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Introduction

Lebanon occupies a unique place in the Middle East. Ever since its establishment as a distinct territory separate from Syria in 1920, this tiny nation on the eastern Mediterranean has experienced a host of issues that has caused it to perpetually redefine its own identity. Specifically, Lebanon has been intensely affected by foreign intrusion and political sectarianism in ways that the neighboring Arab countries have not. Consequently, the concepts of nationalism, identity, unity, and sovereignty in the Lebanese context evolved in a rather distinctive manner over the past several decades.

In the past century, Lebanon has seldom seen an extended period in which it was not the site of some kind of foreign presence, whether the French Mandate (1920-1946), the Syrian intervention during the civil war (1976), the Israeli invasions to eject the Palestine Liberation Organization (1978 and 1982), or the extended military occupations by Israel (1982-2000) and Syria (1976-2005). Furthermore, since 1948 Lebanon has played host to hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees displaced as a result of the Arab-Israeli wars, who live in poor conditions without the benefit of citizenship and threaten to upset the delicate balance of Lebanese society. The extensive foreign presence has led some of Lebanon’s own leaders to describe the nation as suffering from a “war of others.”

At the same time that it has been dealing with protracted foreign interference in its affairs, Lebanon has also had to grapple with entrenched internal divisions in the form of institutionalized sectarianism. Historically, the area of Mount Lebanon has served as a refuge for religious minorities in the region (for example, certain Christian and Druze communities), leading eventually to the official recognition of eighteen distinct religious sects in the present-day Lebanese Republic. These sectarian divisions were cemented into the character of the Lebanese state with the National Pact of 1943, an unwritten agreement that the president would always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shi’ite Muslim. It also required that the parliament seats be split between Christians and Muslims based on the 1932 census that showed Christians constituting a majority of the population. This agreement was revised with the Taif Accord in 1989, reallocating the division of parliamentary seats and shifting some powers between the “troika of presidents.”

As will be discussed in more detail below, sectarianism as it is used here does not necessarily refer to confessional or religious differences. Instead, it refers to a political system

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1 Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir in particular has used this phrase on many occasions. This will be discussed later in more detail.
organized along sectarian/confessional lines. Specifically, sectarianism in Lebanon is not a natural or inevitable state of affairs arising from the multi-confessional makeup of the Lebanese population; on the contrary, it had to be produced. Makdisi writes that sectarianism “was Lebanese nationalism’s specific precursor, a formulation of new public political identities which eventually came to find their fullest expression, as well as their deepest contradiction, in the Lebanese state.” The delicate sectarian balance in Lebanon has resulted in perpetual conflict, the bloodiest example being the civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990, and, although the Taif Accord explicitly called for the eventual elimination of sectarianism, “the reality in post-civil war Lebanon tended toward an entrenchment and strengthening of sectarian allegiances.” In the years since the civil war, it has been evident that sectarianism is an unshakable feature of Lebanese society and government, though communal conflict has generally remained in the realm of politics as opposed to the open warfare of the past.

Predictably, the multi-confessional environment has led to contradictory definitions of what it is to be “Lebanese” and what a Lebanese state should look like. The Lebanese themselves, both the political elite and the general public, have been struggling with these questions ever since French General Henri Gouraud proclaimed the establishment of Greater Lebanon on September 1, 1920. By divorcing the area of Mount Lebanon from the rest of Syria, the French intended to create a Christian enclave in the Middle East. However, in order to ensure its economic viability, they added several predominately Muslim areas to the new state, resulting in a bare majority of Christians. The most politically powerful group, the Maronites, was reduced to approximately 30 percent of the population. Out of these circumstances emerged conflicting theories of nationalism and how to forge a Lebanese state composed of multiple sects. On the one hand, “the Maronites viewed Lebanon as their own special Christian homeland,” and “they envisaged the state developing as a Christian enclave with a Franco-Mediterranean cultural orientation.” On the other hand, “the Sunni Muslims, who became part of Lebanon by French decree, not of their own volition, … demanded unity with Syria and looked toward the wider Arab world for their source of cultural identity.” Unable to reconcile these conflicting identities, the political elite compromised with the 1943 National Pact, an agreement that, according to Makdisi, “[betrays] the inability to locate a genuinely national base.”

The authors of the Taif Accord recognized the destructive force of this conundrum, as well as the role it played in sparking the civil war, and attempted to address Lebanon’s

3 Ibid., 166.
5 This is not to say, of course, that communal conflict is limited entirely to political divisions and peaceful protests. Lebanon continues to experience military skirmishes, suicide bombings, and assassinations. So far, however, the situation has not devolved into all-out sectarian warfare in the same manner as before, though this may change as Lebanon is pulled deeper into the ongoing Syrian civil war. However, this matter resides outside the scope of this thesis.
7 Ibid., 209.
conflicting national identities by declaring that “Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity.”\textsuperscript{9} Additionally, the Accord states that “Lebanon’s soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese” and that “the people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation.”\textsuperscript{10} However, despite the fact that the document calls for Lebanese unity and asserts that “abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective,”\textsuperscript{11} the Taif Accord and subsequent constitutional amendments also reinforce the sectarian system in Lebanon at the same time. A quarter century later, sectarianism shows no signs of going away. After decades of debate, fighting a brutal civil war that tore the country apart, and establishing a new discourse of reconciliation and national unity, Lebanon still cannot seem to reconcile its ideals with its reality.

Despite the seemingly permanent presence of sectarianism, the conflicting notions of Lebanese nationalism, and the long-term interference of foreign actors, the Lebanese themselves have forged ahead in their attempts to come to terms with their own identity. According to Salibi, “the Lebanese, despite persisting differences which often seem grave, have actually become more and more of a distinct people, recognizing themselves as such and being recognized by others as such, simply by the process of living together and sharing in a common national life.”\textsuperscript{12} Salibi continues, arguing that

\begin{quote}
[T]he recurring internal and regional crises which, on the surface, have so frequently made the Lebanese system seem precarious and its continued existence questionable, have, at a deeper level, served to sharpen the sense of Lebanese nationality by forcing the Lebanese, time and again, to redefine their internal and external relationships, thereby gaining a deeper understanding of their national life.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

Although Salibi was writing in 1971, prior to the destruction of the civil war and the reconciliation process of the 1990s and 2000s, these words still ring true today. The Lebanese continue to debate, define, and refine what it means to be Lebanese and how to achieve national unity and sovereignty despite persistent sectarianism and foreign involvement.

**Purpose**

In his work *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson defines the “nation” as “an imagined political community” which is “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”\textsuperscript{14} He then explains this concept further:

It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{10} Ibid., Section I Clause H.
\footnote{11} Ibid., Section II Clause G.
\footnote{13} Ibid., 86.
\end{footnotes}
of each lives the image of their communion...The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them...has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations...It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm...[and as] nations dream of being free,...[the] gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to the above, Anthony D. Smith defines a “national state” as “a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of national unity and integration (but not of cultural homogeneity).”\textsuperscript{16} According to Smith, “the nationalist does not require the individual members should be alike, only that they should feel an intense bond of solidarity and therefore act in unison on all matters of national importance.”\textsuperscript{17} Nationalism itself is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”\textsuperscript{18}

Building from these definitions, one may argue that a viable national state requires a sufficient degree of territorial integrity and sovereignty, national autonomy, and a shared sense of national identity and unity. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how certain political actors imagine the Lebanese nation in the specific circumstances found in Lebanon during the period between May 2000 and April 2005. These nationalist leaders approach various topics related to nationalism, identity, and sovereignty from different angles, and in some cases vehemently disagree with each other, but one common idea shines through: each person imagines the Lebanese nation as one that is demographically pluralistic but is capable of attaining national unity based on peaceful coexistence and dialogue, even if these leaders’ specific visions of national unity do not match.

This thesis will explore the themes outlined above in post-civil war Lebanon through the rhetoric used by the nationalist leaders. I will analyze speeches, statements, and interviews given by leaders of the major religious groups to tease out the similarities and differences in how they present these issues to their Lebanese audiences. While looking generally at the post-civil war era, this thesis will focus on the time period between May 2000 and April 2005, corresponding with the Israeli and Syrian withdrawals, respectively. The Israeli withdrawal was a turning point in Lebanese history. It forced the militant Shi‘i group Hizbullah to reassess both its political and resistance strategies while its victory against Israel endowed the party with a new sense of legitimacy outside of its core constituency; concurrently, the withdrawal stirred up a vehement, public opposition to the prolonged Syrian presence, especially among the Christians. The questions of national unity, identity, and sovereignty play a major role in the political discourse during this time and came to a head following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 and the subsequent Syrian withdrawal two months later.

While reviewing the statements, interviews, and speeches of major political figures during the time period under consideration, I found an explicit emphasis on discrete subject areas

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 6-7.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 9.
within their nationalist discourse. Thus, this thesis will address the questions of national identity, unity, and sovereignty through an analysis of statements on four specific topics: political sectarianism and the quest to abolish it, Syria’s continued presence in Lebanon, the potential resettlement of Palestinian refugees on Lebanese land, and the Israeli occupation of the Sheba Farms. All of these issues relate directly to the basic goals of nationalism outlined by Smith. Political sectarianism is inextricably linked to the problem of Lebanese unity and defining a shared national identity, while the Syrian presence, Israeli occupation, and Palestinian resettlement are connected to the issue of Lebanese sovereignty and autonomy over the country’s own affairs. How to solve these four issues has produced stark divisions within Lebanese society, leading to the passionate public debate amongst major political leaders between May 2000 and April 2005. These are common points of national identity formation in the major religious sects, but their responses undermine constructing a national unity that coheres among them.

Considering that the Lebanese government is controlled by the “troika” of presidents selected from the three largest religious groups, this thesis will focus on religious and/or political leaders drawn from the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi’a—namely, Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Although they are from vastly different backgrounds and orientations, these three figures have played major roles in the political arena of the post-civil war period and feature prominently in the renewed discourse of national identity, unity, and sovereignty. It is crucial to note that these sectarian groupings are in no way monolithic entities and should not be treated as such. The opinions and arguments presented by the three figures in this thesis do not represent their respective sects as a whole, as inter- and intra-sect opposition always exists. The three men happen to be some of the most prominent leaders within their respective sects and on the broader national scene in post-civil war Lebanon, and have been especially vocal in the realm of national unity, sovereignty, and identity.

**The Three Men**

Having “lost” the civil war, the Maronites found themselves severely weakened and without a strong leader to represent their national interests in the restructured Lebanese landscape of the early 1990s. In this uncertain environment, many Maronites rallied around the Patriarch, and, “by uniting the community under him, Patriarch Sfeir was presented with the opportunity to forge a political path for the community as the only recognised populist Maronite leader.”19 In his mission to revive the Maronite community, his Sunday sermons and official church communiqués consistently called for the full implementation of the Taif Accord, the complete withdrawal of foreign actors (specifically Syria), and insisted on the duty of all Lebanese to participate fully in elections. Furthermore, at least until Syria’s withdrawal in 2005, the Maronite president was viewed by many as a Syrian pawn, and Christians of all denominations turned toward the Patriarch for his ostensibly unbiased guidance and authority. Due to the major political role he played for the Christian communities in the absence of secular Christian political leadership and his specific interest in advocating Lebanese unity and sovereignty, Patriarch Sfeir is the most practical choice for the Maronite subject for the time period.

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19 Fiona McCallum, “The Political Role of the Patriarch in the Contemporary Middle East: An Examination of the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite Traditions” (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2006), 177.
Rafiq Hariri was one of the most prominent Sunni politicians in the post-civil war period and served multiple stints as prime minister (1992-1998 and 2000-2004). He spearheaded the reconstruction process of the 1990s and 2000s with the intent of making Lebanon a cultural and economic center in the Middle East. His methods, however, were criticized due to the mounting national debt, increasing unemployment and poverty, and the belief that he and other government figures personally profited from the reconstruction efforts. In addition, as he tried to push through his economic and reconstruction policies, Hariri was forced to walk a fine line with his public support for the Syrian presence, as it was obvious to the prime minister that he served at the pleasure of Syria. Although he was a polarizing figure during his lifetime, his assassination in February 2005 was a unifying symbol, with Lebanese from various confessions claiming him as a martyr for the nation. As one of the most important Lebanese politicians since the Taif Accord, Rafiq Hariri is an appropriate choice to represent a Sunni view of the discourse under examination.

Finally, Hassan Nasrallah was elected as Secretary-General of the Shi’i organization Hizbullah in 1992 and was instrumental in the party’s transformation from a purely militant resistance demanding the imposition of an Islamic state into one of the largest and most powerful political organizations in the country. His words are followed closely by Lebanese of all stripes, and he attracts thousands of people to his speeches and rallies. While Nasrallah himself has never stood for election, he participates directly in Lebanese politics as the ultimate leader of the party, and his statements are interpreted as the policy of Hizbullah as a whole. Arguably, no other Shi’i political leader in Lebanon commands as much authority as he does. His position is further complicated by the fact that, although he is a religious cleric, he is also the leader of an active militant resistance. For these reasons, Hassan Nasrallah seems like the most appropriate choice for the Shi’i subject in this study.

In order to explore the questions and themes listed above, I will analyze the speeches, statements, and interviews these three figures have given on the topics of sectarianism, sovereignty, and national unity, focusing primarily on the time period between May 2000 and April 2005. These statements are available in domestic and foreign newspapers, official websites, YouTube, and book compilations, such as the mawsūʿāt that have been published for Rafiq Hariri and Hassan Nasrallah in recent years. Using the secondary literature to provide context, my analysis of the primary source material will expose the commonalities and disparities within the rhetoric of these three very different men as they participate in a dialogue with each other regarding the identity of the Lebanese state.

**Sectarianism and National Unity**

When discussing sectarianism in Lebanon, it is important to underscore that sectarianism is not religiosity per se, but the establishment of political organization along sectarian lines. Makdisi describes it as “a process through which a kind of religious identity is politicized, even secularized, as part of an obvious struggle for power.” Many authors argue that sectarianism is mostly a political tool, which is designed to “stress their differences and promote an identity of

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It is also important to emphasize that sectarianism is not a natural state of affairs; it has been constructed over time as a system where politics eventually align with sectarian identities, even working to reinforce those sectarian identities through a non-religious mechanism. In this way, in the specific context of Lebanon, sectarian conflict should not be seen as religious conflict: It “has nothing to do with essential religious differences between Shi‘i and Sunni Islam [for example] but rather is based on political and economic differences.” Conflict arises from here, as “those political and economic differences are then laid on to political parties that have built themselves on sectarian identities.”

Political sectarianism in Lebanon is expressed through a power-sharing agreement where government positions are divided in accordance with certain quotas designed to balance the eighteen recognized religious communities. As the very top, this translates to a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, and a Shi‘i speaker of parliament, as set forth originally in a gentlemen’s agreement known as the National Pact (1943). For the political elite, sectarianism has generally served as a tool for control and retention of power in a chronically divided society. Differences and divisions are reinforced in order to maintain the status quo and prevent a unified opposition from coalescing. In this manner, Ofeish sets out the two major purposes this type of arrangement serves: (1) “it creates a solid constituency for the elite” and (2) “it allows the elite to diffuse demands for reforms raised by the lower and middle classes.” Through the fortification of sectarian divisions, the political elite encourage the lower and middle classes to compete for access to resources by way of a client-patron relationship devised by the elite themselves. Even though conflict is bound to arise in this context, the elite who benefit from this system have little incentive to upset the status quo; therefore, “popular attempts to challenge, modify, or abolish the sectarian system are usually blocked by the exploiting elite for the alleged sake of safeguarding the national interest (al-maslaha al-wataniyya) or national unity (al-wihda al-wataniyya).” Thus, sectarianism in Lebanon is presented as a matter of national identity and has become so entrenched in the national psyche that it is almost impossible to remove it.

Many of Lebanon’s leaders at least tacitly acknowledge the role sectarianism has played in sparking conflict within the country, and several have called for its outright abolition. The elimination of sectarianism is enshrined in Lebanon’s constitutional documents, as the Taif Accord itself addresses the issue directly. First, it establishes Lebanon as “Arab in belonging and identity,” declaring that “Lebanon’s soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese.” Thus “abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.” The Accord goes on to establish a joint Muslim-Christian council intended to “examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to

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23 Ibid., 43.
24 Ofeish, “Lebanon’s Second Republic,” 100.
25 Ibid., 100.
26 Ibid., 100.
27 The Taif Accord, Section I Clause B.
28 Ibid., Section I Clause H.
29 Ibid., Section II Clause G.
observe implementation of the plan.”

As lofty and well-intentioned as these goals were at the time, nevertheless, twenty-five years after the Accord was signed, political sectarianism remains dominant as ever.

The political system following the civil war and the signing of the Taif Accord has been characterized as a “paradox of claiming an absolute citizen-based equality at the same time as an all-encompassing communal system of rights and privileges was rebuilt.”

Despite all the talk of eliminating sectarianism, including enshrining such a goal in constitutional documents, the elites who have long benefitted from the system would effectively be committing “political suicide” if they willingly went along with the plan to abolish it. Therefore, the post-civil war era has been rife with contradictions regarding the ultimate fate of political sectarianism, with leaders making big pronouncements that sectarianism is an “unnecessary evil that should be eradicated,” but then actively reinforcing it at the same time. The sectarian landscape is further complicated by the Israeli and Syrian occupations, the presence of Palestinian refugees, and the post-war reconstruction of Lebanon’s devastated infrastructure, economy, and social capital, all of which threaten to upset the precarious demographic balance.

This renewed focus on sectarianism, including whether and how to get rid of it, is a major component of the discourse over national unity and identity that has reemerged following the civil war. From the beginning, the Lebanese have labored to define a singular national identity. As Makdisi writes, the Lebanese state was created by the French mandate power and thus “an ethos of national unity was never forged in a collective struggle.” Once the borders were drawn, they found themselves with the unenviable task of “forging a Lebanese nation-state composed of many taifas.” The sectarian system was meant to balance these competing interests and create at least a semblance of national unity, without one sect completely dominating another. With the establishment of the sectarian system and the National Pact, it became clear that “there could be no Lebanese citizen who was not at the same time a member of a particular religious community” and that there was no separating sectarianism from Lebanese national identity. Unfortunately, the model’s weaknesses came to the surface rather violently with the civil war and left Lebanese society shattered.

Since then, there has been a renewed push among political and religious leaders to forge a distinct Lebanese identity and establish an unbreakable national unity between citizens of all confessions, most likely in an effort to prevent another civil war in the future. While “the ostensible goal is to urge the Lebanese to abandon their ‘premodern’ loyalties of religion that are said to have inhibited the growth of a democratic, civil and secular society,” and although “sectarianism is depicted as exclusionary, undemocratic and disordered,” the inherent

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30 Ibid., Section II Clause G.  
32 Ibid., 148.  
36 Ibid., 25.  
37 Ibid., 23.  
38 Ibid., 23.
contradictions and conflicts of interest have been difficult to overcome. The Lebanese themselves simply have not been able to conclusively define what it means to be Lebanese in an inclusive, stable, and democratic nation. Some even argue that reconciliation and unity under a single national identity is next to impossible, asserting that, “in Lebanon, with eighteen different formally recognized religious sects governing personal status and family law, there can be no universal national subject.” According to this view, a unifying Lebanese identity cannot be forged without a single national law governing all sects equally when it comes to issues such as personal status and family law, regardless of the political rhetoric arguing that all citizens are treated equally under a democratic state. Despite all this, the Lebanese continue to discuss, define, and redefine the Lebanese identity through an active discourse at the highest levels of leadership on the nature of sectarianism.

The Maronites are uniquely sensitive to the sectarian balance within Lebanon. At one time the largest single confessional group according to the 1932 census, they are acutely aware that their share of the population has dwindled significantly over the past few decades due to birthrate disparities and emigration, with the Shi‘i population making the largest gains. Furthermore, the Christian political leadership was severely weakened following the civil war, with prominent figures such as Michel Aoun, Amin Gemayel, and Samir Geagea in exile or in prison. In this context, “the Maronite Patriarchate has emerged as the major pole of Christian loyalty and the primary representative of Christian political activity in Lebanon.” Cardinal Sfeir has filled the political vacuum to speak on behalf of the Maronites as well as other Christian sects, while at the same time demonstrating an awareness that many of the issues he addresses do not affect the Christian communities alone: “the question of reconstruction, of the democratization of political life, and the negotiation of peace” are all matters facing the whole of Lebanese society.

