宋榮子之『定乎内外之分』是任何一物能不能與自身重合的必要先決條件。任何一物無論能夠或不能夠作為自身，是否與自身重合的兩種可能性，取決於指定自身與他物之間的界限。能夠指出「此 / 是」之時，必有相對於「此」的一個「彼」。能夠指出其內容之時，必有其包容在內（是）與其排斥在外（非）之間的對比差異。但這個分裂特有模稜性：

『其分也，成也；其成也，毁也；凡物無成與毀，復通為一。』

When, in the Equalizing Assessments of Things chapter of the Zhuangzi, Song Rongzi makes a sharp and fixed division between the inner and the outer, this same division is the necessary prerequisite condition for anything whatsoever to either coincide or else fail to coincide with itself. For anything whatsoever—whether it can or can't manage to be itself—the very possibility of either coinciding or else failing to coincide with itself hangs on this act which raises the line of demarcation between the 'given anything' in question and a 'something other than it'. The capacity to point out the internal content of 'this one here' requires that we exclude from it a 'that one there', between the two of which there must obtain a minimal contrastive difference. And yet this act of division, Zhuangzi tells us in the same chapter, displays a powerful ambivalence:

【The divisions of things are formations, their formations are destructions. Thus all things are also free of formation and destruction, for these also open into one another, connecting to form a oneness.】

當設置其內與外之間的壁壘之後即為「分」，此物形成其獨特形狀便是「成」。雖然此物朝暮與他物 "[在]重重依待關係中相刃相靡"，但如此僅能盡量防止外來之物透過分隔內外的保護膜而滲透入內。如同一個有機囊泡，必須肢解自己，透過犧牲自身的一個器官（毀），來過濾外來刺激的洪流不斷湧入。這個囊泡必須將犧牲的器官塑造成一層保護膜，形成其內外之間的邊界，如此能夠防止過多刺激湧入。其分，其成，其毀便合而為一。
The moment we raise the line of demarcation between what’s inside and what’s outside of the given anything—just this is its 「division.」On the one hand, when the determinate contours of the ‘anything’ in question takes on its singular shape, this is said to be its 「formation.」So long as the ‘anything’ in question, as Professor Lai Xisan puts it, interminably “chafes up against [what’s other than it] within a myriad profusion of relational vectors”—like this, all it can do is exhaust itself inhibiting the penetration into the interior realm of incoming intensities across the protective film which it must interpose between the inside and the outside. Let us imagine an organic vesicle-sack that must dismember itself—that must sacrifice one of its own organs to filter the unremitting torrential incursion from the outside. Just so, the vesicle-sack’s formation is not separate from, but rather hangs on this 「destruction.」To secure its integrity, it must fashion from the self-severed organ a protective film for itself, raising the border between its inside and its outside. Only like this is it able to repulse the excessive influx of excitations. In this way, its division, formation, and destruction are spliced together into a singular ligature.

Let us suppose that a border is just such an organ deployed to intercede on our behalf with the outside—but then does it belong ultimately to the inside or the outside? Let’s entertain each possibility in turn. First facing inward, the border is something like a criminal which must be expelled from the kingdom, from the realm of internality—before it can take up its watch at the edge. But then surely it must renounce its status as belonging to the interior! And thus it cannot be spoken of as (truly) belonging to the interior. But at the same time, the realm of internality must, in order to fortify its consistency, hang on, entwine itself around—

2 Brassier, Ray. *Nihil Unbound*. Basingstoke/NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2007). “Individuated organic life is won at the cost of this aboriginal death whereby the organism first becomes capable of separating itself from the inorganic outside. This death, which gives birth to organic individuation, thereby conditions the possibility of organic phylogenesis, as well as of sexual reproduction. Consequently, not only does this death precede the organism, it is the precondition for the organism’s ability to reproduce and die.”

