Is Academic Theology an Answer to the Problem of Philosophy of Religion?

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Introduction

The problem with philosophy of religion, and one of the reasons for its waning influence within religious studies departments, has to do with the perennial suspicion that the field harbors a fugitive theological agenda; it remains too Christian and focuses too narrowly on an analysis of the elite production and reception of Christian doctrine. There are two distinct approaches to confront this concern: either to define a new complementary relationship between philosophy and theology, or, to root out all vestiges of crypto-theology remaining within philosophy of religion. The first approach comes from Christian philosophers seeking a denouement between philosophy and theology in two different contexts—analytic and continental—but both sharing the same assumption: namely, that philosophy is here to rescue an increasingly defunct theological discipline. The second approach is more common amongst religionists who remain invested in an examination of the variety of reason-giving found in the religions of the world, but who are also sick and tired of being accused of trying to sneak theology into the back door. An examination of both of these approaches demonstrates, I will argue, a continued misidentification and misconstrual of theology. More tendentiously, however, in this paper I propose to consider a radical thought experiment: could it be that theology, at least a particular understanding of “academic theology,” is a solution to the perennial problem of philosophy of religion? This is clearly a surprising argument to make, having just identified philosophy of religion’s problem as the continued suspicion of its hidden theological intent. However, even if such a thought experiment is prone to failure, following it through will clarify, at least, the precise confusion in the original charge. In order to consider such a hypothesis, I will first explore the relationship
between philosophy and theology, from the perspective of philosophers. This understanding contrasts with the vision of philosophy of religion that is promoted within religious studies departments, as I will demonstrate before, finally, turning my attention to a consideration of academic theology found within the study of religion in this country.

**Philosophy and Theology, or, Philosophy of Religion within Philosophy**

The two very distinct trajectories of contemporary philosophy—analytic and continental—share a common characteristic when it comes to philosophy of religion: an engagement in Christian apologetics. The first crop of analytic philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff were more explicit in their apologetics with the creation of a discipline called Christian philosophy.¹ The continental philosophers, on the other hand, who famously were accused of engineering a “theological turn” in phenomenology,² were more insistent in drawing a boundary between philosophy and theology, refuting the phenomenon of a “Christian philosophy,” and claiming to remain firmly within the boundaries of philosophy.³ Nonetheless, as Christina Gschwandtner has persuasively argued, the project of these continental thinkers remains fundamentally apologetic.⁴

A second generation of thinkers from both sides of the pond have more recently emerged with more nuanced iterations of the supportive relationship between philosophy and theology. On the analytic side, under the leadership of Michael Rea and Oliver Crisp, we have seen the

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¹ The most obvious evidence of this is the establishment, in 1978, of a Society of Christian Philosophers with its own scholarly journal, *Faith and Philosophy.*
³ For example, Marion articulates the distinction—“Between phenomenology and theology the frontier passes between revelation as possibility and revelation as historicity”—and claims his work remains strictly phenomenological. See Jean-Luc Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Summary for Theologians,” in Graham Ward (ed.), *The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 293.
establishment of a new discipline, analytic theology—the offspring of an arranged union between analytic philosophy and theology—through publications, a journal, and an annual series of conference workshops at the University of Notre Dame.\textsuperscript{5} On the continental side, a new network of philosophers, theologians, and scholars of religion, has emerged under the direction of Emmanuel Falque, the International Network of Philosophy of Religion. Falque has also published a clear manifesto of his vision for the relationship between philosophy and theology.\textsuperscript{6} Analysis of these two books, Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology and Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology, then, will provide a good representation of the current view of philosophers interested in theology from the analytic and continental perspectives respectively.

\textit{Defining a New Discipline: Analytic Theology}

Rea defines analytic theology as “…the activity of approaching theological topics with the ambitions of an analytic philosopher and in a style that conforms to the prescriptions that are distinctive of analytic philosophical discourse” through an engagement with the literature of the analytic tradition.\textsuperscript{7} However, as Rea makes clear, in the end “it is the style and ambitions that are more central”.\textsuperscript{8} Though he puts it differently, Crisp agrees that the distinguishing markers of analytic theology are both “procedural and substantive”.\textsuperscript{9} What is the particular manner of proceeding, or style, of analytic theology, and what is particular about its substantive questions, topics, or ambitions?

\textsuperscript{5} See Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (eds.), Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Journal of Analytic Theology (Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame and Baylor University); Logos Workshop (every year annually since 2009) at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame.

\textsuperscript{6} Emmanuel Falque, Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology in Perspectives in Continental Philosophy Series, trans. Reuben Shank (Fordham University Press, 2016).

\textsuperscript{7} Rea, “Introduction” in Crisp and Rea, Analytic Theology, 7.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{9} Crisp, “On Analytic Theology” in Crisp and Rea, Analytic Theology, 35.
Rea defines the style of analytic thought (both philosophy and theology) in an appropriately analytic manner using a series of numbered propositions—eg. “P1. Write as if philosophical positions and conclusions can be adequately formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated. P2. Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence. P3…etc). He follows this numbered list with a more colloquial interpretation of the analytic style in such a way which, as he remarks, any one used to teaching college students to write would be sympathetic to: namely, to “reason coherently; write clearly; say what you mean and mean what you say; try to express your ideas in terms that your audience will understand; try not to express your arguments and conclusions in overly ‘poetic’ language; understand the terms that you’re employing and rely on your understanding of those terms to draw out the implications of what you say and what you presuppose; and so on”. This gloss does not, however, do justice to the specific rigor of analytic style, nor the epistemological assumptions contained therein, such as, at the very least, the trust and optimism in language to communicate what it means without remainder. Nor does it account for the highly technical and jargon-laden tenor of this discourse. As we shall see, Rea, himself, acknowledges both of these objections.

The set of ambitions which, according to Rea, identify thinking as “analytic” are the following: “(i) to identify the scope and limits of our powers to obtain knowledge of the world, and (ii) to provide such true explanatory theories as we can in areas of inquiry (metaphysics, morals, and the like) that fall outside the scope of the natural sciences”. In a similar vein, though expressed in more starkly ambitious terms, Crisp agrees that substantively analytic theology presumes “that there is some theological truth of the matter and that this truth of the

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10 Rea, 5.
11 Ibid., 6.
12 Ibid., 4.
matter can be ascertained and understood by human beings (theologians included!),” and further it presumes “an instrumental use of reason”.\(^\text{13}\) Both agree that analytic theology does not necessarily uphold a particular theory of truth, such as a correspondence theory or foundationalism, nor is it necessarily committed to a metaphysical realism or to a moral or metaphysical absolutism.\(^\text{14}\) Yet, there remains a commitment to the fact that the truth matters and, further, can be “ascertained and understood”. It is on this latter point, as Rea explicitly acknowledges, analytic thought (both philosophical and theological) meets the most vociferous objections especially from continental thinkers.

