Residuosity Problem and Its Applications to Cryptography

Yuliang ZHENG†, Tsutomu MATSUMOTO† and Hideki IMAI†, Members

SUMMARY  Let \( \gamma \) and \( n \) be positive integers. An integer \( x \) with \( \gcd (x, n) = 1 \) is called a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \) if there exists an integer \( x \) such that \( z = x^\gamma \pmod{n} \), or a \( \gamma \)-nonresidue mod \( n \) if there does not exist such an \( x \). Denote by \( Z\gamma \) the set of integers relatively prime to \( n \) between 0 and \( n \). The problem of determining whether or not a randomly selected element \( z \in \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) is a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \) is called the \( \gamma \)-Residuosity Problem (\( \gamma \)-RP), and appears to be intractable when \( n \) is a composite integer whose factorization is unknown. In this paper, we explore some important properties of \( \gamma \)-RP for the case where \( \gamma \) is an odd integer greater than 2, and discuss its applications to cryptography. Based on the difficulty of \( \gamma \)-RP, we generalize the Goldwasser-Micali bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption to a block-by-block probabilistic one, and propose a direct protocol for the dice casting problem over a network. This problem is a general one which includes the well-studied coin flipping problem.

1. Introduction

Let \( \gamma \) and \( n \) be positive integers. An integer \( x \) with \( \gcd (x, n) = 1 \) is called a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \) if there exists an integer \( x \) such that \( z = x^\gamma \pmod{n} \), or a \( \gamma \)-nonresidue mod \( n \) if there does not exist such an \( x \). Denote by \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) the set of integers relatively prime to \( n \) between 0 and \( n \). The \( \gamma \)-Residuosity Problem (\( \gamma \)-RP) is characterized as: Given a randomly selected element \( z \in \mathbb{Z} \gamma \), determine whether or not \( z \) is a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \).

When \( n \) is a prime, the problem is readily solvable\(^{20}\). However, when \( n \) is a composite integer and the factorization of \( n \) is unknown, the problem seems to be very difficult\(^{25}\).

If \( \gamma \) is fixed to 2, the problem is called Quadratic Residuosity Problem, which plays central roles in many cryptographic protocols\(^{26,27}\).

In this paper, we focus our attention on the case when \( n \) is the product of large primes and \( \gamma \) is an odd integer greater than 2. We explore some important properties of \( \gamma \)-RP, and discuss its applications to cryptography. The main results are summarized as follows:

(1) Some properties of \( \gamma \)-RP are discussed (Sects. 2, 3). Of particular interest is Theorem 3 (Sect. 2), since a corollary of it states that if \( \gamma \) and \( n \) satisfy the conditions of \( n = pq = (2p_1'q_1' + 1)(2p_2'q_2' + 1) \) and \( \gcd (\gamma, q' \gamma) = 1 \), where \( \gamma \) is an odd integer greater than 2 and \( p, q, p', q' \) are all primes, then \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) is divided into \( \gamma \) subsets of equal size according to the class-indices of elements in \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \).

(2) When \( \gamma \) is small, the Goldwasser-Micali bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption (the GM encryption, for short)\(^{20}\) is generalized to a block-by-block probabilistic one (Sect. 4). Our generalized encryption achieves semantic security\(^{20}\), a polynomial time bounded version of Shannon’s perfect secrecy, and is more efficient than the GM encryption. The generalized encryption is especially preferable to the GM encryption in such environments as the transmission of secret English files where encrypting a file letter by letter is more natural than doing it bit by bit.

(3) A direct dice casting protocol is proposed (Sect. 5). The well-studied problem—coin flipping is a special case of the dice casting problem. A dice casting protocol can be constructed from a coin flipping protocol by repeating the latter several times. However, such a protocol is too inefficient, and hence of little practical use. To the knowledge of the authors, no direct dice casting protocol has yet been published.

2. Some Number-Theoretic Results

In this section, after introducing some basic concepts in Number Theory, we will investigate the structure of \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) for a special kind of composite integers \( n \).

Let \( \gamma \) be the product of odd prime powers, i.e., \( \gamma = \gamma_1 \cdots \gamma_r \) where each \( \gamma_i = \gamma_i \gamma_1 \cdots \gamma_i \), \( p_i \) is an odd prime, and \( p_i \neq p_j \) when \( i 
eq j \). Denote by \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) the set of integers relatively prime to \( \gamma \) between 0 and \( n \), and by \( \psi(n) \) the number of elements in \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \). From elementary Group Theory\(^{20}\) we know that \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) forms an abelian group under the mod \( n \) multiplication, and that \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \) can be represented by \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma = \mathbb{Z} \gamma_1 \times \mathbb{Z} \gamma_2 \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z} \gamma_r \), where each \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma_i \) is a subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma \), which denotes the direct product operation on groups.

For each \( 1 \leq i \leq r \), \( \mathbb{Z} \gamma_i \) constitutes a cyclic group, since every element is a prime power. Thus there is an integer \( g_i \), called primitive root mod \( n_i \), such that every element \( a_i \) \( \in \mathbb{Z} \gamma_i \) can be written as \( a_i = g_i^{x_i} \pmod{n_i} \) for some \( 1 \leq x_i \leq \psi(n_i) \). (In fact there are as many as \( \psi(\chi(n)) \) such \( g_i, x_i \)). Lemma 2 of Ref. (11) (p.100) tells us a very
useful result:

From the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we can construct \( h_1, h_2, \ldots, h_t \) from the above \( g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_t \) such that \( h_i \equiv g_i \pmod{n_i} \), and \( h_i \equiv 1 \pmod{n \setminus n_i} \). This enables every element \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^* \) to be written uniquely as \( x \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{t} h_i^{m_i} \pmod{n} \), where \( 1 \leq a_i \leq \phi(n_i) \).