3 任博克:《齊物論》學術研討會——第二屆兩岸《莊子》哲學工作坊——化聲之相待若其不相待:以“是非之相待即其不相待”概念為中心的齊——第223頁

4 換一句話說：「此」無法把自己和那個把自己與外界分隔的事物(即邊界)分開。
the border. Professor Ziporyn says, “the negation of [any given thing] belongs internally to, is encompassed within—its nature.” Owing to this dependence on the border (this organ dissevered from itself), the ‘given anything’ is strictly identical to its own negation. It had been originally resolved in this self-severance of the border from itself to pull itself back and apart from the outside; but we see that the outcome runs strictly counter to its resolve. This ‘given anything’ is strictly powerless to separate itself off from the apparatus on account of which it can pretend to be separated off from, over and against—its outside. Thus the border not only doesn’t belong to the interior; and it also doesn’t not belong to the interior.

the border cannot be said straightforwardly just not to belong to the interior.

那麼，向外看的話，邊界是否與外界無縫融合？若果如此，邊界僅是進入廣闊外界的出發點。但我們是否剛說過邊界是內界自身割下的附肢？倘若邊界的主要作用在於過濾外來刺激，又豈能同時與外界無縫融合呢？倘若邊界在與外界接觸之前先結束，那麼邊界與外界之間又有另一個邊界嗎？此一「邊之又邊界」也是在與外界接觸之前先結束嗎？顯而易明地，邊界既不能說是屬於外，也不能說其非屬於外。

Turning then to face outwards, let us ask whether the border is perhaps just seamless with the exterior realm. For if indeed it is just perfectly seamless with it, then the border is but the jumping off point for entry into the boundless beyond. ...But had we not just spoken of the border as wrought from the interior realm’s self-severed appendage? Suppose we grant that the border’s principal function is indeed to filter out incoming stimuli from the exterior—but in that case how could it, at the very same time, just merge seamlessly with the exterior realm?! Supposing then that the border somehow comes to an end prior to coming into contact with the exterior realm, in that case, are we not forced to interpose a second-order border between the first border and the exterior realm? But once again then, does this second-order ‘edge beyond the edge’ itself come to an end before coming into contact with the exterior realm (and so on and so forth)? As is thus clear as daylight, the border not only cannot be spoken of as belonging straightforwardly to the exterior—it also cannot be spoken of just as straightforwardly not belonging to, making contact with—the exterior realm.

『故分也者，有不分也。』《齊物論》

邊界這個器官的屬性十分模糊兩可。邊界縱使追蹤了每一道分隔線，本身也還是不可分割的。5. 或換句話說，邊界所執行的分割本身愈分隔便愈未分隔；其為分隔與其為未分隔之間不可分割。但其為未分隔不在於其為分隔之外。那其究竟何在？邊界要落實其原本的作用，必須避免與之而分開的彼此領域陷入糾纏。但果然如此，邊界與彼此無關，豈能建立彼此之間的關係？邊界根本不可能。

5 此點令人聯想到道德經第28章：『樸散則為器，聖人用之，則為官長，故大制不割』。
Whenever a division is made, something is left undivided. (The Equalizing Assessments of Things)

The border—this organ—displays a powerful ambivalence. Even as it traces out the grooves of every single determinate line of demarcation, it in itself is seamless and indissoluble. Or in other words, the more divided the division carried out by and along the border, the more it goes undivided—the more it has never yet so much as begun to be divided. Its division and its undividedness are thus themselves in turn indivisible. But this isn’t to say that the border’s un-dividedness dwells in repose somewhere outside the division it carries out. Wherein then does it reside? If the border is indeed to conduct its originally imagined function, it must itself ever avoid becoming ensnared in entanglements with both the interior and exterior realms which are purportedly rent asunder from one another, each constituted in turn through its function. But if indeed the border has just straightforwardly nothing to do with these interior and exterior realms, how then could it be the very same thing that determines their constitutive relation to one another? The border is, borders are—fundamentally impossible.

