Dear workshop participants,

Thank you for taking the time to read this incomplete draft of a dissertation chapter draft. I happened on this chapter while trying to wrap up a chapter on developments of the mine and town, and starting another chapter on race in the town. I found myself with unsure of what to do with materials I had cut out from both and decided to see if these materials could yield an actual chapter. Since I had not planned on this chapter, I am stumbling my way through an argument. My stumbles are reflected in the state of this draft and the clunky sentences. I am most grateful for your patience, and welcome any feedback and suggestions on how to improve the argument.

Best,

Limin

Politics and Local Society in Fushun, 1900-1945

Historically, company towns arose due to a company’s investments in manufacturing or natural resource extraction, and existed solely to sustain the company’s employees. With little distinction between the town’s population and the company’s employees, the politics of the workplace often became the politics of the community. In other words, the dominant political issues in company towns tended to stem from workplace conflicts over issues such as wages, working conditions and duration of the working day. This pattern extends to mining towns too.¹

Fushun, especially before 1932, does not seem to follow this historical pattern. The politics of community in pre-1932 Fushun seldom intersected with the politics of the workplace. The recurring issue in pre-1932 Fushun was conflict between the SMR and Chinese elites as the latter sought to preserve its realm of influence and power in the face of economic changes engendered by SMR development of mines and related industries. Especially in the early phase of this conflict, local elites sought to use the Chinese state as a defensive mechanism. After 1932, open resistance from local elites no longer appears in historical documents. Part of this development resulted from fear of violent repression, which the Japanese exercised in Pingdingshan. Another contributing factor was the co-optation of these local elites. Fushun county magistrate, like many others in Manchuria, served both the Nationalist and the Manchukuo governments. Later government documents indicate a fair number of locals who joined the Manchukuo government.

Population and Society

Obtaining information about Fushun before 1900 is challenging. The dearth of archival materials reflects less the efforts to preserve these documents and more the insignificance of Fushun in the eyes of the Qing state. Put differently, Fushun before 1900 was simply not important enough for the Qing state to compile official records on it, be they edicts, memorials or reports. The 1911 gazetteer unintentionally reinforces this point in its account of Fushun’s past. The gazetteer’s narrative suggests that, between the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in 1644 and the start of coal mining in 1900, Fushun was mentioned in the Qing historical records only twice. The first reference pertaining to Fushun’s inclusion in Xingren County and the second concerned the construction of

Fushuncheng the walled city in 1781. One outcome of this insignificant status was the absence of a strong state presence in the area of Fushun.

Fushun before 1900 lacked not only a strong state presence, but also a vibrant local society. Local gazetteers are useful indicators of the cohesion, wealth and even density of elites in local Qing society, since the writing and editing and distribution of local gazetteers required the intellectual work of local scholars and officials. Given that Fushun acquired its first local gazetteer only in 1911, it can be said that local society in Fushun before 1900 lacked the density of population and concentration of elites to support production of a local gazetteer.

That Fushun was located within the Willow Palisades also contributed to a less vibrant local society. The Kangxi emperor, in hopes of preserving Manchuria as the Manchus’ ancestral homeland, banned Han Chinese migration to Manchuria in 1689. To enforce this ban, a physical barrier of willow trees demarcating the border between Manchuria and China was planted. Although this ban did not completely halt Han Chinese migration to Manchuria, it worked well enough to maintain Manchuria’s separateness from the rest of Qing China in its regimented social relations and low population density. Because the majority of land in Manchuria belonged to absent bannermen who were prohibited from selling their lands, local society was an extension of the banner hierarchy, which was strictly controlled. ROUGH PORTRAIT OF LOCAL SOCIETY

The twin bans on migration and sale of land discouraged migration and thereby kept population growth at a relatively low rate. However, when Russia began to expand into Eastern Siberia and toward Manchuria in the nineteenth century, the Qing state sought to counter the Russian threat by gradually lifting the migration ban in the late nineteenth century. With the migration ban lifted, migrants from neighboring Hebei, Zhili and Shandong provinces flooded into Manchuria, heralding the advent of one of the largest human migrations in modern history. Population of Manchuria grew from 422,000 in 1724 to 2,491,438 in 1820, though it leapt to 5,736,000 in 1897 when migration controls were eased. In the twentieth century, the population in Manchuria leapedfrogged from 6.9 million in 1898 to 38.4 million in 1940.