Apparently, each \( h \), defined above is also a primitive root \( \pmod{n_i} \). Let \( \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \) denote \( \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \) is a called generator-vector (for \( \mathbb{Z}^* \)), for simplicity. Notice that there are a lot of generator-vectors for \( \mathbb{Z}^* \).

The following two lemmas are obviously true (see for example Ref. 7 (Chapter 4.2)).

\[ \text{Lemma 1.} \quad \text{Let } n \text{ be a composite integer factorized as } n = n_1n_2 \ldots n_k \text{, where each } n_i \text{ is an odd prime power. Also let } \gamma \text{ be an odd integer greater than } 2, \text{ and } x \text{ be an element of } \mathbb{Z}^*. \text{ Then } x \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n \text{ iff } x \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n_i \text{ for all } 1 \leq i \leq k. \]

\[ \text{Lemma 2.} \quad \text{Let } m \text{ be an odd prime power, and } \gamma \text{ be an odd integer greater than } 2. \text{ Let } y \text{ be any primitive root } \pmod{m} \text{, and let } x \text{, written as } x \equiv x^y \pmod{m} \text{ for some } 1 \leq x \leq (m), \text{ be a positive integer with } \gcd(x, m) = 1. \text{ Then when } \gcd(y, \phi(m)) = 1, x \text{ is necessarily a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } m \text{; and when } \gcd(y, \phi(m)) = y, x \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } m \text{ iff } a = \gamma y \text{ for some integer } a. \]

From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we get Theorem 1 stated below.

\[ \text{Theorem 1.} \quad \text{Let } n \text{ be a composite integer factorized as } n = n_1n_2 \ldots n_k \text{, where each } n_i \text{ is an odd prime power, and let } \gamma \text{ be an odd integer greater than } 2. \text{ Also let } \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \text{ be any generator-vector for } \mathbb{Z}^* \text{ defined above, and } x \text{ be an element of } \mathbb{Z}^*. \text{ Suppose that } x \text{ is expressed as } x \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{t} h_i^{m_i} \pmod{n}. \text{ Then (a) when } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = 1 \text{ for each } 1 \leq i \leq t, x \text{ is necessarily a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n; \text{ and (b) when } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = 1 \text{ for at least one } 1 \leq i \leq t, x \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n \text{ iff for all those } i \text{'s satisfying } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = y, a \text{ can be written as } a = \gamma y \text{ where } a \text{ is some integer.} \]

\[ \text{(Proof)} \quad \text{The truth of (a) follows trivially from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Now we show the truth of (b). For simplicity, we assume that there is an integer } 1 \leq s \leq t \text{ such that } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = y \text{ for each } 1 \leq i \leq s, \text{ and that } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = 1 \text{ for each } s < i \leq t \text{.}

\[ \text{(1) The proof of "if" part: For each } 1 \leq i \leq s, x \equiv h_i^{t_i}h_1^{r_1} \ldots h_t^{r_t} \pmod{n} \text{. Now from Lemma 2, we know that } x \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n_i \text{ for each } 1 \leq i \leq s, \text{ since } a_i = \gamma i \text{; and if } s < t, x \text{ is also a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n_1 \text{ for each } s < i \leq t, \text{ since } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = 1. \text{ By Lemma 1, we conclude that } x \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n. \]

\[ \text{(2) The proof of "only if" part: Now by Lemma 1, } x = h_t^{t_t}h_1^{r_1} \ldots h_i^{r_i} \pmod{n} \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n, \text{ for each } 1 \leq i \leq t. \text{ In particular, when } 1 \leq i \leq s, \text{ we know from Lemma 2 that } a_i \text{ must take the form of } a_i = \gamma_i, \text{ where } \gamma_i \]

is some integer.

We call a triple \((n, y, y)\) acceptable if \( n, y, y \) satisfy the following three conditions:

\[ \begin{align*}
& \text{1. } n \text{ is the product of powers of different odd primes, i.e., } n = n_1n_2 \ldots n_k, \text{ where each } n_i \text{ is an odd prime power.} \\
& \text{2. } y \text{ is an odd integer greater than 2 with } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = y \text{ for just one } 1 \leq i \leq t, \text{ and } \gcd(y, \phi(n)) = 1 \text{ for all } 1 \leq i \leq l, 1 \leq i \leq t. \text{ For simplicity, we will assume that } l = 1. \\
& \text{3. } y \text{ is an element of } \mathbb{Z}^* \text{ written as } y = h_t^{t_t}h_1^{r_1} \ldots h_i^{r_i} \pmod{n}, \text{ where } 0 < e < y, \gcd(e, y) = 1, \text{ and } \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \text{ is a generator-vector for } \mathbb{Z}^*. \\
\end{align*} \]

We claim that if \((n, y, y)\) is an acceptable triple, then \( y \) is a \( \gamma \)-nonresidue mod \( n \). In fact, it follows immediately from the following corollary of Theorem 1.

\[ \text{[Corollary 1.] Let } (n, y, y) \text{ be an acceptable triple. Then an element } x \in \mathbb{Z}^*, \text{ expressed as } x = h_t^{t_t}h_1^{r_1} \ldots h_i^{r_i} \pmod{n} \text{ is a } \gamma \text{-residue mod } n \text{ iff } a_i = \gamma_i y \text{ for some integer } a_i. \]

We are ready to prove a theorem, which is of fundamental importance to this paper.

\[ \text{[Theorem 2.] Let } (n, y, y) \text{ be an acceptable triple. Then every element } x \in \mathbb{Z}^* \text{ can be represented as } x = y^a y^x \pmod{n} \text{ for a unique } 0 \leq i < y \text{ and some } 0 < e < y \pmod{n}, \text{ where } a \text{ is not necessarily unique.} \]

\[ \text{(Proof) Notice that } y = h_t^{t_t}h_1^{r_1} \ldots h_i^{r_i} \pmod{n}, \text{ where } 0 < e < y, \gcd(e, y) = 1 \text{ and } \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \text{ is a generator-vector for } \mathbb{Z}^*. \text{ As mentioned above, using } \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle, \text{ the element } x \text{ can be written as } x = h_t^{t_t}h_1^{r_1} \ldots h_i^{r_i} \pmod{n} \text{ where } 0 < e < y. \]