Borrowing from a description of systematic theology given by Louis Berkhof, Rea identifies the primary ambition of analytic theology to “see the truth as God sees it”. Rea well knows that what is most objectionable here is the “idea that we can, even in principle, have access to ‘the truth as God sees it’—i.e. absolute, perfectly objective truth”.\(^\text{15}\) Rea thinks the “best explanation for the nearly wholesale rejection of analytic ambitions on the part of theologians” emerges out of “a more or less collectively held positive vision about the proper aims of theology that is antecedently at odds with the goals of the analytic theologian”.\(^\text{16}\) I shall say more in a minute about the fact, eluded to in this statement, that theologians seem to be, for the most part, rejecting the analytic approach. For our purposes now, it is enough to identify the reasons why: a lack of recognition of the limits of what humans can claim to know theologically, in other words, the mystery of the “theos” which theologians make the object of their study. Rea also raises the concern that as soon as “conceptual analysis is treated as a source of evidence” then one inevitably opens up analytic theology to the charge that the God of analytic

\(^{13}\) Crisp, 35.
\(^{14}\) Rea, 6.
\(^{15}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 9.
metaphysical discourse is merely a creation and projection of human ideas about God, i.e., an idol. Rea concedes that this is a genuine worry which needs to be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{17}

The objections raised by theologians extends to analytic style as well, which seems to sacrifice wisdom at the altar of clarity and conceptual understanding.\textsuperscript{18} Rea’s defense of the search for clarity as the “route to understanding” assumes that understanding can be reached propositionally. Furthermore, the stylistic demand that such propositions be made in “sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated” would seem to open analytic theology up to the objection that it is too ahistorical. While insisting that analytic thinkers are aware of the history of the doctrines they discuss, Rea confirms that “we do not treat history in any meaningful sense \textit{determinative} of the doctrines”.\textsuperscript{19} Herein lies a real difference with religious studies thinkers, who, for the most part, assume that history is precisely determinative in that way.

Throughout their two essays introducing analytic theology both Rea and Crisp are remarkably forthcoming about the lack of success they have had in theological circles. Crisp describes his essay as a “plea to theologians to give this particular way of doing theology a fair hearing”.\textsuperscript{20} And Rea, for his part, blames the chilly reception of analytic theology amongst theologians on the fact that “theology as a discipline has been beguiled and taken captive by ‘continental’ approaches, and that the effects on the discipline have been largely deleterious”.\textsuperscript{21} As demonstrated above, Rea, in particular, displays a great deal of intellectual integrity and openness to debate in the way that he identifies the range of objections to analytic theology

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 24-25.
\textsuperscript{18} As Rea paraphrases the theologians’ complaint, the “problem with analytic philosophy is that it prioritizes clarity and precision \textit{at the expense of everything else}, and it ignores the fact that sometimes, in order to attain wisdom and understanding, we have to rely substantively on metaphor and other literary tropes” (18).
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{20} Crisp, 34.
\textsuperscript{21} Rea, 1.
(coming from a theology “beguiled” by continental concerns such as idolatry and historicism) and argues they ought to be taken seriously. However, the remainder of the volume does not really address these objections until the final three chapters, all of which “reconsider” the field in essays by Eleonore Stump, Merold Westphal, and Sarah Coakley respectively. Even then these objections are not met but reiterated quaque objections. What I take to be the most significant, for the purposes of my argument here, is the fact that the cause of theology’s broad disinterest in analytic approaches is identified by its being mesmerized by continental thought. Let me turn now to look at one representative of continental thought, to consider his vision for the relationship between philosophy and theology.

**Crossing the Rubicon with Emmanuel Falque**

In his “discourse on method,” *Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology*, Emmanuel Falque wades where the previous generation of French phenomenologists would not dare: into the space separating philosophy and theology in order to, at once, uphold and traverse the distance between the two disciplines. As Matthew Farley notes in his introduction to the volume, Falque challenges those who “continue to treat philosophy and theology as if they were separated by some ancient Panthalassa, rather than by a mere rivulet in Emilia-Romagna” (4). In order to encourage the crossing, Falque will minimize the distance between shores, while at the same time, making it very clear that a border still separates and distinguishes the shores, however slight a body of water it might be. In the context of my argument here, I will consider whether one need map these shores differently if we are to contemplate such a metaphorical crossing in the American academic context, placing it at the

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23 Falque, *Crossing the Rubicon*, 16. Subsequent references will be made parenthetically within the text.
intersection of theology, philosophy of religion, and religious studies. This intersection of
disciplines presents a somewhat messier geography in which the demarcations between river
banks are less clear.

Falque encapsulates his methodological discourse in the following mottos: “The better
one theologizes, the more one philosophizes” (107), but also, “the more we theologize, the better
we philosophize” (139). The benefits of crossing the disciplinary divide are, in other words,
mutual. Falque observes that the benefit has thus far been felt mostly on the side of the
theologians enjoying the “immense fecundity of phenomenology,” while theology’s
“counterblow” has not yet made its impact fully known to the phenomenological world (21)—an
inequity Falque seeks to remedy, already implicitly in his previous works, and now in full
methodological openness in Crossing the Rubicon. His hope is for equal opportunity crossings:

As the philosopher and the theologian cross in the Rubicon, they will have no
choice in passing each other but to let themselves be transformed—each one by
the other. The first will teach the second about the human journey. The second
will make the first see that he cannot refuse to open himself—upon a decision, of
course (Chapter 4, §14)—to the transcendence of the One who comes to
‘metamorphose’ everything, to the extent to which he has first assumed it in its
entirety (151).

Crossing the Rubicon from philosophy to theology, or vice versa, brings the opportunity
of growth in either direction.

