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Remembering Farouk Abd al-Wahhab Mustafa

Art work by Jose Revuelta
Give Me the Flute and Sing*
Gibran Khalil Gibran
Translated Kay Heikkinen

Give me the flute and sing,
for song is the secret that lasts;
the yearning of the flute remains
after all else has past.

Have you dwelt like me in the forest
forsaking the castle at night,
have you traced the course of the
streams and scaled the rocky heights?
Have you bathed yourself in perfume
and dried your body by light,
have you sipped the wine of dawn
from cups of ether, bright?

Give me the flute and sing,
for by song we truly pray;
the yearning of the flute remains
when life has sped away.

Have you tarried like me past noon
beneath the grapes on the vine,
as the bunches dangled above you,
golden chandeliers entwined?
Have you made your bed on the grasses
and wrapped yourself in the sky,
with no care for what my come,
and forgetting what’s gone by?

O give me the flute and sing,
for song sets straight the heart;
the yearning of the flute remains
long after our sins depart.

O give me the flute and sing,
and forget both harm and remedy,
for people are but lines, inscribed,
yet on the slate of the sea.

* This poem was a favorite of Professor Mustafa’s. It is translated by his wife.
“Farouk will be missed in many places around the university and in the larger world of Chicago but for me the greatest void that his passing has left is in the CMES lounge, where I most regularly saw him over the last years. What made those prolonged lunch-time sessions so special was not only Farouk’s warm and lively personality but also the way he linked the two populations of the place—graduate students and fellow faculty members like me. Without being pedantic or insisting on the subjects of Arabic language and literature, Farouk was the teacher of us all. He embodied a common concern for the Middle East which cut across languages, religions and nationalities. Farouk never disguised his own passionate beliefs about the many issues of the region (and the rest of the world) but his humor and his humanity allowed even those who occasionally disagreed with him to feel comfortable.

In the last months of his life my one-on-one conversations with Farouk often turned to the topics that are the special concern of older people: medical care and retirement. I was looking forward to the time that he resolved the most pressing of these issues and we could focus more upon the scholarly matters, politics and jokes that drew the whole lounge community together around Farouk. Now such a possibility has been taken away from us, but I hope that Farouk’s spirit will live on in the way we continue to inhabit this and the many other spaces he so brought to life.”

Ralph Austen, 
Professor Emeritus of African History 
University of Chicago

“In 2005, I taught my first seminar on modern Arab intellectual history. I was unsure as to what materials I should include in this class, and I consulted my friend and colleague, Farouk Mustafa. We met for coffee in his house on Harper Street. Farouk knew every single page I assigned, and his thoughtful insights regarding these texts were nothing short of amazing. After discussing the syllabus, Farouk told me, “You know that the reading-list is too long, right? Think of your poor students!” He then reflected on the fact that as a teacher, I should not consider what I find interesting, or essential for the knowledge of modern Arab culture. I also needed to think, he explained, about my students; what they read in English; what would make them cry or laugh; what would move them, and what they might find absolutely awful. And this was my friend Farouk in a nutshell; a fantastic scholar of Arabic texts, a careful reader of the greatest creations of modern Arab culture, and a sensitive teacher; the kind who constantly thinks about his students. In a way, this role of a teacher, who masterfully mediated between Arabic and English-speaking cultures and between American and Arab publics, was what made him such an important public intellectual; not only in the center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago, but also in the American public sphere.

Farouk, however, was not just a brilliant meditator between Arabic and English-speaking cultures. His works also celebrated one Arab nation-state in particular,
Farouk knew, often by heart, the texts of all major (and minor) Egyptian intellectuals: the authors of the nahda, the secularized generation of the interwar period, and the authors and writers, many of whom his close personal friends, whose formative years were during the Nasserite Revolution. One of the things that made him such a wonderful reader was that he had read the texts he studied on numerous times, at various stages of his life; as a child and a young man in Egypt; as a professor teaching these texts to American students, and as a translator, thinking about the transferability of cultures, languages, and ideas. Nonetheless, as enamored as Farouk was of Egypt and its cultures, its history from the days of Pharos, to the Mamluks, to the present, he was not an uncritical admirer. He delighted at the demonstrations at Tahrir and at the potentialities for a new democratic future for his country, and was very concerned, in his last days, from what awaited Egypt in the near future.

I will miss Farouk very much. In fact, I already miss him. As a colleague, I miss his thoughtful commentary, wisdom, insights, and his sharp mind; but I also miss his voice, shouting al-Salam al-'Alaym as he entered his class, and his laughter, as well as his sense of humor, his puns, and his jokes. I am joined here by dozens; my colleagues and my friends at Chicago, his friends in Egypt, and the dozens of students -- historians, scholars of Arabic literature, political scientists, anthropologists, experts in Ottoman studies and in Persian studies, archeologists, and Egyptologists -- who loved him very much and grave deeply at the passing of an outstanding scholar and a wonderful human being.”

“The Death of a Great Teacher” by Orit Bashkin, University of Chicago, Associate Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History

“I remember the last time I talked one-on-one with Farouk Mustafa before he died. It was in his office, on a Tuesday. Always generous, he was insisting, insisting that I accept a sweatshirt printed with verses by al-Mutanabbi, the renowned 10th-century Iraqi poet. I love al-Mutanabbi’s poetry. Farouk knew this, and that’s why he had pulled me aside, unwilling to give up the chance to get excited about literature. It’s so rare to find people who like this stuff anyway, so why not pass along a free sweatshirt?

He ushered me through the doorway, and it was like I had walked into the belly of a giant that fed on words. Stacks of books leaned against each other with papers jutting out between them, like palm stalks covered in fronds. More dusty tomes rested on the wooden table in a gentle mound. Everything in his office smelled like aging paper. Everything felt old and important.
“No one appreciates al-Mutanabbi anymore,” he was saying from behind an outcropping of books. He took great care with the word “appreciate,” pulling back the corners of his mouth to emphasize the long ee sound in the middle. He made sure to pause for two beats over the doubled b in “al-Mutanabbi” as demanded by good Arabic pronunciation. Words mattered to Farouk. He savored them like the book-chomping beast whose gullet he had commandeered for office space. Each word was important and weighty, requiring precision and care. A treasure to be cherished for its own sake, then lovingly passed along like a free sweatshirt.

I nodded my head in agreement as he jostled a cardboard box out from between two steel grey file cabinets. He pulled out a black sweatshirt several sizes too large for me and held it up proudly. “Do you know this poem?”

I squinted at the Arabic lettering. Farouk’s boyish excitement, belying his age of 70, made me want to lie and say I knew what it said. Three lines from an ode by al-Mutanabbi, he explained, followed by a multiple choice question. A mock test, part of the design for t-shirts advertising summer Arabic classes at the University of Chicago from a few years ago. The last line read, “My body has become so thin with lovesickness that if it weren’t for the fact that I’m talking to you, you wouldn’t be able to see me.” Then the question: “What is the main idea of these lines? (A) Love. (B) Wisdom. (C) Mourning. (D) Anorexia.”

I chuckled as the words congealed in my head. When Farouk saw that I got the joke, his eyes lit up and a self-satisfied grin wrinkled his cheeks. Anorexia! He folded the sweatshirt and placed it in my hands. “It’s a way to help students get excited about poetry. No one appreciates al-Mutanabbi anymore, you know.” I thanked him and walked out of the office and down the hall, not sure whether it was he or I that got more out of this brief moment together.

The weather is warm now, and the sweatshirt is lying in a box in my room. Stacks of books gaze down at it, and it gazes right back. Words speaking to words, authors who never knew each other locked in eternal conversation. Farouk’s words echoing as I smooth out the sweatshirt, place it back in the drawer, wondering when I’ll read it again.

In memory of Farouk Abd al-Wahhab Mustafa, 1943-2013.”

“Words Speaking” by Kevin Blankinship

“When I came to Chicago in the fall of 1982, Farouk was already here and already legendary as a phenomenal teacher of Arabic. We became good friends almost immediately, even though my office was across the street in the Oriental Institute building, and pretty regularly went jogging together along the lakefront in fair weather; he was not yet troubled by the knee injury and other health troubles that bothered him in later years. He already had at that time his characteristic abundant energy and good cheer so familiar to everyone who got to know him, even most recently.
Farouk had a deep and abiding love for the Arabic language, which he knew intimately, and of Arabic literature and indeed of all literature, in which he was astonishingly learned. Over the years he established several literary or poetry gatherings, during which those who knew Arabic would meet to share works of the literature they loved. I believe, too, that he was the founder of the University’s weekly Arabic Circle (al-nadwa al-'arabiyya); whether or not he founded it, he was certainly the life of that particular party, which he animated with his probing questions and many humorous observations, always delivered in his booming, deep voice (and often with hearty laughter). Moreover, whatever he said was delivered with impeccably clear Arabic diction, so that his every comment was instructive for those trying to learn the intricacies of Arabic. He wasn’t trying to be didactic; it was simply his way to speak clearly and forcefully, and thereby to help the rest of us realize that Arabic could be as clear to us as it was to him. Nothing, I think, would give him more satisfaction were he able to return for a short visit in ten, or fifty, or a hundred years, than to see the Arabic Circle still meeting unfailingly every week, and I think there is probably no better way to honor Farouk’s memory that to make sure that it continues and thrives for generations to come.

Farouk’s enthusiasm extended to whatever he loved: Arabic, literature, beautiful women, Egypt, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, democracy, politics that helped the common people and the poor…even to certain foods. Once, when he put me up for a few months while I was between residences, I noticed a large, dried twig of okra (Ar. bamia) in a vase on his bookshelf. It turned out that he especially loved okra stew, a famous Egyptian specialty, and had at one time formed with some like-minded friends an “International Bamia Society”…only in jest, of course, though if the Internet had existed in those days I don’t doubt that Farouk would have created a website for it. He was, he told me, the president of IBS, and when it convened, he would hold the dried okra stalk as a kind of ceremonial staff. Since I like okra too, we had an animated discussion of its virtues and various recipes. He was a lover of life in all its glories, large and small, and not excluding okra stew.”

“FAROUK MUSTAFA as I remember Him”
by Fred M. Donner

“In 1987, when we first met, I was introduced as “the Israeli” and you were “the Egyptian.” Little did we know, that the Israeli & the Egyptian would soon become colleagues & good friends, with no borders to come between us. The two of us had accomplished what our countries of origins never managed - a true, warm peace. We never allowed politics to come between us. In actuality, it even strengthened our bond. We spent endless hours discussing political issues, at times seriously and at times jokingly. We thought that one joke in particular, summed it all up. Whenever you told my joke of how Putin, Bush & Netanyahu came back from meeting God… you enjoyed it like it was the first time you heard it, laughing whole heartily, and your eyes became teary.”
Remembering Farouk Abd al-Wahhab Mustafa

We were close friends because we also shared similar ideas about language teaching in general and teaching it at the University of Chicago in particular. We enjoyed times when we figured out common etymological phenomena our languages share and enjoyed it even more when we could apply it to current affairs. We rejoiced in the realization that our distant cultures actually do share so many common themes. For the love of our cultures and the CMES, we established poetry reading events, trying to show our students how possible it is to build cultural bridges.

Farouk, you became to be not only an anchor of intellectual and academic support but also of moral support. When you squeezed my hand by the university flagpole, when a small community mourned the assassination of the late Yitzhak Rabin, I felt less lonely, not so lost.

I will eventually find the emotional strength to resume attending Friday lectures. I will end up going back to Pick lounge knowing that your couch is empty, that you are not going to be there, calling my name in such an endearing way, just to follow it up with a smile and a kiss. At departmental meetings I will continue to yearn for your questions and comments, always reminding us of times that are no more. Until I am ready to do all that, I will keep reliving the cherished memories I have from knowing you for so many years.

You left us too early, too quickly. Still there is no true peace in the Middle East and our countries of origins are yet to find the right path for their people. I will keep on wishing, in both our names, guided by your INSHA’ALLA.”

Ariela Finklestein
Senior Lecturer in Hebrew

“‘SabaaH el-foll,’”
“SabaaH el-tayr el-mutamakkin min shadwu,”
“Time to make the donuts.”

I’ll never forget that voice. Nor, that stubbornness:

Me: “But Farouk... This isn’t moussakka; it has potatoes!”
Farouk, calmly, pityingly: “Yeeeees. It IS moussakka, with potatoes”

It is hard to distill the essence of a decades long relationship, to wrap your arms around the whole of what you have lost. It comes to you in bits and pieces.
I miss our morning hour in the CMES lounge, 10:30-11:30 MWF. Then, I miss hearing his voice booming “as-salaaaaaaamu ‘alaykum!” at 11:30 in Pick 218. That was my cue, next door, in Pick 222, to start my own class, after the students and I chuckled our response. I was so envious of that voice of his, and sort of “borrowed” it once. I had laryngitis and had to speak publicly, so, I positioned Farouk to speak on my behalf as I whispered the words to him. My words, and his voice. Very funny!
Farouk was part of a generation that is dying out, one that melded the best of the Egyptian, Arab cultures with the best of the western. He so beautifully captured that mix that I began to see his home city of Tanta as a magical place from which fully formed citizens of the world emerged. He loved Egyptian movies and came to everyone we showed, with a special place for “al-Irhaab wal kabaab”. His taste in music was eclectic, from Bossa Nova to jazz to western classical to anything Egyptian. His favorite Shakespeare sonnet was #25. His favorite Qur’anic surah was al-Rahman.

Everything about Farouk bespoke an originality of character and a warm humanity. No wonder that children and young people loved him so much. When my daughter, Alya, interviewed him for a class project, he took it very seriously. When he heard that she loved his chicken thighs, he insisted on making some for her. Farouk made a mean bamia, and I adored his salad, drowning in finely cut parsley. Funnily, he loved, but couldn’t make molokhiyya.

I remember driving him to a student party, the sound of Abba’s “Dancing Queen” blasting into the street. I remember him being the first to get up to dance at the Muslim Hip Hop event a few years ago. Farouk couldn’t sing, but he did.

I’ll miss the suspense of the 5 seconds between the opening of the floor for questions after a lecture and Farouk’s booming voice unfailingly proclaiming his lack of expertise in the same breath as he spews out the first question, the one we’d all love to ask, the one that is genius in its simplicity, but sticks in throats inhibited by academic calculations.

One of the biggest gaps Farouk’s absence has caused is that he’s not here to send jokes to. He indulged my homesickness, and eased it by being there to “get it,” whether it was an article about some political horror or the latest song or joke out of Egypt. Without him here to be the first to receive my fresh jokes, the latest bitingly clever satire from Egypt every day, the circle of relishing it is painfully incomplete. I need to see his “shoulder laugh” to fully enjoy those jokes.

We have lost a great intellectual and human being. I will sorely miss and remember both.”

_Noha Forster_
_Lecturer in Arabic_
_University of Chicago_

“Farouk ‘Abd al-Wahhab Mustafa was an ideal colleague, a gifted teacher, and an erudite but humble scholar who always shared his knowledge generously.

Farouk’s commitment as a colleague was legendary: he was always willing to accept tasks and was always willing to help. He never complained about the invidious unfairness inherent to academic life (especially towards language teachers), and from
which he suffered grievously, and he never held grudges. He was always supportive of others, and was an ideal, faithful friend. In the decade after I left the University of Chicago, I never gave a lecture there when Farouk was not in attendance. This is just one small measure of his loyalty and dedication to those whom he honored with his friendship.

Farouk became a good friend of many of his former students because he was not just the most gifted teacher of Arabic language and literature of his generation. His enthusiasm and vibrant personality brought out the best in those he taught, inspiring students with his passion for the Arabic language and its rich literature. Since his passing, I have heard from people all over the globe who had the privilege of being taught by Farouk: their tributes were not just to an inspiring teacher, but to a man who had become a mentor to so many by virtue of the sense of personal closeness to his students that his brilliant pedagogy inspired.

While Farouk was renowned for his teaching, it was as a translator and literary critic that he will perhaps best be remembered. Great translation requires a level of expertise and sensitivity in two different languages that few people have attained. Farouk was a supremely gifted translator because of his superior abilities in both English and Arabic. His skilled, fluid translations into English of ‘Alaa al-Aswani’s Chicago, Gamal al-Ghitani’s Zayni Barakat, and so many other major Arabic novels is an enormous literary achievement. These translations will serve as a monument to a man whose vast erudition was exceeded only by his modesty.

Farouk had a sparking sense of humor, an outsized, open-hearted, warm personality and a passionate love of life that expressed itself in his wonderful cooking and his generous hospitality. He will be missed not only by past and present friends, colleagues and students, but also by all those who were introduced to the essence of modern Arab culture by his penetrating literary translations.”

Rashid Khalidi  
Edward Saeed Professor of Arab Studies, Department of History,  
Columbia University

“Farouk was my teacher in modern Egyptian literature at the University of Chicago during the late 1970’s. He could take word or phrase of Arabic, embed it in his unique sense of humor, launch it through numerous levels of formal and vernacular usages, deconstruct it with real, pseudo-, and comic etymologies, and bring it back to the matter at hand, all within a few moments in such a way that the word or phrase and the cultural universes in which it was embedded remained vivid and resonant within the memory. In his classes he would declaim passages from works like Yusuf Idris’s al-Farafir or Gamal al-Ghitani’s Waqa’i Harat Za’afarani in a manner that unlocked their irony, wit, dialect, and drama. I sensed the irreplaceable quality of these sessions and, with Farouk’s permission, recorded some of them, and I still preserve those recordings. Farouk’s commitments to human dignity and cultural integrity and his distress at the
over corruption and violence were often inseparable to the wit, joy, and wonder he brought to Arabic literature and to his life within and between cultures.

Farouk bequeaths us a treasure through his translations, translations that are sensitive enough to reflect the distinctive registers, voices, and localities of the Arabic works while at the same time bringing to us the rhythm, suppleness and power of Farouk’s English prose style.

I would like to quote from each of Farouk’s remarkable corpus of translations, and then, whenever I look up one passage I see yet others; each a gift, each remarkable and distinctive gift. Here are two:

His fingernails and toenails were long like fearsome talons, and his face like a black clay pot, the hairs of his beard sticking out like barbed wire. Out of his face peered eyes like those of an old camel, with red sparks flying out of them, and a mouth wide as a toilet bowl without a single tooth, and a nose like a roasted corncob. (Khairy Shalaby, Wikalat `Atiya, 1999; The Lodging House 2006, p. 11)

I found that I was connected to all living things. I heard the calls of the branches, the conversations of the stones, the whispering of the stars, the lisping of the dewdrops, the dialects of winds, the howling of the meteors, the supplications of the comets, the moaning of the atom at the moment of fission, and the echoes of the expansion of the far-flung universe. (Gamal al-Ghitani, Kitab al-Tajaliyyat; 1983; The Book of Epiphanies, 2012, p. 54)

“A Word for Farouk”
by Michael Sells, Barrows Professor of the History and Literature of Islam and Professor of Comparative Literature

“where were you when words were no where
to be found, we are bee stung tongues
fear-numbed from licking honey drops on greedy hands
scared the taste will fade like
memory

swollen throats hoarse from whispering
gibberish, our diction, we are
Babel’s children scattered, you were
our tower, our shadow, our warmth

we picked from your branches, we ate
and we ate and we ate and we
fed till we were empty, weightless
sinners falling heavens-bound over earth’s edges
where is your gravity?

you left us, aimless moons
searching for Jupiter’s ghost
the emptiness is vast and haunting.
and we still stare till we are sun-blind,
begging the universe to quit its jest
the eclipse may pass at any moment

but there is no gravity
hopeful hearts will atrophy
no blindness will cure the inertia
of straying souls

we lie by blindness
listen with deafness
to the booming silence

the rhyme seems lifeless

till we trust that you
have taught us well

till we accept
that our memory
is a translation of you
from then
to now”

“To Farouk”
by Samee Sulaiman
Masters Candidate
University of Chicago
The Fictitious Demise of the Modern Islamic State

A Review of Wael B. Hallaq’s *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament*

By Sadia Absanuddin

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Book Review


The “Islamic State,” judged by any standard definition of what the modern state represents, is both an impossibility and a contradiction in terms.¹

Since December 2010, the Middle East began to undergo upheavals that challenged despots who had held onto the reins of power for decades. These uprisings underscored the sovereignty of the people, a significant majority of whom supported the implementation of Shari’a in some form.² Accordingly, the commencement of revolutionary activities revitalized the Middle East’s Islamist parties. In the January 2012 Egyptian parliamentary elections, Islamist parties received 71.5 percent of the seats in Parliament.³ Five months later, the Egyptian public elected the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi as President.⁴ Additionally, leaders like Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia asserted their

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vision of emulating the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey. Given this backdrop, a well-grounded attempt to harmonize Islamic tradition with modernity would have been valuable: how can a state be both Islamic and modern? What would the implementation of Sharīʿa law in the modern nation-state look like? Is there a need to reconcile Sharīʿa with modern science? Is it reasonable to implement one aspect of Sharīʿa while disregarding the governing context in which it developed? What is that governing context and can it be regenerated?

In *The Impossible State*, Prof. Wael Hallaq, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University, argues that Sharīʿa law cannot be implemented in the context of the modern state because Sharīʿa and the modern state are historically-contingent enterprises, and are fundamentally irreconcilable. As such, Hallaq imposes contextual exclusivity on both Sharīʿa and the modern state. Hallaq discussed this idea in previous works, including *Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations* (2009) and in an article in *Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity* (2004). Hallaq dedicates the whole of *The Impossible State* to examining the opposing worldviews that produced the modern state and the premodern implementation of Sharīʿa law.

Although *The Impossible State* is an impressive work of scholarship, the argument is unpersuasive. Prof. Hallaq ineffectively substantiates his thesis that Sharīʿa and the modern state are irreconcilable: both his discussion on the modern state and Islamic governance are limited. Hallaq fails to recognize the vast diversity of modern states in existence today and accordingly attributes characteristics to the modern state that are inessential to its existence and perpetuation. Furthermore, he conflates criticism of modernization with the modern state itself, which has been developed in many varied contexts. His argument is also lacking because he neglects to address modern attempts to implement Islamic governance, which restricts the value of his book to political theorists studying modern Islamic governance.

Similarly, while Prof. Hallaq does an admirable job of summarizing the principles that developed and sustain the Western worldview, he fails to address critical elements of the modern state *in terms of* the modern state, especially as experienced in the West. For example, the separation between church and state, i.e. secularism, is now an essential characteristic of Western states. Varying degrees of secularism either promote religious freedom or discou-
age its practice in the public sphere (e.g. laïcité). Polemicists frequently set Western secularism in opposition to Sharīʿa. Even so, Hallaq neglects to address the distinct intellectual history of secularism, which may actually be antithetical to Islamic governance and is more definitive of the modern state, especially as experienced in the West.

It is difficult to escape the sense that The Impossible State is ideologically-driven, deriving its rationale from its conclusion. However, in spite of idealizing premodern Islamic governance, Hallaq’s critique of the marginalization of morality in modern states rings true.

The Modern State and Sharīʿa Law: Opposing Central Domains

In framing his argument, Prof. Hallaq utilizes Carl Schmitt’s notion of “central” and “peripheral” domains, or the primariness/secondariness of certain communal pursuits, to assess the weltanschauungs that define the modern state and premodern Islamic governance. According to Schmitt, the central domain defines a worldview because the objectives of the central domain constitute the primary objectives for the worldview. The peripheral domain, on the other hand, includes objectives of lesser importance: “the problems of other domains are solved in terms of the central domain – they are considered secondary problems, whose solution follows as a matter of course only if the problems of the central domain are solved.” Yet Hallaq distinguishes his approach from Schmitt by emphasizing “the centrality of the values adopted in the central domain as ideal values that remain the distinctive desiderata and the locus of purposive action and thought,” even though the values and ideals may not be realized.

In discussing the origins of the modern state, Hallaq directs us through modern European philosophy, from Kant to Hegel and Nietzsche, to demonstrate that the Western weltanschauung is built upon a separation between the “legal” and the “moral:” the legal is intended to take precedence over the moral, and, indeed, does not derive its legitimacy from morality. The moral represents the peripheral domain among the two. Meanwhile, the central domain of the modern state is “the doctrine of progress,” which legitimates boundless dominance of both nature and man. Hallaq states:

6) Ibid., 7.
8) Hallaq, 9.
9) Ibid., 75-79.
The Enlightenment theory of progress shapes not only history, but also, as we intimated, *the very structures* of modern language, a language that in turn not only reflects the weltanschauung of the domination of nature and man but also *constitutes and conveys* domination itself. There is perhaps no idea or doctrine as powerful in the modern mind as this theory.\(^\text{10}\)

As such, the doctrine of progress is the primary factor driving the enterprise of the modern state. The Western weltanschauung is further defined by the preeminence of the “political:” the distinction between “is” and “ought” and the conscious choice to discount the “ought,” as suggested by Nietzsche.\(^\text{11}\)

In contrast, under premodern Islamic governance, the “ought” was paramount and the moral represented the central domain: “For the Islamists, the moral, to use Schmitt’s scheme, is the declared central domain – that latent desideratum providing the core impetus for the overall conception of this book.”\(^\text{12}\) Under Islamic governance, the moral is represented by implementation of the Sharīʿa, the theoretical and practical system that composes Islamic law.\(^\text{13}\) The primary sources of the Sharīʿa include the Qur’an, the Prophetic example (*sunna*), scholarly consensus, and legal analogy. In the words of Shaykh Faraz Rabbani, there is a comprehensive philosophy underpinning Sharīʿa.\(^\text{14}\) However, Sharīʿa does not account for the total legal system that premodern Muslims were subjected to.