既不可得也不可捨，邊界本身不分裂於其無與有之間。在此一論點中，邊界既不可有也不可無的邏輯，與郭象的造物者的邏輯如出一轍7：邊界究竟有耶無耶？若無耶，則其豈能將彼此分裂？若有，則其非邊界，而僅是彼此之外的另一物耳！那麼，果有邊界乎？果無邊界乎？雖然在我們周圍，無物不透露出該分裂的痕跡，但與此同時，本來無一物8。邊界既無所不在，也始終未曾出現。邊界的弔詭『如求得其情與不得，無益損乎其真。』無論是始終無物在於邊界範圍之外，還是連一個邊界都始終未曾出現，皆完全無損於邊界之弔詭真實性。

Both altogether unobtainable and yet nevertheless unavoidable, the border is in itself undivided between its existence and its non-existence. On this point, the logic of the border’s incapacity either to exist or to non-exist converges with the logic of Guo Xiang’s argument concerning the Creator in his comment to the conversation between the shadow and its own shadow, the penumbra, at the end of the the Equalizing Assessments of Things9: Does the border, when all is said and done, exist? Or doesn’t it exist? If it doesn’t exist, then how could it possibly be qualified to carry out the division between interior and exterior realms? If it does exist, then it couldn’t possibly be the thing you had imagined the border to be, but must rather merely be some other measly bounded thing just like the interior and exterior realms it purports to bind! Well then, are there borders? Or are there no borders? Although surrounding us in every direction, not a

6 This point sounds an echo of Laozi's Daodejing, Chapter 28: “It is when the unhewn is shattered that it is made into vessels, into valued tools. When a sage uses them, he becomes chief of all these various functionaries—for his is the great cutting that does not sever.”

7 郭慶藩, et al. 莊子集釋. 卷42. 商周出版, 2018. 第89頁，第4注

8 照此邏輯，莊子的所謂「古之人」的『有以為未始有物者，至矣!盡矣!不可以加矣!』並不意味著既然無物，便無邊界。

『不知周之夢為胡蝶與，胡蝶之夢為周與？周與胡蝶，則必有分矣。』正是因為邊界的永已崩塌而始終無物。

9 “As for this Creator, is he existent or is he non-existent? If he is nonexistent, how can he create beings? If he is existent, having a definite form himself, then he is not qualified to form all the various forms.”
single thing fails to betray the traces of this division—at the very same time, there isn’t so much as a single thing with an unproblematic border.\textsuperscript{10} Not only is there nowhere that there aren’t borders—but also from beginning to end, a proper border hasn’t ever yet even begun to materialize. The paradox of the border is such that, as we’re told in \textit{the Equalizing Assessments of Things}, its \textit{actuality would have to be of some kind that is the same whether any definite reality could ever be found for it or not.} \textsuperscript{11}

Regardless of whether, from beginning to end, not even a single thing goes un-bordered, or whether not even a single proper border ever even so much as begins to materialize, both of these imagined outcomes would have absolutely no impact on the paradoxical corporeality of the border.

只要發揮出這個尚未有之卻又尚未無之的邊界的模糊兩可性，絕對是在任何兩表面之間的關口，便能夠劈開其雙方通路。

『是亦彼也，彼亦是也。彼亦一是非，此亦一是非。果且有彼是乎哉？果且無彼是乎哉？...』

邊界都永已納入於其所分立的兩個表面上，而將之折疊成單個彎曲表面。因而「此」之內本身包含著「彼此」的差異；「彼」本身包含著「彼此」的差異。但在「彼此」外在差異中，彼與此這兩者都帶有相互參照的內在差異。外在差異與內在差異之間是相互交通的。是以這個內外通行的差異將任何一物與其周圍的其他物分隔開來。但與此同時，這個內外通行的差異也永已撕裂了該物的一致性。「此」之內劈開出是非之間的一個差異；「彼」之內也劈開出與「此」的那個「是非」差異相異的另一個「是非」差異。換一句話說，「彼」與「此」都僅能將自己建立於其另一端的否定基礎上。也能說，其「分」既是其「成」又是其「毀」。

We must only bring out the full ambivalence of this border that has never yet begun either to exist or to inexist, for it is at the juncture of absolutely any and every two surfaces, that we are able to open into its bidirectional thoroughfare. \textit{The Equalizing Assessments of Things} tells us that

\textsuperscript{10} On this logic, what it would mean to say, as Zhuangzi says of his “ancient people” in \textit{the Equalizing Assessment of Things}, that “there had never begun to exist thing at all. This is really getting there, as far as you can go. When no definite thing exists, nothing more can be added!” does not imply that because there have not begun to exist any things, there are \textit{ipso facto} no borders. When Zhuangzi says, in the famous butterfly dream passage at the end of \textit{the Equalizing Assessment of Things}, that he “did not know whether he was Zhuangzi dreaming he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuangzi, for surely there must nevertheless be a \textit{division} between them”—I take it that precisely because the structure of the border has always-already collapsed, thus there has “never yet begun to exist anything at all.”