Nonetheless, the possibility of mutual benefit requires that each retains their
citizenship in the land from which they travel; in other words, Falque is interested in
encounter, not migration (i.e., conversion). Indeed, this is one of the markers which,

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24 On this point, Falque would seem to confirm Rea’s point that American theologians have been more enamored by
continental approaches than analytic ones.
25 See Le Passeur de Gethsémani, Angoisse, souffrance et mort. Lecture existentielle et phénoménologique (Paris:
Cerf, 1999); Métamorphose de la finitude. Essai philosophique sur la naissance et la résurrection (Paris: Cerf,
arguably, separates him from a previous generation of French phenomenologists who, by claiming certain topics (such as revelation, liturgy, Eucharist) as properly philosophical, were less explicit about the confessional origin of those topics. Falque, to his credit, wants to be explicit about his own religious influences without, however, needing to “baptize” philosophers like Badiou, Franck and Nancy, who might make use of theology in interesting ways without “believing” in it (138). Despite the fact that he employs a militaristic metaphor—Caesar’s crossing is a movement into battle—Falque’s model of the ensuing encounter between philosophy and theology, he insists, need not result in “crushing” one’s foe, but instead could be understood as an athletic contest in which one encounters an equal adversary against which to test, exercise, and thus, strengthen one’s own abilities (139).

Recalling that, in order to make this crossing productively and safely, one must remember and return to the land from which one travels, it is necessary to mark the distinct topography of each shore in order to be able to make that return. Falque argues that philosophy and theology are distinguished “not so much by their respective contents (after all, the Eucharist, the Passion, or the Resurrection can also be approached philosophically) than by their modes of proceeding—heuristic or didactic” and the direction of their approach, specifically whether the object of study is approached from on high or from below (24). Falque seeks a delicate balance between an over-unification of the disciplines which would confuse their methods and an over-separation which would, prejudicially, exclude legitimate objects of consideration to each. The balance is found thus:

Between philosophy and theology a difference must be maintained between (a) their ways, (b) their modes of proceeding, and (c) the status of the objects to be analyzed, while at the same time recognizing (d) the possible and paradoxical community of objects given to thought (125).
In this schema, theology proceeds didactically—“what is said in opening must then also be repeated identically at the end”—with dogmatic force and “from above,” in order to treat an object it takes as (or claims to be) an actuality. On the other hand, philosophy proceeds heuristically; with an open and questioning spirit, it proceeds “from below” to consider possible objects (126). Regardless of discipline, however, Falque insists on the greatest overlap with respect to the object of study itself—whether considering prayer, liturgy, Eucharist, Incarnation, revelation, etc. In this way Falque characterizes theology as a “discourse beginning with God” whereas philosophy can be a “discourse on the God-phenomenon appearing to the human” (127).

My question below will be whether this distinction makes as much sense in the context of the academic study of religion in North America. First, however, let me give a brief summary of the relationship between philosophy and theology from the perspective of philosophers.

One thing that both these continental and analytic philosophical approaches have in common is their tone of offering a gift of justification, or salvation, to theology, specifically by providing the tools of superior argumentation and utilization of reason to elucidate doctrine which theologians proclaim ‘on high’ without understanding properly. However, this assumption of rescuing theology, perhaps from itself, involves a misidentification of what theology is. If analytic philosophers are guiltier of the first of these errors, continental philosophers remain confused about the second. For example, Crisp proclaims that the “benefit of an analytic approach to systematic theology should be obvious. It provides a means by which complex problems can be made sense of with logical rigour within a metaphysical framework of thought for decidedly theological purposes”. 26 On the other hand, Falque’s depiction of theology as

26 Crisp, 38. Likewise: “The philosophers engaged in this project tend to defend their work by saying that this sort of theology, though very similar to the sort of approach classical theologians of the past have adopted, is not being done by contemporary theologians. So the philosophers have stepped in to do it for them. Unfortunately there is
proceeding “from above” didactically and dogmatically (and only learning about “the human journey” from the philosophers proceeding “with an open and questioning spirit” “from below”) does not accurately depict the kinds of theology being done in a religious studies department.

Finally in neither analytic nor continental philosophy do you get the sense that theology is done in any tradition outside Christianity—Protestantism for the analytic thinkers, Catholicism for the continental.\textsuperscript{27} This fact alone accounts for the limited interest of these approaches within religious studies departments. Both analytic and continental philosophers interested in religion and theology do what they do very well according to their own internal markers of rigor and creativity; however, what they do is also narrowly specific enough to be difficult to adapt within a department dedicated to the pluralistic and comparative study of religious traditions in all their historical and regional specificities. As we shall see, this is the primary critique of philosophers of religion who are peddling their trade from within religious studies departments.

**Philosophy of Religion within Religious Studies**

In the past few years there has been a renewed interest in re-defining the field of philosophy of religion coming from scholars within religious studies departments. In chronological order this crop of new books includes: Knepper’s *The Ends of Philosophy of Religion: Terminus and Telos*;\textsuperscript{28} Schilbrack’s *Philosophy and the Study of Religions: A

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\textsuperscript{27} The only reference to other religious traditions was made in a footnote by Crisp who acknowledged the possibility of “other theistic traditions taking up and adapting” analytic method, but only then to “underline the point that the analytic theology [he has] in mind is analytic Christian theology” (Crisp, 43, footnote 20, emphasis his).

manifesto;\textsuperscript{29} and Lewis’s \textit{Why Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion & Vice Versa}.\textsuperscript{30} One of the common elements of these thinkers is that none identify as analytic or continental thinkers per se, though some may be more or less sympathetic to aspects of those traditions. Likewise, they share a similar critique of traditional philosophy of religion. The critique can be summarized as follows: 1) tradition philosophy of religion is too narrowly focused on a specific version of Christianity (a thinly Protestant theism in the case of analytic philosophy of religion or ecstatic/mystical experience in the Catholic tradition in the case of continental philosophy of religion), and 2) it is both too elitist and too “intellectualist”\textsuperscript{31} as a result of its narrow focus on doctrines and arguments for the existence of God without proper attention to the ethics, politics, ritual and material practices in which religious people engage. These weaknesses are due, in part, from the discipline’s connection to theological apologia: as Knepper puts it, philosophy of religion too often resembles a defense of Christianity—“not a religiously impartial examination of reason-giving in the many different religions of the world, but a religiously motivated apologetic of the reasonableness or usefulness of some one religion or kind of religion”.\textsuperscript{32}

These problems with traditional philosophy of religion boil down to “the simple fact that philosophy of religion is largely uninformed by, and therefore has very little to contribute to, one of its parent field: religious studies”.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, all three thinkers agree on the general vision for an improved discipline of philosophy of religion: it needs to internalize the lessons learned from religious studies in order to better respond to the plural particularities of the global religious

\textsuperscript{31} This is Schilbrack’s term, but the same idea is found in all three. See Schilbrack, xii.
\textsuperscript{32} Knepper, 9.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
traditions, and to explore a richer and broader data set within each of the specific traditions.\textsuperscript{34}

This shift represents a move to the critical engagement with a variety of religions rather than an apologetic demonstration of the coherence and rationality of one.

