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CHAPTER 12

UNDERSTANDING MILITARISM: MONEY, MASCU LINITY, AND THE SEARCH FOR THE MYSTICAL

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*Militarism does not consist of any army, nor even of the existence of a very great army. Militarism is a spirit.*

*Woodrow Wilson, 1916 (as cited by Berghahn, 1984, p. 108)*

Like Woodrow Wilson, we define militarism in this chapter as a psychological rather than a physical process: Militarism is a set of values that support military activities and enable countries to mobilize for war. Militarism is as important during peace as it is during war. In fact, wars cannot be conducted unless militarism is nurtured long before wars begin. In democracies, somebody must provide a rationale for military expenditures and possible threats. The importance of military readiness must be articulated and that rationale must be persuasively communicated to the public. Legislative decision-makers must agree to allocate funds for the military, rather than to other forms of social spending.

In this chapter, we argue that the preparation for war is as problematic as war itself. Because
militarism is a global form of structural violence, we begin by analyzing the excessive financial costs and social injustice caused by militarism. Our central concern is why people decide to pay these exorbitant prices. To answer this question, we examine underlying psychological processes that are not always obvious. We assert that money, masculinism, and the search for the mystical drive militaristic sentiments beyond logical ends. Finally, we suggest that psychologically valid mechanisms to address these motives are required before structural violence from excessive militarism can be curbed. Because militarism calls on some of the deepest and most cherished of all human capacities, we believe that salvaging the best of militarism while redirecting the military’s focus is a crucial task for the twenty-first century.

**THE THIN LINE BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE**

In modern societies, support for military matters is often covert until armed conflict erupts. When soldiers fight wars, they must leave their families and join scores of other displaced persons to march, kill, and die for the sake of some political objective they often know little about. Because, as we have long known, war is not instinctual, people must be socialized to kill (May, 1943). The media helps the public understand the need to fight by objectifying the enemy and portraying it as evil (Hesse & Mack, 1991), and often even subhuman (Reiber & Kelly, 1991). Such treatment communicates dire predictions of what might happen should the enemy prevail. For example, in the early stages of the Vietnam War, the public was continually warned that a communist government in Vietnam would only be the first of a line of falling dominoes that would eventually threaten the United States. Strong feelings of nationalistic identification get aroused, creating an “us vs. them” dichotomy that is oversimplified and rigid (Tetlock, 1988). Military leaders on our side are depicted as heroes, and people questioning the wisdom of mili-
tary action are portrayed as unpatriotic.

Yet sudden psychological support of military actions cannot arise in a vacuum. Along with a well-rehearsed army, government leaders and the media build militaristic value systems between wars so that militaries can be instantly activated. In peacetime, such values are often latent. Large numbers of citizens passively condone, if not support, their militaries, in order for them to function effectively when called upon. In this way, the line between peace and war becomes blurred. The first peace psychologist, William James, noted that “battles are only a public verification of the mastery gained during the peace interval…[The] preparation for war by nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing” (James, 1910/1995, p. 19).

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Preparation for war is a form of structural violence, since its social, political, and economic structures cause avoidable injury or deaths (Christie, 1997; Galtung, 1969). Structural violence is insidious because it has no active agent, no conscious intent, and no clear point of origin (see Chapter 1). But inevitably, national decision-makers choose between military and social spending. When countries spend precious income on military matters instead of food, health care, or environmental protection and restoration, injuries and deaths to civilians occur. As Eisenhower put it a half century ago, “the problem in defense spending is to figure how far you should go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without” (1956, as quoted by Sivard, 1996).

Half of the world’s governments spend more to guard their citizens against military attack than to protect them against the enemies of good health, such as contaminated water, poor nutri-
tion, and lack of medical care (Sivard, 1993). World military expenditures reached an all-time high of $1.3 trillion in 1987. Despite significant decreases since the close of the Cold War, however, global expenditures in 1995 still amounted to more than $1.4 million per minute. The United States became the world’s military superpower during World War II, when its military budget sky-rocketed from under $13 billion a year to $530 billion (Sivard, 1996). The United States currently eclipses the rest of the world by a huge margin, spending over five times that of the second-biggest spender (Russia); more than the combined budgets of the 13 countries ranking below it (Sivard, 1996); and over 18 times the combined spending of those countries often identified as its biggest threats (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba).