\textsuperscript{11} changed from Ziporyn’s ‘genuineness’ to ‘actuality’ for 真
【 to be a ‘this’ is in fact also to be a ‘that,’ and every ‘that’ is also a ‘this.’ ‘THAT’ is then itself already both ‘this’ and not-this. But ‘THIS’ is also itself already both ‘this’ and not-this. So is there really any ‘this’ as opposed to ‘not-this’? Or is there really no ‘this’ as opposed to ‘not-this? 】

Every border is always-already included within each of the two surfaces it purports to divide, enfolding them therein onto a singular curved surface. Thus ‘this one here’ in itself comprehends the difference between itself and ‘that one there’. And ‘that one there’ in itself comprehends the difference between itself and ‘this one here’. So the external difference between ‘this one here’ and ‘that one over there’ is subtended by an internal difference within each by which, just in being itself, it is cross-referenced to the other from the inside. And these two differences, external and internal, are themselves engaged in intercourse with one another. In just this way, the pure difference which makes thoroughfare back and forth between the external and internal differences—on the one hand separates ‘any given thing’ off from all the other things that form its perimeter. But at the very same time, this thoroughfare difference between inside and out has always-already lacerated the consistency of this ‘given anything’ from within. ‘This thing here’ opens up within itself to a difference between what it affirms as itself and what it negates as its other. And ‘that thing there’ opens up within itself to the antithetical difference, cross-referenced with the first, between what it affirms as itself and negates as its other. In other words, each of both ‘this one here’ and ‘that one there’ cannot establish itself but on the foundation of its negation of the other. Their division is equally their formation and their destruction.

關於此一論點，賴教授說: "雖然立場「相異」卻又「相即」不離。" 任教授卻說，恰恰相反: "這樣則又不能說彼此互外而相對相反，又不能說互內而彼此同一。" 但其含義圍繞著同一的弔詭樞紐而匯合。只要這個模糊兩可的邊界已全然滲入其所分立的兩表面（立場），這兩個表面便同時相異又相即，且非相異又非相即。
both jointly different, jointly identical—and at once no different and without any particular identity whatsoever.

In the same vein, Zhuangzi tells us,【a state where 'this' and 'not-this' are no longer coupled as opposites—this is called the Course as axis, the axis of all courses.】'This one here' and 'that one there' do not somehow pre-exist the event of their mediation. It isn’t that we’ve first got the two of them, the one and the other each enjoying its respective independent existence, and that only after this do they intersect—forming a pair of diametric opposites. The place of their intersection, the impossible structure of the interface between 'this one here' and 'that one there', the locus of their mutual infringement upon each other—this always-already exists in and through its non-existence, in-exists in and through its existence. Each of the two of 'this one here' and 'that one there' has always-already transcended itself, outstretched into their common blind spot that is the border they share. When, Zhuangzi tells us,【this axis finds its place in their center】the border which divides 'this one here' from 'that one there' becomes their most intimate bond, the terrain of their mutual cross-entanglement. But this interface isn’t limited to conducting passage only in a single direction. The infinite power of any and every border draws from its simultaneous conduction of two prima facie antithetical functions—separation and linkage of absolutely any two surfaces in question. The border between these two surfaces, 'this one here' and 'that one there' both designates their partition and, at the very same time, weds them inseparably together.

『是以聖人和之以是非而休乎天鈞，是之謂兩行』。《齊物論》

「休乎天鈞」中的那個聖人將分離的倆表面「彼此」雙向進行越境交通。這個走「兩行」者能夠從這個內外通行的差異留下的痕跡中，看得出自己無我的映像，即「吾

15 這個「倆」詞又是 "兩" 卻又是 "一個"。
The sage who Zhuangzi tells us manages to come to【rest in the middle of Heaven the Potter's Wheel】carries out bi-directional transport back and forth between any two surfaces ‘this one here’ and ‘that one there’. Thus the one who【Walks Two Roads】is able to read their own selfless simulacrum refracted back from the traces left behind by the coursings of the thoroughfare difference between inside and out. Just this is, I wager, what Zhuangzi means when he tells us, at the beginning of the Equalizing Assessments of Things, that【I have lost me.】In view of just this, to conduct what Zhuangzi calls the【Radiance of Drift and Doubt】brings about, in a single blow, the divergence and convergence of divergent tracks. So we do not stand in any such position as to have to correct for the divergence of divergent tracks! We call it a border precisely for the reason that the course carried out in the radiance of drift and doubt converges all around this very self-contradictory surplus-object circulating through divergent tracks. 

