

# FASE: Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emanations

## Abstract

*While all computation can potentially generate electromagnetic (EM) side-channel signals, some of the strongest and farthest-propagating signals are created when an existing strong periodic signal (e.g. a clock signal) becomes stronger or weaker (amplitude-modulated) depending on processor or memory activity. However, modern systems create emanations at thousands of different frequencies, so it is a difficult, error-prone, and time-consuming task to find those few emanations that are AM-modulated by processor/memory activity.*

*This paper presents a methodology for rapidly finding such activity-modulated signals, using specially designed micro-benchmarks to create recognizable spectral patterns, and then processing the recorded spectra to identify those signals that exhibit AM-modulation behavior. We apply this method to several computer systems and do find such modulated signals. To illustrate how our methodology can benefit side-channel security research and practice, we also identify the physical mechanisms behind those signals, and find that the strongest ones are created by voltage regulators, memory refreshes, and DRAM clocks. Our results indicate that separate signals may carry different information about system activity, potentially enhancing an attacker’s capability to extract sensitive information. We also confirm that our methodology correctly separates emanated signals that are affected by specific processor or memory activities from those that are not.*

## 1. Introduction

Side-channels are a powerful class of attacks that avoid traditional access controls and protections by exploiting physical or microarchitectural side-effects of computation rather than the computation’s overt (program- and ISA-specified) functionality. Examples of reported side-channels include those that infer secrets (e.g. cryptographic keys) by observing power consumption [8, 20, 25, 27], sound [5, 12, 33], electromagnetic (EM) emanations [2, 17, 24], behavior under faults [9, 19], and performance of shared caches [6, 36, 38], instruction caches, branch predictors [1], etc.

Side channels that exploit shared hardware resources are relatively well understood in the microarchitecture community, and both hardware and software solutions have been proposed to alleviate or even completely close these side channels. Side channels based on physical side-effects (power consumption, sound, or EM emanations) are more difficult for microarchitects and programmers to alleviate, in part because the relationship between computational behavior and the resulting side-channel signal is very complex and poorly understood. Among these, EM emanations are potentially the most complex: the emanated signals may theoretically be anywhere in the EM spectrum, and signals at different frequencies

may provide attackers with insight into different aspects of computational activity. In essence, EM side channels have many sub-channels that the attacker can potentially exploit.

Unfortunately, the EM side channel is also among the least risky for attackers to exploit because EM emanations can be covertly recorded from a distance without requiring physical modifications, physical connections, or system access. In contrast, exploits based on shared-resource side channels require attackers to run their “snooper” code in the same system as the victim programs. Power analysis attacks require power measurement equipment to be attached to the system’s power supply, preferably at a point close to the processor where the rapid changes in the signal are not filtered out.

For both attacks and mitigation efforts, the first step is to identify signals that have some dependence on the secret information of interest. For example, differential power analysis (DPA) attacks [25] determine which time offsets during an encryption operation give the most information about a particular secret key bit. In EM attacks, one typically first identifies a range of frequencies where the signal varies depending on a secret key bit, then demodulates the signal at those frequencies or filters out non-useful frequencies [34, 16, 28]. Many descriptions of successful side channel attacks only briefly or implicitly address the underlying causes and mechanisms resulting in information leakage. This is because finding an information carrying signal and determining its cause are separate processes, and determining causation is not vital to extracting secret information.

However, mitigation is difficult without causation. Without a systematic approach to identification and causation, causation is a time-consuming trial-and-error process where one makes an educated guess as to the likely sources of information leakage, fixes the hypothesized problem, and sees whether leakage has been reduced.

Systematic instruction-level causation analysis for EM signals caused by direct emanations [3] has recently been developed [11]. However, that methodology depends on generating periodic activity at a frequency where precise signal-level measurements can be performed, i.e. where there is no interference from external signals such as radio transmitters, or from system-generated noise and interference. Computer systems have numerous periodic activities whose period is independent of program activity, but which are modulated by program activity. Identification of those periodic signals that are modulated by specific types of program activity (e.g. LLC misses) has thus far remained an open problem.

This paper describes a methodology we call FASE (Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emanations). FASE systematically and efficiently identifies periodic signals whose amplitudes change as a result of specific changes in system

activity, i.e. signals that are amplitude-modulated by system activity. Our methodology uses micro-benchmarks that cause repetitive changes in processor and memory activity, then processes the resulting EM signals to automatically find spectral patterns that correspond to amplitude modulation. To eliminate signals that match AM-modulation but do not respond to changes in program activity, FASE uses several different measurements with slightly different activity patterns.

Our FASE approach for discovering AM-modulated signals is highly effective. The frequencies included in our experiments include the entire AM radio spectrum, and were performed without shielding in a major metropolitan area with hundreds of radio stations nearby. Furthermore, computer systems produce thousands of periodic signals that are not modulated by system activity. FASE successfully rejected all such signals, while reporting the small number of remaining signals that are indeed modulated by the tested system activities. We validated the automated FASE procedure through manual inspection of all rejected signals that are similarly strong (or stronger) than the FASE-reported ones, confirming that these rejected signals are either externally generated or do not measurably respond to changes in system activity.

To demonstrate the usefulness of FASE and to gain additional insight into the potential EM side-channel vulnerabilities of modern processor and memory systems, we then performed additional analysis to identify the source of each periodic signal and the mechanism by which it is modulated. We first identified the source of each signal using short-range probes to find the apparent origin of the signal within the system. Then we performed detailed examinations of the data sheets and specifications for the components nearby to help explain how the periodic signal is generated, and finally we performed additional micro-benchmark experiments to identify the mechanism that modulates each signal.

