INTRODUCTION TO PEACE PSYCHOLOGY

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I urge you to beware the temptation…of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides [United States and Soviet Union] equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil…[The Soviet Leaders] are the focus of evil in the modern world (Ronald Reagan, 1983, pp. 363–364).

What became known as the “Evil Empire Speech” reflected the sentiment of many people in the United States during the 1980s. The United States and Soviet Union were locked into a Cold War, a contest for global power and military advantage (Lippmann, 1947). Both sides exchanged heated rhetoric, amassed weapons, and instilled fear in one another. Shortly after Reagan’s “Evil Empire Speech,” survey research registered a peak in anti-Soviet sentiments by U.S. citizens (Yatani & Bramel, 1989), and a peak in the level of fear people reported in connection with the threat of nuclear war (Schatz & Fiske, 1992). Interviews with children in the United States, Soviet Union, and other countries revealed widespread fear (Chivian et al., 1985; Schwebel, 1982) and other reactions that could be categorized as hopelessness, powerlessness, and futurelessness (Christie & Hanley, 1994).
Fear not only fuelled the nuclear arms race but also ignited the countervailing forces of activists and scholars in psychology who sought ways to reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust (White, 1986). The Cold War wound down with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, but not before galvanizing a generation of psychologists who formed the Division of Peace Psychology within the American Psychological Association (Wessells, 1996), and began to identify themselves as peace psychologists.

Although the emerging discipline of peace psychology is a product of the 1980s, throughout the twentieth century, psychologists have been interested in theory and practice related to social conflict and violence. The level of interest has waxed and waned in parallel with the intensity of conflicts and threats faced by the United States (Morawski & Goldstein, 1985). Interest among psychologists was especially high during the Cold War but also during the “hot wars” of World War I and II.

**PSYCHOLOGY’S ROLE IN WORLD WAR I AND II**

The concerns of peace psychologists are deeply rooted in the field of psychology, not only because the promotion of human well-being is central to the mission of psychology (APA Bylaws I.1, http://www.apa.org/about/mission.html) but also because psychologists have long been concerned about war and peace. William James, a founder of psychology in the United States, has been regarded as the first peace psychologist (Deutsch, 1995). Just prior to World War I, James gave an address on “the moral equivalent of war” in which he highlighted the enthusiastic readiness of humans to rally around the military flag (James, 1995), a social psychological phenomena akin to “nationalism” that has played out repeatedly for generations, especially when relations between nations become hostile. James argued that militaristic urges are deeply rooted in
humans and that societies must learn to channel the satisfaction of their needs in productive directions.

Psychologists did not follow James’ advice, but they did become involved in U.S. military affairs during the First World War. Among the more important contributions of psychologists to the war effort was the development of group intelligence tests that were used to select and classify new recruits, a development that “put psychology on the map” (Smith, 1986, p.24).

Psychologists had even greater involvement during the Second World War. A number of specialties in psychology emerged and supported the war effort. Clinical psychologists developed and administered tests to place personnel within the military establishment and they also treated war-related emotional problems. Social psychologists contributed their expertise, developing propaganda designed to promote the war effort by boosting morale at home and demoralizing the enemy abroad. A number of psychologists worked with the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency, selecting and training people involved in “undercover” activities in Europe and the Far East. Human factors psychologists participated in the design of weaponry and other instruments used by the military, and experimental psychologists trained nonhumans to perform human tasks. The best-known example of the latter was B. F. Skinner’s research in which he trained pigeons to guide pilotless missiles to targets, a program that was ultimately discarded (Herman, 1995). In all these activities, psychologists were enthusiastic participants in the effort to win World War II, a war that was regarded by most people as a just war.

**PSYCHOLOGY’S ROLE IN THE COLD WAR**

The ideology of Realpolitik has guided the conduct of foreign policy worldwide for nearly three centuries (Klare & Chandrani, 1998). Realpolitik is the belief that politics is reducible to three
basic goals: keeping power, increasing power, and demonstrating power (Morganthau, 1972). The international politics of the United States was, and continues to be, primarily guided by the ideology of Realpolitik. From a Realpolitik perspective, one sees security in the international system as the balanced capacity among states to use coercive power. Furthermore, because it is assumed that all sovereign states seek to maximize their power, and they operate within an international structure that is anarchical, the best way to ensure security is to be militarily strong and to adopt a policy of deterrence. According to the logic of deterrence, each state can best ensure its security by threatening any would-be aggressor with a retaliatory blow that would be un-bearably costly to the aggressor. By the conclusion of World War II, a tidy bipolar superpower arrangement had emerged in the world. The United States and Soviet Union were locked into an adversarial relationship in which they competed and concentrated their resources in an arms race, a Cold War that resulted in enormous stockpiles of conventional and nuclear weapons.