Now we prove in two steps that there is a unique \( 0 \leq i < y \) such that \( y^a y^x \pmod{n} \) is a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \). In the first step, we prove that there is such a unique \( 0 \leq i < y \) for the specified generator-vector \( \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \). And in the second step, we prove that the above \( i \) does not change its value even when \( \langle h, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \) is replaced with another generator-vector \( \langle h_0, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle \), i.e., \( i \) depends only on \( x \) and \( y \) themselves, but not on generator-vectors.

\[ \text{(1) Let the generator-vector under consideration be the specified one: } \langle h_0, h_1, \ldots, h_t \rangle. \text{ Since } \gcd(e, y) = 1, \text{ the equation of } x = y^a y^x \pmod{n} \text{ has a unique solution } i = a + x \pmod{y}. \text{ Now let } f = i, e = a, \gamma, \text{ we can get the following:}
\]
First, we prove that \( f \) is a homomorphism from \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \). Next we prove that \( f \) is also a surjection from \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \).

(1) Let \( x,y \mod n \) be a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \). Then \( \langle k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_i \rangle \) be another generator-vector for \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \). It is well-known that each \( k_i \) can be represented as \( k_i = k_i \mod n \) for some \( c_i \), where \( k_i \) is the corresponding constant of the generator-vector \( k_i, k_2, \ldots, k_i \), and \( c_i \) satisfies \( \text{gcd}(c_i, \phi(n)) = 1 \). Notice that \( \text{gcd}(c_i, \phi(n)) = 1 \) implies \( \text{gcd}(c_i, \gamma) = 1 \), since \( \text{gcd}(\gamma, \phi(n)) = \gamma \). Using \( \langle k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_i \rangle \), the elements \( y \) and \( x \) can be written as

\[
\begin{align*}
y &= \langle k_1 \rangle^{x+y} \prod_{i} \langle k_i \rangle^i \mod n, \\
x &= \langle k_1 \rangle^{x+y} \prod_{i} \langle k_i \rangle^i \mod n
\end{align*}
\]

where \( 1 \leq i < \gamma \) and \( 0 \leq f < \gamma \). (\( \tilde{e} \) can not be 0, since \( y \) is a \( \gamma \)-nonresidue mod \( n \)). We now show that the equation \( \tilde{e} = \tilde{f} \mod \gamma \) has a unique solution \( i = -e^{-1} f \mod \gamma \). Notice that

\[
y = h^{x+y} \mod n \quad \text{and} \quad x = h^{x+y} \mod n .
\]

On the other hand,

\[
y = \langle k_1 \rangle^{x+y} \prod_{i} \langle k_i \rangle^i \mod n, \\
\]

and

\[
x = \langle k_1 \rangle^{x+y} \prod_{i} \langle k_i \rangle^i \mod n .
\]

Since \( \phi(n) \) from the above four equations we have \( c_i \cdot e = e \mod \gamma \) and \( c_i \cdot f = f \mod \gamma \). Also since \( \text{gcd}(c_i, \gamma) = 1 \), we have further \( e = c_i^{-1} \mod \gamma \) and \( f = c_i^{-1} \mod \gamma \). Thus the equation \( f = c_i^{-1} \mod \gamma \) is solvable for \( i \) iff \( e + c_i^{-1} \mod \gamma \) is solvable for \( i \). The latter equation has a unique solution \( i = -e^{-1} f \mod \gamma \). The remaining work is simple: We need only to check that, for the generator-vector \( \langle k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_i \rangle \), \( x \mod n \) is a \( \gamma \)-residue mod \( n \), which is indeed true.

For an acceptable triple \( (n, \gamma, y) \) and an element \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), we call \( i \) the class-index of \( z \) with respect to \( (n, \gamma, y) \) if \( z = y^i \mod n \) for some \( n \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \). For \( 0 \leq i < \gamma \), let \( R_{\gamma,n} = \{ y^i \mod n, \quad y \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma, \quad x \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \} \). \( R_{\gamma,n} \) is the set of elements in \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) which have the same class-index \( i \) with respect to \( (n, \gamma, y) \). We denote by \( \# X \) the number of elements in a set \( X \).

Let \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma = \{ 0, 1, \ldots, \gamma - 1 \} \). \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) constitutes a group under the mod \( \gamma \) addition. By the uniqueness of class-index proved in Theorem 2, we can define a function \( f: \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) as follows: \( f(x) = -1 \mod n \) for some \( n \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \). Now we prove more deeply into the structure of \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \).

[Lemma 3] Let \( (n, \gamma, y) \) be an acceptable triple. Then the function \( f \) defined above is an epimorphism (a homomorphism which is also a surjection) from \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \).

[Proof] Again, we prove the theorem in two steps:

1. \( f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y) \mod n \).
2. \( f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y) \mod n \).

From the uniqueness of index-class (Theorem 2), we conclude that \( f \) is a homomorphism from \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \). Since it is an epimorphism from \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), we can choose a \( u \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), and form \( x+y \mod n \). Clearly, \( x+y \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), and it satisfies \( f(x) = f(y) \mod n \). So \( f \) is also a surjection from \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \).

The following theorem is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 3 just proved above and the Fundamental Theorem on Group Homomorphisms (Ref. 3 Ch. 16).