We discovered three main types of signals. All of the systems we examined have very strong signals emanating from their switching voltage regulators and power filtering components, where the frequency of the emanated periodic signal is equal to or a multiple (harmonic) of the specified switching frequency of the regulator (usually somewhere between 200kHz and 500kHz). These signals are being modulated by variations in power consumption in the voltage regulator’s load (the processor, memory or other system components), and they allow attackers to carry out the equivalent of power side-channel attacks from a distance, without the need to place probes within the system. Voltage regulators for different components (processor cores, memory controller, and memory itself) often have different switching frequencies, which gives the attacker component-by-component power consumption information. Among voltage regulator designers, generated EM noise is a known problem [15], but we are not aware of any work that explores the implications of having the power consumption information embedded in the emanations caused by regulator switching.

Another type of signal is generated by periodic memory refreshes, and this signal is amplitude-modulated by memory access activity, i.e. it provides the attacker with an at-a-distance readout of how often the memory is used. Unlike voltage regulators, which can be considered an external problem by processor/memory architects, these refresh-related signals are entirely caused by activity within the purview of memory controller designers, and are likely to be completely eliminated by appropriate modifications to how memory refresh is carried out.

At higher frequencies, FASE discovers clock signals and their multiples (harmonics) that are modulated by activity in the clock’s domain. Because most clocks run at frequencies that are subject to non-interference regulations, they are subjected to measures (such as spread-spectrum clocking) that spread the resulting EM emanations over a range of frequencies [22]. In spite of this, FASE discovers such signals and provides insight into the nature of the activity that modulates them. In particular, we identify that DRAM clocks generate EM emanations which are relatively strongly modulated by the amount of DRAM activity. Interestingly, in the systems we used, processor clocking generates relatively weak spread-spectrum signals but we do not observe any variation in these signals in response to processor activity.


FASE can potentially be used to find which parts of a system leak information about some aspect of program activity. This can be used to reduce the strength of such periodic signals and to weaken their modulation, i.e. disrupt the connection between program behavior and the variations in activity that modulates such signals. Using memory refresh signals as an example, this would involve randomization of the interval between refresh commands, while modulation-weakening efforts might involve careful scheduling of memory accesses to avoid their interaction with refresh activity, or even program changes, to ensure that when processing sensitive data the program’s memory activity is independent of the data values.

## 2. Methodology for FASE


### 2.1. Overview of AM-Modulation in Computer Systems

Our FASE methodology relies on how the spectrum of a periodic carrier signal is affected by a modulating activity to identify signals that are AM-modulated by system activity. The spectral properties of AM-modulated signals are well-understood [32], but some of the issues that FASE has to deal with are not encountered in traditional uses of AM signals (i.e. telecommunications). To understand how FASE works and why it works so well, we first briefly review the general properties of AM modulation, and then review how these are affected by the irregularities of “accidental” side-channel transmission.

Figure 1 shows the spectrum of an ideal carrier signal (at frequency  $f_c$ ) that is modulated by an ideal sinusoidal signal whose frequency is  $f_{alt}$ . In addition to the signal at the carrier frequency, this spectrum has strong “side-band” signals at frequencies that are  $f_{alt}$  away from it, i.e. at frequencies




**Figure 1: Sinusoidal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal.**  $f_c - f_{alt}$  and  $f_c + f_{alt}$ . This would be the spectral pattern to look for when a periodic signal has a perfectly stable frequency and is modulated by a pattern of activity with a fixed period of  $T_{alt} = 1/f_{alt}$  with no variation in timing. None of these ideal conditions are actually present in our signals, but it helps our explanation to introduce non-idealities one at a time.



**Figure 2: Sinusoidal carrier modulated by an arbitrary signal.**


Figure 2 shows the spectrum of an ideal sinusoidal carrier modulated by a realistic signal, such as program activity. The two side-band signals now correspond to the spectrum of the modulating activity. The tallest spike in each side-band signal corresponds to the dominant periodic behavior of that activity, the smaller “bumps” in each side-band signal indicate other periods of repetition which are common, etc. This type of non-ideality is typical for program-generated repetitive behavior: for a given task, the time each repetition of the task takes is not always the same, but there are often several commonly-occurring execution times among the repetitions. For example, in multi-processor or SMT systems the repetitions of a loop may take longer or shorter depending on timing variations due to resource contention with other running threads.



**Figure 3: Non-ideal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal.**

Figure 3 shows a non-ideal carrier modulated by an ideal signal. The spectrum for the carrier is now spread around its nominal value and this spreading is also present in the two side-band signals. Even though  $f_{alt}$  is perfectly stable, the side-bands at  $f_c - f_{alt}$  and  $f_c + f_{alt}$  will “inherit” the instability of  $f_c$ . Many periodic signals are spread out in this manner in computer systems. For example, spread-spectrum clocking


results in deliberate spreading of the clock signal’s frequency. Additionally, many periodic activities (e.g. voltage regulator switching) do not require precise timing, so they often use less stable (cheaper/simpler) oscillators.



**Figure 4: Non-ideal carrier modulated by an arbitrary signal.**

Finally, combining the non-ideal carrier (Figure 3) with non-ideal modulating activity (Figure 2) produces a spectrum like the one shown in Figure 4.

Several other non-ideal properties of computer systems are manifested in measured spectra. Randomly timed switching activity causes broadband noise, and this noise appears as gently rolling “hills” and “valleys” in the spectrum. Additionally, the spectrum contains periodic signals from both inside and outside the system that are either not modulated at all, or that *are* AM-modulated (e.g. AM radio broadcasting) but not by program activity. The overall result is a spectrum like the one shown in Figure 5. Even if we know the carrier and program-activity frequencies it is hard to decide whether this spectrum contains an activity-modulated signal by visual inspection. Our FASE methodology uses several specially generated program activities in conjunction with a heuristic carrier likelihood<sup>1</sup> function to automate the decision process and overcome these problems.