In constructing a narrative of supposed unity between the legal and the moral, Hallaq does not take into account the historical polities, the ruling elite, their myriad intentions, and the areligious rules and laws they enacted.\(^\text{15}\) Rather, the law was constituted solely as a response to “Sharʿī stimuli.” According to Hallaq, “the Sharʿa was the measure against which the subsidiary domains were judged, and its solutions largely determined the solutions of those domains.”\(^\text{16}\) Technology, mathematics, and law were pursued and enacted in response to Sharʿī stimuli. Dominance over nature and man solely for the sake of progress, which yielded the destruction of the environment and the Western legacy of colonialism, does not surface under Muslim rule. Of course, Hallaq

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\(^\text{10}\) Ibid., 17-18.
\(^\text{11}\) Ibid., 80-81, 89-90.
\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 51.
\(^\text{16}\) Hallaq, 10.
acknowledges that “the paradigmatic status of the Sharīʿa” did not of its own accord ensure an ideal life; the premodern Muslim world also had its share of war, theft, larceny, corruption, and invasion. But, the “moral force” of the Sharīʿa prevented the corruption that results from the unbridled desire to make progress and to dominate.\(^{17}\)

Hallaq concludes that because the central domains of Islamic governance and the modern state are fundamentally opposed, with Islamic governance sanctifying the moral and the modern state securing material progress primarily, the two are incompatible. Where implementation of the Sharīʿa was primarily grounded in an attempt to realize the “ought,” modern states debased considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously sanctified the doctrine of progress. This preference of “is” over “ought,” of progress over morality, is perhaps most visibly demonstrated in the destruction of the environment and the various inequalities and ills that plague society. And it is because of these stimuli that Islamism currently enjoys its broad-based support.\(^{18}\)

Prof. Hallaq accurately describes the tension between the Western and Islamic worldviews, but he overstates their incompatibility by setting them as diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive. Prof. Mohammad Fadel from the University of Toronto responded to Hallaq’s previous work, \textit{Sharīʿa}, in an article in \textit{The Journal of the American Oriental Society}. Many of the problematic elements in \textit{Sharīʿa} resurfaced in \textit{The Impossible State}. Regarding the alleged incommensurability between the modern state and Islamic governance, Fadel states, “Unfortunately, many of [Hallaq’s] arguments have the unhappy effect of reinforcing a central tenet of the “war on terrorism:” there is an irreconcilable conflict between Islam and modernity. Indeed, one might read Hallaq’s narrative as merely a sophisticated inversion of the moral conclusions of the legal orientalism he so heavily criticizes.”\(^{19}\) In fact, the Sharīʿa/moral and Western/progressive worldviews may inform each other—a conclusion that Hallaq partially concedes at the end of \textit{The Impossible State}.

Furthermore, Fadel argues that Hallaq did not sufficiently explore or address empirical evidence that contravened his chosen narrative, which pits Islamic governance against the West and portrays the Muslims’ lot as supremely

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 11, 83, 88, 110-113.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 11-12. “Islamism is not just about social justice and profound resentment of the political and military practices of the Western countries in the Islamic world: it is a moral movement that—however politicized—offers critiques of social injustice, political corruption, and Western political domination in moral terms…”

\(^{19}\) Fadel, 110.
tragic. For instance, the unity that Hallaq supposes between the “legal” and the “moral” under premodern Islamic governance did not exist to the extent that Hallaq proposes. As Fadel states, readers may conclude that under premodern Islamic governance, there was no distinction between legally actionable rules and rules that were not.\textsuperscript{20} Premodern Islamic governance did sanction the Shari’a, and the Islamic ethos did inspire the practical undertakings of the government, but there was a clear distinction between religious and areligious law, and between law that could be judicially enforceable and law that was not enforceable because it determined one’s comport with God. Hanafi jurists, for example, distinguished between rules that follow from religion (given by \textit{fatwa}) and rules that apply in litigation (\textit{qaḍā’}).\textsuperscript{21} The former is neither legally enforceable nor binding, whereas the latter is both. Such misleading simplifications pervade sections of \textit{The Impossible State}, as well.

The Transition from Western Philosophy to the Constitution of the Universal Modern State

In addressing these points, however, Hallaq fails to distinguish how the abovementioned characteristics of the modern state negate modern Islamic governance. For instance, the first point can be used in arguing against the potential imposition of the modern state in a foreign context. However, the modern state has been willingly imported by much of the world—e.g. in the aftermath of the independence wars of Latin America and the Arab nationalism movement.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, the state has been adopted and changed to suit the demography and the socio-legal history of each context. Indonesia, for instance, adopted a constitution in 1945, which begins with a reminder that all that has come to pass is by the grace of God and then lays forth the foundation of Indonesian government and society: the panjcta sila, or the Five Principles, drawn up by President Sukarno and other leaders of the early republic.

The Five Principles consist of belief in the One and Only God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives, and the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{23} As a modern state, Indonesia is also

\textsuperscript{20} Fadel, 119.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
characterized by bureaucracy, \(^{24}\) the separation of powers, \(^{25}\) and universal suffrage. \(^{26}\) It is thereby apparent that although the modern state may have originated in the predominantly secular West, it is not bound to secular governance.

Hallaq’s failure to address modern attempts to implement Shari‘a law also weakens his argument, especially as he aims to discuss political theory and not Western/Islamic philosophy. Hallaq’s discussion of the implementation of Shari‘a in the premodern Muslim world does not bear direct relevance to the state of Islamic governance today. If Hallaq intends to maintain the authenticity of Shari‘a by limiting it to the premodern Muslim world, it would be useful to note that Shari‘a in the 12\(^{th}\) century Muslim world was notably different from Shari‘a under the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Islamic governance is better understood as covering a spectrum, with varying forms, each either attempting to implement the Shari‘a or inspired by an Islamic ethos. Saudi Arabia and Iran are two of the most prominent examples of Islamic governance implemented within the context of a modern state. The former is a monarchy while the latter a theocratic republic, and both claim to implement or be influenced by Shari‘a law. Islam also inspires the policies of the Justice and Development Party\(^{27}\) in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.\(^{28}\)

By restricting his discussion to premodern Islamic governance, Hallaq delegitimizes Islamic governance today. In “Islam and the Cultural Imperative,” Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, Chairman of the Nawawi Foundati,\(^{29}\) states that Islam is intended to “reflect the bedrock (indigenous culture)” over which

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\(^{25}\) CIA World Factbook.
\(^{26}\) Ibid.
it flows, looking Chinese in China and Indian in the subcontinent. Islam, and concurrently the Sharīʿa, have a history of being practiced and implemented throughout the Muslim world in various forms and at various times. This continues today in the context of the modern state. Rather than the inherent structure of the modern state, the more significant challenge to instituting Sharīʿa law is the will of an increasingly plural society, as is evidenced by the political drama being played out in Egypt today. As stated by Na’eeel Cajee, a student of Islamic theology, “We can extract paradigms from the past, the shura of the Sahaba [consultation of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, upon him be peace], for example, but it remains up to us…to determine what will maximize justice. The “Sharīʿa” does not detail an ideal government.”

At the root of the misconstruction is the contextual exclusivity that Hallaq imposes upon the modern state and Islamic governance: since the former developed in Europe and was nurtured in an environment saturated with Enlightenment thought, and because the latter defined the theoretical, practical, and spiritual framework for the premodern Muslim world, they cannot be compatible. In the words of Hallaq:

A central comparative dimension here is the controlling phenomenon of historical experience. The European experience that generated the modern state is just that: European. Islamic governance was squarely the product of Islamdom, of the total historical experiences of Islamic culture, values, weltanschauungs, however varied within the tradition these experiences may have been.

And yet, as we have just examined, this presupposition can validly be called into question. The modern state has been exported to numerous societies in the world (to varying levels of success) and Islamic governance has speciated dramatically since the premodern Muslim world.

Deficiencies in the Modern State Conflated with Incompatibility with Islamic Governance

Much of The Impossible State is dedicated to detailing the problems experienced by or because of the modern state, particularly in the West. However, the mere existence of these problems does not imply their incompatibility with Islamic governance. In chapter three, Hallaq attempts to further demonstrate

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31) Na’eeel Cajee, E-mail to author, April 5, 2013.
32) Hallaq, 110.
the incompatibility of Islamic governance with the modern state by addressing Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, attempting to prove that it has been ineffective:

The difficulties in the concept and practice of separation stem from the structural unity of the nation-state we have described, a unity that premodern Islamic governance never developed. The idea that each of the three powers should constitute checks upon the others created the dilemma of the degree of separation.

In addition, Hallaq notes that the three branches share the duties designated to each branch, nullifying the initial purpose for their separation. While the legislative branch specializes in legislation, for example, both the executive and judicial branches are also involved in rulemaking. This implicates the democratic nature of the state, for the executive is strengthened as a result of its encroachment into the realm of the duly-elected legislative and the legislative is correspondingly weakened. Hallaq asks, “How can there be a rule of law when an executive and a judiciary are empowered to legislate general norms?” While Hallaq successfully demonstrates that there are some unresolved problems with polities attempting to exercise the separation of powers, he fails to demonstrate that the separation of powers is incompatible with Islamic governance. The Iranian government, a self-declared theocratic republic, is an example where Islamic governance features the separation of powers.

Prof. Hallaq’s discussion of the creation and discipline of modern subjects vis-à-vis the modern state is similarly suspect. According to Hallaq, “the genealogy of European state discipline was inextricably tied to the rise of powerful monarchs whose main concern had been to tighten their hold over their populations while enriching their coffers.” The “upper classes” were appeased by being assured their share of the national wealth. Naturally, though, the gross disparity in resource allocation engendered resentment in the lower classes, which occasionally erupted. As a response, the state “introduce[d] an organized and well-staffed police apparatus,” and a “colossal prison system.”

In order to solidify the state’s control over its population and to ensure an

33) Hallaq, 40.
34) Ibid., 41.
35) Ibid., 47.
36) Ibid., 40-41.
38) Hallaq, 99.
39) Ibid., 100.
industrious populace, the state gradually introduced a system comprised of prisons, schools, universities, and hospitals: “Discipline thus translated into a site in which the subject was corralled into a system of order and instrumental utility.”\(^\text{40}\) The “trained subject” served primarily to advance the efficiency with which the state progressed. In seeking efficiency and progress, the modern state evolved into a “problem-solving machine”\(^\text{41}\) which inadvertently created a host of its own problems, including the dissolution of the modern family, the destruction of the environment, and the evils of nationalism.\(^\text{42}\)

These points appear to stand true at a cursory glance: it is no secret that modern states are struggling with climate change,\(^\text{43}\) a host of psychiatric illnesses that result from the isolation of the individual,\(^\text{44}\) and, measured in terms of divorce and neglect of children, unstable families.\(^\text{45}\) And yet, two questions remain in relation to Hallaq’s overall thesis: can we fairly claim that these problems should be attributed to the modern state? The modern state has been in existence for centuries. Many of the problems Hallaq notes arose within the last century. More accurate causes for the problems Hallaq notes exist and include the induction of the corporation age, and changing perceptions in society of worth and value that have only been introduced in the last century. Indeed, perhaps modernization is an external cause to which the modern state and society are beholden. Second, as a corollary of the former, how do these problems affect Islamic governance in the context of a modern state? Perhaps Islamic governance in the context of a modern state, when immune to corruption, may actually reel in some of these troubling issues.

**Secularism: The Wall of Separation Between Church and State**

Another significant omission is secularism, or the wall of separation
between church and state. Although Prof. Hallaq discusses the divide between the “legal” and the “moral” in the Western weltanschauung, he neglects to address the separation of church and state, which has a distinct intellectual history from the divide between “legal” and “moral” and is more definitive of the modern state, especially as experienced in the West. Government-endorsed secularism can be wholly antagonistic to the practice of religion in the public sphere, as in France. This directly impinges adherence to many faiths, including Islam and Judaism. A milder form of secularism is grounded in the American tradition. Among the founders of the American republic, Thomas Jefferson was the first to coin the phrase, “wall of separation between Church and State.”

For Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, principal author of the Bill of Rights, the freedom of religious minorities to worship as they please underlay the desire to separate religion and state. Jefferson endorsed and embraced John Locke’s view that “neither Pagan nor Mahomedan nor Jew ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the Commonwealth because of his religion.” Although the freedom of conscience spurred the founders of the republic to keep religion and state separate, the concept of separation rooted in secular ideals morphed elsewhere in the Western world, leading to the imposing form of secularism known as laïcité in France.

In discussing the constitution of the modern state, as opposed to Western philosophy alone, neglecting to address the separation of church and state is a significant omission. This is troubling considering that the most prominent anti-Islamic polemicists tend to implicate the unity between religion and state as the root cause of stagnancy in the Muslim world. Professor Bernard Lewis expresses this viewpoint in his essay in The Atlantic Monthly, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Lewis begins his essay with a quotation from Thomas Jefferson regarding the separation of church and state, deemed the “maxim of civil government”: “Divided we stand, united, we fall.” He traces the legacy of this separation in America and in Europe to their joint Christian heritage:

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“Render...unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God the things which are God’s.”

According to Lewis, Islam compels no such distinction between religion and state. For centuries, in Muslim societies, the state sanctioned religious law while writing a religious law. While dismissing more obvious reasons for global discontent with Western countries, Lewis contends that Western secularism is the root of the outrage that Muslims experience when considering the West. Recently, in September 2012, Ayaan Hirsi Ali reiterated this viewpoint in published remarks in *The Daily Beast*, implicating Islam and all forms of Islamic governance. Given the relevance of this issue to modern states ranging from France and Turkey to Iran, it is surprising that Prof. Hallaq did not address it in *The Impossible State*. Indeed, his failure to address secularism is part of the reason why the book seems more apt in summarizing the philosophical underpinnings of the Western worldview than in assessing the compatibility of Islamic governance with the modern state.

Reconciliation

Prof. Hallaq concludes his book by suggesting that the moral be installed as the central domain for all world cultures. Hallaq appropriately suggests that the marginalization of the moral has produced many of the problems modern societies combat. In elevating the doctrine of progress such that it supplanted the moral as the central domain, the modern state continues to sacrifice the environment, human rights, and the stability of the family. Hallaq’s proposed course of action is that Muslims collaborate with the adherents of “moral strand[s] of Western philosophical and political thought that exhibit[] a near identity with the current Islamic quest.” Again, it is difficult to substantiate the underlying assumption that Muslims as a collective entity can be committed to this goal. Moreover, for the modern Western state, the more significant

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51) Ibid. Lewis’ success in writing and publishing this piece is two-fold: one, he convinces many Westerners that such a dichotomy between the West and the Muslim world exists, that Muslims secretly desire the annihilation of the West, and that Westerners are justified in “self-defense” against the Muslims’ “aggressive” disposition. Two, he suggests to Muslims that perhaps the solution is the adoption of secularism.
52) Ibid. “This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”
54) Hallaq, 169.
55) Ibid.
problem would be finding the source of morality in a plural society. There is wisdom in the tolerant secularism, for example, practiced in the United States that generally refrains from imposing any single normative worldview on the adherents of other faiths.

Another significant problem is how such reconciliation can be envisioned. In an article in *The Pepperdine Law Review*, Prof. Mohammad Fadel theorizes that revealed religion has much to offer in the way of moral guidance to the modern state, specifically through engaging religion and the state in dialogue, as opposed to the current policy of sidelining. Fadel responds primarily to Prof. Abdullah an-Na‘im’s argument that religion and the state occupy “different normative orders” and therefore cannot be in conflict. Fadel asserts that the separation between religion and state as conceptualized in the United States is faulty because of the expansion of government into areas of life that would have been inconceivable in the past.

Fadel argues that perhaps the claims of religion and those of the state should be assessed according to normative concerns of justice. What is the source of these normative concerns? Rather than explicitly subjecting religion and state to an external source, Fadel validates both: “What this implies, then, is that in lieu of a separationist paradigm, the law should adopt a paradigm of principled reconciliation in which legal values and religious values are in a state of continual dialogue with the potential that each may inform and shape the other.” This may be one way to implement Hallaq’s suggestion of elevating the status of the moral again in the modern state.

**Conclusion**

Doubtless, Prof. Hallaq’s main thesis regarding the deterioration of the human condition and the marginalization of morality stands true. The methodology he employs, however, is questionable. By inadequately differentiating between Islamic governance and the modern state and by limiting his discussion of Shari‘a law to a single premodern model of Islamic governance, Hallaq restricts the value of his work to political theorists who are engaged in the study of modern Islamic political theory.

And yet, in describing the development of Western intellectual history, and

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57) Ibid., 1260.
in summarizing the deficiencies of the modern state, Hallaq’s work is valuable. As such, it seems that Hallaq’s argument would have been more persuasive had he chosen to analyze Islam’s compatibility with various theories of modernization or rationalization, which justify devaluing religion.\textsuperscript{58} Practical questions regarding implementation of Sharīʿa in the modern context, however, have yet to be satisfactorily elucidated.

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Abdulhamid Hadi Gadoua

Abdulhamid Gadoua has extensive experience teaching Arabic. He’s taught all levels (primary school, high school and university level) and even to non-Arabic speakers in Tripoli University immediately after obtaining his Masters degree in January 1989. He also taught Arabic at the University of Ottawa, Department of Modern Languages and Literatures in Canada. Gadoua is also the author of two books on the Arabic language, and has done such field-related works as translation from Arabic into English, language editing, and linguistic consultation.

A Metrical Study on The Mu’alqah of ’Imru’u al-Qays and the Mu’allaqah of Zuhayr ’Ibn Abī Sulma

By Abdulhamind Hadi Gadoua

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1. Preliminaries

1.1. Introduction

This study presents a metrical analysis of the Mu’allaqah of ’Imru’u al-Qays, and the Mu’allaqah of Zuhayr ’Ibn Abī Sulma. The two poems were selected according to the harmonized foot sequence and both poems end with the foot1 .ma.fā.Šī.lu. CV-CV-CV-CV. Both poems, according to the traditional Arabic metrics, belong to bahr al-tawīl, which literally means ‘the long meter’ whose feet are .fa.Šū.lun. .ma.fā.Šī.lu. .fa.Šū.lun. .ma.fā.Šī.lu. .CV.CV.CV.CV. CV.CV.CV.CV. CV.CV.CV.CV. Each poem is analyzed on the bases of its internal structure to show the syllable structure of the poem, the most frequent type and the least one. Also, it is aimed to identify the relation between the thematic structure of the poem and its syllable structure, and to know how the use of this small linguistic unit (syllable) differs in the themes of the poem. The quantitative analysis carried out in this study aimed to investigate the frequency of each syllable type in each theme as well as in the poem as a whole. The comparative approach used in this study is intended to explore the differences between classical Arabic poetry, on the one hand, and the prose as well as the text of the Qur‘ān, on the other hand.

1) The foot is known in the traditional Arabic metrics as taf‘īlah and the final foot in the verse is specifically known as ʿarb.
1.2. Notations

The symbols used in writing the Arabic data are mainly the basic Latin, which are available in the regular keyboard. In addition, there are symbols representing the sounds that exist in Arabic and do not exist in English as well as some English sounds that are represented by two characters. The following two figures show the Arabic symbols and their Latin as well as Greek counterparts that are used in this paper. Using these symbols instead of those commonly used in the transliteration is motivated by the fact that in order to show the exact components of the syllable, it is better to use one symbol for each letter.²

**Figure 1: The Vowel System of Arabic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a- Phonemic symbols</th>
<th>b- Orthographic symbols</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ī i ū u</td>
<td>ḳ k ṣ s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ā a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Vowel Distinctive Features**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-back</th>
<th>+back</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-round</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-round</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+high</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>ì</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-high</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>ā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²) In the transliteration convention there are some Arabic letters represented by two Latin symbols such as /kh/ for خ, /th/ for ذ and /dh/ for ذ. The three figures are copied from Gadoua (2011).
### Figure 3: The Consonantal Inventory of Arabic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bilabials</th>
<th>Labiodental</th>
<th>Interdentals</th>
<th>Dentals</th>
<th>Pharyngealized Dentals</th>
<th>Alveolar</th>
<th>Palatal</th>
<th>Velar</th>
<th>Uvular</th>
<th>Pharyngeal</th>
<th>Glottal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stops</strong></td>
<td>b  ب</td>
<td>ت  ت</td>
<td>ظ  ظ</td>
<td>ء  ء</td>
<td>q  ق</td>
<td>ظ  ظ</td>
<td>ء  ء</td>
<td>ء  ء</td>
<td>ء  ء</td>
<td>ء  ء</td>
<td>ء  ء</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fricative</strong></td>
<td>ف  ف</td>
<td>ث  ث</td>
<td>س  س</td>
<td>ص  ص</td>
<td>خ  خ</td>
<td>غ  غ</td>
<td>ع  ع</td>
<td>ع  ع</td>
<td>ع  ع</td>
<td>ه  ه</td>
<td>ه  ه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affricate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>j  ج</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trill</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>r  ر</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lateral</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>l  ل</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nasal</strong></td>
<td>m  م</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n  ن</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semi-vowel</strong></td>
<td>w  و</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y  ي</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 4: Syllable Types of Classical and Modern Standard Arabic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllable Type</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>Super Heavy</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVCC</td>
<td>Super Heavy</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVCC</td>
<td>Super Heavy</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis and Discussion

The two sections present quantitative and qualitative analyses for the results of the syllabification of the two poems.

2. Quantitative Analysis

In the procedure of the quantitative analysis I calculated the frequency of all syllable types in each poem as a whole and in each theme of the poem. Then, I classified the results in two tables for each poem.

2.1. Syllable Frequency in the Two Poems

With respect to the syllable types that characterize the syllabification of both poems, the analysis revealed three types, which are the light syllable CV, the closed heavy syllable CVC, and the open heavy syllable CṼ. These comprise only half of the syllable types that characterize the syllable structure of Standard Arabic as reported in the modern literature of phonology; for example, in Al-Ani (1970). As for the frequency of syllable type, there is a significant number of occurrences for the CV type in both poems. Nearly half of the syllables in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s poem are of this syllable type, 47 per cent, and a percentage close to this occurs in Zuhayr’s poem, 44 per cent. In addition to this, more than a third of the total number of the syllables, which is 34 per cent in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s poem and 38 per cent in Zuhayr’s poem, is of the CVC type. The sum of the occurrences of these two types comprises more than 81 per cent of the total number of the occurrences in each poem. The prominent character of these two types (CV and CVC) is that both have short vowels as nuclei. The other type CṼ, which has a long vowel as nucleus, occurs in both poems only 19 and 18 per cent of the total number of the syllables respectively. However, the super heavy syllables CVCC, CṼC, and CṼCC never occur in any of the poems. The following tables show the frequencies of the three syllable types in each poem as a whole.

Table 1: The Overall Frequencies of the Three Syllable Types in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s Poem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllable Type</th>
<th>Number of Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>0781</td>
<td>34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CṼ</td>
<td>0446</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2297</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: The Overall Frequencies of the Three Syllable Types in Zuhayr’s Poem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllable Type</th>
<th>Number of Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>0733</td>
<td>44 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>0619</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVV</td>
<td>0299</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>100 %</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

With respect to the frequency distribution over the thematic structure of the poems, the analysis showed that the light syllable CV almost maintained its rate of the overall frequency in all of the three themes of each poem. It occurs in the three themes in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s poem in a range of rate between 45 per cent and 47 per cent and in Zuhayr’s poem it is between 44 per cent and 45 per cent. Similar proximity in percentage is found in the occurrence of the closed heavy syllable CVC where it occurs between 34 per cent and 35 per cent in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s poem, and between 37 per cent and 41 per cent in Zuhayr’s poem. With regard to the occurrence of the open heavy syllable CVV, it occurs about 20 per cent in each theme in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s poem, but in Zuhayr’s poem the rate is not very close in the three themes. In the nasib theme, its occurrence is 14 per cent, in the rahil theme its occurrence is 16 per cent, and in the madih theme it is 19 per cent. The following tables show distribution of syllable frequency over the themes of both poems.

Table 3: Distribution of Syllable Frequency in ‘Imru’u al-Qays’s Poem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Distribution over Verses</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>CVC</th>
<th>CVV</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nasib</td>
<td>1-43=43</td>
<td>0562</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>46, 34, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahil</td>
<td>4-52=09</td>
<td>0113</td>
<td>087</td>
<td>052</td>
<td>0252</td>
<td>45, 35, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madih/Faxr</td>
<td>53-82=30</td>
<td>0395</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0840</td>
<td>47, 34, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>2297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Distribution of Syllable Frequency in Zuhayr’s Poem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Distribution over Verses</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>CVC</th>
<th>CVV</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nasib</td>
<td>1-6=06</td>
<td>076</td>
<td>068</td>
<td>024</td>
<td>0168</td>
<td>45, 41, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahil</td>
<td>07-15=09</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>097</td>
<td>041</td>
<td>022</td>
<td>45, 39, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madih/Faxr</td>
<td>16-59=44</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1231</td>
<td>44, 37, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) The approach of the thematic structure is based on what is laid out by Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych in her book *The Mute Immortals Speak* (1993).
The rate of the occurrence of the light syllable CV in every line of the poem ranges between 11 and 16 times in 'Imru’u al-Qays’s poem and it ranges between 11 and 15 times in Zuhayr’s poem. In line 07 of 'Imru’u al-Qays’s poem, for example, it occurs 16 times but in line 29 it occurs only 09 times. As for the rate of the occurrence of the closed heavy syllable CVC in every line of the poem, it ranges between 04 and 16 times in 'Imru’u al-Qays’s poem and it is between 07 and 13 times in Zuhayr’s poem. Finally, the rate of the occurrence of the open heavy syllable CṼ in every line of the poem ranges only between 01 and 10 times in 'Imru’u al-Qays’s poem and between 02 and 09 times in Zuhayr’s poem. In (1) and (2) below I provide examples from the two poems respectively to illustrate those numbers, and each syllable type under consideration is highlighted.

(1) Examples of the Lowest and Highest Frequency in a Line for the CV, CVC, and CṼ Type from 'Imru’u al-Qays’s Poem Respectively

a. CV

Line 29: Total: 11
.fa.la.mā. .2a.jaz.nā. .sā.ḥa.tal. .ḥay.yi. .wan.ta.ḥā. 
.bi.nā. .baṭ.nu. .xab.tin. .ḥi. .qa.qā.ḥa. .qa.qa.li.φ

Line 7: Total: 16
.ka.daʔ. .bi.ka. .min. .ʔu. .wu. .rī. .ti. .qa.b. .ḥa. .ra. .ml. .sa.li.φ

b. CVC

Line 03: Total: 04
.ta.raham. .ba.ṣa. .ra. .ra. .ti. .hā. 
.wa.ḥa. .ni. .ha. .ka. .ma. .ḥa. .bu. .ful. .li.φ

Line 54: Total: 16
.mi.kar.ri. .mi.far.ri. .muq.bi. .lim. .mud.bi. .ri. .ma. .ṣa. 

