CHAPTER 18

CRAFTING PEACE: ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRANSCEND APPROACH

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INTRODUCTION: SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Conflict is ubiquitous, violence is not. Hence the Big Question: How can we approach conflict in a nonviolent way? Here is one trend of thought, a trail of ideas, suggesting one answer:

1. The root of a conflict is incompatible goals, within an actor (dilemmas), among actors (disputes), or (usually) both.

2. The conflict appears to the parties as a block: Something stands in the way of attaining goals; their other goals and/ or the goals of other parties. Other term: knot.

3. Blocked goal-attainment is also known as frustration, but the range of reactions go beyond aggression,[i] and include: A: attitudes, cognitive and emotive; ranging from glowing hatred of Self or Other to denial, from inner boiling to inner freezing. B: behavior, physical and verbal; ranging from deliberate efforts to hurt and harm Self or Other to withdrawal, ranging from outer boiling to outer freezing.

4. The inner and outer reactions are not necessarily at the same temperature (murder in cold blood, "boiling inside").

5. We then add C: contradiction, the root incompatibility of goals, and get the conflict triangle, the three corners being A, B, and C, for attitudes, behavior, and contradiction. Causal flows can start anywhere, but generally in C, the contradiction.

6. A contradiction left unresolved leads to accumulation of negative energies in the A and B corners: to violence ("war" for collective actors) sustained by genuine hatred; to mutual isolation sustained by apathy; to the self-hatred of nations that have suffered major trauma, including being defeated, like Jews, Germans, Japanese after World War II (Serbs? Iraqis?).

7. From the root conflict the conflict has now spread, metastasized, to the A and B corners as people react to having their needs insulted by hatred and violence. Parties and media will focus on the meta-conflicts built around being hated and/or hurt and harmed; they are much more dramatic, newsworthy. Thus, in an unpublished study for his master's thesis Dylan Scudder reports that the *International Herald Tribune* for July 1998 had 44 reports on violence in Kosovo and two on possible solutions. This also plays into a tendency to psychologize the conflict, focusing on A, cognitions/emotions of the actors, and not on C.[ii]

8. A focus on violence, "troubles," is often accompanied by inability to explore the root problems veiled in taboos. Efforts to break the taboos are strongly resented. The discourse permitted is inadequate to dissolve the problem by dialogue (dia = via, logos = word.) Violence, with its simple winner-looser logic, is promoted by focusing on violence.

9. One basic assumption at this point would be that people are more able to discuss a root prob-

lem when they sense a solution somewhere. A glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel makes it considerably more easy to admit that we are in a tunnel. With no light, better not mention the tunnel; truth becomes unbearable. The all-too-human fact that at the end of the tunnel there is another tunnel (all the way, actually) does not make truth easier to bear, except with some light shafts.

10. The second basic assumption is that if we manage to develop a perspective on a transformation of the root conflict, then that opening in the C-corner may drain negative energies in the A and B corners, normalizing inner and outer relations.

Our argument is in favor of recovering the primacy of the root conflict, the contradiction, the incompatibility itself. To soothen hurt egos and teach non-aggressive behavior is good. But hard, root issues have to be approached, coached in deep emotions, the basic one being hatred of the other side for not "seeing the light," i.e. yielding, and for being violent.

Three basic, and frequent, mistakes in conflict practice follow from the failure to take into account the whole triangle:

- The *A-mistake,* the liberal fallacy, focusing on attitudes only, making people more loving (religious), aware of their own mental baggage (psychological). No contradiction is unravelled.

- The *B-mistake,* the conservative fallacy, modifying behavior only by putting a lid on aggressive action. No block disappears.

- The *C-mistake,* the Marxist fallacy, focusing only on the contradiction between labor and capital, regardless of costs to mind and body. We know what happened: The negative energies in A and B caught up with Soviet achievements, and destroyed them.

THE TRANSCEND DIALOGUE METHOD FOR CONFLICT TRANS-FORMATION

The method[iii] is based on trained conflict workers meeting the parties in a conflict, singly, not combined, one-on-one, typically in a conversation-style setting. One experience[iv] is that high-level conflict parties are usually intelligent, articulate, charming people, with high capacity for leadership. There is little doubt that, by and large, they believe what they say, and they are not posturing, at least not after some quiet dialogue disarms their defenses. Nor are they necessarily longing to use violence regardless of the situation; readiness to do so is something else. They are wedded to their positions, but not necessarily inflexible, a characteristic they tend to attribute to the Other. They should not be psychiatrized, nor criminalized; they are not sicker or more criminal than most.