**Figure 5: The same non-ideal carrier and arbitrary side-band signal as Figure 4 with noise and other sources present.**

Many periodic carrier signals in computer systems are generated by digital circuits and clocks, and therefore have sharp transitions that are best approximated by rectangular pulses instead of the sinusoidal waves used as carriers in communications systems. The spectrum of a pulse train with an arbitrary duty cycle is equivalent via Fourier analysis to a set of sinusoids with various amplitudes at  $f_c$  and its multiples (harmonics). In other words, for each carrier signal generated by a digital circuit or clock, additional carrier signals will also be present at  $2f_c$ ,  $3f_c$ ,  $4f_c$ ,  $5f_c$ , etc. As the duty cycle of a signal approaches 50%, the amplitudes of the odd-numbered harmonics ( $f_c$ ,  $3f_c$ ,  $5f_c$ , etc.) reach their maximum, while

<sup>1</sup>Likelihood here does not refer to probability estimates.

amplitudes of the even harmonics ( $2f_c, 4f_c$ , etc) trend toward zero. For a small duty cycle (i.e.  $< 10\%$ ) the magnitudes of the first few harmonics (both even and odd) decay approximately linearly. Finally, note that these observations imply the amplitudes of all the harmonics are a function of the duty cycle. If program activity modulates the duty cycle of a periodic signal while keeping its period constant (i.e. causes pulse width modulation), all of the signal’s harmonics are amplitude-modulated and consequently will be identified by our FASE methodology.

## 2.2. Creating System Activity at Controlled Frequencies

The spectrum of a modulated signal around a carrier frequency  $f_c$  is a lot easier to recognize if we generate periodic processor and/or memory activity that repeats  $f_{alt}$  times per second. Micro-benchmarks for generating such periodic activity have already been proposed for demonstrating the presence of EM emanations from computer systems [39] and for creating measurable periodic signals at arbitrary frequencies [11]. A simplified version of one such micro-benchmark is shown in Figure 6. The loop beginning on line 2 performs one activity (activity X), and the loop beginning on line 8 performs another activity (activity Y). The outer loop repeatedly alternates activities X and Y, creating periodically changing activity whose period equals the execution time for one iteration of the outer loop. This alternation period  $T_{alt}$  is the inverse of the frequency  $f_{alt} = \frac{1}{T_{alt}}$ . Note that prior uses of similar micro-benchmarks [39, 11] used this alternation to *generate a carrier* signal at some chosen frequency  $f_c$ , while we use this alternation at  $f_{alt}$  to measure AM-modulation of any potential *carrier signals intrinsically generated* (and emanated) by the system.

```

1  while (true) {
2      // Execute the X activity
3      for (i=0; i<inst_x_count; i++) {
4          ptr1=(ptr1&~mask1) | ((ptr1+offset)&mask1);
5          // The X-instruction, e.g. a load from L2 cache
6          value=*ptr1;
7      }
8      // Execute the Y activity
9      for (i=0; i<inst_y_count; i++) {
10         ptr2=(ptr2&~mask2) | ((ptr2+offset)&mask2);
11         // The Y-instruction, e.g. a store from L2 cache
12         *ptr2=value;
13     }
14 }

```

**Figure 6: Pseudo-code to generate the X/Y alternation activity.**

As an example of how the alternation of activity can AM-modulate a carrier signal, consider the DRAM clock. Activity X may involve many LLC misses, so it results in substantial DRAM activity. During the X-activity half-period, the DRAM clock drives a lot of switching activity (current flowing through wires), resulting in strong emanations at the DRAM clock frequency. If activity Y has little DRAM activity, much less switching activity is driven by the DRAM clock, generating much weaker emanations at the DRAM clock frequency. Therefore the amplitude of the emanations at the DRAM clock frequency will change with period  $T_{alt}$  (frequency  $f_{alt}$ ), which means that emanations at the DRAM clock frequency will be

AM-modulated by the X/Y periodic behavior whose frequency is  $f_{alt}$ .

It is important to note that switching between activity X and activity Y is abrupt and that we adjust the `inst_x_count` and `inst_y_count` variables so that activity X and activity Y are each done for half of the alternation period (50% duty cycle). Thus the spectrum of each side-band around the carrier’s frequency  $f_c$  will also have odd-numbered harmonics of the alternation frequency, i.e. the side-band signal will have a spikes/peaks at  $f_c \pm 3f_{alt}, f_c \pm 5f_{alt}$ , etc. in addition to  $f_c \pm f_{alt}$ . Also note that the alternation frequency  $f_{alt}$  can be controlled by changing the loop counts, allowing us to create several spectra (with different  $f_{alt}$ ). These spectra can be considered jointly in an effort to distinguish which carriers are modulated by a particular activity.

FASE results for different X/Y pairings usually provide a strong indication of which aspect of the system modulates a given carrier signal. For example, when a signal at a particular frequency  $f_c$  is modulated by X/Y alternation between memory activity and any on-chip activity, but remains unmodulated when alternating between two types of on-chip activity, the carrier signal and/or its modulation mechanism are likely related to the memory controller, processor-memory communication, or the DRAM memory itself.

## 2.3. FASE: Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emanations

As indicated in Section 2.1, discovery of activity-modulated carriers by “eyeballing” the spectrum without generating controlled system activity would be very difficult. Theoretically, one could look for a narrow spikes (potential carriers) with symmetric side-bands on either side as shown in Figure 2, but this approach is not practical due to the non-ideal nature of unintentional carriers, the interference of other signals, and noise as shown in Figure 5.