There is also agreement regarding what philosophy of religion might gain from a closer alignment with the broader field of religious studies: 1) a more complicated range of religious phenomena to analyze— not simply conceptual examples of reason-giving found in the elite production of doctrine, but also the rich array of rituals, material phenomena, and ethical practices involved in any given religious tradition;\textsuperscript{35} 2) the ability to defend the role of evaluation and normativity within philosophy of religion despite, or even because of, the fact that religious studies as a field is less interested in an apologetics of the sort that, ironically, one might encounter in a philosophy department; and 3) the thorough historicizing of the discipline.

While all three philosophers of religion argue that the discipline is best located explicitly within the field of religious studies, Lewis is the most emphatic and clear in his articulation of what this means and the gains brought by this location. He begins by defining the academic study of religion as follows: “the disciplined examination of religion, including religious thought, people, movements, practices, materials, etc., as well as reflection on the conceptions of each of these terms, without presupposing the validity of or privileging the study of any particular religion or group of religious phenomena,” which neither presupposes the truth nor the falsity of

\textsuperscript{34} Schilbrack expresses it in this way: “Philosophy of religion ought to evolve from its primary present focus on the rationality of traditional theism to become a fully global form of critical reflection on religions in all their variety and dimensions, in conversations with other branches of philosophy and other disciplines in the academic study of religions” (xi).

\textsuperscript{35} Like Knepper, Schilbrack identifies philosophy of religion by its focus on reason-giving; however, with Lewis, he conceives of reason-giving in a way that is more expansive than simply doctrine or belief. Thus, both Lewis and Schilbrack argue that philosophy of religion must move beyond the study of doctrine and belief in order to include “the philosophical study of worship practices, sacrifices, spiritual disciplines, liturgies, rites of passage, contemplative exercises, and ceremonies” as these are “the performed dimensions of how ordinary people live their religious commitments” (Schilbrack xii, xiii). See Schilbrack, Ch. 2, “Are Religious Practices Philosophical?” for further details.
any particular religion or even religion in general. In other words, one of the particular demands of religious studies is that it cultivates a self-conscious intellectual practice of openness—generous in its attempt to be fair to an account of otherness (inevitably encountered within the study of religion) and yet critical in its constant methodological self-reflection and questioning. A couple of observations follow from this description of the disciplinary training of religious studies.

First, according to Lewis, the discipline of theology is too varied and diverse to state universally whether or not it belongs within religious studies. Some theology does—what he calls “academic theology,” whereas clearly some does not—that which “excludes itself by making conversation-stopping appeals to authorities conceived as unquestionable”. I will return to this distinction in a moment; for the time being it is sufficient to note that there are a variety of ways of doing theology and to recognize that for Lewis any theology which proceeds “from above,” through an appeal to the authority of revelation of a sacred text or the magisterium, does not belong with the academic study of religion. On this same point, Schilbrack observes that a surviving misconception about the teaching of religion (on the part of those not involved in it) is that “philosophy tends to undermine religious belief and that religion departments ‘teach religion,’ but the truth is that one is much more likely to hear an argument that God exists in the philosophy department philosophy of religion courses than in those from the religious studies department”. This was shown to be the case in the previous section.

Secondly, this location within the academic study of religion in no way precludes the ability of philosophers of religion to make normative claims, or offer evaluative judgments about

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36 Lewis, 7.
37 Ibid., 7-8.
38 Schilbrack, 24.
the varieties of reason-giving they investigate. Indeed, Schilbrack, Lewis, and Knepper agree that making evaluative/normative judgments is one of the specific roles of the philosopher of religion. Schilbrack argues that, on this point, one can learn something from the “style” of doing philosophy of religion found in philosophy departments—a style he identifies as analytic, in contrast to the “hermeneutical or phenomenological” approaches more common to religious studies departments: while agreeing with philosophers of religion in religious studies departments that “the meaning of religious phenomena depends on its cultural and historical context,” Schilbrack, nonetheless, concurs with the philosophers in the philosophy department that “the distinctive contribution of philosophy of religion has to do with the evaluation of truth claims, which means the assessment of reason-giving and arguments”.\(^39\)

While both Schilbrack and Knepper agree that evaluative questions and judgments are a distinctive feature of their vision for philosophy of religion, Schilbrack thinks that this is the distinctive feature which is a legitimate and inevitable complement to the descriptive approaches found in other methodological approaches in the study of religion, whereas Knepper will claim that the task of philosophers of religion is descriptive, comparative, and evaluative.\(^40\) It is Lewis, however, who devotes a chapter to the defense of the role of normativity in religious studies. His primary argument here is that normativity is “inevitable” whether the scholar is considered a “caretaker or a critic” of religion, and furthermore, that normativity is not unique to the study of religion, but is central to many fields of study, not least of which are philosophy and political science.\(^41\) Lewis claims that one of the reasons normativity is so suspect in the study of religion

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 25.

\(^{40}\) See Schilbrack, xvi and Knepper, 12-20.

\(^{41}\) Lewis, 46-53, and 44. The language of “caretaker” or “critic” references the well-known position of Russell T. McCutcheon that has been challenged by Tyler Roberts, Atalia Omer, Paul J. Griffiths and Ann Taves, amongst others. See McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).
(and tied to theology, which bears the weight of most suspicions in the field) is that it is assumed that “religion cannot be argued about—that it is, in essence, ‘reason’s other’” and thus is a matter of faith not debate. Lewis observes that this assumption means that, ironically, “adamant secularists unwittingly join forces with anti-intellectual adherents of religious traditions in supporting the idea that we cannot engage religious ideas constructively”. But this is a mistake; if the cost of admittance in religious studies is “the principled willingness to submit all claims to scrutiny and questioning, to insist that no assumptions, doctrines, or authorities are beyond questioning” then normative claims made in the course of the philosophical study of religion are included, as long as they submit the same entry fee. Again, part of the value of Lewis’ argument here is that, in the midst of his defense of philosophy of religion, he clarifies and corrects a common misconception under which theology is assumed to be normative while religious studies, including philosophy of religion, is merely descriptive.