The population of Fushun experienced similar growth. Reported in the 1911 gazetteer, there were 23,907 households, consisting of 165,699 persons, in Fushun County. In 1933, there were 37,082 households and 225,744 persons. In 1937, the number of households increased to 46,314 and the population to 270,253. The population of mining concession territory grew from 23,957 in 1916, to 58,297 in 1926, to 100,752 in

3 Christopher Isett, State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 35.
4 Ibid., 43-74.
5 Diane Lary and Thomas Gottschang, Swallows and Settlers, XY.
6 Isett, 309.
8 Fushun xian zhi lue (1911).
9 Fushun xian shi yilan (1933).
10 Fushun xian yiban zhuangkuang (1937).
1936 and to 103,588 in 1937.\textsuperscript{11} The population statistics for Fushun County and the mining concession territory were kept separately simply because both lands belonged to two separate political entities. Since the mining concession territory was leased to the SMR, it did not fall within the dominion of the Fushun County government and therefore its population statistics were kept only by the SMR. This arrangement continued even during the Manchukuo period.

The expansion of coalmining is the primary factor that contributed to Fushun's population explosion. The bulk of coalmining depended on manual labor that Chinese migrant workers offered. Although the extensive modernization of coal extraction and conveyance processes were successful reducing the SMR's dependence on manual labor, the scale of Fushun's mining operations was such that the SMR still had to hire large numbers of Chinese migrant workers. Between 1907 and 1911, the number of Chinese workers that the SMR hired increased almost two-fold annually. Starting with 395 Chinese workers in 1907, the figure jumped to 1449 in 1908. It then increased to 2153 in 1909, leapt to 5681 in 1910 and reached 10,572 in 1911. From 1912 onwards, the number of Chinese workers working in Fushun Colliery never fell below 12,000. Even when the Manchurian Incident put a halt to migration into Manchuria, the SMR had 23,626 and 24,956 Chinese workers working in Fushun Colliery in 1931 and 1932 respectively. The number of Chinese workers working in Fushun Colliery peaked at 66,758 in 1941, most likely due to the mobilization demanded of war economy, which is discussed in the later chapter on productivity.\textsuperscript{12} The overwhelming majority of Chinese workers hired were migrant workers from other parts of Liaoning Province and neighboring provinces such as Shandong, Zhili and Hebei.

The influx of migrant workers dramatically altered social relations. CONTINUE

\textbf{Coalmining and the SMR}

Coalmining drew an unprecedented number of migrant workers and small business owners, from neighboring provinces and other parts of Liaoning, in search of mining jobs or opportunities for setting up businesses that catered to the growing number of miners. As much as these newly arrived migrants upset the political peace and social cohesion, these newcomers proved less disruptive than the foreigners who also came for Fushun coal. By 1904, these foreigners came to dominate Fushun coalfields and even encroached on Chinese sovereignty over the area.

In 1901, the Qing state lifted its longstanding ban on mining Fushun coal and permitted Wang Chengyao 王承廈, and Weng Shou 翁壽 to mine the coalfields in Fushun. Wang had raised 160,000 \textit{liang} to form Huaxing Company 華興公司, which operated the colliery in the vicinity of Qianjinzhai Village.\textsuperscript{13} Weng had formed Fushun Coal Company 撫順煤炭公司 with 100,000 \textit{liang} in order to operate a colliery in the vicinity of Yangbaibu Village. Despite the significant amounts of capital raised, both companies soon encountered financial problems. In order to continue operation, ownership stakes in both companies

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\textsuperscript{11} Minami mantetsudō kabushiki kaisha jūnen shi, 725; Minami mantetsudō kabushiki kaisha daini jūnen shi, 1081; Minami mantetsudō kabushiki kaisha daisan jūnen shi, 2092; Fushun xian yiban zhuangkuang (1937).