Even redirecting relatively small amounts of military expenditures could significantly impact social well-being (see Mazaruna and McKay, this volume; Pilisuk, this volume). For example, just 4 percent of the world’s military budget could raise global literacy to 50 percent, and redirecting 8 percent of military budgets for family planning would stabilize global population by the year 2015. The cost of one nuclear-powered submarine ($2.5 billion) could immunize the world’s children for one year. Clearly, excessive military expenditures constitute great structural violence.

TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR EXCESSIVE MILITARISM

Psychological explanations for militarism have for several decades focused on fear, pride, and logic. Let us examine these in turn.

Fear

White (1984, 1986) argued in his classic volume on the psychology of war that “fear is what fu-
els arms races [along with] an exaggerated preoccupation with power” (1986, p. 242). White used Freud’s distinction between objective and neurotic anxiety to argue that most wars are caused by exaggerated, unrealistic fear. Arms races are Freudian compulsions, which have a “symbolic reassuring function [and] serve to keep the underlying neurotic anxiety from reaching the surface of consciousness” (1986, p. 245). From White’s perspective, militarism is primarily an unconscious process through which decision-makers try to reduce their vulnerability by excessive arms buildup. Militaries soothe national fears (at least those of the elites), which is one reason the expression of fear by military personnel is taboo, especially in war-time.

**Pride**

Closely related to fear is pride, which also serves as an important motivator of military activity (Frank, 1986). Ribbons, stripes, and uniforms symbolize glory and honor. War originally undertaken out of fear can be easily continued by pride because so often, “proving one’s courage and determination by continuing to fight becomes an end in itself, more important than gaining the object of the fight” (Frank, 1982, as cited in Frank, 1986, p. 226). Weapons builders have often given affectionate names to their products and displayed them in their glory. For example, one German manufacturer termed the artillery of World War I “Big Bertha,” after his wife (Pearson, 1994). Military leaders have marched in parades for centuries, showing off their grandeur. Even in peace-time, military leaders can easily become attached to their big budgets and prestige.

Status needs are clearly at stake in the nuclear arms race. For example, developing countries like India and Pakistan yearn to become part of the “nuclear club” (Wessells, 1995). Their recent nuclear tests and willingness to pay high costs through economic sanctions demonstrate the powerful psychological factors of both fear and pride that commonly operate. Although Pakistan is
one of the ten poorest countries in the world, its Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif happily announced on May 28, 1998, that “the big powers have never taken us seriously … [but] … today … we have become a nuclear power.” As Pakistanis celebrated in the streets, one university student commented, “we are ready to pay any price and make any sacrifice to live as a self-respecting nation” (Burns, 1998).

**Logic**

While the emotional dimensions of fear and pride are important, so are the more cognitive dimensions of logic and choice. War can be seen as a decision to maximize gains and minimize losses. One way to understand the logic of excessive arms buildup is through *game theory* (O’Neill, 1989), a mathematically formal approach for examining decision-making that assumes people rationally choose to maximize outcomes. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), for example, employs a set of pay-off contingencies that frequently result in self-destructive behavior (Rapoport, 1962; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). When two people are faced with a choice to cooperate or compete, their decision is greatly affected by the costs of being betrayed. In thousands of laboratory studies (Dawes, 1991), people got trapped into self-destructive behaviors by trying to avoid risks. When the repercussions of being betrayed by one’s enemy are too great, trust is unlikely, and choices that seem defensive quickly become self-defeating. From the perspective of game theory, nuclear planners in the United States and Soviet Union became caught in a set of contingencies, whereby attempts to maximize gains and minimize risks led to irrational choices on both sides.

The competitive aspect of such a game has its historical roots in *Realpolitik*, a political philosophy that assumes nation-states operate in a competitive system of threats (see Chapter 1, this
volume). The logic of Realpolitik predicts that nations with inadequate arsenals will be attacked, and the only way to assure deterrence is to build a mightier set of threats than one’s adversaries. Clearly fear and pride are at stake in these decisions, but from the perspective of game theory, excessive nuclear weapons production is also an outcome of logic, when that logic is based on presumed competitiveness and hostility of other nations. When the stakes of being betrayed are horrendous, defensive choices are logical, even when they produce great costs.