During the early years of the Cold War, psychologists continued to support the policies of the U.S. government. Tensions between the United States and Soviet Union grew, as did the arsenals of nuclear weapons that were aimed at each other. There were scattered attempts by committees of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) to analyze the implications of the new atomic warfare capability on future international relations, as well as the potential psychological effects on populations experiencing atomic bombardment. Generally, these early committees lacked focus but agreed that the major psychological concern was citizens’ attitudes toward atomic warfare and energy. They “emphasized the need to accurately assess and control public opinion in order to achieve public consensus regarding foreign relations and atomic war” (Morawski & Goldstein, 1985, p. 278). On the
whole, the public was quite supportive of government policies. Although survey research indicated that Americans were well aware of the bomb, and expressed little hope about the potential for international agencies to harness the spread of atomic energy and bombs, very few Americans expressed worry or fear (Cottrell & Eberhart, 1948). The usual psychological interpretation of the public’s low level of concern in the face of the atomic threat was that ordinary Americans felt helpless, relied on the authorities to deal with the problem, and used a psychological defense that was called “fear suppression” (Harris, Proshansky, & Raskin, 1956). No one in the psychological community suggested that fear might be an appropriate response to the threat of nuclear annihilation (Morawski & Goldstein, 1985).

During the 1950s, a growing number of psychologists were employed as scientists and practitioners by the federal government and the military. Psychologists used their expertise to assess and change the public’s attitudes toward atomic warfare, to deal with emotional problems experienced by persons exposed to atomic testing, and to reduce soldiers’ fear and reluctance to participate in atomic maneuvers (Rand, 1960; Schwartz & Winograd, 1954). Although the activities of psychologists were many and varied, most psychologists shared the common goal of preparing the country—civilians and military alike—for the anticipated nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The ideology of Realpolitik prevailed, despite the efforts of a few individuals within the psychological establishment (such as Gordon Allport, Hadley Cantril, and Otto Klineberg) who argued that the atomic age required a new form of diplomacy and the abolition of war (Jacobs, 1989). Policy makers were not particularly receptive to the advice of psychologists, especially in matters of foreign policy. Besides, most psychologists in the post–World War II era were preoc-
cupied with the development of psychology as a profession and those who wanted to speak out knew they would be putting themselves at professional risk. Marked by the “McCarthy era,” in which anyone opposed to government policy could be branded a communist and brutally punished, the U.S. political climate in the early 1950s was not conducive to voices that opposed government policy.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, several challenges to the Cold War mentality and its embrace of Realpolitik emerged in the field of psychology. Important publications signaled an incipient shift from planning for war to proposing policies designed to promote the chances for peace (Wagner, 1985). In 1957, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* began publishing articles on conflict reduction in international relations. Another publication was a special issue of the *Journal of Social Issues*, which was critical of the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence (Russell, 1961). Two edited volumes were particularly noteworthy: one by Wright, Evan, and Deutsch (1962), *Preventing World War III: Some Proposals*, and another one by Schwebel (1965), *Behavioral Science and Human Survival*. As Morawski and Goldstein (1985) assess the significance of these appearances:

First, the level of analysis was shifted from an exclusive focus on the behavior of individuals to a more inclusive focus on the behavior of nations. Second, psychologists began to emphasize the prevention of war rather than preparations for war. And third, whereas previous research had attempted to document or generate public consensus with government policy, the new work was critical of U.S. foreign policies. (p. 280)

In other ways psychologists began breaking from the tradition of promoting government policy. Instead of analyzing ways of ensuring that public opinion coincided with Realpolitik consid-
erations, Soviet citizens were humanized when interviews with them revealed that their views of the United States were similar to the views that U.S. citizens had of them, forming a mirror image of one another (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). At about the same time, some of the pioneers in peace psychology such as Jerome Frank and Ralph K. White were articulating the dangers of developing diabolical enemy images (Frank, 1967; White, 1966), which people tend to create, especially when they feel threatened. Even deterrence, the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, came under scrutiny as scholars noted the logical and empirical inconsistencies in the policy (Milburn, 1961). The argument applies even today because there is no logical or empirical way to prove whether deterrence actually keeps an enemy from attacking. One can only know when deterrence fails to deter an enemy.