\textsuperscript{12} Mantetsu, 1942 Bujun tankou toukei nenpo, 174.

\textsuperscript{13} 1911 Xuantong Fushun xian zhi and Fushun meikuang an.
were sold to Russian capitalists, who eventually brought about a merger of the two companies. Since both companies were under Russian ownership, the Russian Army took over the mines when the Russo-Japanese War erupted on 8 February 1904. The Russian Army also took over the railway spur line that linked the coalmines to Shenyang.14

During the Russo-Japanese War, coal made Fushun a prized possession that both sides fought to control.15 Although the Russians controlled Fushun coalfields at the start of the war, they quickly lost control in the face of Japanese military challenge. The Japanese Army launched an attack on 10 March 1905, and successfully defeated the Russian troops in one day. Once the Japanese Army captured Fushun, it immediately put its soldiers to work extracting coal. It appears that the Japanese Army continued operating the Fushun coalmine even after the war ended.16 In fact, Japanese troops remained in Fushun until August 1906. As indicated in the Treaty of Portsmouth under the protocols for troop withdrawal, Japanese troops were to be withdrawn to Fushun and to the area south of it by 1 August 1906.17 Reflecting its narrow interest in Fushun coalfields, the victorious Japanese army recorded only damage to the coalmines and mining equipment, not casualties in nearby villages and damage to civilian properties.18 These records, as the SMR reports, reveal that the coalmines required extensive repair as the fleeing Russian soldiers “destroyed buildings, machinery, and burnt the equipment for damming water and storage materials in the underground pits.”19

For most contemporary observers and present-day scholars of the Russo-Japanese War, the significance of this war lies in the unforeseen defeat of a European power by an Asian nation. Indeed, Japan’s victory reconfigured power relations in Northeast Asia, marking the decisive shift of the regional political center from China to Japan and Japan’s rise as a regional power. Because Japan’s victory was unexpected yet momentous, the lines of scholarly inquiry usually concern the Japanese Army’s strategies and campaigns, and the effect that war and its outcomes had on Japanese society and domestic politics. Remarkably few works take up the casualties and property damage visited on the Chinese civilian population.20 This negligence parallels, in some ways, Russian and Japanese attitudes toward Chinese territory and population, that the former was the object of desire over which both parties struggled and the latter was collateral damage of this struggle. Such grasping attitude and blatant disregard for Chinese sovereignty were further sanctioned by the Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded on 5 September 1905. This treaty required Russia transfer its railroad assets, mining and lumber concessions and territorial leases in China to Japan. Even though the Treaty did not entail secession of Chinese territory or surrender of Chinese sovereignty, it still used the framework of international law to permit the abrogation of Chinese sovereignty. Thus, while the Russo-Japanese War resulted in the victory of an Asian power, its settlement represents the continuation of the unequal treaties that began with the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing.

14 Mantetsu juunen shi, 467.
16 Mantetsu juunen shi, 467-468.
17 Treaties of Manchuria, Carnegie Mellon pamphlet, 77.
18 Mantetsu juunen shi, vol. 1.
19 Mantetsu juunen shi, 468.
20 This is based on my unscientific tally of titles listed in the University of Chicago Library’s collection.
At the core of these unequal treaties was the Qing state’s inability to defend its territorial integrity and, by extension, regulate imperialist powers’ activities on its soil. The Qing state’s inability to monitor imperialist powers’ activities is evident in the early years of SMR operation in Fushun. Article V of the Treaty of Portsmouth stipulated that both Russia and Japan “mutually engaged to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government” regarding the transfer of Russian assets in Manchuria to Japanese control. More than three months after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan reached an agreement with China to secure its right to operate Chinese Eastern Railway, though the agreement made no mention of Fushun Colliery. The agreement pertaining to the SMR’s right to operate Fushun Colliery was reached in 4 September 1909, four years after the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed and two years after the SMR officially arrived in Fushun. By the time of the 1909 agreement the SMR already actively operated the Fushun colliery, producing 133,325 tons in 1907 and 706,042 tons in 1909.