Cardinal Sfeir’s statements convey a strong belief in Lebanese geniality and point to a long history of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon as proof that confessional differences do not essentially lead to conflict. The two groups have lived together, “from the dawn of Christianity and Islam,” and “are really disciplined living together next to each other.” The long history of coexistence was interrupted by fifteen years of civil war, which is usually characterized as sectarian in nature. However, according to Sfeir, “this was not the war of Muslims against Christians or Christians against Muslims.” On the contrary, “it was

41 Ibid., 100.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
the wars of others on our land.”

The Patriarch did not let the Lebanese entirely off the hook since they “let others make us tools in their hands,”

but generally “the people of Lebanon seek to be democratic, where Christians and Moslems live in peaceful co-existence, unless an outside element provokes a conflict.”

According to Sfeir, Lebanon’s Christians and Muslims “will not be divided unless somebody is forcefully dividing them and prompting them to undermine their unity,”

but he also had faith in his fellow citizens and did not “believe that there is a single Lebanese who can accept that his country be hurt.”

Notwithstanding the existence of sectarianism, Sfeir rejected the notion that “sectarianism in Lebanon is incurable,”

declaring that “Lebanon is for all its children, Muslims and Christians alike, and the only way the country can function is through peaceful co-existence of all its religious sects.”

Sfeir appears to be calling for a national unity within the context of the sectarian system rather than demanding its outright abolition, bolstering his argument by pointing to Muslim-Christian coexistence as firmly rooted in their history. The multi-confessional landscape is part of the country’s identity and a peaceful sectarianism, as opposed to the conflict-ridden sectarianism experienced in recent decades, should be protected.

Cardinal Sfeir walked a fine rhetorical line, calling for national unity and freedom from sectarian conflict while understanding that the Maronites would be the most negatively affected, and likely lose a great deal of political power, if sectarianism were abolished outright. If this occurred without certain protections in place, McCallum argues that the “Christians would regard the abolition of the confessional system as removing the safeguards that allow them to significantly influence decisions on Lebanese national affairs.”

The Patriarch instead attempted to illustrate that a clash of religions does not exist, never has, and the Lebanese simply need to re-learn how to live as one to ensure they do not repeat the mistakes of their recent past:

“Solidarity becomes an essential requirement in every society; without it, division prevails.”

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47 Ibid.
53 McCallum, “The Political Role of the Patriarch in the Contemporary Middle East,” 197.

Lights: The MESSA Journal
At the other extreme, the Shi’a undoubtedly have the most to gain from the elimination of sectarianism. Since the establishment of the Lebanese state, the Shi’i population has grown to the point where it is now estimated to constitute the single largest religious sect in the country. The largest and most successful Shi’i party is Hizbullah, which originated as a militant resistance movement in the mid-1980s and first participated in parliamentary elections in 1992. By politicizing itself and becoming a vocal supporter of abolishing political sectarianism, Hizbullah has been able to reach outside its core Shi’i base and “[demonstrate] its desire to move beyond factional politics.”  

Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah “views the existence of 18 ethno-confessional communities in Lebanon as an asset” and claims that “the party aspires to openness and dialogue among all Lebanese.”

Through his statements, Nasrallah explicitly contradicted Cardinal Sfeir’s claims regarding the very nature of sectarianism. In dialogue with Sfeir’s declarations that the Lebanese have lived together in peaceful coexistence for centuries and that divisions are caused by external, as opposed to internal, elements, Nasrallah said that “those who speak of the ‘war of others’ are fooling themselves.” In Nasrallah’s assessment, “throughout the past 20 years, and even before that, the Lebanese have fought amongst themselves on their own territory” and “what happened in Lebanon was a result of internal problems which have existed for centuries and were not related to recent regional developments.” The Lebanese must recognize this “true Lebanese problem” and be accountable for it, because “it is we who opened this door and we’re responsible for our situation.” Attempting to escape “from the problem of sectarian realities by saying that we have the Syrian problem is simply escaping from one difficulty to another,” a dig aimed directly at the Christian opposition.

While Nasrallah diagnosed sectarianism as the root of Lebanon’s problems, he was very careful in his choice of rhetoric when he talked about eliminating it as a political system. He was particularly sensitive to the worries of the country’s Christians:

In theory, we are working to end political sectarianism in Lebanon. The problem is that political sectarianism benefits the Lebanese Christians, based on the fact that the country has a Muslim majority. So, when we call for the abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon, the first thing that comes to our Christian brothers’ minds is that we are advocating an open democratic system that would automatically lead to Muslim domination of the National Assembly and the state administration. We respect their fears, and feel that it is necessary to deal with various Lebanese domestic issues with a great deal of empathy and

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58 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
understanding; we want to get rid of political sectarianism, which is a backward and tribal system, and replace it with a modern one that would govern the country and preserve internal cohesion.\textsuperscript{61}

Nasrallah later clarified these remarks, and somewhat undercut himself, by claiming that he “never went to war against political sectarianism, nor demanded its abolition.”\textsuperscript{62} Instead, what he called for was a united national dialogue about the issue and the formation of a joint council, as set forth in the Taif Accord, that would explore the possible paths towards ending the sectarian system “without erecting obstacles between the Lebanese people.”\textsuperscript{63} The most important thing at this time was dialogue, with abolition coming “at a later stage, [which] could take up to 30 more years to happen.”\textsuperscript{64} Sectarianism is definitely one of the country’s most serious problems, but for the time being, Nasrallah wanted the Lebanese to “get together and discuss the issue in view of either reaching a solution or learning how to live with it.”\textsuperscript{65}

While he disagreed with Cardinal Sfeir on the nature of sectarian conflict, Nasrallah agreed with the Patriarch about the importance of maintaining national unity in the face of internal and external threats, though Nasrallah’s language was unsurprisingly more militant. Establishing the Israeli withdrawal as “a victory for all of the Lebanese”\textsuperscript{66} in his speech at Bint Jbeil in May 2000, the Secretary-General called for a unified Lebanese front in the new era:

> With this unity around the nation we can face all that is due and build for ourselves and our future generations a nation called Lebanon. The new Lebanon, whose strength is in its own strength, its strength is in its blood, [and] its strength is in its resilience.\textsuperscript{67}

The Lebanese must seize the opportunity to “fight for a stronger national identity”\textsuperscript{68} and “prove that Lebanon is the fortress that cannot be defeated by storms or hurricanes, and cannot be broken by the most powerful earthquakes.”\textsuperscript{69} Once again, Nasrallah was perceptive to Christian sentiments, and he attempted to assuage any fears of Muslim hegemony by saying, “especially [to] the Christians”:

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\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., 252.
\textsuperscript{64}“ ‘A Peaceful Resolution is a Victory for the Resistance,’ February 16, 2000,” \textit{Voice of Hezbollah}, 228.
\textsuperscript{67}Ibid. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{69}Hassan Nasrallah’s “Victory Speech” from Bint Jbeil on May 26, 2000, Al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya - Lūbnān. (my translation)
\end{flushright}
We are dedicated to living together and are committed to it, and no one wants to oust anyone from this country; all of us, we will stay, and we want to work together on our path of national salvation.  

Above all, Lebanon is “a nation that believes in the dignity and status of the human being” and it is “the country that cannot be built except with the cooperation of its people, and their agreement, dialogue, and meeting.” Lebanese of all sects must build a united national identity and work together towards ending sectarian conflict because, “God forbid, if the roof collapses, it collapses on all of us.” No one can escape the country’s problems. As Nasrallah asked those who “reject the death of Lebanon” and who “want Lebanon to remain strong and cohesive,” to repeat after him during rallies: “Long live the united Lebanon!”

As with some other areas affecting the Lebanese nation, including those topics under examination here, Rafiq Hariri occupied a sort of middle ground between Sfeir and Nasrallah on the issue of sectarianism in Lebanon. This makes sense in that the Sunnis find themselves in an interesting predicament. As Muslims, they stand to gain in relation to the Maronites in terms of power if sectarianism is eliminated, but they also run the risk of having some of those gains usurped by the Shi’i Muslims, whose population is widely believed to have exceeded that of the Sunnis in the past couple decades. Hariri’s friend Marwan Iskandar writes that the prime minister saw Lebanon as “a country of nationals that live together in harmony and respect,” and he “realized that Lebanon could only grow if its Christians and Muslims worked together,” regardless of his own personal religious beliefs. Additionally, like Nasrallah, he recognized and displayed sensitivity towards Christian fears of being outnumbered in a majority Muslim country; therefore, Hariri advocated Lebanon’s confessional system as a way to achieve national unity while also admitting to its negative aspects and the possibility of eliminating it if everyone agreed to do so.

Hariri openly conceded that Lebanon’s sectarian system is a source of conflict and “is its Achilles heel.” Political sectarianism has the potential “to implant dissent that can reduce...”

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74 Hassan Nasrallah’s “Syria Speech” on March 8, 2005, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya - Lubnān. (my translation)
75 Marwan Iskandar, Rafiq Hariri and the Fate of Lebanon (London: Saqi, 2006), 171.
76 Ibid., 174.
nation states to a group of squabbling political factions.” However, like Sfeir, Hariri argued that the existence of multiple religious confessions in itself does not negate or prevent national unity, nor does it “imperil the historic and traditional values of the pluralistic religious beliefs that form Lebanon’s spiritual framework along with a deep commitment to the unity of the Lebanese state and to the well-being of its democratic system.”

Also in line with the Maronite Patriarch, Hariri asserted that “the war was never a sectarian one,” meaning it was not a result of religious differences per se; instead it was in part due to a weak political system, in that “it was sectarian in its politics, but never religious in the true meaning of the word.”

This provides for him evidence that Lebanon’s various sects have historically lived together in peace regardless of their religious differences, and that conflict is due to politics and self-interested actors taking advantage of the system, not sectarianism in and of itself. And while he advocated for the “formation of a body that will investigate ways to eliminate sectarianism,” consistent with Nasrallah’s arguments, what was important for Hariri was a solution “on the basis of a Christian-Muslim participation irrespective of the numbers in each sect.” As such, journalist Nicholas Blanford quotes Hariri as saying, “I am not for the cancellation of confessionalism unless the Christians ask for it…I don’t mean just 51 per cent of them; I mean 75 or 80 per cent. Otherwise, I think it’s better to keep it going the way it is.” Although sectarianism is a negative aspect of Lebanese governance that must be fixed at some point, this can only be accomplished if everyone, especially the Christians, is on board. Otherwise, the elimination of sectarian divisions in the political system would only serve to divide the country more, leading to the worst possible scenario. Until there is consensus on this matter, according to Hariri’s statements, the Lebanese must forge a solid national unity within the sectarian model.

For Hariri, this would be achieved through true democratic governance that includes, nay requires, a peaceful opposition and freedom of expression that involves Lebanese from all confessions: “National reconciliation in Lebanon is necessary…and the state gathers and does not divide, it gathers people and opens all doors for them.” In order to overcome sectarian divisions within a sectarian system, the Lebanese must turn to the system itself by “respecting the Constitution and respecting the Taif Accord and respecting the existing institutions.”

Opposition is welcome, as this is the nature of true democracy and of life in Lebanon, as long as it is constructive and does not “play with sectarian or confessional strings or division of any kind,” a practice that “will not be received by Lebanese ears.” By coming together under the

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79 Ibid., 13.
80 Ibid., 12-13.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 45.
auspices of the democratic government, “we have an opportunity to demonstrate to the Lebanese and the world that the desire for coexistence is a voluntary desire and not governed by law,”

and that “through government policy and internal unity we are able to overcome all difficulties that we face in the future.”

Hariri declared that, in the end, “they say Lebanon is not just a country, but is also an idea. By ‘idea’ I mean it’s a place where everyone, Christians, Muslims and Jews, live together.”

Everyone is equal under the law, with freedom of speech and freedom of expression, and they are all Lebanese citizens regardless of their religious loyalties. On multiple occasions, Hariri underscored the idea that “we don’t have ‘Christians’ and ‘Muslims’ in Lebanon.” Instead, there are only “Lebanese” who “share power together on an equal footing.” He did not see any problems between Muslims and Christians, for “there are challenges we all face, Muslims and Christians,” and “we have Lebanese problems, and not Christian problems and Lebanese problems.” The conflict stems from people defining the Lebanese in terms of separate sects and focusing on their differences rather than their equality under the Lebanese state. Muslims and Christians cannot allow that sort of talk because they have learned the lesson from previous years: “The Lebanese learned the hard way that war and conflict would not lead anywhere; they only lead to destruction. They learned that the common ground they have with each other is much greater than their differences.”

If there are differences of opinion, Hariri wanted to see them manifested in an opposition consisting of “Muslims and Christians dissatisfied with the government” with which he could interact, “for there are no dangers that face the Christians and do not face the Muslims.” For him, this area was where true national unity could be produced.

While approaching the issue of political sectarianism from different angles, all three of these men underscored the necessity of building national unity, as well as their faith in the Lebanese people to accomplish this goal despite multiple religious confessions and a sectarian political system. They seem to be living out Smith’s point that “the nationalist does not require that individual members should be alike, only that they should feel an intense bond of solidarity and therefore act in unison on all matters of national importance.” In particular, Sfeir, Hariri, and Nasrallah seem intent on expressing sensitivity to the feelings of the general population

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92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
regardless of their religious association, reaching out across confessional lines and not simply addressing their own sect even though their political affiliations are, by necessity, based on religious affiliation. In fact, Nasrallah and Hariri specifically addressed the Christians on many occasions when discussing the political system, likely an assuage to comfort any fears of the Christian population disappearing within a majority Muslim nation without the explicit protections of sectarian quotas.

Of the three, Cardinal Sfeir appears to be the only one who never overly supported eliminating the system as a whole, although he did make vague references to implementing the provisions of the Taif Accord. The dwindling Christian population in Lebanon, specifically through emigration due to the poor economy, made the Patriarch very nervous, and he must have been well aware that his sect’s political power would be greatly reduced in the event of full abolition of sectarianism. At the other end of the spectrum, Nasrallah was, at first, rather insistent on his desire to see the system eliminated but quickly softened his rhetoric, possibly upon realizing the potential dangers of such aggressive language in stirring up the very divisions he was purportedly attempting to overcome. Similarly, Rafiq Hariri’s statements reveal a desire to eliminate political sectarianism along with an attempt to avoid alienating large portions of Lebanese society, especially the Christian segments.

It is difficult to discuss this matter without inadvertently sliding into the issue of the motives behind these speakers’ word choices, which are impossible for an analyst to truly discern. What is vital for this thesis is that all three publicly addressed political sectarianism with carefully worded statements, reached out directly to those parts of Lebanese society outside of their own religious confession, and imagined an ideal unified nation where Muslims and Christians live together in peaceful coexistence and participate in a national dialogue in order to work out the nation’s problems. The actual elimination of the sectarian system is almost as a footnote in the overall discourse.

**Syrian Presence**

Following the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, the continued Syrian presence in Lebanon gained a new prominence among the political and religious leadership, as well as the Lebanese citizenry. As one of the primary arguments for the Syrian military remaining in the country was to provide stability and protection in the face of Israeli occupation, many Lebanese began to wonder why they planned on staying once Israeli soldiers were gone. A new public outcry against the Syrians emerged in this period, vocally led by Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir, who made a calculated decision to come forward at this time: “We knew that it would be wrong to call for the exit of the Syrians while Israel was still occupying the land.”98 However, by September 2001, after the Israelis withdrew and the parliamentary elections were held, he decided that “it was our duty to speak out loudly what was being whispered by the people.”99

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99 Ibid.
Prior to the civil war, Syria and Lebanon did not have formal diplomatic relations. While Syria argued that this arrangement was “a symbol of warm fraternal relations between the two countries,” it more likely stemmed from the fact that Syria did not recognize Lebanon as an independent and sovereign nation for most of the twentieth century. As Salloukh writes, “Damascus has always considered Lebanon to be a sort of backyard bound to its eastern neighbor by ‘distinctive relations’ (‘alaqat mummayaza), a euphemism Damascus deploys to legitimize its interference in Lebanon’s domestic and foreign politics.” In line with the arguments set forth by Arab nationalists in Lebanon, Syria saw the two nations as one and the same and refused to officially acknowledge the borders drawn up by the French mandate, at least until the 1990s when they finally recognized Lebanon’s independence in an official capacity.

Syria’s direct involvement in Lebanon began in July 1976, when it launched an extensive military intervention in order to address the emerging imbalance of power created through the civil war, with Christian areas of northern Lebanon under siege by Palestinian forces. While the Christians quickly regained position, the fact remained that, without formal relations or treaties between Lebanon and Syria, the legitimacy of Syria’s intervention remained doubtful according to international law. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad immediately began the process of establishing legitimacy retroactively by setting policies in such a way as to create “the appearance that [the Syrians] were in compliance with international law and by eventually producing outcomes that were widely perceived as ‘beneficial’ by the international community.” Regardless of the motives for intervening in Lebanon, whether these were to protect the Christian communities from inevitable slaughter or to begin the process of subsuming Lebanon into a Greater Syria, Assad needed to ward off international pressure to leave Lebanon, as well as convince the Lebanese themselves that the Syrian presence was a force for good and to assist Damascus in establishing the necessary legitimacy.

The strongest basis for the legitimacy of the Syrian presence is the Taif Accord, which gave Syria “a written legal basis for the extension of its force deployment in Lebanon.” During the negotiation process, Syria achieved a great victory by ensuring the inclusion of certain provisions in the document. In order to guarantee the extension of state authority throughout Lebanese territory by its own internal security forces, and drawing on “the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon,” the document called on the Syrian army to “thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years.” Furthermore, “at the end of this period, the two governments…shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq’a area…and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee.” Perhaps more

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102 “Lebanon,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*.
103 Thompson, “Will Syria Have to Withdraw from Lebanon?” 74.
104 Ibid., 75.
105 Ibid., 80.
107 Ibid., Section III Article D.
significant is the clause referencing Lebanese-Syrian relations, establishing the post-civil war
dynamic between the two nations and providing Syria with a written legal justification to
respond to threats inside of Lebanon itself. According to the Taif Accord:

Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength
from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal
interests... Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the
climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to
constitute a source of threat to Syria’s security, and Syria should not be allowed to
constitute a source of threat to Lebanon’s security under any circumstances.
Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for
any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria’s
security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon’s security, independence, and unity
and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat
to Lebanon’s security, independence, and sovereignty.108

Going forward, Syria could validate its continued presence and interference in Lebanese affairs
as a matter of national security, with the written proof that its forces were welcomed by the
Lebanese themselves.

The dynamics of this relationship were cemented further with the signing of the Treaty of
Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Between Lebanon and Syria, finished on May 22,
1991. Echoing the language of the Taif Accord, the treaty reiterated that neither country shall “be
made a source of threat to the security” of the other, and that “Lebanon shall not afford passage
or provide a base for any force, State or organization seeking to infringe upon its security or the
security of Syria.”109 For its part, the treaty declared that Syria shall also “not permit any action
which threatens the security, independence or sovereignty of Lebanon.”110 Ironically, as
discussed below, many Lebanese would come to believe that Syria itself represented a threat to
Lebanon’s security, independence, and sovereignty.