Runs with arbitrary programs or benchmarks may provide some information about the frequency and properties of carriers that are modulated by system activity. However, it would be difficult to determine the spectral properties of such arbitrary system activity. Even if we are somehow given spectral information about activity in an application, it would be hard to recognize whether the side-band signals around each potential carrier match that spectrum with high confidence because 1) amplitude modulation combines (convolves) the spectrum of the possibly non-ideal carrier signal with the likely vaguely shaped spectrum of the benchmark, and 2) recognition of such a complicated overall spectrum is further hampered by noise and unrelated signals that overlap with portions of the modulated-signal spectrum. We cannot directly control the shape of a system’s intrinsic carrier signals, but we can use the micro-benchmarks described in Section 2.2 to generate system activity that is as close to a perfect square wave as possible. This results in side-band signals whose spectrum has a shape that closely matches the shape of the carrier signal they are modulating, with a  $f_{alt}$  separation between the carrier

and its two side-bands in the spectrum. This could be used to find carriers automatically by looking for such right and left side-band signals because they always appear as peaks in the spectrum separated by  $2f_{alt}$  with the carrier peak half-way between them. However, this simplistic approach has a number of drawbacks. First, the alternation activity is a square wave which has many odd-numbered harmonics ( $f_c \pm f_{alt}$ ,  $f_c \pm 3f_{alt}$ , etc.) that are separated by exactly  $2f_{alt}$ . This makes it difficult to attribute the spikes in the side-band signals to particular carrier frequencies, creating many false positive indications of carrier locations. Second, for some values of  $f_{alt}$ , some of the side-band signals may be overwhelmed by noise and unrelated signals, which would result in many false negatives. Third, computer systems contain many components with periodic activity, so unmodulated signals are often concentrated at specific frequencies. Thus it is reasonably likely that at least some such spectral peaks will be nearly  $2f_{alt}$  apart resulting in more false positives.

Many of the problems caused by the harmonics of the alternation signal and by the existence of unrelated signals can be solved by performing multiple measurements with different alternation frequencies, e.g.  $f_{alt_1}$ ,  $f_{alt_2} = f_{alt_1} + f_{\Delta}$ ,  $f_{alt_3} = f_{alt_1} + 2f_{\Delta}$ , etc., where  $f_{\Delta}$  is typically small compared to  $f_{alt}$ . Figure 7 shows five recorded spectra with  $f_{alt_1} = 43.3\text{kHz}$  and  $f_{\Delta} = 0.5\text{kHz}$  around a carrier signal at  $f_c = 1.0235\text{MHz}$ . To avoid clutter, Figure 7 only shows the three parts of the spectrum that contain the left sidebands, the carrier, and the right sidebands of the signals. In other words, it does not show about 40kHz worth of spectrum to the left and right of the carrier. Note how the peaks in the sidebands move by  $f_{\Delta}$  as the alternation frequency  $f_{alt}$  changes by  $f_{\Delta}$ .

Conceptually, the FASE methodology for finding activity-modulated carriers and determining the frequencies of such carriers is now as follows. First, perform several measurements (we use five) with different  $f_{alt}$  frequencies as described above. Second, look for a shape in the spectrum that moves by  $f_{\Delta}$  or  $-f_{\Delta}$  in successive measurements. This approach eliminates external signals and system-emanated periodic signals that do not correspond to activity-induced AM modulation because such signals stay at the same frequency as  $f_{alt}$  changes. It also only detects the first harmonic of  $f_{alt}$  to the right and left of the carrier. Recall that the alternation activity changes abruptly and may not have a perfect 50% duty cycle, so the spectrum of the modulated signal has side-band signals not only at  $f_c \pm f_{alt}$  but also at  $f_c \pm 2f_{alt}$ ,  $f_c \pm 3f_{alt}$ , etc. However, only the first harmonic ( $f_c \pm f_{alt}$ ) moves by  $f_{\Delta}$  in the spectrum as we change  $f_{alt}$  by  $f_{\Delta}$ . The other harmonics in the side-band move by  $2f_{\Delta}$ ,  $3f_{\Delta}$ , etc.

Once we have identified a first harmonic side-band signal in this way, we can determine whether it is the left side-band (moves by  $-f_{\Delta}$ ) or the right one (moves by  $f_{\Delta}$ ), and we can compute the frequency of its carrier signal. The carrier is located at  $f - f_{alt_i}$  if the modulated peaks are detected at frequency  $f$  and if  $f_{alt_1}$  is to the left of  $f_{alt_5}$  (or at  $f + f_{alt_i}$  if

$f_{alt_1}$  is to the right of  $f_{alt_5}$ ). Note that detection of a single harmonic of  $f_{alt}$  in a single side-band is sufficient to detect a carrier frequency, i.e. we do not need all of them to find the frequency of the carrier. Also, note that any harmonic (e.g.  $\pm 2\text{nd}$ ,  $\pm 3\text{rd}$ , etc.) is sufficient since the observed spacing between the side-band peaks is unique for each harmonic (e.g.  $2h_{\Delta}$  for the positive 2nd harmonic,  $-3h_{\Delta}$  for the negative third harmonic, etc.). This comes in handy if one or more of the signals overlap with other signals or unusually strong noise – with five measurements we get a total of ten side-band signals (two side-bands per measurement) at different frequencies, so we can reliably detect the presence of modulation and the frequency of the carrier even if several of the side-band signals are obscured as shown in the left side-band of Figure 11. Also note that this approach does not rely on actually observing a peak for the carrier signal. This is important when the carrier itself is located in a crowded part of the spectrum – as long as at least a few side-band signals “land” in a “quiet” part of the spectrum, we can deduce the exact frequency of the carrier.

The antennae we used to capture signals from computer systems were designed to detect broadcast radio signals over a wide frequency range, so they pick up these interfering signals very well. It is critical to note that FASE is intended to identify only AM signals which are modulated by *our micro-benchmark*. Although AM radio signals are amplitude-modulated and strong, FASE correctly identifies that these signals are *not caused by our modulation activity* and so should not be reported. This is important not only because it is painfully expensive to shield a measurement setup from broadcast signals, but also because computer systems themselves emit strong radio signals (wifi, bluetooth, NFC, etc.) that are modulated for communication purposes but should not be reported by FASE unless they are *also* modulated by our microbenchmark activity.

## 2.4. Automating FASE

In Section 2.3, we explained that carriers are found by searching for a shape that shifts by  $f_{\Delta}$  when  $f_{alt}$  changes by  $f_{\Delta}$ . However, visual comparison of numerous recorded spectra across a wide range of frequencies would be very tedious and error prone.

