Fever, Commerce and Diplomacy: Consuls, Commercial Agents and the Expansion of the Republic of Fever

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This seminar paper is a chapter of a larger dissertation project: The Republic of Fever: Commerce, Warfare and the Making of Warm Climate Medicine in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions. That project probes the impact of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions on European medical culture and ideas about health in the Atlantic World. Between the mid eighteenth and early nineteenth century, revolutions in the Americas and Europe rocked the Atlantic world and introduced new patterns of trade, warfare and migration. The patterns of long-distance trade that knitted the Atlantic World together, and the warfare that threatened to tear it apart also transported warm climate diseases like yellow fever far from their African origins into the Caribbean, North America and southern Europe. My dissertation argues that the very same forces produced a new medical culture: “The Republic of Fever.” Like yellow fever itself, the medical actors who became immediately involved in studying and treating the new disease were dwellers, migrants and travelers who moved through and connected ports beyond the northern European centers of power and medical knowledge. They were British and French military medical officers and surgeons, St. Domingue refugees, US physicians, lay travelers and commercial agents. Contrary to our traditional view of this period, political and commercial upheaval did not completely fragment the medical and cultural worlds these men inhabited. Rather, those forces created a space for these disparate medical actors outside of northern Europe to imagine and create new transnational intellectual networks, bodies of knowledge and ideas about cultural belonging. Recovering the collectives these men built (and their legacy) helps us rethink the long durée of global and international histories of health by pushing our gaze back before the late nineteenth century. It also draws historians’ attention to disease and health experiences as a useful lens for tracking patterns of cross-border connectedness and disconnectedness in the Atlantic world.

*NOTE TO PARTICIPANTS IN HISTORY 700: For the lunch colloquium, I would like to concentrate on the other assigned readings and hold off on discussing this paper and my project until the CHR seminar in the afternoon.*
Chapter 5
Fever, Commerce and Diplomacy: Consuls, Commercial Agents and the Expansion of the Republic of Fever

In February 1804, Doctor Edward Miller of New York received a package from Doctor James Mease in Philadelphia. As an editor who worked to expand the coverage of his medical journal, the Medical Repository, Miller welcomed a growing influx of treatises and correspondence on diseases and disease ecologies in the US and different parts of the Atlantic world. When Miller opened the parcel, he discovered not a letter from Dr. Mease but rather letters and extracts from “the doctor’s acquaintance,” J.F. Eckard, Esq., the Danish Vice-Consul to the Middle States.1 “Sir,” Eckard wrote, “In one of a series of numbers republished last autumn, in a newspaper of this city, from a New-York gazette […] I observed some extracts from a medical work, referring to the prevalence of the malignant pestilential fever in the island of St. Thomas, which forcibly drew my attention.” Eckard had witnessed the very same outbreak in 1796 and he recognized several of the victims described in the piece, including merchants, captains, physicians, and a Danish consul. “Knowing the statement to be inaccurate,” Eckard decided to correct it by writing an account of his own. He based his corrections on his long-term residence in the island, personal knowledge of captains’ habits in the port, and “intimate” ties with the consul and several merchants mentioned in the account. Mease and Miller were both pleased with Eckard’s piece. Miller promptly published the “Correction of Dr. Chisholm’s Mistatement” in a new volume of the Medical Repository.2 American and non-American readers in different parts of the Atlantic soon picked it up and worked the consul’s perspective into their new treatises on yellow fever in warm climates.3

J.F. Eckard was no anomaly in the medical world. Over the course of the 1790s and early nineteenth century, consuls and commercial agents became increasingly active in the medical networks spanning the Atlantic world. On the ground in ports-of-call and within the pages of the

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1 Miller very briefly recounted this incident to his former mentor in Philadelphia, Doctor Benjamin Rush, who received frequent updates on Miller’s editorial activities. See Edward Miller to Benjamin Rush, February 20, 1804, Benjamin Rush Manuscripts: Correspondence, Volume 10 (Philadelphia: Library Company Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania).


During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, webs of consuls and commercial agents expanded dramatically as European and new Atlantic polities jostled with one another in the arena of global commerce. As this chapter will show, this context helped expand the Republic of Fever in two pivotal ways. First, it produced a new kind of medical actor and thereby broadened the range of agents who made this new medical world order. As commerce and warfare introduced new patterns of disease and altered patterns of medical exchange, consuls’ diplomatic and commercial duties came to involve disease surveillance and brokering between medical cultures. They kept tabs on the mortality of seamen and travelers, immersed themselves in local medical politics, translated regulations and writings and even wrote treatises. Much of their tools and knowledge entered into the Republic of Fever.

Second, as consuls expanded the compass of actors involved in the Republic, they also extended the Republic’s geographic scope. Medical writers confined to their localities or within limited patterns of migration and exchange came to recognize consuls as valuable resources for disease knowledge and new interactions with medical cultures in unfamiliar places both within and beyond the Atlantic world. At the same time that commerce and warfare brought warm-climate fevers into the Mediterranean, consuls and commercial agents began to play a significant role in translating and transforming those spaces into new nodes within the Republic of Fever.

This chapter on consuls and commercial agents is part of a much larger dissertation project, which addresses a major gap in the historiography of medicine and health. In spite of the growing interest in international and global trends in the history of American and European medicine/health, most historians begin their studies of those patterns around the mid- to late nineteenth century. The major problem underlying this outlook is the tendency to force earlier periods into a theoretical frame designed around the emergence of technologies, scientific medicine and public health institutes particular to empire-building and world capitalist expansion later in the nineteenth century. Historians, with few exceptions, have either hesitated to view the eighteenth and early nineteenth century through a global lens or searched for precursors and weaker versions of the international and global health apparatuses of a much later period.4


5 David Arnold reflected on this pattern in Arnold, “Introduction: Tropical Medicine before Manson,” in David Arnold, ed., *Warm climates and western medicine: the emergence of tropical medicine, 1500–1900* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996). Scholars, for example, have tended to trace the development of international health negotiations and agencies to patterns in the mid- to late nineteenth century: specifically, industrialization, internationalism among European nation-states and international attempts among physicians to institutionalize and standardize orthodox medicine. See, for example, Valeska Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary
This chapter (and dissertation) chips away at this narrative by applying a different approach to studies of the long durée of international and global currents in medicine and health. Rather than look for precursors to later technologies and actors, this project revises our picture of where the Age of Atlantic Revolutions fits in the history of trans-national medical and health relations by re-evaluating the categories of “governance,” “medicine” and “global” we use to examine that period in history.

**Statecraft in an Age of Commerce, Warfare and Disease**

In order to recover the role of consuls in the changing medical world order, we must first take a closer look at their role in international statecraft during the Age of Revolutions. The scale of consuls’ presence, their locations, the nature of their duties and the conditions of their work all positioned them well to become entangled in the transnational sphere of warm climate medicine.

Consuls grew in number and global presence during the eighteenth century – a product of changing economic and state-building conditions. Over the course of the century, as European powers continued to push their commercial interests and political rivalries beyond continental Europe, they increasingly invested in the establishment of state representatives on the ground in their growing number of Mediterranean, Atlantic and even East Indian ports of call. To enable their valuable trade to operate in the changing political climate, merchants and captains required good relations with local authorities in ports of call. They needed to remain vigilant and informed about threats to the safety of ships and crews. Sick, shipwrecked or kidnapped seamen also required assistance. Consuls were charged with the task of brokering commercial and diplomatic relations with foreign officials on the ground. They were also to both gather and provide commercial and naval intelligence from and for merchants, captains, and government officials. By the late eighteenth century, European consuls had become prominent fixtures in the international relations and commercial expansion – within the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and even beyond, in the East Indies.6

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6 Most studies of this period focus on particular national and imperial contexts. Examined collectively, they highlight the important role of commercial and political expansion in facilitating European powers’ investment in
New geopolitical circumstances at the end of the eighteenth century altered the scope and geography of consular networks. A new player – the United States – entered the arena of international commerce and politics. The young republic relied heavily on securing and promoting many international markets for its agricultural produce and carrying trade. Between 1793 and the 1810s, warfare among Great Britain, France and Spain opened up opportunities for the “neutral” nation to carry goods across international boundaries. Merchants and officials alike fought to maintain this position in the midst of political turmoil. Attitudes toward the new nation’s shipping fluctuated among various powers during this period. As a fledgling republic, the country’s officials and merchant marine needed to establish respect and trust necessary to secure favorable commercial relations. Americans also needed to contend with European powers that were establishing their own consuls in various seaports along the Atlantic seaboard of the US. Hence, Americans took up the tools of international statecraft and began investing in their own consular services.

By 1800, both Europeans and Americans had created new webs of consuls within and beyond the Atlantic. British, French, Spanish and Danish powers, among others, had established consular posts in various American seaports from New York to Philadelphia to Charleston, South Carolina. These consuls became valued outlets for commercial and political intelligence about the port, the new nation, and the Caribbean. Reciprocally, in places ranging from St. Croix to Tangier to Naples, a new cast of over seventy American consuls translated regulations, presided over ship prize cases, negotiated commercial policies, circulated naval intelligence and even mediated fights between American and foreign sailors.

The establishment of consular posts (and not merely diplomats, who were, in fact, fewer in number). Studies have also alluded to the role of international political and commercial pressures in inspiring the establishment of consuls, in particular in the Mediterranean, where the culture of consular services thrived in the early eighteenth century (and even before). Leos Müller addressed this larger context in his study of the role of consuls in the establishment of Swedish commercial expansion into the Mediterranean. See Müller, “The Swedish Consular Service in Southern Europe, 1720-1815,” Scandinavian Journal of History 31.2 (2006), 186-195. Silvia Marzagalli, James R. Sofka and John J. McCusker also address the growth of consuls in the eighteenth century, in particular their role in the circulation of commercial and political news. See Marzagalli, Sofka and McCusker, “Rough Waters: American Involvement in the Mediterranean in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Introduction,” in Silvia Marzagalli, James R. Sofka and John J. McCusker, eds., Rough Waters: American Involvement with the Mediterranean in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (International Maritime Economic History Association: St. Johns, 2010), 1-6. For other contexts, including France, see Christian Windler, “Representing a State in a Segmentary Society: French Consuls in Tunis from the Ancien Regime to the Restoration,” The Journal of Modern History 73.2 (2001), 233-274. As a testimony to consuls’ increased presence in on-the-ground diplomacy, a number of historians of the Atlantic Revolutions have used and promoted consuls’ records as a lens through which to study transatlantic relations during the period. See, for example, Robert J. Alderson, This bright era of happy revolutions: French Consul Michel-Ange-Bernard Mangourit and international republicanism in Charleston, 1792-1794 (University of South Carolina Press, 2008).