Instead of analyzing methods of treating soldiers’ resistance, Osgood (1962) proposed Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction (GRIT), a method of defusing international tensions by having each side take turns at initiating tension-reducing actions. Not unlike standing on the outer edges of a teeter-totter, both superpowers could move toward the center of the teeter-totter in small steps, taking turns all the way. There have been suggestions that President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khruschev drew from the GRIT model back in the early 1960s when they took a series of initiatives that culminated in a nuclear arms control treaty (viz., the Limited Test Ban Treaty). Etzioni (1967) identified the steps that were taken by both sides, and they neatly conformed to a GRIT pattern.

From the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, domestic concerns took precedence over international issues and U.S. psychologists gave less attention to the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war. Topics that appeared with some regularity in the American Psychologist and the Journal of
Social Issues included student activism, population growth, changes in sex-roles, and a range of problems related to race relations. Meanwhile, political scientists continued their scholarship on war and peace. Looking at the world through a Realpolitik perspective, political scientists and those who specialized in international relations analyzed the Vietnam War, casting the war in the bipolar East-West struggle in which the United States sought to contain the spread of communism. The policy of containing communism was driven by Domino Theory; the belief that the fall of Vietnam to Soviet influence would make it likely that another domino would fall, producing a chain reaction and ultimately leading to the spread of communism all over the world.

As the United States withdrew troops from the hot war in Vietnam, a second round of the Cold War ensued. In lockstep, the superpowers enacted the well-known “security dilemma” with one side’s attempt to gain security through more military armaments threatening the other side, which responded in turn by increasing its armaments. During the 1970s, the policy of deterrence was taken to the height of logical absurdity as the arms race backed both superpowers into a corner and stuck them with the reality of MAD, “mutually assured destruction.” Now, no one would begin a nuclear war, it was reasoned, because no one could win. Both sides’ excessive stockpiles of nuclear weapons meant that if an all-out nuclear war did occur, the result would be not only the total destruction of the superpowers but an end to life as we knew it.

In the early 1980s, public concern about the threat of nuclear war increased dramatically as the rhetoric grew more hostile on both sides and the U.S. government began to openly discuss plans for achieving nuclear superiority and for waging and prevailing in a protracted nuclear war (Scheer, 1982). Citizens’ concern about nuclear war continued to rise, especially in the United States and in Europe, as the U.S. Defense Department proposed to build a nuclear capability that
would enable the United States to fight a range of nuclear wars, from a limited strike to an all-out nuclear exchange (Holloran, Gelb, & Raines, 1981). The threat of nuclear war loomed large, especially for Western Europeans because the United States deployed “intermediate range missiles” on their soil and there was talk in the Reagan administration about the possibility of keeping a nuclear war in Europe limited to tactical exchanges with the Soviet Union. A limited nuclear war would not require the use of missiles from the U.S. strategic arsenal, thereby keeping the war at a distance from the U.S. mainland (Scheer, 1982). Not surprisingly, the increasing levels of tension and the escalation of the arms race activated peace movements in both the United States and Europe.

As tensions peaked, reactions of the scientific community in psychology were varied. Some social and behavioral scientists took policy positions (White, 1984), or advocated political activism (Nevin, 1985), while others cautioned that taking positions on such issues required extrapolating far beyond existing psychological knowledge (Tetlock, 1986). A useful analysis of the problem was offered by Deutsch (1983) who underscored the interdependence of the United States and Soviet Union and made it clear that any attempt by one side to pursue security without regard for the security of the other side was self-defeating.