In addition to reinforcing the provisions of the Taif Accord, the Treaty of Brotherhood
also effectively extended the decision regarding the withdrawal of Syrian forces as far into the
future as possible by stating that redeployment to the Beqa’ would be decided after the institution
of constitutional reforms and the expiration of the time limits set forth in the Taif Accord.111
Although the treaty was written in terms of kinship, joint destiny, and mutual interest, the reality
of the situation was that Lebanon was much weaker than its neighbor to the east. Consequently,
“given the power disparity between the two states, the treaty amounted to the institutionalization
of a Syrian overlordship in Lebanon, especially in the foreign policy and security fields.”112 The
broad language used in both the Taif Accord and the Treaty of Brotherhood gave Syria wide
latitude to do as it pleased in Lebanon in the name of national security, both its own and that of

108 Ibid., Section III.
109 Treaty of Brotherhood, Article 3, United Nations, accessed April 8, 2014,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-
SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf.
110 Ibid., Article 3.
111 Ibid., Article 4.
Lebanon. It became general knowledge in the years that followed that Lebanon’s top political leaders deferred to Syrian desires and electoral laws were written to favor candidates and alliance blocs of which Damascus approved. At the same time, however, the Treaty of Brotherhood did provide Lebanon with an important win: for the first time, Syria officially recognized Lebanon as an independent state, even if it did not necessarily appear to treat it as such.\(^{113}\)

Although Damascus effectively controlled most Lebanese affairs, and many Lebanese citizens resented the ubiquitous presence of Syrian intelligence personnel and Syrian laborers willing to work for much lower wages, Lebanese political leaders continued to publicly support Syrian actions and praise what they saw as Syria’s positive influence in providing stability and peace. Syria could point to this cooperation and support to further legitimize its presence and argue that it was the only force capable of stabilizing a perpetually divided Lebanon. However, it was understood by some that the public support from Lebanese political leaders and government officials may not have been entirely genuine, since “Syrian intelligence officers penetrated every nook and cranny of Lebanese life, and had the final say in appointments in almost all public institutions.”\(^{114}\) Government leaders were well aware that they served at the pleasure of Damascus, and that, “in effect, the state was run by the security agencies, hiding behind a civilian institutional veneer.”\(^{115}\)

Syrian control continued unimpeded throughout the 1990s, but by the time of the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, large segments of the Lebanese population were fed up with the status quo and a very vocal, public opposition to the Syrian presence emerged. On one hand, Lebanon was, in theory, an independent and sovereign nation, yet it maintained relatively little control over its own affairs. On the other hand, Syria held almost complete power with none of the accountability. Moreover, “the machinery of extortion had become particularly burdensome, as the Syrians helped themselves to what could be had in Lebanon.”\(^{116}\) Put simply, “it had become increasingly difficult to live with the humiliation.”\(^{117}\) This newfound opposition was by no means universal and high-ranking government officials as well as Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah continued to very publicly support the Syrian presence and stress its necessity. However, the cracks in Syrian domination had finally begun to show.

It was against this backdrop that the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1559 in September 2004. Promoted by the United States and France, the resolution reaffirmed the Security Council’s “call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon” and called upon “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw,” a direct reference to Syria.\(^{118}\) It also supported “a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence.”\(^{119}\) The resolution had a polarizing effect within Lebanon, with some

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\(^{113}\) Thompson, “Will Syria Have to Withdraw from Lebanon?” 82.


\(^{115}\) Ibid., 20.


\(^{117}\) Ibid., 25.


\(^{119}\) Ibid.
groups accepting it wholeheartedly and calling for its full implementation and others framing it as a Western conspiracy to assert control over Lebanese affairs. In an act of defiance, Syria went ahead with its plans to extend Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s term for another three years, which required a constitutional amendment. On September 3, 2004, only one day after the adoption of Resolution 1559, the Lebanese parliament approved the term extension by a vote of 96 to 29. Even though he voted for the extension and never publicly opposed the Syrian presence in Lebanon, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri submitted his resignation in October, a move generally seen as an act of protest.

All three personalities framed the Syrian issue in terms of brotherhood and the special relationship that should and/or does exist between Lebanon and Syria; however, the implications of this relationship vary widely. Hassan Nasrallah presented the Lebanese and Syrians as true brothers with an unbreakable bond. He argued that the Syrian “presence in Lebanon is not a physical military presence; you [the Syrians] exist in the souls, in the hearts, in the minds, in the present, in the past, in the future,” and because of this, “no one can force Syria from Lebanon, or from the mind, heart, or future of Lebanon.” The Syrian presence in Lebanon was a national duty and could only have positive effects because Syria “has always wanted what is good for Lebanon.” The two nations are bound together by “the will of God… history, geography, kinship, and [a] single destiny;” thus, threats against Syria are “threats against Lebanon.” In response to calls for Syria to withdraw, Nasrallah along with, according to him, “the majority of Lebanese” saw the Syrian presence as a force for good and an expression of the special bond between the two peoples. Asking them to leave, especially at the behest of “international pressures and dictates,” a direct reference to Resolution 1559, would be tantamount to betrayal and only serve to “reward Israel.” It was an internal matter to be decided between Lebanon and Syria alone, and, in his view, Syria was more than welcome to stay.

Hariri used similar language when describing the relationship between Lebanon and Syria, presenting it in terms of kinship and interrelation. In 2003, he stated:

No one is able to drive wedges between Syria and Lebanon; relations between the two are interrelated and interdependent, and strong in such a way that it is difficult for anyone to separate them no matter how much he tries. I do not see how this is possible.

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121 Hassan Nasrallah’s “Syria Speech” on March 8, 2005, Al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya - Lubnān. (my translation)
122 Ibid. (my translation)
123 Ibid. (my translation)
126 Hassan Nasrallah’s “Syria Speech” on March 8, 2005, Al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya - Lubnān. (my translation)
He stressed the importance of being “committed to maintaining our legitimate rights and to the unified path and common fate with Syria.”\textsuperscript{128} Not only have the two nations always had excellent relations with a “history [that] brings us together,”\textsuperscript{129} but the “Taif Accord enshrines this special relationship with stipulations, agreements, and treaties.”\textsuperscript{130} Therefore, he argued that “we all have a duty to see the imminent dangers for the two countries and address them with a unified position.”\textsuperscript{131} Even when his personal relations with the Syrian leadership began to unravel over the extension of President Lahoud’s term in 2004, Hariri continued to stress the importance of Lebanese and Syrian unity and brotherhood while finally acknowledging the growing Lebanese opposition against the Syrian presence. In a statement shortly before his death in 2005, Hariri is quoted as saying:

We all respect Syria and consider Syria a brotherly and friendly country; everyone has his opinion about the path of the relationship, which we want to be in the interest of Lebanon and the interest of Syria.\textsuperscript{132}

Both Hariri and Nasrallah argued that, because of this special relationship, the Syrian presence was appropriate, even necessary. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir approached this from a different angle: the Syrians should leave because of the special relationship between the two countries. Shortly after the Israeli withdrawal, in a statement issued in September 2000, the Maronite Archbishops’ Council led by Sfeir clearly stated a desire for brotherly relations between two equal partners:

Our desire is to consolidate the fraternal relationship between Syria and Lebanon. It’s time to reconsider the course of communication between the two countries so that they will perfectly [complement] each other in every respect.\textsuperscript{133}

Sfeir wanted to have the best possible relationship with Syria but believed this was not attainable as long as Damascus controlled Lebanon’s affairs. Unlike Hariri and Nasrallah, Sfeir saw the current situation as undermining the excellent relationship they could achieve—a true friendship was not one “between a master and a protege.”\textsuperscript{134} He argued that,

\[\text{[w]hile we have always advocated good relations between Syria and Lebanon, true international relations are possible only when the countries involved relate to}\]

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{128} Rafic Hariri, \textit{Statesmanship in Government}, 90.
\textsuperscript{129} “Al-Faḍāʾiyyat ‘al-‘arabiyya’; June 5, 2003,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website. (my translation)
\end{footnotesize}
each other on an equal footing. They cannot be established if one country
dominates the other."\(^{135}\)

Understanding the political and regional circumstances, Sfeir never discounted the importance of
remaining on the best terms with Syria and insisted that “we’re not saying this out of hostility for
Syria, but out of the friendship and coordination between us.”\(^{136}\) All he wanted was for Lebanon
to “have the right to freely direct its own issues and be independent”\(^{137}\) and for the two neighbors
to “commit themselves to agreements…including the Taif Accord which stipulated the
redemption of the Syrian Army.”\(^{138}\) This situation had gone on far too long according to Sfeir,
and even though “we have strong healthy ties with Syria,”\(^{139}\) it was time for Lebanon to finally
become an equal partner, with full independence, sovereignty, and decision-making ability. He
summed up his argument nicely in a statement from 2005, approximately one month before the
withdrawal was complete: “Syria is good in Syria, and Lebanon is good in Lebanon.”\(^{140}\)

One of Sfeir’s biggest fears, which was apparently not shared by the other two leaders in
their public statements during this time, was that Lebanon might disappear entirely under Syrian
domination. Since the Syrians controlled everything within Lebanon and “everything happens as
if Lebanon did not exist,”\(^{141}\) the Patriarch worried that “Syrian hegemony is causing Lebanon to
fade away, little by little, from the international arena.”\(^{142}\) The leaders in Beirut put on a show
and “try to look like we are responsible for what takes place on our territory, but it is taking place
under duress.”\(^{143}\) Sfeir also took issue with Nasrallah’s assessment that a majority of the
Lebanese welcome the Syrian presence, instead asserting that it “continues against the will of the
Lebanese.”\(^{144}\) Like the Christian Lebanese nationalists before him, Cardinal Sfeir wanted to see
an independent and sovereign Lebanon, ruled by its own people and without Syrian dominance.

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\(^{135}\) “Speech by Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, 7 March 2001,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 3 (2001).

\(^{136}\) “Sfeir to Damascus: hands off,” The Daily Star, August 23, 2000, accessed April 1, 2014,

\(^{137}\) “Sfeir wants ’100% Lebanese’ elections,” The Daily Star, July 14, 2000, accessed April 1, 2014,

\(^{138}\) Abdo Matta, “Sfeir stands his ground on Syria,” The Daily Star, April 14, 2001, accessed April 1, 2014,

\(^{139}\) Hanna Khoury, “Sfeir backs Syria in face of American threats,” The Daily Star, April 26, 2003,


\(^{141}\) Mona Ziade, “Old interview comes back to haunt Sfeir,” The Daily Star, December 1, 2000, accessed March

\(^{142}\) Abdo Matta, “Patriarch urges diplomatic ties with Damascus,” The Daily Star, November 14, 2000,

\(^{143}\) Abdo Matta, “Sfeir issues warning over national vulnerability,” The Daily Star, December 24, 2001,

Another aspect of the debate over the Syrian presence in Lebanon is whether it was a force for good, helping to stabilize the smaller country in the context of sectarianism and Israeli aggression, or whether it was itself a destabilizing influence. Both Nasrallah and Hariri said, unequivocally, that it was a good thing. In his 1999 essay published in multiple Lebanese newspapers, Hariri declared that “had it not been for Syria, Lebanon would not be where it stands today, nor would it have been able to reunite its territory and its constitutional, security, military and administrative institutions.” He rejected the notion of Syrian supremacy, claiming that “they don’t control, they help.” Without Syrian protection against internal and external threats, Lebanon could easily slip back into chaos. Instead, “Syria plays, in effect, a clearly positive role” and “is principally responsible for Lebanon’s national reconciliation.” Hariri’s argument regarding Syria’s role in the country is encapsulated in the phrase he repeated on many occasions, specifically that “the Syrian presence in Lebanon is legal, and it is necessary and temporary.”

Perhaps to mitigate the fears held by some segments of Lebanese society that Syrian control would continue forever, or that Lebanon might be subsumed into a Greater Syria once again, Hariri made sure to stress the temporary aspect of this argument. According to him, “if we had not needed the Syrians then they would not have been found in Lebanon,” and, therefore, “when we no longer need their presence in Lebanon we will ask them to leave.” In fact, there was no need to fear a permanent Syrian presence because, once the Lebanese requested Syria to withdraw, they would “respond more quickly than all the doubters imagine.” As opposed to Sfeir, who portrayed the situation as a strong country preying on a weaker one, Hariri presented it as a matter of a friend helping another friend in their time of need, and leaving voluntarily as soon as his help was no longer required.

Nasrallah did not talk about the evanescence of the Syrian presence, like Hariri did. Instead, he portrayed Syria as a savior, rushing to stabilize a chaotic mess of Lebanon’s own making and who was now welcome for as long as he pleased. In direct contradiction to Patriarch Sfeir (discussed below), Nasrallah argued that Lebanon brought its problems upon itself and he explicitly rejected the idea of a “war of others” on Lebanese soil. According to Nasrallah, “there were no Syrians in Lebanon before the civil war broke out; they came into the country because of the civil war, and their presence here is therefore an outcome of intra-Lebanese issues.” In other words, “if we didn’t have sectarianism, we wouldn’t have had the

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145 Rafic Hariri, Statesmanship in Government, 89-90.
148 Rafic Hariri, Statesmanship in Government, 89.
149 “Muqābalat al-Ra’is Rafiq al-Ḥarirī ma’ Ṣaḥīḥat “al-Jazīra” al-Saʿūdiyya, March 20, 2001,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website. (my translation)
150 Ibid. (my translation)
152 “Maḥāṭṭat al-Jazīra; March 7, 2002,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website. (my translation)
Syrians.” Syria was ultimately Lebanon’s saving grace, as “everyone knows that Syria, through its direct presence in Lebanon, stopped the civil war, the bloodshed, and the devastating fighting amongst and within the sects.” “Syria is Lebanon’s security guarantee” and those who were “working hard to push the Syrians out of Lebanon” were only trying to “stir up divisions among the Lebanese.” Everyone must acknowledge Syria’s positive and stabilizing role in Lebanon, and show continued appreciation for Syria’s help in the face of sectarianism, civil war, and Israeli occupation. As Nasrallah said, “Beirut was destroyed by [Ariel] Sharon, and Hafez al-Assad protected it.”

Cardinal Sfeir vociferously disagreed with both Hariri’s contention that the Syrian presence was temporary and Nasrallah’s assertion that Syria salvaged a mess of Lebanon’s own making. Sfeir saw Syrian dominance as a continued humiliation and a primary cause for Lebanon’s disunity and weakness. He blamed foreign interference for many of Lebanon’s problems, saying that “what the Lebanese have come to is not only their fault, but the fault of the continuous tutelage imposed on them for more than half a century.” Lebanon had “a paralyzed will” and “[executed] orders without discussion and without exchange of point of views [sic].” The Patriarch was extremely troubled by the country’s projected image, in which “its people appear to be invalids who can’t keep their house in order, and have to seek someone to shepherd them around.” At the same time, he rejected the notion that Syria is a source of stability and Lebanese unity. On the contrary, in Sfeir’s view, “it’s not that the Lebanese are divided, but someone has divided them.” While the Maronite Council of Bishops argued that the only way to prevent Lebanon from falling apart was for the Syrians to leave, it also dismissed Hariri’s argument that the Syrian troops would leave as soon as the government requested them to do so as “utter illusion.” The Lebanese must unite to force them out and, now that Israel had left, the time was ripe for the Syrians to fulfill the provisions of the Taif Accord and finally put an end to this “humiliation and agony,” allowing the Lebanese to take the reins of their own

154 Ranwa Yehia, “Nasrallah to religious and political leaders: ‘We are the cause of our own problems,’” The Daily Star, September 29, 2000.
155 Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on the 10th of Muharram, Al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya - Lubnān, April 4, 2001. (my translation)
156 Ranwa Yehia, “Nasrallah to religious and political leaders: ‘We are the cause of our own problems,’” The Daily Star, September 29, 2000.
158 Hassan Nasrallah’s “Syria Speech” on March 8, 2005, Al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya - Lubnān. (my translation)
160 Ibid.
164 “Ibid.
independent, fully sovereign country. As Sfeir contended, “it is in vain for all builders to try and construct a house unless the master of the house does it himself.”

As is clear from this discussion, the attitudes towards the continued Syrian presence following the Israeli withdrawal vary widely, with the Lebanese Christians the most vocal opponents, led by Patriarch Sfeir. Sfeir used “the sanctity and protection given by his standing in Lebanon and the Catholic world” to emerge “as the standard-bearer of the country’s sovereignty,” by “denouncing Syrian steerage of Lebanon.” The matter finally reached its tipping point in early 2005, when Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in February led to massive demonstrations within Lebanon both in support of and in opposition to Damascus. Hariri himself became a symbol for the anti-Syrian faction, even though, as shown above, he was never an outspoken critic of the Syrian presence in his country. His image was also appropriated by the pro-Syrian side, with Nasrallah claiming him as a martyr during his March 2005 “Syria speech.” In the end, Hariri’s assassination was the straw that finally broke the proverbial camel’s back and Syrian troops left Lebanon entirely by April of that year. The Lebanese finally proved that they had “matured,” in the words of Cardinal Sfeir, and demanded the ouster of their overseer. As Ajami writes,

For the span of a generation, Lebanon was merely an appendage of Syrian power: for all practical purposes, the small republic left the world of independent nations. But now the Lebanese were clamoring for a return to normalcy, calling their spontaneous eruption the “independence intifada.”

In the nearly five years since Israel ended its occupation of south Lebanon and the anti-Syrian opposition began asserting its voice, the conversation became more than just a disagreement over sovereignty and diplomatic relations: “The struggle against Syrian influence had become a dispute about self-identity and direction for Lebanon’s future.”

Palestinian Refugees

Amidst the entrenched sectarianism and the seemingly unending conflict regarding many issues of Lebanese sovereignty and identity, there is at least one subject upon which almost all Lebanese groups agree: the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Some observers have argued, only slightly facetiously, that “the only thing that unites the Lebanese political factions today is antipathy for the Palestinians living in their midst.” Following the 1948 Arab-

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168 Hassan Nasrallah’s “Syria Speech” on March 8, 2005, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya - Lubnān. (my translation)
Israeli conflict, Lebanon was among several neighboring Arab states to take in the Palestinians fleeing the war, approximately 450,000 in Lebanon alone, according to UN estimates.\footnote{United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East, accessed April 8, 2014, http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon.} Distributed across twelve camps throughout the country, the refugees are denied basic rights such as property ownership, employment in many occupational sectors, and access to health care and social security.\footnote{Khalidi and Riskedahl, “The Road to Nahr al Barid,” 32.} While the extension of some of these civil rights has been a matter for some debate among the Lebanese, one issue is assuredly decided: the Lebanese on the whole reject the permanent settlement (\textit{al-taw\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{t}in}) of the refugees on Lebanese territory. In fact, many Lebanese argue that the withholding of certain civil rights is necessary in order to ensure that the Palestinian presence is temporary.\footnote{Ibid., 33.} Directly tied to the issue of Lebanese identity and national unity within a sectarian system, “the fate of Lebanon’s sizeable Palestinian community is one of the most persistent and explosive issues that threatens the sociopolitical fabric of the Lebanese system with dissolution.”\footnote{Simon Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon,” \textit{International Migration Review} 38/2 (2004): 470.}

This issue has maintained a certain prominence in the post-civil war period, with the Taif Accord itself stating that “there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation,”\footnote{The Taif Accord, Section I Clause H, accessed April 8, 2014, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm.} this last word a direct reference to the Palestinian refugees. Opposition to resettlement is partly a result of the fact that many within Lebanon believe that “outsiders,” particularly the Palestinians, were responsible for the outbreak of the civil war and continue to view them as “provocateurs or a proverbial ‘fifth column’”\footnote{Laleh Khalili, “A Landscape of Uncertainty: Palestini\texta in Lebanon,” \textit{Middle East Report} 236 (2005): 35.} who threaten to upset the country’s delicate demographic and sectarian balance. Simon Haddad’s survey work in the early 2000s shows a general consensus among the Lebanese against Palestinian resettlement, with some variation according to sectarian affiliation. In general, the Maronites and Shi’a express most strongly the desire to see the refugees settled elsewhere, while the Sunnis and the Druze are slightly more amenable to their presence.\footnote{See: Simon Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon,” and “Sectarian Attitudes as a Function of the Palestinian Presence in Lebanon,” and \textit{The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon}.} As Peteet illustrates, sectarian differences in Lebanon lead to a situation where “Palestinian otherness is juxtaposed not to a homogeneous, singular category of Lebanese, but to a shifting set of sectarian groups and alliances, each with particular interests and fears.”\footnote{Julie Peteet, “From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon,” \textit{Middle East Report} 200 (1996): 27.} Thus, while each sect or alliance bloc rejects the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, they do so using a variety of discourses reflecting the disparate motivations behind such a rejection. Haddad’s study shows that this opposition is based on three main contentions: (1) the negation of the right to return, (2) economic concerns, and (3) historical and political implications.\footnote{Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon,” 471.}
The Lebanese Maronites, the largest and most politically powerful of Lebanon’s Christian sects, have traditionally felt especially vulnerable due to their minority status in the broader Middle East region. As stated above, the Maronites have historically viewed Lebanon as a Christian refuge or homeland and are particularly sensitive to the confessional makeup of the country. Since the vast majority of the Palestinian refugees are Muslims, “the presence of Palestinian refugees shifted the Muslim-Christian demographic balance in favor of the Muslims,” leading the Maronites to “[anticipate] that the largely Muslim refugees might threaten their economic and political dominance.” The Maronites also generally believe that, due to its small size and high population density, Lebanon simply cannot absorb the refugees and that doing so “may threaten its very existence by endangering its natural unity and economy.” In this manner, Lebanon is sometimes portrayed as the weakest of the Arab states, possibly undermining their nationalist discourse in other areas.