Unfortunately, the scope and length of this paper do not allow a detailed description of our side-band detection and analysis algorithms. Instead, we provide insight by presenting a simplified and easily-implementable heuristic for finding side-bands whose shift in frequency correspond to shifts in  $f_{alt}$ . For a given harmonic of  $f_{alt}$ , function  $F_h(f)$  is intended to have a large value for a frequency that corresponds to a activity-modulated carrier. We compute this score as

$$F_h(f) = \prod F_{i,h}(f) \quad (1)$$

where  $F_{i,h}(f)$  is a sub-score for the  $i$ -th recorded spectrum ( $i$ -th  $f_{alt}$ ). This subscore is computed as

$$F_{i,h}(f) = \frac{SP_i(f + h \cdot f_{alt_i})}{\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i} SP_j(f + h \cdot f_{alt_j})}. \quad (2)$$




Figure 7: A carrier at  $f_c$  and its right and left side-bands generated by memory activity.

This function first appropriately shifts the frequency so its result corresponds to the frequency of the carrier  $f_c$  rather than the frequency of the expected side-band signal  $f_c + f_{alt_i}$ , i.e. we score the side-band signals, but the sub-score is “reported” at the carrier frequency.

The value of the sub-score is computed by normalizing the strength of the side-band signal in this spectrum by the average of the other  $N-1$   $f_{alt_j}$  spectra. For side-band signals that do shift in frequency as  $f_{alt}$  changes, the sub-score for a particular  $i$  will be larger than 1 because the side-band signal is stronger at the  $f_c + f_{alt}$  frequency in this spectrum, but at the exact same frequency in at least some of the other spectra the signal will not be as strong because they have peaks at  $f_{alt_j}$  and so their side-band signal is at a different frequency. In contrast, a strong signal that does not shift in frequency as  $f_{alt}$  changes will stay at the same frequency in the other spectra, so the normalization will produce a score close to 1. The overall score  $F_h(f)$  multiplies the sub-scores, so the overall score is close to 1 if no  $f_{alt}$ -induced frequency shifting occurs. If each  $i$ -th spectrum has the side-band signals at  $f_{alt_i}$ , the frequency-shifted sub-scores will align producing a very large value for the carrier frequency. Finally, if only some side-band signals are present (one or a few may be “buried” by some unrelated signal), the overall score will be weakened because each  $f_{alt_i}$  where the side-band is obscured will have a sub-score close to 1, but the remaining sub-scores will still increase the overall score significantly above 1. Overall, this heuristic produces large peaks at frequencies of modulated carriers and is almost completely flat at all other frequencies. Figure 8 shows the heuristic function’s output for the carriers shown in Figures 7 and 11.

### 3. Experimental Setup

We evaluate the effectiveness of our FASE methodology by applying it to several computer systems. Unless otherwise indicated, the EM emanations were received with a magnetic loop antenna (AOR LA400) from a distance of 30 cm and




Figure 8: Output of the heuristic for the 1st and -1st harmonics of  $f_{alt}$  for two carriers.

Frequency Range(MHz)	$f_{res}$ (Hz)	$f_{alt_1}$ (kHz)	$f_{\Delta}$ (kHz)
0 to 4	50	43.3	0.5
0 to 120	500	43.3	5.0
0 to 1200	500	1800	100

Figure 9: FASE measurement parameters.

a spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A) was used to record the spectra of the received signals. This setup was used because it allowed us to capture emanations from the entire system across a wide range of frequencies with little manual effort. We note, however, that attacks exploiting a particular set of carrier signals could likely be carried out at larger distances using more directive antennae optimized for higher gain across a narrower frequency band.

We performed three measurement campaigns, each across a different frequency range and with different FASE parameters, as shown in Figure 9. Parameters  $f_{alt_1}$  and  $f_{\Delta}$  were chosen to ensure sufficient separation between side-band and carrier,

and between the peaks generated at  $f_{alt_1}$ ,  $f_{alt_2}$ , etc. Aside from this consideration, the choice of  $f_{alt_1}$  and  $f_{\Delta}$  is arbitrary, with the caveat that while using only one choice  $f_{alt_1}$  and  $f_{\Delta}$  is almost always sufficient to detect all carriers, measuring with multiple choices of  $f_{alt_1}$  and  $f_{\Delta}$  increases the confidence that all carriers have been detected. For example, a carrier might be missed if FASE is only run with one choice of  $f_{alt_1}$  and  $f_{\Delta}$  and a carrier is weak and strong signals happen to occur at the side-bands. We found that five alternation frequencies (i.e.  $f_{alt_1}$  through  $f_{alt_1} + 4f_{\Delta}$ ) are sufficient to detect almost any carrier even in the presence of unrelated signals from other system activity, noise, and radio broadcasts.

The  $f_{res}$  parameter is the resolution of spectrum sampling. For example, our 0-4MHz measurements used  $f_{res} = 50\text{Hz}$ , so each recorded spectrum had  $4,000,000/50 = 80,000$  data points (frequencies). Each spectrum was measured 4 times over several hours and averaged, and we used the heuristic function in Section 2.4 to detect the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th positive and negative harmonics of the alternation activity. We then visually inspected the heuristic function’s output to identify peaks (potential carriers). Algorithms to detect peaks in the output of the heuristic function are beyond the scope of this paper ([29] and [4] cover such algorithms), but we found that the heuristic function’s output had strong spikes for carriers modulated by system activity, so the task of visually inspecting the output to identify potential carriers was relatively straightforward and quick.