Despite the thoughtful analyses of some psychologists, psychological theory and practice had little if any influence on the course of the Cold War. From the perspective of policy makers, the Cold War was fundamentally an interstate problem, not an intrapsychic problem that was amenable to psychological analyses. Instead, international relations specialists, steeped in the tradition of Realpolitik, were called on as the experts who were best equipped to address most of the scenarios that were likely to lead to a nuclear war.
In order to have credibility, psychologists who wanted to develop theory and practice related to the prevention of nuclear war had to begin by understanding and challenging a Realpolitik framework. Ralph K. White’s (1986) edited volume, *Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War*, provided a compendium of articles written by psychologists and political scientists who gave coherence to the perspectives of political psychologists and also added a measure of legitimacy to psychological analyses of the nuclear threat. Likely psychological and political antecedents of a nuclear holocaust were identified and elaborated upon. Emphasis was placed on the problems of an unbridled arms race, mutually distorted perceptions, destructive communication patterns, coercive interactions, competition for allies around the world, and other psychological and political processes.

With few exceptions (Frank, 1967; Wagner, 1988), psychologists and political scientists stayed close to the Realpolitik framework when analyzing large-scale conflict during the Cold War. Moreover, policy recommendations were largely reactive and narrowly focused on the superpower relationship as attempts were made to prescribe ways of diminishing the intensity of the superpower conflict.

The Cold War was a conflict on a grand scale that spawned a great deal of research and practice on methods of resolving conflicts. The groundwork for the practice of conflict resolution was laid many years earlier when Follet (1940) introduced conflict resolution methods in organizational settings. But it was in the midst of the Cold War that Fisher and Ury’s (1981) very practical and highly readable little book, *Getting to Yes*, became a bestseller. To this day, the book is a useful guide on how to negotiate and resolve conflicts. Some of the concepts they introduced, such as “win-win outcomes,” are still part of the everyday vocabulary of professional negotiators.
and laypersons alike.

The late 1980s saw the Cold War end, with little assistance from conflict resolution procedures. Instead, the Soviet Union’s power diminished under the crush of its own economic problems, which were largely caused by its overextension on international commitments around the world far beyond its capabilities (Kennedy, 1986). The West could rejoice as Soviet influence sharply declined and the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the great global, superpower divide, began to fall. At the conclusion of the Cold War, only one superpower remained, and concerns about the nuclear arms race and the possibility of nuclear annihilation subsided dramatically (Schatz & Fiske, 1992).

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: PEACE PSYCHOLOGY COMES OF AGE

The Cold War was a power struggle of global proportions that made certain categories of violence salient. Using the state as the focal unit of analysis, scholars concentrated their attention on interstate wars, wars of liberation, secessionist movements, civil wars, and wars in which the superpowers directly intervened militarily (i.e., interventionist wars). Although many other forms of violence were prevalent, from a state-centered perspective, what mattered most were those struggles that had a direct bearing on the strategic, U.S.–Soviet balance of power (George, 1983).

Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the planet’s bipolar superpower structure has reconfigured dramatically and entirely new categories of security concerns have emerged. To be sure, the sovereign states of the international system will still have conflicts to manage, but increasingly, patterns of violence are not neatly following the contours of our inherited system of sovereign states. In the post–Cold War era, a complex pattern of interlacing schisms is emerging, which divides people not so much by state boundaries but by ethnicity, religion, economic well-
being, population density, and environmental sustainability (Klare, 1998). A small sample of what we are now observing globally is the outbreak of ethnic violence and other forms of identity group conflict and violence, a growing number of economic and political refugees, ecological devastation and pockets of food insecurity, concentrations of drug-related violence, and international terrorism. These problems are within and across international boundaries and underscore the need to reorient peace psychology and enlarge its scope of practice. The current volume was conceived within the context of these new challenges and represents an attempt to reinvigorate the search for psychological analyses that can inform theory and practice in peace psychology for the twenty-first century.

DEFINING THE SCOPE OF PEACE PSYCHOLOGY

The waning of the Cold War made it possible for peace psychologists to step back from a preoccupation with a single issue—nuclear annihilation—and begin to consider a broader range of threats and opportunities that bear on human well-being and survival. Our intention in this volume is to capture some of the new currents in the field by offering a sample of scholarship that reflects the breadth of research and practice that is being undertaken and shaping peace psychology in the twenty-first century. We have tried to include the work of scholars from around the world because peace psychology aspires to be international in scope and grounded in a multicultural framework. As the chapters will make clear, peace psychologists in the post–Cold War era remain concerned about the problem of violence but they are enlarging the radius of their concerns to include the insidious problem of structural violence, which occurs when basic human needs are not met and life spans are shortened because of inequalities in the way political and economic structures of a society distribute resources (Galtung, 1969). Moreover, the “peace”
in peace psychology is being cast in a far more comprehensive framework, requiring an ambitious agenda that attends not only to traditional concerns about the nonviolent resolution of conflict but also to growing concerns about the pursuit of socially just ends. These new emphases in peace psychology require nothing short of a redefinition of the field. Accordingly, we offer the following definition that captures the thrust of the current volume:

Peace psychology seeks to develop theories and practices aimed at the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence. Framed positively, peace psychology promotes the nonviolent management of conflict and the pursuit of social justice, what we refer to as peacemaking and peacebuilding, respectively.

