1. We puzzled over the grammar of the first sentence (ll. 1-4). There are chiefly two questions of syntax: (1) How does the clause ὅσα ... ἡκατοστήναι, ἢ ... ἐχεῖν attach to the main clause ὅρθως ὑπὲρ ἑξεῖν? (2) How do we construe the infinitives καταστῆναι and ἐχεῖν? I proposed that we understand ἀπορήσαντας with the implied subject of ποιῆσαι, read an implied ἀπορεῖν as the complement to δεῖ, and take the infinitives as a result clause. This has the virtue of getting the right sense from the infinitives at the cost of making the construction with δεῖ rather difficult. Another option proposed was to take the infinitives with δεῖ, but that makes it more difficult to see how the ὅσα clause attaches. On that point, something we did not consider during our session but that Marko and I discussed later was taking ὅσα as the object of the verbal idea in πραγματείαν. At any rate, the sense is not difficult to make out.

2. We next discussed ll. 6-8 and noted that there were two interpretive options: if the subject of δίδωσιν were ψυχή (supplied from ταύτης, the last word of the previous sentence), as I proposed, then the soul itself would give us knowledge of what was aetiologically above and below it. As others noted, this would tie this point quite closely to what follows, esp. ll. 10-14. If instead the inquiry (supplied from πραγματείαν in l. 4) is the subject of δίδωσιν, then the sense is straightforward, but we must endure a change of subject in the last clause of the sentence, ὧν ... ἐστι, from the inquiry to ψυχή.

3. We spent some time trying to unpack ll. 10-12. I proposed in my presentation that a point about the priority of an inquiry into the soul over that into other things is being made. I was quickly dissuaded from this language by Agnes and others. The question then arose how the wanters of the first clause (βουλόμενοι) are related to the yearners (ποθοῦντες) of the last clause. Kate suggested that the last clause is a kind of gloss on the previous one – that yearning for a sight of Intellect just is how one seeks rightly.

4. We then turned to the view opposed by Plotinus in the rest of ch. 1 (ll. 16-22). I laid out the passages noted by H-S in their apparatus to account for the opponents’ view (ll. 17-18). The view is Stoic, but we noted that the expression ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς is extremely vague. The citation of Zeno’s view in Diogenes Laërtius does contain the more precise formulation in terms of parts (l. 21). Gabriel noted that ‘extending to the same things’ indicated the thought that we too can intellect the forms.

5. We took up the arguments that Plotinus’ opponents try to find in Plato and noted that however these are meant to work, they are quite weak, especially the analogical ones (ll. 23-33). It was noted that our nature and circumstances (τὰ ἡθη καὶ τὰς τύχας, l. 28), which we receive from what surrounds us, exhausts the category of what has a causal impact on us. Not only was the last argument, from the principle that all soul cares for all inanimate nature, obscure, the grammar of ll. 35-37 was also quite mysterious to us. Some options were raised but no resolution reached before we ran out of time.