Although presumed competitiveness of the other may sometimes be accurate, countries often interpret an adversary’s actions as offensive, when the adversary perceives its own actions as defensive (Bronfenbrenner, 1961; Pilisuk, 1972.) We call this paradox the offense/defense ambiguity. An example is the U.S. bombing of Iraq during the late 1990s. While the United States claimed that its actions were designed to prevent Iraq’s future use of weapons of mass destruction (thus a defense), Iraq clearly saw the U.S. actions as offensive (Newsday, January 18, 1998). A second example of the offense/defense ambiguity is the Cuban Missile crisis. When the Soviets sent a ship with nuclear materials to protect Cuba in 1962 (regarded by the Soviets as a defensive action), the United States quickly interpreted the move as offensive and sent a blockade to surround the ship. Tensions mounted as the two countries came as close to nuclear strikes as any time before or after. Further demonstrating the tendency to see one’s own actions as purely defensive, the United States changed the name of its “Department of War” to “Department of Defense” in 1948.

This offense/defense ambiguity is an example of the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), by which we explain our own behavior in situational terms, but others’ behavior as an outcome of their intentions and dispositions. Behavior by a perceived adversary that is poorly
understood is easily interpreted as intentional aggression (Jervis, 1976), whereas the action of our own country seems a natural self-protective reaction to a dangerous situation. Unfortunately these misperceptions quickly accumulate and lead to armed conflict (Stoessinger, 1998), undertaken out of defense rather than offense. Charles Osgood (1962) noted this proclivity in his theory about reciprocated aggression. When one’s moves are seen as offensive, they stimulate reciprocated aggression; when one’s moves are clearly seen as an attempt to de-escalate tension, they can be reciprocated and armed conflict can be avoided (Pilisuk & Skolnick, 1968).

**THE MONETARY BASIS OF MODERN MILITARISM**

With or without perceived threat from adversaries, military expenditures soon develop a life of their own. Though they may have originally been formulated on the basis of fear and competition, continued militarism can only thrive if societies are able and willing to pay the financial costs. In modern bureaucracies, budgets develop self-sustaining power.

The U.S. defense budget, for example, is often justified on the basis of economic, rather than security reasons. Jobs, it is argued, are the reason we need bigger budgets. Budget cutbacks are dangerous not because of national security, but rather for economic reasons. For example, when the 1998 U.S. Congress allocated an additional $7 billion to the Defense Department beyond what the Pentagon requested, legislators argued that jobs would be threatened if orders for weapons and base operations were diminished (Kreisher, 1998).

The job argument is fallacious, however, because spending on infrastructure creates more jobs than spending on defense. For example, in the United States, $1 billion pays for 9,000 guided missile production jobs; 21,600 local transit jobs; 63,000 educational services jobs; or
16,500 jobs in pollution control (Renner, 1990). Thus three times as many jobs are created when federal monies are directed toward domestic programs than toward weapons. Similar figures have been generated for Germany, India, and other countries (Renner, 1990).

Industrialized countries increasingly build and sell weapons because bureaucratic conservatism and vested interests are strongly reflected in military spending patterns (Pearson, 1994). Weapons are big business. Over a quarter of the top 500 multinational corporations are licensed to produce and export arms (Buzuev, 1985). Governments need weapons industries to maintain their arms businesses, and often parcel out contracts to various manufacturers and laboratories to keep them going. In this way, the United States has sustained numerous aerospace firms, including McDonell-Douglas, Northrop, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Lockheed (Pearson, 1994).

Efforts to control the manufacture and distribution of arms produce a dynamic tension between economic forces and long-range security. Unfortunately, the increasingly global production system makes arms control more difficult than ever. Big arms firms work under multinational structures, where cross-border military/corporate collaboration leads to foreign investments, international subcontracting, international licensing, and joint ventures. If one country has regulations that forbid arms sales to a certain customer, a deal can still be closed by using a foreign partner-firm (Pearson, 1994). Moreover, well-educated but unemployed engineers and scientists can offer their services to potential enemies abroad. Such internationalization of the arms industry is eclipsing the power of national governments to maintain regulations of any sort (Greider, 1998). Consequently, arms firms can continue producing weapons long after their utility for national security has waned.