[Theorem 3] Let \( (n, \gamma, y) \) be an acceptable triple. Then for any \( 0 \leq i < \gamma \), the number \( \# R_{\gamma,n} \) of elements in \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) which have the same class-index \( i \) with respect to \( (n, \gamma, y) \) is \( \# R_{\gamma,n} = \# \mathbb{Z}_\gamma = \phi(n) / \gamma \). Elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) have the Jacobi Symbol (Ref. 7, p. 65) of \( -1 \), and hence can be easily identified without knowing the factorization of \( n \). These elements are "wasted" in the sense that they can never be used as encryptions of messages. However, for \( \gamma \)-RP with \( \gamma \) being an odd integer, we can elaborate select two primes \( p \) and \( b \) such that \( \text{gcd}(\gamma, p-1) = \gamma \) and \( \text{gcd}(\gamma, b-1) = 1 \), and an element \( y \in \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) which is a \( \gamma \)-nonresidue mod \( n \) such that \( (n, y, \gamma) \) is an acceptable triple. Now \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) is pretty divided into \( r \) subsets \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), \ldots, \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \), each of which has exactly \( \phi(n) / \gamma \) elements. In other words, no elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_\gamma \) are "wasted".

3. Residuosity and Related Problems

In this section we discuss several problems related to \( \gamma \)-RP, and reveal some relations among them. Also we compare the difficulty of \( \gamma \)-RP with that of the factorization problem. And finally, we state an assumption about the intractability of \( \gamma \)-RP.
3.1 Three Problems

Suppose $k$ is a positive integer. $k$ will play the role of the security parameter. Let $\gamma \geq 3$ be a fixed odd integer. The hard number set $H$ is defined as:

$$H = \{ n | n = pq, p = 2^\gamma + 1, q = 2^q + 1, \gcd (q, q') = 1, p, q, p', q' \text{ are all primes, } |p| = |q'| = k \},$$

where $|x|$ denotes the number of bits in the binary expansion of the integer $x$.

Let $n \in H$ and let $y \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$ be a $\gamma$-nonresidue mod $n$ such that $(n, \gamma, y)$ is an acceptable triple. From Theorem 3, $\mathbb{Z}^\ast$ is divided into $\gamma$ subsets according to the class-indices with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$ of elements in it, and each subset has the same size $\phi(n)/\gamma$.

We referred briefly to $\gamma^n$-RP at the beginning of the paper. Besides $\gamma^n$-RP, there are two other problems related intimately to the former. For completeness, the three problems are formally defined below.

(1) $\gamma^n$-RP: Given $n$, $\gamma$, and an element $z \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, decide whether or not $z$ is a $\gamma$-residue mod $n$.

(2) Class-index-comparing problem: Given an acceptable triple $(n, \gamma, y)$ and two elements $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, judge whether or not $z_1$ and $z_2$ have the same class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$.

(3) Class-index-finding problem: Given an acceptable triple $(n, \gamma, y)$ and an element $z \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, find the class-index of $z$ with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$.

Theorem 4 shows some relations among the three problems. Before proving it, we first introduce a few conventions. These conventions can be found in recent papers or books on the theory of circuit complexity. See for example Ref. (10) as well as the references cited there.

By a circuit we mean a logic network composed of ordinary AND, OR, and NOT gates, and by the size of a circuit we mean the number of logic gates in the circuit.

Let $P_1$ and $P_2$ be any two problems among the above three ones. By "$P_1$ is reducible to $P_2$" we mean that, given a circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ which solves $P_1$ for some integer $n \in H$, we can construct another polynomial size circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ which, by using $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ as an oracle gate, solves $P_2$ for the same integer $n$ with overwhelming probability. If $P_1$ and $P_2$ are reducible to each other, then we say they are (polynomially) equivalent.

Notice that in proving the claim of "$P_1$ is reducible to $P_2$", we need only to show explicitly a (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm which is constructed from the circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$, and solves $P_1$ with overwhelming probability. Such an algorithm and be converted into a polynomial size circuit completing exactly the same tasks done by the algorithm.$^{[1]}$

[Theorem 4] (a) $\gamma^n$-RP and the class-index-comparing problem are equivalent; (b) $\gamma^n$-RP and the class-index-comparing problem are reducible to the class-index-finding problem; (c) $\gamma^n$-RP and the class-index-comparing problem are equivalent to the class-index-finding problem when $\gamma = O(\log (k))$, where $\log (\cdot)$ denotes a polynomial.

(Proof)

(1) The Proof of (a)

- The class-index-comparing problem is reducible to $\gamma^n$-RP: Suppose there is a circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ which, for an integer $n \in H$, and for any element $z \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, outputs a bit 1 when $z$ is a $\gamma$-residue mod $n$ or a bit 0 when $z$ is a $\gamma$-nonresidue mod $n$. Using $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$, we can judge whether or not two elements $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$ have the same class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$: We form $z_1 = (z_1, z_2)$ mod $n$, and consult $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ will outputs 1 if $z_1$ and $z_2$ have the same class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$.

- $\gamma^n$-RP is reducible to the class-index-comparing problem: Suppose there is a circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ which, for an integer $n \in H$, (which we call a favorite integer with $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$) outputs 1 iff $z$ is a $\gamma$-residue mod $n$ such that $(n, \gamma, y)$ is an acceptable, and for any elements $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, tells us whether or not $z_1$ and $z_2$ have the same class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$. (Assume that $\mathcal{T}[n, y, z_1, z_2]$ outputs 1 iff $z_1$ and $z_2$ have the same class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$.)

Let $x \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$ be a $\gamma$-residue mod $n$ where $n$ is a favorite integer with $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$. Fix the third input of $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ to $x$, and let $\mathcal{T}[\cdots, x]$ Then for any $\gamma$ such that $(n, \gamma, y)$ is an acceptable tripe, and for any element $z \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, $\mathcal{T}[n, y, z]$ outputs 1 iff $z$ is a $\gamma$-residue mod $n$.