Any 「彼此」之間的邊界不可得，況位於不同邊界間之邊界啊！邊界不僅不分裂於其無與有之間，又不分裂於其分裂與不分裂，也不分裂於其一與多之間。無論是國與國之際，還是影子與罔兩之間的那一道分隔線，任何邊界（以及該邊界所包圍的領域）最終皆將在所有邊界接踵而來的崩塌與再生中融為一體「生死存亡之一體」。

And if between any given two surfaces ‘this one here’ and ‘that one there’, the border is unobtainable—how much the less attained will the border be between one border and the next! The border not only isn’t split between its existence and in-existence, between its being itself divided and un-divided, it also isn’t split between its singularity and multiplicity. From international borders all the way down to the the faintest line of demarcation between the shadow and this shadow’s own shadow, the penumbra—any and every border

16 『和之以天倪，因之以曼衍』。

17 changed from 'rights and 'wrongs' to 'affirmations' and 'negations for是非, which can be read in both of these interconnected ways.

18 I have in mind here another passage from the Equalizing Assessment of Things: “Harmonize with them all by means of their Heavenly Transitions, following along with them in their limitless overflows.”
 whatsoever (along with any and all of the territory it hems in) all vanishes into the collapse and regeneration of all borders—just this is what Zhuangzi calls, in the Great Source as Teacher chapter, 【the single substance in which life and death both stir one another into life and liquidate one another in turn.】

這個弔詭邊界器官僅是藉著透露出此（絕對是任何一）物內在自我分裂而出現，因此不能將之理解為能夠補充或縫合裂縫的另一物。那麼，就因此該不該去追求脫離關係性的糾纏，將所有邊界渣滓抹殺了，而進入毫無邊界的一個所謂逍遙境? 賴教授問: "「關係性」到底是導至痛苦的羅網桎梏? 還是逍遙的翼下之風?" 20 說的也是，這個不可躲避的分裂所導致的痛苦確實是解脫不了的  21。我們僅能泯然玄同於使我們遭受無限痛苦的同樣裂縫，並從中得到治癒 22。

Because this paradoxical organ—the border—emerges only as the internal division which opens up at the seam of any given thing, it cannot therein be understood to be any some such other thing as would be able to restore what was lost, suture this wound. Then ought we go off in search of deliverance from the entanglements of relationality, efface the leftover dregs of the border, and enter into that borderless terrain of some so-called “Wandering Far and Unfettered.” 23 Professor Lai Xisan asks, “Is it not precisely relationality that generates all the webs and fetters of suffering? Or is relationality itself the very wind beneath the wings of our Far and Unfettered Wanderings?” This is just it—the inescapable torment which division inflicts upon us is absolutely un-shakeable. We can only just vanishingly merge into the very same fracture by which we are at once subjected and subject ourselves to infinite torments—and heal ourselves from its midst. 24

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19 This is my own translation, modified slightly to my purposes here. Compare with the Ziporyn: “the single body formed by life and death, existence and non-existence”

20 賴錫三：〈齊物論〉的天籟、喪我、天鈞、兩行之疏解——上遊「天籟物化之無窮」與下遊「是非物論之無窮」——第16頁

21 大宗師：『此古之所謂縣解也，而不能自解者，物有結之。』

22 這個表述參考了瓦格納歌劇的最後一幕《帕西發爾》：“傷口只能通過其擊打的矛才能治癒 (Die Wunde schliesst der Speer nur der Sie schlug) ”。

23 The title of the first chapter of the Zhuangzi, Wandering Far and Unfettered 《逍遙遊》

24 Here I make reference to a line from Wagner, Parsifal: “The wound can be healed only by the spear that smote it.”