Line 15: Total: 10
.fa.ḥa. .ti. . ri. .fu. .li. .φ

4) This is the same line as the following example for CṼ type.

c. CṼ

Line 54: Total: 01
.mi.kar.ri. .mi.far.ri. .muq.bi. .lim. .mud.bi. .ri. .ma.ṣan. 
.fa.ḥa. .ti. . ri. .fu. .li. .φ

Line 15: Total: 10
.fa.ḥa. .ti. . ri. .fu. .li. .φ

(2) Examples of the Lowest and Highest Frequency in a Line for the CV, CVC, and CṼ Type from Zuhayr’s Poem Respectively

a. CV

Line 03: Total: 11
.wa. .ṭa. .la. .ʔu. .hā. .yan.ḥa. .na. .min. .kul. .maj. .ṭa. .mi.φ

Line 13: Total: 15
.ba. .ḥa. .na. .bu. .ku. .ran. .wa. .ṭa. .ha. .na. .bi. .suḥ. .ta. .tin. 
.fa.ḥun. .wa. .dir. .ra. .si. .kal. .ya. .di. .fi. .fat. .mi.φ
A Metrical Study on The Mu’alqah of ‘Imru’u al-Qays

b. CVC
Line 30: Total: 07
 weaponry, the trinity of the heavy, the super heavy syllable.
Line 05: Total: 13
 c. CṼ
Line 32: Total: 02
Line 30: Total: 09

3. Qualitative Analysis

Four main phenomena characterize the syllable quality and the syllable occurrence in the two poems. But before analyzing these phenomena, let us give a background on the syllable categories of Arabic in terms of the weight of the syllable.

With respect to the criterion on which weight of a syllable is based, the six types that comprise the syllable structure of Arabic have been divided in the modern literature of phonology into three categories: light, heavy, and super heavy. The syllable that is considered light is the CV type. The second category, the heavy syllables, contains two syllable types: CVC and CṼ. The third category, the super heavy syllables, contains the syllable types: CṼC, CṼCC and CVCC. The weight of a syllable depends on how many segments it contains, particularly, the number of segments that comprise the rime of the syllable, i.e. the nucleus plus the coda, if there are any. Accordingly, the light syllable has one mora, the heavy syllable has two morae, and the super heavy syllable has three morae.

5) This is the same line as 2-b above.
6) Some recent studies on Arabic phonology suggested that there is a sixth syllable type composed of two consonants, the final of which is doubled, mediated by a long vowel CṼC. Those who do not consider Arabic syllable structure composed of five types only embedded this type in the closed super heavy syllable CṼC ignoring the duplication of the final consonant; among those who argue for six types is Al-Ani (1970) in the latest edition of the book.
8) This category is irrelevant here because none of the super heavy syllables occurs in the two poems, and we mentioned it just to give a full picture of the syllable weight in Arabic.
3.1. Syllable Weight

With respect to the weight of the syllable, the examination of the syllable type occurring in the two poems revealed that the syllable can be either light or heavy and none of the super heavy syllables CVCC, ČVC, and ČṼČČ have presence in any of the two poems. In addition, while syllables with short vowels as their nuclei (CV and CVC) occur considerably in all themes of the poems, the heavy syllable with long vowel as its nucleus (ČṼ) occurs only slightly. All of the three syllable types occur in every verse (line), and within the word, they occur initially, in middle position, and in the final position. In isolation, however, both of the heavy syllables CVC and ČṼ occur but the light syllable CV cannot. Two examples are provided in (3) below to illustrate the occurrence of the three syllable types in any position of the word. The examples are taken from the two poems respectively and the syllables under consideration are highlighted.

3.2. Consecutive Occurrence within the Word

As for the successive occurrence of the same syllable in every single word, the analysis revealed that each of the three types cannot occur more than twice in the same word successively. In (3) and (4) below, examples are given to show the consecutive occurrence of each syllable type within the word. The first set of examples (3a-c) is taken from 'Imruʿu al-Qays’s poem and the second set (4a-c) is taken from Zuhayr’s poem and the consecutive occurrences of identical syllables are highlighted.

(3) Consecutive Occurrences of Identical Syllables in ’Imruʿu al-Qays’s Poem

a. CV Type
     .la.dā. .sa.mu.rā.til. .ḥay.yi. .nā.qi.fu. .ḥan.ẓa.li.φ

b. CVC Type
     .wa.lā. .siy.ya.mā. .yaw.man. .bi.dā.rā.ta. .jul.ju.li.φ

c. ČṼ Type
     .wa.lā. .tub.ṣi.đi.nī. .min. .ja.nā.kīl. .mu.ẓal.la.li.φ

(4) Consecutive Occurrences of Identical Syllables in Zuhayr’s Poem

9) There is no Arabic word made up of one single CV syllable.
a. CV Type
    .ma.rā.ji.su. .waš.min. .fi. .na.wā.ši.ri. .miʕa.mi.φ

b. CVC Type
    .wa.nuʔ.yan. .ka.ji.ʔu.ʔi. .ʔa.ʔu.ʔa. .mu.ʕa.rra.θa. .lam. .ya.ta.ʔal.la.mi.φ

c. CṼ Type
    .wa.taḍ.ra. .ʔi.ʔā. .dar.ʔu.θū. .fa.taḍ.ʔa.θa. .θa.la.mi.φ

3.3. Features in Line final Syllable

With respect to the distribution of features in the right edge of line final syllable, the analysis showed that the final segment in the final syllable must be a high short vowel, and every line in both poems ends with a sequence of two light syllables CV-CV. Any underlying form that does not fit this constraint is rendered to a CV-CV form in order for the line final foot in each line to harmonize with one another.

3.4. Domination of CV type

There are two reasons for the CV domination in terms of frequency. The first reason is shown in tables 5 and 6; that is, a significant number of line final feet in both poems undergo some phonological change in order for them to harmonize with the remaining feet of the poems and that phonological change affects the syllable structure of the final foot rendering it to have a sequence of two light syllables CV-CV. For example, the final words in the first four lines in 'Imru’u al-Qays’s poem end with tanween, which is a suffixed /n/ added to the indefinite noun in Arabic; however, as a rule this /n/ is deleted in line final position.10 Also, the final words in lines 5, 14, 17, and 18 are verbs in the imperative and negative moods and according to the Arabic grammar the final vowel is deleted in these cases. Yet, in the poem the final vowel must remain in order for the final syllable of the word to harmonize with the other. In (5) and (6) below I provide examples to illustrate these two cases.

(5) CVC Type Become CV-CV in the Noun in 'Imru’u al-Qays’s Poem

a- .fa.ḥaw.ma.ɸin. → .fa.ḥaw.ma.膦a.φ
b- .wa.ʔa.ʔi.лина. → .wa.ʔa.ʔu.ʔa.φ
C- .fu.ʔal.liner. → .fu.ʔa.θa.φ
D- .ʔa.ʔu.ʔa.liner. → .fa.ʔa.ʔa.φ

10) See: Chapter 3, section 3.2 in Gadoua (2011).
Likewise, the final nouns in lines 2-4 and 7, and the final verbs in lines 5-6, 12 incurred to the same change shown in (5) and (6) above. In (7) and (8) below I present these words.

(7) CVC Type Become CV-CV in the Noun in Zuhayr’s Poem

a- .miʕ.ṣa.min. → .miʕ.ṣa.mi.φ
b- .maj.θa.min. → .maj.θa.mi.φ
c- .ta.wah.hu.m. → .ta.wah.hu.mi.φ
d- .jur.θu.m. → .jur.θu.mi.φ

(8) CVC Type Become CV-CV in the Verb in Zuhayr’s Poem

a- .ya.ta.θal.lam. → .ya.ta.θal.la.mi.φ
b- .was.λam. → .was.λa.mi.φ
c- .yu.ḥaṭ.ṭa.m. → .yu.ḥaṭ.ṭa.mi.φ
d- .yaʕ.ẓu.m. → .yaʕ.ẓu.mi.φ

This change increases the frequency of the CV type at the expense of the frequency of the CVC type. The other reason is that it is a fact that the light syllable CV is cross-linguistically the most natural and therefore the least marked syllable in human languages (Sloat et al. 1978).

4. Discussion

In this final section I present two comparisons. One is related to the quantitative analysis involving the results of this research and similar study on the modern Arabic of Al-Šām in terms of syllable frequency, and one is related to the qualitative analysis involving the similarity and differences between classical Arabic poetry and the text of the Qur’ān.

4.1. Syllable Frequency in classical Arabic poetry and Some Modern Arabic Dialect

Concerning frequency, the quantitative analysis revealed a high frequency for the occurrence of the two syllable types that contain short vowels as nucleus, CV and CVC, compared to the syllable with long vowel as nucleus, CṼ. The results of our analysis, as shown in tables 1-2 above, make it possible to

11) This verb is in the conditional mood which too requires the deletion of the final short vowel.
claim that it is nucleus and not syllable weight which matters with respect to syllable frequency. Indeed, despite the fact that both CVC and CṼ syllables are considered as having the same weight (McCarthy 1979), the CVC syllable is much more frequent than the CṼ syllable.\(^{12}\)

The results of our analysis of syllable frequency in classical Arabic poetry revealed some similarity to as well as some differences with the outcome of some other analyses reported in the phonological literature related to Arabic. Abu-Salim and Abd-el-Jawad (1988) examined the syllable patterns of Levantine Arabic (LA), which has similar syllable structure as Classical Arabic, and one of their findings is that the syllable CV is the most frequent in all syllable types and the syllable CṼ is much less frequent\(^{13}\). Another finding related to our analysis is that the application of phonological rules plays a major role in determining the frequency and distribution of the syllable.

Given the fact that our analysis is restricted to only syllable types CV, CVC, and CṼ, the comparison between the results of their analysis and this analysis will be mainly concerned with the results related to these three syllable types. In the left side in table 7 below, I have gathered the frequencies of the three syllable types, which were given in table 1, (pp. 4), in Abu-Salim and Abd-el-Jawad (1988).\(^{14}\) In the right side of the table I gathered from the tables 1-2 above the frequencies of the three syllable types in both of the poems that represent the data of this paper.

The data of Abu-Salim and Abd-el-Jawad was “the actual word syllable-patterns that occur phonetically in Levantine Arabic” (p.1). It was the inventory of a dictionary of Syrian Arabic,\(^ {15}\) which is the major dialect of Levantine Arabic, or the Arabic of Al-Šām.

### Table 7. Frequencies of the Syllable Types in Word Final Position in Abu-Salim and Abd-el-Jawad (1988: 7-10) and their Counterparts in this Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abu-Salim and Abd-el-Jawad (1988)</th>
<th>This Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syllable Type</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>0701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{12}\) see section 3 above

\(^{13}\) Their study involved the five syllable types that compromise the syllable structure of LA, i.e., CV, CVC, CṼ, CVČ, and CVCC. They found that the least frequent is the CVCC type followed by the CṼ.

\(^{14}\) The cells that contain the frequency of irrelevant syllable types are shaded.

If we compare the results of our analysis with the syllable weight categories mentioned above, we find no consistent association between heavy syllables and high occurrence frequency or light syllable with low occurrence frequency. Abu-Salim and Abd-el-Jawad (1988) also found that “there is no one-to-one correspondence between syllable weight and frequency of occurrence” (p.4).

In addition, the light syllable CV is considerably the most frequent syllable in both studies. It comprises nearly half of the total number of occurrences in this research and in their study it covers more than one third of the total number of words and it is the most frequent syllable. The syllable CVC comes second in frequency in our research as well as in their study with about one third of the total number in both of the studies. As for the syllable CṼ, it is the least frequent of the syllable types in both of the studies if we exclude the irrelevant super heavy CVCC in their study. Its frequency does not exceed 01 per cent in their study and it comes below 20 per cent in this research. The only significant difference between the two studies is the occurrence of five syllable types (CV, CVC, CṼ, CṼC, and CVCC) in their study and the occurrence of only the first three syllable types in this study.

### 4.2. Classical Arabic Poetry and the Text of the Qur’an

When the revelation of the Qur’ān took place, the prominent aspect of the cultural circumstance in the Arabian Peninsula was the traditional Arabic poetry. Certainly, the text of the Qur’ān is not a chain of classical Arabic poems because there are major differences between the Qur’ān and classical Arabic poetry. With respect to the terminology, the text of the Qur’ān consists of Suwar (singular Surah) and the Suwar consist of āyāt (singular āyah), whereas the equal terminology in classical Arabic poetry is ṣaṣiṣa for Surah, and bayt for āyah. In the most common English translation ṣaṣiṣa is ‘a poem’ but Surah is ‘a chapter’, and the word ‘verse’ is given for āyah and bayt, but the word ‘line’ is given only for bayt.

According to my earlier study on the text of the Qur’ān, there are major differences between the traditional Arabic poetry and the text of the Qur’ān in terms of the weight and rhyme of the verse or line, as well as the occurrence of syllable type. Regarding the weight of the verse, the verses in a single poem
in the traditional poetry must have the same number of feet (tafāʕil), while a verse in the Qurʾān can be a single word or many sentences.

As for the rhyme, which is the line final consonant known as rawiy in the traditional terminology, in a poem in the traditional poetry the rhyme must remain the same until the end of the poem, whereas in the Qurʾān relatively few Suwar have the same consonant in line final position.

Regarding the harmony in line final position, in the traditional Arabic poetry a poem must contain only one sequence of harmonized verses, and the harmony includes not only the final segment but the final foot as a whole, whereas in the Qurʾān there are many Suwar that have more than one sequence of harmonized verses, and it is not necessary for the final feet to have exactly the same weight.

With respect to syllable type occurrence and frequency, in the text of the Qurʾān all five syllable types occur and as we have seen above only three syllable types occur in the classical Arabic poetry presented in this study by the poems of Imruʿul Qays and Zuhayr. My earlier study on the text of the Qurʾān focused on the line final syllable and I found that the most frequent syllable type in line final position is the super heavy closed syllable CṼC and in the second place comes the heavy open syllable CṼ. In the text of the Qurʾān, “the sum of the occurrences of these two types comprises more than 90 per cent of the total number of the syllable types that occur in line final position.”

---

16) The term that equalizes ‘foot’ in the traditional Islamic literature is maqṭaṣ and there are 6 feet or maqāği (plural form of maqṭaṣ): 1) CVC or CVV, known as sabab xaʃī, 2) CV-CV, known as sabab ɑqīl, 3) CV-CVC or CV-CVV, known as wataḍ maʃmū, 4) CVC-CV or CVV-CV, known as wataḍ maʃrūq, 5) CV-CV-CVC or CV-CV-CVV, known as faʃila suqrā, 6) CV-CV-CV-CVC or CV-CV-CV-CVV, known as faʃila kubrā. A group of two or three of these feet is known as tafāʕilah and there are 8 standard tafāʕil (plural form of tafāʕilah) constituting the 16 meters in the traditional Arabic metrical system and these are: 1) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CVV-CV-CVC, 2) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC, 3) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC-CVC, 4) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC-CVC, 5) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC-CVC, 6) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC-CVC, 7) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC-CVC, 8) / Sağ.ši.lun./ CV-CV-CVC-CVC. The final tafāʕilah in the first half of the verse is known as faʃila kubrā, the final tafāʕilah in the second half of the verse is known as darb, and each of the remaining tafāʕil is known as haʃw. Each half of the verse is known as misrāʕ or šaʃr, and when there is difference between the final tafāʕilah in either half of the verse it is known as haʃw only. For more details, see Frolov, Dmitry (2000). Classical Arabic Verse: History and Theory of ʽArūḍ. Brill Publication, Leiden, Netherland.

17) Among the 114 Suwar that comprise the text of the Qurʾān there are only 10 that have the same consonant in verse final position and these are: Surah 54, 63, 97-98, 103-105, 108, 112, and 114.

18) Modern Arabic poetry, known as free verse poetry, is more similar in many aspects to the Qurʾān than to the classical Arabic poetry. The similarity between the Qurʾān and the modern Arabic poetry is interesting because it reflects the influence of the text of the Qurʾān on the modern Arabic poetry.
The CVC type occurs in only about 07 per cent and the light CV type never occurs in line final position in any verse. These striking differences between the Qur’ān and classical Arabic poetry regarding the occurrence and frequency of syllable types are given in the following table which is copied from Gadoua (2011).

Table 8. The Overall Frequencies of All Syllables in Line final Position in the Text of the Qur’ān

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllable Type</th>
<th>Frequency in Final Position</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CṼC</td>
<td>4572</td>
<td>073.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>019.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>0419</td>
<td>006.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVCC</td>
<td>0034</td>
<td>000.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6236</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers in table 8 above illustrate two major differences regarding the results of the current study. First of all, there is a complete absence of the light syllable CV in the entire verses of the Qur’ān while all verses in the two poems under consideration end with the CV type. Secondly, the two syllables that contain long vowels as nuclei, CṼ and CṼC, dominate the occurrence frequency in the Qur’ān, with more than 90 per cent, and the syllables with short vowels as nuclei occur only marginally whereas in the two poems of this study the situation is vice versa; the two syllables with short vowel are much more frequent than the one with long vowel, see tables 1-2 above.19 In (9) below I give Sura 89 as a sample of the syllabification conducted in my earlier study to show the differences between the two studies mentioned above.

(9) Surah: 89
Total Number of Verses: 32

1. .biṣ.mil. .lā.hir. .raḥ.mā.nir. .raḥīm.φ
2. .wāl.fajr.φ
3. .wāl.yā.lin. .ṭašr.φ
4. .wāl.layli. .ṭi.ṭā. .yāsr.φ
5. .ḥal. .fī. .dā.li.ka. .qa.sa.mul. .li.ṭī. .ḥijr.φ
6. .ʔa.lam. .ta.ra. .kay.fa. .fa.ṣa.la. .raḥ.bu.ka. .bi.ṣād.φ
7. .ʔi.ṛa.ma. .dā.til. .ṭi. .mād.φ
8. .ʔa.la.ṭī. .lam. .yux.laq. .miθ.łu.hā. .fil. .bi.ṭād.φ
9. .wā.ṭa.mū.dal. .la.ṭī.na. .ja.ṭūṣ. .ṣa.x ра. .bil. ṭād.φ

19) In my earlier study the quantitative analysis was concentrated on verse final position.
The Sura given in (9) above, showed many differences between the text of the Qur’ān and classical Arabic poetry regarding line final domain. First of all, there are five syllable types in the final position: CVCC in verses 1-5, CṼC in verses 6-14 and in verses 17-18, CVC in verses 15-16 and in verses 25-28, and CṼ in verses 19-24 and in verses 29-30, and the light syllable CV is completely absent. Secondly, the final feet in the 30 verses of the Sura have different syllable weight and they do not have the same sound. In the two poems analyzed in this study the final verse position is occupied with one syllable only, that is, the light CV syllable and the whole of the verses in both poems end with the same sound, that is, the high short vowel /i/. Finally, the number of feet in each verse in the Sura varies from one verse to another while it is the same in the two poems under consideration.

5. Conclusion

In summary, an examination of classical Arabic poetry on the ground of versification and syllabification revealed that the frequency of syllables with
short vowels is far higher than that of syllables with long vowels. Among vow-
els, only a short vowel occurs in the right edge of line final foot. This is com-
pletely the opposite regarding the syllable occurrence in text of the Qur’ân and
the syllable organization in the prose.
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Appendix: The Poems of 'Imru’ul Qays and Zuhayr Ibn Abī Sulmā

I. Mu‘allaqat ’Imru’ul Qays (tawil)
The number of verses in poem 1 is 78 and the whole of the verses of the poem end with the CV syllable type.

4- .ka.ʔan.nī. .ʔa.dā.tal. .ba.yi. .ya. sh. .ustainability. .ba.ni. .ta.ham.ma.lū. .la.dā. .sa.mu.rā. til. .hay.yi. .nā. fu. .μu.ʔaw.wa.li.φ
6- .μu.ʔaw.wa.li.φ .μu.ʔaw.wa.li.φ
7- .μu.ʔaw.wa.li.φ .μu.ʔaw.wa.li.φ
11- .wa.ya.wa.m. .ʕa.qar.tu. .li.l.ʕa.ẓā. rā. .ma.ṭi.ya. ti. .fa.ʕa. .ʕa.ja.bam. .mir. .ra. h. li. ha. .μu. ta.ham.ma.li.φ
13- .wa.ya.wa.m. .da.xal.tul. .xid. ra. .xid. ra. .ʕu.nay.za.tin. .fa.qā.lat. .la.kal. .way.là.tu. .ʔin.na. ka. .μu.ʔaw.wa.li.φ
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14- .ta.qū.lu. .wa.qad. .māl.lal. .ğa.bī.țu. .bi.nā. .ma.ʕan. .ṣa.qa.r.ța. .ba.țī.țī. .ya.m.ța.r.ța. .qay.ṣi. .fa.n.țī.li.φ

15- .fa.qul.țu. .la.hā. .sī.țī. .wa.ʔa.r.xī. .zi.mā.ma.hū. .wa.lā. .tı.bī.țī.țī. .min. .ja.nā.ki. .mu.ța.la.lī.φ

16- .fa.mī.țī.li.țī. .hūb.lā. .qad. .ța.raq.tu. .wa.mur.dī.țīn. .fa.ʔa.l.țay.hū.la.hā. .ṣan. .díi. .ta.mā.ʔi.ța. .mu.h.wi.țī.li.φ

17- .ʔi.dā. .mā. .ba.kā. .min. .ṣa.r.țī.ha.n. .ṣa.ța.r.ța. .la.hū. .bi.șī.q.qi.ţ. .wa.ta.hī.țī. .șī.q.qu.hū. .la.m. .yu.h.ța.wa.lī.φ

18- .wa.yaw.ța.n. .ṣa.lā. .zah.țī.l. .ka.țī.țī. .ta.Ṣa.țā.ța.ța.ța. .ṣa.lā. .wa.ʔa.la.ța. .ha.l.ța.ța. .la.m. .ța.ha.la.lī.φ

19- .ʔa.ț̱i.ța.mu. .ma.h.lam. .ba.ș.ța. .hā.ța.ța. .ta.dal.lu.lī. .wa.ʔin. .ku.n.țī. .qad. .ʔa.z.ța.ța.ța. .ṣa.r.ța. .fa.ʔa.jm.țī.li.φ

20- .wa.ʔin. .ku.n.țī. .qad. .sā.ța.ța.ța. .mi.n.nī. .xā.țī.qa.ța.țu. .fa.sul.lī. .țī.yā.țī. .mi.n. .țī.yā.țī. .ki. .ța.n.ṣu.țī.li.φ

21- .ʔa.ʒa.r.ța.n. .mi.n.nī. .ʔa.n.ta.n. .hū.b.ța.ța. .qā.țī.lī. .wa.ʔa.n.ța.n. .mā.h.ța. .ța.ʔa.m.ța.r.ța. .qal.ța.ba. .yaf.ța.lī.φ


23- .wa.bay.ța.ța. .xid.țī.l. .lā. .yu.rā.ța.mu. .xī.bā.țu.ta.țu. .ta.m.ța.t.ța.ța. .mīl. .lā.h.ța.ța. .gī.ța.ța. .yag.ța. .mu.ța.j.ța.lī.φ

24- .ta.jā.waz.țu. .ʔa.h.ța.r.ța.ța. .ʔi.ța.l.ța.ța. .wa.mā.ța.ța.ța. .Ṣa.l.ța.ya. .hī.ța.ța.șal. .la.w. .yu.șir.ța.ța.na. .ma.q.ta.lī.φ

25- .ʔi.dā. .ma.ța. .țu.ʔa.r.ța.yā. .fī. .ṣa.ța.mā.ʔi. .ța.Șa.țar.ța.ța. .ța.șa.r.ța.ța.n. .ʔa.ța.ța.ța.ța. .ți. .wi.șā.hīl. .mu.ța.fa.șa.lī.φ

26- .fa.jiʔ.țu. .wa.qad. .na.țad. ța.ța.n. .lı.naw.mi.n. .țī.yā.ța.ța. .la.dā. .și.ța.lı. .ți.ța.șa.țal. .mu.ța.fad.țī.lī.φ


   .bi.nā. .baṭ.nu. .xab.tin. .dī. .ḥi.qā.ḥī. .ʔa.qan.qa.li.φ
30- .ha.ṣar.tu. .bi.faw.day. .raʔ.si.hā. .fa.ta.mā.ya.lat. 
   .ʔa.lay.ya. .ha.ḍī.mal. .kaš.ḥi. .ray.yal. .mu.xal.xa.li.φ
31- .mu.haf.ha.fa.tun. .bay.ḍā.ʔu. .gay.ru. .mu.fā.ḥa.tin. 
   .ta.rā.ʔi.bu.hā. .maš.qū.la.tun. .kas.sa.jan.ja.li.φ
   .bi.nā.zi.ra.tim. .miw. .waḥ.ši. .waj.ra.ta. .muṭ.ṭi.li.φ
   .ʔi.ḥā. .hi.ya. .naš.ṣat.hu. .wa.lā. .bi.mu.ṣat.ṭa.li.φ
   .ʔa.ṭī.ṭīn. .qa.qin.wīn. .na.xa.ṭil. .mu.ta.ṣa0.ḳi.li.φ
   .ta.ṭī.lul. .ʃī.qā.šu. .fī. .mu.ṭan.nan. .wa.mu.ṣa.la.li.φ
   .wa.sā.qin. .kaʔun.bū.ṭī. .sa.qiy.yīl. .mu.ṭal.la.li.φ
   .naʔu.muḍ. .du.ḥā. .lam. .tan.ta.ṭīq. .šan. .ta.faḍ.ḍu.li.φ
38- .wa.taʕ.ṭū. .bi.rax.ṣīn. .gay.ri. .ʃa0.nīn. .kaʔan.na.hū. 
   .ʔa.ʃi.ʃu. .zab.yīn. .ʔaw. .ma.sā.wī. .ku. .ʔi.ṣa.li.φ
   .ma.nā.ra.tu. .mu.mu.sā. .rā.ḥi.bīm. .mu.ta.bat.ṭi.li.φ
   .ʔi.ḥā. .mas.ba.kar.ṭa. .bay.na. .dir.ʃīn. .wa.mi.j.wa.li.φ
41- .ka.bik.ṭīl. .mu.qā.ʃa.ṭī. .ba.yā.ḍī. .bi.ʃuʃ.ə.ʁa.ṭīn. 
   .ʒa.ḥā.hā. .na.ʃī.ʃu. .mā.ʔi. .gay.ru.l. .mu.ḥal.la.li.φ
42- .ta.ʃal.lat. .ʃa.mā.ya.tur. .ri.jā.li. .fa.niʃ. .ʃi.bā. 
   .wa.lay.sa. .fuʔa.ḍī. .ʃan. .ha.wā.ki. .bi.mu.ns.ṣa.li.φ
43- .ʔa.lā. .rub.ba. .xaṣ.min. .ʃī.ki. .ʔal.wā. .ra.dad.tu.hū. 
   .na.ʃī.ḥīn. .ʃa.lā. .taj.ʃā.ḥī. .gay.ri. .muʔa.ta.li.φ
44- 

45- 
\[\text{fa.qul.tu. la.hū. lam.mā. ta.maṭ.ẓā. bi.šul.bi.hū. wa.ʔar.da.fa. ʔaʕ.jā.zan. wa.nā.ʔa. bi.kal.ka.li.φ}\]

46- 
\[\text{ʔa.lā. ʔay.yu.hal. lay.luṭ. ʔa.wī.lu. ʔa.lan. ja.lī. bi.šub.ḥin. wa.mal. ʔiš.bā.hū. min.ka. bi.ʔa.m.tha.li.φ}\]

47- 

48- 
\[\text{ka.ʔan.naθ. ʔu.rah.yā. ʕul.li.qat. fī. ma.šā.mi.hā. bi.ʔa.m.rah.ṣī. kat.tā.nin. ʔi.lā. ʔum.mi. ja.n.да.li.φ}\]

49- 
\[\text{wa.qir.ba.ti. ʔaq.wā.min. ja.ʕal. ʕā.lī. kā.hi.lī. min.nī. da.lū.lī. mu.rah.ha.li.φ}\]

50- 
\[\text{wa.wā.din. ka.jaw.fil. ʕay.ri. qaʔ.ri. ku.ʔar.Ṭū. ḥū. bi.ḥi. ʔiʔ. bu. yaʕ.wī. kal.μa. ʕi. ʕul.li. ka.maw.wa.li.φ}\]

51- 

52- 
\[\text{ki.lā.nā. ʔi.ʔā. mā. nā.la. ʔay.ʔa.n. ʔa.fā.ta.hū. wa.may. ʔaʕ. ʔa.ti.lī. wa.ʔar.ʔa. ʔa.ka. yah.za.li.φ}\]

53- 
\[\text{wa.qad. ʔa.ʔa. waṭ.ṭay.ru. ʔa. wa.ku.né. ʔa.ti.lā. bi.mun.ja.ri.din. qay.μil. ʔa.ʔa.bi. bi. ay.ku.li.φ}\]

54- 
\[\text{mi.kar.ri.m. mi.ʃar.ri.m. muq.bi.lim. mu.d.bi.ri.m. ma.ʔa. ka.jul.mā. di. ʃa.ri.μi. ḥaʕ.τa.hus. say. ʔu. min. ʔa.li.φ}\]

55- 
\[\text{ku.may.ti.n. ya.zi.lul. lab.da. ʕa.n. ʔa.θa.li. mat.mi.hī. ʔa.mah. zal.la. ʔis. saʕ. ʔa. ʔi. ʔa.mu.te.naz.zi.li.φ}\]

56- 

57- 

58- 
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II. Mu‘allaqat Zuhayr Ibn ‘Abī Sulma (ṭawīl)

The number of verses in poem 5 is 59 and the whole of the verses of the poem end with the CV syllable type.