The 1909 agreement was yet another treaty formulated in the template of earlier unequal treaties. Not only did the terms of the 1909 agreement grant the SMR considerable freedom in its mining operation in Fushun, it also promised the SMR extensive support from the Chinese state in ensuring the success of its mining operation. The Chinese state agreed to protect the SMR’s right to full monopoly over the Fushun coalfields by prohibiting “anyone outside the Company to prospect or mine within the boundaries of the two mines, and speedily to cancel permission which may already have been granted to anybody.” Moreover, the Chinese government was also obliged to provide “sufficient facilities in mining, transportation of coal and the hiring of labourers.” In return, the SMR agreed to pay taxes on coal produced in Fushun, and export duties on coal sold outside of China, though the SMR would be taxed using the lowest rates. Moreover, the SMR also agreed to consult the Chinese government and compensate landowners if it needed to purchase private lands to expand its mining territories; the SMR would “restore to the Chinese government the land that was used for mining” when it was done with mining; and the SMR agreed to “establish appropriate provisions for the control of laborers and for relief.” The SMR was the obvious beneficiary of this agreement; all the Chinese government had to gain were Japan’s promise to return the mines in sixty years’ time if the mines still contained coal, and a limited amount of tax revenue.

These limited gains that the Chinese state secured in the 1909 agreement were entirely negated in later treaties. The most notable surrender of Chinese sovereignty occurred when the Japanese government under Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu delivered its Twenty-One Demands to the Chinese government under Yuan Shi-kai on 18 January, 1915. These demands, separated into four groups based on specific provinces, called for the Chinese government to cede to Japan authority on a large number of issues, ranging from trading rights to land ownership to policing. Pertaining to its railway and

21 Manchuria: Treaties and Agreements, 72.
22 Ibid., 78-83.
23 Minami manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha jūnen shi, XV.
24 Manchuria: Treaties and Agreements, 132.
25 Ibid., 132.
26 Ibid., 132. The SMR’s lease on Fushun was further extended when Yuan Shikai’s government accepted Group II of Japan’s Twenty-One Demands issued in 1915.
mining operations in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan demanded extension of existing leases by another 99 years, freedom for its citizens to travel and engage in business in both regions, and the right to lease land in both regions.27 Yuan’s government accepted almost all of the demands, except for Group V that included stipulations on hiring Japanese advisors and policemen.28 This in effect extended SMR’s lease in Fushun to 160 years, and spurred the SMR on a land acquisition frenzy, as described in Chapter __. A year later, the Chinese government of Fengtien Province under the warlord Zhang Zuolin signed an agreement with Japan for borrowing 1.5 million yen. The terms of this loan, for which Japan charged 7.5 percent interest, included Japan keeping tax receipts collected from extracted Fushun coal, along with that from Benxihu Iron Works and Andong Lumber Company, as security for the loan’s capital and interest.29 With this 1916 loan agreement, the Chinese state bartered away its final claim to Fushun coal.

The Treaty of Portsmouth and subsequent agreements signed between Japan and China capture the weak position of the Qing state in its dealings with Western and Japanese imperialist powers. While these treaties demonstrated the Qing state’s impotence on the international level, the Chinese state (first Qing, later Republican) on the local level proved less willing to concede its grounds of authority and more inclined to challenge the SMR.