The basic point is that they see no way out, are blocked, tied up in knots partly of their own making. The TRANSCEND method, based on dialogues with all conflict parties one at a time, is an effort to expand their spectrum of acceptable outcomes. The method is not based on arguing positions closer to the other parties, e.g., compromise. That they can do themselves in a process known as negotiation. But the experience is that *direct contact* may exacerbate conflicts for several reasons: because of the verbal violence often used in verbal encounters, because compromise means accepting some of the Other, and because of the absence of creativity when Other is present. In one-on-one conversation-style dialogues, the task is to stimulate creativity, develop new perspectives, and make the conflict parties "ready for the table."

The First Round: Five Processes

Generally, the following five processes are designed to encourage disputing parties to refrain from calcifying their respective positions and moving them each toward new and creative perspectives on the problem.

1. *A first process* will have to probe the negative goals (fears) and positive goals (hopes), exploring beyond public posturing. Thus, Protestant fears in Northern Ireland may be less about religion and more about "being absorbed in tear-dripping Irish sentimentality and emotionalism," mirrored by Catholic fears of "cold English so-called rationality"; not to mention the fears of unemployment (Catholic) and of being killed (both). The positive goal is to be surrounded (and confirmed!) by one's own kind, in a setting of economic and physical security.

2. *A second process* will in no way try to dissuade the party from their goals, but probe more deeply into the nature of the goals. Goals are many-dimensional. Thus, the "Korean conflict" is not only over political-military, but also over cultural-economic issues. The broader the vision of the goal, the more likely that some perspective can be developed, *ceteris paribus*.

3. *A third process,* the kernel, will open cognitive space to new outcomes not envisioned by the parties. These outcomes will relate to the range of goals seen by the parties, allaying the fears, satisfying the hopes, but from another angle. At this stage, much creativity is needed. This is where positive outcomes can be enlarged by creatively arriving at positive goals that overlap for both sides.

   For example, in the conflict in and over Korea (including the United States and neighbors), it might be useful to put the complex and incompatible political-military goals on the sideline, and proceed from a cultural-economic angle. There is the rich, shared Korean culture and history. Opening rail and road lines would unleash enormous economic potentials,

connecting North Korea–China– Vietnam with South Korea–Japan– Taiwan. Military-political issues can come later, or even better: wither away.

In another example, Northern Ireland, a possible Ulsterite identity could be built on the richness of both cultures, being an enclave of high tech, owned by neither one nor the other, relating positively to both Ireland and England, to Wales and Scotland, in a process of devolution that ultimately may lead to a Confederation of the British Isles. Again, the point is not so much to be for or against any formula as to know that there are formulas further down the road, not uncharted wilderness.

4. *A fourth process* will have each conflict party and conflict worker together construct a new cognitive space, seeing the old goals as suboptimal, simplistic, and formulating broader goals. "Don't be so modest, go in for something better than what you used to demand!"

5. *A fifth process* will explore whether all parties embrace the same points in the new cognitive space. If they do in Korea, there are still conflicts. NAFTA/ EU will fear East Asian markets with free flow of goods and services. The Koreas will fear free flow of persons and ideas. There will be quarrels over costs and benefits. But all of this can be handled without violence.

The dialogue between each conflict party and conflict worker ends when they have successfully completed the last two processes: discourse/*Gestalt* enrichment, *complexification;* and a change in *cathexis* toward new points in the cognitive space.

The conflict worker then goes to the other conflict party, or shares the findings with team members who dialogued with other parties. The latter may be preferable lest conflict party num-

ber 2 sees the conflict worker as an envoy for conflict party number 1. In either case, the process with number 2 has to start from the beginning, not using the outcome from number 1 as a starting point for number 2. The process is new for number 2 even if it is not for the conflict worker.

At the end of this first round, the dialogue processes of both parties have to be compared, which is simplest with only one conflict worker. Not only the outcomes, but also the processes leading to those outcomes have to be "processed" for new and shared perspectives.