Our working definition of peace psychology is used to frame the organization of the book, which conforms to a four-way model focusing on direct violence, structural violence, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK: THE FOUR-WAY MODEL

Section I: Direct Violence

The current volume retains the traditional focus of peace psychology on international relations by applying psychological concepts and theory to problems of interstate violence and the threat of nuclear war. In addition, because direct violence does not neatly follow the contours of the sovereign state system, chapters in Section I reflect a wider radius of violent episodes that vary in scale from two-person intimate relations to the large-scale violence of genocide. While different in scale and complexity, these varied forms of violence share several features: They all engender direct, acute insults to the psychological or physical well-being of individuals or groups,
and they erupt periodically as events or episodes.

The analytic tools of peace psychologists are central to understanding many forms of direct violence. For instance, in Section I, many of the contributors from around the world underscore the importance of social identity processes, which are manifest when individuals begin to identify with particular groups and favor their ingroups over outgroups. Quite naturally, the basic need to have a sense of who we are is inextricably woven into the fabric of our identity groups. Conflict and violence often erupts when two or more groups of individuals have different identities and see each other as threats to their identity group’s continued existence. These identity-based conflicts are central to many forms of violence including hate crimes, gang violence, ethnic conflicts, and even genocide. Sovereign states have been woefully inadequate in dealing with identity-based problems.

Also reflected throughout the text is peace psychologists’ growing appreciation for the structural roots of violent episodes. For example, patriarchal structures in which males dominate females play a role in intimate violence. Similarly, cultural narratives that denigrate gays, lesbians, and other marginalized identity groups are predisposing conditions for direct violence. Section II looks closer at some forms of violence that are deeply rooted in the structures of a society, what we are calling “structural violence.”

**Section II: Structural Violence**

Today, an increasing number of peace psychologists are concerned about structural violence (Galtung, 1969), an insidious form of violence that is built into the fabric of political and economic structures of a society (Christie, 1997; Pilisuk, 1998; Schwebel, 1997). Structural violence is a problem in and of itself, killing people just as surely as direct violence. But structural vio-
lence kills people slowly by depriving them of satisfying their basic needs. Life spans are curtailed when people are socially dominated, politically oppressed, or economically exploited. Structural violence is a global problem in scope, reflected in vast disparities in wealth and health, both within and between societies. Section II examines a number of forms of structural violence, all of which engender structure-based inequalities in the production, allocation, and utilization of material and non-material resources.

Galtung (1969) proposed that one way to define structural violence was to calculate the number of avoidable deaths. For instance, if people die from exposure to inclement conditions when shelter is available for them somewhere in the world, then structural violence is taking place. Similarly, structural violence occurs when death is caused by scarcities in food, inadequate nutrition, lack of health care, and other forms of deprivation that could be redressed if distribution systems were more equitably structured. The chapters in Section II make it clear that structural violence is endemic to economic systems that produce a concentration of wealth for some while exploiting others, political systems that give access to some and oppress others, and hierarchical social systems that are suffused with ethnocentrism and intolerance.

In Table 1, we outline some differences between direct and structural violence based in part on Galtung’s (1996) pioneering work in peace studies.