A variety of activities were used as activities X and Y in the alternation loop (Section 2.2) – integer multiplication, division, addition, subtraction, as well as load and store to all levels of the cache hierarchy. The results we show focus on only three X/Y alternations. The first alternates between a load from main memory (LLC miss) and a load from L1 cache (L1 hit), which we abbreviate as LDM/LDL1. This alternation is useful in exposing modulated carriers related to memory activity. We tried other X/Y activity pairs that included main-memory accesses and on-chip activity, e.g. LDM/ADD, LDM/DIV, etc. and also pairings that used STM (LLC write-back activity) instead of LDM. We found that they have some variations in the exact shape and strength of the side-band signals, but applying FASE to them exposes the same carriers as LDM/LDL1.

The second X/Y alternation whose results we show alternates between L2 hits and L1 hits (LDL2/LDL1). This alternation is useful in exposing carriers related to variations in activity on the processor chip. We tried numerous other pairings of on-chip activities, e.g. LDL1/ADD, LDL2/DIV, etc. and found that they expose the same carriers through FASE, although they vary in the exact shape and strength of the side-band signals.

Use of LDM, LDL2 and LDL1 is also methodologically convenient in that it uses the exact same micro-benchmark code for all three activities. They differ only in the `mask` values in Figure 6, which gives us excellent confidence that any observed modulation is due to differences between LDM,

LDL1, and LDL2 activity and not the other activity (address computation, looping, etc.) in the alternation loop. Finally, note that the microbenchmarks produce a nearly 100% load, so frequency scaling does not affect our experiments much. However, the effect of frequency scaling wasn’t of interest for these measurements and so we disabled dynamic frequency scaling whenever possible.

## 4. Experimental Results

We begin with Figure 10, which shows the FASE results for a recent desktop system with an Intel Core i7 processor, with the memory access modulation (LDM/LDL1) micro-benchmark. To emphasize the usefulness of FASE, we show a light gray outline of the actual recorded spectrum for one of the alternation frequencies. This spectrum is very noisy and crowded, especially in the long-wave (30-300kHz) and AM radio (540-1600kHz) bands, but FASE correctly indicates which signals are AM-modulated by the alternation activity. The thick vertical lines correspond to the frequency and magnitude of the modulated carrier signals automatically identified by FASE. Lines with the same color/pattern correspond to harmonics of the same frequency. A set of harmonics is likely caused by a periodic yet non-sinusoidal behaviour within the system, and the magnitudes of the harmonics in a set give us important clues for identifying the source of that carrier signal. Therefore, after performing FASE it is useful to group the identified carriers into sets such that all the carriers within a set occur at frequencies which appear to be multiplies of one another.

The remainder of this section discusses how we used the information provided by FASE such as carrier frequency, harmonics, modulation depth, and modulation activity (e.g. on-chip activity or memory activity) to identify the sources of three types of carrier signals. In the systems not shown, similar types of signals were detected.




Figure 10: FASE results for the Intel Core i7 desktop and main-memory (LDM/LDL1) modulating activity.

### 4.1. Switching Voltage Regulators

The set of carriers indicated by red dashed lines in Figure 10 occurs at frequencies 315kHz, 630kHz, 945kHz, etc., which are all multiples of 315kHz. Because the even harmonics of

this carrier are relatively strong we can conclude that these carriers are likely caused by some behaviour that repeats at 315kHz and has a small duty cycle. It is also helpful to look at each harmonic’s shape in the spectrum. While this figure does not provide enough detail to see each harmonic’s shape distinctly, the shape is very similar to that shown in Figure 11 (this figure corresponds to a Different regulator in the same system). The carrier’s energy is spread around its central frequency by what looks like a Gaussian distribution. Clock signals for digital logic and I/O interfaces (such as memory) are tightly controlled but clocks generated by RC oscillators create carriers like the one in Figure 11.<sup>2</sup> In computer systems, RC oscillators are usually used in switching regulators, which convert the 12V to 24V PSU or battery voltage to 1V to 2V supplies used by processors and memory. The duty cycle of the regulator’s switching signal is small when the ratio between the input and output voltage is large, which is another argument in favor of the 315kHz signal being related to a switching voltage regulator. We manually localized the source of the signal using a EM probe to determine where the 315kHz EM signal was strongest in the system. We found that the signal was strongest near the high power MOSFET switches and power inductors that supply power to the main memory DIMMs. These switches were driven by a nearby switching voltage regulator IC and its switching frequency was 315kHz, confirming our initial hypothesis.

Once the source was found, the modulation mechanism was obvious: the regulator maintains the voltage supplied to the CPU by varying the duty cycle of the control signal of a switch between the 12V supply and the 1V output supply. For example, when DIMMs draw more current, the voltage at the regulator’s output drops, so the regulator compensates by increasing the duty cycle of the switch, i.e. by connecting the 12V supply to its output for a longer fraction of the fixed 315kHz period. When running the LDM/LDL1 microbenchmark, the DRAM regulator’s duty cycle is increased during LDM and decreased during LDL1 activity. Changing the duty cycle changes (modulates) the amplitude of all the signal’s harmonics, which explains why LDM/LDL1 activity modulates the emanated signal at the harmonics of the regulator’s switching frequency.

Carrier signals indicated by black dash-dot lines in Figure 10 are also caused by a voltage regulator, this time one that supplies the power to the on-chip memory interface (the chip has separate power supplies for its cores and its memory interface). Figure 12 shows the spectrum for heavy on-chip alternation activity (LDL2/LDL1). Only one type of carrier was found to be modulated in this case – the signal that corresponds to the switching regulator for the CPU cores. Figure 11 shows one of the harmonics of this signal in greater detail. We confirmed the origin of both memory interface and core regu-

<sup>2</sup>This variation (referred to as jitter or phase noise) is well studied because it impacts reliable communications and high frequency digital circuits [21, 35].

lator signals through the same near-field localization process.

Interestingly, the core regulator’s signal is also visible in Figure 10 (the prominent gaussian-like shapes) but was not reported by FASE because it was not significantly modulated by the LDM/LDL1 alternation. This again illustrates the importance of not simply reporting strong or easy-to-notice signals – they may not be actually modulated by the activity under observation.