For a general discussion of the effects of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars on American shipping, see Anna Cornelia Clauber, “American Commerce As Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1793-1812,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1932).

For the Mediterranean context, see Anthony Antonucci, “Consuls and Consiglieri: United States Relations with the Italian States, 1790-1815,” in Silvia Marzagalli, James R. Sofka and John J. McCusker, eds., Rough Waters: American Involvement with the Mediterranean in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (International Maritime Economic History Association: St. Johns, 2010), 77-100. In his study of American seamen, Brian Rouleau found in sailors’ correspondence, diaries and court records multiple instances of consuls serving as translators, mediating
While criteria for selection varied according to a country’s interests in a given region, governing officials typically sought out men who harbored knowledge of the regulatory cultures, shipping, outlets for commercial intelligence, language or political circumstances in the port in question. The post of consul was, moreover, neither full-time nor fully salaried. Consuls were expected to profit above all from their own business and personal pursuits in the region. As a result, consular posts were typically filled by merchants; middling class, educated men with experience in travel; former naval officers; or residents (both citizens and non-citizens) who resided in the port while holding business, political or cultural ties to the country they would serve.  

Consuls needed to mobilize social, cultural and political capital in order to perform their administrative duties, channel information and broker relations. They drew upon their backgrounds as well as local and trans-local resources, transforming them into tools for their work as consuls. Agents from mercantile backgrounds, for example, applied their skills in accounting and creating inventories in order to monitor ships and calculate fluctuations in tariffs and volumes in shipping. As we shall see later on, men with established business and social ties to a port-of-call did not hesitate to draw upon regional commercial partners, their knowledge of the local markets or newspapers that provided business news. Business connections to shopkeepers and grocers even served consuls who sought provisions for seamen in distress.

A consul’s political, cultural and social circumstances could also determine the types of relationships he formed and relied upon for his work. Consider the case of Thomas Appleton, the US consul in Livorno, Italy. His background in the American export trade to France and Italy provided him with a lingua-franca in Livorno and the ability to immerse himself in the regional commercial culture. The port’s cosmopolitan character and positive outlook on American shipping eased both the process of assimilation and the task of mediating relations between captains and port authorities. In the context of these warm relations and Appleton’s enthusiasm for the area, Appleton established new contacts for commercial agents back in the US. He not only sent officials’ information about port regulations. Just a few years into his post, he began translating and submitting some of them as models for the US seaports. In other words, he was re-relating both commercial relations and port regulatory cultures.

Of course, not all consuls had the same linguistic dexterity, cultural knowledge and political capital as Appleton. The first three US consuls in Algiers were not fluent in Arabic, had little cultural familiarity with the Barbary States and arrived at a time when the local dey was rather hostile toward American shipping in the region. They ended up relying heavily on intermediaries: American slaves, who had managed to become fluent in Arabic and work their way up the slave hierarchy to win the dey’s trust. Most of those consuls’ interactions, then, were fights and hunting down facilities for seamen in Pacific and Atlantic ports alike. See Rouleau, “With Sails Whitening Every Sea: Commercial Expansion, Maritime Empire, and the American Seafaring Community Abroad, 1780-1870,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2010).


10 Antonucci, 83-92.
filtered through the lens of American slaves. As these different examples reveal, the texture of consuls’ work was such that they created and remade nodes of political, cultural and social interchange within and beyond the Atlantic. And they did so in diverse ways.

By virtue of their locations, duties and backgrounds, many consuls were well placed to have an impact in warm climate medicine. A world shaped by new patterns in commerce and warfare ultimately put Americans and Europeans abroad and at home in contact with new pandemics, foreign ecologies and, subsequently, foreign medical and disease control cultures. Through the cycles of Caribbean warfare during the Napoleonic Wars and fluctuating traffic between the US and West Indies, yellow fever pandemics spread throughout Caribbean and US seaports. As American shipping ventured into the Caribbean, captains and seamen confronted the problem of disease ecologies and mortality from fever outbreaks in ports far away from home. The increase in traffic between the Atlantic and southern Europe also transformed the disease landscape of the Mediterranean. A Mediterranean world shaped by centuries of plague suddenly had to confront the threat of a “new world” disease: yellow fever. With American shipping pouring into Mediterranean ports, American seamen and Mediterranean port authorities were forced to adapt their disease experiences to one another. Maritime disease problems, health and medicine subsequently became tangled up in trade, international relations and the preservation of shipping and travelers in ports-of-call – all part of the domain of consuls.

A number of consuls and commercial agents, moreover, were already embedded in networks of transnational scientific and medical exchange because of the social and business backgrounds they brought to their posts. By the eighteenth century, many men from the very backgrounds discussed above had come to occupy positions in networks of scientific and cultural exchange within the Atlantic and beyond. It was not uncommon for European and American merchants to blend business with the vibrant commerce in knowledge and cultural/scientific artifacts that had grown dramatically in the context of European and American expansion. Indeed, we can find records in a number of consuls’ account books of trans-oceanic shipments in

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11 Kennedy, 28-32.
12 Yellow fever pandemics had become very common in the Caribbean in the eighteenth century, moving up into North America during the late eighteenth century. The Haitian Revolution and Napoleonic Wars altered patterns in migration and shipping, integrating the US, Caribbean and southern Europe in very new ways. This is what facilitated the resurgence of yellow fever pandemics in the Caribbean and US in the 1790s and early nineteenth century. It is also what generated unprecedented scattered outbreaks along the Spanish coast, in Marseilles and in a couple of Italian ports between 1800 and 1804, in the 1810s and again the 1820s. For a study of the changing epidemiology of yellow fever in the Caribbean and US, see Harry Marks, “How Might Biology Matter? Explorations for a Materialist History of Disease,” (Unpublished Paper, 2001). For the southern European context, see Lawrence A. Sawchuck and Stacie D.A. Burke, “Gibraltar’s 1804 Yellow Fever Scourge: The Search for Scapegoats,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 53.1 (1998), 3-42; William Coleman, Yellow Fever in the North: The Method of Early Epidemiology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
botanical items, published natural histories and medical curiosities to merchants, laymen and even physicians.\(^\text{14}\)

Depending on the demands of their work as consuls and businessmen, a number of merchants and non-merchants took what time they could to pursue their own intellectual and cultural interests. In addition to administrative papers and business records, a few consuls have left notebooks, letters and even publications that reveal interests in botany, the study of natural history and transnational scientific exchange. There is even evidence of consuls who used their tasks and powers as consul for their own economic and intellectual purposes, using missions into an unexplored region to collect new natural specimens or, as we shall see later, using connections to shipping routes in order to safely transport letters or goods.\(^\text{15}\) By the beginning of the nineteenth century, scientific institutes like the American Philosophical Society boasted a range of correspondents, among them, several US, French and Spanish consuls and ambassadors.\(^\text{16}\) In sum, by virtue of many consuls’ social status and the networks in which natural knowledge production was embedded, consuls were well placed to become physicians’ resources for information about distant sites of warm climate disease activity.

Because of the variety of unique backgrounds, local and trans-local resources consuls drew upon for their work, they were ultimately destined to alter more than the geographic scope of the Republic of Fever. They were also destined to remake the epistemological tools and corpus that constituted it. And as they created and remade nodes of political, cultural and social interchange, consuls were likely to remake cultural and intellectual relations within the Republic. A close, comparative look at the experiences of three different consuls in disparate contexts highlights these degrees of expansion and the multifarious forms they took.

Remapping the Terrain of Havana

\(^\text{14}\) As both US consul and merchant in Livorno, Italy, Thomas Appleton developed an interest in the region’s wine cultivation and art, and he sent friends like Thomas Jefferson samples of grape vines and art pieces as gifts. Historians have in fact come to view his account book as a valuable source for studying cultural relations between Italy, southern France and the US. See Philipp Fehl, “The Account Book of Thomas Appleton of Livorno: A Document in the History of American Art, 1802-1825,” Winterthur Portfolio 9 (1974), 123-150.

\(^\text{15}\) An excellent example of this is Andre Michaux, the French consul based in Charleston, South Carolina in the 1790s. Michaux was supposed to monitor Americans’ responses to the French Revolution and rally support among Americans for French expansion into the Mississippi. While in the US, he devoted a considerable amount of time to botany, traveling in the Appalachians to collect plants, sending specimens back to France and coordinating explorations with American botanists (and French consuls) based in New York and Philadelphia. During his diplomatic missions, he carried with him a botanical notebook and recorded observations. David M. Rhembert, “The Carolina Plants of Andre Michaux,” Castanea, 44: 2 (Jun., 1979), 65-80. See also Gilbert Chinard, “Andre and Francois-Andre Michaux and Their Predecessors. Botanical Exchanges between America and France,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 101.4 (1957), 344-361.