A final benefit of any philosophy of religion that is found within religious studies, according to Lewis, Schilbrack and Knepper, is its historicism. Indeed, this methodological presupposition is what the philosophy of religion has most to learn from religious studies. Lewis charts the shift within religious studies in the past three decades from the predominance of philosophy of religion as the privileged method for studying religion, to history and genealogy. As is well documented, this turn to history included an interrogation of the historical processes through which “religion” has been conceptualized (by thinkers such as Talal Asad, Jonathan Z. Smith, Tomoko Masuzawa) and, thus, called into question the notion of a natural, or universal, ahistorical notion of religion.

42 Ibid., 45.
43 Ibid., 61.
44 Ibid., 8.
Lewis argues that philosophy of religion, as a discipline, has to learn from the broader field of religious studies here; which is to say, philosophy of religion should become more self-consciously historical, tracing the arc and development of various doctrines or religious concepts.\(^{46}\) Furthermore, despite their vast differences, the two camps of analytic and continental philosophy of religion are “united in their relative neglect of broader developments in religious studies”\(^{47}\). Lewis expresses his frustration with “the vast majority” of the recent scholarship in philosophy of religion (of the sort discussed in the first section of this chapter) which “has largely ignored the emphasis on sophisticated attention to history that has had such powerful effects in other subfields of religious studies”, including, I will argue, the subfield of theology.\(^{48}\)

In other words, despite the fact that a keen sense of the historical and cultural production of knowledge and understanding arises out of continental philosophy, nonetheless, continental philosophy of religion has not fully integrated this methodological awareness in its own discourse. I would argue that one of the reasons for this is that continental philosophy of religion has focused on phenomenological thinkers and discourses, rather than hermeneutical ones; hence, it preferences eidetic essences and universality over historical specificity.

Thus far in this collective consideration of how philosophy of religion might learn from its location within religious studies, I have isolated three specific lessons: to become more pluralistic and material in the collection of data to describe, analyze, and evaluate; to become more thoroughly historical in orientation; and to be able to defend the practice of making

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 11.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., 15.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 28. By way of contrast Lewis discusses Amy Hollywood’s work on the contemporary French retrieval of medieval mystics which is as successful as it is by “repeatedly locat[ing] texts and figures in thickly textured portrayals of their intellectual, social, and political contexts” while still being explicit about the normative claims it makes about the gendering of trauma and suffering, limits of representation, construction of subjectivity, etc (Lewis, 32). See Amy Hollywood, *Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002).
evaluative and normative judgments. However closer examination of Knepper’s proposal for philosophy of religion will uncover a tension amongst these lessons: between the drive for pluralism and historical specificity, on the one hand, and the aim of establishing general patterns of reason-giving, on the other.

As with Lewis and Schilbrack, Knepper begins with a critique of the current state of affairs. Specifically, his complaint is that the problem with philosophy of religion is that it is not really philosophy of religion—in all its rich complexity and diverse forms and instantiations. In contrast, Knepper argues that analytic philosophy of religion ought really to be called “philosophy of ahistorical theism” and continental philosophy of religion, simply refers to a “philosophy of religionized postmodernism”—neither of which, for their narrowness, offer the field of religious studies very much.\(^4^9\) When philosophy of religion—in either its analytic or continental form—claim to provide universal accounts of religion, Knepper counters they are actually simply echoing a fairly specific and narrow intellectual lineage.\(^5^0\) Note, however, that he does not complain about their claim to provide a universal account of religion, but simply their means of approaching and arriving at that account.

Knepper provides his own account of the direction philosophy of religion ought to take within religious studies. He outlines five criteria, or “ends,” for a more robust philosophy of religion: 1) it must be religiously diverse in order to avoid the risk of mistaking a part for the whole (as previously iterations of analytic and continental versions have done); 2) there must also be a diversity of subjects (in terms of race, gender, class, and especially, creed) engaged in

\(^4^9\) Knepper, 23.
\(^5^0\) Knepper is pretty cutting about this, especially when it comes to continental philosophy. For example, he talks about one continental philosopher’s attempt to uncover the universal structure underlying all religious traditions in the concepts of infinite love and responsibility which are then “located in the infinite and therefore unattainable demands of justice and responsibility that Derrida reads out of Levinas’s reading of Kierkegaard’s reading of the myth of Abraham’s attempted sacrifice of Isaac” (12). Analytic philosophy of religion is, at least, more explicit and upfront about the self-reflexivity of their discourse; they simply suppose it to be the one true discourse.
philosophy of religion to guard against the biases of any one investigator; 3) it begins with “thick description” of religious reason-giving; 4) it must be comparative; 5) it will culminate in the explanation and evaluation of these instances of religious reason-giving—a task which can only come after thick description and comparison. Knepper faults analytic and continental philosophy of religion for rushing too quickly “to judgment about the truth or value of some religious belief or practice to be bothered with the hard work of gaining hermeneutically sensitive and ideologically aware understanding of that which is under investigation”. Thus he wants to begin with a “thick description of religious reason-giving in all religions for the sake of critical understanding” in a way that is inclusive of both formal reason-giving (theological, exegetical and legal traditions) and informal (mythological, narratival, and ordinary discourse); such description should be both synchronic and diachronic. Subsequent to such a robust descriptive production, philosophers of religion are in the position to compare them, and further, “only after philosophers of religion have come to a critical understanding of many different instances of religious reason-giving from many different religions of the world are they in a position to proffer general claims about the overall patterning of religious reason-giving”. Finally after thick description and comprehensive comparison, the philosopher of religion is in the position of “explaining the comparative patterning of religious reason-giving and evaluating the truth and value of religious reason-giving”.