The Second Round: Sustainability of Outcomes

In the second round, the new cognitive space is handed back to the parties. The space should be complex, having more than one point, but the points should not be spelt out in too much detail. The second round should not be a copy of what conflict parties often do: This is the position, take it or leave it.

If the first round has been done well, mutual acceptability has already been built into the new cognitive space by taking into account all kinds of objections. The task of the second round is to probe for *sustainability,* together with the parties. What could make outcomes of these types stick? What are the vulnerabilities, the weak points? The five processes will be about the same as those employed in the first round.

The Third Round: Coming Together

In the third round, parties meet to negotiate the details of a transcending outcome, not a com-promise, now presumably being "ready for the table," equipped with expanded cognitive spaces. Or, even better, one of them makes an opening move and the other follows. For this process they may not even have to meet, the conflict may simply have "evaporated" like what happened to the

Cold War with its countless dialogues.

To open the cognitive space, forgotten parties and goals may have to be included so as to have more cognitive complexity to work with. A common goal can then be identified—transcending, going beyond, the original goals—expressed in short, evocative formulations, preferably only one to four words, difficult to reject.[v] Concrete steps will then have to be identified for all parties.

Obviously, this work is difficult, requiring experience, sheer intelligence in the IQ sense, the capacity to internalize vast amounts of emotional/cognitive material and to make that quantum jump to a new image/perspective with sufficient clarity, combined with the wordsmith's ability to find the right words.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN THE TRANSCEND APPROACH

Two psychological processes seem to be involved: one more cognitive, cognitive expansion and reframing, and one more emotive, a shift in cathexis toward new goal-states.

Cognitive Expansion and Reframing

This happens when a simple two-points discourse, like status quo vs. independence with totally incompatible goals, yields to a more complex discourse with goals at the time held by nobody; like giving the disputed object away (*res nullius*) or sharing it (*res communis*). The original positions are still on the map, but in a context of new positions that at a first glance may look strange, but worth exploring. As cognitive reframing breaks open a simple Gestalt, providing building blocks for another and more complex Gestalt, emotive suffering and cognitive pain may be high.

A shift in the viewing angle or perspective on the conflict is a part of the process known as

reframing in psychotherapy.[vi] The terms disembedding/re-embedding are more evocative, however. The conflict, and the accompanying discourse, have come to rest, been "embedded," usually in a dualistic framework. One way of disembedding brings in more goal-dimensions with or without clashes, more actors and more concerns. Sexual infidelity looks different when four other ways of being unfaithful are also considered: of the mind (the secret love), the spirit (no concern for the partner's life project), socially (no social support), economically (having a secret account, "just in case"). Options like separation/divorce look different when children, grandparents, friends, and neighbors enter the cognitive space, not only the couple defining themselves as the center of the universe, wrapped around their fight over sexual monopoly.

Creating Cognitive Dissonances and New Consonances

The point of departure is usually a two-point, dualist discourse reflecting a polarized conflict formation. There is cognitive consonance: Other and his position are both viewed negatively, Self and own position are glorified, the positive identification of each party with their positions is highlighted. To move from this ultra-stable position, dissonances or cognitive inconsistencies have to be introduced.

One approach is to move the dialogue from a concern with the present (diagnosis) to the future (prognosis). Ask what the positions taken will lead to. The answer "only by being firm can we find a solution" can be followed up by the question "what if Other thinks he also has to be firm?" A silence in the dialogue may indicate a recognition of the possibility of endless revenge cycles that may spell disaster to Self. The assumption would be that "peace by peaceful means" has some attraction.[vii] And that is where the expanded cognitive space and the new angles may enter: "What would happen if we proceeded along the following lines?" "How would life be for

your children, grandchildren?"

This process is not a Socratic "dialogue" where the conflict worker knows in advance what s/he wants as a conclusion. The process is mutual, also taking place inside the conflict worker. For her or him the negative goal, fear, is the violence and the positive goal, hope, some constructive outcome for all parties, that history moves on. If the conflict worker is hardened, refusing to budge, closed to new facts, theories, and values, s/he may have to yield that position to somebody else. The task is to elicit, suggest, propose, not to impose. Sentences end with the question mark typical of a dialogue, not with the exclamation signs typical of a debate.[viii]

A dialogue should be between equals. They meet away from the power paraphernalia of the conflict party (seals, titles, flags) or of the conflict worker (books, titles, awards). The conflict worker knows more about general conflict theory, the conflict party more about this specific conflict. The conflict worker ought not to be too well prepared on the specific conflict lest s/he becomes too overwhelming, looming too high, well above the conflict party, both on generalities and specifics. Exchanging general and specific knowledge is not a bad basis for equality.