As noted in Table 1, direct violence refers to physical violence that harms or kills people quickly, producing somatic trauma or total incapacitation. In contrast, structural violence kills indirectly and slowly, curtailing life spans by depriving people of material and non-material resources. Direct violence is often dramatic and personal. Structural violence is commonplace and impersonal. Direct violence may involve an acute insult to the physical well-being of an individ-
ual or group. Structural violence is a chronic threat to well-being. Direct violence occurs intermittently, as discrete events, while structural violence is ongoing and continuous. In direct violence, the subject-action-object relationships are readily observable while political and economic structures of violence are not directly observable, though their deadly results, which are delayed and diffuse, are apparent in disproportionately high rates of infant and maternal mortality in various pockets of the world. Because it is possible to infer whether intentionality is present in cases of physical violence, the morality of an act can be judged and sanctions can be applied. Direct violence is often scrutinized by drawing on religious dicta, legal codes, and ethical systems. Intentionality is not as obvious in impersonal systems of structural violence, and considerations of punishment are seldom applicable. Finally, direct violence can be prevented. In contrast, structural violence is ongoing, and intervention is aimed at mitigating its inertia. Fundamentally, structural violence occurs whenever societal structures and institutions produce oppression, exploitation, and dominance. These conditions are static, stable, normalized, serve the interests of those who hold power and wealth, and are not self-correcting.

Table 1

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<tr>
<th>Direct Violence</th>
<th>Structural Violence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kills people directly</td>
<td>Kills people indirectly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kills quickly</td>
<td>Kills slowly</td>
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<td>Somatic harm</td>
<td>Somatic deprivation</td>
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<td>Dramatic</td>
<td>Commonplace</td>
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<td>Personal</td>
<td>Impersonal</td>
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<td>Acute insult to well-being</td>
<td>Chronic insult to well-being</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<td>Subject-action-object observable</td>
<td>Subject-action-object unobservable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intentional and immoral</td>
<td>Unintentional and amoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodes may be prevented</td>
<td>Inertia may be mitigated</td>
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A psychological question, posed in Section II on structural violence, is how people, who are morally principled, can live their lives without giving much attention or thought to the pervasive problem of structural violence. To answer this question, research is presented that identifies psychological processes people employ routinely and by so doing, limit their scope of justice to include only certain people, thereby perpetuating the socially unjust conditions of structural violence. Authors in Section II also look carefully at the targets of structural violence, especially women and children, because they are disproportionately harmed by structural violence worldwide. An emerging problem of the twenty-first century is globalization, which refers to the worldwide push for free markets that leave in their wake enormous inequalities on a large scale. Globalization is fuelling vast disparities in wealth and a global division of labor in which people in some countries profit and engage in the work of the head while others suffer and toil with their hands. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, militarization continues to be an important source of structural violence, generating vast inequalities in coercive power and fuelling the potential for episodes of violence, as big powers supply arms to smaller countries around the world.

Although we have highlighted distinctions between direct and structural violence, the relationship between direct and structural violence is circular. For example, the man who physically abuses a woman is enacting a dominance hierarchy that is supported by patriarchal narratives in a society. At the same time, his violent act reinforces the structural arrangement that puts men in a dominant position over women. Hence, direct violence is not a stand-alone phenomenon; instead, direct and structural violence operate together forming an interlocking system of violence. The challenge for peace psychologists is to become systems analysts, which requires an effort to simultaneously focus on the individual as the locus of the problem while also transforming the
structural and cultural context within which violent behavior is embedded.

In the last two sections of the book, we look at two kinds of peace processes which form a system of peace that is well suited for the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence. We begin with peacemaking, an attempt to prevent or mitigate direct violence by promoting the nonviolent management of conflict.

**Section III: Peacemaking**

Peacemaking is designed to reduce the frequency and intensity of direct violence. The section on peacemaking begins with a chapter on U.N. peacekeeping, an approach in which would-be combatants are separated by neutral forces. Peacekeeping may be used flexibly, either before or after episodes of direct violence, that is, to prevent or mitigate episodes of violence. Peacekeeping has traditionally focused on managing, rather than resolving, conflicts. Several chapters in Section III are given to the topic, “conflict resolution,” reflecting the emphasis in peace psychology on the prevention of violent episodes by using procedures that encourage dialogue, empathy, and win/win outcomes. Contemporary theorists and practitioners in conflict resolution view conflict as a perceptual event, arising when two or more parties perceive their goals as incompatible with one another. By convention, psychologists separate thought and action, which allows conflict practitioners to decouple the perception of incompatible goals (conflict) from violent behavior, and deal with the former before the outbreak of the latter. Therefore, although conflicts may lead to direct physical violence, the perception of incompatible goals does not make violence inevitable. What matters most is whether or not the parties in a conflict use the situation as an opportunity for creative problem solving that can benefit both or alternatively, mismanage the conflict in ways that damage the relationship (Rubin & Levinger, 1995). Because the meanings of conflict
and resolution are always embedded within the context of a particular culture, we also have in-cluded a chapter that highlights the importance of cultural contexts.