Thus, arms manufacturers’ quarterly reports illuminate more about the militarization of the
world than any one political ideology, Realpolitik included. Most of the wars around the planet are now fought within nations, with small arms supplied by developed countries. Almost 90 percent of all war deaths are caused by guns, rather than missiles, bombs, or tanks. Small arms are cheap: for $50 million (the price of one modern fighter jet), 200,000 assault rifles can be purchased. Small arms sales are largely unregulated, but rampant: $3 billion worth of small and light weapons are shipped across borders each year (Renner, 1998). Moreover, small arms feed private security units, which are increasing in number and size, just as national armies are shrinking. In some countries, such as South Africa and Australia, private security forces are larger than national armies (Renner, 1998).

Thus, while Realpolitik may have provided the logic for massive military expenditures between the superpowers during the Cold War, market forces contribute to its healthy survival long after the reasons for creating them have faded. But market forces cannot be the whole story because market forces exist for all human endeavors, whereas militarization has thrived when social spending has dropped. To answer why, we turn to the question of just who is responsible for making decisions to buy bombs instead of butter.

MASCULINISM AND THE MILITARY CULTURE

Arms dealers, makers, producers, designers, and users are almost universally male. Feminists ask about the gender of those making important decisions (Seager, 1993) and find it consequential that militaries and state departments are almost entirely made up of men, working in highly masculinist institutions that glorify and promote the traditional male values of strength, power, and competitive advantage. From a feminist perspective, male dominance of military and arms industries is no coincidence. As Cynthia Enloe (1993) notes, universally, “masculinity has been so in-
timately connected to militarism that it is no wonder there have been questions about whether the two are analytically separable” (p. 52).

War is always, in some way, a test of gender, and soldiering a test of manhood (Elshtain, 1987). Drill sergeants are hired to make boys into men. Boot camp recruits are called “ladies,” “girls,” or “fags,” until they are toughened up for their role as killers—then they become men (Ruddick, 1995). These homophobic, misogynist labels are justified as a means to prevent troops from displaying feminine traits and affections that might threaten the place of ritualized masculinity (Reardon, 1985).

From their position of control in militarized institutions, men enhance their power over women by defining and conducting war, as well as most functions of the state. In the Pentagon, logic and reason are cherished, emotions and caring are disparaged. The gendered dimension of reason vs. caring is well-established—males are socialized to display reason, and females to display caring (Bem, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Tannen, 1994). The most “hard-nosed” and coldly “logical” men are the ones promoted in the defense establishment (Cohn, 1987). Those men who demonstrate the most masculine values get to define national security.

Conventional military mechanisms are saturated in sexual dynamics in which male power is often expressed through violence against women. Sexual assaults and harassment are common occurrences in the military, as seen in the military colleges of the United States throughout the 1990s. The Tailhook scandal, in which naval officers were convicted of sexual harassment during an officers’ party, is exceptional, not for its crimes, but for the willingness of the women officers to press charges (Zimmerman, 1995).

Likewise, domestic violence is three times higher among U.S. military than nonmilitary
families (Thompson, 1994), and domestic violence escalates when soldiers return to their homes after war (Edmonds & Castaneda, 1992). Guatemalan indigenous women have reported more domestic violence during the civil war in their country (Enloe, 1993), as have Yugoslavian women (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996). The sexual warfare in former Yugoslavia is not new: Rape of women has always occurred in armed conflict.

That military men should be so easily prone to sexual violence is not surprising when militar-ies systematically condone the objectification of women by providing prostitutes for their troops. Military planners see such services as legitimized rewards that the hardships of soldiering re-quire. Ubiquitous in militarized settings, prostitution is officially approved and supported by governments and banks around the world to aid military personnel. For example, in 1967, the U.S. military signed a treaty with the Thai government that allowed soldiers from Vietnam to visit Bangkok for “recreational services.” That Thailand is now considered a world center for the sex industry can be attributed to the various American banks that loaned the necessary $4 million to build the massage parlors and brothels (Seager, 1993).

The normalization of prostitution in the military culture was clearly illustrated during an in-cident in 1995 in which three U.S. soldiers were charged with raping a schoolgirl in a car near the Army base in Okinawa, Japan. Their commanding officer said that the rape could have been avoided if the soldiers had simply paid for a prostitute. “For the price they paid to rent the car they could have had a girl,” he explained (Molotsky, 1995). Entangled in the system of military prostitution, women learn to “interpret womanhood as acceptance of themselves as militarized service objects” (Enloe, 1989, p. 214).