But there is another inequality lurking. Conflict party and conflict worker are both exploring new outcome spaces for exits. The conflict worker is bound to the principle of hope: Somewhere there is some exit. The conflict party may share that hope but also be convinced, in head-brain or gut-brain, that there is no such point, thereby vindicating the position taken. Violence is legitimated negatively: There is no alternative! Hopes for confirmation makes for blindness to transcendence.

A way out is to use the diagnosis-prognosis-therapy formula creatively. Each of them defines a dialogue mode, a discourse. Diagnosis and prognosis are both descriptive, of past and future,

respectively (past because facts that have become data reflect the past). Therapy is prescriptive, of the future. That map reveals an unexplored spot: the therapy of the past.

The question, "what went wrong, when, where, and what could have been done at the time?" is designed to make the party reflect on the past to the point of owning the past, coming on top of history rather than permitting history to come on top of Self; giving in to fate, to destiny. Counterfactual history, in the subjunctive rather than the indicative, has to be elicited.

In our experience, after some reluctance, conflict parties are willing to engage in history "as if." History is distant, or they can make it distant, pointing to events that occurred a long time ago, far beyond their current responsibility horizons. Suggestions usually emerge, creating a discourse that is more creative, less filled with terrible "facts" that lead us nowhere. "Maybe at that point in history we should have…."

The conflict worker would elicit maximum creativity, and then move across both dimensions, from past to future, and from the prescriptive to the descriptive: "What do you think is going to happen now?" Obviously, this would be an effort to provide a positive anchoring in some hope, some perspective emerging from the "therapy of the past" (with the great advantage that it cannot be subjected to the test of reality), and a negative anchoring in the fear, of a dark prognosis come true. But what if they say, "We want only one thing, to win"? Extend the time horizon by asking: "What if they take revenge, in twenty years"?

The conflict worker has two major tasks. The positive task is, through dialogue, to elicit a new conflict perspective and a positive anchor or goal to which both parties are attracted, learning from the parties, contributing own ideas, until something creative and solid emerges. The

general method is to expand the cognitive space so that the old conflict positions are still identifiable, yet a new transcending position has emerged. The conflict is disembedded from its old "bed," and re-embedded at a new place.

Second, the negative task is to open for the full spectrum of invisible consequences of violence, the "externalities."[ix] Just as in the "science" of economics keeping major effects invisible as "side-effects" or "externalities" makes it easier to engage in exploitative economic practices, the military HQ approach in terms of numbers killed, wounded, and material damage only, nothing about side effects, such as structural and cultural damage, glorification of violence and urge for revenge makes it easier to engage in violent conflict practices.

An important question is where this approach places the conflict worker on the dialogue-debate axis. Conflict workers have a double goal: starting with the therapy of the past, then moving to the prognosis, then risking a joint exploration to arrive at a diagnosis, then making an effort to identify therapies of the future. And then, the same process again. And again, until something fruitful emerges, if necessary by replacing both the conflict parties and the conflict workers.

The process is only meaningful if the dialogue is a genuinely mutual brainstorming process, looking like a cross between a good conversation in a saloon and a lively university seminar. If the conflict worker in fact is pushing a specific position, then she/he is ripe for replacement.

The crisis over UNSCOM inspection in Iraq, February 1998, may serve as an example. That the United States and United Kingdom wanted to bomb Iraq "to the table," or punish Iraq for non-compliance, was clear. But Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary General, went to Baghdad and came back with a perspective that looked "reasonable to reasonable men and women." The basic

idea was to attach a diplomat to every team so that verbal encounters could be more according to diplomatic protocol. An important point was the difference between plain, colloquial American English and an Arabic richly endowed with honorifics; literal translation would sound even more insulting and "undiplomatic" to Arabs. The perspective became a shared point of reference and built a consensus which in the end was joined also by the United States and United Kingdom.