\(^\text{16}\) Michaux became an active correspondent, as did the French consul in New York, J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur. See Rhembert, 69-70. The APS also received correspondence from Marques de Casa Yrujo, the Spanish Minister in Washington in the early nineteenth century (who liked to correspond with Thomas Jefferson scientific topics as well). One of the most prominent US consuls was an agent based in Paris in the early nineteenth century, David Bailley Warden, who sent the institute letters from foreign scientists, publications and few of his own treatises. We will revisit him later in the chapter.
In April of 1805, Secretary of State James Madison appointed Henry Hill the new US consul for Havana, Cuba. The news subsequently reverberated through the newspaper circuits of several Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic ports.\(^\text{17}\) The Connecticut merchant’s appointment was part of the recent efforts among US officials and merchants to expand American trade connections to the Spanish Caribbean. Havana loomed large for merchants in New York, Philadelphia and New England as a market for American exports, a venue for the carrying trade and a source for staples like sugar and coffee. In the wake of American independence and escalations of warfare during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, political tensions with the British and French limited Americans’ options for trade destinations in the West Indies. Cuba quickly emerged as a dynamic alternative to the British and French West Indies.\(^\text{18}\)

Opening up the port to the United States proved to be no smooth process. An elaborate series of commercial regulations had accumulated over the eighteenth century designed to confine the entire trade to a few Spanish mercantile houses. Spain’s late eighteenth-century entanglements in warfare with Great Britain and France, in addition to natural disasters, made relaxation necessary, as Cuban colonial official had to admit foreign trade in flour and other goods. American merchants and officials thus contended with inconsistent attitudes and policies toward their shipping in Havana.\(^\text{19}\)

By 1805, moreover, Havana began taking on new significance in light of Americans’ recent acquisition of the Louisiana territory and interest in Florida. From the Cuban perspective, Cuba was being drawn too close to the United States, and Cuban officials were more than ever disposed to be friendly to France (and French privateering) as a protective device. US-Cuban trade, while it flourished, was in a precarious position. Henry Hill was to foster Americans’ vulnerable shipping. Secretary of State James Madison gave him specific instructions to report any unusual military or naval activity between Cuba, Louisiana and Florida.\(^\text{20}\)

When Hill arrived in Havana with his instructions, he found his office in a rather precarious position. Cuban and Spanish imperial attitudes toward official US presence in the port shaded between ambivalence and suspicion, particularly in light of Americans’ geopolitical ambitions in the region. Americans had gone through six consuls at the port within the past twenty four years, two of whom did not even receive official recognition by local authorities.

\(^{17}\) Roy F. Nichols, “Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 13.3 (1933), 295. For announcements in newspapers (resources for general commercial news), see Charleston Courier, 14 May, 1805; The United States Gazette, 25 May, 1805; Salem Gazette, 31 May, 1805; Connecticut Gazette and Commercial Intelligencer, 55 June 1805; The Newport Mercury, 8 June, 1805.


\(^{20}\) Nichols, 307-308.
Now the captain general refused to recognize Hill as the new consul. American merchants and ship captains were also confronting new irregular alterations in duties and customs policies toward ships arriving from US ports. Hill’s lack of familiarity with the port created some additional dilemmas. Previous consuls had been able to bring to their posts greater on-the-ground experience in Cuba and other regional Spanish possessions. Hill, in contrast, was fresh from Guilford, Connecticut and had less experience with the regulatory culture in the port.  

Hill’s struggles are apparent in the lengthy dispatches he prepared for the Secretary of States. Hill tried, diligently, to perform the tedious task of monitoring fluctuations in duties on American shipping, calculating their changes and potential impact on profits from trade. His dispatches are long, filled with detailed accounts of alterations in port regulations for American captains and seamen as well as activities of the French privateers roaming the region. He collected editions of the Havana Aurora, a “government organ,” for officially published updates on regulations and sent them along with his reports.

Unfortunately, reading and negotiating the regulatory culture that produced those regulations proved no easy task for the consul, who did not refrain from complaints to the Secretary of State about his situation. While Hill tried to keep up with officially published regulations, captains’ grievances with customs officers frequently alerted him to overlooked rules, many of which he thought “ruinous,” arbitrary” and mere products of Cubans’ dissatisfaction with US foreign policies in the region. His anger lapsed into Anglo-American disdain for Spanish imperial political culture. Customs officers appear in his dispatches as “barbarick” and “petty despots” who were driven by “rude prejudice” against American seamen. They did not hesitate to throw American captains “into a prison the most loathsome in the world, among criminals of every class and crime, and description of colour, or placed in the publick stocks exposed to public view and ridicule.” Cultural dissonance and distrust, amplified by current political tensions, shaped Hill’s interactions with the Spanish colonial port.

As Hill was soon to discover, Cuba’s environs presented another problem for American shipping: disease. Like many ports in the West Indies during this period, Havana was vulnerable to the importation of diseases that circulated through the channels that linked the port up the Atlantic world. Pandemics of yellow fever proved a particularly great source of anxiety. They had been a problem as early as the mid-eighteenth century. Over the previous two decades, however, the disease moved with greater frequency between Havana and the North American and Caribbean ports that flooded the city’s harbor with shipping. Indeed, concerns about the causal relationship between American sailors and the importation of yellow fever had already

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21 Ibid., 307-308.
By the time of Hill’s arrival, disease surveillance and regulation of bills of health were beginning to figure in the Spanish and American consular networks that linked Cuba, American port towns and Spain.  

In mid-summer 1805, not too long after Hill’s arrival, yellow fever returned to Havana in full force. Hill included news of the outbreak in his June 27 dispatch to Madison: “The yellow fever in some instances [has] made its appearance, I am apprehensive many of the Seamen will fall victims to its malignity in the cause of the season.” Hill’s worries were confirmed. Shortly thereafter, American seamen began dying from the disease. In subsequent dispatches, Hill wove disease and health into his other updates relating to tariffs and local judicial matters relating to captains and the jurisdiction of ships. His consular duties quickly expanded to managing the disease harming American seamen and shipping.  

But Hill himself was still relatively new to Havana. While he had struggled to master the character of the local regulatory culture, tariffs and American traffic in the port, he displayed even greater unfamiliarity with Havana’s local ecology, the character of outbreaks and medical resources. Hill subsequently faced severe challenges in his quest to make sense of the situation and create some order. One was determining the sheer magnitude of the mortality among the American seamen, who began falling sick in large numbers – aboard ships and in a local hospital.  

Locating medical resources also presented cultural barriers for a native of Connecticut. Hill learned to chart the ways in which sick American seamen navigated Havana’s medical world. As he did, his own cultural and social background colored his perceptions of local care options and their shortcomings. He fumed in one lengthy letter to Secretary of State James Madison:

> When attacked with [yellow fever], they are either confined on board to the unskillful and neglectful care of their captains or mates, or hurried off to the hospital where they are sure to die. I hear they are placed in apartments very illy [sic] adapted to their state and are looked upon more as objects of profit than of benevolence and commiseration. Their fees are greater for burying them, than for medicine and attendance while living. And as those hospitals are operated by an order of people less humane and more unprincipled than perhaps any other class

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24 An excellent example of this is the Spanish Cuban physician, Tomas Romáy. Following an outbreak in 1799, Romáy wrote in a local newspaper that he believed American sailors had imported the disease. For a discussion of Romáy’s views and the debates among Spanish-Cuban medical writers about yellow fever, see Adrián López Denis, “Disease and Society in Colonial Cuba, 1790-1840,” (PhD Diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2007), 134.

25 Linda Salvucci noted this in her study of the activities of the Philadelphia-based Spanish consul, who was charged with the task of filling out bills of health for Americans traveling to Havana during an outbreak of yellow fever in that city in 1803. See Salvucci, n. 35, 798.

26 See Henry Hill to James Madison, 27 June 1805, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Havana,” RG 59.
of human beings (I speak of the friars), I doubt not but they prefer their patients should die, rather than live.

Hill’s general frustrations with the treatment of American interests and shipping surely inspired some of his exasperation with the treatment of sick Americans. However, Hill was also reading the hospitals, the treatment of the Americans, and hospital staff’s communications through the lens of a New Englander who had grown up with medical institutions embedded in a constellation of Protestant values and Anglo-American medical traditions. Those values generally inspired disdain for Catholic institutions and the belief that Catholic religious orders were unfit to govern and dictate the proper function of a hospital. Hence Hill’s contrast between the “death traps” of “inhumane” and “greedy” “friars” and the culture of “benevolence” and rationalized order he desired in a hospital. But in Havana there were few alternatives to charity hospitals supervised by the Catholic Church. Other institutions in the city, such as the military hospital Intendenia de Hacienda, largely restricted care to specific segments of local society.

Cultural clashes and limited options aside, Hill expressed concern about the ability of Spanish-Cuban practitioners to monitor and adapt therapeutics to the constitutions and habits of men who resided in “northern” climates and failed to adjust to the much warmer environs of Cuba. He ended his letter by posing the question to Madison “whether the importance of our trade to this port, the number of seamen employed and their incidence to disease while here would not warrant the Establishment of an hospital for the reception of American seamen here at the expense of the United States.”

In lieu of his sought-after transplant of the medical institutions he knew and trusted for the care of lower-class North Americans, Hill found other ways to take command of the situation. Sometime between his frustrated letter to Madison in June 1805 and autumn of 1805, Hill began transforming the tools and knowledge of his familiar commercial and medical worlds into valuable resources, which he used to make a new “map” of the disease and medical environs of Havana.

First, Hill took up the skills he had cultivated and applied in his work monitoring the ships, goods and citizens arriving in the port. He began to organize information about health, disease and environment as he had information about local circumstances for American shipping. Hill went to his primary source for political and commercial news, the Havana Aurora, and collected the October 30 edition, which featured an excerpt of a royal physician’s study of the disease off the coast of Spain. Hill transformed his practice in collecting records of ship cargos, crews and voyage histories into a method for gathering information about the deceased seamen.

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27 Enlightenment reformers sought rationalize hospital care and architecture in the late eighteenth century Anglo-American and French contexts. They were thus highly critical of religious orders, in particular the Catholic Church, which not only funded hospitals but also staffed them and shaped their function. See Risse, Mending Bodies, Saving Souls: A History of Hospitals (Oxford University Press, 1999), 231-256, 289-338. Hospitals in the Early American Republic were also an integral part of the culture of benevolence and philanthropy, which were very often tied to the promotion of Protestant values. See, for example, Nina Reid-Maroney, “Scottish Medicine and Christian Enlightenment at the Pennsylvania Hospital, 1775-1800,” in Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800, ed. Ned C. Landsman (Lewisburg, 2001).

28 López Denis, 170-171.

29 Ibid.
He applied to the masters of American vessels for information about the names of the deceased; names of the vessels to which they were attached; the names of masters and the ports to which they belonged; their usual residence and their native country. By the end he had produced a list of eighty-six men which was, by his estimate, imperfect. “I suppose,” he added at the end of the list, “about one hundred seamen have fallen victims to disease in this port, during the period above-mentioned.”