Ritualized masculinity fuels military institutions, and weapons engineers and war strategists
use explicit sexual imagery to describe their powerful technologies. Defense intellectuals inside the Pentagon use eroticized language, discussing warheads in terms of “penetration dynamics” with “weight to thrust ratios” (Cohn, 1987). Nuclear warheads are referred to in sexual terms, as strategists ask each other if they got to “pat” the missile? Cohn explains that “patting is an assertion of intimacy, sexual possession, affectionate domination. The thrill and pleasure of ‘patting the missile’ is the proximity of all that phallic power, the possibility of vicariously appropriating it as one’s own” (p. 695). With overtly gendered imagery which celebrates male power, scientists at Los Alamos Laboratory called the first atomic bomb “Oppenheimer’s baby,” and referred to those that were successfully detonated as male babies, whereas duds were called girls.

These explicit sexualized images portray identification with male power, a God-like control over the forces of life and death. The first atomic bomb test was called Trinity—the unity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—to symbolize the male forces of creation. One physicist witnessing the first test commented that “It was as if we stood at the first day of creation.” Robert Oppenheimer, lead scientist of the team which designed the first atomic bomb, thought of Krishna’s words in the Baghavad Gita: “I am become death, the shatterer of worlds” (Pilisuk, 1999).

**EXPERIENCING THE MYSTICAL**

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States, nuclear scientists refer to their club as “the priesthood” (Gusterson, 1991). Those with great seniority preside over a set of ritualized rites of passage for the novices. These rituals include years of study in the esoteric and secret classified language, competitive jousting for the role of designer of the next weapon test, grueling months of hard work for the chosen, and limited access to the sacred test site for the
cloistered elite.

That many nuclear engineers both portray and experience their work in spiritual terms illuminates the third and perhaps most elusive dimension of militarism: that of mystical experience, which we define here as the experience of absolute or ultimate forces beyond human control. Mystical experience is at the core of religion, and militarism calls upon deeply religious sentiments. William James acknowledged this argument in his lecture on “The Moral Equivalent of War” when he noted that “reflective apologists for war at the present day take it religiously. It is a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as to the victor; and quite apart from any question of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic” (1910/1995, p. 20).

More recently, Barbara Ehrenreich (1997) has put mystical experience at the center of her theory about war. War, she claims, is a kind of sacrament, a blood ritual that has drawn on humankind’s deepest and oldest impulses. Although militarism is not an instinct, the religious sentiment underlying it may be. The religious passions of war are easily observed throughout history: in the more militarized forms of Islamic jihad, in the Christian Crusades, and in twentieth-century Nazism, where religious rituals were manifestly incorporated. Less obvious but equally potent are the contemporary religious sentiments in the form of nationalism. Nationalism elicits spiritual strengths of self-sacrifice, courage, and honor. Ehrenreich posits that “the passions of war are among the ‘highest’ and finest passions humans can know: courage, altruism, and the mystical sense of belonging to ‘something larger than ourselves’” (1997, p. 238). James noted that these sentiments are not bad; indeed they represent the more virtuous dimensions of human existence: “conceptions of order and discipline, the tradition of service and devotion, of physical

With such sentiments, large numbers of people may be swept into an altered state of consciousness, marked by emotional intensity and a fixation on the collectivity. For example, World War I brought on the ecstasy of taking part in great events and joy of overcoming the pain of death. People became socially intoxicated, feeling a part of a whole, and the sense of being lost in that greater whole (Partridge, 1919). Even during peace, war monuments and cemeteries stimulate religious sentiments where civil worship may take place in sacred places. According to Arnold J. Toynbee, humans require “spiritual sustenance which can be found in militant nationalism in which the glorification of War is a fundamental article of faith” (Toynbee, 1957, p. 18).

Like monks, initiates into military institutions undergo stringent training, deprivation from normal sources of social contact, and systematic education on the moral dimensions of service. If infantry soldiers do not always feel a religious conviction about their soldiering, they at least feel the bond of the platoon as a primary motivation for putting themselves at risk. Feeling oneself part of the greater unit, even if it is only the platoon, rather than the nation, is the spiritual fuel of battle.