From $\mathcal{T}[\cdots, x]$, we can construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm $A(\cdot)$ which takes $\mathcal{T}[\cdots, x]$ as an oracle, and on input $n$ and $z \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, outputs 1 iff $z$ is a $\gamma$-residue mod $n$. Notice that to consult the oracle circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots, x]$, successfully, we have to input to it an element $y \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$ which is a $\gamma$-nonresidue mod $n$ such that $(n, \gamma, y)$ is an acceptable triple. We are not given directly such a $y$. This problem can be resolved by the randomization argument. Detail, but lengthy, description for the algorithm $A(\cdot)$ can be obtained by making a few obvious modifications on the proof of Theorem 2 of Ref. (6). Here, we omit it for the sake of space.

(2) The Proof of (b)

Suppose there is a circuit $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$ which, for an integer $n \in H$, for any $y$ which is a $\gamma$-nonresidue mod $n$ such that $(n, \gamma, y)$ is an acceptable triple, and for any element $z \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$, finds the class-index of $z$ with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$. Using $\mathcal{T}[\cdots]$, we can quickly judge whether or not two elements $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^\ast$ have the same class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$. Thus the class-index-comparing problem, and hence $\gamma^n$-RP are both reducible to the class-index-finding problem.

(3) The Proof of (c)

By (1), $\gamma^n$-RP and the class-index-comparing problem are equivalent, and by (2), $\gamma^n$-RP and the class-index-finding problem are reducible to the class-index-finding problem, thus it suffices to prove that the class-index-finding problem is reducible to $\gamma^n$-RP when $\gamma = \cdots$
Suppose that we are given a circuit $T:\{\cdot,\cdot\}$ which answers the residuosity of $z$ for an integer $n\in\mathbb{H}$ and any element $z\in\mathbb{Z}^*$. By using $T:\{\cdot,\cdot\}$ as an oracle and consulting it as follows, we can determine the class-index of $z$ with respect to $(n,\gamma,\rho)$:

$$i := 0; w := z;$$

While $T[n, w] = 0$

\{ $i := i + 1$;

Select at random an $x \in \mathbb{Z}^*$;

$w := (w/y)x^i \bmod n$;

output($i$).

This algorithm halts after consulting $T:\{\cdot,\cdot\}$ for $O(\gamma) = O(\text{poly}(k))$ expected times, hence the class-index-finding problem is reducible to $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP when $\gamma = O(\text{poly}(k))$.

3.2 How Difficult are the Problems

From Theorem 4, we know that the class-index-finding problem is in general harder than both $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP and the class-index-comparing problem. Also we know that the latter two ones are equivalent in any cases, so from now on, we will not refer to the class-index-comparing problem.

Now we informally compare the difficulties of $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP and the class-index-finding problem with that of the factorization problem. We do it in two cases:

1. $\gamma$ is small, i.e., $\gamma$ grows polynomially in (the security parameter) $k$. Such a $\gamma$ is denoted by $\gamma = O(\text{poly}(k))$.

2. $\gamma$ is large, i.e., $\gamma$ grows faster than any polynomial in $k$.

1. When $\gamma$ is Small

In this case, the class-index-finding problem is equivalent to $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP.

When the factorization $(p, q)$ of $n\in\mathbb{H}$ is known, deciding the residuosity of $z\in\mathbb{Z}^*$ is easy: By Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, $z$ is a $\gamma^\text{th}$-residue mod $n$ iff $z^{p^{\gamma+1}} = 1 \pmod{p}$. This equation can be checked in $O(\text{Poly}(k))$ time. Hence $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP can not be more difficult than the factorization problem.

On the other hand, when the factorization is unknown, $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP seems to be intractable. Adleman and McColl showed that if there is an oracle which solves $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP for any randomly selected $\gamma = O(\text{poly}(k))$, then we can use the oracle to construct an efficient (albeit not polynomial) algorithm for factoring (large integer) $n$.

Thus for a randomly selected $\gamma = O(\text{poly}(k))$, $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP and the class-index-finding problem are both approximately equivalent to the factorization problem. In cryptographic uses, $\gamma$ is usually fixed to some small odd integer. However, even in such situations, $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP seems to be equally difficult.

2. When $\gamma$ is Large

The equation $x^{p^\gamma-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$ can be checked in $O(\text{poly}(k))$ time even when $\gamma$ is exponentially large in $k$. Thus $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP for a large $\gamma$ is also solvable provided that we know the factorization of $n$. If $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP with a large $\gamma$ is solvable, the factorization problem seems to be also solvable, though we can not prove it now. The class-index-finding problem, however, appears to be still intractable even when the factorization of $n$ is known. We can consider that, when $\gamma$ is large, the class-index-finding problem is harder than both $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP and the factorization problem, and the latter two problems are equivalent.

3.3 $\gamma^\text{th}$-Residuosity Assumption

Having known that $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP in intractable, now we can formally describe our intractability assumption for $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP:

[$\gamma^\text{th}$-Residuosity Assumption] Let $\Omega$ denote the set of circuits which, for a fraction 1/poly($k$) of $n\in\mathbb{H}$, and for all $z\in\mathbb{Z}^*$, take as inputs $n$ and $z$, output a bit 1 if $z$ is a $\gamma^\text{th}$-residue mod $n$. Denote by $S_\gamma$ the minimum size among all sizes of circuits in $\Omega$. Then $S_\gamma > \text{poly}(k)$ for all sufficiently large $k$.

4. Generalizing the GM Encryption

This section is concerned with generalizing the GM bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption to a block-by-block probabilistic one, based on the difficulty of solving $\gamma^\text{th}$-RP. In Ref. 2 Benaloh and Yung discussed briefly a generalization for the most restricted case where $\gamma$ is a small odd prime. For our generalization presented below, $\gamma$ can be any small odd integer greater than 2. So Benaloh and Yung's generalization is, as a special case, included in ours.