Not unlike his lists of the ship arrivals in Havana, Hill arranged the seamen’s information in a table. The resulting table served not only to “inform friends of the deceased” back in the United States but also to satisfy Hill’s “own curiosity” about the character of disease mortality among Americans. It is clear that the lists alone did not satisfy Hill’s curiosity. After the outbreak had subsided, Hill began calculating mortality rates out of the records. By autumn of 1805, he had managed to produce a comparison between his calculated rates and those from the “returns made from different churches and hospitals” about births and deaths of Spanish-Cuban residents. Calculating mortality rates among Americans and relating them to the local environs and health records were not unlike Hill’s efforts to map out all of the political, cultural and environmental factors that affected the course of American shipping in the region.

Second, Hill drew upon his own cultural background to identify and select the elements of local medical care he deemed most trusted and familiar. As Hill charted Americans’ navigation of the local medical world, he discovered a practitioner, José Agustín Tomás Domínguez. Domínguez held considerable appeal for Hill, more for the hybrid nature of his identity and medical background than any specific experiences in Havana. He was originally from Scotland. John Holliday Heragod had arrived in Havana in 1792, where he adopted the Catholic faith and a Spanish alias in order to obtain a license from the Royal Protomedicato to practice medicine. While he boasted local credentials and experience with yellow fever, Holliday also carried a degree from the University of Edinburgh – a major center for medical education in the Anglo-American world. He mobilized both of these medical and cultural backgrounds to make a niche for himself. Well before Hill’s arrival, the doctor had produced studies in both Spanish and English on yellow fever in 1794 and explored common local therapeutics. Known by his Spanish alias among locals, José Agustín Tomás Domínguez was “John Holliday” to the Americans who arrived in port and to medical print audiences back in Great Britain.

Hill turned “John Holliday” into a valued intermediary between the more foreign elements of the Spanish-Cuban medical culture in Havana and the ones he knew and trusted.

30 “Report to Secretary of State James Madison, 30 August 1805,” NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Havana,” RG 59.
31 Idem.
32 Idem.
34 For a biographical study of Holliday, including his general practice and work on yellow fever in Havana, see José Antonio López Espinosa, “Una rareza bibliográfica escrita en Cuba sobre fiebre amarilla,” ACIMED 13.2 (2005). I am also indebted to Adrian López Denis for sharing his findings on Holliday’s thriving practice among Americans in Havana.
“Doctor Holliday, a Scotch gentleman, who has resided twelve years in this country, and has had
great experience in practice, is usually employed by Americans, and has been very successful
generally.” Hill chose to emphasize Holliday’s Scottish background in his own interpretation of
effective elements of local medicine, and he relied on Holliday as a guide to local therapeutics
and local studies of yellow fever in Havana. Hill’s sources of medical information thus came to
include Holliday’s own manuscript treatise along with the doctor’s “estimation” of effective
remedies employed in the city.  

Ultimately, Hill complemented his medical cultural knowledge and consular skills with
his own on-the-ground experiences with the materiality of yellow fever. Throughout much of his
report, Hill referred to Holliday and unnamed practitioners when discussing the disease and
therapeutics. However, he also slipped into first-person: “I have seen the progression of the
fever much more rapid than in other cases, and seldom an instance of recovery from an attack of
much greater violence.” Hill signaled to his readers that these were his own firsthand
observations of physical manifestations of the disease in American bodies. Even though he
himself was not a practitioner, he deemed them authoritative enough to include in a report on the
disease’s course.

Hill penned his whole piece in four pages of an official dispatch, burying the account and
table of deceased seamen in one of his usual long reports to the Secretary of State. He sent along
with it John Holliday’s manuscript treatise and the October 30 edition of the Havana Aurora. In
spite of the similarity in format, Hill’s report does not read entirely like his other dispatches. He
decided to give his report a title, Observations and Remarks on the Prevailing Fever at Havana,
which echoed the style of another genre: the fever treatises doctors and military medical writers
produced and circulated during that period.

Hill’s identity underwent one final transformation not on the ground in Cuba but back in
the United States. His report did not remain in Secretary of State James Madison’s hands. Much
like the sphere of statecraft abroad, government circles back in the US often blurred with the
worlds of science and medicine. Madison passed Hill’s report on to Samuel Mitchill, a physician
who worked in both early Republican federal government and medicine. As Hill’s piece
changed hands, it changed in function. Mitchill read the piece as a physician and editor of the
Medical Repository, which was rapidly becoming an important forum for discussions about
yellow fever in different parts of the Atlantic world. In spite of the journal’s growth in

35 “Report to Secretary of State James Madison, 30 August 1805,” NARA, Department of State, “Consular
Dispatches from Havana,” RG 59.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. For more on the genre of “Observations” in medicine during this period, see Lorraine Daston, “The Empire
of Observation,” in Histories of Scientific Observation, Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck, eds. (University of
38 Samuel L. Mitchill was one of the founding editors of the New York-based Medical Repository. For a discussion
of the journal’s founding (and its link to investigations of yellow fever), see RJ Kahn and PJ Kahn, “The Medical
Repository — The First U.S. Medical Journal (1797–1824),” New England Journal of Medicine, 337.26 (December,
1997); Catherine O’Donnell Kaplan, Men of Letters in the Early Republic: Cultivating Forums of Citizenship
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 87-113; Bryan Waterman, Republic of Intellect: The
Friendly Club of New York City and the Making of American Literature, 189-230. I discuss the content, function,
circulation and readership of the Medical Repository in Chapter 4. In contrast to previous scholars, who portray the
geographic coverage, the editors complained that “literary and professional productions from Spanish America rarely come into our hands.” Both language barriers and limited access to Cuba’s medical print made it difficult for the editors to tap into information about yellow fever’s activity, in particular its effects on Americans. As a solution, Mitchill and Miller had begun using literature and information from the consuls based in Havana.39

Unbeknownst to him, Mitchill and Miller turned Hill into a medical correspondent. Mitchill turned Hill’s administrative work and report into a treatise. He removed Hill’s table of deceased seamen from the essay on yellow fever and gave the account a new name: *Observations on the Mortality by Yellow Fever, among the Seamen of the United States, who, with northern Constitutions and Habits, sail to Havanna, in Cuba; and on the Health and Longevity of the Native Spanish Inhabitants. By Henry Hill, Esq. Commercial Agent for the United States at that City: Communicated to Dr. Mitchill by the Secretary of State.* Mitchill then published it in the *Medical Repository.* Mitchill remade the audience for Hill’s piece by inserting it into a journal that circulated not only through the US but other parts of the Anglophone and even Francophone Atlantic. Through his revised title, moreover, Mitchill designed the piece more clearly as one of many new resources medical men might use for study of the shifting ecologies of disease and health in the Atlantic world.

By entering into that medical world and the collective process of mapping the changing ecological and cultural landscape of the Atlantic, Hill had helped alter the Republic of Fever in two pivotal ways. He had expanded the Republic geographically, facilitating the uneasy process of integrating Havana into the Republic’s sites of study. By making a medical role for himself, Hill had also expanded his function on the ground in Havana. He, together with Mitchill and Miller, helped expand the compass of actors who participated in the networks of exchange that made up the Republic of Fever. Like many of the civilian physicians and military medical officers who contributed to this medical world, Hill had drawn upon a mixture of his own medical cultural knowledge and firsthand experience with yellow fever. Mitchill and Miller, in turn, had given him an authoritative position in the world of warm climate medicine by publishing and circulating his work.

Hill had also contributed epistemological practices, information channels as well as political and cultural capital particular to his work as a consul. The materials that landed in Mitchill’s hands and the essay that circulated via the *Medical Repository* rested on Hill’s preferred local print sources, captains’ ship records, seamen’s maps of the local medical culture.

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39 One of Hill’s predecessors, John Morton, actually sent Spanish publications to Mitchill and Miller in 1803. In a letter to his former mentor, Benjamin Rush, Edward Miller commented on the value of Morton’s contributions in light of Americans’ limited access to studies of yellow fever in Havana. See Miller to Benjamin Rush, 10 August 1803 in Benjamin Rush Manuscripts: Correspondence, Volume 10 (Philadelphia: Library Company Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania). The quote appeared in the introduction to the review in the 1803 review of the literature Miller received from Morton. See “REVIEW,” *Medical Repository,* Second Hexade, Volume 6 (1803), 49-52.
as well as the recording and accounting practices he used to perform his duties as consul. While Hill had helped open up Havana as a site of study in the Republic of Fever, Havana was ultimately filtered through the lens of an Anglo-American consul in a Spanish colonial port.

Translating Disease Experiences in the Mediterranean

This flux in geopolitical circumstances was not confined to the Atlantic world. During Hill’s forays into the Spanish West Indies, another consul, Étienne Cathalan, Jr. was grappling with the changing landscape of disease in Marseilles, France. At the time of his appointment in 1789, the newly independent Americans had come to regard not only Spanish Caribbean ports but also southern French and Italian entrepôts as viable alternative markets for their carrying and export trade. Cities like Marseilles subsequently experienced an influx of American vessels that transported goods and seamen between the US, West Indies, Spain and various destinations within the Mediterranean. The region was also witnessing new forms of naval activity. The Napoleonic Wars also introduced new movements of American, British and French troops and agents throughout the Mediterranean – between the Atlantic, various southern European ports and northern Africa. Barbary privateers, who frequently attacked American shipping and kidnapped seamen, also roamed the region and magnified the Mediterranean’s significance for the US government.40

Étienne Cathalan, Jr. was very much a product of this changing world. He was born in 1757 to a successful French merchant family that thrived on the export trade in Marseilles. When his father began integrating him into the business in the 1770s, many French merchants in the region were becoming swept up in the American Revolution. Americans appealed to the French for support in the cause, and a number of French merchants answered the call by taking up the risky venture of exporting grains and even ammunition to the rebelling colonies. Cathalan, Sr. was among those who seized the moment, identifying not only pecuniary advantages but also the possibility for future prosperous ties to a new nation. In the wake of the American Revolution, Cathalan, Jr. absorbed his father’s outlook and a legacy of transatlantic commercial, political and social ties, which he subsequently integrated into his connections to ports and merchants in Italy.41

New political and commercial developments in the 1780s and 1790s altered the information channels that Cathalan, Jr. had used to connect Marseilles with the broader world.

