CHAPTER 15

U.N. PEACEKEEPING: CONFRONTING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT OF WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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United Nations peacekeeping evolved following the founding of the United Nations in 1945. Throughout the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping developed as a series of ad hoc responses to individual crises, although the superpowers were always careful to constrain U.N. peacekeeping operations to a limited set of actions to be undertaken only under certain specified conditions. It was not the purview of these peacekeepers to use force themselves or to participate in the conflict. The end of the Cold War brought a period where the superpowers and the world community were willing to see the United Nations attempt more complex and ambitious peacekeeping missions under more difficult conditions and in environments of war and chaos. These more difficult conditions called for a different set of psychological approaches, which included armed peacekeepers using threats, coercion, or force, and sometimes engaging in the fighting.

The attempts by the United Nations to intervene in these demanding environments met with a
mixture of success and failure. Soldiers of all nations are trained to prevail in combat over a clearly defined foe and the traditional soldier’s psychology is one of force and intimidation. Soldiers serving on traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations are called upon to use a different set of psychological approaches. Instead of using force to achieve their ends, they use the tools of persuasion and trust to limit fighting between the armies engaged in the conflict. However, recent conflicts have been characterized more often by a complicated mixture of paramilitaries, ethno-political rivalries, humanitarian emergencies, and civilian refugees, than by two clearly defined armies sent to war by sovereign leaders. These complex emergencies present a different psychological environment from earlier conflicts and call for different forms of peacekeeping.

In this chapter, we will trace the development of peacekeeping from the founding of the United Nations to the end of the Cold War, and we will discuss how the close of the Cold War ushered in an era where new approaches to peacekeeping might be undertaken. We will review some of the structural components that contributed to the success or failure of these recent missions, and we will suggest the direction U.N. peacekeeping may take during the early part of the twenty-first century.

THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING

The Origins of the United Nations

The United Nations was founded during the closing days of World War II, and it was the goal of the United Nations to prevent a reoccurrence of wars of the scale and scope of the two World Wars. The Charter of the United Nations, which came into force on October 24, 1945, proposed

To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our life-
time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and … to promote social progress and … to ensure that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.

(United Nations, 1945, pp. 1–2)

However, peacekeeping was never mentioned in the U.N. Charter, but came to be defined through evolution, rather than deliberate planning. United Nations peacekeeping falls somewhere between the pacific settlement of disputes as proposed in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, and joint military actions discussed in Chapter VII. The accepted practices of U.N. peacekeeping are known as the unwritten “Chapter six and a half” and are based on the concept of impartial soldiers from neutral nations applying the techniques of conflict resolution to contain and limit violence.

Superpower Limitations and the Evolution of Traditional Peacekeeping

Throughout the Cold War, the two superpowers were reluctant to see the United Nations assume too strong a role in international affairs. If a proposed U.N. peacekeeping mission offered any possible strategic advantage to either the United States or the Soviet Union, the other would veto the resolution in the U.N. Security Council. During these years, therefore, peacekeeping was constrained to a limited range of activities (United Nations, 1990) that would not raise the superpowers’ objections. The United Nations would only deploy peacekeepers with the consent of the warring nations, when a cease-fire was in place and the armies disengaged. United Nations peacekeeping was to be a temporary measure to maintain a cease-fire while diplomats sought more permanent solutions to fundamentally political problems (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1993). Be-
tween 1948 and 1988, the United Nations established only 13 peacekeeping or observer forces (Roberts, 1996), despite more than 80 wars that were fought between nations (and not including the smaller intrastate conflicts) with a toll of 30 million deaths (James, 1990).

The Close of the Cold War and a New Willingness: An Agenda for Peace

With the close of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political differences that had served to constrain U.N. peacekeeping for over 40 years vanished. In 1992, world leaders gathered at the United Nations for a Security Council Summit and called upon U.N. Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to draft a paper proposing his view of the emerging role the United Nations should play in peacekeeping and international security.