But why not leave the processes to the parties in a direct encounter? Fine, if they manage. The experience is that in a hard conflict they do not. They are emotionally overwhelmed by their hatred for each other and fear of what may happen if they can be seen as yielding on some point. And they are cognitively blinded by their efforts to defend untenable positions rather than searching for something new. Creativity is at a minimum. Having the "enemy" three feet away does not serve to open up cognitive spaces or to let dissonances in, let alone permit them to start dismantling their entrenched configurations.

Anger may well be a dominant emotion if the conflicting parties are prematurely brought together. No emotion is likely to be more contagious. Trying to create a dialogue when anger prevails is like trying to erect a tent in a tornado.[x] The storm has to settle down before the tent can be made to stay up. That is where the conflict worker, enters: calming the parties down by talking with them one at the time. There may be no time to lose before violence.

With only negative affects towards each other the parties are likely to stick to their positions, and real listening will be minimal. What they hear will sound like well-known tape-recordings and only serve to elicit defenses of their own position. At best it leads to debates that quickly degenerate into quarrels, but not to real dialogue. Real dialogue requires emphatic listening, not so much concern for the other as concern for the total, inclusive "system" (like "Europe" in a broad

sense during the Cold War, "the subcontinent" in any Indo-Pak encounter), and willingness to take a fresh look instead of running up and down fixed grooves of thought.

Access to prominent niches in public space is essential. That access will probably be controlled or attempted controlled by State (censorship) or Capital (corporate media), lest a perspective should serve as a war-blocker when that war is wanted for some reason. The more a war seems to be imminent, and the higher the status of the country in the international community, the more closed are major mass media to perspectives on conflict transformation by peaceful means. To break this invariance is no doubt a major task in this field. The Internet does not quite solve the problem: It is publicly accessible, but it is not public knowledge who possess that public knowledge. Big powers prefer perspectives developed behind closed doors, producing a heavy pluralistic ignorance (ignorance about where the plurality stands) and a wait-and-see attitude in the public.

A meta-script seems to be at work here, driving not only the media but also the diplomats. A good story starts up softly, then builds up to a dramatic peak, builds down, and flattens out, to quiet, the End. Let in early violence, let it escalate, let it peak; then time is ripe/mature. People are begging for "peace," handed down to victims and bad (violent) boys, by the intervention of big (powerful) boys, putting an end to conflict.

The idea of an ending already spells disaster. Violence may end, but a conflict always has residues. Violence will be reproduced if the causes are not sufficiently uprooted. Was the agreement really accepted by all parties? Is it really self-sustainable or does it have to be propped up from the outside? In that case, for how long? Has there been any reconciliation? Any professional would know this. Interstate or -nation conflicts are not handled with much professional-

ism.

DEEPER PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRANSCEND APPROACH

Of course what has been said above, essentially some Gestalt theory and cognitive dissonance theory, taking note of the emotions accompanying complex cognitive processes, is heavily biased in favor of conscious and cognitive processes. If we try a division of psychology, individual as well as collective, into four fields, then so far we have favored the northwestern corner (see Table 18.1).

Table 18.1 A Division of the Field of Psychology

	Cognitive processes	**Emotive processes**
Conscious processes	IDEOLOGY True vs. False	LOVE/HATE Good/Right vs. Bad/Wrong
Subconscious processes	COSMOLOGY Deep cognitions	GLORY/TRAUMA Deep emotions

At the conscious level there is awareness or easy retrieval, a test being ability to verbalize. At the subconscious level there is no awareness, retrieval is difficult/painful, and not possible under normal circumstances. Professional help may be needed to construct a map of the subconscious from manifest indicators. Psychoanalysis in the Freudian tradition has had a tendency to focus on the individual, the subconscious, the emotive and the traumatic; a needed, but also narrow approach.

The southeast corner is needed to correct for the northwest corner bias. Dialogues have been explored in order to rearrange cognitive structures, using emotionally positive and negative anchors. But that is only part of the story. We may enter the deep personality of conflict parties and conflict workers, but it should be noted that in political and particularly geopolitical conflicts, the

conflict party is a representative, a diplomat. Consequently, Table 18.1 has to be read as reflecting collective, meaning shared, psychological processes.

The terms in the table are already adjusted to fit also the collective level of analysis.[xi] The two subconscious categories add up to the deep culture of that collectivity; which could be a collectivity shared by the representatives/diplomats.