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Americans’ expanded naval and commercial activity, for one, opened up more exchanges in goods, news and people between the Mediterranean and North American ports than before Independence. Through his early business transactions with Americans and exposure to American commercial and government agents, Cathalan, Jr had acquired proficiency in English, and he put both French and English skills to work in some of the transatlantic personal and business correspondences he cultivated during and in the wake of the American Revolution. Cathalan, Jr. even answered American contacts’ requests for regional news, Mediterranean foods, wine and botanical objects.\(^{42}\)

The increased presence of American shipping and seamen also accompanied the growth of a new web of networks. In lieu of guaranteed protection and representation by the Mediterranean-based agents of their former mother country, Americans began establishing their own consuls and vice consuls in various Italian, French Mediterranean, coastal Spanish and northern African ports who might ease the movement of American shipping in the region by circulating relevant naval intelligence, translating port regulations, mediating between local authorities and seamen and also helping seamen and travelers in distress.\(^{43}\) Cathalan, for example, began involving himself in the difficult task of creating new regional intelligence channels and support networks for Americans trying to escape the threat of Barbary privateers. He became an important intermediary between the US and the consuls in Algiers, who frequently required help in freeing kidnapped Americans or needed to find alternative routes for naval intelligence.\(^{44}\)

New patterns in movements of ships, goods and seamen also wrought ecological and medical cultural transformations. Like many other southern European ports, Marseilles’s health regulations and disease experiences rested on a long and intimate history with plague. The city’s massive lazaretto and permanent health office, created in the late seventeenth century, were both products of the city’s centuries-old ongoing battles with regional plague pandemics in the Mediterranean. Outbreaks, quarantine regulations and correspondences with regional Italian ports had fuelled local discussions, health decisions and created rich material for the explosion of plague literature in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. By Cathalan’s appointment in 1789, plague had not appeared in the city for fifty nine years. The city’s 1720 epidemic had, in fact, acquired fame as the last outbreak in Western Europe. Nonetheless, plague was still entrenched in the city’s culture, medicine and legislation. The office and lazaretto remained active and important fixtures in the city’s health regulations and relationship to the maritime world. Plague literature from the 1720s was still reprinted, cited and talked about in Marseilles and other parts of France.\(^{45}\)

The 1790s witnessed a resurgence of the disease in Egypt, Algiers and islands off the coast of northern Africa. The disease itself was not a new threat, but its routes and victims were.

\(^{42}\) Cathalan’s correspondences came to include, among others, Thomas Jefferson, who became acquainted with Cathalan during his time in Paris. See Gasquet, 75-79.


\(^{44}\) Gasquet, 99-112.

As the Napoleonic Wars played out in Egypt, French troops threatened to spread the disease to southern European ports-of-call were they typically touched. Americans fell victim not only to attacks and kidnappings in northern Africa but also to outbreaks of plague, a disease many had never experienced. And they, too, threatened to spread the disease from port to port.

New plague activity also raised concern about the vulnerability of US ports to the Mediterranean pandemic. During a regional plague outbreak in 1796, Cathalan became outraged with the consul in Gibraltar, who decided to shorten a ship’s quarantine and send it on its way back to the United States. “If this could have been allowed to me,” he observed to the Secretary of State, “I would have opposed to it, to prevent Plague to be imported by them to the United States.” It was not so much the ship itself, but rather American ports’ defense that concerned Cathalan. “There being no place fitted for quarantine, nor proper known ways to extirpate from all their clothes the effluvia, which is the custom here.” American ports, to his mind, lacked the experience and necessary facilities so well established in Marseilles. Cathalan, among others, was starting to think about American port operations in relation to plague.

The growth of trade with the Americas also brought with it a new disease threat to the Mediterranean: yellow fever. In the 1790s and early 1800s, reports and rumors about outbreaks in the US and West Indies spread through French and Italian ports via consuls, merchants and intraregional government networks. Health authorities in Marseilles began approaching Cathalan with news from the French consuls in Charleston and Philadelphia about the state of health in their regions. Port officials in Naples and Livorno subjected Americans to particularly rigorous quarantine policies – a result of conflicting reports from the US and suspicion of American captains’ accounts of their movement from port to port. Cathalan, as a result, began receiving requests from other US consuls for information about captains who might have touched in Marseilles before approaching health authorities in Italian ports. The threat of yellow fever became all the more real in 1800, when outbreaks began occurring along the Spanish coast in Cadiz and Gibraltar – right at the mouth of the Mediterranean. By 1804, the

Ibid., 833-834.
Joel Barlow to Étienne Cathalan, 12 July, 1796, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseilles,” RG 59.
Ibid.
See, for example, the Health Office’s report to Cathalan, dated 2 February, 1802, which Cathalan forwarded to Secretary of State James Madison. Cathalan to Madison, 10 March 1802, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseilles,” RG 59.
In February 1804, for example, John Mathieu, the consul in Naples, complained to Secretary of State John Marshall that an outbreak in Malaga was believed by the Neopolitan health office to have been brought to that port by an American ship. The office decided not to admit any American ships from Philadelphia or any southern US ports. Those from northern ports were subject to a twenty-one-day quarantine. See Mathieu to Marshall, 12 February 1804, NARA, Department of States, “Consular Dispatches from Naples,” RG 59. In June, 1799, the consul in Livorno, Thomas Appleton, responded to a petition by American merchants about the city’s quarantine policies against American shipping, which they thought unreasonably rigorous. Appleton, in turn, requested information from Secretary of State Thomas Pickering that would “prove the perfect conditions of health in the United States.” See Appleton to Pickering, 28 June 1799,” NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Livorno,” RG 59.
See, for example, Cathalan to Marshall, 4 September 1804, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marsellies,” RG 59.
disease had spread to Cordoba, Grenada, Valencia, Catalonia, Malaga and Livorno. The latter was one of the top destinations for the American re-export trade.\textsuperscript{52}

With the advent of plague and yellow fever, Cathalan began putting his cultural and linguistic mobility to work in matters concerning health relations. One challenge presented itself in July of 1796, when a group of kidnapped Americans encountered a plague outbreak in Algiers. Americans began falling victim to the disease. The consul in Algiers, Joel Barlow, quickly turned his regional support networks for aiding kidnapped Americans into resources for medical assistance and disease prevention. After acquiring money to free kidnapped Americans in the region, he directed the ship to Livorno with a letter of explanation to the consul there: “It is the only way in which I could get the people free and save the rest of them from dying with the plague.”\textsuperscript{53} The ship arrived in Marseilles instead. The captain explained to Cathalan that he had altered his course because of the rigor and expense of the quarantine in Livorno. Cathalan knew these health policies well. He had learned from both the consul there and “captains arriving from [Livorno]” that the procedure was “nearly double that of Marseilles.” Cathalan quickly sent word of the captain’s arrival to Barlow and the consul in Livorno, forwarding all of his correspondence to the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{54} Cathalan, fellow consuls and a captain had made regional maritime and government information channels into a system for disease and health surveillance.

Such situations often demanded the vice consul’s skill in negotiating between the needs and desires of American seamen and the authorities and local population of Marseilles. When the captain arrived, he begged Cathalan to assist in care for the sick seamen and consultations with local authorities that might “expedite our quarantine.”\textsuperscript{55} Cathalan obliged. He interviewed, translated and explained the medical information to the captain and the Secretary of State. Cathalan was in a particularly good position to negotiate with the lazaretto surgeons and doctors. He was not only a local citizen who grew up with the city’s medical culture. The head physician, “Citizen Bourg,” was Cathalan’s personal physician. He expressed to both Pickering and the captain his faith in the physicians’ skill and sense of pride in the lazaretto facilities.\textsuperscript{56}

As a resident of Marseilles, Cathalan understood aspects of the city’s relationship to the ancient lazaretto facilities. He observed that “the good policy of the lazaretto, and the safety of the Town” created limitations in how the sick seamen might acquire foodstuffs and other goods to refresh themselves in light of the sickness. Cathalan used both his warm and personal relations to the health officials and his acquaintance with a nearby inn keeper to set up provision

\textsuperscript{52} For an overview of early outbreaks in southern Europe, see William Coleman, \textit{Yellow Fever in the North: the Methods of Early Epidemiology} (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 18-20. For Livorno’s status as the major port for American shipping, see Marzagalli, 54-55.
\textsuperscript{53} Letter from Joel Barlow to Filippo Fellicchi [consul in Livorno], 12 July, 1796. Cathalan sent this letter in a dispatch to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, [undated], NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseille,” RG 59.
\textsuperscript{54} Cathalan to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, 26 July, 1796, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseille,” RG 59.
\textsuperscript{55} Cathalan copied the content of the captain’s note in his dispatch to Secretary of State, 22 July, 1796, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseille,” RG 59.
\textsuperscript{56} Cathalan to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, 26 July, 1796, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseille,” RG 59.
of breakfast and dinner rations for the men. When the men completed their stay, the captain expressed his gratitude to both Cathalan and the superintendent of the lazaretto “for their humanity in using every possible means for preserving our health” and ensuring a smooth performance of quarantine. Cathalan’s interactions with captains would not always prove as successful. Regardless, this incidence reveals the social and cultural capital the Marseilles merchant-turned-US consul began using to cultivate a new medical role for himself.

As Cathalan witnessed these ecological transformations, brokered disease information and mediated health relations, he began to re-evaluate the relationship between American and Mediterranean health measures, bodies of disease knowledge as well as the medical men and policymakers who produced them. Clashes and misunderstandings over health regulations, local anxieties over yellow fever and American anxieties over plague all suggested to the vice consul that American and European disease zones and experiences were colliding in unprecedented ways. These circumstances, he believed, warranted new types of interchange between American and European physicians and health offices.