Moreover, our generalized encryption is more efficient than the GM encryption, and shares with the latter an appealing property —— it hides all partial information from a polynomial time bounded adversary, or it achieves semantic security which is a polynomial time bounded version of Shannon's perfect secrecy.

4.1 The Generalized Encryption

Consider the situation in which $B$ wants to send some secret information to $A$. Let $\gamma$ be an odd integer of poly($k$) size agreed upon between $A$ and $B$, and let the message space be $M_i = \{m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_l, m_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q, 1 \leq i \leq l\}$, where $l$ is a positive integer of size $O(\text{poly}(k))$, $\mathbb{Z}_q = \{0, 1, \ldots, q-1\}$, and $a \| b$ denotes the concatenation of $a$ and $b$.

$A$ selects an $e = pq \in \mathbb{H}$, and uses the factorization $(p, q)$ of $n$ to choose at random an element $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
such that $y$ is a $y^m$-nonresidue $\mod n$ and that $(n, y, \gamma)$ in an acceptable triple. Then $A$ makes $n$ and $y$ public, but keeps $\gamma$ and $q$ secret.

The encryption algorithm for $B$ and the decryption algorithm for $A$ are as follows:

[Encryption Algorithm] $E(n, y, \gamma, u, m)$

Let $m = \prod_{i=1}^l m_i$. From $i = 1$ to $l$, do as follows:
1. Randomly choose an $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$;
2. Compute $c_i := y^{m_i}x^i \mod n$;
3. $c = c_0 \cdot c_1 \cdots \cdot c_l$ is an encryption of the message $m = m_0 \cdot m_1 \cdots \cdot m_l$.

[Decryption Algorithm] $D(p, a, q, \gamma, v, c)$

Recall that by Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a $y^m$-residue $\mod n$ if $x^m - 1 \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

Let $c = c_0 \cdot c_1 \cdots \cdot c_l$. Now for each $c_i, 1 \leq i \leq l$, do as follows:
1. Randomly select an $f \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and an $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$;
2. Compute $z := y^x \cdot c_1 \mod n$;
3. if $z^m \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ then goto 1;
4. $m_0 := \gamma - f \mod \gamma$;
$m = m_0 \cdot m_1 \cdots \cdot m_l$ is the message concealed in the encryption $c = c_0 \cdot c_1 \cdots \cdot c_l$.

The foregoing decryption algorithm runs in $O(\gamma \log n \log \log \log n)$ expected time. Rabin's fast probabilistic algorithm, which finds a root of a polynomial of degree $\gamma$ over the finite field $GF(p)$ by $O(\gamma \log n \gamma \log \log \log \log p)$ expected number of arithmetic operations over $GF(p)$, can also be used for our decryption purpose.

Clearly, the running time of either of the two algorithms grows polynomially in the size of $\gamma$. This puts limitations upon our degree of freedom of selecting $\gamma$.

To be sure that the decryption algorithm runs in $O(\gamma \log n \gamma \log \log \log \log n)$ time, we have to choose $\gamma$ such that $\gamma = O(\gamma)$.

It seems to the authors that $\gamma^{th}$-RP with a large $\gamma$ is unlikely to be applicable to constructing GM-like probabilistic encryptions. Nevertheless, the problem may have application to other cryptographic problems such as the digital signature and the key distribution problems.

4.2 Security of the Generalized Encryption

Under Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, the GM encryption has been proved to be polynomially secure. Notions introduced in Ref. (6), where the basic message unit for encryption is a bit $0/1$, can be obviously generalized to those for the case where the basic message unit for encryption is an integer from $0, 1, \ldots, n - 1$. In particular, the definition of unapproximable trapdoor predicates of Ref. (6) can be generalized to that of unapproximable trapdoor functions. Then under $\gamma^{th}$-Residuosity Assumption, we can prove that our generalized probabilistic encryption is also polynomially secure, by the use of proving techniques developed in Ref. (6).

5. How to Cast Dice over a Network

A (two-party) coin flipping protocol is a communication protocol between two mutually distrust- ed parties $A$ and $B$ in a network, by which the two parties can jointly generate a sequence of unbiased random bits, i.e., a sequence where each bit is equally likely to be 0 or 1 independent of preceding bits.

Coin flipping is a special case of $\beta$-face dice casting (throwing a dice with $\beta$ faces, each of which has a score differing from all other faces) with $\beta = 2$. By a $\beta$-face dice casting protocol, two mutually distrusted parties can jointly generate a sequence of unbiased random letters from a $\beta$-letter alphabet, i.e., a sequence where each letter is equally likely to be any letter from the $\beta$-letter alphabet independent of preceding letters.

For many practical uses, it is enough to have sequences of polynomially unbiased random bits or letters which are indistinguishable from those of truly random bits or letters by polynomially bounded Turing machines $^{5,6,9,10}$. So from now on, we will assume that both $A$ and $B$ are polynomially bounded Turing machines, and by "unbiased" we will always mean "polynomially unbiased". We will also assume that a $\beta$-letter alphabet $\Sigma$ is a set of integers defined by $\Sigma = \{0, 1, \ldots, \beta - 1\}$.

Many fair coin flipping protocols have been proposed in the literature. In contrast to this, few direct and efficient dice casting protocols are known.

A coin flipping protocol can be easily translated into a $\beta$-face dice casting protocol in the following way:

Repeat the coin flipping protocol $|\beta|$ times, where $|\beta|$ denotes the number of bits in the binary expansion of $\beta$. Take the resultant $|\beta|$-bit sequence as an integer, and check whether or not the integer is in $\Sigma$. If not in, throw away the sequence and return to the beginning; otherwise output the integer as an agreed dice score.

However, such a naive $\beta$-face dice casting protocol would be very inefficient in practice.

Along another line, researchers (see for example Ref. (4)) have constructed various protocols which solve all mental games (including dice casting, key sharing, etc.). Unfortunately, all those protocols seem to be only of theoretical value.