In *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1992) proposed that the United Nations and the international community should not simply wait for the outbreak of violence before taking action, but instead should undertake both preventive measures early to avert war, and remedial steps following a cease-fire to hasten a return to a durable peace. He called for a greater willingness to address the basic economic, social, political, and ethnic causes of conflict. *An Agenda for Peace* also called for a greater readiness for the international community to support the United Nations in the use of force when necessary to end violence by imposing peace on behalf of a civilian population in the face of war.

THE 1990S AND A NEW PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

Following *An Agenda for Peace*, a wider scope of U.N. peacekeeping missions were undertaken in the absence of an agreed-upon cease-fire, when the conflicts were intranational, not interna-
tional, and without the consent of the parties to the conflict. Several general types of operations 
emerged.

1. *Traditional Peacekeeping Operations*, functioning as they did throughout the Cold War. Un-
   armed or lightly armed peacekeepers would be deployed with the consent of the parties to the 
dispute to monitor an agreed-upon cease-fire.

2. *Implementation of Complex Agreements and Settlements*, the U.N. force supervising or moni-
toring agreements which include not just military, but also extensive civilian components.

3. *Preventive Deployment*, the positioning of armed peacekeepers, without the consent of one or 
   both nations involved, to serve as a preventive military barrier and discourage cross-border 
   aggression.

4. *Observing a Non-U.N. Peacekeeping Force*, a way for the United Nations to assist a regional 
   organization or other local force to maintain peace. This is a way for the United Nations to 
decentralize the maintenance of peace and security while ensuring the legitimacy and interna-
tional standards of the peacekeeping force.

5. *Providing Humanitarian Aid*, where soldiers are deployed to provide security and transporta-
tion for aid workers, and to escort refugees to safety.

6. *Peace Enforcement*, the use of military force to impose the will of the international commu-
nity on violators of the peace.

**Changing Precepts of Peacekeeping**

These newer, more assertive peace interventions require a new set of precepts from those that 
were operative for traditional peacekeeping.
First, the original requirement that peacekeepers would only be deployed with the consent of the participants to the conflict, is no longer observed. Experience has shown that consent may be a fundamental condition for the eventual success of a peacekeeping mission but it may be possible for the presence of peacekeepers to bring about an induced consent, which can lead to peace.

Second, today there is a willingness to abridge the precept of sovereignty, especially when internal conditions have deteriorated catastrophically.

Third, impartiality remains an important precept of modern peacekeeping, especially where an agreement has been signed by the parties in conflict.

Fourth, peacekeeping may now include early measures to avert escalation into a violent conflict, steps to contain a conflict geographically once it begins, and measures to hasten a reconciliation and a return to a stable peace.

Fifth, there may be time constraints and limits on the resources, political effort, and military sacrifice the United Nations and the international community will be willing to expend on a conflict.

Sixth, peacekeeping may now require a willingness to take military action.

Some Successes and Some Failures: Is It Better to Have Tried?

As the United Nations has attempted to intervene in increasingly chaotic and demanding environments there has been a mixture of both success and failure. The U.N. mission in Haiti reintroduced free elections and legitimate self-governance to the nation and helped with the reestablishment of Haiti’s own police force and law-enforcement institutions. The U.N. missions in Mozambique succeeded in holding democratic elections and the U.N. interventions in Cambodia...
helped bring factions together, ending armed conflict. Only time will tell if these successes prove to be the initial steps to durable solutions or if they will subsequently be viewed as well-intended efforts that collapsed shortly after the peacekeepers left.

There have also been some well-publicized failures. The U.N. peace force in Yugoslavia could not prevent atrocities from occurring even in so-called safe havens. The U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus, originally intended to be a temporary measure, continues after more than three decades (United Nations, 1996). The U.N. force in Somalia was able to provide humanitarian aid to famine-torn regions but in Mogadishu was capable of doing little more than guarding itself.