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51 Ibid., 3.
52 Ibid., 7.
53 Ibid., 75 (emphasis original) and 80, 83. Furthermore, Knepper adds that a thick description “includes the grounds and ends, authors and audiences, proponents and opponents, settings and trajectories, and non-discursive embodiments and enactments of religious reason-giving” (86) using hermeneutical, phenomenological, ethnographic methods and speech-act, semiotic, and genealogical theories (87).
54 Ibid., 99 (emphasis original).
55 Ibid., 120.
explanation and evaluation must come last. Restraint is required; the philosopher of religion should not rush to evaluate before the hard and time-consuming work of description and formal comparison has been made.\textsuperscript{56}

In an important critical response to Knepper’s argument, Bradley Onishi first critiques Knepper’s reductive view of continental philosophy of religion, before turning to offer a more nuanced historical account of the variety found therein.\textsuperscript{57} Onishi takes Knepper to task for his overly simplistic treatment of continental philosophy, in particular for choosing John Caputo as the best representative of the field. While sympathetic to Knepper’s (and others) concern to guard against theological vestiges in the field, Onishi tracks an important divergence therein between those scholars who he would identify as doing continental philosophical theology and those doing continental philosophy of religion. Onishi differentiates these through a “\textit{distinction of purpose}”; the former “seeks to defend, improve, or advance (Christian or Jewish) theology by way of philosophy,” whereas the latter “is dedicated to exploring the potential resonances and dynamisms between philosophy and religious phenomena, particularly as they bear upon scholarly approaches to secularity.”\textsuperscript{58} In the former camp Onishi would place thinkers like Kevin Hart, Catherine Keller, and even the “Christian atheist,”\textsuperscript{59} Caputo; whereas in the latter, one might find thinkers as diverse as Mark C. Taylor, Thomas Carlson, and Mary-Jane Rubenstein

\begin{footnotes}
\item[56] Ibid., 136.
\item[58] Ibid., 2 (original emphasis).
\item[59] Ibid., 14. Though Onishi doesn’t explicitly say it, one gets the sense that there is a way in which Caputo’s crypto-theology is more insidious and damaging to the reputation of continental philosophy of religion than the explicit theological stances of Hart and Keller who are, at least, honest about their own projects’ aim. As Onishi says, the problem with Caputo’s approach is the following: “By dirempting Christianity, and religion in general, of its doctrinal, historical, and ritual particularity, Caputo’s work, unlike Hart’s, offers little more for philosophical theology than a deconstruction of Christianity and translation of religion into a religiosity of hope. However, Caputo is also vulnerable to Knepper’s claim that philosophy of religion is crypto-theological, because his translation of Christianity into a religion without religion sets up philosophy of religion as a field constituted by the Christian hope for the kingdom of God” (15).
\end{footnotes}
(the primary subjects of Onishi’s argument), as well as Jeff Kosky, Tyler Roberts, Sarah Hammerschlag and Ryan Coyne. These latter thinkers, argues Onishi, draw on continental philosophy primarily “to refine and critique the theories and methods of religious studies”.\(^{60}\)

To Onishi’s argument, I would add two things that are significant to observe regarding Knepper’s proposal: first, Knepper’s vision for philosophy of religion is a vastly ambitious project which, taking into account the language training (as a minimal requisite to embarking on such a study), would seem impossible for any one philosopher to perform.\(^{61}\) Secondly, I would draw attention to the fact that the end or \textit{telos} of this project remains the uncovering of a system of “overall patterning”—a trend towards giving a universal account of religious reason-giving. This is the reason for comparison in the first place—“for the sake of understanding general patterns of religious reason-giving”.\(^{62}\)

Ironically, such a vision opens Knepper up to very objections he seeks to redress: if Knepper’s understanding of the “telos” of the philosophy of religion is a general pattern of religious reason-giving which the philosopher of religion is ultimately to evaluate in terms of its truth and viability, then aren’t we returning to the kind of grand-narrative assumed to be the telos of an uncritically ambitious theology? To be fair, there is no step of Knepper’s project that is not accompanied by critical stop-gaps to continually question and correct its own assumptions, to guard against biases by the collection of more diverse data to compare and diverse subjects making the comparisons. Nonetheless, it is striking that the end of Knepper’s vision of

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 3.

\(^{61}\) Knepper acknowledges as much and states that “due to the paucity of thick descriptions of religious reason-giving in many of the religions of the world” most philosophers of religion will be devoted to that original step of the overall project (101). However, he does not indicate how philosophers of religion might work together to produce his own vision of the field’s end: an evaluation of such general patterns of religious reason-giving.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 101.
philosophy of religion remains the evaluation of the viability and truth of general patterns of religious reason-giving, implying not merely normativity, but one universally applied.

This is an interesting place to end up, because, as I will argue below, the sort of theology which one would most likely encounter in an institution dedicated to the academic study of religion—that is, a properly historicized theology—is unlikely to make such a claim to universality. Theology is, de facto, always regionalized; it is always constrained by the boundaries of its own tradition—it is Hindu theology, or Christian theology, or Muslim theology. As we saw in the case of analytic theology, analytic philosophy was not readily welcomed by theologians within religious studies departments due, I would contend, in large part to theology’s internalization of the historicizing of its discipline. While theology accepted (some might say too meekly, others might say appropriately) the limitations of its own discourse—its regional specificity, and historical contextualization—philosophy remained more ambitious in scope, ever attempting a universal theory or understanding. Thus, the perennial concern that philosophy of religion harbors a hidden theological agenda needs to be probed with greater precision.

**Academic Theology and Religious Studies**

Returning to Falque’s depiction of the possibilities of encounter between philosophy and theology, he begins his book with a remark that the “relationship between philosophy and theology in France has recently shifted”. In France, policies of laïcité, which forced theology out
of the public university setting, are being challenged, and “locked doors have already given way”.\textsuperscript{65} What I am suggesting is that, in the American context, we might observe a self-imposed laïcité within, at least, academic theology. To explore this question, I will consider two centers of theological training in the US, the University of Chicago Divinity School and Harvard Divinity School. These institutions are interesting to consider not only because of their place of influence in the field of philosophy of religion,\textsuperscript{66} but more specifically, because both operate on a model which would seem, at first glance to have interesting parallels to Falque’s vision of the crossing of disciplines: they are institutions in which students can train for either ordination or for academia, and are centers of research in which the philosophy of religion, religious studies, and theology meet.