Corresponding to glory/trauma at the collective level would be pride/shame. These deep emotions, especially shame, have been neglected in the literature. An exception is Tomkins:[xii]

> While terror and distress hurt, they are wounds inflicted from outside, but shame
>
> is felt as an inner torment, a sickness of the soul. The humiliated one who has
>
> been shamed feels naked, defeated, lacking in dignity and worth.

No wonder that shame, perhaps more than sexual and aggressive feelings, has been ignored both in everyday life, and in the literature. The more a society is based on exploitation and oppression, the more intolerable shame will be for the oppressor. Shame and fear are instilled in the oppressed, while anger and contempt dominate for the oppressor.

Scheff has drawn attention to how unacknowledged shame may lead to anger, and how spirals of shame-anger figure prominently, not only in quarrels but also in international relations, and how war may be a way to reduce chronic shame. Nathanson has a broader perspective on shame, and one powerful strategy to evade the experience of shame is to "attack others."[xiii]

Healthy pride, enjoying one's own accomplishments, is a joy to see in children. But the dangers of extracting undue glory from deeds vicariously earned, as in celebrating yesterday's battle victories or "our" team in sports, are ubiquitous. Hubris, false pride, is a well-known human af-

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fliction. We hypothesize that the stronger that pride, the more vulnerability to shaming, and shaming will then likely lead to escalating anger. As collectively shared sentiment, this cycle may become dangerous.

Insight in the collective deep culture would seem to be essential for the conflict worker; insight in the deeper layers of the personality of the specific conflict party perhaps less so. Representatives come and go; the deep culture stays about the same, even for *la longue duree* (Braudel), the longer run.

To take an example: Imagine a conflict party (a major country) and a representative (a major person). There is a dialogue with the conflict worker, and a high level of verbal agreement about both the positive and the negative anchors is brought about. Yet there is no acceptability in the sense of acting upon that consensus. There is unarticulated resistance.

Imagine now that in the collective subconscious of that country, in the deeper recesses of that collective mind, two ideas are lurking: [1] no perspective on a conflict is valid unless it can be seen as originating with us (written US?), the center of geopolitics; and [2] no transformation of a conflict is valid unless military power has played a major role.

Whether those beliefs are consciously present and the conflict party prefers not to articulate it, or absent from consciousness and unarticulated, may be less important. The conflict worker has an array of choices: bringing such tacit assumptions out in the open as a dialogue theme; taking the assumptions into account without explicitly saying so.

The first course of action is preferable, but maybe in a roundabout way: "Sometimes there are countries that have a tradition of feeling that_____What do you think?" To ask that

question, however, the conflict worker must have the ability to hear the inaudible, that which has not been said, and to see the invisible, the (too) well-controlled body language. This model becomes more complicated if we think in terms of two persons aiming at conflict transformation. Three cases are:

- two conflict parties, known as negotiation

- one conflict party and one conflict worker, known as dialogue

- two conflict workers, known as a seminar

    However, whenever two psyches are meeting, four layers interact:

- the collective conscious, meaning the role behavior

- the personal conscious, meaning the personal outlook

- the personal subconscious, meaning the personal baggage

- the collective subconscious, meaning the deep culture

    To start with the conflict worker: no doubt s/he should know more than his role repertory, as spelt out in manuals. Through experience s/he should develop the personal touch, adding and subtracting from prescribed repertory, like any psychotherapist, social worker, mediator, or diplomat would do. S/he should also have some insight in the deeper forces at work at the personal and collective levels, not pretending to be a *tabula rasa*. Any conflict worker, like any other human being, has a biography. Like a psychoanalyst having psychoanalysis as part of her training, the conflict worker may have conflict transformation at the personal level as hers.

    This knowledge cannot be demanded of any conflict party. The only thing that should be de-

manded is conflict worker awareness of such factors, as indicated in the example above.

But the conflict worker might also do well to consider her or his own personality, especially at the subconscious level of deep emotions. Could there be some shame, some false pride? How about compatibility with the conflict party, with regard to the taste for anecdotes, humor, knowledge display, etc.?

How do two conflict parties participate in a negotiation? Their verbal exchange is a debate, not a dialogue; a verbal duel. There is winner and loser, according to whose position best survives the battle. There is mobilization of conscious and subconscious energies to fulfill the collective program, delivering the cultural script intact into the final document.