These new and messy conflicts brought enormous challenges to the United Nations and the international community, and the struggle to come to grips with these chaotic situations was tentative. Would it have been better to sit by and wait for these conflicts to take a form that would suit traditional peacekeeping, or was it better to attempt constructive interventions? The United Nations, and the nations that contributed troops to these missions, paid a high price, both in terms of casualties to peacekeeping personnel, damage to the reputation of the United Nations, and the amount of support a skeptical public was willing to provide.

This dilemma is likely to be among the most fundamental questions to face the institution of peacekeeping during the first part of the twenty-first century. There may be little point in the United Nations insisting that a conflict conform to a rigid set of prerequisites before a peacekeeping mission is attempted. In the next section, we will discuss lessons the United Nations could learn from the challenges of these recent missions and how it can prepare itself to cope more effectively with such situations in the future.
LESSONS LEARNED

Indispensable Ingredients: Mandate, Outcome, Means, Intelligence, and Media

There has been much interest in identifying the reasons for the success or failure of recent peacekeeping missions (Durch, 1996; Maren, 1997; Roberts, 1996; Schear, 1996; Vaccaro, 1996). It is difficult to draw any conclusive generalizations about what may cause peacekeeping missions to succeed or fail but it is worth exploring five of the key findings generated by the U.N. Lessons Learned Unit.

First, mandates of peacekeeping operations need to be clear and precise, yet flexible and based on the realities that exist in the conflict situation. “Only on the basis of accurate information should a practicable mandate be formulated or a determination made of whether the United Nations should even establish a peacekeeping operation” (Stiftung, 1996, p. 5).

Second, there is a need to determine the political outcome that will stem from the successful pursuit of the mandate. In the Somalian mission, no overall plan of action was ever clearly established. In Eastern Slavonia, on the other hand, the mandate for the operation was relatively clear and precise, and specifically included several nonmilitary interventions, such as monitoring the voluntary return of refugees and establishing and training a transitional police force. This clear and detailed mandate permitted the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General to formulate the strategic plan for the mission with confidence.

Third, there must be sufficient resources and mandates must be matched with the means to implement them. The mismatch of the forces vis à vis the mandate in Somalia, where the U.N. mission tried to achieve the impossible, and the failure to provide sufficient resources to the mis-
sion in Rwanda, are glaring examples of what happens when the mandate exceeds the means for implementation. United Nations peacekeepers in Somalia could not address the social and political complexities of fighting war lords, and in Rwanda the international community was simply not willing to provide the military force that would have been needed to prevent the slaughter of a half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the genocide of 1994. In contrast, the provision of needed levels of resources in Namibia, Mozambique, Haiti, and Eastern Slavonia represent the alternate approach. More than adequate resources—equipment, money, and personnel—were provided, allowing the United Nations to undertake its mandate with relative success.

Fourth, intelligence must be included as an essential component of peace operations. Although the concept of “military intelligence” may carry an undeserved sinister association for some, U.N. peacekeeping requires an in-depth understanding of the conflict, based on ample intelligence from member states and solid political analysis. Only on that basis can a clear mandate be formulated and the operational means assembled to achieve it. From the Congo operation, where the intelligence service did not exist, to Eastern Slavonia, where there was a staffed military component within the mission staff, the development of an information/intelligence capacity has assisted commanders in better managing their operations, reacting to possible threats, and better understanding the political, military, and social environment of their area of responsibility.

Fifth, an effective public information strategy should be established by the United Nations to provide a direct channel of communications with the local population as soon as a peacekeeping mission is deployed. Experience has shown correlations between the presence of information strategy and mission success. The U.N. radio station in Cambodia was judged instrumental in the education of the population and in convincing them to vote. The responsible agency, staffed by
expatriate Kmer language and culture experts, would go out among the people in the remotest regions of the country and explain to them what the United Nations was doing there, why, and how long it would remain (Ahlquist, 1996). In contrast, the U.N. mission in Somalia, although the best-covered U.N. operation from the media viewpoint, lost the media war. Radio, the key in the Somali oral society, was not set up and proved to be a serious shortfall in getting the U.N. message out (Giuliani et al., 1995).