1- .ʔa.min. .ʔum.mi. .ʔaw.fā. .dim.na.tul. .lam. .ta.kal.la.mi. .bi.ḥaw.mā.na.tid. .dar.rā.ji. .fal.mu. ta.ṭal.la.mi.φ

2- .di.yā.rul. .la.hā. .bir.raq.ma.tay.ni. .ka.ʔan.na.hā. .ma.rā.ji. ʕu. .waš.min. .fi. .na.wā.ši. ri. miʃ. ʕa.mi.φ


6- Fa lam mā. Sa raf, tud. dā ra. qul tu. li rab ši hā. Ša lan. šim. ša bā ḥan. Šay yu har. rab šu. was la mi φ

7- Ta baš šar. xa li li. hal. ta rā. min. Ša šā ṭi nin. ta ḥam mal na. bi ḥal yā ṭi. min. faw qi jū thu mi φ

8- Ja šal na. qa na na. Šan ya ma mi nin. wa ḥaz na hū. wa kam bi li qa na ni. mim mu hil liw. wa muh ri mi φ

9- Wa šā lay na. Šan ma ṭan. ši tā qan. wa kil la tan. wi rā dal. ḥa wā šī. law nu hā. law nu. Šand am id φ

10- Ša har na. mi nas sū bā ni. Šum ma. ja za ša na hū. Ša lā kul li. qay ni yin. qa ši biw. wa mu f a mi φ

11- Wa war rak na. fis sū bā ni. ya šī lū na. mat na hū. Ša lay hin na. dal lun nā ši mil. mu ta na ši mi φ

12- Ka ṭan na. fu tā tal. Ših ni. fī kul li. maw qī fin. wa qāf na. bi hī ḥā bul. fa nā lam. yu haṭ Ša am id φ

13- Ba kar na. bu kū raw. was ta ḥar na. bi suh ra tin. fa hun na. wa wā dir. ras ū. kal ya di fil fa mi φ

14- Fa lam mā. wa rad na. mā ṭa. zur qan. ji mā mu hū. wa da ša na. šī ši yal Šā di ri l. mu ta šay yi mi φ

15- Wa fi hin na. mal hal. li la Šī fi. wa man za run. Ša ni qul li šay nin nā Šī ri l. mu ta was ši mi φ

16- Sa šā šā šī ya. Šay zib ni. mu ra ta ba ša da mā. ta baž za la mā. bay na Ša šī ra ti bid da mi φ

17- Fa ṭaq sam tu. bi l bai til. la Šī. Šā fa. Ša haw la hū. ri jā lum. ba nū hū. min. qu ray ši w wa jur hu mi φ

18- Ya mī nal. la ni š mas. say yi dā ni. wu jīd tu mā. Ša lā kul li Šā lim min. sa Šī li w wa mub ra mi φ

19- Ta dā rak tu mā. Šab saw wa Šub yā na ba ša da mā. ta Šā naw wa daq qaw bay na hum. šī Šī ra man ša mi φ

20- Wa qad qul tu mā. Šīn nud ri kis. šil ma. wā š ši Šan. bi mā li w wa ma š Šī Šī mi nal qaw li nas la mi φ
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21- .faʔaš. baḥ. tu.mā. .min. hā. .ṣa. lā. .xay. ri. .maw. ti. nīn. .ba. fi. day. ni. .fī. hā. .min. .ṣu. qū. qiw. .wa. maʔ. ʔa. mi. φ

22- .ṣa. zī. may. ni. .fī. .ṣul. yā. .ma. šad. din. .hu. dī. tu. mā. .wa. may. .yas. ta. biḥ. .kan. zam. .mi. nāl. .maj. di. .yaʕ. żu. mi. φ

23- .wa. ʔaš. ba. ḥa. .yu. hū. dā. .fī. hu. mu. .min. .ti. lā. di. kum. .ma. gā. ni. mu. .ṣat. tā. .min. .ʔi. fā. lim. .mu. za. n. na. mi. φ

24- .tu. ʕaʃ. fa. .ku. lū. mu. .bil. mi. ŋi. na. .fa. ʔaš. ba. ḥat. .yu. na. jī. mu. hā. .mal. .lay. sa. .fī. hā. .bi. muj. ri. mi. φ


26- .ʔa. lā. .ʔab. li. gal. .ʔaḥ. lā. fa. .ṣan. nī. .rī. sā. la. tan. .wa. ŏub. yā. na. .hal. .ʔaq. sa. m. tu. mu. .kul. la. .muq. sa. mi. φ

27- .fa. lā. .tak. tu. mun. nāl. .lā. ha. .mā. .fī. .ṣu. dū. ri. kum. .li. yaw. fā. .wa. mah. mā. .yuk. ta. mil. .lā. .hu. .yaʕ. la. mi. φ


30- .ma. tā. .tab. ʔa. ṭū. hā. .tab. ʔa. ṭū. hā. .dā. mi. ma. tan. .wa. taḍ. ra. .ʔi. dā. .dar. ray. tu. mū. hā. .fa. taḍ. ra. mi. φ


32- .fa. tun. tij. .la. kum. .ṭīl. mā. na. .ʔaš. ʔa. ma. .kul. la. hum. .ka. ʔaḥ. ma. ri. .ṣā. din. .ʔum. ma. .tur. dī. ʕī. .fa. taʃ. tī. mi. φ


34- .li. ḥay. yin. .ḥi. lā. liy. .yaʕ. ši. mun. .nā. sa. .ʔam. ru. hum. .ʔi. dā. .ṭa. ra. qat. .ʔi. h. dal. .la. yā. lī. .bi. muʕ. ża. mi. φ

35- .ki. rā. min. .fa. lā. .dūq. .diŋ. ni. .yu. dī. ku. .tab. la. hū. .wa. lāl. .jā. ri. mul. .jā. nī. .ṣa. lay. him. .bi. mus. la. mi. φ
51- \( \text{wa.mal. lā. ya.zal. yas.tar.bi.lun. nā.sa. naf.sa.hū.} \)
(\( \text{wa.lā. yu'fī.hā. yaw.mam. mi.nā. ðam.mī. yan.da.mī.φ} \)
52- \( \text{wa.may. yağ.ta.rib. yaḥ.sib. ša.duw.wan. ša.dī.qa.hū.} \)
(\( \text{wa.mal. lā. yu.kar.rim. naf.sa.hū. lā. yu.kar.rā.mī.φ} \)
53- \( \text{wa.mal. lā. ya.ṣud. šan. ḥaw.ḍi.hī. bi.si.lā.ḥī.hī.} \)
(\( \text{yu.had.dam. wa.mal. lā. yaz.li.min. nā. sa. yuẓ.lā.mī.φ} \)
54- \( \text{wa.mal. lam. yu.ṣā.niʕ. fi. ťu.mū.rin. ka.thī.rin.} \)
(\( \text{yu.ḍar.ras. bi.ʔan.yā. biw. wa.yū.ʔa? bi.man.sī.mī.φ} \)
55- \( \text{wa.mal. lā. ya.ʕa.lil. maʕ.rū.fa. min. dū.ni. šir.ḍi.hī.} \)
(\( \text{yu.ḥad.dam. wa.mal. lā. yat.ta.šī. ťat.mā. yuṣ.ṭa.mī.φ} \)
56- \( \text{sa.ʔim.ṭu. ta.kā.ḥī. fal. ḥa.yā.tī. wa.may. ya.ʕiš.} \)
(\( \text{ya.fir.hu. wa.mal. lā. yu.ṣā.niʕ. fī. ťu.mū.rin. ka.thī. ra.ṭī.n.} \)
57- \( \text{wa.mah.ма. ta.kun. šin.dam.ri.ʔim. min. xa.lī.qa.tin.} \)
(\( \text{wa.ʔi.n. xa.lā.hā. tax.fā. ša.lān. nā. si. tuʃ.ła.mī.φ} \)
58- \( \text{wa.ʔaʕ.ła. mu. mā. fil. yaw.mī. wa.ʔam.si. qab. la.hū.} \)
(\( \text{wa.lā. kin.na. nī. šan. šī.mī. mā. fi. ʕa.dīn. ʔa.mī.φ} \)
Brittany Haynes

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Transforming Masculinity and Male Sexuality in Modernity
From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic
By Brittany Haynes

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In her book, *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards*, Afsaneh Najmabadi analyzes how gender has shaped Iranian modernity. She argues that the heteronormalization of love, which took place during the nineteenth century, was a key element influencing the political and cultural shifts of emerging Iranian modernity. She examines other male “gender positionalities” which existed during the nineteenth century before the modern gender binary of man/woman became the paradigm for sexuality.¹ During this transitional period, “…homoeroticism and same-sex practices came to mark Iran as backward; heteronormalization of eros and sex became a condition of ‘achieving modernity,’ a project that called for heterosocialization of public space and a reconfiguration of family life.”² Najmabadi states that beauty transformed from a concept that could lead a man to love and to desire a young male or female regardless of gender to one that polarized gender in the context of “natural” heterosexual love.³ She suggests this “enormous cultural transformation” had occurred by the end of the nineteenth century as Iranians were exposed to the European gaze and increasingly interacted with Europeans who viewed homosexual desire and homosexual practices as vices.⁴

The present study explores the relevance of Najmabadi’s arguments regarding the heteronormalizing processes of Iranian modernity in an Ottoman/Turkish context. I will illustrate and problematize the ambiguity of heteronormative Turkish modernity by examining some of the paradoxes and conflicts

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² Ibid., 3.
³ Ibid., 5-6.
⁴ Ibid., 4.
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occurring within transformations of masculinity and male sexuality. In order to support this analysis, elements of Najmabadi’s study will be explicated, drawing parallels between the Iranian and Ottoman contexts, particularly in regard to Sufi notions of young male beauty and male same-sex desire and their contentious legacy as it became embodied by the ambiguous modern figure of the Europeanized dandy. Drawing from these discussions, the figure of the young male dancer, the köçek, as an object of male desire in the Ottoman/Turkish context, will take central focus. The köçek, as the ultimate embodiment of the ambiguity of heteronormative Turkish modernity, was subverted and marginalized as a performer of homoerotic masculinity and male sexuality during the late nineteenth century through the 1950s. This was done in part by Kemalist efforts to shape national dance as a performance of heteronormative modernity. Such transformations were invested in the bulk of society living in the countryside, an important demographic not addressed by Najmabadi. As demonstrated by this study’s examination of the rural presence of the köçek, homoerotic concepts of masculinity in Turkish society were not altogether erased, but in fact persisted through heteronormative modernization and the Kemalist establishment of the Turkish Republic.

Najmabadi illustrates with an analysis of Qajar paintings how concepts of beauty were not defined according to gender in early Qajar Iran (1785-1925).\(^5\) She acknowledges that from a modern perspective, sometimes it is very difficult to discern whether an individual depicted in these paintings is male or female, as figures of both sexes embodied features of beauty which would appear feminine to the modern eye. Persian poetry and paintings often feature beautiful young, beardless males known as the ghilman, or amrads.\(^6\) For a male adolescent, it was considered inevitable, if not accepted and valued, to be the object of adult men’s desires. Once a man developed a full beard, he was expected to become the desirer rather than the object of desire. However, some adult men, mukhannas, shaved their beards to attract the desires of other adult men. The binary of modern sexual categories has perceived amrads and mukhannas as effeminate, thus rendering homoerotic desire as “frustrated heterosexual desire.”\(^7\) For contemporaries, however, the taboo surrounding the shaving of an adult man’s beard, the symbol of manhood, was the association of beardlessness with amrads, not with femininity. Sexual practices were not static and bound by concepts of sexual orientation in the pre-modern Islamic world. Najmabadi states that, “In particular, men, whose sexual practices we know a great deal more about than those among women, engaged in a variety

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5) Ibid., 11.
6) Ibid., 15.
7) Ibid., 16.
of sexual acts. Vaginal intercourse with wives was to fulfill procreative obligations, while other acts were linked to the pleasures of power, gender, age, class, and rank. As expectations for modern companionate marriage rose later in the nineteenth century, wives began demanding that their husbands cease their relationships with *amrads.*

Najmabadi discusses briefly the connection of concepts of beauty to their Sufi origins as well as to their ability to incite love and desire for both young males and females. I would like to elaborate on these origins in relation to homoeroticism by drawing on Dror Ze’evi’s *Producing Desire.* In the Ottoman Middle East, Sufis developed the idea of gazing at beauty as a path to true love of God. According to Ze’evi, since men were considered more perfect beings than women and the latter were not permitted inside Sufi lodges, beardless young men became the “objects of loving contemplation.” Taboos against sexual relations broke down after gazing at the beauty of young men was combined with the song and dance ritual *sama,* which often produced states of trance and ecstasy and involved bodily contact. This was a radical, but popular, practice and considered a challenge by the orthodox Sufi order which comprised the religious backbone of Ottoman society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Ze’evi clarifies that the point of conflict was around the social and political implications of this heterodoxy, not the expression of homoerotic desires and practices. Homosexual practices in the Middle East had been recognized and tolerated since the beginnings of Islam. Although they were morally and legally derided, little was done to prevent or punish them as long as they were kept private.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many treatises were written against the practice of gazing at beardless youths in an attempt to preserve the soul of the Sufi community and uphold public morality. Adult men’s sexual relations with young beardless males, which came to characterize the gazing element of radical Sufism, was viewed as a threat because it was a sexual norm with the ability to pervade Sufi sects and undermine the Sufi orthodoxy. Any mention of sexual deviance in the treatises had to do with adult males engaging in sexual relations, which Najmabadi also refers to in the Persian context. Similarly, Ze’evi draws the conclusion that male sexuality was

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8) Ibid., 20.  
9) Ibid., 25.  
11) Ibid., 87.  
12) Ibid.  
13) Ibid., 88-90.  
14) Ibid., 92-93.
viewed in two distinct phases. Until puberty boys were thought to have an untamed sexuality which they could use to seduce older men, but they could be attracted just the same to other boys and women. Once they matured, men were expected to become attracted only to younger males or women; those who desired other adult men were thought to be suffering from an illness.

In the nineteenth century, Sufi ideas regarding homoeroticism became problematic not for their political radicalism, but because of their sexual positioning. The expectations for men changed from attraction to males and females with love for young men as the most virtuous to heteronormative sex and love accompanied by distinct ideas of beauty for women and men. Ze’evi suggests that the process of heteronormalization occurred over a longer period of time and less rapidly in the Ottoman Middle East than it did in the Persian world as Najmabadi describes. Homoerotic love and sex became shameful to discuss and texts involving such themes ceased to be reprinted, contributing to the evaporation of the discourse on divine love and beauty. Many Sufi groups were disbanded out of a new sense of fear and shame at what was now viewed as deviant, perverse sexuality. During the modernizing Tanzimat reform era of Sultan Abdulhamid II, a Sufi himself, Sufis were no longer permitted to promote gazing and the desiring of amrads. The final blow was delivered in the 1920s when Mustafa Kemal outlawed Sufi activity as a corrupt leftover of the Ottoman Empire that needed to be swept away to accommodate modern society.

Najmabadi explains that, by the end of the nineteenth century, beauty was no longer genderless in Qajar Iran; it had become feminized, as was occurring elsewhere in the Middle East. She argues that the heteronormalization of Iranian social values occurred largely through increased travel of Europeans to Iran and Iranian men to Europe. Iranian men became frustrated that homoeroticism between adult men and adolescent males was viewed generally as an appalling vice and impediment to modernity by Europeans. Europeans linked same-sex practices with women’s seclusion and with amrad dancers, whom they perceived to be effeminate and dressing up in female clothing. While Iranian men drew parallels between the shaven faces of European men and the amrads or ghilman, Najmabadi identifies this juncture as the point where the connection between effeminacy and beardlessness, and therefore

15) Ibid., 93.
16) Ibid., 96.
17) Ibid.
18) Ibid., 98.
19) Ibid., 97.
20) Najmabadi, 26.
21) Ibid., 33.
the object of male homosexual desire, was initially made.\textsuperscript{22} In response to European misreadings of homosociality as homosexuality, Iranians sought to distinguish the two as mutually exclusive domains, paradoxically allowing homosociality to function as a masquerade for homosexuality.\textsuperscript{23} Additionally, the depiction of the male beloved disappeared from paintings and poetry and heteroeros became a masquerade for homoeroticism, marking the adaption of the modern binary concepts of heterosexuality and homosexuality. In turn, female figures took the place of the male as the beloved and ideal of beauty, as previously embodied by the \textit{ghilman}.\textsuperscript{24} Male homoeroticism was also feminized as it became viewed as an unnatural substitute for, and derivative of, heterosexual desire.

Additionally, Najmabadi argues that Iranian men’s heterosocial interactions in Europe conjured images for them of paradise filled with the \textit{ghilman} and \textit{hur}, which manifested in a desire for heterosociality.\textsuperscript{25} By the end of the nineteenth century, Iranian travelers were writing about the beauty of European women only. Love of young men became disapproved of and associated with the backwardness and corruption of Islamic culture as perceived by new modernizing, secular regimes in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{26} However, men were still seen as engaging in homosexual practices, which were to cease with marriage, in what could be read as a temporal type of masquerade for homosexual preference.\textsuperscript{27} Love had also shifted from the homosocial domain to that of marriage, uniting masculine and feminine gender categories in a realm of sexuality and love, not merely procreation. The feminized young male object of desire became a shameful figure and the pre-modern homoerotic relationship between adult men and \textit{amrads} was unable to form an equivalent in modernity.\textsuperscript{28}

Najmabadi discusses how elements of women’s and men’s appearances, such as veiling and maintaining beards, came to represent the backwardness of Islam as many modernists insisted that one had to begin the modernization process by adopting European manners and dress.\textsuperscript{29} Emulation of the European dandy became a source of cultural anxiety for Iranian men being pushed and pulled in different directions by the upheavals and transformations of modernization. Najmabadi argues that, through the 1930s, veiled women represented backwardness and tradition while the Europeanized male dandy, 

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 35.  
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 38.  
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 38-39.  
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 55.  
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 56-57.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 58.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 59-60.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 137.
farangi’ma’ab, embodied the excesses of modernity. The term came to be used as a negative connotation for men who dressed in European style but had not internalized any modern virtues of European culture, such as scientific learning. Furthermore, the farangi’ma’ab’s beardless face and fitted, fashionable outfits conjured images of the beautiful amrad, the feminized dancing amrad and mukhanna, and the adult male desirer of both young men and women, all of which cast him into a masculinity loathed by Iranian modernity. The ambiguous figure of the farangi’ma’ab was portrayed not only as a challenge to public morality and traditional notions of manhood, but also as a political opportunist undermining social reform. Najmabadi explains that the evolution of the farangi’ma’ab into the modern man was another reason why efforts were made to erase the amrad and ghilman from Iranian cultural memory. She argues that the unveiling of women, their emergence into public life, and transformation into companionate wives was necessary for the heteronormalization of love and sex and thus the subversion of the ghilman’s memory and the “unnatural” same-sex practices that had become associated with gender segregation.

I have used Producing Desire to demonstrate how male homosocial culture in the wider Middle East, particularly in the Ottoman world and Iran, was shaped by Sufi concepts of beauty, love, and sex, and how male gender and sexuality became heteronormalized under the pressure of modernizing reforms beginning in the late nineteenth century through the 1930s. Now, I would like to discuss perceptions of the Europeanized dandy in the late Ottoman context as a parallel to the farangi’ma’ab, the former whom Elif Bilgin analyzes in her 2004 thesis, An Analysis of Turkish Modernity Through Discourses of Masculinities. Similar to Najmabadi, Bilgin identifies a cultural anxiety over what was portrayed in late Ottoman literature as a gender ambiguous, “over-Westernized” male dandy. According to Bilgin, as the pace of modernization became more rapid, the proliferation of this figure in society became more threatening to established views of manhood. Like the farangi’ma’ab, the Ottoman dandy was also the subject of satire and accused of mimicry. In novels of the period, the effeminacy of such characters is constantly implied, though never addressed directly, and they are overly concerned with body image.

Bilgin argues that the over-Westernized Ottoman male dandy was feminized because of his association with the West, viewed as a woman yet repre-
senting characteristics of both femininity and masculinity. This contributed to his ambiguity that threatened to upheave the existing social order and ideas of honorable masculinity. I would further suggest that Najmabadi’s analysis of the farangi’ma’ab applies to the Ottoman context. The Ottoman dandy’s representation of both feminine and masculine qualities can be seen also as the simultaneous embodiment of the beautiful amrad, the feminized dancing amrad and mukhanna, and the adult male desirer of both young men and women. Therefore, the Ottoman dandy would have been feminized, and therefore problematized, not only because of his association with the West/women as Bilgin argues, but also because of his likeness to an amrad. The lack of direct accusations of effeminacy Bilgin refers to may be indicative of social mores becoming heteronormalized and discussion of male homoeroticism subsequently becoming shameful, particularly with the restrictions placed on Sufi discourses of love and beauty as noted by Ze’evi.

I would now like to focus on how the amrad, analyzed by Najmabadi as a contested figure of male gender and sexuality, also represented the ambiguity of heteronormative modernization specifically in his ability to perform these concepts through dance. As indicated by Najmabadi, the amrad became a feminized figure initially because European travelers who observed dances performed by amrads thought they were dressing in women’s clothing and trying to imitate women’s mannerisms. Her analysis of the farangi’ma’ab and the parallel I have drawn to the Ottoman dandy indicate how the effeminate amrad, particularly as this feminization was associated with and perceived as being performed through dance, became a sexual and cultural conflict for modernizing society, thus creating the drive among modernists to subvert the figure of the amrad and his shameful homoeroticism. I will now discuss the attempted subversion of the amrad as a dancer and gender performer, and the ultimate effeminate male and deviant of modern heterosexuality.

In the Ottoman context, young male dancers were known as köçeks. Certain dances were traditionally performed by köçeks in the Ottoman Empire. Köçeks were either professional or amateur dancers who could be found performing for the imperial Ottoman court, Ottoman elites in the taverns of Galata and Pera in Istanbul, or male audiences throughout the Anatolian countryside. The young male dancer existed, and still exists, in various manifestations throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. In his book, Dances of An-
Transforming Masculinity and Male Sexuality in Modernity

tolian Turkey], published in 1959, early Turkish dance researcher and scholar Metin And describes, similar to Najmabadi, that the dances of young men offended European travelers’ heteronormative conceptions of sexuality and beauty, yet at the same time also had the ability to enthrall them.\(^{40}\) The köçek were adored by their male audiences and their praises were sung in poetry. And states that the dances and appearance of the köçek “suggest femininity” and that “sometimes they dress like girls.”\(^{41}\) However, in his article, *The Male Dancer in the Middle East and Central Asia*, Anthony Shay emphasizes a point made by Najmabadi that young male dancers were not trying to impersonate females, except for comical purposes, but were using elements of both male and female dress along with other markers of maleness to enhance their beauty as young male performers.\(^{42}\)

Similar to European accounts, And’s description of the köçek as feminized reflects a heteronormalized, modernist view, additionally hinting at a sense of Kemalism that was instilled in urban Turkish society by the time of the book’s publication. While professional dancers were often from non-Muslim origins,\(^{43}\) And demonstrates several times, and illustrates with traveler accounts, that köçek were “not Turks” and that “Turks would not enter such a degraded profession.”\(^{44}\) He defends the image of the modern Turkish heterosexual male by casting the köçek as a feminized and therefore “degraded” masculinity and relic of the Ottoman past. This indicates the nationalization and elevation of the term “Turk” as an ethnic marker, which was used historically by Ottoman elites as a negative connotation for the uneducated peasant. Professional dancers in the Ottoman Empire, like many köçek, were typically non-Muslim, not non-Turk, a misinterpretation that is indicative not only of the modernization of masculinity but also its nationalization, thus casting Turks as historically morally superior and the typically minority dancers (mostly Armenians, Jews, and Greeks according to And\(^{45}\)) as feminized Others.