Inspired, Cathalan developed a new project. He was going to do more than translate and channel information. He would help remake relations between American and Mediterranean medical writers and health authorities. Sometime between 1796 and 1799, Cathalan decided to set up a meeting with “Citizen Bourg” and “three others of our most reputed physicians.” The vice consul approached the doctors with a series of questions about the city’s lazaretto facilities and their opinions about the cause of yellow fever. After a number of consultations, Cathalan returned to his desk. He pulled recent letters from Timothy Pickering out of his files. They were letters that had described the state of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1798 – personal and official – and containing queries about the character of health regulations in Marseilles. He began arranging and rearranging the French and American materials together. He finally set to work translating from French into English and from English into French.

By the time he finished, Cathalan had produced a fifty-nine-page treatise: Recueil de pièces relatives à la fièvre jaune d’Amérique, envoyées par le consul des États-Unis d’Amérique, à Marseille, au gouvernement des États-Unis, 1799. It was nothing like the topography Henry Hill had made. Recueil de pièces reads more like a series of exchanges – between Cathalan and the physicians, between Pickering and Cathalan and between “American and European” physicians. It captures Cathalan, Jr’s belief that Americans and Mediterranean Europeans shared common experiences with warm climate diseases. This went right down to the level of personal suffering. The treatise opens with a personal letter between Pickering and Cathalan, dated December 15, 1798, in which Pickering conveyed the sad news that the Frenchman’s brother-in-law and had fallen victim to a recent yellow fever outbreak in Philadelphia. The volume proceeds with an official letter from Pickering. This one updated Cathalan on discussions in the US about “means of prevention of this calamity and plague” and expressed interest in the

57 Ibid.
58 Letter from the captain dated Lazaretto, 24 July, 1796. Cathalan included the letter in the above dispatch to Timothy Pickering, 26 July, 1796, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseille,” RG 59.
59 Cathalan to Timothy Pickering, 10 June 1799, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseilles,” RG. 59.
60 Cathalan compiled records and materials from his project into the above dispatch.
“establishments at Marseilles for preventing the introduction of the plague, [and] said to be the most complete in Europe.” 61 Through the medium of letters, both personal and official, Cathalan presented both the cultural bonds as well as the ecological and intellectual ties that united American and Mediterranean encounters with maritime pandemics.

Cathalan also used Recueil de pièces to present the knowledge and tools he (and others) thought American and southern European port cities could and should share. Pickering had signaled to Cathalan that the health regulations in Marseilles might work as a model for those in the United States. Cathalan, in response, turned the city’s physicians and legacy of plague literature into resources for Americans’ own health policies. He included a detailed record of the regulations of the lazaretto, “which [the physicians] have given me for the use of the Government of the United States.” Along with the treatise, he sent Pickering “a Journal abridged of what happened in this town of Marseilles during the Plague of 1720, drawn from a memorial in this Municipality [and the] Historical Relation of the Plague of Marseilles in the year 1720, by Mr. Bertrand, Doctor Physician who attended to the great number of Patients.” 62 While the resurgence of plague once again tested Marseille’s power against the disease, “this horrid calamity” threatened the United States all the more, as it was “not yet known there.” 63

Cathalan also inserted the French physicians’ opinions regarding the cause of yellow fever in the United States. The physicians had mobilized treatises at their disposal, notably John Lining’s 1756 A description of the American yellow fever – a famous American work that had been circulating in French since 1758. 64 They used Lining’s meteorological observations, description of the marshy landscape in South Carolina and disease among “negros” to determine the environmental circumstances in which the disease could thrive and the body types that were most susceptible. More recent reports on the status of outbreaks in the 1790s had also allowed them to chart yellow fever’s progress and geographic range along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. They even related these materials to their own records of the “bilious remittent fevers of the warm climates of Europe” and their own observations of the habits of American travelers in the region. 65

What the physicians finally concluded was that they wanted more information: “We still need to know how it responds to the influence of localities and in different atmospheric constitutions and seasons.” They required meteorological observations and records of the fever’s course in individuals and its effects on different temperaments. “All of these facts,” they wrote, “could be united into one enlightening collection, which would allow us to make a decision with

61 Stephen Cathalan, Recueil de pièces relatives a la fièvre jaune d'Amérique, envoyées par le consul des États-Unis d'Amérique, a Marseille, au gouvernement des États-Unis, 1799 (A Marseille : De l'imprimerie de Jean Mossy, imprimeur-librairie, a la Canebiere, an VIIe de la République française, 1799), 3-5.
62 Ibid., 32; Cathalan to Timothy Pickering, 10 June 1799, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseilles,” RG 59.
63 Cathalan, Recueil de pièces, 34.
65 Cathalan, Recueil de pièces, 40-42.
Cathalan likewise apologized that the memorandum was “very imperfect, being redacted only on what I could have heard by few American or French people, arrived here after the yellow Fever of 1797 and preceeding years [sic], I have heard there are precious observations made by Physicians or other [sic] in Philadelphia and other afflicted towns, works on that disease have been lately published.” Accordingly, the physicians and Cathalan used the treatise to request more recent volumes of medical literature from the United States. Such works, they argued, “would a great deal inlight [sic] the Physicians of Montpellier” and help them form their assessment. Americans might regard the Montpellier faculty as a resource for studying of yellow fever.

At first glance, Cathalan’s ideas about authoritative knowledge read like a European fashioning of old world disease experiences as the seasoned knowledge a younger nation lacked. Americans might gather facts and materials for the august European centers of medicine to interpret. Cathalan, after all, was deeply embedded in a French Mediterranean medical culture that privileged the University of Montpellier. The lazaretto and health office were both a well-established part of the city’s relationship to maritime diseases. They were also enshrined in heroic accounts of the outbreak in 1720. This was a world that Cathalan knew very well.

Ultimately, though, Cathalan revealed to readers that he felt that that world was changing too. The physicians he interviewed did not merely want to advise Americans about plague and yellow fever. “The health officers,” they wrote in one letter to the vice consul, “are concerned about the Health of Europe, because of the relationship between the two worlds.” By the end of their review, the physicians determined that more up-to-date information from Americans about yellow fever would also be useful for them when the disease threatened their own ports. “I would advise,” Cathalan concluded, “to request the Faculty or society of Physicians of Philadelphia, New-York, etc. To appoint a comitee [sic], to correspond the soonest possible with and consult the most celebrated Faculties of Physicians of Montpellier and Paris (if that has not been done already), in order that on the result of their different consultations, added to the opinion one with the other,” Americans and Europeans might both produce greater knowledge. The treatise was not only a resource for new ideas about health relations. Nor was it mere advice to Americans. It was a model and plea for future collaborations. Cathalan prepared the publication for both American and southern European audiences. The consultations with the physicians appear in both the original French and English. The same pages with the vice consul’s letters to and from Pickering feature a corresponding French translation. In addition to Pickering, the vice consul sent one copy of the treatise “to each of our Consuls in Spain and Italy.” He did not forget the local French physicians: “Ones have been asked to me by the Doctors health office, &c.”

In the end, political circumstances and trade patterns in the 1790s had transformed Cathalan. By virtue of his status as consul, he, like Hill, had become a new participant in warm

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66 Ibid., 38-39.
67 Ibid., 28.
68 Ibid., 12-13.
69 Ibid., 30.
70 Ibid., 32; Cathalan to Timothy Pickering, 10 June 1799, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Marseilles,” RG 59.
climate medicine. And, just as Hill had helped open up Havana as a site of study, Cathalan had helped extend the Republic of Fever beyond the Atlantic and into the Mediterranean.

There are other lessons to take away from Cathalan’s medical work. Unlike Hill’s experience in Havana, Cathalan reveals another way in which consuls came to figure in the world of warm climate medicine: as men well placed to alter medical relations in ports-of-call. New movements in shipping, new information channels and new cultural relations had fundamentally altered Cathalan’s sense of place: as a southern Frenchman, a merchant and a consul. They had thereby transformed his ideas about the relationship between his world of plague and the Atlantic world of yellow fever. Cathalan became part of a growing number of medical actors – consuls, policymakers, physicians and travelers – who were importing, exporting and remaking disease experiences in the Mediterranean.71 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, they had helped to expand the Republic of Fever into the Mediterranean by re-relating the worlds of plague and yellow fever.

**Preserving and Expanding the Republic**

In contrast to Henry Hill and Etienne Cathalan, David Bailie Warden neither came from a commercial background nor developed a head for business. His post in Paris was also far removed from the onslaught of yellow fever and plague. Nevertheless, by virtue of his unique background and Paris’s changing position in the medical world, Warden was destined to play an important role in the Republic of Fever.

David Bailie Warden entered the consular circles of Paris via a rather unconventional route: his cosmopolitan immersion in the world of letters and sciences. In fact, his placement as consul in Paris was rather fortuitous. Warden had devoted most of his life crafting a career as an all-round scholar and enthusiastic information broker. He was born in County Down, Ireland in 1772, and from an early age, the Irishman immersed himself in diverse array of subjects, never easily settling on just one. He attended Bangor Academy and Glasgow University, where he received a Master of Arts degree, won a prize for general proficiency in natural philosophy and became fluent in French and Latin. While in Glasgow, Warden decided to take courses in anatomy and surgery and earned a certificate in midwifery. In spite of his newfound interest in medicine, he never practiced and moved on to a new interest in theology. He decided to enter the Presbyterian ministry, where he quickly became wrapped up in the revolutionary fervor of the Irish Revolt against in England in 1798. A series of fiery sermons in support of the uprisings

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71 Thomas Appleton performed a feat similar to Cathalan’s publication. After a yellow fever outbreak in Livorono in 1804, he translated all 284 rules of the three local lazaretto facilities, and had the translations printed by a local printer with the governor’s permission. The project served a dual function. Appleton believed that ship captains were having too many run-ins with the port authorities because of their “ignorance of the laws” and the language. He added to this: “Having heard that the governments of the United States were establishing in various ports lazarettos to prevent the introduction of contagious disorders I have thought that a translation of laws and regulations of the three Lazarettos of [Livorno] would be no unacceptable tribute of my respect.” See Thomas Appleton to James Madison, 14 July 1806, NARA, Department of State, “Consular Dispatches from Leghorn,” RG 59.
soon got him into trouble with authorities. Warden was expelled from British territory and set sail for New York in 1799.72

