Enneads IV.3.2.44 – IV.3.3.31

IV.3.2.44-59

44-49. Unacceptable consequences of dividing the whole soul into parts; the wine image.

-What is the sense of analōsousi in this passage? Would the whole soul (eventually) perish if it were divisible? Or would it be transformed in such a way as to become unrecognizable as such?

50-58. The whole soul stands to its parts as a science (epistēmē) to its theorems, with the whole as potentially each part, and with each part potentially possessing the whole. The whole soul is not the soul of anything.

-cf. 2.5-10 for the whole soul (presumably hypostasis soul) as substance (and genus).

-What is the sense in which the Pythagorean theorem potentially possesses the whole of geometry?

58-9. New question: how is it that the world-soul is one thing, while there are also souls of parts of the world?

IV.3.3.1-31

1-3. Can the soul of a part of the world stand to the world-soul as the soul in a finger stands to the individual’s complete soul?

3-6. This view makes either (1) no soul (come to) be [gignesthai] outside body; or (2) all / every soul not (come to) be in body, but rather has the so-called soul of all outside the body of the world.

-What is the sense of gignesthai here? Logical? Or does it pertain to the becoming of soul?

-Given that the view being considered will be rejected, we would expect 3-6 to present a dilemma – and one that arises from the view of 1-3. It seems easier to make sense of (1) than (2). (1) seems to mean that just as the soul in a finger and the whole individual’s soul are in body, so the many souls and the world-soul, on this model, would be in body. But it is not obvious why the finger-individual model should imply anything about soul that is outside of body.

-And it is not immediately clear why one or either of these consequences should be unacceptable, unless hypostasis soul (or another disembodied kind of soul) is included among the souls considered in (1); and the “so-called soul of all” of (2) is meant to be the world-soul rather than hypostasis soul.

6-12. But the view has other problems: either (1) the world-soul makes itself available to individual souls in part, such that a part is available in each case – but this would divide the world-soul, and it could not make itself (rather than a part of itself) available to each individual soul; or (2) the whole world-soul would be one and the same everywhere, but this would not allow the world-soul to be a whole and the individual souls parts of it.

12-20. This becomes apparent when we examine the relation between the whole soul of an individual and its various functions. For it’s not that different organs with different functions (e.g. eyes and ears) have different parts of the soul present to them, but that a different potentiality of soul is activated with respect to each organ. Different kinds of apprehensions come through different organs, not different parts of the soul.

20-6. Likewise, all impressions are judged by the same soul. There is one soul everywhere, and one soul for all psychic functions.

27-31. If individual souls stood to the world-soul as the senses stand to the whole individual soul, either (1) each sense would have to think by itself, or (2) individual souls would not be rational in the way the world-soul is rational. But neither of these is the case.