A critical and very often neglected point is the role of the collective subconscious in this connection. Consider these four possible outcomes:

	Identical collective subconscious	Different collective subconscious
Verbal agreement	A	B
Verbal disagreement	C	D

In Case A, the agreement is unsurprising, assuming that the collective subconscious dictates 90 percent of the positions, making the agreement pre-programmed (e.g., the European Union treaties).

In Case B, the agreement is more interesting, bridging gaps in underlying assumptions. Sustainability of the agreement may be questioned, however (e.g., the U.S.–Japan security treaties).

In Case C, the disagreement is interesting, reflecting genuine ideological disagreement, ques-

tioning the sustainability of the disagreement under pressure (e.g., France and NATO in 1965–1966).

In Case D, the disagreement is unsurprising if we assume that the collective subconscious dictates 90 percent of the positions taken, making disagreements pre-programmed (e.g., U.S.–China relations).

An agreement may be little more than a celebration of the collective subconscious, not backed by real dialogue. "Good chemistry" between individuals may bridge gaps. But be skeptical: Such agreements may be based on false assumptions.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION CULTURE

Conflict releases, and builds, human and social, individual and collective, energy; the problem is how to channel that energy in constructive rather than destructive directions. Look at the faces, at people's eyes when in conflict: Some show dullness and apathy; others have beaming eyes, ready to go. The question is where—to the battlefield or to scale peaks of human creativity?

We have not tapped the psychology of creativity,[xiv] focusing on the (often lonely) creative individual and how insight comes as a flash, through analogic rather than logic. An exception is provided by Edward deBono[xv] and his "lateral thinking" to arrive at fresh perspectives. We are, however, looking more for how people can be creative together, like in the Somalian *shir:*[xvi]

> …a traditional conflict resolution structure that brings together all the mature men in the clans involved in a conflict. Women, children and young hot-blooded warriors are excluded. Men lounge under the thorn trees during the hot, dry day. They chat and drink tea. They also spend long hours chewing qat, the mildly euphoric

drug grown in the Horn of Africa, smoking, greeting each other, delighting in the

pleasure of meeting old friends—or old foes….At some point, things will jell. The

various pieces that make up the main issue for which the *shir* was called will fall

into place because a social climate conducive to a solution will have slowly

emerged. The result will be proper peace—a peace felt from the inside—a peace

that will have nothing in common with the quick-fix conferences in air-

conditioned hotels in Addis Ababa organized by the UN…

In short, a conflict market filled to the brim with dialogues! There is no assumption that the

model described in this chapter is easy.[xvii] We would like to emphasize the intellectual effort in-

volved in developing fruitful conflict perspectives. No attention to the emotive and the subcon-

scious, however warranted, should detract from this intellectual aspect, and whether conflicts

mobilize sufficient numbers of people with the talents needed. The verdict of this century is a

resounding no. We have much to learn, and to do, to handle conflicts better.

Note: Johan Galtung's writing is difficult to understand and challenging for those who are new to

his work. His writing often does not fit into the usual academic mainstream and many of his

ideas are very original. The rewards are great for those who are patient and grapple with his

ideas. More information about the TRANSCEND method can be found at the website:

http://www.transcend.org/

i Dollard and Miller, *Frustration and Aggression.* New York: Yale University Press, 1939; Berkowitz, L. "Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation,*" Psychological Bulletin,* 1989, 106, 59–73.

ii It would be unfair to classify the problem-solving workshops of the Yale learning school, the Harvard interactional school and the London communication/human needs school under the A and B corners, failing to take C into account, but not too wrong. But their rebuttal might be that the TRANSCEND transformation approach is singlemindedly focused on C, which is true and is also why TRANSCEND has eleven other programs. For a fine analysis, see Tarja Vaeyrynen, "Problem-Solving as a Form of Conflict Resolution," Rutherford College, University of Kent, UK, 1992.