Elites and Social Problems Caused By Coalmining

The earliest evidence of public protest against coalmining activities is a newspaper announcement in 1908/05/02 issue of the Japanese-owned Chinese-language newspaper, Shengjingshibao, by the heads of six villages, including Shanzuizi, Yangbaibao, Qianjinzhai and Guchengzi. The latter three villages were adjacent to working underground coal pits, which coincidently were named after these villages. This announcement begins with the village heads deploiring the breakdown of public safety in their villages: they blamed Wang Chengyao’s company for introducing “bad elements” to the area when it “recruited mine workers from everywhere 招集礦工四方雜聚.” According to the village heads, these “bad elements” committed a string of armed robberies, causing great unease among the villagers. Although these bandits were subsequently arrested due to the concerted efforts by Qing and Japanese police officers 清日警察官, the villages encountered a different problem of the colliery seizing peasants’ lands. The village heads reported that officials from the Board of Negotiation personally investigated the matter twice. On their second visit, Officials Li and Ha accompanied SMR board member Sakaguchi in his survey of the leased mining concession territory and in determining compensations for villages who lost their lands. The village heads approved the boundaries of the leased territory and the amount of compensation that villages received. In fact, they ended the announcement by saying that the officials performed such an excellent job in restoring harmony to the area that they were compelled to make this public announcement.

The village heads’ expression of satisfaction with the rapid resolution of banditry and land disputes was perhaps premature. Banditry continued to be a problem in the area. After the publication of this announcement in 1908, the Shengjingshibao still regularly

27 Manchuria: Treaties and Agreements, 164-66.
28 Ibid., 170.
29 Ibid., 183-186.
reported on incidents of banditry and arrests of bandits in Qianjinzhai Village in particular and Fushun area in general. The largest bandit attack that took place in 1916 was so infamous that it was reported in the Japanese newspaper, *Asahi Shimbun*. In this attack, a local bandit chief and his men, numbering around 150, attacked the Chinese police station in Qianjinzhai, stole the stored weapons, and wrecked havoc on the town. The Chinese police chief was so desperate that he sought refuge in the mining concession while Japanese police and troops arrested the bandits.30

To a large extent the scale and boldness of this specific bandit attack reflects the frontier character of and the lack of strong state presence in Manchuria. In the early half of the twentieth century, Manchuria could have been the metonym for banditry. While no official statistics on the number of bandit attacks were collected, the prevalence of banditry is evident in that several leading figures in the political scene of early twentieth century Manchuria were bandits before joining the Qing army. The most well-known bandit-turned-military-leader is probably Zhang Zuolin, the Fengtien province warlord.

Land disputes also continued to plague villagers and town residents for the next two decades. With its relentless goal of increasing coal production, the SMR was always in need of land for mine expansion or new urban centers. These acquired lands were purchased legally from landowners and the transactions authorized the Chinese state. It is difficult to ascertain if the SMR paid competitive market rates, but it is safe to assume that the rates were attractive enough such that few landlords protested the land sales. There appeared to have been only one instance of unhappy landlords, who petitioned the Fengtian Governor-General about their inadequate compensation and the Governor-General actually brought these complaints to the attention of the Japanese Consul-General in Shenyang.31 This incident resulted in the *Asahi shimbun* protesting Chinese authorities’ interference in Fushun land sales.32

The most protracted and well-known land dispute concerned the forced relocation of Qianjinzhai. According to the SMR, about 7,000 households and 35,000 persons were affected in this relocation.33 Given the magnitude of this relocation, it took almost ten years to complete the actual move to Xinfushun and the demolition of Qianjinzhai. For its scale and its duration of this relocation, no mention of conflict arising from this relocation can be found in the Chinese language Manchukuo gazetteers and government reports, and SMR publications. The only available but unverified account of the conflict between local Chinese businesses and SMR was found in *Fushun tongshi* [General History of Fushun].