Once in New York, Warden’s political zeal waned while his passion for the sciences persisted. He embraced his new intellectual environs, participating in local agricultural experiments and improving technologies for farming. In order to earn money, he put his broad-based knowledge of medicine, sciences, civil law and French to work and secured the principalship of a seminary in Kinderhoek, New York. By the time he took up a new post as a principal tutor in Kingston, New York in 1801, Warden had built a network of like-minded intellectuals interested in the natural sciences, largely through correspondence and the exchange of specimens.73

Warden also expanded his networks across the Atlantic. He sent his friend, Dr. S.M. Stephenson of Belfast, local minerals and seeds of American plants. Upon news that Warden had revived his study of medicine, Stephenson cautioned that, although “it would suit your inquisitive philosophical genius,” medical practice itself might prove too laborious for a scholar such as Warden, who was interested in a range of natural-historical topics. He eventually helped the cosmopolitan scholar to earn a membership in the Literary Society of Belfast by presenting the Society with natural objects that Warden collected and a journal he had kept on weather, disease, and meteorological phenomena around Kinderhoek.74

Through his broad scholarly background and activities in New York, Warden eventually established relationships that would lead, unexpectedly, to his diplomatic career in Paris. While principal tutor of Kingston Academy, Warden became acquainted with a variety of local prominent people, including the Republican senator General John Armstrong. Impressed with Warden’s academic background, Armstrong hired Warden as a tutor for his children and invited him into his household. When Thomas Jefferson appointed Armstrong as United States Minister to France in 1804, Armstrong decided Warden’s fluency in French and ability to absorb new skills and information would make him a valuable assistant. He hired Warden as secretary, arranged for his naturalization and took him to Paris. When the post of consul opened up in 1808, Warden applied to Armstrong for the position and got it.75

In his capacities as secretary and consul, Warden became occupied with new forms of brokering. While working for Armstrong, he networked for the diplomat, helped with creating passports and helped produce reports for the US government. He even took over the entire business of legation when Armstrong went on a tour of France with his wife. As a consul, he hosted travelers, relayed political and naval intelligence from Paris and served as an intermediary for other consuls within France. A mounting shipping crisis also occupied his time as consul. During his term from 1808 to 1814, Warden had to meet the problem of handling a large number of prize causes, which resulted from both England and France preying on neutral ships during the

73 Idem.
74 Stephenson to Warden, April 25, 1801, David Bailie Warden Papers, 1797-1851 (American Philosophical Society).
75 Haber, 4.
Napoleonic Wars and War of 1812. In order to earn an additional living, Warden also tried to do what many other consuls had done: he became a business agent for American merchants. Still, administrative duties, politics and business did not lessen Warden’s enthusiasm for the sciences. On the contrary – the sciences tended to consume his time. As he had in Ireland and in New York, Warden immersed himself in diverse branches of the sciences in Paris. While secretary to Armstrong in 1806, he formally enrolled in the Ecole de Medicine de Paris and took courses in comparative anatomy, the causes of sickness, zoology, mineralogy, botany and chemistry. Warden also kept abreast of the latest medical and scientific publications, new journal volumes and different booksellers who populated the world of print in Paris. While he was failing to turn himself into a successful and savvy business agent for American interests, Warden still managed to host dinners and converse with a variety of scientists and physicians.

Nor had Warden lost his ties to his like-minded correspondents in the US and to the scientific and medical societies there. Once again, Warden adopted the role of transatlantic correspondent and intermediary, but from the European side of the Atlantic. He wrote to a variety of US-based physicians and scientists, sending publications, objects and news about Paris. One of his most avid correspondents, Doctor Samuel Mitchill, gladly received the latest literary productions and news about new appointments to French scientific societies. On one occasion, Warden indulged Mitchill’s fascination with chemistry and sent him fifty-five volumes of the *Annales de Chimie*. In exchange for volumes of the *Annales de Chimie*, Warden distributed copies of the *Medical Repository* in Paris and throughout France.

Not simply an avocation for his own intellectual development, Warden came to regard this transatlantic interchange as a critical component of his work in international relations. In a way, he absorbed his new duties and tasks as secretary and consul into his work as a scholar. In 1813, when Warden decided to put his concept of a consul’s function into writing, he made the sciences central to the credentials he thought most suitable for the job. “It is the current practice,” he wrote, “to fill a consulate in a foreign country with a resident businessman who accepted the position on a part-time basis with the clear understanding that it must not seriously interfere with his own commercial affairs.” Warden attacked this idea of a consul’s background and work, replacing it with the idea of a representative who might also improve his nation in matters that were not commercial. “To be useful to his country in arts, sciences and manufactures, a consul must have no commercial engagements,” he wrote. “In the course of a few years, what a variety of useful information may a consul communicate to his country, if he have an acquaintance with the director and professors of public establishments. Books, maps, pamphlets, models and drawings of machines, seeds and plants, are gladly offered in exchange for similar articles.”

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76 Jolynda Brock Chenicek, “Dereliction of Diplomacy: The American Consulates in Paris and Bordeaux during the Napoleonic Era, 1804-1815,” (PhD. Diss: Florida State University, 2008), 105-108; Haber, 11-12.
77 Ibid., 5-6.
78 Ibid., 19.
80 See, for example, Warden to Mitchill, 1 September 1807, David Bailie Warden Papers (American Philosophical Society); Warden to Mitchill, 1 August 1807, Ibid.
81 Warden to Mitchill, 24 June, 1807, Ibid.
Alongside trade and commercial intelligence, a nation’s wealth and health rested on commerce in useful knowledge and natural objects. Good relations manifested themselves in intellectual ties, not merely commercial treatises and policy negotiations. A consul thus needed to broaden his range of resources beyond merchants and government representatives to include medical and scientific establishments as well. He was to be just as much a cultural agent as a commercial one.\(^83\)

While Warden was crafting his role as transatlantic culture-broker, aftershocks of the Haitian Revolution and Napoleonic Wars were also altering the medical worlds Warden knew and served. In spite of the city’s geographical remove from the diseases of warm climates, warm climate medicine descended upon the France’s medical capital during Warden’s tenure there. French medical officers began returning from the Caribbean and Egyptian theaters of the Napoleonic Wars. Officers from Egypt had witnessed and studied plague in 1798. Those officers from the Caribbean had grappled with yellow fever outbreaks, which took a deadly toll on French troops in the region. After the Haitian Revolution, refugee physicians and surgeons began resettling in France where they set up new practices. Like the officers who had served in the Caribbean, many of these men had spent years studying yellow fever in St. Domingue and in the American seaports that had hosted them. Now both diseases threatened the south of France, making them newly-immediate topics of debate in Paris. The French government was even stepping in, creating committees from the University of Montpellier and Paris Faculty of Medicine to investigate outbreaks in Spain and Marseilles on-site.\(^84\)

These developments transformed the geography of warm climate medicine, and, subsequently, Warden’s transatlantic medical world. Resettled refugees did not sever their ties to correspondents and colleagues back in the US and Caribbean, but worked to preserve those connections in spite of the new distance between them. In fact, actors on both sides of the Atlantic actively sought to expand those networks and capitalize upon the growing interest in warm-climate medicine in France. Former St. Dominguan refugees and medical officers began producing an unprecedented number of books on warm-climate diseases, which they published in Paris, one of the biggest centers of French medicine. For instance, former refugees Louis Valentin and Jean Devèze published French volumes on their experiences with yellow fever in the US.\(^85\) They sent their works to colleagues back in the US along with details of other new publications that had begun appearing in French medical literature and periodicals Warden absorbed. The two former refugees’ treatises on American outbreaks appeared alongside the studies of former medical officers, like Victor Bally, N.P. Gilbert, J.D. Larrey and Etienne

\(^{83}\) Ibid., 26-27.
\(^{85}\) Jean Devèze, Dissertation sur la fièvre jaune qui régna à Philadelphie, en 1793, depuis le mois d'août jusque vers le milieu du mois de décembre, par Jean Devèze (Paris: impr. de Vve Huzard, 1803); Ibid., Traité de la fièvre jaune, par Jean Devèze (Paris: A. Comte, 1820); Louis Valentin, Traité de la fièvre jaune d'Amérique: Ouvrage dans lequel on recherche son origine, ses causes ... on y examine, d'après les faits et l'expérience, si elle est contagieuse, on y indique non seulement les différents moyens curatifs, mais encore ceux qui peuvent en préserver les militaires, les marins, et autres (Paris: Méquignon l'aiéné, 1803); Ibid., Réflexions Sur Le Rapport De La Faculté De Médecine De Paris, Concernant La Fièvre Jaune (Paris: 1817).
Pariset, who also discussed warm climate “fevers” in relation to the plague outbreaks a number of them had experienced in Egypt.  

Warm-climate medicine had also begun to penetrate many of the medical schools and societies that were a part of Warden’s network. Junior health officers returned to the Ecole de Medicine de Paris, where they wrote dissertations on yellow fever. Former medical officers began forming new intellectual circles and helped create new medical societies and health bureaus, like the Academy of Medicine, in cooperation with the government.  

Further south, near Marseilles, where Louis Valentin had resettled, the faculty in Montpellier took an ever increasing interest in the alarming changes in the disease ecologies of southern Europe.  

Valentin began socializing with the faculty members and he made every effort to create an interchange between his new acquaintances and colleagues back in the US. Valentin passed Rush’s news and ideas on to his new colleagues. In exchange for news on yellow fever in the United States, Valentin sent to Rush his latest French treatise on the disease and “pamphlet of Dr. Beguerie of Montpellier concerning a fever which made its appearance in French vessels going to St. Domingue & which was truly yellow fever.”  

As Paris and other French medical centers turned into new centers of intellectual activity, actors inside and outside of France worked to remake them into new nodes in the transnational Republic of Fever.

Preserving the Republic of Fever proved no easy task, though. Disruptions in transatlantic shipping, for example, often frustrated efforts to keep up correspondences and access some of the latest news and publications on yellow fever. After moving from Norfolk, Virginia to Marseilles in 1802, Louis Valentin decided to keep up an active correspondence on news of yellow fever with acquaintances and colleagues back in Virginia, Philadelphia and New York. He filled long letters to Benjamin Rush and Felix Pascalis with queries about recent outbreaks and requests for any recent publications, including volumes of the Medical Repository.  