iii Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means,* United Nations, 1998, the "mini-version," in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Chinese. A "maxi-version" is coming, available on the TRANSCEND home-page, *www.transcend. org.* For some of the theoretical background, see Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means* (London, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), Part II, particularly Chapter 3. For other works, see: John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures,* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995. "Dialogue" is neither in the table of contents nor in index. There is a fine comparison of the prescriptive and Lederach's own famous elicitive approach (TRANSCEND is in-between); Mari Fitzduff, *Community Conflict Skills,* third ed. Belfast: Community Relations Council Publications, 1998, analyzes "Third Party Roles—Mediation," but "dialogue" is not found in the detailed table of contents (no index); and Friedrich Glasl, Konflikt-Management, *Ein Handbuch fuer Fuehrungskraefte,* Beraterinnen und Berater, Bern: Paul Haupt, 1997. Dialogue is neither in the contents nor in the index.

iv TRANSCEND is today working in and on Chiapas/Guatemala, Colombia, Peru/ Ecuador, Northern Ireland, the Basque situation, Gibraltar-Ceuta-Melilla, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, the Middle East, the Kurdish situation, Caucasus, Afghanistan, Kashmir, ChinaTibet-Taiwan, Okinawa, Hawaii and the Pacific in general, to mention some conflict arenas. See *www.transcend.org.*

v Good examples would include "common security" (Palme Commission), "sustainable development" (Brundtland Commission). TRANSCEND has used "Middle East Helsinki Process" for the Israel-Palestine and the Gulf conflicts, "equal right to self-determination" for Yugoslavia, "condominium," or "joint sovereignty" or "binational zone" for the Ecuador-Peru border issue, "Switzerland of East Asia" for Okinawa, "2+3" for Korea (meaning the two Koreas with Japan, China, and Vietnam, the Mahayana-Buddhist countries), etc.

vi Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J., and Fisch, R., *Change,* New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.

vii This is spelled out in some detail in Johan Galtung, *Peace By Peaceful Means,* London, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996. Part II, Ch. 3.

viii For an excellent exploration of the difference, see Deborah Tannen, *The Argument Culture: Moving From Debate to Dialogue,* New York: Random House, 1998.

ix For a presentation of that spectrum, see Johan Galtung, *After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution;* Geneva: TRANSCEND, 1998; also at *www.transcend. org.*

x We are grateful to Jim Duffy for suggesting this metaphor.

xi For an exploration of the cognitive collective subconscious, see Johan Galtung, *Peace By Peaceful Means,* London, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996. Part IV, particularly p. 213, and for an analysis of the emotive collective subconscious see Johan Galtung, *Global Projections of Deep-Rooted U.S. Pathologies,* Fairfax, VA: ICAR, George Mason University, 1996.

xii Silvan S. Tomkins, *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness,* Vol. 2, New York: Springer, 1963, p. 118.

xiii Thomas J. Scheff, *Bloody Revenge. Emotions, Nationalism, and War,* San Francisco: West-view, 1994. Scheff discusses the role played by shame-rage in the origin of World War I and II. Donald, L. Nathanson, *Shame and Pride,* New York: Norton, 1992. This carries further Tomkins's pathbreaking work on emotions.

xiv James L. Adams, *Conceptual Blockbusting,* Toronto: McLeod, 1974, may serve as an intro-duction to creative problem-solving, and since the root of a conflict is an incompatibility we are certainly in the field of problem-solving. His references are: George F. Kneller, *The Art and Sci-ence of Creativity,* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965; S. J. Parnes and H. F. Harding, *A Source Book for Creative Thinking,* New York: Scribner's 1962; Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation,* New York: Dell, 1967; H. H. Anderson, ed., *Creativity and its Cultivation,* New York: Harper & Row, 1959; J.S. Bruner, J.J. Goodnow and G.A. Austin, *A Study of Thinking,* (New York: Wiley, 1957); Sigmund Freud, *On Creativity and the Unconscious,* New York: Harper & Row, 1958; Carl Jung, *Man and His Symbols,* New York: Doubleday, 1964; Lawrence S. Kubie, *Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process,* New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1966; F. Perls, R. Hefferline, and P. Goodman, *Gestalt Theory: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality,* New York: Dell, 1951.

xv See Edward DeBono, *Serious Creativity: Using the power of lateral thinking to create new ideas,* London: HarperCollins Business, 1992.

xvi See Gerard Prunier, "Somaliland Goes It Alone," *Current History,* May 1998, pp. 225–228; the quote is from p. 227.

xvii Thus, see James Scott, *Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed,* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998 (for a review see C. R. Sunstein, "More is Less," *The New Republic,* May 18 1998, pp. 32–37).