In the following, we propose two direct $\beta$-face dice casting protocols: the first is a general one based on any one-way one-to-one function; the second is a practical and efficient one based on $\gamma^{th}$-RP.

Below, just as in Sect. 3.2, "small" means growing polynomially in (the security parameter)$\lambda$, and "large" growing faster than any polynomial in $\lambda$. To simplify our discussions, we will assume that the communication channel between $A$ and $B$ provides data integrity in the following sense: (1) data transmitted through the channel are not affected by natural noise, and (2) no adversary can alter or insert something into data trans-
mitted through the channel.

5.1 A General Protocol

In this subsection, we show that a one-way one-to-one function, such as Discrete Exponentiation (over a large finite field) whose inverse (called Discrete Logarithm) is widely considered to be intractable\(^{39}\), can be used to construct a general $\beta$-face dice casting protocol.

Let $S_m = \{0,1\}^m$ denote the set of intractable $m$-bit representations of length $m$ over the alphabet $\{0,1\}$, where $m$ is a positive integer. Let $I_k$ denote the set of $k$-bit integers $0,1,\ldots,2^k-1$. If $m<0$, $S_m$ as well as $I_k$ is defined as an empty set. For any integer $x \in I_k$, $\bar{x}$ denotes the $m$-bit binary representation of $x$.

Suppose that $\beta = |\Sigma| = 2^l$ for some integer $1 \leq l \leq k$, where $k$ is the security parameter.

First, $A$ and $B$ jointly select a one-way one-to-one function $f(\cdot): S_m \mapsto I_k$, then they do as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>$A$ selects a random $x \in I_l = {0,1,\ldots,2^l-1}$ and an $r \in S_{m-1} = {0,1}^{m-1}$, then he sends $x$ together with $\bar{r}$ to $B$;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>$B$ returns a random $y \in I_k$ to $A$;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>$A$ reveals $r$ and $x$ to $B$;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>$B$ checks whether $x$, $r$, and $z$ satisfy $z = f(y \cdot \bar{x})$. If so, then $A$ and $B$ agree upon the letter $d = (x+y)$ mod $2^l$; otherwise $B$ detects $A$’s cheating.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Replacing the step 4 with the following step 4’, we obtain a protocol for the case where $\beta$ is any positive integer less than or equal to $2^l$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4’</td>
<td>$B$ checks whether $x$, $r$, and $z$ satisfy $z = f(y \cdot \bar{x})$. If the check is not passed, then $B$ detects $A$’s cheating. Otherwise, $A$ and $B$ agree upon the letter $d = (x+y)$ mod $2^l$ whenever $d \in \Sigma = {0,1,\ldots,\beta-1}$, and they return to the step 1 whenever $d \in \Sigma$.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remark: We combined $r$ and $x$ by $r \cdot \bar{x}$, since for many one-to-one functions $f(\cdot)$ which are seemingly one-way and have received extensive examination, such as Discrete Exponentiation and the RSA encryption function, the least or nearly least significant bits of $v$ appear to be extremely hard to extract from $u = f(v)$ (Ref. \(^ {8} \)). Of course, which method for combining $r$ and $x$ should actually be taken depends on the function $f(\cdot)$ selected.

For the above protocol, neither $A$ nor $B$ can control the result $d$; hence $f(\cdot)$ is one-way, $B$, whose power is tacitly assumed to be polynomially bounded, cannot compute $r \cdot \bar{x} = f^{-1}(z)$ from $z$, and hence can not bias the result. On the other hand, since $f(\cdot)$ is also one-to-one, $A$ can not change his mind after sending $x$ to $B$.

For most functions $f(\cdot)$ which seem to be one-way one-to-one, evaluating $z = f(x \cdot \bar{x})$ is time-consuming, so the above protocol may be inefficient in applications. In Sect. 5.2, we describe a practical protocol based on $\gamma^b$-RP. This protocol is especially efficient when $\beta$ is not so large.

5.2 A Practical Protocol

Here, $\gamma^b$-RP once again finds its application to cryptography: Under $\gamma^b$-Residuosity Assumption, we can construct a direct $\beta$-face dice casting protocol which can be executed very fast when $\beta$ is small.

Suppose $A$ and $B$ has agreed upon an odd integer $\gamma$ such that $\gamma \geq \beta$. Also suppose $A$ has published a large integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and a $\gamma^b$-mon residue mod $n \psi \in \mathbb{F}_n$ such that $(n, \gamma, \psi)$ is an acceptable triple. Thus, every element $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ has a unique class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, \psi)$.

Now we give a protocol for the special case when $\beta = \gamma$, i.e., $\beta$ is an odd integer. [Dice Casting Protocol 2]

1) $A$ chooses randomly an $i \in I_l = \{0,1,\ldots,\gamma-1\}$ and an $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, then he sends $s = y \cdot 2^i$ mod $n$ to $B$;
2) $B$ gives back a random $j \in I_k$ to $A$;
3) $A$ reveals $i$, $x$, and $j$ to $B$;
4) $B$ checks whether $i$, $x$, and $j$ satisfy $s = y \cdot 2^i$ (mod $n$). If so, then $A$ and $B$ agree upon the letter $d = (i+j)$ mod $2^l$; otherwise $B$ detects $A$’s cheating.

Modifying the step 4) in the same way as in Sect. 5.1, a protocol for the case when $0 < \beta < \gamma$ can be obtained. Details are omitted here.

Dice Casting Protocol 2 has several desirable features:

1) $B$ can not be cheated by $A$, and vice versa ——
   (1) By our assumption, $z$ has a unique class-index with respect to $(n, \gamma, \psi)$. Thus, $A$ can not change his mind after sending $x$ to $B$. (2) If $\gamma^b$-RP is intractable, (and hence class-index finding problem is also intractable) then $B$, when given $x$, $n$, and $\gamma$, can not get any information about the class-index of $x$ with respect to $(n, \gamma, \psi)$. This is the very basis of our block-by-block probabilistic encryption presented in Sect. 4. Thus, under $\gamma^b$-Residuosity Assumption, $B$ has no way of cheating $A$. (See also the following property (3)).