The rhetoric employed by Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir in statements and interviews reflected these fears of the broader Maronite population. He declared, “the struggle for Palestine cannot be fought from Lebanon, the smallest and weakest state in the Arab world.” Due to its size and high population density, Sfeir argued that “imposing on tiny Lebanon a large foreign population would have dire demographic effects, since Lebanon already has the highest population per capita in the region.” The Patriarch also stressed that “Lebanon is a place for Lebanese, and its soil is neither for selling nor for settlement,” borrowing from the concept of national unity and the idea that “Lebanon has the right to maintain its society’s composition.”

Lest a cynical observer assume that he argued these points solely because he desired the continuance of Maronite hegemony, the Patriarch pointed out that this was not simply a Christian versus Muslim issue: allowing the Palestinians to permanently settle “destabilizes the balance between Christians and Moslems, and even among the Moslems themselves,” referring to the population distribution between the Shi‘a and the Sunnis. In this way, Sfeir framed the matter as affecting the Lebanese as a whole, Christian and Muslim alike. He accomplished a similar goal when he claimed that “if they want to destabilise the situation and make trouble, they of course can,” reminding his listeners that the Palestinians “destabilised the whole situation” once before “when they tried to settle down in Lebanon” and contributed to the outbreak of the civil war.

By focusing the argument against resettlement on the issues of Lebanon’s size, demographics,

182 Ibid., 475.
190 Piotr Balcerowicz, “The Interview with His Eminence Nasrallah Butros Sfeir the Patriarch of the Maronite Church,” February 6, 2000.
and internal stability, Cardinal Sfeir presented the subject as one that affects all Lebanese regardless of sect, while at the same time protecting Maronite interests in the sectarian make-up of the country. Furthermore, since the Palestinians cannot remain in Lebanon, Cardinal Sfeir argued that the refugees “have the right to go back to their homes,” saying that “moving the Palestinian community elsewhere is of course not possible because Palestinians are attached to their territories: it is the land of their fathers and forefathers!”

According to Haddad’s study, the Lebanese Shi’i are also concerned with the demographic issue. While settling the Palestinians would alter the Christian-Muslim dynamic in the Muslims favor, it would do so by predominantly adding Sunnis and, thus, tilt the Muslim balance in the wrong direction. Thus, the Palestinians cannot stay in Lebanon, a stance the Shi’i justify by focusing on the right of return. Allowing the Palestinians to settle in Lebanon, or any other country for that matter, would implicitly endorse the Israeli government’s policies and preclude the refugees’ right to return to the homes and villages they fled. Hizbullah, for its part, frames the argument in militant terms, claiming that its members are fighting to help their “Muslim brothers” and ultimately return them to Palestine where they belong.

Hassan Nasrallah explicitly declared that “Lebanon cannot enter into any settlement with anybody on the granting of Lebanese nationality to the 300,000 or 400,000 Palestinians who live on Lebanese territory.” According to Nasrallah, “in its current social configuration, and given the nature of its problems, Lebanon cannot accommodate the Palestinian refugees on its territory” and, thus, “the Palestinians should go back to Palestine.” In Nasrallah’s configuration, the refusal to settle the Palestinians is the morally correct position: Hezbollah’s rejection of the option of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon is not politically or ideologically motivated, but rather based on a sincere belief that settling the Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria or Jordan would mean the total abandonment of Palestine, [which] is neither acceptable nor logical.

In fact, Nasrallah and Hizbullah are merely supporting the wishes of their Muslim and Lebanese brothers, as “the Palestinians do not want to stay here,” and “all of the Lebanese, Muslims and Christians, refuse the settlement of the Palestinians and their remaining in Lebanon.” Ultimately, Nasrallah rejected settlement “for the sake of the other option, which is the return of

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192 Piotr Balcerowicz, “The Interview with His Eminence Nasrallah Butros Sfeir the Patriarch of the Maronite Church,” February 6, 2000.
193 Haddad, The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon, 47.
195 Ibid., 159.
197 “‘A Peaceful Resolution is a Victory for the Resistance,’ February 16, 2000,” Voice of Hezbollah, 221.
199 “‘A Peaceful Resolution is a Victory for the Resistance,’ February 16, 2000,” Voice of Hezbollah, 221.
200 Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on the 10th of Muharram, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya - Lubnān, April 4, 2001. (my translation)
the Palestinians to their lands, homes, and fields." Anything less would be "a service and reward for Israel" and would amount to the abandonment of the refugees both inside and outside Lebanon.

One would imagine that, since they would have the most to gain from incorporating the Palestinians into Lebanese society, the Sunnis would be more open to the proposition than the other sects. According to Haddad’s survey study, this is true to a certain extent. However, the official position of Sunni leaders has been to explicitly oppose resettlement, clearly in line with the Maronite and Shi’i positions outlined above. As Rafiq Hariri unequivocally stated, “there is no disagreement and no Lebanese opinion to the contrary,” declaring that “Lebanon will not waver from its position to not accept the settlement of the Palestinians on its land.” Doubling down, Hariri told his interviewer that “we will not budge from our position to not accept the settlement of a single Palestinian on Lebanese lands.”

Like Cardinal Sfeir, Hariri claimed that the Palestinians destabilize the Lebanese community and he invoked Lebanon’s unique position and demography in his explanations:

Lebanon is a very (special case). We said, and it is part of the Arab peace plan, that the Lebanese cannot settle the Palestinians on their soil because this will create social, economic and above all political problems in Lebanon.

Hariri also appeared to be taking a cue from Nasrallah when he stated that the Palestinians themselves support the Lebanese position and, therefore, rejection of Palestinian settlement is what the refugees themselves want. As Hariri argued, “there is the subject of resettlement, which we reject as Lebanese, and the Palestinians reject it as well; there is no disagreement on this matter.” By framing the matter in these terms, Hariri summoned not only national Lebanese unity but broader Arab and Muslim unity as well.

The rhetoric employed by Sfeir, Nasrallah, and Hariri regarding Palestinian resettlement overlaps and diverges in several ways, with the overall conversation based on the three main contentions outlined by Haddad and mentioned above. Regardless of the specific rhetoric or the motivations behind it, the underlying message is clear: Lebanese citizens of all confessions oppose the settlement of Palestinians on Lebanese soil. This discussion definitely lends credence to Peteet’s argument that, “in the post-civil war period, a Palestinian presence has lent Lebanese national identity some cohesion.” Despite the existence of sectarian conflict and differing definitions of Lebanese nationalism and identity, “the Palestinian presence, perceived as a problem, can and does serve as a common denominator in unifying often disparate elements of...”

201 Hassan Nasrallah’s “Syria Speech” on March 8, 2005, Al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya - Lubnān. (my translation)
202 Ibid. (my translation)
204 Ibid. (my translation)
205 “Speech of PM Hariri at Woodrow Wilson Center; April 18, 2002,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website.
206 “Muqābalat Dawlat al-Ra‘īs Rafīq al-Ḥarīrî ma‘ Qanāt ‘al-‘arabīyya’ al-Fāḍā‘iyya; December 15, 2005,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website. (my translation)
207 Peteet, “From Refugees to Minority,” 27.
The subject is “presented as a matter of life or death,” with Lebanon’s very future at stake; the only way to survive is to promote a solid national unity, even if that means denying civil rights and nationality to the refugees living in their midst.

**Sheb’a Farms**

Following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, a new debate emerged over the location of the Lebanese borders and Israeli violations of the country’s sovereignty. Specifically, the questions revolved around whether a small patch of land called the Sheb’a Farms was in fact Lebanese territory and whether the continued Israeli presence in this area constituted an occupation. According to Israel and the United Nations, Israel fulfilled the terms of UN Resolution 425 when it withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000 and no longer occupies Lebanese territory since, in their view, the Sheb’a Farms are part of the Syrian Golan Heights. Lebanon and Syria, on the other hand, both publicly claim that the area belongs to Lebanon, and, thus, Israel did not in fact withdraw completely. This dispute is the culmination of decades of confusion regarding where the border between Lebanon and Syria actually lies, dating back to the French Mandate and detailed in an article by Asher Kaufman. The two countries allowed this situation to continue until, faced with the prospect of the Israeli withdrawal, Kaufman argues that the Lebanese government “made it an official Lebanese claim only on May 4, 2000, three weeks after the Israeli official declaration of withdrawal.” Following this claim, “Syria was quick to line up with Lebanon’s ‘new position’ and to support the Lebanese claim of sovereignty over the Shebaa Farms.” The motivations behind these assertions or whether this issue was truly only constructed once the Israelis announced their intention to withdraw is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important is that the major players in Lebanon continue to claim that Israel occupies a piece of Lebanese territory, and it is part of a national discourse regarding sovereignty, foreign intervention, and national unity.

The most visible and vocal Lebanese actor in the Sheb’a Farms dispute is Hizbullah. As Kaufman notes, when the militia “launched its first mortar attack in the area” on May 21, 2000, “the Israeli-Lebanese Shebaa farm dispute was born.” Although the party has branched into mainstream politics and social welfare distribution, a major part of Hizbullah’s identity continues to rest on its resistance to Israeli occupation. Thus, it is not surprising that Hizbullah would continue resistance activities against a new Israeli occupation, assuming the Sheb’a Farms are Lebanese. Hassan Nasrallah treated this designation as given, and stated that, regardless of what the United Nations claims, it is Lebanese territory: “We don’t care about the political translation of Resolution 425 or 242, what we care about is that we want the Shebaa farms, which are part of our land no matter what.” In his view, it does not matter that the farms might be a small piece

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208 Ibid., 27.
209 Meier, “‘Al-Tawteen’: The Implantation Problem,” 155.
211 Ibid., 592.
212 Ibid., 593.
213 Ibid., 593.
of land, the only thing that matters is that they are Lebanese. As Nasrallah declared, “for us a handful of our soil is of the same value as several kilometers” and, thus, “Israel’s occupation of the Shebaa Farms is a violation of sovereignty and an insult to Lebanon.” For Nasrallah, there was absolutely no question that the Sheb’a Farms belong to Lebanon, and he spoke as if the debate over ownership was effectively closed.

Rafiq Hariri used similar language when discussing the Sheb’a Farms but qualified it in a certain manner. He claimed the Sheb’a Farms as Lebanese territory, stressing that Syria also agreed on this point, but for Hariri the aspect that was absolutely decided was that the area was not Israeli land; consequently, the rest should be for Syria and Lebanon to work out. He stated pointedly that “Israel never pretended they were on Israeli land,” while stressing that “we say that it is Lebanese land and the Syrians say that it is Lebanese land.” As such, “it is not Israel who decides if these lands are Lebanese or Syrian” and “thus, they are occupied Lebanese territory.” Hariri also rejected UN participation in deciding whether the Sheb’a Farms are part of Lebanon or Syria, arguing that “the United Nations is not the one who draws the borders, the ones who draw the borders are the neighboring countries,” and that its role is “to maintain stability in the region.” While never relinquishing Lebanon’s ownership over the territory, Hariri’s rhetoric was slightly more equivocal than Nasrallah’s in that, instead of focusing on Lebanese ownership, Hariri stressed the fact that the farms are not Israeli. As he stated: “There are no [differing] points of view. The reality is that the Shebaa Farms are not Israeli territory. Israel concedes this, as do the United Nations, United States, and the whole world.”

Of the three personalities covered in this thesis, Cardinal Sfeir is the only one who explicitly allowed for the possibility that the Sheb’a Farms might not be Lebanese territory. In a statement from 2000, Cardinal Sfeir stated, “it is contested because Syria asserts that Shebaa farms belong to Lebanon.” Although the Lebanese government also made this claim, he argued that “Lebanon cannot definitely confirm that the [strip] of land of Shebaa farms is the property of Lebanon.” Instead of focusing on the stakes of the ownership debate itself, Sfeir talked about the process for resolving it; namely, peaceful diplomacy. According to the Patriarch, “there is no need to use the arms and to fight in order to push Israel away from there.” While he recognized a people’s “right to defend its territory, its land and its existence” through armed

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215 The size of the Sheb’a Farms area is about fourteen kilometers in length and two kilometers in width, according to Kaufman.
219 Ibid. (my translation)
220 Ibid. (my translation)
221 Ibid. (my translation)
222 Piotr Balcerowicz, “The Interview with His Eminence Nasrallah Butros Sfeir the Patriarch of the Maronite Church,” February 6, 2000.
223 Ibid.
resistance “if there is no peaceful means to push away the occupier,” he made sure to stress that the problem of the Sheb’a Farms “can be only solved through peaceful means and obeying UN resolutions.”224 Cardinal Sfeir also saw the resolution of the Sheb’a Farms dispute as a means towards disarming Hizbullah, a goal he openly advocated over the years. In his view, speaking in the context of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah, “as soon as a cease-fire with Israel takes place, as soon as the two sides exchange prisoners and the Shebaa Farms are returned to Lebanon, Hezbollah will no longer have the right to maintain an army.”225

Whereas Cardinal Sfeir explicitly advocated a peaceful diplomatic solution, Nasrallah openly declared that armed resistance was the only viable option: “We have learned that our occupied lands cannot be returned through peaceful means. The lands can (only) be returned through Jihad (holy fighting), martyrdom, blood, sacrifices and bullets.”226 He vowed that Hizbullah would “continue to fight until the occupation is completely over” and demanded “the full eviction of the Zionist regime.”227 Under no circumstances would he agree to give up even an inch of what he considered Lebanese territory and he refused to agree to a negotiated compromise: “If you give all the money in the world in return for giving up our land…we will not accept even if you sent armies and fleets.”228 From this perspective, resistance is the only option to regain the Sheb’a Farms and Lebanese sovereignty.

Rafiq Hariri occupied a middle ground in this regard. While he advocated a solution based on peaceful diplomacy, he recognized the validity of the resistance option as well. At the same time that he invoked UN resolutions (he stipulated to their authority but rejected the idea that they had been fully implemented), he also argued that “because it [the Sheb’a Farms] is Lebanese and because it is occupied by Israel so the Lebanese people have the right to have it back, by all means including resistance.”229 Both Sfeir and Hariri advocated a diplomatic solution, but Hariri was more open regarding the legitimacy of armed resistance. However, unlike Nasrallah, Hariri did not push resistance as the only viable option. Where Hariri and Nasrallah’s arguments converge is that neither was willing to give up any portion of the Sheb’a Farms. As Hariri so eloquently put it in a 2002 speech:

We cannot accept seeing any part of our country occupied. It is the same as someone here not allowing his neighbor to take over a part of his backyard. It may be small, it may or may not be important but it is, in the end, our land, our backyard—and we want it back.230

Of the four subjects areas discussed herein during the time period under consideration, the issue of Hizbullah’s arms is most directly related to the Sheb’a Farms dispute. Following the civil war and the signing of the Taif Accord, all Lebanese militias were disarmed except for

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224 Ibid.
225 “We Don’t Want a Proxy War in Lebanon,” Der Spiegel Online, August 11, 2006.
230 “Speech of PM Hariri at Woodrow Wilson Center; April 18, 2002,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website.
Hizbullah, which continued its resistance against Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon. As long as foreign occupiers remained within Lebanon’s borders, the Lebanese generally supported the armed resistance, at least tacitly. Once the Israelis withdrew from the south, however, the question of whether to disarm the party came back to the fore. Hizbullah itself believed the occupation, and thus the resistance, had not ended since Israeli soldiers remained in the Sheb‘a Farms. As such, in line with Nasrallah’s argument that armed resistance is the only viable method of solving the dispute, Hizbullah will not entertain the thought of disarmament. When it comes to Hariri and Sfeir, however, the issue becomes more muddled.

In the statements reviewed for this thesis, the topic of Hizbullah’s disarmament usually arose in the context of international pressure. Specifically, interviewers asked questions regarding the United States officially designating Hizbullah as a terrorist organization and/or the adoption of UN Resolution 1559, which called for the disarming of all militias in Lebanon. Hariri generally sidestepped the specific issue of whether the government would force Hizbullah to give up its arms, instead choosing to remind his audience of the continued occupation and confrontation with Israel. As mentioned above, Hariri viewed armed resistance as a legitimate tool to be used where peaceful diplomacy fails in the context of occupation, and pointed out that Hizbullah is a party that “‘is seen in Lebanon as contributing effectively in liberating the occupied south.’”\(^{231}\) The party has “‘dispatched martyrs’”\(^{232}\) in defense of its country, and it “‘has a special position’”\(^{233}\) in Lebanon. According to the statements reviewed herein, Hariri never explicitly stated that Hizbullah should be disarmed, instead immediately bringing the discussion back to Israel. He claimed that outside actors were attempting to force a confrontation between Lebanon and the United States on the issue of disarmament, which would “‘fulfill the interest of Israel, because what Israel wants is for the Arabs to quarrel with the Americans.’”\(^{234}\)

Patriarch Sfeir, on the other hand, stated on multiple occasions between 2000 and 2005 that he wanted to see Hizbullah disarmed and integrated into the Lebanese political mainstream. Sfeir spoke positively about Hizbullah’s role in bringing Israel’s two decade long occupation to an end, saying that the party “‘is comprised of people who fought against the Israeli occupation of their country and are continuing to do so.’”\(^{235}\) However, now that the occupation of the south was over, Sfeir wanted Hizbullah to lay down its arms and allow for a resolution regarding the Sheb‘a Farms exclusively through peaceful diplomacy. In his words from early 2005, “‘there is no longer any reason for them to be armed.’”\(^{236}\) Instead of weapons, Sfeir called on the Lebanese people to “‘arm themselves with wisdom’”\(^{237}\) to solve their problems. He acknowledged Hizbullah


\(^{232}\) Ibid. (my translation)

\(^{233}\) “Maḥaṭṭat al-Jazīra; March 7, 2002,” Rafic Hariri – The Official Website. (my translation)

\(^{234}\) Ibid. (my translation)


as an undeniable power that “should just become a political group”\textsuperscript{238} and participate in the political arena on the same level as the other Lebanese political parties—meaning, unarmed.

As is clear from the above discussion, Hizbullah’s disarmament is a polarizing issue amongst Lebanon’s political elite and it appears that the matter will not be resolved in the near future. Therefore, it should be noted that the presence of such a powerful armed militia in Lebanon complicates other matters related to nationalism not mentioned here, such as Lebanon’s national defense and Hizbullah’s relationship with the Lebanese army. While these issues should certainly be kept in mind, they are outside the scope of this thesis.

\textit{Conclusion}

Given the discussion in the previous sections, one can locate certain patterns in the nationalist discourse and rhetoric utilized by Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir, Rafiq Hariri, and Hassan Nasrallah. Once again, it is important to note that they do not exemplify the views of their respective religious sects as a whole but are representative of important arguments being presented in Lebanon with regard to national identity during the time period between May 2000 and April 2005. This thesis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nationalist views of the various religious sects; instead, it endeavors to analyze the rhetoric employed by prominent individual leaders of these sects and how they themselves imagine the nation within a specific set of circumstances.