The search for the mystical helps us understand why the countervailing forces, such as the dissolution of the Cold War, increasing gender parity, and informed discussions about budgets and jobs, have not seriously impeded militarism. Militaries will continue to train people for killing, and others will design, build, and sell weapons, until other mechanisms for militarism’s spiritual dimensions are provided, because these motivations are not only deeply seated, but represent some of the most valued sentiments of human beings. Given the depth and value of these religious dimensions, we must ask: What alternatives could possibly provide an alternative to
militarism?

**ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARISM**

What alternatives can we find to militarism? Many might claim that the best alternative to militarism that contemporary industrialized societies offer is sports. In peace-time, no other single activity draws the collective embrace of victory, ecstatic crowds, big money, and national attention as professional and collegiate sports teams. But sports are more likely to be a predictor of war than a substitute for it. A connection between sports and militarism was well established by Mangan (1981), who demonstrated the way team sports in the nineteenth century flourished in British boarding schools and socialized boys for the British military. Sports are an efficacious teacher of militaristic values because they are inherently competitive and strategic. War imagery is frequently laden with sports metaphors, e.g., in Vietnam, a bombing campaign was named “linebacker I”; and sports imagery is frequently laden with war metaphors, e.g., football players are referred to as “weapons” who must “obliterate” the “enemy” (Shields & Bredemeier, 1996). Most boys view successful participation in sports as tests of masculinity, whose links to militarism we have already discussed. Empirical research has shown that more violent societies engage in more aggressive forms of sports. For example, Sipes (1973, 1975, 1976) found a strong link between wars and popularity of contact sports. In another demonstrated link between athletics and militarism, the number of months a country had been at war correlated positively with the probability of participation in Olympic games (Keefer, Goldstein, & Kasiarz, 1983). Sports more likely teach militarism than provide or teach alternatives to it.

We believe that a better substitute would be to use militaries for domestic programs rather than wars. Long before the U.S. Job Corps program began, William James argued that a youth
corps should be substituted for mandatory military service:

Instead of a military conscription, a conscription of the whole youthful population … to coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of sky-scrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas… [Then]

… no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man’s [sic] relations to the globe he lives on” (1910/1995, pp. 24–25).

Almost a hundred years ago, James argued that the values of military service are worth retaining: self-sacrifice, discipline, and work for a common goal. But elites had lost touch with the working poor, and also lost awareness of their problematic relations with the planet. Social service and experience with physical labor would be good for them, and good for society.

We agree with James. And we would like to extend his argument by noting both Ehrenreich’s (1997) and Greider’s (1998) similar thoughts about how to retain the best of militarism, while using it for peace. Both argue that enormous amounts of human and financial capital should be freed from excessive militarism for fighting that which will be the largest peril of the twenty-first century: environmental degradation, climactic changes, and the depletion of natural resources. Worldwide, militaries use one-third of research and development resources (Renner, 1990). Just when we need to reduce excessive expenditures on militarization, we need funding for environmental reclamation, for new technologies for sustainable culture, including renewable forms of energy, water conservation, nonpolluting agricultural practices, and sustainable urban planning.
Converting “swords to plowshares” will not be an easy task but it is imperative and it is underway. In Indiana, an Army ammunition plant was converted to parkland and a small business center (Wade, 1994). The California State University at Monterey Bay opened in 1995 on former Fort Ord (Hartigan, 1995). Citizen groups have worked on converting San Francisco’s Presidio (Rubenson, 1996). Most defense contractors are studying ways to convert weapons technologies to consumer goods.

Meanwhile it is also appropriate to nominate nonviolent direct action (see Steger, this volume) for the moral equivalent of war. Such activities have brought independence to India, the overthrow of a violent dictator in Haiti, and a revolution in the rights of African Americans in the United States. The teachings of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. both illuminate how nonviolent action enlists people’s energies in great contests of strategy, and provide an opportunity for identifying with causes that affirm the spiritual. Because most wars are now fought within, rather than between, nation-states, the prospects for allegiance to symbols of hope are more decentralized. The same human strengths tapped by militarism could be directed to social action.

The challenges for human survival in the twenty-first century are great, but so have been the inordinate expenditures on militarization in the twentieth. Rechanneling our money, attention and commitment from destroying enemies to combating environmental decline and building sustainable societies (see concluding chapter) will be our greatest and most challenging project. Yet we are entitled to feel hopeful because the powerful motivations of money, masculinism, and mystical experience are still available and we can chose to direct them toward building peace, instead of war.