According to *Fushun tongshi*, the most intransigent opponent to the relocation was Shao Baolian, the largest landowner and one of the wealthiest businessmen in Qianjinzhai. Shao rebuffed the SMR’s offer to buy his land in Qianjinzhai, and refused to move his teahouses, brothels and residence to Xinfushun. The SMR attempted various measures to displace Shao and other similarly uncooperative residents of Qianjinzhai. The SMR tore up the main road connecting Qianjinzhai to Benxi. The County Magistrate then convened a public meeting in 1935 in order to convince those still remaining in Qianjinzhai the benefits of moving to Xinfushun, Shao Wenchun, Shao Baolian’s eldest son, openly challenged the

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31 MÔntie shì zìliào, vol. 4 pt. 1, 142-145.
32 *Asahi shimbun* (24 August 1915)
33 Minami mantetsudō kabushiki kaisha daisan jūnen shi, 1897.
magistrate and the SMR on the dangers arising from Xinfushun’s proximity to the industrial zone and the density planned for Xinfushun. Still unable to get Shao to move, the SMR proceeded to demolish all buildings adjacent to Shao’s property and to dismantle all streets, power lines and water supply, leaving Shao’s businesses nonviable and his residence uninhabitable. He finally left by 1938.34

In the conflicts mentioned above, except for the dispute arising from the forced relocation of Qianjinzhai, the aggrieved parties relied occasionally on the Chinese state for protection. The paradox of these conflicts lies in the fact that these problems—banditry and the SMR trespassing on lands outside the bounds of its mining concession—originated with a weak Chinese state. Despite the Chinese state’s obvious limitations, the aggrieved parties still resorted to it to defend their rights and privileges. It is possible to argue that they turned to the Chinese state as the last resort. Nonetheless, it remains significant that the Chinese state is viewed as a defensive mechanism. This view is captured in Zhao Erxun’s preface of the 1911 gazetteer Fushun xian zhi. He wrote,

Fushun, located in a remote corner, has barely begun establishing its local government. Its government, though not perfect, will be built step-by-step. As many know, outsiders are streaming into Fushun by the day. Those seeking to protect this place, who therefore are also reformers, will not cease in their endeavors.35

Expressed in these few lines is Zhao’s unmistakable desire for the presence of a robust Chinese state in Fushun. Due to the area’s remote location in the Qing Empire and the relatively late appearance of the Qing state, as Zhao explained almost regretfully, the local government was not adequately “protect[ing]” Fushun, in the face of overwhelming numbers of “outsiders” flooding the place, whom Zhao obliquely blamed for Fushun’s woes. The “outsiders” were clearly the migrant workers and the SMR.

**Growth of the Chinese state**

**Qing state**

Defying its image of decay and decline, the Qing state was surprisingly aggressive in building up its presence in Fushun after the advent of coal mining in 1900. Historians generally agree that the Qing state in the second half of the nineteenth century was in decline. On the foreign front, the Qing state suffered a series of military defeats at the hands of and unequal treaties with Western and Japanese powers. On the domestic front, the Qing state saw frequent challenges to its legitimacy in the form of popular rebellions like the Taiping Rebellion and increasingly strident criticisms from the intelligentsia like Zhang Taiyan. However, on the local level of Fushun, the Qing state was exceedingly responsive to the need of governance in a rapidly changing society.

The first order of state-building was the establishment of law and order. In 28th year of Guangxu (1902), the Shengjing General extended the jurisdiction of Xingren County to include Fushun, and established a district jailor 典史 in Fushun. In the 31st year of Guangxu (1905), an army camp for capturing bandits, budaoying 捕盗營 was formed. In the 34th year of Guangxu (1908), a local court 地方審判廳 replaced the district jailor 典史, policemen 巡警 were hired to replace the original banner troops in the area (by 1911, there were 210