In many recent processors, the core CPU voltage is adjusted dynamically, while many on-chip cache and memory interface designs require fixed voltage supplies. Therefore, some processors require separate voltage regulators for the CPU and cache. As we have demonstrated, a regulator’s carrier is modulated by the activity in the circuit it provides power to, so an attacker can distinguish cache and CPU activity by demodulating each regulator’s carrier separately. Also, when separate dynamic voltage scaling is used for each CPU core, each core requires a separate regulator. When such regulator switching frequencies are not identical, attackers might be able to remotely receive a separate power consumption readout for each core, allowing attackers to remotely perform a separate power analysis attack for each core.

Finally, we note that the emerging use of in-package/on-chip regulators for processors will likely affect regulator-related EM information leakage in new and interesting ways. Linear regulators have no switching frequencies modulated by system activity, so use of on-chip linear regulators such as [37] would not produce modulated emanations. However, integrated switching regulators will have a more complex impact. Because each integrated regulator will supply a smaller part of the chip, the switching currents are likely to be lower and follow shorter paths, which tends to reduce emanations. However, integrated switching regulators are likely to use much higher switching frequencies (e.g. 140MHz in [10]) where EM emanations suffer from less noise. Part of the reason for the higher switching frequencies is that it allows faster reaction to changes in output voltage. For attackers, this means that the emanated signal will provide a much higher-bandwidth readout of the power consumption.

## 4.2. Memory Refresh

The modulated carrier shown in Figure 10 as solid blue lines has harmonics at frequencies of 512kHz, 1024kHz, etc. This signal did not match any previously known mechanisms that can cause EM emanations. It has a very stable frequency, indicating it was likely generated by logic that is clocked with a crystal-oscillator derived clock. Its harmonics are all of similar strength, which points to an extremely small (<5%) duty cycle. Localization showed that this signal was strongest near the memory DIMMs. Additional experiments have shown that the carrier signal is strongest when there is no memory activity and weakest when we generate continuous memory activity. This is unusual – if this signal is caused by memory activity, we would expect it to get stronger with more activity. Further measurements with small probes close to the memory revealed




Figure 11: A switching regulator related carrier at  $f_c$  and its right and left side-bands generated by on-chip activity.




Figure 12: FASE results for Intel Core i7 desktop and L2 cache (LDL2/LDL1) modulating activity.

many additional harmonics with a greatest common divisor of 128kHz, not 512kHz. This was the key clue in solving the puzzle, because 128kHz corresponds to a period of  $7.8 \mu\text{sec}$ , the maximum allowable average time between refresh commands for recent DRAM standards such as DDR3. While it would be difficult to conclusively prove that this signal is generated by memory refresh activity, the evidence strongly suggests it is. The duty cycle memory refresh activity is very low ( $< 3\%$ ) because each refresh command lasts approximately 200 nsec and occurs every  $7.8 \mu\text{sec}$ . The refresh timing is derived from the memory controller clock, which is crystal-derived. While DRAM standards specify that the average time between refresh commands must not exceed  $7.8 \mu\text{sec}$ , the memory controller has some control over the timing of the refresh commands. For example, the memory controller could postpone sending refresh commands during a  $40 \mu\text{sec}$  period of intense memory activity, and then “catch up” when memory has some idle time. This explains the strangest observation about this signal, which was that it weakens (instead of getting stronger) as memory activity increases. When the memory is inactive, the memory controller simply sends memory refresh commands at regular intervals, resulting in the strongest signal at that interval’s frequency. As memory activity increases, the memory accesses increasingly interfere with the timing of

the refresh commands, causing refreshes to be delayed and disrupting their periodicity (thus spreading their emanated energy across a much larger frequency range and causing the signals at 128kHz, 256kHz, etc. to weaken). Although the first harmonic of this signal is weaker than regulator-related signals, note that memory refresh produces many modulated harmonics and that attackers can potentially correlate them to dramatically improve their detection of this signal and its signal-to-noise ratio. It is also worth noting that with the exception of one system, the refresh carrier signals are present at the same frequencies on all the systems we tested, which could simplify the exploitation of this leakage.

Detailed exploration of alleviating solutions is beyond the scope of this paper, but this potential problem likely has an easy fix: randomizing the issue of memory refresh commands would be compatible with existing DRAM standards and would greatly reduce the modulation of refresh activity.

### 4.3. DRAM Memory Clock




Figure 13: DRAM clock spectrum with 0% (LDL1/LDL1) and 100% (LDM/LDM) memory activity.

Above 30MHz, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards limit the allowable level of EM emanations from consumer devices such as computers. Many periodic signals such as high frequency processor and memory clocks are strong enough to grossly violate these limits, so alleviation techniques for these clock signals have been developed. EMC requirements specify the maximum magnitude for emissions

at any particular frequency, and a popular technique (called spread spectrum clocking) varies the clock frequency periodically, spreading the emitted energy across a range of frequencies (instead of emanating it all at one frequency). For example, a 333MHz memory clock might be swept back and forth between 332MHz and 333MHz over a period of 100  $\mu$ sec, producing a spectrum similar to Figure 13. While such techniques facilitate compliance, they are unlikely to hinder attacks because a receiver can easily track the clock signal’s slow changes. Such “carrier tracking” techniques have already been developed in telecommunications to allow reception of radio signals transmitted using this technique [13]. While spread-spectrum clocking does not significantly mitigate information leakage, it creates interesting problems for discovering such modulated carriers through manual analysis of the spectrum. The shape of the carrier and its side-bands is less recognizable, and the carrier and its side-band signals are likely to overlap significantly when using modulation activity that is not carefully chosen. The signals are only weaker in an averaged sense: attackers can still track the carrier and use the full power of the signal after demodulation.