2) If $A$ follows the protocol, then he gives $B$ no information which may have help to $B$ in trying to cheat $A$ or more directly to factorize the integer $n$ —— The reason is very obvious: Both $i$ and $x$ are selected by $A$ randomly and independently of $B$. Hence $x \cdot 2^i \cdot \psi$ mod $n$ is also a random element in $\mathbb{Z}_n$. Thus when $B$ tries to cheat $A$ or to factorize the integer $n$, he can not hope to do them better with these random $i$, $x$, and $z$ than without.

3) The resultant letter $d = (i+j)$ mod $2^l$ is a random letter from $\mathbb{Z}_n$, if at most one of the two parties does not follow the protocol in the narrow sense that he does not select element(s) randomly. —— There are three cases to be analyzed. (1)
The claim is clearly true if both of the two parties follow the protocol. (2) Suppose $B$ follows the protocol but $A$ does not in the narrow sense. Then $d$ is still a random letter since $A$ must determine $i$ before $B$ selects $j$. (3) Finally, suppose $A$ follows the protocol but $B$ does not in the narrow sense. There are many ways for $B$ to behave in this case. Among these the most "terrible" one we think on $B$ chooses $j$ after checking whether or not $x$ is in $Z(B)$, the set of elements whose class-indices with respect to $(n, \gamma, y)$ are known to him ($B$). Notice that $B$ can readily obtain an element $x_0 \in Z(B)$ by choosing $i_0 \in Z_2$, $x_0 \in Z_2^r$, and forming $x_0 = y - x_0 \mod n$. Also notice that elements in $Z(B)$ may be those $x$'s used by $A$ in the previous executions of the protocol with the same parameters $n$ and $y$. It is easy to see that the probability an element randomly selected by $A$ is not an acceptable triple $x_0 \in Z(B)$ is negligible small since $\phi(n)$ is exponentially large but $\pm Z(B)$ polynomially by our assumption that $B$ is polynomially bounded. Thus $d$ is indeed a random letter if $A$ follows the protocol but $B$ does not in the narrow sense.

The preceding argument follows immediately that, $A$ and $B$ can jointly generate a sequence of $f$ unbiased random letters from $E$ by executing repeatedly for $f$ times the above dice casting protocol with the same parameters $n$ and $y$, where $f$ is polynomially large in $k$, i.e., $f = O(\text{poly}(k))$.

One may argue that $B$ may be cheated by $A$ from the beginning, since $(n, \gamma, y)$ is published by $A$ and hence it may not be an acceptable triple. $B$'s concern about this kind of cheating is removed if $A$ can convince $B$ in some way that $(n, \gamma, y)$ is indeed an acceptable triple.

General, the solution to the problem is to force $A$ and $B$ to cast dice using some random letters $(n, \gamma, y)$ of $A$, which are published by $A$ and are used for constructing probabilistic encryptions for protecting information transmitted to $A$. To decrypt uniquely and efficiently an encryption transmitted to him, $A$ has to choose a triple $(n, \gamma, y)$ such that it is an acceptable one. Thus, if such $(n, \gamma, y)$ is used in casting dice, $B$ is ensured that he will not be cheated by $A$.

If there is a trusted authority in the network, we can take another approach to the above problem: (1) Let $A$ open the factorization of his $n$ to the authority; (2) The authority checks whether or not $A$'s triple $(n, \gamma, y)$ is acceptable, and tells $B$ "YES" if is, or "NO" if not. Or more simply, we can let the authority choose and publish an acceptable triple $(n, \gamma, y)$. Now it is not necessary for the users in the network to concern about whether or not the triple is acceptable, since the authority is trusted.

Moreover, any two parties in the network can cast dice by using the same acceptable triple $(n, \gamma, y)$ and following Dice Casting Protocol 2.

6. Conclusion

We have revealed several useful properties of $\gamma^g$-RP with $\gamma$ an odd integer greater than 2. Under the assumption that $\gamma^g$-RP is intractable, we have generalized the Goldwasser-Micali bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption to a block-by-block probabilistic one, and have proposed a direct protocol for the $\beta$-face dice casting problem. Applications of $\gamma^g$-RP to other cryptographic problems such as the key distribution and digital signature problems are worth investigating.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Mr. John W. Machar for his enthusiastic help in preparing this article. The second author was supported in part by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture under Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists #62750283.

References

Yuliang Zheng was born in Jiangsu, China on Feb. 5, 1962. He received the B.S. degree in computer science from Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing, China, in 1984. He is currently a graduate student in the Division of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan. His research interests include cryptography, information security, computational complexity theory, and information theory. He is a student member of IEEE.

Tatsuo Matsumoto was born in Maebashi, Japan, on October 20, 1958. He received the B.Eng. and M.Eng. degrees in computer eng. both from Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan, in 1981 and 1983, respectively, and the D.Eng. degree in electronic eng. from the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan, in 1986. Since 1986, he has been Lecturer for Electrical and Computer Engineering at Yokohama National University. He is currently working in cryptography, complexity theory, computational mathematics, and their applications to information security. Dr. Matsumoto is a member of ACM, IEEE, IPSJ, ITA, and Akarai Angou Kenkyu-kai.

Hideki Imai was born in Shimane, Japan on May 31, 1945. He received the B.E., M.E. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from University of Tokyo, Tokyo, in 1966, 1968, and 1971, respectively. He is currently a Professor in the Division of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Yokohama National University, Yokohama. His current research interests include information theory, coding theory, cryptography, and their applications. He is the author of two books and coauthor of several books. Dr. Imai is a member of IEEE, IEE of Japan, IPS of Japan, and ITE of Japan.