What If There Is No Political Will?

Political motivation and political persuasion are critical elements in a peace process. When the parties are genuinely interested in a settlement, mountains can be moved in the interests of peace. However in chaotic conditions in which power has devolved to splinter factions which have no real interests in peace, there are palpable limits to what the international community can accomplish. A sense of community—the will to reconcile—cannot be imposed. (United Nations, 1997, p. 2)

Comprehensive peace agreements should be the foundation of any deployment of a peace operation. Consent of the parties is ideal such as occurred with the deployment of the U.N. operations in Mozambique and Angola. Yet in the confused situations found in many war-torn regions, particularly during intra-state conflicts, consent may be fleeting. At this point inducement may be the answer.

Inducement operations are conceived … to restore civil society by two methods
where it has broken down: (1) the use of positive incentives (rewards) to induce, in the first instance, consent and cooperation with the peace operation and, beyond that, reconciliation; and (2) the threat of coercion to gain the consent and cooperation, however grudging of those who are unresponsive to positive incentives. (Annan, 1996, p. 3)

**Civilian, Military, and Diplomatic: Integrative Approaches**

To achieve maximum effectiveness, the civilian and military components in a peacekeeping operation must work together and coordinate their joint efforts toward shared goals. Recent complex emergencies have seen a need for the integration and coordination of military resources and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Twenty-eight different NGOs provided humanitarian aid during the Kurdish crisis of 1991, 78 participated in Somalia, 170 in Rwanda, and over 400 in Haiti (National Defense University, 1996). In cases such as these, a common vision needs to be established within the broad context of the mission to coordinate military and humanitarian efforts. This should be based on a consensus on how to proceed without stripping individual agencies of their independence or autonomy. Military and civilian components need to be cognizant of the operating parameters of the other. Both face serious operating constraints with civilian agencies no longer seen as neutral or facing any less dangers than the military.

Diplomatic activity is central to peace operations. The importance of diplomatic success may be seen in essentially all peacekeeping missions but was most clear in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia (Perkins, 1998). Perhaps the greatest challenge in the political realm is defining objectives at the strategic level to which all the players can subscribe. There will rarely be complete agreement by all parties on end-states, but for effective interagency coordination, the extent to
which there is a commonly pursued goal must be made clear at the highest level (Last & Vought, 1994).

Peacekeeping can no longer be treated as a distinct element that is undertaken in isolation from peacemaking and peacebuilding. Patrick Rechner of the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre makes an important argument:

…the key to linking peace making, peacekeeping and peace building functions is to do so both at the macro and micro levels, working pro-actively at both levels and shifting the focus of efforts between the two as obstacles crop up or local leaders become intransigent. Moreover each of these three functions must be directed at specific aspects of a conflict structure. (Rechner, 1998, p. 5)

From this integration devolve some of the absolutely vital tasks that must begin immediately as a peacekeeping operation is deployed. These include demilitarization, disarmament, demining, law and order training and monitoring of a local police force, human rights monitoring and reintegration of public institutions. They must be considered constituent elements of a secure environment.

Today, security is increasingly understood not just in military terms, and as far more than the absence of conflict. It is in fact a phenomenon that encompasses economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament and respect for human rights. These goals—these pillars of peace—are interrelated. (Annan, 1997b, p. 4)

**THE FACE OF FUTURE PEACEKEEPING: A NEW PARADIGM**
Dealing with Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Although the threat of interstate conflict will not disappear over the foreseeable future, the operating environment for peace operations will clearly focus on intrastate conflict.