Despite the centrality of national sovereignty and autonomy in the general theory of nationalism employed in this thesis, a more complicated picture emerges from the Lebanese context. The three leaders studied herein seem to have very different ideas as to what constitutes a violation of national sovereignty. When it comes to an issue such as the Sheb’a Farms, the basic problem is quite clear: the Lebanese government claims the area as Lebanese territory, Israeli soldiers continue to occupy this land, therefore a violation of sovereignty has occurred (according to the official Lebanese position). Even Cardinal Sfeir, who at least once acknowledged the possibility that the Sheb’a Farms might be Syrian territory, generally went along with the official Lebanese position in this regard and presented it as a political matter that should be resolved peacefully through international diplomacy. Nasrallah, on the other hand, portrayed this issue as a humiliation for the Lebanese and used it as a primary justification for his party’s continued armed resistance, calling for a united Lebanese population to rally behind such activities. His militant language evokes strong emotions among large portions of Lebanese society, especially those from the south who bore the brunt of Israel’s 22-year occupation. By invoking such a recent, painful memory, Nasrallah could be attempting to forge national unity through emotion while promoting his party’s militancy. Conversely, Sfeir appealed to the more rational side in order to build a national unity around peaceful measures. For his part, Hariri straddled the line between these two, calling for peaceful diplomacy (with resistance reserved as an option) while also utilizing evocative metaphors that equate the Lebanese nation with a single family home whose neighbor is violating the sovereignty of its backyard. In all these cases, the Lebanese people must unite in their response to Israel’s presence in the Sheb’a Farms. Exactly what that response should be is up for debate.

\textsuperscript{238} “Maronite leader calls on Hezbollah to disarm,” \textit{Yahoo News}, March 18, 2005.
While there is some question as to whether the Israeli occupation of the Sheb’a Farms represents an actual violation of Lebanese sovereignty, there is little doubt when it comes to the Syrian presence. Analysts and outside observers generally agree that, for the duration of Syria’s occupation, the Lebanese had little control over its own affairs. According to the statements covered in this thesis, Lebanon’s own nationalist leaders do not necessarily agree. Despite their talk of foreign conspiracies or outside actors (usually the United States or Israel) attempting to weaken Lebanon by dividing its people, Nasrallah and Hariri took an entirely different view in the specific case of Syria. This is one area in which greater Lebanese-Syrian unity became more important than Lebanese autonomy. With regard to Syria, these two men seem to have forgotten their arguments against violations of Lebanese sovereignty that they employed against Israel and sought to forge a national unity in support of the friend and savior next door. According to Nasrallah and Hariri, Syria’s presence served to strengthen an inherently weak Lebanon—a stance that directly contradicts many of their other arguments regarding the identity of the Lebanese national state. It is here where Lebanese Muslims’ ambivalence towards their own identity emerges: Are they Muslims, Arabs, or Lebanese first and foremost? Depending on the answer, how does the Lebanese nation as a whole fit into that picture? Based on the statements of Nasrallah and Hariri during this time period, it appears that even they did not know how to reconcile their own conflicting identities and that of their constituencies. They continued to call for national unity in support of Syria, but they did not directly address the obvious contradictions they created with regard to the concepts of national sovereignty and autonomy and how those contradictions complicate their notions of nationalism.

Cardinal Sfeir, however, saw this paradox and was the only one who seemed to be concerned with Lebanese sovereignty and autonomy in the context of Syrian hegemony. In one of the most starkly divisive issues to arise in post-civil war Lebanon, Sfeir refused to see the Syrians as “helpers” like his colleagues. Instead, it was his turn to use evocative language, rendering the Syrian presence as a humiliation for his country. As opposed to Hariri and Nasrallah, and in slight contradiction to how he portrayed the Lebanese national state in other contexts, Sfeir depicted the situation as a usurping neighbor deliberately weakening a potentially strong Lebanese nation. As such, the Lebanese must unite in opposition to the continued Syrian presence and reclaim their national strength and identity. If they did not do so, Lebanon ran the risk of disappearing entirely and being subsumed by a Greater Syria with Damascus at the helm. This rhetoric mirrored general fears that the Christian population might disappear under Muslim supremacy if/when the sectarian political system is abolished outright. In both cases, the unified Lebanese nation is found in acknowledging and protecting the pluralistic nature of the population, recognizing the common ground as “Lebanese,” and ensuring full sovereignty and autonomy in its own decision making process—including freedom from the control of its “friend” and “brother” next door.

Regardless of the specific cause behind which these leaders want the Lebanese people to unify, there remains the very real problem of political sectarianism—the “Achilles heel” of the Lebanese nation, according to Hariri. While they emphasize the notion that confessional differences do not necessarily lead to conflict, nationalists of all stripes are astutely aware that the sectarian system is a hindrance to their vision of a unified Lebanese nation. At the same time, though, none of them seem to be in any real hurry to get rid of it. Even Nasrallah, the most vocal opponent of political sectarianism, quickly backtracked his hardline stance, possibly to avoid
alienating the non-Muslims he needs to reach. The elimination of sectarianism appears to have become a buzzword in Lebanese discourse to which nationalist leaders must at least pay lip service since the system itself is incompatible with their projected ideal nation in which all Lebanese are equal regardless of religious affiliation. Instead, there is a focus on being “Lebanese” in the context of sectarianism, instead of “Christian” or “Muslim,” especially in the statements of Hariri and Nasrallah. Hariri even went so far as to claim that there are no “Muslim problems” or “Christian problems,” only “Lebanese problems.” All of them summoned either past or future coexistence among the sects as proof that religious differences themselves are not the issue at hand, and they were careful to frame the matter in ways so as not to offend members of other confessions. After all, in order to be a true nationalist these leaders must appeal to Lebanese from all religious sects, not just their own. By the way Hariri and Nasrallah framed the matter, it would appear that the Christians have the final say as to what ultimately happens to the sectarian political system. And considering the manner in which Cardinal Sfeir tended to sidestep the central problem and bring the topic back to historical peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians, something that has little to do with current political sectarianism, the system will most likely remain in place for some time. Whether this lack of any real engagement with the actual problem on the part of all three personalities discussed here is due to simple inertia of the status quo, or to a cynical political elite trying to hang on to an unequal system from which they greatly benefit, it is difficult to know for sure. What this analysis has shown, however, is that prominent Lebanese nationalist leaders continue to imagine the nation as one with a special demographic diversity that is unified under the general banner of being “Lebanese,” while at the same time neglecting to put forth any real solutions to a sectarian status quo that undermines that very vision.

To reiterate the central issue in this thesis, a viable national state requires a sufficient amount of certain elements: territorial integrity, national autonomy, and a shared sense of national identity. Through a public discourse on subject areas related to these components, nationalists present to their intended audiences a vision of the nation, an “imagined political community” that is “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” This national state is “legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of national unity and integration.” Since its inception, Lebanon has struggled with all of these matters due to its multi-confessional composition and persistent foreign interference, in the form of both armed occupation and control over its political system. Despite the French mandate, protracted civil war, and multiple occupations, however, Lebanese nationalist leaders continue to debate and define their visions of an ideal Lebanese national state through their public discourses. Regardless of religious sect or opinion concerning Lebanon’s neighbor to the east, they all seem to agree on one thing: Lebanon occupies a unique place in the Middle East where people of all religious affiliations have the capacity to live in peaceful coexistence and who will vociferously defend their nation’s distinctive demographic mixture to the very end.

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239 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5-6.
240 Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, 17
Bibliography


**Treaties and United Nations Resolutions**

The Ta’if Accord (1989)

Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic (1992)

The Tripartite Accord (1985)

UNSC Resolution 425 (1978)

UNSC Resolution 426 (1978)

UNSC Resolution 520 (1982)

UNSC Resolution 1559 (2004)
Throughout history, conquerors have adapted rather than destroyed the institutions in the territories they have conquered. In this respect, the establishment of the four crusader States (Jerusalem, Tripoli, Edessa, and Antioch) was among the most successful exports that the First Crusade brought into the Middle East. It was the beginning of a new era of Latin dominion in the region. However, it would be erroneous and inaccurate if we consider the creation of these Latin states on a *terra rasa* basis. In other words, the conception that the Crusader States were the embodiment of an ideal feudalism—the way in which it was perceived in Europe at the time—and were transplanted on a land with no prior administrative basis, does not hold true. Comparing the administration of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem established in 1099 to that of European principalities, I will argue that although the Crusaders carried with them their political practices, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem ought to be viewed as a *unique* outcome of the First Crusade, insofar as it was an amalgam of the already established Islamic-Byzantine administrative techniques used prior to the Franks’ arrival and the newly introduced elements and practices into the region. On the one hand, this means that in the process of this transplantation and cross-fertilization, the remnants of the ancient Byzantine and Islamic practices survived. On the other, however, a full-fledged European feudalism as such was not implemented due to the *exigencies* of the new geography and demography, which dictated a shift from mainstream feudal measures and practices. Thus, it was these few modifications from the incoming Westerners and the preservation of earlier practices which came to distinguish and characterize this Latin settlement. Therefore, the organization of the kingdom far from being imported *en gros* was put together piece by piece in terms of European experience and local conditions. Thus, the first part of this essay will tackle the question, “What kind of state was created by the Crusaders?” One aspect of the answer to this question lies in the way in which the Crusaders managed their Kingdom. Thus, following common expediencies, the survival and the prosperity of these states are largely the outcome of, what I will call, a *survival policy* which comprised local Orthodox Christians such as Armenians, Nestorians, Jacobites Greeks, Maronites, Jews, Druze, Zoroastrians as well as Muslims. It was indeed a diverse culture turned into a “Frankish-Syrian” nation, incorporating the various elements existing and imported to the Middle East. Looking at the administrative techniques and the constitutional practices implemented in the Latin Kingdom requires an understanding of the features of European feudalism on the one hand, and the way in which it concurred with the adapted Islamic-Byzantine ones on the other. Thus, the survival of these Latin states owed its success largely to the incorporation of the locals in various administrative positions, since the Crusaders lacked the required manpower to implement a pure *European* feudalism solely

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on their own. The Franks had taken control of a large area of land, certainly too much for them to occupy and control with their own people.\textsuperscript{243} This was a primary necessity that compelled them to take the indigenous population into consideration and to commission them for administrative and economic purposes. Therefore, the twofold aspects of this \textit{survival policy} complemented each other insofar as the inclusion of the locals in the administration engendered a heterogeneous administration process, and hence helped the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem to survive until 1187, when it was conquered by Saladin. Therefore, the parallel application of both brought about a process of internal consolidation or \textit{a modus vivendi} in which public offices began to function in a coherent and hierarchic framework.\textsuperscript{244}

One \textit{foreign} input that the Crusaders bestowed upon the conquered territories was the attempt to apply a feudal system in the sense it was perceived in Western Europe. This political system was embraced for the sheer fact that the Crusaders felt safer by adopting an administrative system to which they were already accustomed. In other words, the local villagers were technically serfs, being tied to the land, unable in ordinary circumstances to leave or alienate their shares in arable fields.\textsuperscript{245} Thus, in this respect, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was reminiscent of Normandy and England insofar as the overall hierarchical structure of serfdom and lordships were preserved. The villages were mainly governed by a headman who controlled the affairs of the village. As was the case in Europe, his office carried with it more land and a larger house than the other villagers had, and he presided over the agricultural decisions made by the community as a whole.\textsuperscript{246} What identified the Latin settlements with the principalities located in Western Europe was the fact that this headman was additionally the community judge applying a specific set of laws pertinent to that village only. His community, therefore, had its own \textit{judicial system}.\textsuperscript{247} In judicial matters, there was no appeal above this level of denoted \textit{courts of lordship}.\textsuperscript{248} By reference to the writings of John of Ibelin, who was a 12\textsuperscript{th} century crusader noble, Joshua Prawer states that the courts of the lordships were entirely autonomous, and enjoyed full rights of jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{249} Nevertheless, one example of judicial similarities between the Latin Kingdom and the principalities of England is the execution of \textit{Frankish Justice} by the trial of fire/water, which adjudicated between guilt and innocence through boiled water or hot drills, and the famous European \textit{dual of swords}. Robert Bartlett contends that there is a strong likelihood that the custom had Frankish origins.\textsuperscript{250} These were common judiciary laws and practices in medieval England. As for the trial by battle, Bartlett states that this legal practice was found among the law codes of many Germanic people.\textsuperscript{251} We know about the Franks importing this judicial practice to the Middle East through the Memoires of Ussama Ibn Munquidth, a Muslim warrior and noble, who recorded his impressions on the Frankish system. He regards this as reflecting the poverty of the Frankish legal system and is

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\textsuperscript{244} Prawer, 7.
\textsuperscript{245} Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades: A History}, 82.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 82.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{248} Joshua Prawer, \textit{Crusader Institutions}, 15.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{250} Robert Bartlett, \textit{Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),1
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., 104.
\end{tabular}
unimpressed by its brutality.\textsuperscript{252} The significance of Ussama’s memoires is that it reflects on the legal system imported by the Franks and on the similarity between some set of laws applied in both England and the Latin Kingdom. A further statement by Ussama claiming that “their [Frankish] judgments could not be altered even by the King himself,” attests further to the judicial autonomy that the nobles enjoyed in their territories.\textsuperscript{253} Claude Cahen draws a distinction between the occidental nobles of Europe and those of Jerusalem. He contends that whereas for the former, the administration of a domain was subordinate completely to the lord’s rule, including the implementation of justice, the nobles of the Latin-Orient occupied themselves with financial matters, and appointed a qadi who was responsible for the application of justice and law.\textsuperscript{254} Although Cahen contends that it was basically the Catholics who were appointed by the feudal lord and occupied this position, it is evident that the office itself was of Arabic and, hence, Muslim origin, since qadi signified judge in Arabic.\textsuperscript{255} When the issue came to legislation, however, the difference between European dynasties and the Latin Kingdom is conspicuous. Prawer states that, “in the Crusader Kingdom there was one legislation for all the nobles of the kingdom. Nothing similar existed in France until the second half of the twelfth century,” which sheds light, as far as legislative prerogatives were concerned, on one aspect of administrative difference between the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its counterpart in France.\textsuperscript{256}

Scrutinizing the prerogatives of the royal power of Jerusalem, the existence of a non-feudal element becomes visible. One such royal perquisite was the existence of the institution of regalia. According to the Oxford Dictionaries, the term regalia means “the emblems or insignia of royalty, especially by the crown, scepter and other ornaments used at coronation as an indication of status”.\textsuperscript{257} According to Prawer no such institution existed in Europe. Thus, no such institution could have existed if the Crusaders had completely structured their kingdom according to the principles of European feudalism.\textsuperscript{258} This would suggest that the institution of regalia was an outcome of the Holy Land once the Crusaders had started to establish themselves in the area and operate in terms of the local conditions, hence developing a modus vivendi. Therefore, the existence of regalia, which also gave the rights of the kings of Jerusalem to intervene in ecclesiastical elections, bears witness to the authority of the royal institution itself. In other words, this means that unlike the royal powers of Louis VI and Louis VII of France, the royal power in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem did not depend upon the personality of the ruler, but was rather vested in the royal institution itself. In short, the royal power of the first kings of Jerusalem in no way resembled those of their contemporaries in Europe.

Thus far, what we have been focusing on were constitutional matters such as legislation, judiciary rights, and authority. Although the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem might seem like a European satellite executing a pure feudal system, delving into more concrete

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\item \textsuperscript{252} Usamah Ibn-Munqidh, Memoirs of an Arab Syrian Gentleman, or, An Arab Knight In the Crusades: memoirs of Usamah Ibn-Munqidh (Kitab al-I’tibar), trans. Philip Hitti (Beirut: Khayyat, 1964), 93-94.
\item \textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{254} Claude Cahen, Orient et Occident au Temps des Croisades (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1983), 158.
\item \textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 158.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Prawer, Crusader Institutions, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{257} “regalia”, Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Prawer, Crusader Institutions, 18.
\end{itemize}
and tangible examples, evidence is found on the way in which the two principalities actually differed. One such evidence is the formation of the Crusader nobility and the distribution of lands. On the formation of new social elite, it is reported from the crusader chronicler Fulk of Chartres that in 1100 there were no more than 300 knights and 1200 sergeants in the Latin Kingdom.259 This created a vacuum in the noble class, since most of the leading figures of the great families who partook in the First Crusade left to Europe after the expedition was over. As the chronicler Chartres rightly observes, this seems to suggest that most of the settlers who remained in the holy land were of modest origin and had no reason to retain surnames drawn from their European possessions.260 Therefore, the new aristocracy that settled in Jerusalem did not belong to the European social elite. It was an emerging noble class with obscure origins that rose to the highest steps of the social ladder.261 In this respect, the overwhelming majority of the Crusader nobility were products of the Holy Land itself.262 This rupture from the eleventh century European aristocracy came to distinguish the Latin settlements and its new elite. The significance of this phenomenon in our context is the way in which this new aristocracy adapted itself to the local requirements and came to develop a *modus vivendi* with the local population. Being a *product* of the Holy Land itself made them supple in integrating earlier Islamic-Byzantine practices, rather than bestow a pure European feudalism *per se*. Had the European elite stayed in the Holy Land, the way in which they handled the administration, I believe, would have been different and more akin to “European feudalism,” since this would have implied an influx of manpower, the shortage of which impelled the remaining lords to deviate from mainstream political-feudalism systems. Thus, the perception of the Latin Settlement in light of the emerging social elite is crucial, since it endows us with the ability to understand the difference that existed between the Latin Kingdom and its counterparts in Europe.

Securing their country and land from Muslim aggressions compelled the Kings of Jerusalem to take the remaining knights into their service in the form of vassal. The King needed the support of individuals who had men at their disposal or were rich enough to recruit them mainly due to the shortage of Catholic manpower. The feudal tradition which might have been transmitted revolved around a territorial ruler whose control was already accepted.263 Furthermore, the normal method would have been to give the conquered territories as *fiefs* to these vassals. However, the kings of Jerusalem acted otherwise. Some, like Godfrey of Bouillon, gave *town and city revenues* as fiefs instead of conquered lands as such.264 Money-fiefs were less common in the west, but nonetheless helped ensure the financial survival of the nobles in the Holy Land.265 This is one instance, in the way in which a shift from “pure feudalism” becomes evident. Moreover, it is an example of how the dynamics of local conditions were instrumental in bringing about this diversion; Godfrey of Bouillon was the first King of Jerusalem, in a period where the Kingdom had not yet expanded its territories. Thus, one explanation in the shift from pure feudalism lies in the fact that there was a steep lack in sufficient territories. It was only afterwards with the

260 Ibid., 56.
261 Cahen, *Orient et Occident au Temps des Croisades*, 156.
264 Ibid., 21.
expansion of borders, that the basic feudal element of fief was introduced in the organizational structure of the Kingdom. The crucial question here is to ask: “Was there ever an actual division of land to create a territorial framework for a feudal state?” If evidence is found to assert the division of fiefs, the homogeneity of feudal organization and hierarchy becomes apparent. However, this was not actually the case. Cahen explicates this point excellently; he contends that the solidarity of the rural communities made it impossible for the Frankish Lords to re-distribute and re-configure the division of lands, since all the villagers had already partitioned their lands among themselves in the form of iqtas. Therefore, what the Frankish Lords could best do was simply accept the status quo without modifying the traditional structure of lands. A further difference between the principalities of England/Normandy and the Latin Kingdom became manifest upon the introduction of the concept of “Allods”. In the former states, the lands held by the nobles were fiefs. The introduction of a non-feudal element in the organizational process gives us a clue to what extent the Latin Kingdom cannot be alleged of being purely feudal. Anyone who acquired allodial lands, thus acquired a certain autonomy vis-à-vis his lord. Given that no lord wanted a loss in authority and fiscal control, it seems that the only possible way for the introduction of allodial lands is through conquest. This was unusual but not unknown in Europe. The Crusader conquest had a character of its own, which permitted and conditioned the creation of allodial lands. The conquests of Nablus, Bethsan, Tiberias, Bethlehem and Tibnin are instances of allodial conquests, where a royal intervention by Godfrey did not occur. The difference between the European principalities and the Latin Settlement concerning the issue of division of lands proves the extent to which the Kingdom of Jerusalem portrayed a unique administrative character. The existence of allods is reason enough to reconsider the total feudalization that is alleged for the Kingdom, since it undermines the notion of pure feudalism by the existence of an eminently non-feudal element.