The figure of the köçek became misconstrued under the European gaze as the feminized stand-in for women in terms of dance and sexual relations, allegedly as a result of gender segregation. European observers viewed the sensual movements and facial expressions of köçek dances, which also involved

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Orient and the Politics of the Imperial Gaze,” in *Dancing Fear and Desire: Race, Sexuality, and Imperial Politics in Middle Eastern Dance* (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004), 77.


41) Ibid., 26.


45) Ibid., 29.
skilled athleticism and acrobatics, as lascivious and morally degraded. However, they did not comprehend that sexual references were often intended to be comical or satirical.\textsuperscript{46} Still, the \textit{köçek} was an object of adult male desire and, as author Stavros Karayanni explains in \textit{Dancing Fear and Desire}, the \textit{köçeks} were sexually available and courted by men, including the Janissaries.\textsuperscript{47} Their performances could so impassion their audiences that they could lead to “…an ecstasy of obscene and blasphemous words, glass breaking, and sword and dagger brandishing” in the taverns of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{48} This also caused infighting among the Janissaries and Sultan Mahmud II’s subsequent banning of the \textit{köçeks} in order to preserve the order of the army.\textsuperscript{49} I would further suggest that the \textit{köçek} was banned officially in the mid-nineteenth century because he represented a threat to a public order which sought to transform with a heteronormalizing face. In addition to the European perception of their appearance and erotic movements, the sexual availability of \textit{köçeks} to other males compounded their image as vulgar and effeminate and that of Ottoman/ Eastern morality as depraved and backward in the eyes of European observers.

And indicates that, although the \textit{köçeks} had disappeared in one of their traditional urban forms as companies of professional dancers in Istanbul, at the time of his writing (1950s) they could still be found performing as professional or amateur dancers in Anatolian villages.\textsuperscript{50} He states that, “The boys dance as long as they preserve their good looks and can conceal their beards. In some Anatolian provinces, even today, they become drummers to other dancing boys when they lose their looks and their beards grow.”\textsuperscript{51} This indicates strongly that homoerotic notions of male beauty and sexuality persisted well into modernity at least among the peasantry, which compromised approximately 80 percent of Turkish society in the first years of the Turkish Republic. For the Kemalist regime, the Anatolian peasant represented both the backwardness of Islam against which the Kemalist regime was trying to modernize, and a pure, untouched type of Turkishness that could be tapped in the creation of the concepts of civilization and Turkish national identity. These views of the peasantry represent one of the Kemalist modernization project’s many contradictions.

With this in mind, I would now like to discuss an anecdote from the travel narrative of İrfan Örga, a Turkish air force pilot turned writer living in England

\textsuperscript{46} Shay, “The Male Dancer in the Middle East and Central Asia,” 147.
\textsuperscript{47} Karayanni, 78.
\textsuperscript{48} And, \textit{Dances of Anatolian Turkey}, 30.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 30-31.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 27.
who first published in the 1950s an account (originally in English) of his travels in rural Anatolia during the 1930s in pursuit of a group of Turkic nomads, the Yürük. It captures how homoerotic notions of masculinity could prove to be resistant to top-down modernization, and therefore heteronormalization, in Turkey. Orga recounts the experience he had observing an “erotic dance” performed by a köçek one night in an Anatolian village. In contrast to the denunciation of such performances by European travelers, Orga’s account is more ambivalent:

A boy of perhaps fifteen was pushed into the centre of the floor. His fresh adolescence was a touching thing in that stale old room….He singled me out for his attentions, standing so close in front of me that I was aware of the little pulse beating in his throat and his head outlined in flaring candlelight. He stared at me for a moment, his eyes taunting me, then he flung back his head in laughter. He leaned forward to snatch my hand and kiss it, and all the time his lightning gaze flashed from my ring to the gold watch on my wrist. Hikmet Bey pulled him close to plant a kiss on his upturned mouth, then said thickly that he was to dance.52

For a few moments the boy stood slackly, but one felt the ripple of excitement that went through the watching men. For a little longer the boy timed his movements against the beat of the music, little hesitant movements that were suggestive of young amorous limbs….His smooth young face was as blank as a sleepwalker’s. He weaved a pattern with his feet, but his mind was somewhere else. His artistry was superb, for the movements of his body and the fluttering hands portrayed unmistakably a young girl’s first reluctance to physical love, her gradual desire to experience it, finally her surrender.53

Orga describes a young male dancer who, as evidenced by his flirtations, is accustomed to being the object of his older male audience’s affections. Orga is touched by his “fresh adolescence,” which recalls Najmabadi’s description of “the ambivalence of youthful masculinity, a transitional age when the young man became adult men’s most coveted object of desire.”54 The descriptions of the dancer’s “smooth young face” as “blank as a sleepwalker’s” and mind as “somewhere else” also reflect this ambivalence, which I would suggest position the köçek temporally not only as an ambiguous figure of transitioning male sexuality and desire, but also as an ambiguous figure of transformative

53) Ibid., 51.
54) Najmabadi, 32.
modernity. Orga’s views conflict as he at once seems drawn to the dancer’s beauty, yet justifies this sentiment by interpreting the dance as a young girl’s “surrender” to physical love. Orga’s homoerotic attraction can be masqueraded, to use Najmabadi’s term, by feminizing the dancer.

Men sat in rapt attention, light running silver down the side of a face or the jutting archipelago of a nose. The half-darkness was rapacious and secretive and all eyes were directed to the boy who swayed in moaning rapture, his dark shadow leaping up the wall behind him—monstrous, gigantic. The music rose and fell, offbeat, infinitely sad, for it spoke of passing earthly joys. The languorous boy stood quite still in the middle of a twirl, one foot poised above the other, the posture sustained magnificently, then, in time to quickened music, abandoned himself to the consummation….His low sad cry of surrender echoed round the startled room, and then he flung himself to the floor, twitching.55

Orga expresses a sentimentality and sadness for the dance and its homoeroticism as something in the process of “passing.” The dancer, as a declining cultural feature, performs his demise by languishing and succumbing under the forces of modernity. However, Orga also describes the dark atmosphere of the performance as “rapacious and secretive” with the dancer’s “monstrous, gigantic” shadow looming on the wall behind him. This might indicate that, on the other hand, while marginalized to such spaces, the köçek and his legacy of masculinity and male homoeroticism may not disappear so easily from Turkish modernity.

With the ending of the dance cries rose from dark corners where men sat clasping their hands between their thighs, lost, abandoned to the erotic moment. Someone shouted, ‘All-ah,’ unable to contain himself any longer….I found the experience of that night both moving and chilling, an experience so primitive that it could not fail to stir the blood, yet so expressive of man’s lower nature, so imprisoning, that one felt brushed by the Devil himself.56

Again, Orga attempts to reconcile his conflicting feelings of being moved by the dance by interpreting the experience through a modernist point of view. Whereas previously he feminized the dancer, here he describes the experience as “so primitive that it could not fail to stir the blood.” Throughout his narrative, it is clear that Orga considers himself an outsider to the cultures of the Anatolian peasants and nomads he encounters. He describes them occasion-

55) Ibid.
56) Orga, 52.
ally as “simple,” “primitive,” and lacking reason. He attempts to romanticize the Yürük nomads, still resistant to Kemalist modernization efforts, as continuing the same untouched way of life for centuries despite the progression of civilization. By displacing homoeroticism as a relic of the past, he can explain being moved by it because of its foreignness to him as a “modern” man. Furthermore, he describes the experience as being “expressive of man’s lower nature, so imprisoning, that one felt brushed by the Devil himself.” To Orga, the dance represents a morally corrupt pre-modern past from which he seeks to distance himself, yet one from which he cannot completely free himself.

To stagger out to the sweet night air was a form of relief, for unless one has lost one’s senses in drink it is impossible not to be appalled by licentiousness….I was moved again by the memory of the dancer and the certainty that he would never grow old. The moon was high in the sky, infinitely remote, symbol of men’s dreams…. In my mind’s eye I saw, as in a witch’s ball, the figure of myself, spellbound.57

Orga closes his account of the dance with yet more contradicting impressions. While continuing to express revulsion towards the homoeroticism he experienced, he is once again moved by the dancer and “the certainty that he would never grow old.” I would suggest that Orga is attempting to romanticize the dancer in order to place him in a distant, timeless past, yet also implying that, as a cultural feature, the young male dancer and his associated homoeroticism would never disappear completely. Orga describes the moon here as a “symbol of men’s dreams.” This parallels several descriptions in Najmabadi’s book where male (and female) beauty is compared to the moon. She provides two excerpts from different texts, one describing beautiful young males as “moon-faced”58 and one about how a young servant’s “moon” lost its brightness as his mustache grew.59 By using the moon as a metaphorical representation of the adolescent male dancer’s beauty, Orga places him in a world of adult male fantasy.60 Ambivalent himself as to whether this world is part of a depraved past or modernizing present, Orga is nonetheless “spellbound.” Orga’s conflicting feelings about the dancer indicate, as Najmabadi notes about the (fe)male sun in Iran, “…something ‘secretly familiar, which has undergone repression and then returns from it’ (Freud 1955, 245).”61 Additionally, his account evidences her assertion that, “Despite denial, disavowal, and transcendentalization, not to mention suppression and punishment, the

57) Ibid.
58) Najmabadi, 11.
59) Ibid., 23.
60) Ibid., 93.
61) Ibid., 95.
The figure of the ghilman continually threatens to break through modern normative masculinity. The title of Orga’s book, *The Caravan Moves On*, can be interpreted as alluding to certain elements of “traditional” life, including homoerotic notions of male sexuality and masculinity, continuing on in spite of attempts to modernize and heterosexualize them.

I have thus far attempted to demonstrate how some of Najmabadi’s arguments regarding the ambiguity of heteronormative notions of modernity can be applied to the Ottoman/Turkish context, specifically by analyzing male gender and sexuality as it is performed and interpreted through dance. However, Najmabadi’s arguments for the transformation of masculinity and male sexuality are based on what she views as the effects of the European gaze and of Iranian male elites’ interactions with Europeans, as well as their subsequent responses to European social norms and judgments of Iranian mores. She does not address in depth to what extent concepts of masculinity and male sexuality among the peasantry, as the bulk of society, may have been transformed, nor how this would have occurred once they changed among elites. This study necessarily expands to address heteronormative modernization efforts by the Turkish Republic as they related to the majority of the population, the Anatolian peasantry.

As discussed previously, according to Metin And, the köçek could still be found dancing in rural Anatolia as late as the end of the 1950s, although most likely marginalized to performing homoeroticism in the “secretive,” “dark” type of space Irfan Orga describes. It is striking that towards the end of *Dances of Anatolian Turkey*, And states that, “As has already been stressed Turkish dancing developed on two planes, that of the old Istanbul and urbanized dances and that of the peasant dances.” It is clear from And’s description of the “dancing boys” that he considers them part of an urban tradition associated with Ottoman Istanbul stating, “They were mostly in vogue in old Istanbul, even at the seraglio level, and their quarter was Tahtakale.” However, it is evident from his own descriptions of young male dancers, as well as those of Irfan Orga, Anthony Shay, and Stavros Karayanni, that they were a cultural feature throughout the Middle East, including the countryside. And’s description of the köçek’s presence in a rural context is vague and does not account for how such a traditionally urban dance form evolved among the peasantry. It would seem that the dances of köçeks did not develop only on an urban plane as And indicates, but can indeed also be considered a “peasant dance.”

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62) Ibid., 151.  
63) Ibid., 57.  
64) Ibid., 25.
then, does he draw such a conclusion while leaving out a discussion of the significance of köçek dancing among the peasantry?

By describing köçek dancing as a mostly urban phenomenon separated from the world of rural peasant dances, And wishes to position them in the Ottoman past of “old Istanbul,” just as Orga attempts to displace his homo-erotic experience in a morally depraved, primitive pre-modern time. As I have previously addressed, And also attempts to subvert the köçek and distance him from heteronormative Turkish modernity and masculinity by feminizing him and associating him with feminized minority Others, while denying any connection to Turkishness. This supports the perception of the peasantry by the Kemalist regime as an integral resource for its nation-building project. The separation and subversion of male same-sex desires and practices from the peasantry was necessary in the pursuit of heteronormative modernity. And’s avoidance of discussing köçek dances in contemporaneous rural society and therefore Turkish modernity is reflective of this.

The Kemalist elite sought to create a new Westernized, secular Turkish nation and culture while separating it from an old, corrupt Ottoman/Islamic order. They attempted to do this in part by utilizing the Anatolian peasantry to shape the new national culture. As mentioned previously, the Anatolian peasantry was viewed by modernizing Kemalists paradoxically as both a backwards bastion of ignorance in need of civilizing reform and a source of pure, untouched Turkishness which could form the basis of a new national identity. Fatma Tütüncü asserts that the strength and health of the village symbolically represented the purity of the Turkish heart.65 In her 2007 dissertation, National Pedagogy of the Early Republican Era, Tütüncü argues that Kemalist ideology in the 1930s in part focused on instilling the peasantry with a sense of “Republican morality” through a national pedagogy aimed at creating physically, mentally, and morally healthy and strong citizens for whom Turkishness should be regarded as the ultimate virtue.66 An intense cultural interest in gathering information on and studying rural life ensued, coinciding with the government establishment of institutes, namely the People’s Houses,67 for activities like the collection of folklore, including folk dance, and the dissemination of Republican values among rural people.68 In his study of state-instituted Turkish

66) Ibid., 81.
67) Ibid.
folk dancing, Anthony Shay points out that this trend of cultural research, of which Metin And’s work is a part, prevailed until the 1950s when the imaginary Turkish national identity was solidified.\textsuperscript{69}

According to Shay, regional village dances were eventually coopted and reinvented by the state to perform a standardized image of the “traditional” folk culture of the Turkish nation for both national and international audiences, while at the same time subverting any origins or influences perceived to be non-Turkish. State-sponsored folk dance companies emerged, performing carefully choreographed dances with uniformly costumed dancers that were not an authentic representation of the village, but rather an invented tradition of Kemalist social engineering.\textsuperscript{70} The major change was the repeated use of similar geometric floor patterns and costuming across different dance genres, making them indistinguishable and lumping separate traditions into a single genre of “Turkish folk dance.”\textsuperscript{71} The mostly urban choreographers and dancers had no experience or knowledge of the dances and their meanings in their original rural contexts.\textsuperscript{72} Additionally, participation in folk dance groups was, and is still, viewed as a “healthy and proper environment” in which young men and women can socialize,\textsuperscript{73} thereby encouraging the heterosocial element of modern society within moral bounds. The popularity of ballroom dance among Westernizing Republican elites\textsuperscript{74} was another way in which heterosociality, as well as pairing of the heteronormative male-female companionate couple, was encouraged.

In the state-run folk dance companies, the wealth of urban dance traditions was rarely adopted. Shay argues that this is because of their association with the Ottoman political order in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{75} If one considers, like And, köçek dancing to be an urban phenomenon, then one could further argue that köçek dances were not employed in the Kemalist nation-building project and became marginalized in modern Turkish society because they had been popular among Ottoman elites in Istanbul. However, I would argue that the köçek, who clearly was also a persistent feature of peasant culture, and the plurality of male sexuality he represented posed a challenge to heteronormative modern-
organization implementing a binary of female and male gender and sexuality. For this additional reason, it had to be subverted and marginalized by the Kemalist national imaginary that was embodied in the countryside.

Furthermore, the köçek represented a threat to the “politico-moral pedagogy” of Kemalist elites described by Tütüncü, which aimed at penetrating and controlling every aspect of individuals’ lives in the effort to create “strong Turks” and, therefore, a strong nation. The authoritarian character of the Kemalist regime and its reforms led to an emphasis on maintaining social order, particularly by enforcing the homogenization of society, and wrestling control from an Ottoman legacy of “decadence.” The body of the peasantry was viewed as sick, weak, and living in a state of filth and disorder caused by Ottoman neglect. In order to purify the heart of Turkishness, Tütüncü states that the national pedagogy attempted to incorporate the peasantry with, “…physical education, including hygienic and civility rules so that peasants would have a proper body, and second, a sentimental education for eradicating the gap between the republican elite and peasants, so that the peasants would passionately attach themselves to Turkishness, and thus a homogenous nation would be achieved.” She elaborates Republican ideas of national morality by citing a guidebook, Moral Rules for Young Generation: Nine Rules of a Good Turk (1934), which gives self-control, including that of emotion and desire, as the first virtue followed by self-confidence, self-improvement, sportsmanship, duty, and cooperation.

Victorian-style ideas on sexual health and morals were also introduced through advice and pedagogical literature with the purpose of regulating society and ensuring the future of generations of strong Turks. Tütüncü states that, “…sexual lust is also a national resource which should not be wasted carelessly, because this would lead to sexual infertility and population scarcity.” Sport and other physical activities, including dance, were considered effective ways of regulating sexual desire in young people and therefore promoting the health of the nation. Sexual desire and activity were welcomed as long as they were sanctioned by a harmonious marriage, which was viewed as a “buttress against sexual decadence and social disorder” and the foremost goal of life as a means to fulfilling the duty of producing a strong Republic-

76) Tütüncü, 3-4.
77) Ibid., 49.
78) Ibid., 83-87.
79) Ibid., 86-87.
80) Ibid., 141-42.
81) Ibid., 178-79.
82) Ibid., 185.
83) Öztürkmen, “Modern Dance ‘Alla Turca,’” 45.
can generation.\textsuperscript{84} According to Tütüncü, sex and marriage advice writer Daniş Remzi Korok emphasized the need to reorient Turkish society’s unnatural path of dirty habits derived from old morality and norms towards Western ideas of regulated, educated sexuality and family life.\textsuperscript{85}

From Tütüncü’s analysis, it is clear that Kemalist elites were attempting to draw a line between an old, Ottoman/Eastern sexuality and a new, Turkish/Westernized one, the latter of which they sought to introduce in the countryside through manipulation of the peasant body and thereby national life. This further explains the exclusion of the köçek from representation in national folk dance and his subversion in the countryside, as well as indicates how new imaginations of masculinity were being shaped. While the authoritarian Kemalist regime was first and foremost attempting to control society and maintain order, the young male object of desire, represented by the köçek, embodied a period of untamed, seductive sexuality set in a world of male fantasy, which became seen as a threat to public order in the nineteenth century. I would therefore suggest that the perceived sickness and disorder of the peasantry included male homoerotic desire and same-sex practices as a relic of Ottoman sexual decadence and corrupt morality which could be homogenized into a vision of a Westernized, heteronormative society through self-control and regulation by physical activities like sports and dance. Sexuality, including same-sex desire, could be regulated in this way until marriage, at which point heteroeros could serve as a masquerade for homoerotic desires. Same-sex practices and representations of desire had to be suppressed in the Republican era as heteronormative companionate marriage and sexuality were viewed as essential to the production of future generations of Turks, and thus the survival of the Turkish nation. As Tütüncü notes, control of sexuality became equated with control of national life.\textsuperscript{86} This can be extended to control of the male dancing body as an embodiment and performer of sexuality.

In the Republican era, dance was transformed into an activity which served to regulate sexual desire and promote health of the body and nation through physical activity. It also served to facilitate heterosocial and heterosexual imaginings of a modern, secular society by pairing men and women together in public.\textsuperscript{87} State invention of “traditional” Turkish folk dance was, in part, an attempt to control the perceived disorder of the peasantry, embodied sexually by the köçek who Kemalism sought to cast out of the national imaginary altogether. The images provided by Metin And in his book, \textit{A Pictorial History

\textsuperscript{84} Tütüncü, 194.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 201, 204.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{87} Öztürkmen, “Politics of National Dance in Turkey,” 142.
of Turkish Dancing,\textsuperscript{88} indicate how representations of masculinity and male sexuality were transformed in the Turkish Republic. Approximately the first half of images is from the Ottoman era, mostly depicting religious dancing and professional young female and male dancers. Köçeks were often represented in Ottoman miniature paintings.\textsuperscript{89} These are set in contrast with the second half of images, which consists mostly of photographs of folk dances and some ballet performances. This is apparently another way And attempts to distinguish what he perceives to be old, urban Ottoman dance and sexuality from national Turkish dance and modern sexuality as it was to be embodied by the rural population.

It is unclear as to when many of the photographs are dated and in what contexts the dances shown are being performed. However, the types of folk dances depicted are generally those adapted by the national folk dance “tradition,” including the bar, halay, and horon where dancers are linked together, dances involving the carrying of scarves, weapons, or spoons, and couple’s dances.\textsuperscript{90} Some of the photographs appear to be staged, costumed performances. At least two indicate government sponsorship, with one including a sign representing a tourism initiative\textsuperscript{91} and another with a sign of a local Halk Eğitim Merkezi [People’s Education Center].\textsuperscript{92} Many of the photographs display the repetition of geometric formations folk dance historian Arzu Öztürkmen indicated as a major shift towards uniformity. The symmetry and geometry of the dances portray a controlled and refined image of masculinity paired with strength and agility. Photographs of couples and mixed chain dancing are also used to portray the image of heterosociality and companionate pairing of heterosexual men and women. The extent to which the invented tradition of Turkish folk dance fed back on and transformed the evolution of the original regional dances is unclear, but it is likely to have had a significant effect given the widespread popularity of competitive amateur and professional folk dancing in contemporary Turkish society.

In this paper, I have presented the young male object of desire, embodied by the köçek, as an ambivalent figure representing the ambiguity of modern Turkish masculinity and male sexuality. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the young male beloved became identified as a shameful, threatening figure by Ottoman elites. The processes of Westernization and modernization that began in the late Ottoman Empire were continued through the 1920s-30s by the Ke-

\textsuperscript{88} See List of Figures for select images.
\textsuperscript{89} Öztürkmen, “Modern Dance ‘Alla Turca,’” 41.
\textsuperscript{90} Shay, Choreographic Politics, 212.
\textsuperscript{91} See Fig. 9.
\textsuperscript{92} See Fig. 14.
malist regime, attempting to construct a new, Turkish society by implementing top-down reforms including a moral pedagogy targeting the peasantry as the strength of the nation. It was in the Kemalist national imaginary of the countryside that the young male beloved was subverted and marginalized. However, rural Anatolia was where the köçek persisted the longest after having been banished initially from urban profession in Istanbul under the scrutiny of Ottoman elites. As demonstrated by Irfan Orga’s account, the image of the young male object of desire continued to simmer under the façade of heteronormative modernity and would occasionally burst forth and threaten it by provoking both feelings of fear and desire, to use Stavros Karayanni’s terms.

I hope to have contributed an insight into how gender and sexuality were transformed in the context of a non-Western modernity. It would be pertinent in a future study to examine further the extent to which the legacy of the köçek and male homoeroticism has persisted in and/or affected Turkish society since the 1950s. As the failures of the Kemalist nation-building project come to light and attract increasing criticism, it would be valuable to evaluate to what degree it was able to bring about lasting change in the social and sexual mores of the male rural population, which was looked to as the embodiment of strong, heterosexual Turkish masculinity. This analysis has combined research from fields dedicated to the study of dance, folklore, gender and sexuality, history, and political science to address a seldom-studied aspect of Turkish modernity. An interdisciplinary approach such as this is necessary in the effort to problematize Turkish modernity in terms of its own internal dynamics and existing cultural parameters, not just Western influence, particularly in this case when historical texts about köceks are lacking and many accounts reflect heterosexual interpretations or projections.
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“Silhouettes d’Afrique” by Isabelle Eberhardt (1898)
Trans. by Mara Steele (2011)

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Preface
Isabelle Eberhardt: Sufi, Orientalist, and “Proto-Postmodernist”

In 1904, at the time of her death in a flash flood in the Algerian desert, Russo-Swiss traveler and writer Isabelle Eberhardt left the literary world a legacy that would amount to thousands of unpublished pages of journals, short stories, and unfinished novels. By the age of 27, she had lived for years as a Muslim convert in North Africa, writing constantly of her spiritual, cultural, and psychological struggles and epiphanies, both in fiction and personal diary form. As well as documenting her inner life, she possessed a remarkable gift for rendering the visual and sensuous details of the people she met and the landscapes that bewitched her. Yet among the literary travelers to the Muslim and Arab worlds of her period, she remains a marginalized figure on the stage of European Orientalism, escaping the attention of Edward Said’s Orientalism as well as that of many existing scholars in cultural, literary, and religious studies. For some scholars familiar with her work, she fits cleanly under a pejoratively-dispensed Orientalist label, although others will suggest she is not so easily categorized. While she employs numerous tropes of the Orientalist writing of the era, she was also an advocate for French decolonization in North Africa. Speaking fluent Arabic, living and traveling through Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia dressed as a man, she took her shahada at the age of 18 and studied Islam for the remainder of her life with the Sufi order known as the Qadiriya. Her Orientalism was one of hyperbolic adulation, drawn to the beauty and serenity of fin de siècle Algeria and naively believing the Muslim world to be morally and spiritually superior both to that of European intellectualism and Christianity. Like many, she was sometimes prone to hypostatiz-
Her decidedly impassioned conversion to Islam complicates a wholly rationalist effort to understand her project, particularly because her faith is admittedly far from unequivocal or orthodox. Raised in an anarchist, revolutionary, and atheist household, she would be plagued by religious doubts all of her life, while at the same time struggling with drug and alcohol addiction. It should not be surprising, then, that some choose to ignore or dismiss Eberhardt’s spiritual inclinations as the whims of a dilettante. Following a translation of her work, Karim Hamdy makes a baffling error, writing that “nowhere in her diaries did Eberhardt discuss, or even refer to her mystical experience in Islam.” Nevertheless, her diaries abound not only with spontaneous quotations from the Holy Qur’an and invocations for the blessings of Allah, but with passages such as the following:

Whoever considers themselves to be a Muslim must devote themselves body and soul to Islam for all time, to the point of martyrdom if need be; Islam must inhabit their soul, and govern every one of their acts and words. Otherwise, there is no point in mystical exercises of any sort…God is Beauty. The word itself contains everything: Virtue, Truth, Honesty, Mercy…

In his detailed and enumerative effort to determine if Eberhardt was “truly a Sufi,” Hamdy suggests that Eberhardt’s failure to write of the details of her Sufi training proves her lack of commitment to it. However, in his preface to The Oblivion Seekers, Paul Bowles suggests that this silence is just as likely to be a sign of her humility and commitment to its secrets. Perhaps Hamdy sees her as another Edward Lane, who learned to pray alongside Muslims yet whose “identity as a counterfeit believer and privileged European” maintained him at a “cold distance” from Islam. Unlike Lane, however, who writes extensively of the most outlandish and sadomasochistic Sufi rituals, Eberhardt is not interested in producing a codified Islam or sensationalist Sufism for European consumption. Her faith is movingly personal, complex, and appears to

sustain her emotionally, a crucial matter for a woman who in her brief lifetime experienced the loss of many family members, social alienation, poverty, and starvation as well as an attempt on her life. Therefore, her silence on her training and religious experiences in the sealed walls of the zawiyas of Africa must be accorded some respect, at the very least because such an overwhelming and ubiquitous piety imbues her later journals.