At both of the divinity schools at Harvard and Chicago one can pursue a terminal graduate degree in theology either for the purposes of ordination or ministry (an MDiv), or for preparation of academic research and teaching (PhD). Both degrees are pursued in the same set of buildings with the same faculty teaching and advising in the programs. This dual identity distinguishes these institutions from others, like Yale and Princeton, both of which institutionally separate theological training from the academic study of religion—they are geographically located in different schools or departments, with separate faculty teaching and advising the programs.

\textsuperscript{65} Falque, 16.
\textsuperscript{66} Of the figures which Onishi identified as leading thinkers in philosophy of religion, most either received their PhDs from, and/or remain members of the faculty teaching in, one of these two institutions. Significantly, Ryan Coyne, Tyler Roberts, and Thomas Carlson all have PhDs in Theology, Jeffrey Kossky and Sarah Hammerslag have PhDs in Philosophy of Religion, whereas Amy Hollywood graduated from one institution (Chicago), and is a member of the faculty in the other (Harvard) teaching in the following fields: History of Christianity, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology. At the very least this would seem to confirm a blurring of the lines between philosophy of religion and theology.
The study of theology in these institutions is also distinguished from the study of theology in either a Catholic seminary or Protestant seminary, both of which can assume a uniformity of religious identity and confession that is not possible in a more diverse or pluralistic setting such as Chicago or Harvard. Depending on the order of the Catholic seminary, philosophy may play a smaller or larger role in the curriculum; whereas in most Protestant seminaries, philosophy will be emphasized less than cognate disciplines such as biblical studies in theological formation. A third possible setting in which we can consider the relationship between theology and philosophy would be larger Catholic universities such as Villanova, Fordham, Boston College, or Notre Dame, which have both strong theology and philosophy departments. These institutions might be more sympathetic towards the kind of relationship between disciplines that Falque advocates for two reasons: on the one hand, these large Catholic universities historically have been more favorably disposed to the continental tradition within their philosophy departments, and on the other hand, their overarching Catholic identity welcomes the contributions of the theology departments in a way that goes absolutely against the trend in public universities and private, non-sectarian universities which have increasingly forbidden anything that smells suspiciously theological. However, these Catholic institutions are also, unsurprisingly, less interested in the theological (or philosophical) study of religions outside of Christianity.

Again, on this point, Chicago and Harvard seem to occupy a unique and significantly different position as non-sectarian research institutions that continue to hold a place for the study of theology. However, I would argue that this has been accomplished only through a shift in the understanding of how theology is done. On its website describing the PhD programs of study, the

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67 The University of Notre Dame is the exception here; however, one might argue that in its marriage of analytic philosophy and theology in the formation of “analytic theology” it follows the same pattern as Falque promotes.
University of Chicago Divinity School structures the possible trajectories of study into three committees and eleven areas of study. We are concerned here with the committee on the “constructive studies in religion” which includes the three areas of Philosophy of Religion, Religious Ethics, and Theology. Within this structure, theology is defined as a “concern with the historical study of the self-understanding of a religious tradition and with the interpretation of its meaning and truth for the contemporary world”. Note the framework of the area is necessarily historical, while there is no specification of which religious tradition can be studied theologically. Faculty teaching on this committee work in Chinese religions, Judaism, Tibetan and Indian Buddhism, as well as Christianity. The PhD at Harvard is jointly offered by Harvard Divinity School and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and is administered by the Committee on the Study of Religion (which is comprised of members of the faculty from both schools). There are many different areas of study into which one can apply to pursue a PhD including Theology, Philosophy of Religion, Religious Ethics, Islamic Studies, Religions of the Americas, Jewish Studies, African Religions, Buddhist Studies, Greco-Roman Religions, Religion, Gender and Culture, and so on. However, if one is applying to study Ethics, Religion and Society, Philosophy of Religion, Religion Gender and Culture, or Theology, the applicant must specify “the religious tradition(s) and/or approximate geographical range(s) or temporal period(s)” upon which the applicant intends to focus. In other words, here too, there is no assumption that one is studying Christianity when one studies theology, while at the same time, there is a recognition that one doesn’t study theology generally, but only within a specific tradition, region and historical period.

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68 The University of Chicago Divinity School, [https://divinity.uchicago.edu/constructive-studies-religion](https://divinity.uchicago.edu/constructive-studies-religion) (emphasis added).

69 Committee on the Study of Religion webpage, [https://studyofreligion.fas.harvard.edu/pages/research](https://studyofreligion.fas.harvard.edu/pages/research).
My doctoral advisor at Harvard Divinity School, Sarah Coakley, occasionally would voice a concern that the study of theology had become a study of “theologology”—that discourse on God had become, in other words, discourse on the discourse on God, a second-order study. If I understand Falque correctly, what Coakley meant by “theologology” is something akin to a process of what Falque calls “vulgarization”—the process of clearly identifying and communicating historical lines of influence and the transmission of evolving interpretations of theological (or philosophical) concepts, which is to be explicitly distinguished from the act of philosophical “thinking.” The point I am making here is that, again for better or worse, this portrait of the pursuit of academic theology is fairly accurate.

Academic theologians have as their object of study not “theos” directly but “discourse on theos”—a discourse which is, of course, a human phenomenon and always necessarily placed within its historical context. Moreover, the term “discourse” here is cast most broadly to capture, not merely doctrinal and creedal statements, but also liturgy, hagiography, hymns, poetry, art and architecture, ethical and legal precepts, mythological narratives, etc. Relatedly, one might delineate the characteristic of what makes academic theology academic thus: the primary audience of the academic theologian is the academy, and the academy is also the authoritative body determining what counts as evidence and legitimating the discourse as such. In other words, the academic theologian does not speak from, or to, a specific confessional body or institution. While the identity of the academic theologian may be confessionally specific, it also may not. In either case, however, the academic theologian is trained not to rely on a specific confessional identity as the foundational authority for his or her argument. Rather arguments are defended and adjudicated based on grounds that are held in common with other disciplines:

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Falque, 17.
historical responsibility or acuity and the overall persuasiveness of the theological argument—something which may be judged by a variety of criteria including the ethical and pragmatic implications of the argument, its internal logical coherence, or its use of evidence, etc.