One feature, however, which gave these settlements a European appeal was the architectural form by which the devastated towns were re-constructed and what Jonathan Riley-Smith calls Villeneuves or newtowns; they had immigrant European peasants living in planned and developed streets instead of a formless hurdle of houses with a tower courthouse, a Latin church, and an elaborate cistern. In his work, Riley-Smith refers to the work of Dr. Ronnie Ellenblum, who identifies more than 200 villages and small settlements having this same configuration. These independent farmsteads were surrounded by extensive irrigation systems and advanced management, and they demonstrate the well-organized and prosperous nature of these Latin enclaves. A significant amount of Western peasants lived in the rural areas and were given land by a local lord in return for 10 per cent of the produce. The majority of the inhabitants of these newtowns, however, were the indigenous population. Utilizing the writings of Ibn Jubayr as a primary source, Hans Mayer

266 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, 10.
267 Cahen, Orient et Occident au Temps des Croisades, 158.
269 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, 12.
270 Ibid., 12.
272 Ibid., 83.
273 Ibid., 83.
notes that “…travelling from Tibnin to Acre, He [Ibn Jubayr] portrays almost an idyllic picture of rural conditions.”\textsuperscript{275} Agricultural production was firmly in the hands of the local Christians and the subjected Muslims. The settlement on the other hand, of western peasants in the conquered villages is an indication that the Crusaders felt safer with their co-religionists by transplanting a similar administration and attempted to construct a kind of a “West or Frankish Europe” though on a small scale.\textsuperscript{276}

By contrast, one aspect of this village organization which differentiated these Latin-Eastern towns from the ones existing in Western Europe is the fact that there was very little demesne land. Professor Riley-Smith defines this latter term as “the home farm which in the West involved a lord in the agriculture of his village and on which the peasants performed labor services for him-courvées.”\textsuperscript{277} Thus, in contrast to their European counterparts, demesne lands in the East were generally to be found only in the gardens and sugar-cane plantations that lined the coast and very few villages were coastal.\textsuperscript{278} Another aspect pertinent to the feudal system applied to these towns is the fact that the villagers owed little in the way of labor services, usually not more than one day a week, something which really contrasted with the system in the West, where peasants had to work all week long on the lord’s land.\textsuperscript{279} Benjamin Kedar summarizes this point by the following statement: “...the Frankish variant of feudal economy did not know much demesne land and therefore the amount of courvées or labor services imposed on the Muslim serfs-or villeins as they were called in the Frankish Levant was limited.”\textsuperscript{280} The examination of the technicalities of a feudal organization attests to the extent to which the Crusaders failed to create a homogeneous “European” principality.

Although the difference between the two proceeded because of the Crusaders’ attempt to adapt to the local exigencies of the new demography and geography, of which we have mentioned the lack of sufficient lands, one important element in the process of settlement was the Latin treatment of the native inhabitants. They were not without their own internal social and, consequently, in a broad sense, political organization, and were given various degrees of internal administration, the Muslims receiving the smallest share.\textsuperscript{281} This further accentuated the shift from traditional or classic European feudalism.\textsuperscript{282} The inclusion of substantial indigenous communities in many of these towns such as Muslims and Jews is what bears the character of an “Oriental feudalism.” Why did the Crusader’s include Islamic-Byzantine practices in their organization is a question to address in the final section of this paper. The description of how Muslim administration survived in Latin kingdom is what will constitute the bulk of this next passage. Although we have disproved any claim for an ossified feudal state, this does not directly imply an adoption of Islamic practices by the sheer rebuttal of pure feudalism. A gradual understanding and thorough description of what there was before the Crusaders and what these latter integrated into their organization is essential.

\textsuperscript{276} Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades: A History}, 83.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{281} Mayer, 177.
\textsuperscript{282} Phillips, \textit{The Latin East}, 113.
The Crusaders only succeeded in implementing some aspects of their administrative system. Since most of the native population stayed on to live under their rule, it is not surprising that some of the outlines of the previous administration remained in place. The Westerners arrived in the East with attitudes that they found impossible to eradicate.\(^\text{283}\) Nevertheless, they occasionally altered them to suit their preconceptions and requirements. One such alteration was the machinery of finance and jurisdiction. The Franks, coming from an area in which jurisdiction was usually linked to the raising of revenues, found it hard to cope with a machinery of government in which the two [finance and jurisdiction] functioned separately.\(^\text{284}\) In the West, these were usually conjoined, and it is not surprising to find the European settlers reconciling these two and including the financial affairs within judicial functions.\(^\text{285}\) Thus, they incorporated many of the financial offices into the hierarchy of their courts hence turning the local sekretas (Greek) or diwans (Arabic) into tribunals or attaching them to one of their own courts.\(^\text{286}\) Moreover, the Franks feudalized the already established monetary institutions or financial offices such as the iqta or daman. The prominent orientalist Claude Cahen described the iqta as follows: a form of administrative grant, often (wrongly) translated by the European word “fief.” The nature of the iqta varied according to time and place, and a translation borrowed from other systems of institutions and conceptions has served only too often to mislead Western historians and, following them, even those of the East.\(^\text{287}\)

A glance at the Palestinian countryside will reveal more; the appointment of a village headman was an essential component in the administration of the village community. The Crusaders adopted the title of rais, which is the Arabic translation of headman or chief. He acted as a community chief, making common decisions on the cultivation of arable lands.\(^\text{288}\) This position is reminiscent of the modern term mukhtar. Although the Crusaders might have adopted this title, the fact still remains that it was an Arabic and, hence, Islamic office integrated into Crusader hierarchy. Moreover, many of the terminologies used for cultivation and agriculture derived from Arabic terms. For example, many villages had khirbas attached to them. According to Gudrun Kramer, a khirba is not necessarily an abandoned land, but rather one that is uncultivated or else unsuited for cultivation and, hence, of little value.\(^\text{289}\) Scholars were inclined to see this term corresponding to the Arabic kiberet or khirba, which as such had an eminent place in the toponymy of Palestine and Syria.\(^\text{290}\) Adding on to this, the villagers paid their lords kharaj, which according to the Islamic Law, is the tax paid on agricultural lands.\(^\text{291}\) Although during the Muslim period the kharaj was levied from dhimmis, meaning the infidels and technically the non-Muslims, by the time the Crusaders installed their rule upon the Orient, the kharaj was also applied to Muslims. These are clear


\(^{284}\) Ibid.


\(^{287}\) Cahen,“Iḳṭā’,” Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 3, 1088–1091

\(^{288}\) Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 11.


\(^{290}\) Prawer, Crusader Institutions, 161.

indications of the adoption of Islamic offices and elements. The more we inquire into the organizational character of the Latin States, the more the integration of pre-Crusader established practices becomes evident. It is in this sense that the term amalgam comes to be used.

Mediating between the new Latin lords and the villagers were two officials whose offices predated the conquest of the Crusaders and suggest that organs of Muslim local government had survived.292 The first of these officers was called the scriba, who was responsible for the treasury department, collection of revenues, and had knowledge of the names and holdings of the peasants in his area. It was an office dating back to the Fatimid period, where the scribe used to collect the jizya tax (poll tax) on non-Muslims as well as the kharaj. With the Frankish rule, the jizya was not lifted from Christians of all denominations but maintained on Jews and imposed on Muslims.293 Ibn Jubayr mentions the imposition of the poll tax on the Muslims in his travel diaries, writing that “…They [Muslims] surrender half of their crops to the Franks at harvest time and pay as well as a poll-tax of one dinar and five quirat for each person.”294 Thus, it is clear that the title of scriba was merely a translation of the Arabic Katib, meaning writer or registrar and used in Muslim cadastral offices.295 The second office was the interpreter also known as the dragoman. This title was the transliteration of the Arabic tarjuman, meaning interpreter. This is sometimes to be found in the documents with the Latin title of interpres.296 The Mutarjim already existed under Muslim rule. It may have served later as the basis of the office of the dragoman. According to Benjamin Kedar, most Arabic writing clerks appear to have been Oriental Christians.297 What is fascinating though is the proportional representation of these offices. According to Riley-Smith a very high proportion of them were indigenous: 14 or perhaps 16 out of 25.298 This suggests a high percentage of indigenous participation in some of the local offices. Ibn Jubayr attests to this fact, in his memoirs reporting that the clerks of Acre customs house who wrote and spoke Arabic were Christians.299 However, we should be cautious in noting that although the Christians were employed in the sub-offices, no local Christian ever attained the higher ranks, which were solely preserved for the Catholics.300 Although the numbers may vary from one source to another, the fundamental point here is the employment of local Christians and Muslims in the Latin regional administration, suggesting that the predominance of Oriental Christians may have been an inheritance from the pre-Frankish period on the one hand, and the gradual pragmatic as well as tolerant attitude of the Crusaders towards the indigenous on the other.301

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296 Ibid., 11.
299 Ibn Jubayr, 317.
300 Cahen, Orient et Occident au Temps des Croisades, 157.
The tax system was technically non-Western and the Crusaders simply adopted it. The taxation procedure, described extensively in Smith’s work, explicates that these procedures were typical of Byzantine and Muslim practices and underline the continuity between the old and new system. Retail shopkeepers, stall-holders and artisans were subject to a charge called mensuragium on weights and measures and what appears to have been the Muslim hilali tax. The various aforementioned examples indicate that although the nomenclature of some offices and tax names was indeed Latin, this did not conceal the fact that these offices were Islamic in origin, retaining the same function for which they had hitherto been used. The Muslim origins of the tax are also suggested by the fact that in the Tyre region, these taxes were levied by a Muhtasib. Another curious aspect is the tax on pork meat that was to be found only in Tyre. Pork butchers had to pay 4 denarii or denarius (roman currency) for every pig they slaughtered. This tax was called tuazo and most probably was the transliteration of the Arabic term tawaddu, meaning ritual ablution. A closer scrutiny on the origins of this tax will reveal that its origins ought to be Islamic, since it would be absurd to esteem a tax on pork meat which was not unclean for and in Christian principalities. This would suggest that tuazo was a survival from Fatimid period and was maintained by the Franks. Moreover, addressing the administrative similarities and parallels between the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Byzantine Empire, one finds the preservation of Byzantine tax system on the activities of ships and vessels. The ports of the Latin East became thriving commercial centers that attracted a substantial amount of international trade. The terciaria tax was estimated on the numbers of passengers and crew of the ship. As for the imported goods, they were taken to the shore, inspected and registered by customs officials who taxed them on an ad valorem basis. What seems to be here the parallel with Byzantium is that nothing was levied at this stage on goods destined for sale in the markets. Therefore, a close inspection suggests that a port like Acre worked very much in accord with East Mediterranean practice.

The judiciary problems of the ports were adjudicated by a special court subordinate to the Burgess Court and called Courts of the Chaine. Although one role of the Burgess Court was to mediate the affairs of the towns and was presided over by Catholic officials, the Cour de La Chaine also known as the Cour de la Mer was predominantly comprised of non-Catholics. A similar court called Cour de La Fonde existed, which controlled the financial transactions and affairs of the Markets. Finally, there was the third type of civilian court, which again was accountable to the Burgess Court but mediated the internal disputes of the local population that was called Courts of the Syrians and was presided over by non-Catholics.

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303 Ibid., 86-87.
305 Ibid., 13.
306 Ibid.
309 Ibid., 14.
310 I am indebted to Professor John Lash Melo from the American University of Beirut, for providing this information through a PowerPoint presentation prepared for the HIST 227 (Cultures in Contact: The Crusades) course.
One important office that operated within the Kingdom was the *Grant Secrete*, which was the chief financial office of the Kingdom. It contained records of the revenues collected by courts and royal agents as well as the records of measurement of the Frankish *carucate*, which was the unit of assessment. It was designed along the lines of Greek *Sekreta* or Muslim *diwans* and having duties similar to the Fatimid *bayt al mal* (house of money).\(^{311}\)

The similarities of the office duties and the way in which it was designed, suggest that the Kingdom inherited this cadastral office from the Muslim Past. Integrating, hence, the various constituents of Western and Eastern administrative practices and offices, the Crusaders gave a unique template to their Latin settlements, making them conform to their mundane surviving requirements and providing them with the means of exploiting their rights in towns, villages, and ports.

We mentioned that each settlement or town had its judicial system, which was only applicable to the inhabitants of that specific village or town, with the headman of the village appointing the supreme Judge, who had the full right to impose the death penalty on delinquents or outlaws. This right was reserved solely for the king in Western states, which distinguished the application of the legal system in both East and West. This aspect of separate judicial systems promoted the emergence of a class of nobility that Riley-Smith calls *burgesses*.\(^{312}\) The autonomy of the nobles plays a significant role in our context. The decentralized system of Royal power, made them eligible for the right to make peace or war with Muslims without reference to the king.\(^{313}\) Thus, these nobles were permitted considerable latitude in the decisions they made with regard to conflict with their Muslim neighbors and in disposing properties within their territories.\(^{314}\) By contrast, the nobles in the European states were vassals of the king and were bound to the King’s actions. What differentiates the Eastern nobles from their European contemporaries, and consequently the Eastern Latin states, is the fact that these burgesses operated autonomously and were therefore not tied to feudal obligations. As we explained above, being the product of the holy land and acquiring their autonomy by conquest each had its set of public laws and acted independently.\(^{315}\)

A further indication of difference is the location where nobles in the Kingdom of Jerusalem presided in contrast to the European seigneurs. Most of the fief holders of Jerusalem lived in towns or fortresses and not on their lands, limiting themselves to collecting the revenues of their villages.\(^{316}\) According to Hans Mayer, they did not even know how much their peasants made.\(^{317}\) Finally, they [the Latin Lords] had coins, that is molds for impressing their seal and counterseal on a lead *bulla*, and this right allowed them to faire *prevelige donatif* to grant a piece of land without the confirmation of the sovereign.\(^{318}\) The autonomy was the cost that the Kings of Jerusalem had to pay or the concession they had to make. As the emergence of burgesses intensified as a result of a lack

\(^{313}\) Riley-Smith, “The Survival in Latin Palestine of Muslim Administration,” 16.
\(^{315}\) Ibid., 84.
\(^{316}\) Ibid., 207.
\(^{318}\) Mayer, 179.
of a centralized authority, the Kingdom was in a dire need of individuals who had men at their disposal or were rich enough to recruit. 319

Many crusaders after fulfilling their vows in the Near-East returned to their homeland in the West, which left them with a small number of knights and soldiers unable to withstand a sudden hostile attack from the enemy. William of Tyre, a Crusader chronicler of the twelfth century, attests to this fact by writing that “...in about 1116, the King [Godfrey’s successor, Baldwin] realized with great concern that the holy city, beloved of God, was almost destitute of inhabitants. There were not enough people to carry on the necessary undertakings of the realm.” 320 Moreover, Fulk of Chartres writes that “…some remained in the Holy Land, and others went back to their native countries. For this reason the land of Jerusalem remained depopulated,” 321 By the summer of 1100 it was reported that in the area under Godfrey of Bouillon, the King of Jerusalem’s immediate control, there were no more than 300 knights. 322 The pattern of Frankish Settlements was thus determined in one respect by the Westerner’s lack of manpower. Consequently, as vassals of the king military service was required from all of them, whereas in the West this might be commuted for money. 323 This is another example of the way in which the demographic situation of the Crusaders dictated an abrogation of basic feudal rights. Eventually, it became apparent that the application of the feudal system to the fullest was quasi-impossible. Therefore, pragmatic measures and policy were deemed crucial in order to survive. This is what I call the survival policy of the Crusaders, manifested by the participation of the indigenous population in the economic exploitation of the lords and their tenure of administrative positions in the hierarchical structure. Most of the offices assigned to non-Catholics, of which we have mentioned the Cour de La Mer, were largely the result of the dynamics of this survival policy. 324 The early years of the conquest (1099-1100) were marked by a series of massacres, but it soon turned out to be counterproductive. 325 The Crusaders soon came to realize that without the help of the indigenous population, the control and the administration of the country was unrealizable. Consequently, their approach to the local population changed. An instance of this rapprochement with the locals is provided by Ibn Jubayr in his travel memoires, where he notes: “…On the same Monday, we alighted at a farmstead a parasang distant from Acre; its headman is a Muslim, appointed by the Franks to oversee the Muslim workers in it.” 326 Thus, through the inclusion of non-Catholics in the governmental machinery, the Franks hoped for a system of integrated managerial practices conducive to the welfare, maintenance, and successful organization of their domain. One element of our understanding of the preservation of Islamic-Byzantines practices lies in the Franks’ conviction that trade could not take place without a high level of interaction between them and the locals and numerous concessions were granted to the indigenous

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319 According to Cahen, it was only after Baldwin III (1143-1162) and Amaulric I (1162-1174) that the power of the royal authority augmented. Claude Cahen, Orient et Occident au Temps des Croisades, 157.
322 Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, 88
324 Out of a total of 30 offices, 15 were handed to non-Catholics. I would like to thank again for Professor John Meloy for providing this information.
326 Ibn Jubayr, 316.
because it was simply not possible to fight all the time.\textsuperscript{327} In order to survive, they needed \textit{food} and given that the plains between the mountains and the coast were fertile and well-populated, they started exploiting the Muslims and non-Catholics alike for agricultural purposes as laborers and manpower.\textsuperscript{328} Hence, the emergence of a \textit{Modus vivendi} was a growing sense of realism which extended the relations between the Franks and their Muslim neighbors. Not only some elements of Islamic administration had survived under Latin rule, but some adopted even Islamic customs and values as well, such as mimicking Islamic architectural ornaments by embellishing their houses in Islamic or Arab Ways.\textsuperscript{329} Moreover the Islamic chronicler, Ussama Ibn Munquidth, points out that the usage of sugar and soap became marks of Islamic influence upon Frankish settlers.\textsuperscript{330} With the progress of such a \textit{modus vivendi}, the framework of government, the land, and personal relations became better designed and stabilized. The usage of the expression \textit{Orientalized Franks} by Ussama Ibn Munquidth clarifies well in this regard.\textsuperscript{331} Another statement by the latter is elucidating in this respect: “…These Franks have become acclimatized and have held a long association with the Muslims,”\textsuperscript{332} Fulk of Chartres uses a similar expression when he writes that “…we who were Occidentals have now become Orientals. He who was a Roman or a Frank in this land made into a Galilean or a Palestinian.”\textsuperscript{333} One curious example of the way in which this \textit{survival policy} was instantiated was the arrangements made between the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Fatimid governor of Ascalon, noted by Ibn al-Qalasi, who states that “Shams al-Khalifa [the Fatimid governor] bought a truce from Baldwin [the king of Jerusalem]”, which eventually led to cooperation and giving each other supplies against Al-Afdal, the Fatimid vizier of Egypt in 1111.\textsuperscript{334} Thus, from primary sources Professor Hillenbrand makes it evident how pragmatic politics of survival and co-existence characterized this period. Sizeable incomes for the Franks were generated, and thriving resulted once they dropped the conservative policy of excluding Non-Catholics.