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35 Zhao Erxun, ed., *Fushun xian zhi* (1911).
policemen in the service), and the *pudaoying* was dismantled. This court was upgraded to the level of district court 分廳 in the 2nd year of Xuantong (1910). At the same time, a local inspection district court 地方檢查分廳, primary trial court 初級審判廳 and a primary inspection court 初級檢查廳 were also established. Between 33rd year of Guangxu (1907) and 7th month of the 3rd year of Xuantong (1911), the First Trial Court 第一初級審判廳 in Fushun presided over 1798 civil cases 民事案件, with debt-related conflict leading the number of cases, followed by land disputes. There were also 820 criminal cases 刑事案件 heard, with thievery and robbery in the lead, and gambling and fighting competing for second place. In the same period, the local trial court presided over 446 civil cases, with land disputes and debt issues in the majority, and 228 criminal cases, with robbery and homicides in the majority.

The second order of state-building was tax collection, which intimately involved the expansion of government bureaucracy. In 1908, the Qing state designated Fushun its own county. To reflect the local government elevated status of county government, a county magistrate 知縣 was appointed, and a statistics department 統計課, an accounting department, and an administration department were created. In the first year of Xuantong (1909), a tax collection agency 收捐處 was established. In the same year, local self-government councils 自治會 were created in the cities 城 and villages 鄉, and elections were held. While a tax collection branch agency 稅務統捐分局 was established in the 33rd year of Guangxu (1907) to collect taxes on goods, livestock, granaries, and lumber, splinter agencies were created in Qianjinzhai in the 10th month of 1909, another in Xiaopiaotun in the 5th month of 1910, and one in Gelaogou 閣老溝 in the 5th month of 1911. The main sources of tax revenue were land tax and commuted labor corvée 地丁, rental income from rented out Banner lands, and coal taxes, which consisted of excavated coal tax 出井 and compensation 報償金. The main items of expenditure of local government included costs of maintaining police force, schools and self-government councils.

The Qing state was concerned with more than tax collection and law and order; it also actively extended its reach to regulating commerce. In the second year of Xuantong (1910), the Branch Chamber of Commerce 商務分所 was founded in Qianjinzhai and the Agricultural Affairs Branch Council 農務分會 was established in the Guanyin Pavilion 觀音閣 in Gao’er Mountain 高爾山 (northern bank of Hun River). The Labor Affairs Branch Council 勞務分會 was created in the 3rd month of the 3rd year of Xuantong (1911). In 1911, local government had to do some epidemic prevention (in the realm of public health, a smoking cessation group 戒煙會 was formed in 1909. Between 1908 and 1911, the number of schools in Fushun increased to 109. There were 127 teachers and 4520 students.

*Republican*

In 1931, when the gazetteer was revised, the county government was still located in Qianjinzhai. The only difference was that the local state had modernized. Now, in addition to the expected government agencies for finance/taxation, public safety, education, a legal court and a local jail, and even a police training academy, there were new and modern public services that the government provided. These included a public library (established in 1928), public hospital (also established in 1928), a slaughterhouse, local savings union
(credit union?) 儲蓄會 (established in 1915), committee for eliminating bandits 清鄉會, telephone department, water utilities department, and a home for destitute persons. There were also semi-official agencies: Lawyer Guild, Youth Club, Hebei Tongxianghui, Shandong, and a Foreign Affairs Association (established in 1929).

The public library was located outside the southern gate of the walled city of Fushun 撫順城. It contained a Chinese newspaper reading room, along with the Children’s reading room, Women’s reading room and the regular reading room. There was an average of 8 library users on a daily basis in a year.

There was a night school for continuing education that was set up in 11th year of Minguo (1922) and a publishing house for educational materials set up in 1923 that put out a monthly magazine called Fushun County Education Monthly 撫順縣教育月刊.

Mantetsu paid 10,000 yuan in land use tax and provided additional 28000 yuan in buzhu fei 補助費. This is the second largest source of tax revenue for the local county government, after land taxes. New sources of taxed revenue not seen in the Qing gazetteer included advertisement 廣告捐, jinricksha 人力車捐, prostitution妓捐, vehicle licenses 車牌捐 and meat肉捐.