Arguably, scholars such as Hamdy deny Eberhardt her commitment to Islam because it destabilizes easy conclusions that would place her in the same ignorant and imperialistic category as Lane, Chateaubriand, and other Romantic pilgrims to the idyllic land of sensualists and barbarians. However, Hedi Abdel-Jouad proposes a radically different conclusion about her work, writing that “Isabelle/Mahmoud [her male Arab alias] will henceforth embody the mendicant Sufi as artist.”5 Referring to Eberhardt as “proto-postmodern and postcolonial,” emphasizing “the empathy she showed for the disinherited,”6 he suggests that her writing defies the authoritative and teleological project of Orientalism, replacing it with anti-colonialist sentiment and an insecure and troubled place of enunciation. Abdel-Jouad invokes Eberhardt’s polyglottal plurivocality, her inability to settle on a unary identity or speech. Instead, as a multilingual, cross-dressing, Russo-Swiss Muslim convert, she offers a rich multiplicity of voices: ethnic, gendered, and linguistic. As the first writer in the French language to use the native term “Maghreb” in reference to the region at the time only known in Europe as North Africa, she incorporates many other transliterated Arabic words into her published writing, while her journals and personal correspondences unfold in a dizzying woven tapestry of Arabic, Russian, and French.7

Flirting with the slippage of meanings, identities, and language, seeking signification in diffèreance, Eberhardt will ally her faith with alinguistic, jouissant moments of self-disintegration into music and embodied response, such as the emotional fusion and sensuous pleasure of prostration in prayer and the trance-like exaltation induced by the melodies of the muezzin’s call. In “Silhouettes d’Afrique,” the masked voice of Eberhardt—writing under the male pseudonym Mahmoud el Mouskoubi—protests the failure of language to describe her memories:

Where are the words subtle and tenuous enough, also, vaporous and imprecise enough, that could ever translate these impressions

6) Ibid., 101.
7) Ibid., 110-116.
so profoundly individual, and unique? …One would need, for that, words in turn inflamed and idyllic, of a delicacy and a sweetness inaccessible to the human language.

While lamenting that “words cannot describe” is something of a cliché, I think that Eberhardt as “proto-postmodernist” expresses her awareness in this passage and elsewhere that nothing escapes the violence of written representation. Positive description will always fall short of and interfere with the religious ecstasy of music and surrender, those things that she and the narrator of “Silhouettes” seek and find in Islam. In her Muslim life she seeks what she will call the “felicity of faith”\(^9\): not just transcendence from the hardships of her existence or reprieve from metaphysical doubt, but also liberation from the constraints and limits of positive knowledge. “I will only ever be drawn to people who suffer from that special and fertile type of anguish known as self-doubt,”\(^{10}\) she writes in a journal entry, elsewhere noting her alienation from those who fail to acknowledge the importance of what could not be seen, those “skeptics…who like easy solutions and have no patience with mystery.”\(^{11}\)

In such passages, Eberhardt may reveal the roots of her private Sufism—an intuition that truth, if there is such a thing, is inarticulable in human language. Her practice of faith is passionate and heretical: the striving for bliss-as-transcendence and an aching, tearful love for an inherently unknowable Truth or God. Her manic-depressive moods and notorious addiction to alcohol situate her in a space at once too sensual and erratic to be orthodox spirituality, and yet arguably too mystical to be sheer libertinism. Sufism is as complex and regionally varied as Islam itself, often more strictly disciplined than its romantic Western depictions; nevertheless, its origins are inseparable from music, dance, and heretical poems of erotic metaphor and forbidden intoxication. Perhaps most of all, Sufism is known to emphasize desire’s role in the acquisition of spiritual knowledge: unrequited desire for the beloved and for the Divine Mystery that comes to dwell in the broken heart.

“Silhouettes d’Afrique” closes with a description of the melancholic vigil of Abdesselim, who spends his evenings composing love songs on a flute, for a beautiful woman with whom he once fell in love and has not seen since. Situated at the end of a tale of religious inspiration and personal loss, the vignette carries intimations of a Sufi parable, that of an unrequited love doubling as


\(^{9}\) Ibid., 64.

\(^{10}\) Eberhardt, *Nomad*, 38.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 84.
inspired mystic devotion. As in the lover’s flute song, Eberhardt invokes the sovereign and untouchable others of lost epiphany, God and human memory, disintegrating meanings never to be reconstituted, and therefore always to be desired. Like Abdesselim, she has been touched and abandoned, her love since reduced to scattered ashes of that which once burned apotheotically, and for which she can now only compose songs of mystical desire.

“Silhouettes d’Afrique”
Isabelle Eberhardt (1898)

It was a time long ago, a time already distant, when I was a student at the zawiyas of the kind Shaykh Abderrhamene, in Anneba, the old Maghrebian city dozing in its azure gulf, in the great and morose shade of Idou... I recall these times as a dream of youth, like something sweetly melancholic that passed in a sunny morning of my life, it would have been so long ago, alas!

It was also in this era of my life that Islam cast upon me its deep and powerful charm which, by the most mysterious fibers of my being, attached itself to me forever in the strange land of Dar-el-Islam. And it is well since then that the heritage of the Prophet has become my elected homeland, loved for life, through the years and the exiles and the prodigious distances. In winter and summer, from near and far, as long as I will live and beyond!

In those times—I was twenty years old—I loved life for her brilliant illusions, for her ineffable enchantments, without a care for the universal grief so ceaselessly triumphant... I loved life, melancholy and serene, relentless and mysterious—the grand smiling sphinx, infinitely charming and menacing.

I was a vagabond—because I had no country... I loved, in theory, a grand country of the North because it had seen to give birth to my beloved mother and because, from there, weak yet still vibrant echoes reached me, of strange melancholies, of the identical essence to my own inexplicable and precocious moods... the Slavic country that I could never know. Yet, in this Dar el-Islam, I had found the fatherland so much and so desperately desired... And I loved it.

With great clarity of vision, I recall the beings and things from then: all that which has already disappeared and all which is destined to remain still, all that will rest unchanging forever across the infinite expanses of Time—when I myself will have been annihilated.

12) Zawiya. School in North Africa for mystical Sufi learning, often built close to a holy place such as the tomb of a Saint.
Sometimes, in hours of melancholy, it appears to me again, looming out of the heaps of life’s dismal ashes accumulated over the years, the silhouette of the bright white Annaba, at the foot of austere Idou, reflecting in the vibrant azure of her gulf, at the favored hour of the Maghreb.

It appears to me, as then, from the terrace of my Moorish home, profiled in the sky’s profound blue, facing the Orient, a snowy and vaguely bluish piling of old houses, peaceful and unchanging through all the tumults and silences of centuries; fiercely sealed against all deleterious foreign influences.

 Appearing to me once again are the beloved shadows before which, now, I would like to be able to prostrate myself in the dust, in an infinite adoration…

And I believe I hear, as then, the clear and melancholy voice of Hassene the muezzin intoning in the ancient manner the litanies of Islam, proclaiming loudly, in the great golden-red glow of sunset, the glory of the Eternal…

Now that all which was then standing and to my juvenile soul appeared nearly indestructible, nearly eternal—now that those beings and things have disappeared, returned to the original dust—it is with a great anguish, with an icy shiver, that I shall stir these dead ashes of my early years, all over there, beyond the Great Azure…And it is especially for unknown and distant brothers who, like myself, think sometimes, with the same anguish and the same unfightable regret, of cherished lands, among all those of the earth where, still young, in the enchanted dawn of their lives, they have loved, contemplated and suffered and where, like myself perhaps, they have left in silent tombs that which they would love the most madly, that which ultimately was their reason for existing and accepting pain—where they have left behind, in painful separations, their final vestiges of love.

It is exclusively for the restless and the melancholy, for the loners and dreamers, that I wish to evoke these cherished shadows.

In an old and sedentary neighborhood, sleeping for centuries in the protective shadow of the holy zawiya of the Aissaouas13 on a narrow and very steep little street, there was a low-lying and unsophisticated house, a little cube of hundred-year-old masonry faded each year to a whitewashed blue, and crowned over its roof by an ancient fig tree, planted in the middle of a small Moorish courtyard, long ago cemented, now rough and uneven. On the

13) Aissaouas. Sufi fraternity known for its members’ abilities to attain states of unusually heightened ecstasy.
street, nothing, not a window or embrasure. The low Gothic door, of thick planks bordered by iron and embellished with ancient brass studs, was always mysteriously closed, and did not open but to allow one of us who lived there to enter or leave: Sidi Mohammed Djeridi the landlord, Sidi Abdel Qader, Negro talib\textsuperscript{14} from Morocco and myself, known in the neighborhood and at the djema\textsuperscript{15} under the name of Si Mahmoud el Mouskouby, the Muscovite... Only sometimes, this fierce door would give passage to veiled shadows appearing under the white ferrachia of the wealthy or the blue mléya\textsuperscript{16} of the working class women. This, only after nightfall, and very clandestinely, so that no one could give a name to these impersonal phantoms...

There were four rooms within, whose doors and little windows all opened on the courtyard, in the midst of which, at the foot of the hundred-year old fig tree, was a stone well in the form of a sculpted vase. The gray trunk of the household tree inclined over the narrow orifice and leaned upon the edge of the terrace, shaded by its yet very green branches, those which had earned the house its nickname, Dar el-Quarma, or house of the fig tree.

The walls were, inside and outside, cleanly faded to a whitewashed blue of a shade approaching azure, like most Maghrebian homes. The interior doors were simple curtains of floral calico. To the right of my door, in an old broken planter, lived several white pigeons, domesticated to the point of coming to eat with us in the room of Sidi Mohommed, where he lived with his wife Lella Fatima, and his young niece Yamouna.

At the edge of the terrace was the inevitable pot of white jasmine, and also a little rosebush with red flowers, and antique amphoras of tapering depths within which we stored our oil. The fig tree’s branches reached a section of wall belonging to a neighboring house, where a small window opened and where a priceless creature sometimes came to speak to us, an immodest and mischievous young Negress from Sudan, of whom Sidi Mohammed Djeridi was quite afraid.

In the steep and poorly paved road, hardly any vehicle traffic. Only the occasional rhythmic noise of some Negress’ or Jew’s wooden sandals, or the singing cries of traveling merchants or morning milkmen... Then, the silence would fall again, heavy and deeply lulling. In this old neighborhood, the time-clock seemed to be thirty centuries slow, arrested in the last years of

\textsuperscript{14} Talib. A student of theology (pl., talib\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{15} Djema. Literally, “place of assembly”—usually refers to a mosque on Fridays.
\textsuperscript{16} Mleya, ferrachia. Regional types of traditional head and face coverings worn by the Muslim women of the neighborhood.
the caliphates... The days and years, immutably alike, passed with a lulling monotony, as the centuries had passed before, illuminated by a serene faith and a tranquil resignation.

In the house, a serene and nearly solemn peace ruled, and in this profound peace was something very archaic, of another time... And when, upon leaving the banal and tumultuous city of the Nazarenes, one re-immersed oneself there, it was like a sudden backward plunge into the unfathomable depths of long-ago.

Above the door of my bedroom, Sidi Djeridi had traced in red ink this fatalist maxim: “Man does not ever escape the hour of his destiny”.

In the crimson-flushed dawns, when the cocks sang in the blond light, shaking their multicolored plumage, and the pigeons awoke and flew in circles in the cool, perfumed air, I awoke on my woolen mattress, stretched out upon a thick rug... I awakened with a delicious sensation, of a force and insouciance nearly joyful... like the happy mornings of my joyful childhood, long ago. I went out, dressed in the long white gowns of haik, under the burnous17 and the yellow turban of the Maghrebian Beldi (the Moors).

Invariably, I found Lella Fatima engaged in lighting her charcoal fire in a smoking kanoun.18 Crouched with her little braided fan in hand, careful and dignified, she was entirely pre-occupied by her task. Tall, slender, and shapely under her long-sleeved shirt of patterned muslin, pulled and attached in the back, her long gandoura19 of yellow calico tied at the waist by a red kerchief, a little tiara of velvet trimming her handsome black headscarf, Lella Fatima had once been very beautiful. Now, her calm and honest, fading beauty held a great charm, consisting of naïve peace and gentleness. Ceremoniously, we exchanged long salutations and the kissing of hands, with many questions regarding each others’ health, our dreams, and all this during five wonderful minutes, interrupting our conversations with numerous staunch alhamdulillah’s (Praise to God).

Then, sitting myself on the trunk of the fig tree, next to the deep cistern, we would chat familiarly until Lella Fatima placed three minuscule cups filled with very sweet coffee on the little deep meida. In the middle, she placed an unleavened bread of her own making, and a blue pot full of strawberries candied in honey. Then, in her placid voice she would call “Ya Sidi

17) Haik. Light scarf or veil; Burnous. Large wool cloak.
18) Kanoun. Stove.
19) Gandoura. Long tunic of light material.
Mohommed, Ya Yamouna!” And from the still closed door of the bedroom, the pleasant voice of the old *talib* responded, just as scrupulously polite: “A’nam, ya oumni Fatima!” *Yes, o mother Fatima—mother* being a formula of affectionate respect. Never, in any circumstance of life, did one of them depart from this well-observed politeness, which excluded neither the passion of youth, nor the close friendship of their tranquil old age. And this had a very touching, aesthetic charm which made them appear to both love and venerate one another...

Sidi Djeridi was an old man of sixty-five years, tall and thin. His oval face, emaciated and somewhat ascetic, carried the imprint of an entirely childlike sweetness and simplicity, despite the clear and always wakeful intelligence of his striking, iron-gray eyes. His white beard and his habit of wearing a rosary of black wooden beads around his neck had earned him several irreverent nicknames from some, us other young and mocking *tolba* having the custom of referring to him as *Bou Léhia*, the man with the beard, and *Bou Sébha*, Father Rosary. He knew, and laughed in good humor. A little melancholy and silent, extremely modest and very poor, making his living from meagerly remunerated private lessons, Sidi Djeridi had an extraordinary charm, seeming to move in an unearthly atmosphere of peace and serenity, living in a special world of silence and dreams.

The little niece of Lella Fatima, natural daughter of her late brother and a rich woman from Marseilles, was a great beauty of a nearly pure Moorish type, with the exception of her clear, small eyes which betrayed her mixed blood. Her mother had abandoned her, and Sidi Djeridi was raising her as his daughter. She was eight or nine years old, extremely capricious, and of a seemingly incurable lazy disposition.

With Sidi Djeridi, we exchanged greetings still even longer, then we sat ourselves around the table upon little squares of carpet or cushions. Each of us spoke aloud this formula of sanctification: “In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful!”—and then, in silence as usual, we would eat. When finished, we washed our hands in the little pewter basin that Lella Fatima brought to us, and we arose, finishing our meal as we had started it, by an act of remembrance: “Praise to God!”

Then, sometimes, Sidi Mohammed and I would go down to the *djema el-Bey*, the mosque of Annaba, for the morning prayer, the *cabéha*.

20) *Tolba*. Students of theology at the *zawiya*. 
Grave, and majestically draped in our burnous, we went out in the street, still full of cool shadows and peaceful silence, increasingly noisy and hurried the closer we came to Armes, the center of Moorish life. We spoke learnedly, with the great reflective calm of Muslims, of ancient things, of religion and of its poetic aspect mainly, because Sidi Djeridi, like all tolba, was passionate about ancient literature and poetry. Immersed in these tranquil and inoffensive conversations, we arrived at the narrow and silent street whereupon opened the small rear door of the great djema, at the foot of the minaret, at the very moment when Hassene began to cry: “Allahu Akbar!” (God is Greater!)

And with the other tolba, after our ritual ablutions, we entered into the meditative shadow of the mosque.

The hour of the cabéha, and that also of the next-to-last prayer, the Maghreb, at sunset, would become the sweetest hours of my life, blessed hours when an infinite peace descended upon me, and a serene resignation towards the inevitable rulings of Destiny... Blessed hours whose melancholy charm still remains dear to me across the years and the vertiginous distances—beloved, forever.

Where are the words subtle and tenuous enough, also, vaporous and imprecise enough, that could ever translate these impressions so profoundly individual, and unique? And who could ever describe the ineffable beauty of Africa’s mornings and evenings, their lights of gold and of purple, and the apotheotic dawns of a red sun emerging from a bloody sea and lighting aflame the mountain summits, and the enchanted twilights upon the white cities of the Orient, veiled in light lilac mists... and the nights flooded with blue moonlight, of an incomparable limpidity... and the sad splendor of the litanies of Islam, sung in the voices of men, fervent and sonorous, at the height of the minarets and in the solemn silence of the mosques, proclaiming the triumph of Faith, and ineluctable Destiny, and the infinite glory of the Eternal! Who could express these indescribable things of such powerful charm... these ineffable things, so distant from the banal objects of a feverish and morbid Europe? One would need, for that, words in turn inflamed and idyllic, of a delicacy and a sweetness inaccessible to the human language.

In the vast, solemn djema, the sweet murmur of prayers put to rest all sadness, in a slow ecstasy.

However, for a long time, I went to the mosque only as a dilletant, nearly impious, an aesthete hungry for rare and delicate sensations... Yet, since the
very beginning of my Arab life, the incomparable splendor of the God of Islam dazzled and attracted me, with an unexplainable desire to let myself be penetrated with the great, gentle light of the fierce and magnificent desert, in order to escape the dreadful solitude of disbelief... in order to take my flight out of the obscure abysses of Doubt, towards the azure heights of Heaven.

Of all the evils which afflict the human soul, Doubt is the slowest and most arduous to fight off. And the man who thinks is no more a master of belief than of denial. It was, then, in great sadness and with an intense anguish that I searched for the felicity of faith.

One clear summer evening, when the great heavy warmth of the day had lifted, I passed through a silent crowd of Muslims in the little white alleyway lying in the shadow of the old minaret, gilded in its vague sheen of sunlight.

There above, in the purple light of golden iridescence, Hassene the muezzin sang in his melancholy voice with such sweet, slow modulations, the eternal hymn of the One God. In this dreamlike voice was translated, strikingly, all the grand serenity of Islam.

Suddenly, as if touched by a divine grace, in absolute sincerity, I felt an exaltation, without name, carrying my soul towards previously unknown regions of ecstasy. On the doorstep of the mosque, an old blind man in rags—in his resignation, the tragic image of a Biblical Job—moaned in a tone of unending sadness, the following plea: “For Sidna Abraham and Sidna Abdelkader and Sidna Belkerim...For the Lord, give me a coin, O believers in God!”

Everyone who passed contributed some alms to him, in silence, and he blessed them with this word of hope, always the same: “May God repay you!”

For the first time in my life, I entered with an inexplicable joy, sweet and intense, into the perfumed coolness of the *djema*, which filled little by little with muffled murmurs and vague echoes. For the first time, crossing this familiar threshold, I murmured with their unshakeable faith: *Allahu Akbar!*

In that blessed hour, my doubts were dead and forgotten. I was no longer alone, facing the sad splendor of Worlds. In a shiver of mystery I had, in the precise instant whence died up there the sad call of Hassene, something like an intimate foreshadowing of Eternity. And I went, eyes bathed in ecstatic tears, to prostrate myself in the dust, before the majesty of the Eternal.
Surely, such ecstasies are but luminous meteors that do nothing but dazzle our shadowy worlds, illuminating them in a brisk yet incomparable flash, just as quickly forgotten in the night of a more mortal darkness. Perhaps even, it is nothing but a divine illusion, torn from grief, an illusion of health for the sick of soul...but this is of little import! In the vertiginous whirlwind of lives and of deaths, in our supreme distress, why and in the name of who should one drive away and dispel the enchanted mists of Dream, ultimate consolation of the most unfortunate of beings?

Who will ever give me back the blessed hours of faith and of sweet felicity found in the blue half-light of the African mosques? Who will return them to me, the glad intoxications of that time, the inappreciable instants of hope, when the dark realities of life seemed to fade and disappear in a gentle radiance, and infinite horizons opened to me, of enchanted light and ineffable hope?

How young and naïve—and more pure—was my spirit of that time, carried away towards mystic regions of ecstasy, on the iridescent wings of Chimera…!

When, after the oblivion and slow exhilaration of prayer, we left the mosque, we searched out and called to one another, students of theology and rhetoric of the zawiya, to re-embark together up our old street of silence and sleepy tranquility, onto which again opened the little stalls of bakers and the Moorish cafés.

Among us—there were approximately twenty—were the mischievous and the mystics (these latter of small number, as elsewhere), the mutes and the dwarves, the voluptuous and the indolent; all entirely preoccupied with love and poetry, the only tastes intense and common to all. In small groups, according to the affinities of our souls, we climbed our poorly paved street, with the grave leisure of Muslims, talking without raising our voices, nearly without gesture, very calmly, as befits tolba concerned for their dignity.

Discussion sometimes playful, sometimes melancholy, in these groups of poets and dreamers, where Love and Death returned frequently...discussions of the young scholars of the Middle Ages, embellished with citations from the great poet-philosophers of Islam.

My two intimate friends, Abdesselim ould Esseny and Essalah ben Zerrouk Elerarby, and myself, we were closely linked, despite great differences of character, by the commonality of our thoughts, and a shared taste for silence, contemplation and indolent dreaming. Sons of illustrious Moorish families, issued from austere and rigid races, Abdesselim and Essalah were both very handsome, of that Moorish beauty at once masculine and very slender...they were very young and very enamored of freedom, while still observing family
traditions of respect and submission. They profoundly loved their Arab life and its lulling constancy; outsiders to and above all scornfully indifferent to a European “Movement.” Neither one knew a word of French. Essalah spoke perfect Spanish, learned in Morocco, his fatherland. Neither had any curiosity for the things of Europe.

“That we never change our Africa, and the old homeland over there, our Yemen and our Hadjaz, where lie our holy mosques and the tomb of our Prophet! Peace be with him! And his family and our ancestors!...That we change nothing, that we never rebuild the ruins, and that we never attempt to be wiser and more powerful than God, in wanting to rebuild that which time has destroyed! That we never replace our beautiful horses with their imbecile railroads, sons of hatred and insane agitation! That our Islam, instead of assimilating the lies and impure forgeries of the Occident, return to the purity of the first centuries of the Hedjira in its original simplicity, above all! Then, that nothing more be changed or modified across the centuries. When the Sage has achieved that which may accrue happiness to the son of Adam, he does not search, like a madman, to change his condition and he does not abandon the real for Chimera...the insatiable are the ones who starve, and the ungrateful to God are the evil ones.”

Such were the discourses of Abdesselim, enthusiastic believer, beyond any superstition, and affiliated with the powerful fraternity of the Senouussy.

Abdesselim was consumed with love for a beautiful Moorish woman glimpsed by chance on a terrace. He never saw her again, and employed his leisure time composing melancholy kacides, singing in harmonious verse of his passion and the beauty of his beloved. Of her, after numerous and ardent researches, he knew only her name, Mannoubia, and the impassioned taste of the young woman for the music—infinite sad—of the Bedouin reed flute.

Every evening, very late, Abdesselim went to sit on the steps of an old, low-lying door, always shut, that of an ancient zawiya abandoned for years, whose khouan were all dead or long ago departed...

It was in his old neighborhood, which had been hers. There, to the echoes of the dead streets, in the silence of the night perfumed with vague scents, he told of his ardent dreams and his sadnesses, through the sobs and sighs of the little enchanted flute.

21) Senouussy. Sufi fraternity.
22) Khouan. Members of a religious fraternity.
Bibliography


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The Hidden Imam’s Charisma

The Relationship between Authority and the Permissibility of Violence in Two Shi‘ite Revolutionary Movements

By Patrick Zemanek

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In Islam, authority originates from God. In Shi‘ism, God’s authority on earth belongs to the living Imām, who is responsible for guiding the community of believers down the right path. As a result, the Imām alone possesses the right to declare jihād or sanction other violent practices. Historically, this has generated questions regarding authority during the absence of a just Imām, which extends into permissibility of defense and warfare. This survey explores the relationship between authority and violence in two examples of Shi‘ite revolutionary movements in which an Imām was not present: the Nizārīs under Ḥasan-i Šabbāh during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, and the Islamic Revolution and establishment of the Iranian state led by Ayatollah Rūḥullāh Khumaynī during the 1970s and 1980s. The survey will primarily focus on individual examinations, considering both traditional notions of Shi‘ite authority and how the revolts answered the dilemmas regarding leadership during these eras. Subsequently, it will consider the use of violence as limited by the nature of that authority and as a tool to affirm legitimacy. Finally, it will briefly treat the two movements in relation to one another and discuss recurring elements suggestive of an overarching Shi‘ite identity despite the temporal and ideological gaps between them.