The Crusader States were formed at a time when the feudal system was at its height in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{335} However, although the Crusaders might have expected to implement their conception of feudalism fully on the lands they would conquer, I have tried to demonstrate that the reality was different. The essential question after the conquest was: “How was a small Latin Christian occupying force going to survive in a distant and difficult terrain whose populations had little reason to regard the occupiers with benevolence?”\textsuperscript{336} Because it was impractical and counterproductive for the Franks to drive out and persecute all those who did not observe the Latin creed, they were compelled to resort to a more tolerant policy, developing thus a \textit{modus vivendi} with the local population. In this sense, the \textit{survival policy}, which was the designation I had to attribute to this tolerant attitude, turned out to be the dynamo for the Latins’ success in Palestine. Moreover, the political

\textsuperscript{327} Phillips, “The Latin East 1098-1291”, 114.
\textsuperscript{328} Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, 82.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibn Munquidth, 163.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 103-104.
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., 163.
\textsuperscript{333} Fulk of Chartres, Chronicle of the First Crusade, 271.
\textsuperscript{334} Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 82.
\textsuperscript{335} Richard, 207.
developments that this policy engendered came out to distinguish the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem giving it a unique administrative character, insofar as it embodied the concept of oriental feudalism. Thus, the reconciliation of Western and Eastern administrative and political practices demonstrates the gradual adaptability process that the Crusaders underwent in the region in face of the circumstances they had to encounter, and the extent to which the Latin Settlers became flexible due to the exigencies of the local conditions. Merging the earlier Islamic-Byzantine practices with the political practices imported from the West, the Crusaders managed to create an organizational structure in which the hierarchical framework of European feudalism was preserved, and yet the participation of the local indigenous population was safeguarded. Therefore, their survival tendency, which prompted their attention towards the indigenous population, produced an organizational framework in which its two aspects complemented each other. In other words, the enclosure of Eastern practices to which the indigenous population was accustomed in the managerial frame of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem brought about an organizational framework, which on the one hand came to be known as Oriental Feudalism, and on the other, contributed to the maintenance, governance and welfare of the Latin Palestine. To recapitulate, although it was not possible to analyze the sophisticated feudal structure of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem as a whole within the limits of a couple of pages, since it comprised hundreds of intertwined eastern and western practices, the analysis and examination of the primary constituent features of this structure such as the nobility, the tax and judicial systems, enabled an overall understanding of the Latin Kingdom. The analysis of the reconciliation of European Feudalism and Islamic administration in terms of local conditions, exigencies and measures of survival, endows us with the ability to examine the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem throughout a different, yet an overarching perspective.
Bibliography


**Abstract**

During Sudan’s 1983-2005 civil war, massive numbers of South Sudanese people were abducted and forced into chattel slavery by Arab tribal militias armed and supported by the central Sudanese government. It is probable that tens of thousands of these people remain in captivity in the Republic of Sudan following the secession of South Sudan. While the problem is officially acknowledged by the Sudanese government, the United States government and the United Nations, the issue of war slavery in Sudan has never been comprehensively addressed by these actors, despite the heavy and continued involvement of the U.S. and UN in Sudan’s peace processes. The improbably low estimates of enslaved people published by UNICEF and the U.S. State Department illustrate the continuing official disregard for this human rights crisis.

**Historical Background**

Slavery has existed in present-day Sudan in one form or another throughout recorded history. The enslavement of Sudan’s black peoples by Arab Muslims dates to the Arab conquests and settlements there in the seventh century CE. Black slaves were used for economic labor and as a source of troops for the armies of the various Islamic empires. The slaving reached a peak in the nineteenth century, when Sudan was under Turkish-Egyptian rule. According to Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, the Anti-Slavery Society in Great Britain reported in 1833 that 20,000 slaves were being exported from Sudan annually by the military forces of Egypt’s ruler Mohammad Ali. In conjunction with the ivory trade, Lobban writes, “the slave hunt…became a common fact of life…for the people of Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur after 1865. …Slavery was conducted for both military and commercial purposes. The Turco-Egyptian armies depended on regular slave raiding, and the demand for domestic slaves in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Arabia was continuous.”

The Dinka, the largest people group in South Sudan, refer to the arrival of Arab armies and slave traders in their lands in the 19th century as “the time when the world was spoiled.”

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The practice of chattel slavery was rooted in what South Sudanese scholar Jok Madut Jok calls “a long tradition of an ideology of dominance” from Sudan’s Arab rulers, embodied in their treatment of black South Sudan “as a mere source of material resources, and its inhabitants as cheap laborers who can be useful only when they are stripped of their freedom.”

This ideology had both religious and racial roots. Jok writes, “[i]t was the perception among the Arabs, the Turks, and the British that black Sudanese – Southerners, Nuba, and people of the Ingessana hills – were not only uncivilized and unintelligent, but also barbaric, good only as slaves.” Indeed, in North Sudan, the Arabic word for slave, ‘abd, has become almost a racial epithet for black Africans in general.

Moreover, the slave raids were informed by the traditional Islamic practice of taking non-Muslims as captives in jihad under certain circumstances. (Most South Sudanese practice either traditional religions or Christianity.) Lobban writes, “[t]he Turco-Egyptians fostered an interpretation of the slave raids…[as] military campaigns carried out in the name of Islam against the unbelievers.”

While the practice of slavery was curtailed under British colonial rule (1882-1956), Jok argues that “the dominant feature in the British policy against slavery was the effort to stop the export of slaves for sale outside Sudan, and toleration of internal slavery.” Ahead of Sudan’s independence from Britain in 1956 (and the first north-south Sudanese civil war that immediately ensued), South Sudanese leaders and sympathetic British officers alike predicted that the end of colonialism would mean the resumption of the slave trade. They were correct.

Chattel slavery’s current incarnation in Sudan dates to the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war, a conflict that resulted in the deaths of more than two million South Sudanese people, and eventually, the emergence of South Sudan as an independent state. In September 1983, just eleven years after the Addis Abba agreement ended the first civil war and assured South Sudanese autonomy, President Jafar Numayri abrogated the South’s semi-autonomous status and declared the imposition of Islamic shari’a law throughout.

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340 Ibid., 89.
341 Ibid., 21.
342 To take just one of innumerable examples, a South Sudanese colleague who attended university in Khartoum recalls attending a football match between a Sudanese team and a team from Cameroon where the Sudanese fans chanted “‘abed, ‘abed!” at the opposing team.
343 As Professor Fred Donner notes, this practice dates at least to the ridda wars after the death of Muhammad: see Fred Donner, *Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012), 102.
344 Jok, 90.
345 Ibid., 16; 99.
Sudan. As Richard Cockett writes, “[t]he Christian South, to no one’s surprise…went back to war with the north almost instantaneously.”

After Numayri’s overthrow in 1985, successive Sudanese governments instituted a policy of providing automatic weapons to nomadic Arab tribes on the border with South Sudan – the Beggara, Miseriya and Rizeigat – and organizing them into militias, encouraging them to raid Southern villages. The government’s support destroyed the former balance of power between these groups and their traditional Southern competitors for land and water, and left Southern villages at the mercy of the raiders. The raiders, based in the Darfur and Kordofan states of Sudan, would raid and burn Southern villages in Bahr el-Ghazal and other regions, kill civilians, loot cattle and other goods, and seize survivors to be taken to the north as slaves. After they seized power in Sudan in 1989, the radical National Islamic Front organized the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) militias, which also played a large role in the slave-raiding. As Jok writes, “the line between the slave-raiding armies of the different sub-tribal groups in Darfur and Kordofan, the PDF, and the Sudanese army was blurry… Often the army undertook a joint operation with these militias to attack SPLA [Sudanese People’s Liberation Army] positions or villages suspected of sympathizing with the SPLA.” (As an example of such brazen cooperation, Jok points to the 1998 raid on Nyamlaye: “[t]his occupation, which resulted in the taking of hundreds of slaves, was filmed and broadcast on an army program on Sudan national television.”)

The NIF’s promotion of the war as a jihad to defend Islam in Sudan also encouraged the taking of slaves. Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Sudanese prime minister who expanded the use of slave-raiding militia proxies before being overthrown by the NIF, told the United Nations in 1999, “[i]t is true that the regime has not enacted a law to realize slavery in Sudan. But the traditional concept of jihad does allow slavery as a by-product.”

The ferocity of the slave raids is reflected by their effect on the market for human beings in Sudan. In 1987, a Dinka boy could be purchased for the equivalent of $90 in North Sudan. By 1990, the price had fallen to just $15.

**International Responses**

International reaction to the revival of slavery in Sudan was largely muted until the 1990s. (One published study focusing on the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* found a

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348 Slave raids also occurred against African communities in the Nuba Mountains and Upper Nile regions. Unfortunately, there is little documentation about the raids on these communities.

349 Cockett, 86-87; 93.

350 Jok, 28-30.

351 Ibid., 30.


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“stark absence of reporting” on the issue from 1986 to 2001.\textsuperscript{354} In 1994, Gaspar Biro, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan, reported that abduction and slavery were “routinely practiced” by Sudanese government military and paramilitary forces, and that testimonies from eyewitnesses and survivors of the enslavement bore “a great deal of consistency.”\textsuperscript{355} Amnesty International\textsuperscript{356} and Human Rights Watch\textsuperscript{357} also published reports on the issue in 1995, but a concerted international response remained lacking.

At the invitation of the New Sudan Council of Churches, Christian Solidarity International began traveling to Sudan and documenting human rights abuses there in 1992. In 1995, CSI’s Dr. John Eibner and Baroness Caroline Cox wrote one of the first detailed reports on slavery, after a visit to the city of Nyamlel in the aftermath of a massive slave raid.\textsuperscript{358}

In October 1995, CSI began “redeeming” Southerners out of slavery. A preexisting network for slave redemption had been set up by Dinka and Arab chiefs in the early 1990s, as part of an internal peace agreement allowing Arab tribes access to Dinka grazing lands, water and markets. Arab traders working for this network traveled throughout the area where people were being held in slavery, buying them from their masters and covertly bringing them back to their home villages. They did so at great personal risk. One such trader was arrested and tortured by Sudanese security forces on suspicion of his participation in the network; his house was later burned to the ground.\textsuperscript{359} Security forces seized the mother of another trader and imprisoned her for five months; she died shortly after her release.\textsuperscript{360}

At the invitation of local community leaders, CSI began providing the funding for these liberations, documenting the return of people from slavery, and distributing humanitarian aid to slavery survivors. Eibner claims that between October 1995 and October 1999, CSI liberated 15,447 people from slavery in Sudan through this network.\textsuperscript{361} As the word spread and abolitionists and lay-campaigners across the United States and Europe began raising funds for the liberations, the number of freed people reached 80,000 by 2003.\textsuperscript{362} As the end of the civil war in 2005 did not result in the emancipation of most of the enslaved, CSI has continued supporting this retrieval network until the present day, with the cooperation of local authorities in South Sudan, who record the return of the abductees. The


\textsuperscript{358} Cockett, 147-150.

\textsuperscript{359} Eibner, 3-16.

\textsuperscript{360} Author’s interview, Aweil North County, North Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, March 17, 2013.

\textsuperscript{361} Eibner, 3-16.

The figure of enslaved persons recorded as repatriated through the network currently stands at over 100,000. By this point, the returnees include many who were not abducted, but born into slavery as children of abductees.

Under increasing international pressure over the slavery issue, the Sudanese government in 1999 set up the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children. While refusing to admit the existence of slavery in Sudan (using the word “abduction” to refer to the issue) or the government’s complicity in it, the committee did eventually return some 4,000 Southern individuals to South Sudan, although under dubious conditions. Jok reports interviewing some of these returnees, many of whom reported that they were IDPs, not abductees, or had been abducted but had gained their freedom and established a life in the North. “We were repatriated by force, we have been abducted again,” they told Jok. The State Department’s 2005 Trafficking in Persons report noted that “various NGOs and international organizations expressed concerns regarding CEAWC’s methodology for verifying victims of abduction,” while the 2006 report praised “noticeable improvements in CEAWC’s methods of returning abductees, including no known cases of forced returns.”

The north-south civil war, and with it, the slave raiding, ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Six years later, under the terms of the CPA, South Sudan voted for independence in a national referendum, and formally seceded from Sudan on July 9, 2011. There has been only one cross-border slave raid since then, in January 2013, when 96 children were abducted by a Riziegat militia in a cross-border attack on the SPLA. They were returned by the Sudanese government in June 2013.

CEAWC disbanded in 2010. The State Department’s 2014 Trafficking in Persons report states that in 2013, “The [Sudanese] government made no efforts to assist victims of abduction and enslavement that occurred during the twenty-two year civil war or to facilitate their safe return to their families.”

The Nature of Sudanese Slavery

Based on the present author’s extended interviews with dozens of formerly enslaved persons repatriated to South Sudan through CSI-supported networks, we can identify these eight features of war chattel slavery in Sudan since 1983:

364 Jok, 154.
367 U.S. State Department, 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, Country Narratives: Sudan http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2014/226823.htm (the present author’s colleagues were present at the return of the abducted children to Aweil City).
**Forced Captivity:** Most interviewees report being threatened with violence, even death, if they tried to escape; some describe witnessing executions of failed escapees.

**Forced Labor:** Enslaved men are typically forced to care for the captors’ livestock or work as field laborers; enslaved women are often forced into harsh domestic servitude.

**Low economic value ascribed to enslaved persons:** In contrast to slavery in the antebellum American South, there is no large-scale industry or agricultural enterprise creating demand for forced labor in Darfur and Kordofan states. As such, enslaved persons are usually valued at about the price of a female goat.

**Forced Religious Conversion and Suppression of Cultural Identity:** The lack of economic need for slaves in these regions points to an ideological/religious motivation driving the enslavement of South Sudanese. It is not surprising then that nearly all returnees report receiving Arab names from their captors, and being forbidden to use their old ones, being forbidden to practice their religion, and being forced through violence or deprivation to adopt outward Islamic practices. Mature women usually report being forced to cover their hair and being subjected to ritual genital mutilation, a pre-Islamic practice regarded as a religious obligation by the Arab tribes involved in the slave raiding, but foreign to the Dinka. Some young men report being forced to attend Qur’anic memorization schools where they were subjected to physical abuse from teachers and other students. Enslaved persons sometimes come to identify with their captor’s religion and culture. Upon repatriation, a handful of returnees have been witnessed rebuking female returnees for uncovering their hair, refusing to eat with the other returnees because they are non-Muslims, or reacting angrily when other returnees begin singing Christian religious songs.

**Systemic Sexual Abuse:** The vast majority of enslaved women report being raped or forced into sexual relationships with their captors or with other enslaved individuals. Some enslaved men and boys also report or allude to sexual abuse at the hands of their captors.

**Separation of Families:** Enslaved people, if captured with their relatives, were often separated from them upon arrival in North Sudan; women who give birth in slavery in North Sudan are often separated from their children.

**Automatic Enslavement of Children:** A significant proportion of the persons repatriated through these networks appear to have been born into slavery; although clearly Dinka, they have no memory of life in South Sudan, and often no memory of their parents.

**Capricious Violence Against Enslaved Persons:** Violence against enslaved persons ranges from beatings and sometimes maimings for failures in their assigned duties, to revenge executions and lynchings following Arab defeats on the battlefield, to seemingly senseless acts of torture and murder. Again, this wanton violence reflects the low economic value placed on enslaved persons by their captors.

A few representative personal accounts are in order:
Nyibol Wol Mel, female, middle-aged, enslaved c. 1996, liberated January 2012:

My worst memory is when my three children were killed by my master. His name was Hamad Hamad Jamal. He told me, “I want you to be my wife. I don’t need these dirty children. I will give you children I can control.” At first, I did not agree to be his wife. When I saw my dead children, I realized there is no mercy, so I agreed. He killed them when I was away getting water. I saw them lying on the floor, swollen everywhere on their bodies. I think they were beaten to death. I was circumcised before I became the master’s wife. I tried to resist, but my master cut me with a knife when I did.

My jobs in slavery were fetching water, cleaning the compound, and washing clothes. I was fed only the leftovers of what the master and his wives ate. The master had two other wives, Fatima and Amona. They were very unkind. One of them burned down the rakuba [a small hut] where I slept, while I was inside it.

After I became Hamad’s wife, I gave birth to three of his children. All three were taken away from me as soon as they were weaned. I don’t know where they are.

When the slave retriever came, he negotiated for hours, and then I was released. I worry about the children I left behind. The names of my children who died: Deng Wol Garang, Adoot Wol Garang, Achol Wol Garang. The names of the children I was separated from: Hamad, Adam and Ali.370

Mou Garang Mou, male, preadolescent, liberated January 2012:

I never met my parents. My master told me that he was my father, and his children told me that I was their brother. He called me Mahamed Ali.

I lost my pinky finger because my master was angry with me. He told me to wash the dishes, but I refused and ran away. When he found me, he told me I was doing a bad job taking care of the goats, and he cut off my pinky finger. No one did anything to treat the wound until I left with the slave retriever.371

Malwal Deng Deng, male, middle-aged, enslaved c. 1989, liberated January 2012:

I was called Malwal before I was abducted. Now I am called Mousa. I do not want to go back to the North, but I need to find a mosque to pray at.

I was about ten years old when I was captured in Atido, near Wau. I was walking on the road with my mother when the train came. We heard the shots, and then we were set upon by men on horseback. Some wore khaki military uniforms, and some wore jalabiyyas.

370 Author’s Interview, Mabok, Aweil East County, North Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, January 31, 2012.
371 Author’s Interview, Aweil North County, North Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, February 3, 2012.
My mother ran away, but I was taken with seven other boys. They immediately put us on the train, and we headed north. The adult captives on the train car were tied up. The children on the train cried all night. The ones that cried were seriously beaten. Two stubborn children who wouldn’t stop crying were tied up and thrown out of the window while the train was moving. I did not cry, because of what I saw happen to them. We spent two days on the train.

At first, I was taken by a man named Ruma. He gave me the name Mousa. Later, I was stolen from him by a man named Mohammad Gadallah. I had to take care of his camels and sheep. Sometimes Gadallah would promise me a camel if I never lost a sheep. Every year, Gadallah would delay giving me the camel. He would say, “Not this camel; I will find you another one.” I never got a camel. Gadallah also promised me girls, but when each girl he promised me matured in turn, he would say, “Not that one, another.” I never got a wife. I never got any gifts from Gadallah, except for religious clothes during Ramadan. Another slave I knew, named Deng, was shot and killed by Gadallah’s cousins. Gadallah told me, “If you try to escape, I will shoot you like Deng.”

Gadallah sent me to khalwa [Qur’anic school.] In khalwa, I learned about jihad. They said, “If you are a Muslim, you must go to the South to fight.” If I didn’t go to khalwa, I was not given food. Sometimes at khalwa, if I didn’t understand the lesson well enough, I was forced to drink miyya, the dirty water used to wash the holy words of the Qur’an off the chalkboard. I was told, “You have taken the miyya. Never abandon praying as a Muslim.”

Adhel Atak Bol, female, adolescent, enslaved c. 2001, liberated March 2013:

I had gone to Ariath with two of my mother’s relatives to sell goods. They ran away when the raiders came. Four other people were taken with me. The Arabs put the children on horses, but tied up the adults in a line and made them walk. After a while, two of the adults became totally exhausted. They said, “Either kill us or put us on a horse. We cannot walk anymore.” So the Arabs cut their throats. One of them said to the rest of us, “Do you want to stay in the South like them?”

I was taken to Dar Afat to live with my master Mohammad Adallahi. He was a bad man. He sent me to the well to collect water even when it was hot, and the sand was burning and I had no shoes. He beat me with a stick if I asked for shoes. He made me call him “father.”

Mohammad had eighteen children and five wives. His boys raped me, though he did not know it. The women were always making me cook for them.

Before the slave retriever came to take me, one of Mohammad’s wives told me that I was to be circumcised. She said, “You will be clean. You will be part of us. You will be our child.” I did not believe her.

372 Author’s Interview, Aweil North County, North Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, February 1, 2012.
I thought about running away at night to escape the circumcision, but I was afraid. I told one of the master’s children what I was thinking, and he told the master. They punished me by keeping me inside the house for a week, and giving me no food for four days. I was so scared they would kill me. I spent the whole first day crying.

A short time before, five teenage Dinka slaves had run away. They were caught in Meiram and taken back. They were taken to a rubbish heap, where their throats were cut. Mohammad took me to see their bodies. I remember there was a lot of blood. He pointed at them and said, “You will follow these people!” The boys had been slaves of one of Mohammad’s neighbors. Their names were Garang, Deng, Athian, Bol and Bol.

Before I was to be circumcised, I was sent to the market to fetch something. A truck full of Dinka people passed me by on the road and then stopped. The slave retriever got out of the truck and asked me, “Are you a Dinka?” I said yes. He said, “Get in the truck!” and I did.

The slave retriever brought me here. He is a good man, and gave us lots of bread on the journey. I don’t know if Mohammad knows where I went. 

Garang Machar Deng, male, adolescent, liberated May 2014

I am from Yelaal in North Sudan. I was born there, and lived with my parents there. They were living with an Arab man. When I was small, other Arabs came and took me away from my parents. I don’t know if I was sold or stolen away. My parents tried to keep me, but the Arabs beat them, tied me onto a horse, and ran away with me.

The man who I lived with after that was named Abakar. I hate him because he took me away from my parents in a cruel manner, without even talking to them about it.

Abakar didn’t give me enough food, and hit me a lot. Even his children treated me badly. They tried to fight with me, and when I defended myself, one of them knifed me in my right arm. You can see the scar here. Abakar said nothing.

I had to call Abakar “father.” He called me his son, but he disliked me, and also called me “jengai” [a racial epithet]. Abakar didn’t try to make me a Muslim. He kept me with the goats, and I spent most of my time with them, in the forest.

