Game Theory 2: Extensive-Form Games and Subgame Perfection
Dynamics in Games

How should we think of strategic interactions that occur in sequence?

Who moves when?

And what can they do at different points in time?

How do people react to different histories?
Modeling Games with Dynamics

Players

Player function

- Who moves when

Terminal histories

- Possible paths through the game

Preferences over terminal histories
A strategy is a complete contingent plan

Player $i$’s strategy specifies her action choice at each point at which she could be called on to make a choice
AN EXAMPLE: INTERNATIONAL CRISSES

Two countries (A and B) are competing over a piece of land that B occupies.

Country A decides whether to make a demand.

If Country A makes a demand, B can either acquiesce or fight a war.

If A does not make a demand, B keeps land (game ends).

A’s best outcome is Demand followed by Acquiesce, worst outcome is Demand and War.

B’s best outcome is No Demand and worst outcome is Demand and War.
An Example: International Crises

A can choose: Demand \((D)\) or No Demand \((ND)\)

\[ u_A(D, A) = 3 > u_A(ND, A) = u_A(ND, W) = 2 > u_A(D, W) = 1 \]

\[ u_B(ND, A) = u_B(ND, W) = 3 > u_B(D, A) = 2 > u_B(D, W) = 1 \]

How can we represent this scenario as a game (in strategic form)?
## International Crisis Game: NE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country $B$</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$W$</td>
<td>$A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D$</td>
<td>1, 1</td>
<td>3, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ND$</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country $A$</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$D$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ND$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Crisis Game: NE
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GAME: NE

Country A

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
D & W & A \\
\hline
1,1 & & 3^\lor, 2 \\
\hline
2^\lor, 3 & & 2, 3 \\
\end{array}
\]
## International Crisis Game: NE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country $B$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>W</strong></td>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D$</td>
<td>1, 1</td>
<td>3✓, 2✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ND$</td>
<td>2✓, 3</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country $A$
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GAME: NE

Country A | Country B
------------|--------------

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>W</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>2\checkmark, 3\checkmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**International Crisis Game: NE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country A</th>
<th>Country B</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td><strong>W</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, 1</td>
<td>3✓, 2✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2✓, 3✓</td>
<td>2✓, 3✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ND</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2, 3✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Crisis Game: NE

Country A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1, 1</td>
<td>3✓, 2✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>2✓, 3✓</td>
<td>2, 3✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country B

▷ Is there something funny here?
International Crisis Game: NE

Is there something funny here?

Specifically, \((ND, W)\)?
**International Crisis Game: NE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Country B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1, 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>2✓, 3✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Is there something funny here?
- Specifically, \((ND, W)\)?
- The threat of war deters the demand, but would \(B\) follow through?
Non-Credible Threats

The equilibrium \((ND, W)\) depends on a “non-credible threat”

Once \(A\) makes a demand, \(B\) does not want to fight a war

But to rule out such behavior, we need a stronger solution concept

One that incorporates the fact that actions are taken in sequence
Why Rule out Non-credible Threats

Equilibrium as a steady state

War is only a best-response for $B$ because when no demand is made, $B$ is indifferent

If $A$ accidentally made a demand, war is not a sequential best-response for $B$. $B$ should acquiesce instead

- Read the strategy $W$ as “if $A$ makes a demand, I will go to war”
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

A strategy specifies what a player will do at every decision point

- Complete contingent plan

Strategy in a SPNE must be a best-response at each node, given the strategies of other players

Backward Induction
But First!

Let’s introduce a way of incorporating the timing of actions into the game explicitly.

Use a game tree to represent the sequential aspect of choices.
An Example: International Crises
An Example: International Crises

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{A} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{B}
\item \textit{ND} \hspace{1cm} \textit{D}
\item (2, 3) \hspace{1cm} \textit{War} \hspace{1cm} \textit{Acq}
\end{itemize}
An Example: International Crises

\[ \begin{aligned}
&\text{A} \\
&\downarrow \quad \text{ND} \quad \text{D} \\
&\quad \rightarrow \quad (2, 3) \quad (1, 1) \\
&\text{B} \\
&\downarrow \quad \text{War} \quad \text{Acq} \\
&\quad \rightarrow \quad (3, 2)
\end{aligned} \]
AN EXAMPLE: INTERNATIONAL CRISSES

A

ND

(2, 3)

D

(1, 1)

B

War

Acq

(3, 2)
An Example: International Crises

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A \\
\downarrow ND \\
(2, 3) \\
\downarrow D \\
(3, 2)
\end{array}
\]
An Example: International Crises
An Example: International Crises

A

ND
(2, 3)

B

D

War

(1, 1)

Acq

(3, 2)

(1, 1)
Another Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Player 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Player 1</td>
<td>5, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another Example

Player 1

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
& C & D \\
A & 5\checkmark, 3\checkmark & 0, 0 \\
B & 0, 0 & 3\checkmark, 5\checkmark \\
\end{array}
\]

Player 2
Another Example

Suppose that player 1 moves first and player 2 moves second.
Another Example

```
1

A

2

C  D
5  0
3  0

B

2

C  D
0  0
0  3
5
```
Another Example

A B

A

C

D

C

D

5

3

0

0

0

3

5
Another Example
Another Example
Another Example

SPNE: \((A, (C, D))\)
Practice Game

```
    1
   / \  
  a   b
  / \  /
 2   2
 / \ / \ 
2  2 4 4 1 1
```

\[ (2, 4, 1, 3, 5) \]
Practice Game
Practice Game

```
1
  a  b
2  2
  c  d  e  f
2  4  4  1  3  3  5
```
Practice Game

```
1
  /\  /
 a b 
  \  /
  2 2
  /\ /\  /
 c d e f
 2 4 1 3 3 5
 4 1 3 5
```
Practice Game