Ismā‘īlī Authority and Hasan-i Sabbāh’s Legitimacy to Rule

Ismā‘īlī belief separates faith into visible, physical piety and internal, spiritual enlightenment. The exoteric aspect (ẓāhir) consists of ritual devotion and

1) Wladimir Ivanow, Brief Survey of the Evolution of Ismailism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952), 50. In the post-Alamūt period of Nizārī history, much of the subsequently described scheme was simplified so that the functions of some positions in the hierarchy were changed. In some instances, they were omitted completely. For this treatment, descriptions of Ismā‘īlī, Fāṭimid, and Nizārī authority and doctrine refer to those in place during the Fāṭimid and early Alamūt periods.
the observance of *sharīʿa*; understanding the intellectual and philosophical significance behind these acts constitutes the esoteric facet (*bāṭin*).\(^2\) From the inception of Ismāʿīlism, there developed the understanding that the *zāhir* embodied the literal observance of the religious laws that had been revealed by the prophets.\(^3\) By the dawn of the Fāṭimid movement (890 CE), a cyclical model had been implemented to explain these prophets’ continued revelations across the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. For example, in this system, the laws of Mūsā (Moses) supplant the earlier laws of Ādam, and each ensuing prophet reveals a new set of divine regulations that replaces those transmitted by the preceding prophet.\(^4\) The pattern recurs six times, the most recent iteration being Muḥammad’s abrogation of the laws divulged by ʿĪsā (Jesus) and the implementation of the Islamic *sharīʿa*.\(^5\) The finite world inevitably changes, so new laws must address the ensuing change in circumstances.\(^6\) As the revealed law changes, so too does its observance. Thus, the *zāhir* is impermanent. By contrast, the *bāṭin* embodies the spiritual significance behind these transmutable laws and remains constant.\(^7\)

This knowledge cannot be deduced by reason or bequeathed generationally from elder to younger.\(^8\) Whereas the *zāhir* is comprehensible to everybody, the *bāṭin* must be intuited by a guide with access to occult knowledge that by its nature is beyond human comprehension.\(^9\) Hence, a divinely-guided executor (*waṣī*) follows the prophet to explain the current *sharīʿa*; the Imāms, who succeed the executor, safeguard and teach the *bāṭin* to initiated believers.\(^10\) Thus, the prophet divulges the *zāhir*, the executor interprets the *bāṭin* from this instruction, and the Imām becomes the authority on and defender of both.\(^11\) In the sixth cycle, Muḥammad is the prophet, ʿAlī follows as his executor,\(^12\) and the Imāms emerge from the ʿAlid lineage.\(^13\) Originally, Ismāʿīlī doctrine held that Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl, the seventh Imām after the Prophet, had entered a period of concealment, and his return would end the temporal world, initiating an antinomian era in which the *bāṭin* would be apparent to all.\(^14\) However,
the first Fāṭimid caliph, ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī, (d. 934) delayed this advent indefinitely.\textsuperscript{15} Although messianic expectations propel revolutions, their promises, when unfulfilled, undermine a polity’s stability in the post-insurrection phase. Plausibly, al-Mahdī’s revisions dispelled Ismāʿīlī messianism to secure the foundations of the Fāṭimid state. As a result, the imamate in the Fāṭimid tradition, as well as its derivative sects, theoretically continues as long as the temporal world subsists.\textsuperscript{16} By the time al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 974) composed his masterwork of Ismāʿīlī jurisprudence, \textit{Daʿāʾim Al-Islām}, the renovated imamate was an inveterate principle. Among his collected \textit{aḥādīth}, one attributed to the Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq states, “He who dies without recognizing the Imām of his time, dies the death of a pagan,” after which the Imām adds, “a \textit{living Imām.”}\textsuperscript{17}

As fundamental aspects of Ismāʿīlī belief, knowledge and its promulgation legitimize the position of an individual in the sect’s hierarchy. Authority, as delineated in the Fāṭimid era, parallels the doctrines of belief. The chain of command possesses components in both the physical and spiritual worlds. The Fāṭimid \textit{daʿwa} and philosopher al-Kirmānī (d. 1021 CE) describes the manner in which authority, in the form of knowledge, radiates from God to the individual devotee. In between God and worshipper, ten intermediaries exist; five are terrestrial and five are celestial.\textsuperscript{18} On earth, preeminence resides in the prophet (lawgiver), who is followed, in diminishing rank, by the executor, Imām, \textit{huja} (“proof”), and \textit{dāʿī}.\textsuperscript{19} The occupant of each stratum is expected to defer to and learn from the position above them.\textsuperscript{20} For this reason, in the absence of the prophet and executor, the living Imām occupies the apex of earthly authority. Befitting God’s chosen representative, strict requirements apply. As hidden religious knowledge (\textit{ʿilm}) is an ʿAlid privilege,\textsuperscript{21} the Imām must ultimately descend from ʿAlī. Additionally, the imamate may only pass from father to son, and the Imām must receive the explicit designation (\textit{naṣṣ}) from his predecessor.\textsuperscript{22} Because of the Imām’s \textit{ʿilm}, he invariably chooses the correct successor, but the supernatural attributes transfer only when the current Imām dies.\textsuperscript{23} Ultimately, this designation traces back through the imamate to ʿAlī, who was chosen by Muḥammad, who was chosen by God.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, the

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Walker, \textit{Hamīd Al-Dīn}, 113.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ivanow, \textit{Early Persian Ismailism}, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{22} Ivanow, \textit{Brief Survey}, 61.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
nāṣṣ ultimately designates the Imām as God’s chosen one. Because he must adeptly interpret matters of religion and lead the community down the correct path in accordance with this mandate, he is necessarily infallible.25 The Imām, though he possesses the sum of God’s truth, reveals only as much as his followers can understand.26 The Ismāʿīlī daʿwa, the proselytizing branch of the faith that possesses further internal stratification, then promulgates these truths.27 Although the structure of the daʿwa underwent change over time,28 the basic concept of missionaries (dāʿī) answering to a senior missionary (ḥujja) appears constant.29 Because of these tiers, Ismāʿīlī authority and responsibility during the Fāṭimid and early Nizārī eras was, if not simple, thoroughly defined and flowing from the top down.

Considering the necessity of the Imām, the Nizārī development despite his absence calls into question both the Ismāʿīlī hierarchy in practice and the permissibility, from the Ismāʿīlī perspective, of Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ’s mission. Foremost, despite the emphasis on a living Imām, occultation is not alien to Ismāʿīlī doctrine. Before ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī claimed the imamate, Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl’s concealment and eminent return as the Mahdī constituted a core tenet of Ismāʿīlī dogma.30 In this pre-Fāṭimid era, ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī held the title ḥujja as one of several, high-ranking missionaries through whom contact with the occulted Imām was possible.31 Whereas the Fāṭimids expunged these elements, they provide a precedent through which Hasan-i Sabbāḥ’s actions maintain threads of continuity with earlier Ismāʿīlī notions of leadership.

Hasan-i Sabbāḥ’s relationship with the imamate was complicated. Though he resided in the Fāṭimid capital of Cairo from 1078-1081 CE, little is known of his activities there.32 Significantly, he never met the living Imām, al-Mustansir.33 Moreover, he allegedly antagonized Badr al-Jamālī, the powerful vizier who actually ruled the state, by supporting the Imām’s designated successor, Nizār.34 Whether or not this is true, it seems Badr banished Ḥasan from Egypt.35 Although difficult to confirm, Hasan may have abandoned the

26) Ivanow, Brief Survey, 49.
27) Ibid.
30) Daftary, The Ismaʾīlīs, 117.
31) Ibid.
34) Ibid.
35) Ibid.
Egyptian regime at this point.\textsuperscript{36} Considering his evident political acumen, he certainly would have assessed the waning condition of the Fāṭimid state in practical terms and noted that the government lacked the ability to support the \textit{da’wa} in Persia.\textsuperscript{37} Perhaps most telling, the Iṣmāʿīlī schism from which the Nizārī designation originates occurred after Ḥasan began his mission. The chronology demonstrates this notion: Alamūt was captured in 1090 CE, the group’s apparent assassination of Niẓām al-Mulk transpired in 1092 CE, and only in 1094 CE did the contested succession between Nizār and al-Mustaʿī arise upon their father’s death. The activist policies later synonymized with the Nizārīs, such as institutionalized assassination and coopting defensible fortresses, developed several years before rejecting al-Mustaʿī’s imamate as invalid and adapting their doctrines accordingly. Hence, Ḥasan’s activities seem to demonstrate a degree of Persian Iṣmāʿīlī autonomy prior to his break from the larger religious populace. The rift in the community ostensibly emerged due to political machinations in Cairo. Al-Afḍal, the son of the late Badr al-Jamālī, inherited his father’s de facto authority; upon the death of al-Mustanṣir, he ignored the \textit{nāṣṣ} designating Nizār as successor to the imamate and installed his younger, more pliable brother, al-Mustaʿī—presumably to secure his own authority.\textsuperscript{38} Nizār fled to Alexandria, where the populace declared him Imām, and led a failed revolt, after which he was captured by al-Afḍal, imprisoned, and executed via immurement.\textsuperscript{39} The Persian Iṣmāʿīlīs, who supported Nizār’s claim and thus the prerogative of the Nizārid line, severed all ties with the Fāṭimid state.\textsuperscript{40} As evidenced, Ḥasan had already begun to act on his own initiative, and the contested imamate seems to have provided ideological grounds for a complete split.

The impending problem looming over early Nizārī authority, namely, the Imām’s absence, never manifested. Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ’s charisma as a leader conjoined with established Iṣmāʿīlī thought and jurisprudence seems to have prevented such issues. Considering the ongoing struggle against the Saljūqs in Persia, pragmatism probably contributed to the widespread acceptance of Ḥasan’s authority in that area. Doctrinally, the Saljūqs deemed Iṣmāʿīlīsm an extreme heterodoxy and aggressively persecuted the sect.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, native Persians resented the exploitive rule of the Turkic Saljūqs, which contributed de facto popular support to the insurgency against unjust, ethnic aliens.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{37} Daftary, “Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ,” 187.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 193-194.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 194.
\textsuperscript{41} Daftary, \textit{The Assassin Legends}, 24.
\textsuperscript{42} Daftary, “Ḥasan-i Şabbāḥ,” 190.
 Hasan likely benefitted from actively engaging the Saljūqs when the regional population was receptive to opposition.

Consciously or unconsciously, the Nizārī revolution followed the principles of valid authority as established in Fāṭimid jurisprudence. The exemplar of that tradition, al-Nuʿmān, describes the obligation to rulers:

> Obedience is also due [in the same manner as the Imams] to those [representatives] appointed by [the Imams], so long as such deputies obey the Imams. But if they disobey them and rebel against the Imam’s authority, then no obedience is due to them. ⁴³

Whereas explicating Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ’s personal rationalization is impossible, this excerpt provides an ideological justification to his break from the Cairene daʿwa and autonomous mission. Al-Afḍal, as his father’s successor, inherited the position of chief dāʾī in the Fāṭimid daʿwa. Following the Fāṭimid hierarchy and expectations of deference, Ḥasan would have been expected to observe Al-Afḍal’s authority. Al-Mustanṣir had given his naṣṣ to Nizār, and nothing indicates he rescinded this designation. ⁴⁴ When al-Afḍal replaced Nizār, he ignored central tenets of Ismāʿīlī belief. Obedience to the Imām is obedience to God, and replacing the divinely-designated Imām with a puppet signified disobedience to earthly and celestial authority. Theologically, he lacked the ʿilm, and that quality of divine knowledge ensured the proper choice. Thus, even if the Nizārī-Mustaʿlī split was only an expedient means to reinforce his de facto authority with de jure legitimacy, Ḥasan’s proclamation for Nizār and subsequent break with the Fāṭimid daʿwa corresponds with Ismāʿīlī fiqh. Al-Afḍal, acting against the designated Imām, no longer warranted allegiance from devotees. That the Persian Ismāʿīlī community adhered without dissent to Ḥasan’s decision ⁴⁵ reinforces the perceived justness of his cause among the populace, the actual influence he already wielded, or, more likely, a combination of the two.

Nizār seems to have been executed without proclaiming the naṣṣ for his successor, and none of his progeny claimed the position immediately thereafter. ⁴⁶ As a result, the Nizārī community was faced with a vacant imamate. ⁴⁷ Notably, the philosophical quandaries seem not to have slowed the practical Nizārī mission, as they continued their activities by capturing the fortresses of Girdkuh and Shāhdiz ⁴⁸ either during Nizār’s imprisonment or shortly after his

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⁴⁴) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 324.
⁴⁶) Ibid.
⁴⁷) Ibid., 195-196.
execution. Though later Nizārī tradition states that a grandson of the murdered Imām was smuggled to Alamūt, Ḥasan did not announce this successor. More importantly, no indication suggests that Ḥasan had designs on the position himself. Instead, the Persian Ismāʿīlīs seem to have adopted elements of the pre-Fāṭimid model. The latter, during the ninth century, seems to have consisted of revolutionary daʿwa activity enacted by the proselytizing of the dāʿīs, dispersed widely and directed through a secret central leadership.

In both, pragmatism seems to have dictated policy. In contrast to the Fāṭimid state, in which Ismāʿīlīsm was the ruling sect over a Sūnni majority, early Ismāʿīlīsm and Nizārī Ismāʿīlīsm were protest movements against oppressive regimes that appealed to diverse social strata. Hence, the complex hierarchy developed under the Fāṭimids seems to have relaxed due to the Nizārī’s revolutionary mode. Ismāʿīlīs of diverse social backgrounds referred to each other by the egalitarian “comrade” (rafīq), and the tradition of authority stemming from learning ended with Ḥasan, after which militarily capable individuals, rather than the intellectuals of Fāṭimid times, rose to high-ranking positions. Therefore, it seems little surprise that Ḥasan, paralleling the leaders of that earlier era, became the ḥujja of the absent Imām, representing him on earth during his occultation. In itself, the designation merits consideration. The Fāṭimid use of the term, as mentioned, designated a high-ranking member of the daʿwa. The early Ismāʿīlīs, however, used the term to describe the successor who would become Imām when the Imām perished. Moreover, in early Shiʿite usage, ḥujja was a synonym for Imām.

Though he did predict the imminent coming of the Imām-qaʾim, unlike the pre-Fāṭimid ḥujja, Ḥasan never claimed access to the Imām. Though a proxy, the Imām would not have been providing direction to Ḥasan in his absence. The imamate continued to belong to the Nizārid line and the occulted Imām, even if practical authority belonged to Ḥasan. For example, numismatic evidence demonstrates that coinage continued to be minted in Nizārī's

49) Ibid., 49.
51) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 98.
54) Ivanow, Early Persian Ismailism, 26.
56) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 118.
57) Ivanow, Early Persian Ismailism, 42.
58) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 326.
name until after Ḥasan’s death.  

60) Ḥasan never introduced doctrinal revisions in the fashion of the Imām, and his driving contribution to early Nizārī practice, “the new preaching” (daʿwa jadīda), was an aggressive reconstruction of longstanding doctrines on authoritative teaching (taʿlīm). The extant summaries of Ḥasan’s own writings demonstrate he continued to argue for the imamate’s necessity, as the Imām’s ʿilm remained the only true means to understand God’s will. However, the title he adopted may indicate manipulating the term’s amorphous history to insinuate the Imām’s authority without usurping the imamate outright. In this way, he could capitalize on the charisma of the Imām to hold together a community in which an occulted Imām would have been, in practice, a novel concept. Nominally, however, he remained the Imām’s deputy, under the Fāṭimid definition. The record of his actions does not indicate any instance in which he acted against this mandate and would therefore be illegitimate. The sharīʿa remained enforced. He emphasized the commanding of right and forbidding of wrong and had his own sons executed for their transgressions: one for drinking wine and the other for complicity in a murder of which he was posthumously exculpated. It seems Ḥasan was either as severely pious as he appeared or he understood the necessity to appear rigorous in his observances to maintain his authority. Whereas there seems to be no reason to doubt the former, even if his piety was political theatre, his actions indicate awareness that legitimacy in accordance with Ismāʿīlī tradition were vital to his control over the Persian mission.

### Legitimacy of Nizārī Warfare under Hasan-i Sabbāḥ

The structure of Ismāʿīlī authority makes warfare fairly straightforward under normal conditions. As offensive jihād in most Shiʿite doctrines requires the Imām to approve and direct it, and, as Ismāʿīlism by nature upholds the living imamate, any violence sanctioned by the Imām is legitimate. As the deputy of the Imām, first as a dāʿī and then as ḥujja, Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ wielded this authority to endorse warfare. However, this authority in Ismāʿīlī tradition is not absolute. Al-Nuʿmān states that “a deputy [who] leads the people contrary to [the principles of] the Book of God or the commands of His Plenipotentia-

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61) Ibid., 197.
64) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 343-344.
65) Bonner, Jihad in Islamic, 125.
ries (awliyāʾihi) [the Imams]" loses his right to command. The preeminence given to assassination by Ḥasan radically departed from the established norms of warfare in the Ismāʿīlī tradition. For example, Al-Nuʿmān collects aḥādīth that treat warfare in traditional terms, describing the proper management of infantry, archers, and cavalry. In the Daʿāʾim Al-Islām, the nearest analogue to assassination originates in a ḥadīth in which ʿAlī relays the permissibility of one-on-one combat during the time of Muḥammad, and solo combat clearly differs a great deal from targeted murder. Despite this, assassination exists in the greater Islamic tradition. Records insinuate that Muḥammad employed the technique to eliminate particular enemies. Thus, whereas there seems not to have been jurisprudence governing assassinations, the practice had precedence in the form of the Prophet himself. The difference between previous models of assassination and that used by the Nizārīs is that the latter constituted a mode of war rather than a purely practical stratagem.

Three factors define the Nizārīs’ specific brand of assassination. The first is the psychological component. The second is the violence against the intended target. The nearly ubiquitous suicidal nature of the mission provides the third. Beginning with the first, the Nizārīs intended to frighten potential opposition by theatrically eliminating their targets in public forums. Though this practice led to accusations that Ḥasan pioneered terrorism, the call to “terrify the enemy of God” (turhibūna bihi ʿadwawwa Allāhi) is Qurʾānic in origin. Psychological assault had never evolved into a recognized category of warfare, but the seminal idea predates the Ismāʿīlīs. From the Ismāʿīlī standpoint, Ḥasan represented the occulted Imām, who represented God on earth; hence, the Nizārīs’ enemies were the enemies of God. As a result, psychological warfare could be legitimized from the Ismāʿīlī perspective; their enemies, obviously, categorically denounced it. Therefore, ritualized intimidation, while novel in practice, could plausibly have been corroborated by doctrine.

The second characteristic of Nizārī assassination, the murder itself, is most problematic as legitimate practice. As mentioned, assassination was not alien to Islamic rulers. The Saljūqs, frequently targets of the early Nizārīs, employed it. Considering the circumstances the Nizārīs faced, the method exemplified

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67) Ibid., 460-461.
68) Ibid., 460.
69) Hodgson, The Secret Order, 82.
70) Daftary, The Assassin Legends, 34.
72) Cf. Qurʾān 8:60.
74) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 338.
practicality. In addition to the psychological effects, assassination decapitated the authority in a society that depended on individual charisma as a prerequisite to rule.\textsuperscript{75} As the Nizārīs found themselves severely outnumbered, a single assassination could avert a costly battle as the targeted individual typically embodied local authority. It seems likely that the sect justified the practice as humane in light of the deaths prevented by using the technique expediently.\textsuperscript{76} Where no ruling validates the practice, several Ismāʿīlī precedents and \textit{ahādīth} relate tangentially. Foremost, the Sunnī Saljūqs would have been regarded as usurpers of ʿAlid authority. A \textit{ḥadīth} attributed to ʿAlī describes his combat against his opponents at the Battle of the Camel, Muʿāwiya’s supporters at the Battle of Ṣīfīn, and the Khawārij as actions that were commanded,\textsuperscript{77} presumably by God. Another \textit{ḥadīth} attributed to Imām Muḥammad al-Bāqir describes the Muslims who rebelled against ʿAlī as greater sinners than the infidels who fought the Prophet because the latter were ignorant and the former possessed the Qurʾān and still defied ʿAlī.\textsuperscript{78} In yet another \textit{ḥadīth}, ʿAlī proclaims that “the party of rebellion should be fought and they should be killed with every instrument used against the polytheists.”\textsuperscript{79} Thus, fighting against the illegitimate Sunnī oppressors was not merely acceptable; it was doctrinally obligated. Moreover, the historical precedent in which the Fāṭimid Imāms expanded into Palestine and Syria,\textsuperscript{80} which were ʿAbbāsid territories, validated combat with Sunnīs when promoting Ismāʿīlīsm.

Regarding the method of assassination, Ismāʿīlī jurisprudence does not forbid it, and elements of it seem acceptable. A \textit{ḥadīth} credited to ʿAlī states that “the polytheists may be killed [in war] by all possible means; [for instance by weapons made of] iron or stone or fire, or water, or any other means.”\textsuperscript{81} As previously established, rebels and polytheists are interchangeable, and thus \textit{carte blanche} seems to be issued in their elimination. In another, the Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq reiterates that acting to uphold the command, and to support the authority, of the Imām and his representatives is tantamount to obeying God.\textsuperscript{82} Since there was no explicit prohibition against assassination, Ḥasan’s innovation was authorized by virtue of his position.

The final violent aspect of Nizārī assassination is martyrdom. \textit{Ahādīth} credited to Muḥammad recognize martyrs as the most generous people among

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 328.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Hodgson, \textit{The Secret Order}, 84.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Nuʿmān ibn Muhammad, \textit{The Pillars}, 480.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid. 489.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Bonner, \textit{Jihad in Islamic}, 135.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Nuʿmān ibn Muhammad, \textit{The Pillars}, 465.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
mankind and martyrdom in the way of God as the highest possible act. In fact, the Nizārī practice seems to ensure martyrdom as a necessary component of the act. The assassins exclusively used daggers, notably limited in range, despite the availability of poison and projectile weapons that would have afforded a greater chance of survival for the assassin. With hardly any exceptions, the assassins did not attempt escape and were consequently killed. Within the Nizārī community, the individuals who undertook these missions were known as fidāʾīs, literally meaning “devotee.” Under Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, the fidāʾīs likely received no special training and probably did not constitute a special corps. Instead, they seem to have been young members of the Ismāʿīlī population who volunteered to sacrifice themselves due to a deep spiritual conviction and for the greater good of the community. All of these factors suggest that the act was as much an expression of faith as it was mode of resistance. In fact, the practice seems to have developed to serve the two functions simultaneously. On one hand, the assassination dealt with a palpable political problem. The secondary martyrdom answered a personal religious need following the tradition of preexisting Ismāʿīlī beliefs. Martyrdom being the highest possible act, and the devotees being volunteers, the act achieved a sanctity that placed it beyond a mundane killing. Simultaneously, while thus sanctified, Nizārī warfare was deeply pragmatic. Much like Ḥasan’s “new preaching,” the implementation of widespread assassination reinterpreted and reformed extant traditions but did not necessarily invent new ones. Considering the Nizārī ethos and the exigency of defending the community in a hostile environment, Ḥasan’s program was not inherently illegitimate.

Twelver Authority and Wilāyat al-Faqīh

In Twelver thought, the sharīʿa is the complete and perfect law derived from the Qurʾān and the sunna. Whereas the Qurʾān remains free from falsification, the sunna does not. Because of the restricted scope of the Qurʾān and the sunna’s corruptibility, God provided the imamate to ensure the guidance of the human race after Muḥammad’s death. In the Twelver tradition, there

83) Ibid., 427.
84) Ibid.
86) Ibid.
87) Hodgson, The Secret Order, 82.
88) Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, 328-329.
89) Daftary, The Assassin Legends, 35.
92) Ibid.
must always be an infallible guide and proof (ḥujja) of God to whom mankind can turn for certitude in religious matters. Thus, God gifted the Imāms with divine knowledge (ʿilm) and insusceptibility to human error (ʿisma). They occupy the position of Muḥammad, excepting revelatory attributes; from this mandate, the Imām holds the rights to sovereignty (wilāya) and government (ḥukūma). ‘Alid heritage and descent from the Prophet are also emphasized as a prerequisite to the imamate. A ḥadīth attributed to Muḥammad relates their preeminence: “Behold, I leave for you two weights: the Book of God and my Family.” Based on the divinely-granted rights to sovereignty and government, from the Twelver perspective, any earthly authority other than that of the Imām is illegitimate. As ʿAlī was the sole politically empowered Imām, all subsequent rulers are illegitimate. Under Jaʿfar al-Sādiq, the authority of the imamate became derived exclusively from ʿilm rather than worldly political dominion.

In 941 CE, the greater occultation (ghayba) marked the Twelfth Imām’s disappearance, and, as he left no explicit instructions regarding leadership of the community, the ghayba also signified the end of legitimate authority. Where-as much of the Imāms’ practical responsibilities had already devolved to the Shīʿī ʿulamāʾ, the ghayba removed the titular authority without explicitly replacing it. Thus, while the actual effect was probably limited, absorbing the loss into doctrine generated debate that continues into contemporary times. In practice, the ʿulamāʾ inherited the religious authority of the Shīʿite community but not the right to secular leadership. The evolving government in Iran saw the corresponding evolution of the Shīʿite clerical class. During the Ṣafavid era, the ʿulamāʾ outright claimed deputyship to the Twelfth Imām from a statement attributed to him: “As for new cases which occur, refer concerning them to the transmitters of our [the Imam’s] statements; for they are my proof (ḥujja) unto you, and I am God’s proof unto them.” By the Qajar dynasty, the Shīʿite ʿulamāʾ in Iran monopolized religious authority, and the

96) Ibid., 136.
100) Ibid., 166.
101) Ibid., 165-166.
102) Arjomand, The Turban, 11.
underpinnings of the modern clerical hierarchy began to form. At this time, their dominion did not extend to the political realm, which remained firmly the prerogative of the Qajar administration.

Two concepts are central to understanding authority in the clerical class. The first is a jurist’s (faqīh) personal interpretation of a legal issue and decision on the matter (ijtihād). The second is following the example set forth by a jurist qualified to perform such an interpretation (taqlīd). In order to perform ijtihād, a student must prove himself capable as a jurist, at which point he receives permission to give legal rulings based on his personal investigation (ifāsūt al-ijtihād). At that point, he becomes a mujtahid. In matters of religion, those not recognized to perform ijtihād are obligated to observe the rulings of a recognized mujtahid. Because the 'ulamā' lack the ʿilm that ensures the correct ruling on a religious matter, an ijtihād can never be definitively proven correct. As a result, mujtahids provide different rulings, all of which are acceptable. Since the nineteenth century, the preeminent mujtahid has held the position of marjiʿ al-taqlīd, meaning “a source to imitate.” In theory, the layman follows the marjiʿ’s rulings and example because he is the most learned jurist and, therefore, the one best suited to guide the believer. Notably, several mujtahids may be worthy marājiʿ simultaneously. As a result, the system, though stratified, allows for numerous valid opinions from among the marājiʿ. The structure of this clerical hierarchy would later clash with the Islamic Republic established by Khumaynī.