These intra-state ethnic conflicts are not going to disappear—they may be the pattern of the future which will be marked on the one hand by the creation of large economic and even political spaces in which internal boundaries will be practically meaningless and, on the other hand by internal conflict and fragmentation of states, usually states in transition, with much bloodshed. (Annan, 1996, p. 3)

These can best be described as complex humanitarian emergencies, and the threats they produce include civil strife; mass dislocations of people both internally and externally; economic collapse; famine; starvation; epidemics; disease; and gross violations of human rights. Within this context, any future paradigm for action must include not only the military capability to impose order in an environment of chaos, but also the humanitarian capability to provide protection, food, water, and shelter to refugees, and the capacity to assist with the full recovery and rebuilding of society in the aftermath of war.

To succeed in bringing relief and order to such chaotic environments, many future U.N. peacekeeping operations will straddle the boundary between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These types of missions with elements from the enforcement side of the spectrum have presented new problems for the United Nations and the controversial missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda have helped to generate conservatism in member states. The United Nations will continue to be asked to conduct multidimensional missions and indications are that the Security
Council will continue to ask the Secretary General to perform operations outside the boundaries of traditional peacekeeping. The United Nations must face the problems it is presented and solve them with the appropriate tools, procedures and resources.

In the new paradigm, the scope of peace operations in the twenty-first century will remain broad and incorporate some of the tools previously available: embargoes, blockades, and “all means necessary” for the military enforcement of peace. Forces will be equipped and mandated to accomplish more robust tasks, including preventive deployment, peace enforcement, and other tasks that call on peacekeepers to use the force of arms to impose peace. Enforcement measures may be taken proactively, or may be used under more limited rules of engagement and only to ensure compliance with consent-based agreements. Another progressive step may be the utilization of more technologically advanced equipment to monitor these agreements in order to reduce the need to use force.

Future peacekeeping will almost certainly be a joint venture by a variety of organizations: political, democratic, diplomatic (Perkins, 1998), humanitarian (Wessells, 1998), human rights, media, military, civilian police (Vaccaro, 1998), and electoral (Pagani, 1998). Peacekeeping will also be carried out under conditions of uncertainty and great personal danger to the participants. Political leadership, the military, civilian police, humanitarian agencies, civilian support staff, and developmental staffs must all act in concert during complex multidimensional humanitarian emergencies if success is to be achieved.

The Component Chiefs—both military and civilian—of future missions must recognize there will be no simple military solution to conflict. Military operations can buy time, jump-start an operation, and respond more quickly in a crisis to reduce the levels of violence, disorder, or star-
vation. But these procedures must be accompanied by long-term political and humanitarian efforts designed to resolve the bases of the conflict.

Another danger for the leaders and planners of future peacekeeping missions is that when the military arrives, other components may be inclined to stand down until it is their turn again. Political efforts must continue while troops are on the ground to ensure their contribution is not wasted. Other components have roles to play in order to reestablish stability and put the peace process back on track. In the former Yugoslavia, the political efforts needed to implement the terms of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord seemed to slow to a crawl with the arrival of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR). The presence of a force is a tool in the integrated peace process, not a solution. What happens when the forces are withdrawn? Will this lead to another failed effort? To achieve a coordinated outcome and avoid failure, the mission management structure must integrate efforts of all the mission components simultaneously.

Operations are and will continue to be multidimensional in nature. Future missions will almost always include aspects of many tasks. Tasks performed within the framework of traditional peacekeeping will continue and traditional techniques will continue to be applicable. In the end, the basic principles of peacekeeping doctrine remain as important as they ever were, but perhaps the emphasis and how they are applied has changed as a result of the new paradigm. A brief examination is in order:

*Unity of Purpose*—Leadership is the key to achieving this goal. Doctrinal conflicts between mission participants, linguistic barriers, different levels of capability, and different levels of training will all impact on the unity of purpose. A principal challenge for leaders in peace operations will be to overcome these internal obstacles in the organization and operation of the
mission.

