits and dispersed tax costs. This estimate is much higher than Inman (1988), who measured deadweight loss at 17 cents for every dollar spent. Inman’s lack of cross-sectional data may have caused downward bias in deadweight loss estimates since under-spending districts and over-spending districts tend to cancel out one another when aggregating spending across all districts. On the other hand, the deadweight loss estimate here is potentially overstated here if state or local governments supplemented federal spending for those under-provided districts.

9. Conclusion

In summary, this paper uses Congressional votes over transportation project funding in order to test for common pool incentives. This empirical voting analysis is shown to be consistent with the two most commonly-used legislative processes in the theoretical literature and is thus quite general. The empirical results are consistent with legislator reactions to common pool incentives: the probability of supporting funding for these projects is increasing in own-district spending but is decreasing in the tax costs associated with aggregate spending. Having found that legislators do respond to common pool incentives, I then use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level of public goods, which suggest over-spending in aggregate, especially in politically powerful districts, and large associated deadweight loss.

While I find significant deadweight loss from federal provision of these transportation services, it is important to note that this critique of centralized provision is specific to the projects under consideration. National networks, such as the interstate highway system or
Amtrak, may have more prevalent spillover effects than the projects considered here and may, therefore, be provided more efficiently in a centralized setting. Similarly, other public policies, such as regulations, may exhibit significant uniformity under centralized assignment, a disadvantage of centralization that has been the focus of the economic federalism literature.23

Given this caveat, I have found significant costs to centralized provision of these transportation projects. It is often assumed that central governments act as a benevolent social planner, maximizing national welfare. This analysis casts doubt on that assumption, demonstrating that the federal government consists of agents facing incentives to serve local, rather than national, interests. This clash between national and local interests, combined with asymmetries in political power, leads to a misallocation of economic resources from politically weak to politically powerful districts.

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References


23 See Oates (1972, 1999). Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2001) study liquor regulations, which tend to be set uniformly under centralization. Their primary finding is that states with more heterogeneous preferences tend to decentralize decision-making to local governments.