**Expanding Chinese state in conflict with SMR**

The first recorded incident occurred on 10 March 1911. According to a report in the Shengjingshibao, non-SMR personnel’s access to the Japanese mining concession territory was restricted due to reports of plague outbreak in the area.\(^{36}\) In the afternoon of the 10th, an unidentified Chinese male attempted to force his way into the mining concession territory, and SMR firefighters (shōjōfu 消防夫), who were on duty at the entrance, denied him entrance.\(^{37}\) This person then returned with thirty armed Chinese policemen (巡警). Fighting broke out and one of the Japanese firefighter was fatally stabbed. The Japanese residents, upon hearing of the fatal incident, clamored for the Japanese police confront their Chinese counterparts. When the Japanese policemen arrived in front of the Chinese police station in Qianjinzhai, another round of fighting erupted, resulting in the death of a Chinese policeman. On the following day, the Japanese Consul-General Koike in Shenyang lodged an official compliant to the Chinese government. This matter was finally resolved when Koike was assured that “no harm will ever befall on Japanese nationals performing their duties,” and the Chinese policemen who were responsible for the Japanese firefighter’s death compensated his family.\(^{38}\)

Another skirmish involving Chinese and Japanese police officers occurred on 19 January 1918. The Asahi Shimbun reported that six Chinese policemen entered the mining concession territory while trying to capture a suspect, and ended up assaulting several Japanese police officers.\(^{39}\) In retaliation, First Lieutenant Takamori led fifty armed policemen to Qianjinzhai, laid siege on the Chinese police station and demanded the handing over of the six Chinese policemen involved in the assault. It appeared that the

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\(^{36}\) Shengjingshibao (Xuanton 3rd year, 2nd month, 14th day).

\(^{37}\) Asahi shimbun reports claimed that it was the local police chief, though Shengjingshibao did not identify this person. Asahi shimbun (12 March 1911, 15 March 1911 and 18 March 1911).

\(^{38}\) Asahi shimbun (15 April 1911, 16 July 1911).

\(^{39}\) Asahi shimbun (9 January 1918).06
Japanese Consul-General was not enlisted to pursue this matter, and the incident was resolved quickly thereafter. The relatively easy resolution of this incident, as compared to the 1911 skirmish, could be due to an earlier bandit raid that the Japanese security forces came to the rescue of the Chinese police. Two years ago, a local bandit chief and his men, numbering around 150, attacked the Chinese police station in Qianjinzhai, stole the stored weapons, and wrecked havoc on the town. The Chinese police chief was so desperate that he had to seek refuge in the mining concession while the Japanese police and troops arrested the bandits.\textsuperscript{40} This episode with the bandits must have been humiliating for the local Chinese police chiefs and perhaps made them more compliant with the Japanese.

\textbf{Fushun in the Manchukuo period}

The events of 1931 and 1932 fundamentally altered the political climate in Manchuria in general and Fushun in particular. In all of Manchuria, uncooperative Chinese bureaucrats were removed and Chinese nationalists were either forced into exile or silenced by censorship. In Fushun, the Fushun county magistrate, who served under the Republican government in 1931, also served as county magistrate under the nascent Manchukuo puppet regime created in 1932.\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, the massacre in Pingdingshan Village, a few \textit{li} south of Qianjinzhai, probably discouraged officials and other local residents from joining Shao’s protest. Unlike most of Manchuria, the 1931 invasion was unusually violent in Fushun. The Kwantung Army, mistaking a recent attack on Fushun Colliery by a loosely organized Red Spear brigade as having originated from Pingdingshan Village, launched a covert operation that ended with the village razed and almost all of its residents killed. Although such display of brute violence was not repeated, the possibility of a recurrence was likely enough of a threat to gain compliance from the local population of Fushun.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Asahi shim bun} (23 September 1916, 24 September 1916, 28 September 1916).
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Minguo Fushun xian zhi} (1931).