_Use of Force_—The use of force needs to be considered in the context of the mission area. The use of force may range from the use of coercion, sanctions, or embargoes, to the simple presence of the peacekeeper on the ground, to the application of lethal force by appropriately equipped military units. The decision to use the force needs to balance with the end-state goals of the integrated mission. However, the critical aspect is that peacekeeping must always be backed up with credible force. “You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by fairness and force” (Annan, 1998).^{1}

_Consensus Planning_—In this multidimensional environment, the need to utilize an integrated planning process to ensure that the unity of purpose is woven into all aspects of the plan will be crucial to success. Trying to plan a series of military activities without consideration for the impact on humanitarian or other operations in the mission area may incite disputes ranging from the allocation of resources to a lack of trust and confidence between agencies in the area.

_Simplicity_—Complex operations need to be broken down into clear achievable tasks, which will make the goals of the mission more apparent to the parties of the conflict and other agencies in the mission area. Additionally, clearly stated goals avoid the “CNN effect” whereby sympathetic viewers worldwide call for the United Nations to undertake more than may be possible in terms of peacekeeping missions.

^{1} Quotes from Annan (1998) can be found in “The Quotable Kofi Annan, Selections from Speeches by the Secretary General,” New York: The Department of Public Information, p. 12.
and humanitarian interventions (Jakobsen, 1996).

It is improbable that the Security Council will take a traditional, retrenching approach to peace operations in the future. The overall change in the global context of peacekeeping presents the United Nations with a new ideal that requires a shift from traditional peacekeeping to a refinement in the planning, management, and execution of complex, multi-dimensional operations. There must be a focus on political solutions or achievable end states supplemented by forces mandated and resourced to accomplish them.

**How Is the U.N. Community Responding to Changes in the Operational Environment?**

It is clear that the Member States of the United Nations have realized that change is occurring rapidly. Although few new missions were authorized by the Security Council during the period 1996 to 1998, troop-contributing nations have been preparing themselves with the expectation that this may change. Training has improved and includes multinational exercises held to teach soldiers methods and techniques for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Self-paced correspondence courses are offered to instruct peacekeepers world-wide on procedural, conceptual, legal, and administrative aspects of peacekeeping (Langholtz, 1998).

Strengthening of the mechanisms for planning and management, human rights monitoring, humanitarian relief, rapid deployment—all indicate that the community, whether individual member state, agency, or secretariat department are voting through action. Annan (1997a) believes that the U.N. community will be better prepared in the future because they have a clearer
understanding of the limits and continuing usefulness of peacekeeping. Past setbacks have demonstrated the risk of dispatching peacekeepers with inadequate resources. Finally, Annan asserts, the U.N. member states recognize that inaction is not an acceptable response to massive violence that threatens international peace and security.

**CONCLUSION**

The United Nations was built upon the ashes of World War II and was designed to avert a repeat of the scale of wars that had twice plagued the world during the first half of the twentieth century. Peacekeeping was not written into the U.N. Charter but evolved nevertheless throughout the Cold War for use only under certain conditions and only when the nature of the conflict fit with what traditional peacekeeping could offer.

The end of the Cold War brought a willingness for the community of nations to attempt more risky peacekeeping missions, while fighting is still going on, where boundaries and sovereignty are not clearly defined, and where the psychological environment is characterized by polarization, hatred, revenge, and suspicion. “Where in the past (wars) generally arose from aggression across national frontiers, the wars of the 21st century will more likely be between ethnic, religious, ideological, or tribal factions within the same country” (Schlesinger, 1997, p. 12). “The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 2).

There is every reason to believe that the first part of the twenty-first century will witness a continuation of these intranational conflicts. It will not be possible to define, control, or understand these conflicts using the political and psychological assumptions that were suitable for
peacekeeping operations from the founding of the United Nations to the close of the Cold War. Instead, the twenty-first century is likely to see multidimensional military and civilian peacekeeping missions deployed in settings of war and anarchy, not only to impose peace, but also for the purposes of peacemaking, peacebuilding, demining, humanitarian aid, election monitoring, and assisting with the reinstitution of the fabric of civil life that will nurture an enduring and self-sustaining peace.