Although conflict resolution procedures attempt to prevent episodes of violence, in many in-
stances, when violence is not prevented, other efforts are needed that are better suited for post-
war interventions. Several chapters in Section III address the aftermath of violence and the im-
portance of addressing psychological, political, and economic dimensions of the problems that
arise in the wake of violent episodes. Topics include the problem of post-war trauma, reconcilia-
tion in divided societies, and the broader problem of societal reconstruction. Even though these
post-war interventions take place after-the-fact, they can interrupt repeated episodes or cycles of
violence, and thereby serve as a form of violence prevention.

Although peacemaking is often very useful, the approach has limitations, not least of which
is the problem that peacemaking can be used as a tool by those with power who can insist on
peaceful means of resolving disputes, while ignoring socially just ends. The dialogue process
that characterizes peacemaking approaches is important but a sustainable peace requires struc-
tural and cultural peacebuilding, actions and supporting narratives that redress the deeper and
more permanent roots of the problem.

**Section IV: Peacebuilding**

While preventing and mitigating episodes of destructive conflict and violence are familiar moor-
ings for peace psychologists, we seek to enlarge our scope of inquiry and practice by mitigating
the inertia of structural violence. Just as we found it useful to distinguish direct and structural
violence, we also see merit in distinguishing peacemaking (Section III) from peacebuilding, the
latter of which refers to the pursuit of social justice (Section IV). The issue of social justice
(Deutsch, 1985) and positive approaches to peace that emphasize human interdependence and the satisfaction of needs is not new to the field of psychology (Wagner, 1988), nor to the interdisciplinary field of peace studies (Smoker, Davies, & Munske, 1990). But once again, we are particularly indebted to Galtung’s (1996) work in the multidisciplinary field of peace studies, where the distinction between peacemaking and peacebuilding is central to the discourse. In Table 2, we delineate a number of differences between peacemaking and peacebuilding.

As noted in Table 2, the term “peacemaking” refers to a set of actions that reduce the likelihood of violent episodes. In contrast, peacebuilding is designed to reduce structural violence. Peacemaking emphasizes nonviolent means while peacebuilding emphasizes socially just ends. Peacemaking tends to be reactive, arising from the threat or actual use of direct violence. Peacebuilding can be proactive, addressing long-term structural inequalities that may become antecedents of violent episodes. Peacemaking is temporal and spatial, satisfying the current interests of conflicted parties who occupy a particular geopolitical space. Peacebuilding is ubiquitous and less constrained by time and place. Peacemaking emphasizes the prevention of violence while peacebuilding emphasizes the promotion of social justice. Peacemaking may support the interests of the status quo while peacebuilding often threatens the social order.

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Table 2
Reduces direct violence  Reduces structural violence
Emphasis on nonviolent means  Emphasis on socially just ends
Reactive  Proactive
Temporally and spatially constrained  Ubiquitous
Prevention of violent episodes  Promotion of social justice
Interest in the status quo  Threat to status quo

Peacebuilding has cultural, political, and economic dimensions (Galtung, 1996). Culturally, peacebuilding requires the transformation of cultural narratives or beliefs that justify and legitimize the dominance of one group over another. Politically, peacebuilding occurs when political systems that oppress people are transformed so that there are equal opportunities for political representation and voice. Peacebuilding includes transforming economic structures that exploit and deprive people of resources needed for optimal growth and development so that everyone has adequate material amenities such as decent housing, jobs, education, and health care. Although transformative processes are cultural and structural, progress in peacebuilding can be observed indirectly with measures that tap the degree to which there is equity in basic need satisfaction within and between societies. Quality of life indices are particularly useful and typically include mortality, lifespan, and levels of literacy (see, for example, United Nations Development Programme, 1997).

Peacebuilding is important in and of itself, to redress structural inequalities that deprive people of choices, health, and wealth. But peacebuilding also is essential to root out the structural bases of direct violence. A theme we advance in the present volume is that sustainable peace requires peacemaking efforts within the context of longer term efforts to promote macro level changes that produce more equitable social structures, that is, both peaceful means of dealing with differences and socially just ends. Indeed, from our perspective, peace is indivisible, includ-
ing not only the absence of violence but also a continually crafted balance of structurally organized equality that satisfies basic human needs.