Khumaynī’s delineation for the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) evolved out of the mujtahid tradition like previous interpretations, but from the outset, it was tinged with pragmatism. Notably, in Islamic Government, Khumaynī consistently argues that establishing a government during the ghayaba as “necessary” to defend Islam and its boundaries. Khumaynī continues

104) Arjomand, The Turban, 15.
105) Ibid., 180.
107) Taskhīrī, “Supreme Authority,” 159.
110) Ibid., 159-160.
111) Ibid.
112) Stewart, “Islamic Juridical Hierarchies,” 139.
113) Ibid., 140.
114) Ibid., 139.
this rhetoric, quoting the Prophet’s statement that, “Were it not for the obligation imposed on me, forcing me to take up this task of government, I would abandon it.” In Khumaynī’s argument, government from the outset was an unpleasant necessity, even to Muḥammad. It is not, Khumaynī asserts, a spiritual station but a means to an end. In the dichotomy of faith, the alternative is a situation in which Islam cannot be upheld, and, consequently, a return to jāhilīyya.

In the evolution of Khumaynī’s version of wilāyat al-faqīh, this “necessity” seems to have constantly outweighed the particulars. When asked in 1963 about the institutions of government he desired to implement, he declined to affirm any particular system on the grounds that an endorsement would inevitably draw criticism from some sector; therefore, such matters would be addressed when relevant. Indeed, Khumaynī makes no mention of the Islamic Republic in *Islamic Government*, which may indicate that he envisioned the republic model to be a stepping-stone to a truly Islamic government. Corroborating this notion, Khumaynī articulates that “Islamic government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government.” The pith of his arguments state that the ʿulamāʾ, as the only valid authority present during the *ghayba*, hold the right to rule. In an Islamic government, the indispensable credentials of Khumaynī’s ideal ruler are general “intelligence and administrative ability” in addition to “knowledge of [Islamic] law and justice.” A ruler emulating a marjīʿ has natural limits to his authority because following another undermines his own power; by contrast, one who reigns without practicing *taqlīd* governs incorrectly. Therefore, the only rulers who can fulfill this mandate autonomously are the jurists, who are capable of *ijtāhad*. Revelation and ʿilm, which grant divine insight, do not “confer additional governmental powers.” Thus, any jurist possessing superior knowledge may rule, and it becomes incumbent for the people to obey him. Importantly, though this ruler obtains the political agency of the Imāms, he does not assume their spiritual rank.

117) Ibid., 65-66.
119) Arjomand, *The Turban*, 149.
123) Ibid., 60.
124) Ibid.
125) Ibid., 62.
126) Ibid.
127) Ibid., 64-65.
While not the first proposal of wilāyat al-faqīh, schemes prior to Khumaynī had involved collective rule by all the jurists (fuqahāʾ) with the understanding that the general deputyship to the Hidden Imām extended to the jurists as a collective group. Indeed, the statement used to justify the position of the ʿulamāʾ during the Şafavid period denotes that “they are [the Imam’s] proof.” Khumaynī broke from this understanding by suggesting that one faqīh should be elevated to a superior status by virtue of implementing the wilāyat al-faqīh as a working system. As he had been successful in that function, he became the designated leader. Again, this justification was pragmatic; the fiat to rule stems from the faculty to establish rule. Khumaynī could never substantiate the office of one supreme jurist over his contemporaries from a theological standpoint, but it had to exist to maintain societal order. Naturally, this shortcoming had ramifications. A number of marājiʿ and ayatollahs, including Grand Ayatollah Sharīʿatmadārī, objected to wilāyat al-faqīh on the aforementioned doctrinal grounds. As a result, Sharīʿatmadārī suffered a brutal character assassination campaign and, in 1982, was demoted from Grand Ayatollah, a relegation that had no precedent and constituted a move on the part of the state to consolidate power. Likewise, Khumaynī’s supporters purged the pro-Sharīʿatmadārī ʿulamāʾ. The incident demonstrates the innate conflict between Khumaynī’s government and the fuqahāʾ hierarchy. Because of the accepted plurality of the marjiʿīyya construct, the total submission to one jurist based on his political capability clashes with the knowledge-based underpinnings of the entire establishment. Because no one ijtāhad can be known to be conclusively correct, Khumaynī’s wilāyat al-faqīh could be opposed on doctrinal grounds under the religious institution as it existed. Furthermore, as both Khumaynī and Sharīʿatmadārī were marājiʿ, Khumaynī could not suppress Sharīʿatmadārī on religious grounds due to the model of clerical authority.

The state’s public castigation of Sharīʿatmadārī reflected the evolution of Twelver ideas of authority—at least in Iran. In practice, the Islamic Republic began to override traditional Shiʿi paradigms of prestige for the sake of its own stability. The idea that the leading jurist is primus inter pares in relation to the other fuqahāʾ did not translate into reality. It became obligatory to obey the rulings of the supreme jurist, even if other jurists disagreed with the

130) Ibid., 156.
131) Ibid.
interpretation. If individual jurists were allowed to proffer rulings, these alternative judgments could threaten public unity, encourage dissidence among the populace, and, therefore, threaten the Islamic Republic itself. Religious rhetoric also served to quell discord. As Khumaynī outlined it, the Iranian political regime was the only valid government during the ghayba, and its support became mandatory for Shiʿites not on a nationalistic basis, but as a religious duty. Likewise, the believer’s failure to participate in government resulted in spiritual consequences. Gradually, wilāyat al-faqīh became the most important element of the Islam of the Iranian state. In 1988, Khumaynī commented that,

Islamic government, since it is the extension of the authority of the Prophet and holy Imams, is considered one of Islam’s fundamental tenets, having precedence over even devotions such as performing prayers, fasting, or pilgrimage...Thus, for example, the government can abrogate the ritual duties of ḥajj or revoke contracts undertaken when those contracts are perceived to be detrimental to its interests, whether they pertain to religious matters or not.

Paradoxically, the regime, which Khumaynī considered necessary on the basis that the institution must exist to protect Islam, could circumvent shariʿa and tradition to fulfill this mandate. In the ultimate example of ends justifying means, the ruling jurist could ignore or change Islam in the interests of preserving it. Of course, such logic also presented the ruler with a carte blanche to administer in any chosen way and retain immunity from criticism.

Concurrent with the religio-political posturing, Khumaynī’s individual charisma contributed to his authoritative standing. Khumaynī benefitted from a climate in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s that fomented the return of millenarian beliefs. Core aspects of his persona promoted a tacit link to the Hidden Imām. As a sayyid, Khumaynī claimed descent from the Prophet through the seventh Imām Mūsā al-Kāẓim. Due to the ʿAlid prerogative of the imamate, Khumaynī benefited from the messianic expectation of the Twelfth Imām’s return by virtue of being a prominent public figure who was also an ʿAlid. Likewise, Khumaynī’s fourteen-year exile from and return to Iran readily mirrored the ghayba motif. While not explicitly endorsing them, Khumaynī allowed his followers’ messianic beliefs to manifest around him. By 1970, his supporters

134) Ibid.
135) Ibid.
had bestowed the honorific title “Imām” on him; the term had previously been reserved for the divinely-guided leaders of the ʿAlid line ending with the Hidden Imām.\(^{139}\) The Iranian populace argued over whether Khumaynī was the Twelfth Imām returning from occultation to fulfill his role as Mahdī.\(^{140}\) Even those unprepared to concede that Khumaynī was the eschatological redeemer postulated that he might be the Mahdī’s forerunner.\(^{141}\) Denizens of rural cities apparently beheld Khumaynī’s face in the full moon and responded by sacrificing lambs in the ensuing days.\(^{142}\) After ascending to power, people began referring to Khumaynī as the Deputy to the Twelfth Imām (nāʿib-i imām).\(^{143}\)

In perhaps the most demonstrable incident of Khumaynī manipulating these expectations, when asked directly about his being the Mahdī, Khumaynī prevaricated and provided neither confirmation nor denial.\(^{144}\) In this manner, he avoided marginalization as a radical for promoting himself as the divine Imām while maintaining the aura of such popular associations. Without appropriating these ingrained Shīʿite notions of authority into his own charisma, it is unlikely Khumaynī would have succeeded in restructuring both the political and religious orders.\(^{145}\)

### Using Violence to Legitimize the State in the Khumaynī Era

In classical Twelver Shīʿite jurisprudence, the utilization of violence for any ends must be approved by the Imām. Under this ruling, employing violence in jihād\(^ {146}\) or in the Islamic responsibility to “command good and forbid evil” (al-amr biʾl-maʿrūf waʾl-nahy ʿan al-munkar) becomes forbidden during the ghayba.\(^ {147}\) Regarding the former, Twelver Shīʿism divides jihād into the “greater jihād,” (al-jihād al-akbar) in which the believer struggles against their baser instincts, and “lesser jihād” (al-jihād al-aṣghar), in which the believer engages against a hostile opponent in warfare.\(^ {148}\) In Twelver belief,

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139) Ibid.
140) Ibid.
141) Ibid.
142) Ibid.
145) Arjomand, The Turban, 100.
jihād also entails seeking knowledge (ʿilm) and guarding Shiʿite secrets. Lesser jihād can be conducted against polytheists, apostates, practitioners of other monotheistic religions (ahl al-kitāb), and unjust dissenters to legitimate rule (ahl al-baghy). Whereas the first three align with Sunnī sanctions to wage jihād, the final possesses a distinctly Shiʿite character. In Sunnī fiqh, dissenters are Muslims who rebel against the government. In Twelver fiqh, because all rulers are illegitimate save the Imāms, all non-Twelver Muslims, by not recognizing the Imāms, are dissidents against whom fighting is obligatory and not dependent on any temporal prompt. Again, only the Imām may order these offensive jihāds. Over time, however, worldly practicality led to alterations in the doctrine. For example, Al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067 CE) rules defensive jihād against hostile incursions to be acceptable even during the ghayba. Al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) concludes that declaring jihād is the Imām’s privilege, but an appointee of the Imām may also instigate it. Whereas al-Ḥillī’s language describing this appointee is ambiguous, the tacit implication seems to be that it is the fuqahā’, upon whom had devolved several of the Imām’s functions at this juncture. During the Qajar period, defensive jihād became the explicit right of the mujtahids in the absence of the Imām. This jihād could be called to defend the lands of Islam from infidel encroachment, could only be led by a divinely sanctioned ruler, and was distinct from simple self-defense. The other situation in which violence may be permissible in a religious context, commanding good and forbidding evil, becomes relatively quietist in Twelver doctrine. Collecting traditions of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, common themes in “forbidding wrong” include advising the faithful and teaching the ignorant, but not engaging an armed opponent or correcting an unjust ruler unless that ruler seeks correction. Specifically using force to prevent wrong was restricted without the Imām’s permission; even in rare instances when jurists ruled wounding acceptable, they forbade killing.

Khumaynī reinterpreted jihād and commanding good and forbidding evil from an activist perspective to legitimize insurrection against the Pahlavi state. In Islamic Government, he cites the tradition in which Husayn justifies

149) Kohlberg, “The Development,” 66
150) Ibid., 69.
151) Ibid.
152) Ibid.
153) Ibid., 80.
154) Ibid.
155) Ibid., 80-81.
158) Cook, Commanding Right, 254-255.
159) Ibid., 266-270.
rising against Yazīd and argues that

…the *fuqaha*, by means of *jihad* and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, must expose and overthrow the tyrannical rulers and rouse the people so that the universal movement of all alert Muslims can establish Islamic government in place of tyrannical regimes.\(^{160}\)

The quietist traditions of commanding good and forbidding evil, specifically Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s prohibition against insurrection, are categorically ignored. In this vein, the *fuqahāʾ* are obligated to forbid evil by revolting when the ruling regime stands to damage Islam.\(^{161}\) In his *Tahrīr al-Wasīla*, Khumaynī expounds this notion by explaining that certain cases exist in which the evil to be forbidden constitutes a base threat to Islam. In these cases, the compulsion to forbid the evil overrides the typical sanction against acting when such action could harm the believer, especially if the believer is a cleric.\(^{162}\) Examples of such threats include the preservation of life and safeguarding Islamic territory.\(^{163}\) Under Khumaynī’s ruling, a *jihād* may be called by the jurists against the unjust regime to establish the Islamic government. In this case, defensive *jihād*, which usually signifies resisting an incursion, seems to include warfare against an incumbent regime transmitting practices detrimental to Islam within the Islamic territories.

The 1979 Constitution granted Khumaynī the right to “[declare] war and [mobilize] the armed forces at the suggestion of the High Council for National Defense” as the constitutionally stipulated “leader” (*rahbar*).\(^{164}\) Furthermore, the Constitution delineated the purpose of the defense forces as “not only for defending the borders, but also for the mission stated in the Book, of holy war in the way of God and fighting to expand the rule of God’s law in the world.”\(^{165}\) The Constitution draws a distinction between war and *jihād*. Therefore, the leader may declare war in the interests of the nation, but this is distinct from *jihād*, struggle in the cause of God. Notably, while offensive *jihād* is categorized as the duty of the defense forces, its permissibility remains vague. Indeed, under Khumaynī, *jihād* remained a defensive conflict.\(^{166}\)

Accordingly, Khumaynī’s rhetoric during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 113-115.
\(^{162}\) Cook, *Commanding Right*, 534.
\(^{163}\) Ibid.
\(^{166}\) Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution,” 200.
frequently invoked defensive *jihād*, either conceptually or directly. In September 1980, Khumaynī described the war as “Islam in its totalit ...fighting against blasphemy” and called Muslims, under religious obligation, “to protect, to support and to defend Islam.”\(^{167}\) When addressing the Iraqi people in October 1980, Khumaynī asserted that the “war [had] been imposed on Iran” and that defending Iran was “both logical and a religious duty.”\(^{168}\) In a speech later that month, Khumaynī appealed to the Iranian people with “the honor of jihad” and “the defense of an Islamic country.”\(^{169}\) In particular, Khumaynī targeted Saddam Hussein, alternatively labeling him an atheist,\(^{170}\) a hypocrite,\(^{171}\) the enemy of the Imāms,\(^{172}\) a pagan,\(^{173}\) an infidel,\(^{174}\) an apostate,\(^{175}\) and the dirty agent of colonialism.\(^{176}\) By rejecting Saddam Hussein as an unbeliever, Iranian self-defense became a defensive *jihād*. By labeling him a colonialist puppet, Khumaynī approved of an Iraqi *jihād* against Saddam Hussein as he had for Iranians against the Shah. Accordingly, he petitioned the Iraqi people to follow Iran’s example and overthrow their unjust ruler,\(^{177}\) while petitioning the Muslims in Saddam Hussein’s army to kill him, abandon him, and return to Islam.\(^{178}\)

The other recurring motif permeating Khumaynī’s speeches and the propaganda of the era is martyrdom. Martyrdom holds a preeminent place in Shi’ite

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175) Khumaynī, “Greetings to the Oppressed,” 76.
177) Khumaynī, “Iraq Attacks Iran,” 53-54.
tradition. According to Twelver belief, the first eleven Imāms were martyred. In particular, the murder of Ḥusayn and his company at Karbalāʾ had a foundational effect on Shīʿite identity. Classically, the Shīʿite narrative emphasized the soteriological implications over a possible activist interpretation. During the 1960s and 1970s, figures such as ʿAlī Sharīʿatī emphasized the insurrectionary quality of the account, in particular Ḥusayn’s role as “the messenger of martyrdom [and] manifestation of the blood revolution.” Prior to his assassination in 1979, Murtazā Muṭahharī equated martyrdom with the “transfusion of blood into a particular human society, especially a society suffering from anaemia.” To Muṭahharī, the martyr “charges the atmosphere with courage and zeal” which is “essential for the revival of a nation.” Furthermore, a martyr, like the Prophet and the Imāms, may intercede with God on the behalf of another on the Day of Judgment, reaffirming his elevated spiritual status. The general elevation of martyrs in Islam is not a novel concept, but the rhetoric predating the 1979 Revolution demonstrates the politicization of the ideal. Thus, the overwhelming presence of martyrdom as a motif during the war merely continued the tropes developing in the decades prior. During the war, martyrs served to reinforce the connection between the state and God. For example, Khumaynī continuously revisited martyrdom in his discourse, intertwining the sanctity and reward of martyrs, the Iranian nation, and Islam. In September 1980, Khumaynī described Iran’s transformation “from a weak nation into a strong one in which every single individual longs to be martyred.” The Iranian defense forces’ status paralleled “the army of the Prophet”; by killing or being killed by the enemy, they attained paradise.

Dying in defense of Iran and its Islamic government corresponded directly with martyrdom while struggling in the way of God. This speech illustrates the persistent emphasis on martyrdom, one promulgated through other means. Graphic media of the era depicted soldiers killed in battle alongside the martyrs of Karbalāʾ with captions such as, “Every day is ʿĀshūrāʾ and Every Soil is Karbalāʾ.” This reference becomes expressly poignant when one considers Muṭahharī’s claim that the dead of Karbalāʾ hold a special status among all of the martyrs. Thus, the soldiers killed in action rank among the best

183) Ibid., 37.
184) Khumaynī, “Follow the Ideology,” 60.
185) Ibid.
of martyrs. As the conflict developed in the mid-1980s, the Iranian cinema of self-defense immersed; the recurring structure of these films involves a man shirking material wealth and personal desire to seek salvation through martyrdom in combat. Saturating Iranian culture with martyrdom benefited Khumaynī’s government in several ways. On one level, it appealed to the heritage of the Shi’ite community and motivated soldiers with promises of salvation in the cause of God, despite the particularly brutal events of the war itself. On another level, Khumaynī’s declaration of jihād against Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath regime on the pretense that they were unbelievers (kuffār) and dissenters (bughat) had caused debate about its permissibility amongst the clergy. Martyrdom cannot occur in a secular war, fighting for mundane concerns; it only occurs when one dies struggling in the way of God. By emphasizing martyrdom, the state generated a self-affirming loop. If the Iranian soldiers were martyred defending Iran, then Iran was, by default, the government of God. If the Iranian state was sanctioned by God, then defense of it was jihād, in which a soldier’s death was martyrdom. Hence, the motif served to reinforce the state as representative of God, which was especially important considering the Iranian government’s continued difficulty in aligning the pluralistic opinions of the clerical order with those espoused by the supreme jurist.

Trends in Revolutionary Shi’ite Movements

The Ismā‘īlīs and the Twelvers diverged from one another shortly after the death of Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq (d. 765) over the succession to the imamate. Originally, al-Ṣādiq had granted the naṣṣ to his son Ismā‘īl, who either predeceased him or was disavowed due to alcoholism. In any case, upon his death, the majority of the Shi’ite community pledged their allegiance to another son, Mūsā al-Kāẓim while a minority recognized Ismā‘īl’s son Muḥammad as the rightful Imām. The majority group ultimately became the Twelver Shi’ites while the minority evolved into the Ismā‘īlī Shī‘ites. From that point, the two sects developed independently of one another with distinct traditions. Even the common features, such as ‘Alid loyalty and the imamate, assumed very different characteristics. This fact makes similarities between the Nizārī uprising under Ḥasan-i Șabbāh and the Islamic Revolution, including the establishment of wilāyat al-faqīh, intriguing vis-à-vis a distinct Shi’ite identity. Admittedly, the scope being two specific Shi’ite movements limits the conclusiveness of

191) Ibid., 89-90.
any subsequent inquiries. Despite this dilemma, several trends seem to appear.

Whereas one cannot correlate the political situation in geographical Persia during the eleventh century with its twentieth century counterpart, both insurrections arose in part as resistance to “foreign” occupation. For the Nizārīs, this presence took the form of the Saljūqs. Although not a national revolt, as the concept of the nation postdates the era, ethnic identity played into indigenous Persian resentment. Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ reportedly labeled the Saljūq sultan an ignorant Turk and remarked that Turks were jinn rather than men. Economically, the Saljūq amīrs’ abuse of the land grant (iqṭāʿ) system and the harsh tax policies implemented in urban areas exploited lower class Persians. So, despite the Saljūqs’ zealous oppression of Shiʿites, widespread discontent transcending religious identity existed prior to Ḥasan’s actions. The revolt received widespread urban and rural support from non-Ismāʿīlīs because the Nizārīs fought the oppressors. In an unprecedented move among Muslims, Ḥasan also elevated Persian to the official religious language at Alamūt. While undoubtedly a pragmatic move, considering the missionary character of Ismāʿīlism at the time and the Nizārīs’ intended audience, it also “localized” Ismāʿīlism in a way that directly opposed the Saljūqs, whose religious language was Arabic, and thus imported from other locales.

In the twentieth century, Iran’s economic downturn in the 1970s saw almost complete stagnation in production, the cultural disorientation resulting from the White Revolution, the practically nonexistent participation in government, and resident foreigners brought in as a result of the Shah’s reforms. The subsequent discontent among the Iranian populace resulted in a deep desire to reactivate their national heritage while simultaneously transferring their disquiet onto the ubiquitous figure of the Shah. As the Iranian writer Jalal Al-e Ahmad observed in Gharbzadegi, Shiʿism provided the one aspect of Iranian culture not corrupted by Westernization that also possessed an ideological and traditional cache rooted deeply enough in the Iranian consciousness to mobilize its people. Thus, Shiʿism provided a preexisting, distinctly “nationalist” aspect in ready opposition to the ostensible source of Iranian objections. The Shah, who was Shiʿite, seems to have been excluded from this identity

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194) Ibid., 316.
195) Ibid., 316-317.
196) Ibid., 316.
198) Ibid., 109.
in light of his secular state and promotion of pre-Islamic Persian culture. By contrast, Khumaynī, exiled due to his vehemently anti-Shah discourse, became the embodiment of Iranian culture. Like the Nizārī revolt before it, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 benefitted from widespread dissatisfaction among the populace at large, not merely pious Shīʿites and the clerical class. The motives for revolution among the revolutionaries varied according to background; the establishment of the Islamic government was Khumaynī’s ideal and differed greatly from the model desired by other constituent elements of the revolution.

Foremost, one is reminded that, despite the rhetoric and actions of both leaders being predominantly couched in Shīʿite tropes, the driving forces behind both uprisings were far more complicated than religious grievances. In both cases, in the capacity that Shīʿism drove the movements, it seems to have functioned both as faith and a rallying point as an aspect of identity not shared by their oppressors. As the basic Shīʿite ethos developed out of the perceived betrayal of ʿAlī and Ḥusayn by the larger Muslim community, a preoccupation with injustice has always permeated the community. Thus, while not a doctrinally rebellious faith, its worldview and underlying sense of persecution readily graft onto revolt against worldly inequalities. Noting this, the leadership of both movements seems to have capitalized on two pan-Shīʿite motifs: martyrdom and ʿAlid charisma.

Whereas martyrdom is relevant to most Islamic denominations it gains particular significance in the Shīʿite community due to the history of the early imamate, particularly the assassination of ʿAlī and the massacre at Karbalāʾ. Likewise, martyr veneration occurs throughout Islam. In Shīʿism however, martyrdom represents “redemptive suffering” and thus gains an “enhanced reverence.” During these revolutionary movements, this reverence seems to have manifested in such a way that martyrdom became an end within itself, rather than simply a corollary aspect of waging jihād. In the tradition of Ḥusayn, its aim is not necessarily victory against the enemy but creating fervor and fomenting action in those who survive the martyr. As mentioned, the Nizārī practice of assassination seems to have been one that institutionalized martyrdom to the same extent as it did political murder. The roll of

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201) Ibid., 108.
honor at Alamūt, which recorded the assassins and their victims for posterity provided a constant reminder and plausibly glorified the act. Likewise, the cultural climate under Khumaynī in the 1980s promoted an entire nation willing to become martyrs in defense of Iran, which constitutes religious victory but military defeat. Likewise, the films and art of the era depicted martyrdom as the goal of Iranian soldiers as a path to salvation. This is not to suggest that Khumaynī intended to lose the Iran-Iraq War, but that martyrdom holds an innate power in Shi‘ite thought. Merely standing up to the oppressive figures seems to indicate success independent of triumph in battle. Notably, an Ismā‘īlī hadīth attributed to ʿAlī notes that “martyrdom in the way of God,” but not necessarily martial victory, constitutes the best of acts. A Twelver hadīth is more explicit. According to it, ʿAlī’s words after being struck by his assassin were, “By the Lord of the Ka‘abah, I have become successful.” From a cynical perspective, the leadership benefits from this rhetoric, as dying in service of God has much deeper roots in the Shi‘ite consciousness than dying for the leader of the government during the ghayba. As previously stated, martyrdom only occurs in the cause of God, not in secular wars. Hence, institutionalizing martyrdom reaffirms the righteousness of the authority by tacitly linking its objectives with the objectives of God.

This link between God and the leader manifests more ostensibly through the appropriation of ‘Alid charisma. As all authority in Shi‘ism emanates from the Imām, worldly authority must posture itself in relation to the imamate. Noting this, Ḥasan and Khumaynī seem to have benefitted from the ambiguity of their status as leaders. As hujja, Ḥasan represented the Imām during his absence, and due to the structure of the Ismā‘īlī da‘wa, he had the agency of the Imām to act according to his agenda. As much of his revolt resembled the pre-Fāṭimid Ismā‘īlī da‘wa, it remains plausible that hujja as a word mirrored this reversion to a previous era. As the title hujja was held by ‘Abd Allāh al-Mahdī before his rise to the imamate, Ḥasan may have encouraged its ambiguity to reinforce his de facto authority with insinuations of being the ‘Alid Imām. As mentioned, he never claimed the title himself and seems to have followed Ismā‘īlī jurisprudence, albeit with some notable innovations. But as his personal charisma appears to have been a source of cohesion and strength in the Nizārī movement, it is reasonable that the ‘Alid charisma around which all Shi‘ism revolves played some part in organizing the revolt. In any case, as the Imām’s deputy, Ḥasan still benefited from being the closest gateway to God in the Nizārī community during the absence. With few extant

207) Muṭahharī, The Martyr, 47.
208) Daftary, “Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ,” 188.
sources from the Alamūt period, such observations are admittedly speculation. By contrast, Khumaynī encouraged the abstruseness regarding his relationship to the imamate in the previously outlined ways. Because the hierarchy in Twelver Shīʿism remains nebulous, his controversial implementation of wilāyat al-faqīh probably succeeded because he insinuated this higher degree of authority. Importantly, he never claimed any divinely appointed status, which allowed him to benefit from his standing as a marjiʿ in more “rational” circles. Judging from these two examples of Shīʿite revolutionary movements, it seems that the individual charisma of the leader plays an important role in the success of the uprising. Furthermore, he must tread the line between obeying precedent and traditional continuity and obliquely appropriating the charisma of the absent Imām in order to implement more tenuous, perhaps radical, aspects of his programs.
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