SPNE: \((b, (c, f))\)
The Centipede Game
The Centipede Game
The Centipede Game

1 → C → 2 → C → 1 → C → 2 → C

E → E → E → E

1 → 0 → 5 → 4

1 → 3 → 2 → 7
**The Centipede Game**

The diagram illustrates the Centipede Game, a sequential bargaining game. The payoffs are as follows:

- Player 1: 1, 0, 5, 4
- Player 2: 2, 3, 2, 7

The game progresses from left to right, with each player choosing to continue (C) or exit (E). The payoffs are indicated at each stage, with the final payoffs for each player at the end of the game.
The Centipede Game

1 C 2 C 1 C 2 C
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 0 5 4
1 3 2 7

6 6
The Centipede Game

Unique SPNE: $((E, E), (E, E))$

Equilibrium payoffs $(1, 1)$

Pareto dominated by 3 outcomes!
Multiple Equilibria

Graphical representation of the game with multiple equilibria.
Multiple Equilibria
Multiple Equilibria
Multiple Equilibria
Multiple Equilibria

SPNE 1: (D, A, (R,L))
Multiple Equilibria

SPNE 1: (D, A, (R,L))
Multiple Equilibria

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{L} & \text{R} \\
1 & 3 \\
1 & 1 \\
0 & 5 \\
\end{array}
\quad U
\quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{L} & \text{R} \\
2 & 4 \\
2 & 4 \\
2 & 2 \\
\end{array}
\]
Multiple Equilibria

SPNE 1: (D, A, (R, L))
SPNE 2: (U, B, (R, R))
Buying Votes (Osborne)

Legislature with $N$ members ($N$ odd) votes on two bills, $X$ vs. $Y$

Interest groups $I_X$ and $I_Y$ try to buy votes in favor of preferred bill

First $I_X$ makes payments (could be 0) to each legislator

\[ (x_1, \ldots, x_N) \]

Then $I_Y$ makes payments (could be 0) to each legislator

\[ (y_1, \ldots, y_N) \]

Legislators vote for whomever paid them more (ties go to $Y$)
**Payoffs**

Group $I_X$ values at $V_X > 0$ and $Y$ at 0

Group $I_Y$ values $Y$ at $V_Y > 0$ and $X$ at 0

Payoff is value from bill minus sum of payments made
Example 1: $N = 3$ and $V_X = V_Y = 300$

Start by finding $I_Y$’s best response to $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$

Suppose $x_i$ is the smallest, $x_j$ is the second smallest, and $x_k$ is largest

If $x_i + x_j < 300$, then want to buy the two cheapest legislators

$\quad ▶ y_i = x_i, y_j = x_j, y_k = 0$

If $x_i + x_j \geq 300$, not worth it to buy the vote

$\quad ▶ y_1 = y_2 = y_3 = 0$
Example 1: $I_X$’s best response

In order to win, $I_X$ must spend at least 300 on each pair of two legislators

The cheapest way to do this is $x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 150$

But then $I_X$’s payoff is

$$300 - 450 < 0$$

So $I_X$ will instead choose $x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 0$
$x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 0$

If the two smallest payments by $I_X$ sum to less than 300, $I_Y$ matches them and offers 0 to the third legislator.

If the two smallest payments by $I_X$ sum to 300 or more, $I_Y$ offers 0 to all legislators.
**Example 2:** $k = 3$, $V_X = 300$, and $V_Y = 100$

Start by finding $I_Y$’s best response to $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$

Suppose $x_i$ is the smallest, $x_j$ is the second smallest, and $x_k$ is largest

If $x_i + x_j < 100$, then want to buy the two cheapest legislators

▶ $y_i = x_i$, $y_j = x_j$, $y_k = 0$

If $x_i + x_j \geq 100$, not worth it ot buy the vote

▶ $y_1 = y_2 = y_3 = 0$
Example 2: $I_X$’s best response

In order to win, $I_X$ must spend at least 100 on each pair of two legislators

The cheapest way to do this is $x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 50$

$I_X$’s payoff from this is

$$300 - 150 > 0$$
SPNE of Example 2

\[ x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 50 \]

If the two smallest payments by \( I_X \) sum to less than 100, \( I_Y \) matches them and offers 0 to the third legislator.

If the two smallest payments by \( I_X \) sum to 100 or more, \( I_Y \) offers 0 to all legislators.
SPNE of Example 2

\[ x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 50 \]

If the two smallest payments by \( I_X \) sum to less than 100, \( I_Y \) matches them and offers 0 to the third legislator.

If the two smallest payments by \( I_X \) sum to 100 or more, \( I_Y \) offers 0 to all legislators.

Second move advantage

- When values are equal, second move wins.
- For first mover to win, has to value winning a lot more than first move.
Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over a dollar

Player 1 makes a take it or leave it offer of a division \((\alpha, 1 - \alpha)\)

Player 2 says accepts or rejects

If Player 2 accepts, each makes a payoff equal to her share of the dollar

If Player 2 rejects, each makes 0
The Ultimatum Game in a Tree
The Ultimatum Game in a Tree

\[ 2 \xleftarrow{\text{Reject}} \alpha \xrightarrow{\text{Accept}} 1 \]
The Ultimatum Game in a Tree

\[ \begin{align*}
\alpha & \\
1 \quad & 2 \\
Reject & \quad Accept \\
\begin{align*}
u_1 &= 0 \\
u_2 &= 0
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
u_1 &= \alpha \\
u_2 &= 1 - \alpha
\end{align*}
\]
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium.

It rules out equilibria that rely on incredible threats in a dynamic environment.

All SPNE are identified by backward induction.