To allow FASE to successfully detect modulated spread-spectrum clocks, it is best to set  $f_{alt}$  large enough to move the side-band signals outside of the carrier’s own spectrum. Figure 14 shows the effect of modulating the clock signal at several such alternation frequencies, and Figure 15 illustrates that the heuristic function does detect such modulated signals though it reports the clock as two separate carriers at the edges of the spread out clock signal.




Figure 14: DRAM clock spectrum with 50% (LDM/LDL1) memory activity.




Figure 15: Heuristic carrier detection function output.

#### 4.4. Testing the Laptop Systems

We tested three laptop systems: one based on an Intel Core i3 processor from 2010, one based on AMD Turion X2 from 2007, and one based on Intel Pentium 3M from 2002. In all three systems, FASE finds the same types of carriers we already reported: regulator-related signals, signals caused by memory refresh, and DRAM clock signals. For example, Figure 16 shows the modulated carrier signals found for the AMD Turion X2 system with LDM/LDL1 alternation of activity. Interestingly, the memory refresh carrier for the AMD Turion X2 laptop is at 132kHz instead of 128kHz observed in all three other systems. We also confirmed a memory regulator carrier and while the two signals shown as “unidentified” appear to be caused by regulators, we did not confirm their sources because the laptop is very compact and taking it apart to perform localization may damage the system.




Figure 16: FASE results for the AMD Turion X2 laptop and main-memory (LDM/LDL1) modulating activity.

The AMD Turion X2 system was the only system confirmed to have an activity-modulated carrier that is not reported by FASE. This carrier was emanated by the voltage regulator circuitry for the processor cores, and was *frequency*-modulated (we confirmed this with a spectrogram of the modulation). Therefore FASE correctly does not report it. This particular regulator keeps the input-to-output switch turned on for a fixed amount of time during its switching cycle, but changes the duration of the switching cycle (i.e. its switching frequency) to increase/decrease its duty cycle. In principle, signals that are frequency-modulated by system activity should be possible to identify by a FASE-like approach, but one based on spectral properties of FM-modulated signals. We leave the design of such FM-seeking approaches for future work.

#### 5. Related Work

Many side channels have been reported, such as those that observe power consumption [8, 20, 25, 27], sound [5, 12, 33], electromagnetic (EM) emanations [2, 17, 24], behavior under faults [9, 19], and performance of shared caches [6, 36, 38], instruction caches, branch predictors [1], etc.

For EM emanations, signals that potentially leak sensitive information are often more easily identified and analyzed in the frequency domain (spectrum) than in the time domain [16, 34]. Some reported EM-emanations attacks rely on AM demodulation of signals [3, 28, 31], but explanations of how the carrier frequency used in the attack was found are either omitted or brief, and no systematic procedures for finding carrier signals modulated by specific system activities have been reported.

Other work focused on finding frequencies where cryptographic keys are leaked by cryptographic algorithms [7], and information theory has been used to correlate observed signals to secret keys [18]. However, these approaches do not provide insight into which aspect of processor, memory, or other system activity is causing modulation of the signal at that frequency. Therefore, these methods can be used to evaluate the security of systems against specific attacks on specific cryptographic implementations, but they are not directly useful to those interested in mitigating information leakage. Algorithms have been developed for detecting modulated signals [14], often in the context of military communications intelligence. While such algorithms may discover the same signals FASE does, they would also report radio stations and other modulated signals that are unrelated to the system activity of interest.

Modulated EM signals have been deliberately generated by program activity to measure their propagation distance [39] (distances of at least 2-3m have been reported). The closest work to ours is probably the use of similar microbenchmarks to generate simple (unmodulated) periodic signals at a desired frequency in order to enable measurement of overall potential for information leakage at the instruction level [11]. In contrast, we use micro-benchmark activity to modulate existing periodic signals to enable automatic identification of such activity-modulated periodic (carrier) signals.

Finally, many of the emanations that FASE reports as activity-modulated signals, such as those from switching regulators and memory clocks, are also considered in the context of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and interference (EMI) compliance testing [23, 30]. Work directed at understanding EMI sources often yields useful information about potential carriers of sensitive information. For example, it has been shown that the magnitude of emissions from DRAM modules changes with program activity [26], implicitly indicating that the memory clock acts as a carrier and can be modulated.

## 6. Conclusion

Efficient “surgical” mitigation of side-channel vulnerabilities requires knowing the sources of the information-leaking signals, and how information is embedded into these signals. In this paper we describe FASE, a novel methodology for automatically finding which EM-emanated signals from a computer system are amplitude-modulated by specific differences in program activity. FASE relies on microbenchmarks to generate detectable spectral patterns in any signals that are modulated by microbenchmark activity, then automatically processes measured spectra to identify the frequencies

of those carrier signals that are AM-modulated by the microbenchmarks’ activity.

This approach has several advantages. First, it directly identifies the carrier frequencies which are modulated *by specific system activities*, which goes a long way toward determining the sources of compromising emanations. Second, it is very robust against the interference of unmodulated signals and noise inside and outside of the system, such as AM-modulated signals and carrier-like signals which are not specifically modulated by system activity. Third, it quantifies how strongly carrier signals are modulated, which is useful for identifying how the carrier is generated, for quantifying information leakage, and for evaluating the effectiveness of mitigation efforts. Fourth, it is specifically designed to robustly detect un-intentionally modulated signals, which have several inconvenient features not found in ideal AM signals. Finally, each FASE evaluation requires only a few spectrum measurements, producing results with much less time and effort than other techniques such as DPA which can require thousands of spectrum captures with different keys and plaintexts [34].

To demonstrate FASE’s effectiveness, we applied it to several computer systems and found three types of activity-modulated signals – those generated by voltage regulators, memory refresh activity, and DRAM clocks. Our results indicate that separate signals may carry different information about system activity, potentially enhancing an attacker’s capability to extract sensitive information. We also confirm that our methodology correctly separates emanated signals that are affected by specific processor and/or memory activity from those that are not.

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