Peacebuilding shifts the emphasis from extreme individualism to institutional change and community based solutions, as exemplified in participatory action research, a methodology which places social transformation and empowerment at the center of the research process (Brydon-Miller, 1997; Lykes, 1997). Section IV deals with various conceptualizations of peacebuilding and applications throughout the world. Emphasis is placed on promoting human rights, Gandhian principles of nonviolent social change, the role of women as peacebuilders, and roles for psychologists as practitioners and policy change advocates.

The four-way model we introduce employs conceptual distinctions between direct and structural violence and between peacemaking and peacebuilding. In practice, however, direct and structural violence form a larger system of violence. Similarly, peacemaking and peacebuilding, while conceptually distinct, can be treated as an interlocking system of peace.

SYSTEMS OF VIOLENCE AND PEACE

Although it may be useful for peace psychologists to distinguish direct and structural violence, we are beginning to see more clearly a circular relationship between both types of violence, forming an interlocking system of violence. The system operates at various levels, from the interpersonal level to the large-scale violence of genocide as we illustrate with the following examples.

In intimate relations, for example, the direct violence of men on women continues worldwide, in part because women’s low socioeconomic status constricts choices and keeps women in
a position of vulnerability and dependency vis-à-vis men, a structurally violent condition that sets the stage for more episodes of direct violence. The cultural dimension is also present as violence is justified by patriarchal narratives about a “woman’s place” (Bunch & Carillo, 1998).

At another level, genocide cannot be easily explained away as the resurfacing of ancient hatreds. Although a number of familiar psychological dynamics are at play in ethnicity-based genocide, including oppositional group identities, group polarization, and fear of one another, the deeper, structural roots also matter. For example, the genocide that took place in Rwanda and left nearly three-quarters of a million people dead can be traced back to colonial policies that gave preferential treatment to one group (Tutsis) over another group (Hutus), and by doing so produced a hierarchical arrangement in their society (Mays, Bullock, Rosenzweig, & Wessells, 1998). These differences are then exacerbated by contemporary structural forces such as crushing poverty, large class inequalities, pressure from the International Monetary Fund (making the poor even poorer), and a variety of others structural factors (Smith, 1998).

Not only does structural violence play a role in direct violence but the converse also holds, thereby completing the circle. For example, militarization, the degree to which nations rely on weapons, is treated in this volume as a form of structural violence. We appreciate that there is a large political constituency in the United States that embraces a robust military budget because it believes that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength. At the same time, militarism produces enormous profits for weapons developers and drains resources from other sectors of the economy that could satisfy human needs more productively and equitably. Moreover, the United States supplies more weapons to the world than any other country and most of the recipients are Third World countries that feel threatened by their neighbors. Like the United States,
these Third World countries are pursuing security by accumulating weapons (Renner, 1998). In essence, militarization produces structural violence within the United States and provides the means by which internation rivalries can become deadly, organized, direct violence.

On a global scale, resources are distributed unevenly with the poverty in the global south contributing indirectly to drug-related crimes and deaths in the global north. Interdependence is apparent as poor farmers cultivate the coca plant in order to generate income to survive. On the demand side, drug traffickers in the global north find it far more lucrative to move drugs than to work at minimum wage jobs that offer no health care benefits or opportunities for advancement (Crosby & Van Soest, 1997).

Not only is violence systemic but peace processes also can be viewed from a systems perspective. Peacemaking, as exemplified by conflict resolution procedures, can be used to deal directly with part of a violent system, encouraging nonviolent dialogue instead of overt forms of violence. However, from our perspective, the deeper roots of these problems require an integration of peacemaking with peacebuilding. To root out the structural bases of these problems previously mentioned requires a transformation of the socioeconomic status of women worldwide, the elimination of militarism, and the elimination of disparities in wealth that divide people by ethnicity and geography. In short, problems of violence on any scale require the promotion of a system of peace that emphasizes the nonviolent management of differences combined with the pursuit of socially just ends.

In the last chapter of this volume, we revisit the four-way model and then delineate some perennial tensions in the field of peace psychology. We conclude with a discussion of the challenges that are likely to face peace psychologists throughout the twenty-first century, emphasi-
ing the centrality of environmental sustainability (Winter, 1996) as we pursue structural and cultural changes that are capable of delivering the equitable satisfaction of human needs for current and future generations.