In other words, the study of academic theology, at least as it is found in the two major centers of theological study in the US, proceeds very much “from below,” rather than dogmatically from above. If academic theology is dealing in actuality rather than possibility, as Falque determines, than it is merely the actuality of “theologology”—that is, the intellectual history of thinking about the divine, and the rich varieties of doctrine and practice that represent such thinking, found within a specific religious tradition. Theology is, to borrow Heidegger’s term, a “positive (ontic) science”—the disclosure of a given being, a \textit{positum}, which is objectified in its study.\footnote{This definition of theology is found in a lecture by Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology” which was originally given on March 9, 1927 and subsequently translated and published in \textit{Pathmarks: James G. Hart, John C. Maraldo, and Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology (1927)”} in \textit{Pathmarks}, edited and translated by William McNeil, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 39-62.} According to Heidegger, in the case of the science of Christian theology, its positum is faith, or “Christianness”.\footnote{Ibid., 52.}

Heidegger’s definition of theology is especially constructive to consider in relation to his understanding of philosophy. Philosophy is differentiated from theology and other positive sciences by its ontological, rather than ontic, status: philosophy doesn’t study a concrete being (like the historically specific traditions of Christian faith); it studies Being generally. As such, according to Heidegger, philosophy trumps theology because one can always go beyond a historically specific ontic concept such as Christian “sin” to the more primordial ontological concept of “guilt”.\footnote{Ibid., 58.} Embracing this distinction, and in the context of the historical bent of
religious studies, here theology seems to be more historically responsive than philosophy. Let me restate the problem of the philosophy of religion to see whether any clarity has been gained.

Religious studies, which historically was born out of departments of theology, has for the most part banished its parent: theology has been pushed out of most departments of religion. Up until fairly recently philosophy of religion still held a prominent place within religious studies. However, as Lewis demonstrated, with the material turn to “lived religion” in the 1990s, and the concurrent radical and thorough historicization of the field which problematized any natural, universal, or ahistoric notion of religion, philosophy of religion also increasingly came under suspicion as a subfield which was seen to be sneaking theology in by the back door.

Precisely what is entailed within this suspicion, however? In this context what does the term “theological” reference specifically?

I would argue that there are three things that people mean when they qualify discourse as “theological,” and as such, suspicious within academic settings: 1) it makes claims about how things ought to be, i.e., it is normative; 2) it makes claims about the truth in a singular or universal way; 3) it is confessional—which means not only that it speaks from and to a particular tradition, but also that it claims that this tradition grants sufficient authority to proclaim dogmatically certain truths as true. However, as we’ve seen in the defenses of philosophy of religion that eschew any connection to theology, the first two of these can be said of philosophy of religion as well. The ability to make and evaluate normative judgments is explicitly defended (especially by Lewis) as an inevitable telos of the field and not dissimilar to the kinds of judgment that occur in philosophy departments, or political science, or environmental science.

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74 This can be seen in the cases of other prestigious centers of philosophy of religion within Religious Studies such as UC Santa Barbara, Columbia, and Brown (where Thomas Carlson, Mark C. Taylor, and Thomas Lewis respectively teach).
The second meaning of theological lurks more opaquely in the background, but can be uncovered, nonetheless; philosophy of religion inevitably tends towards singular, universal accounts of reality, in part because there are no geographical, temporal, or tradition-based boundaries to distinguish the scope of philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion, as sophisticated and attuned to the problems of history and hermeneutics as it is in the hands of Lewis, Knepper, and Schilbrick, still strains at least implicitly towards the universal. This ambition is most explicit in Knepper, but haunts all philosophical projects whose horizon is defined ambitiously as the human, or the secular world, or Being. Ironically, according to this measure, philosophy is more “theological” than theology.

The third concern about theology is that it is always confessional—i.e., taught and studied by practitioners for whom that confessional identity is a source of authority for what they teach, study, or write about. There are many sub-fields within theology. Traditionally, introductory textbooks on theology would distinguish between historical theology, systematic theology (and the distinct, but overlapping) philosophical theology, biblical theology, dogmatic theology, and pastoral theology.75 Given my established criteria for academic theology—that it is second-order discourse which speaks to and from the academy (as opposed to a religious community), I would argue that in descending order of likelihood all of these could qualify as academic theology which the exception of pastoral theology which, by definition, must be addressing a faithful community primarily.

The criterion for academic theology is not whether the thinker is a believer or non-believer, insider or outsider, caretaker or critic; academic theology does not require either

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75 More recently, one sees the emergence of the terms like constructive theology, apophatic theology, liturgical, and political theology, not to mention, post-colonial, feminist, womanist, latinx, and queer liberation theologies—all of which likewise could be pursued as academic theologies.
supernaturalist or naturalist explanations. All variations of these possibilities exist. Rather, the
criterion is who is authorizing the discourse, and in so doing, established the rules of procedure
(eluded to by Lewis in his requirement that all inquiries into religious phenomena—whether
philosophical or theological—remain open to debate and reasoned argument). Is it the academy
or a religious community? Theology is academic when its audience and authorizing body is
the academy. Thus, “confessional” is less accurate to define academic theology than
acknowledging that it is always regionally and historically specific, and this specificity,
moreover, may turn out to be a boon.

It was perhaps an overstatement to claim that theology can save philosophy of religion,
yet it may remain the case that the champions of philosophy of religion are not helping
themselves by the continued rebuttal of problematic theological overtones. Those theological
overlaps are there—in some ways that philosophy of religion itself wants to embrace (eg.
normativity), whereas its specificity (the fact that theology is always Jewish, or Christian, or
Hindu) paradoxically prevents theology from making universal claims in the way that philosophy
of religion remains somewhat seduced by. A more explicit understanding of the claims to
authority of academic theology might make it a support for philosophy of religion, not in the way
that the philosophers (either analytic or continental) envisioned it, however, by providing the
truth “from above”. Rather, far more humbly by proceeding not only from below, but from a
regionally limited and historically specific domain—a specific historical instantiation of a
religious tradition. In this way, academic theology might complement philosophy of religion by

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76 This is not a new distinction that I am drawing. Interestingly Crisp himself cites a similar distinction being made
by no less evangelical a theologian than Alistair McGrath. McGrath defines “doctrine” as the work of a particular
community, the Church, and “theology” has something that individuals may engage in “with no commitment to a
particular ecclesiastical body”. Crisp, 34, footnote 7.
providing the kind of thick descriptions Knepper envisions as the first stage of philosophy of religion, but also by reminding the latter of the limits of its reach.