Eager though Valentin was to keep up with correspondents back in the US and extend those networks, he experienced an array of problems with shipping. He was disappointed in 1807 to discover that his requested literature had arrived in a damaged state. “The pamphlet of Doct. Caldwell on quarantines [was] almost torn into pieces and soaked in vinegar,” he complained in a letter to Rush. He blamed the “awkwardness of the captain” who had

86 Heamen, 6-11.
87 Ibid., 6.
88 The faculty published the result of their study of the site of an 1800 outbreak of yellow fever in Cadiz, Spain. See F.C., Cauzergues, Mémoire sur la contagion de la fièvre jaune (Montpellier: Picot, 1817).
89 Valentin to Rush, 22 October 1807, Benjamin Rush Manuscripts: Correspondence, Volume 18 (Library Company Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
Reliability was not the only issue. As hostilities mounted between the US and Great Britain, ship confiscations began to frustrate Valentin’s efforts. In October of 1807, he wrote to Rush: “I entertain some doubts concerning that of January last acknowledging your favor and returning you my gratitude for the handsome and valuable gift of the second edition of your works; I say some doubts, because I heard that the Vessel, Columbia Packet, directed to Mr. Clapier of Philadelphia had been taken and sent to Bermuda or Halifax. Perhaps the captors have permitted the packet of books, I do not know.” In 1808, channels of communication remained very vulnerable and Valentin’s anxieties lapsed into near defeatism. “I am so much the more disappointed that very probably it will pass a great while before our communications should be free,” he wrote to Rush. “With America in the present circumstances and almost universal contest between European powers and the new World will deprive us of corresponding.”

This is how Warden, and his fellow correspondents in the Republic of Fever, came to transform Warden’s position as consul. Valentin suggested a new tactic to Rush. “If you can find an opportunity for any French ports in the ocean in the Mediterranean or for Paris, to the American ambassador or other agents, I would recommend to your goodness to avail yourself with it.” By 1809, Valentin and Rush had begun applying to Warden, who obliged and turned his government envoys into alternative routes for the men’s letters and packages. As Valentin wrote in the middle of one letter to Rush: “Let me know the medical news in case Mr. Warden would come back again as it is hoped if he embarks himself at Philadelphia or when your government envoys an ambassador or any agent you could avail yourself with their opportunity unless free intercourse should be reestablished between both countries.” Convoys and consular agents, in particular Warden, increasingly became as much a subject of both men’s correspondence as the medical content itself. In light of new geographical and political obstacles, Rush, Valentin and Warden took channels and powers designated for the preservation of the American Republic and began turning them into a means for preserving the Republic of Fever.

Medical men and Warden also took advantage of his position in changing medical world of Paris. As he had with other branches of the sciences and medicine, Warden also began keeping abreast of the latest developments in warm-climate medicine in Paris. Samuel L. Mitchell, for example, began turning his valued source of news about chemistry in Paris into a resource for news about yellow fever discussions in France. Alongside French publications on natural philosophy and chemistry, the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia began

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91 Valentin to Rush, 21 September 1807, Ibid.
92 Valentin to Rush, 22 October 1807, Ibid.
93 Valentin to Rush, 1 January 1808, Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Valentin to Rush, 15 August 1809, Ibid.
96 Valentin to Rush, 14 November 1810, Ibid.
97 See, for example, Samuel Mitchill to Warden, July 20, 1807, David Bailie Warden Paper, 1797-1851 (American Philosophical Society).
receiving new literature on warm-climate diseases from their dedicated member and correspondent.  

Medical writers wanted more than just reliable channels for the circulation of news and literature; they sought personal connections to other scholars. US-based physicians, who could rarely come to Paris in person, desired agents who could get works translated and republished and who could deliver works to potential patrons previously encountered only in print. Warden possessed and promoted those connections. Felix Pascalis, for example, wanted to integrate the warm-climate medicine community in New York into the fever discussions in Paris. He started translating treatises into French and establishing new correspondences with participants in Paris. He and his co-editor, Samuel Mitchill, were already promoting the Medical Repository in Paris; they now discussed circulation of the journal in relation to warm-climate medicine. In spite of his ties to Francophone medical communities, including those in Paris, Pascalis did not find it all that easy to insert himself in the Paris-based circles of warm-climate medicine. Without immediate familiarity with some of the editors and medical writers in those circles, Pascalis felt uncertain about the best means of winning patronage and opening up possibilities for the Medical Repository. In addition to relying upon Warden’s connections to shipping routes, Pascalis began prevailing upon Warden’s knowledge of medical print in Paris. He asked Warden what kind of patronage he might receive in France if he published a translation of Rush’s works. In his shipments of the Medical Repository, Pascalis included descriptions of volumes that contained particular reviews and essays about yellow fever. He begged Warden to find the best means of circulating the material in the print circuits of Paris.

Acquaintance in print was also different from personal interaction. Both played roles in building and maintaining good relationships within the Republic of Fever. Pascalis, for example, succeeded in contacting the former medical officer, Victor Bally, and prevailing on him for a copy of his yellow fever treatise, in order to initiate exchanges with Bally’s circle and to expand the scope of transatlantic discussions in print. Pascalis decided to review Bally’s work in the Medical Repository and then distribute the volume to Bally and other contacts in Paris and France. However, Pascalis worried about the tone of his review, which was very critical of Bally’s belief that yellow fever was contagious. Pascalis decided to send Bally’s copy of the Medical Repository to Warden, along with an explanation:

In a preceding Number the 4th of the third volume I had a review of it in which I am afraid, if he has seen it, he may think to himself severely treated, although, I have in the same abundantly acknowledged his talents and merit in this number, the second of the IV Volume, you will see the same subject thought again: the review by me of Maclean on pestilential disease, &c. as this writer is a powerful opponent to all contagionists, I will be glad to let Bally see how far he may be yet

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98 David Ballie Warden’s inscription appears on the inside of the cover of at least ten of the early nineteenth-century French volumes on yellow fever and plague housed in the American Philosophical Society.
99 Pascalis to Warden, 22 October 1818, David Bailie Warden Papers, 1797-1851 (American Philosophical Society).
100 Pascalis to Warden, 28 May 1819, Ibid.; Pascalis to Warden, 21 September 1821, Ibid.
of a true reckoning, you will therefore confer a favor by transmitting to him, a copy with my best respects.101

Medical writers such as Pascalis, as this letter shows, walked a fine line between productive criticism and personal attack, as questions about the cause of yellow fever became bound up in many practitioners’ professional identity. Without personal acquaintance and prior standing in Bally’s circles, Pascalis’s criticism could come across as rude attacks on character rather than a healthy component of collaborative work. By showing preference for Charles Maclean, a particularly vocal and divisive British medical officer who opposed views endorsed by Bally, Pascalis risked accusations of partisanship, breaches in implicit codes of conduct among medical writers. Pascalis viewed Warden as someone who understood these politics well enough to mediate. By virtue of his direct and indirect acquaintances with Bally and his colleagues in Paris, Warden possessed not only that knowledge but also the cultural and political capital that Pascalis lacked. Warden could help create and stabilize relationships in spite of the factions and contentious language that were crystallized in print.

When Pascalis solicited Warden’s help with Bally, the political landscape had changed. While Warden still resided in Paris in 1818, he no longer served as an official consul for the US government. The Napoleonic Wars, moreover, had come to an end; so too had the War of 1812. As naval hostilities settled, the new peace reduced the dangers of shipping and travel and opened up the possibility of easier intercourse between Paris and the US. Medical students and physicians in the US took advantage of the situation and began traveling in great numbers to study in Paris and grasp it for themselves.102

In spite of this turn in political and cultural circumstances, as Pascalis’s request to intercede with Bally suggests, Warden’s power as an agent for the Republic of Fever persisted. In the 1820s, Warden’s role in the Republic of Fever even broadened as more Americans came to Paris. In addition to ongoing solicitations for news, publications, and favors, Warden now received an increasing volume of students and medical visitors with letters of introduction.103 Vast hospitals, surgery, and pathological medicine aside, a number of those travelers sought specific connections to the Parisian practitioners of warm-climate medicine.104 Physicians and Warden had remade an agent for the American Republic into an agent for the Republic of Fever.

Conclusion

By the end of the Napoleonic Era, the Republic of Fever had expanded outside of the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and taken hold of European medical centers like Warden’s Paris.

101 Pascalis to Warden, 1 January 1818, Ibid.
103 Haber, 30-34.
104 For example, Peter Solomon Townsend of New York traveled to Paris in 1828 specifically to network with Paris-based physicians who were participating in the debates there. The first person he approached for a description of the local medical politics and introductions to practitioners was David Bailie Warden. See, Peter Townsend, Unpublished Diaries, Series II, Volume 4, 53-56 (New York Academy of Medicine Rare Books and Manuscript Collection).
Commerce and warfare had dramatically altered the disease landscapes and medical geographies of the Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds. Physicians and surgeons were not the only agents in this process. While commerce and warfare had altered the movement and identities of physicians and surgeons, they had also transformed the medical world by creating new medical actors. Collectively, consuls like Henry Hill, Etienne Cathalan and David Baillie Warden reveal how warm climate medicine became embedded in the commerce and statecraft that expanded within different parts of the Atlantic and beyond.

Their diverse contexts and medical roles also highlight the variety of ways in which commercial agents contributed to the world of warm climate medicine. Consuls introduced methods of knowledge-production based on practices and networks particular to their work in commerce and statecraft. By virtue of the cultural and social capital they mobilized in ports-of-call, consuls also succeeded in remaking the webs of relationships within the Republic. The very blurry boundaries between cosmopolitan medical/scientific exchange, lay travelers/port residents and international statecraft even created opportunities for physicians and consuls to collaborate and transform the function and powers of an agent to the state.

The medical world that emerged out of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions did not fade away in the mid-nineteenth century. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Republic of Fever became a framework for a new and exotic disease threat to port cities in America, the Caribbean and Europe: cholera.