When the slave retriever came, he talked to Abakar for two hours. I didn’t know what they were discussing. Then the slave retriever took me away with him.

I’m happy to be in South Sudan, because there are so many other Dinka people here.

373 Author’s Interview, Aweil East County, North Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, March 15, 2013
374 Author’s interview, Mayom Deng Akol, Aweil North County, North Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, May 19, 2014
The Question of Numbers I: Official Estimates

In attempting to determine the scale of the abductions and enslavement of South Sudanese people since 1983, it is regrettably instructive to examine the official figures published by international bodies and the U.S. State Department.

While refusing until 1999 to use the word “slavery” in reference to the Sudan crisis, UNICEF eventually gave public estimates of between 10,000 and 17,000 people abducted, with 6,000 to 7,000 still missing.

In its 2000 Human Rights Report, the State Department claimed, without citing sources, that “10,000 to 12,000 slaves remain in captivity at year’s end.” This unsubstantiated figure would remain in the State reports, in some form, for over 15 years. In the 2001 report, the State Department expanded on this claim: “In the last 15 years, between 5,000 and 15,000 Dinka women and children have been abducted; between 10,000 and 12,000 persons, most of whom are Dinka, remained unaccounted for at year’s end.” There was no explanation of who was accounting for the abductedees (or how, if possibly as few as 5,000 people were taken, how 12,000 could be “unaccounted for.”) The 2002 report revised this to, “Approximately 15,000 Dinka women and children have been abducted and between 10,000 and 12,000 mostly Dinka persons remained abducted or unaccounted for at year's end.” Confusingly, this report also mentioned the May 2002 report from the International Eminent Persons Group, which was set up to investigate slavery in Sudan as part of the U.S.-led peace process, noting that “the Group was unable to determine the scale of abduction and enslavement.”

The 2003 report repeated the unsubstantiated 15k-10k-12k claim verbatim, but also noted the report of the Kenya-based Rift Valley Institute “documented more than 11,000 persons abducted by government-supported militia in northern Bahr el-Ghazal during the last 20 years.” (See below.) The 2004 report also contained the 15,000-10,000-12,000 sentence, but in a separate paragraph contradictorily referred to the “10,000 persons abducted by government supported militia in northern Bahr el Ghazal during the last 20 years.”

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By 2006, the report’s figure of “unaccounted-for” abductees had dropped to 8,000 without explanation. In 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, this was changed to the more general “thousands.”

The 2011, 2012 and 2013 reports brought a new variation: instead of repeating the sourceless figure of 10,000-12,000 unaccounted-for abductees, the report gave a remarkably specific figure of 10,700, and attributed it to the Sudanese government’s defunct Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC).

The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons reports are less specific. The 2003 report said that CEAWC had “documented 2,000 cases of abductees.” The 2005 report gave a figure of 14,000 abductees, and cited the Dinka Chiefs’ Committee, a group of Dinka leaders based in Khartoum who were absorbed into CEAWC after the latter’s formation in 1999. In 2006, the TIP report simply referred to “thousands” of abductees, and maintained this formula in its seven succeeding annual reports.

As this overview demonstrates, the State Department’s estimates about the scale of wartime abductions in Sudan are confused and contradictory. Their only consistent feature is that they are low – between 2,000 and 15,000. It is not accidental that the only sources cited for the figures – when sources are cited at all – are institutions of the Sudanese government, which has an obvious interest in downplaying the extent of the chattel slavery present in its territory as a direct result of its war policies.

The case of the Dinka Chiefs’ Committee illustrates the inherently political nature of these figures. In October 2000, the U.K.-based group Anti-Slavery International traveled to Sudan at the invitation of the Sudanese government to investigate allegations of slavery, and met with representatives from CEAWC and the DCC. Anti-Slavery’s report claimed “[m]embers of the Dinka Committee estimated that in the years since abductions started in 1986 or 1987, a total of 6,000 people had been taken to Darfur, and a further 8,000 to

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382 U.S. Department of State, 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78759.htm. (We may speculate, however, that the drop in “unaccounted-for” abductees is based on CEAWC’s claim, cited in the 2005 TIP report, to have identified over 7,000 cases of abduction. CEAWC claimed to have repatriated just over 2,700 of the individuals in these cases).


Kordofan, i.e. a total of 14,000 abducted over about 13 years.” In 2006, the head of the DCC, James Aguer, received Anti-Slavery’s annual award, and claimed in his acceptance speech that “[t]he Committee recorded the names of 14,000 women and children abducted between 10 June 1989 and 1997,” and estimated that the total number of abducted could be as high as 20,000.

However, after the release of the 2005 TIP report, which quoted the 14,000 figure and cited his committee as a source, Aguer denied being the source of the figure, claiming that the DCC had identified 40,000 enslaved Dinka people since 1986, and accepting the estimate of 200,000 abduction given by community leaders in Bahr el-Ghazal. In 2007, Aguer told BBC News that, aside from a list in his possession of the names and locations of 8,000 currently enslaved people, he believed the true number of slaves in Sudan to be over 200,000. In 2008, Aguer claimed, “There are around 35,000 women and children still away, all over Sudan.” None of these larger figures were ever cited by the State Department in its annual reports. Nor, judging by the text, do the reports’ authors appear to have ever consulted with South Sudanese community leaders and organizations not operating under the aegis of the Sudanese government.

Mapping these wildly divergent estimates from Aguer and the DCC onto political developments in Sudan may bring some clarity. In 2001, when the Sudanese government was making limited efforts through CEAWC to liberate and return enslaved people, the DCC held to the government’s line in speaking with Anti-Slavery. In 2005, when the international community was taking a softer line towards Sudan, Aguer reacted angrily to the State Department’s citing his committee as the source of low figures in a report that praised Sudan’s “notable effort” to liberate the enslaved. In 2006, after CEAWC had

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http://www.antislavery.org/includes/documents/cm_docs/2009/isthereslaveryinsudanreport.pdf. Perhaps unsurprisingly for a report based on an investigation undertaken at the invitation and with the assistance of the Sudanese government, Anti-Slavery’s report was oddly defensive of the government. In one paragraph, the report expressed concern that other advocacy groups had “misrepresented the pattern of abuse that is actually occurring, suggesting, for example, that the number of people abducted is much larger than evidence appears to justify, or that the Government of Sudan is directly responsible for slave raids and holding captives in slavery.” Regardless of controversies over numbers, the investigations of Jok Madut Jok and Gaspar Biro, the UN Commission for Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur for Sudan, among others, established that the second “misrepresentation” was very much the case.

389 James Aguer, “2006 Anti-Slavery Award Acceptance Speech.”


http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/09/199668.html.

393 U.S. Department of State, 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report
resumed small-scale returns after a funding shortfall.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65990.htm.} Aguer repeated the 14,000 figure. In 2007 and 2008, CEAWC had largely ceased operations, and Aguer returned to using the larger estimates.

Ultimately, in assessing the State Department’s estimates, we must return to the conclusion of the International Eminent Persons Group: “None of the estimates of the total number of abducted persons or slaves is based on any recognized sampling system.”\footnote{Report of the International Eminent Persons Group: Slavery, Abduction, and Forced Servitude in Sudan, May 22, 2002, 43 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/11951.pdf.}

The Question of Numbers II: Evidence on the Ground

No grounded estimates of the size of the slavery problem in Sudan exist, but there does exist an attempted \textit{count} of abducted persons. In 2003, towards the end of the civil war and the era of renewed slave raiding, a 48-member team from the Rift Valley Institute led by Jok Madut Jok and John C. Ryle conducted a survey of the Bahr el Ghazal and Abyei regions of Sudan, attempting to compile a list of South Sudanese people abducted since the beginning of the war. Interviewing local community leaders and war survivors, the team produced a list of 12,000 names of abductees. The team recorded the name, village and clan affiliation, date of capture, and circumstances of capture of each abductee on the list.\footnote{Jok, 153.}

That researchers were able to compile so large and detailed a list in a country where a twenty-year war had killed as much as one-fifth of the population, displaced some four million more\footnote{“Sudan: Nearly 2 million dead as result of world’s longest-running civil war,” U.S. Committee for Refugees, April 2001 http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm.} and led to a near-complete breakdown in the social order, is suggestive of how high the true figure must be.

In addition, as the report authors themselves make clear, due to government interference with the research which restricted the work to SPLA-held areas, the database “does not include Southerners abducted…within Government-controlled areas [or] within the formerly Government-controlled towns of Bahr-el-Ghazal.” The authors also state that victims from areas along the railway leading from Babanusa in the North to Wau in the South are “under-represented” due to “limited access to these places because of hostilities during the main phase of field research.”\footnote{“The Sudan Abduction and Slavery Project,” Rift Valley Institute http://riftvalley.net/project/sudan-abduction-and-slavery-project#VE3RGCJ4pcQ.}

This was an inevitable but unfortunate limitation, as this railway carried Sudan’s infamous “slave train,” a military supply train that employed tribal militiamen on horseback as protection against rebel attack. The International Eminent Persons Group reported that the militiamen created a “security cordon several kilometers wide on either side of the line” by “raiding and burning villages deep into Dinka and Jur Luo territory. The raids are brutal, with killing, rape and amputations reported in addition to the looting of cattle and other...
property and the abduction of civilians."³³⁹ (This train was apparently the means by which Malwel Deng Deng, above, was transported into captivity.)

Also suggestive of the true scope of the slavery problem is the number of slave raids the Ryle report documented: over 2,000.⁴⁰⁰ The largest of these raids resulted in the abduction of hundreds or even thousands of people at a time.⁴⁰¹

Local community leaders in Bahr el-Ghazal claim that some 200,000 people were abducted during the war.⁴⁰² This is doubtless a very rough guess, but for a twenty-year war which otherwise claimed the lives of over two million South Sudanese, an average of 10,000 people abducted per year is likely far closer to the mark than just several hundred per year.

As noted, Christian Solidarity International has documented the return of over 100,000 people from slavery through the underground retrieval networks it supports, many of whom were born into slavery, and thus did not number among the original abductees. (Many enslaved people have also died in captivity or been executed by their masters.) Every enslaved person who is repatriated through the CSI-supported networks is photographed and interviewed by local staff. His or her name, home village, and the details of his or her enslavement are recorded on a form, which is then verified by local authorities and stored digitally by CSI. CSI staff from the United States and Europe perform numerous extended interviews with the survivors.

**Conclusion: Erasure as Policy**

As the Clinton administration was drawing to a close, senior figures finally responded to pressure from civil society activists in the U.S. and recognized the existence of slavery in Sudan. In November 2000, the then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice visited SPLA-held territory in Bahr el-Ghazal and declared, “[d]espite what some of our partners in the European Union may want to pretend, slavery exists, and it has to be addressed,” speaking of an “obligation to ameliorate the suffering.” In December, then-President Clinton personally spoke out against “the scourge of slavery in Sudan.”⁴⁰³ During his term, then-President George W. Bush drew attention to the issue as well, inviting

⁴⁰¹ See, for example Jok, 24; 25 and Cockett, 149: Jok: “The first and most destructive attack on the Dinka communities of Awei, Abyei, and Tuic occurred in February 1986. …The Rezeigat and the Misseria Humr occupied a large area of Malwal Dinka for nearly two months. …They took two thousand women and children and thousands of cattle. …The January 1987 raid targeted the area of Gong Machar in Awei West County. The raid continued through February, and the Rezeigat…captured about a thousand women and children.”Cockett: “The most recent raid took place on March 25 [1995]. About 3,000 Arab soldiers and tribesmen arrived with no warning. …282 were enslaved, including 48 children.”
a formerly enslaved South Sudanese man, Simon Deng, to the White House to discuss the crisis.  

Considering the U.S.’s own history and eventual repudiation of chattel slavery, and the extensive involvement of American civil society and the U.S. government in Sudanese politics, from the “war on terror” to the Darfur Genocide to the secession of South Sudan, the issue of Sudanese slavery has the potential to be a powerful force in U.S. domestic politics. The U.S.’s commitment to international law also comes to bear, as the International Eminent Persons Group found: “[u]nder international law, slavery and related practices are classified as a war crime and a crime against humanity, subject to universal jurisdiction.”

Since the conclusion of the peace process however, high-level attention to the slavery issue has come to an end. President Barack Obama has never directly addressed the issue, unlike his two predecessors.

In October 2005, the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons office upgraded Sudan’s offender status from Tier 3, marking the worst offenders, to Tier 2, marking countries that are “making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards.” Other Tier 2 countries in 2005 included Switzerland, Chile and Greece. Activist outrage prompted the State Department to revise the ranking downward again in 2006, but in the 2014 report, Sudan was again raised to Tier 2, despite noting that the government had “made no efforts” to address the single most egregious issue of trafficking in their territory.

On October 5, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for Africa held a hearing on the U.S.’s Sudan policy. The witnesses included both Ambassador Princeton Lyman, then-U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and Ker Deng, a formerly enslaved South Sudanese teenager, who was repatriated to South Sudan through the CSI-supported networks, but only after his captor had deliberately blinded him and left him for dead.

In questioning, the hearing’s chairman, Congressman Chris Smith, directly asked Lyman, “Can you speak to the issue of slavery? How many do you think? What are we doing to help free the slaves in Sudan?”

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405 Cockett reveals that, in early 2002, CIA officials met with Sudan’s head of intelligence and foreign minister in London and explicitly threatened to bomb Sudan’s air force and oil industry if more cooperation was not received on counterterrorism efforts; Cockett, 77-78.


Lyman did not address the question of “how many,” but acknowledged that slavery is an “ongoing issue” and “part of that general need in Sudan to establish a constitution that protects human rights, that investigates wrongdoing and brings people to accountability.”

To the present author’s knowledge, this is the most recent statement on chattel slavery in Sudan from a high-level U.S. official. As genuine constitutional reform seems a remote prospect in Sudan, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that chattel slavery in Sudan is an issue the U.S. government would prefer not to address at all. The improbably low estimates of the scale of the problem published by the U.S. State Department and others are best interpreted as a reflection of that reality.

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In the middle of the tenth century, Persian scholar Abu Yaqub al-Sijistanī wrote the philosophical treatise, *The Wellsprings of Wisdom*. In the book, al-Sijistanī creates a philosophy based on his own intellectual leanings, thus synthesizing two traditions. The first of these traditions is the Neo-Platonism of such thinkers as Proclus and Porphyry; al-Sijistanī was one of the few scholars in the Muslim world who was involved in this strain of thought at the time. The second tradition is rooted in the mysticism and doctrines of al-Sijistanī’s Isma‘ili faith. Al-Sijistanī organizes his ideas into forty wellsprings, or topics, in which he expounds on ideas ranging from metaphysical concepts such as the nature of the soul, to more mystical arguments such as why the angels cannot be counted. The synthesis, however, is hardly seamless. The wellsprings are organized inconsistently, which leads to certain jarring transitions between philosophy and mysticism, sometimes within the same wellspring. The lack of orderliness throughout the book may be due to the fact that the author did not see these two doctrines as wildly different. However, to a modern reader, the treatise appears disjointed and thus difficult to comprehend. To make sense of this often-jumbled text, one must first identify which parts are religion and which parts are philosophy.

In the first wellspring, entitled ‘On the Meaning of Wellspring’, al-Sijistanī introduces both religious and philosophical concepts to the reader. He defines a wellspring as a source from which something flows. Physical wellsprings produce water and sustain physical life, while spiritual wellsprings produce knowledge and sustain spiritual life. The author then identifies the four sources of knowledge: the ‘Preceder’, the ‘Follower’, the ‘Speaking Prophet’ and the ‘Founder’. Here the chapter takes a very mystical turn -- the sources of knowledge are correlated with the four letters in the word Allah, the four classical elements and another series of letters. This is all part of a construct referred to as the balance of letters, which is often associated with fortune telling. While to the modern eye this may not be philosophy, it must be noted that al-Sijistanī did, in fact, understand his system as a philosophy. Understanding this chapter is of utmost importance because it clearly lays out the four wellsprings of knowledge, an understanding of which is essential for comprehending what follows.

Wellspring two is the first truly philosophical section of the text. It focuses on the identity of God whom al-Sijistanī calls the ‘Originator’. He is not the Intellect, which is his first creation, nor is he the first cause, as Aristotle would describe him. Instead, the Originator conforms closely with the Neo-Platonic view of God. He is so far beyond comprehension that no concept of his identity or being can even exist. His nature cannot be

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accessed through logic or intellect. This leads to wellspring three, which returns to religion and the balance of letters, which is used to describe the command of the Originator. What is interesting here is that al-Sijistanī departs from the Neo-Platonist view that God does not command, but rather statically emanates things into being.\(^{411}\)

Chapters four through twelve are the most coherently organized sections in the entire treatise. Instead of alternating between religion and philosophy, this section is consistently philosophical in nature. It begins with a description of the nature of the world of the intellect and the soul. (In accordance with the Arabic tradition, the soul will be referred to in the feminine.) The intellect encompasses the soul, which comprises, respectively, the aforementioned ‘Preceder’ and Follower. Soul, in turn, encompasses the physical body. This concept of soul is different from the traditional concept. Here, there is a universal soul of which human souls are just a sliver. Humans are inside the soul in the same way a net is inside the ocean; fragments become entangled with the corporeal world and forget the spiritual world. This comes dangerously close to the idea of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls, because it claims that human souls had previously existed in the universal soul before their human lives.\(^{412}\)

The next eight wellsprings specifically deal with the problems of the intellect. Al-Sijistanī begins by explaining that the intellect envelops the corporeal world, and that therefore the intellect cannot be corrupted or contaminated by it. This also proves that the intellect is the primary creation of the ‘Originator’. Prior to the intellect’s creation, nothing could be imagined, because the intellect is the very “thingness” of things. Thus, there is nothing that can be conceived of that is outside of it. If something were, it would be coeternal with God because something cannot precede its “thingness”, which is within the intellect. It is also incorruptible because it is ontologically higher than the concept itself. Corruptibility is only understood through the intellect itself. It is beyond everything except the ‘Originator’.

The intellect is quiescent; because of its primary status, it cannot be moved or changed by anything lower than itself. It also has no wants or needs and so has no desire to move. At the time, philosophers debated the quiescence of the intellect and some scholars contemporary to al-Sijistanī claimed that the intellect is moving because it longs to know God. However, al-Sijistanī refutes that notion, contending that because God is beyond all comprehension, the intellect would not have such a desire and therefore is unmoving and unchanging. The intellect is also complete in both actuality and potentiality. To understand this, one must know that before something exists, it must have the potential to exist. However, because the creator constructed the intellect out of absolutely nothing, not even potentiality, these states came into the universe together in the same instance because nothing can exist before the intellect, save for God.

The intellect is also immaterial; it cannot be merged with the corporeal world. It can appear in the physical realm through rational humans, but doing so, because of its higher nature, cannot be tainted. The intellect communicates with the soul through a higher and lower discourse. In the lower discourse, the intellect takes pity on the soul, which instructs

\(^{411}\) Ibid., 129-131.
\(^{412}\) Ibid., 132-134.
nature on reason. The intellect also tells her that the physical world is transitory, reminding the soul of her true higher status. The third way the intellect communicates is more spiritual, where the intellect creates a longing for itself within the soul. In this case, the soul is most happy the nearer it gets to intellect but ultimately fails in becoming it, causing it pain and fatigue. Finally, in this section al-Sijistani presents his argument regarding how the soul attains the benefits of the intellect. If the soul were completely part of the physical world, this process would be impossible. For al-Sijistani this demonstrates that the soul is partially in both the corporeal and spiritual realms. This concept is corroborated by the fact that the soul is not corrupted by human existence. 413

While both are steeped in philosophy, wellsprings thirteen and fourteen are interesting because they contradict each other. Wellspring thirteen states that being is unable to become nonbeing. Al-Sijistanī is arguing essentially that once created, the universe is eternal because a just and good creator created it. If this were not true, it would imply that God’s goodness was imperfect. In fourteen he claims that all beings are finite within an ultimate limit. Here he makes the argument that if something has an origin, it is necessarily finite, which completely disregards the previous wellspring. The argument behind this is if something is limited in one capacity, i.e., having a beginning, then it is limited in its entirety. How this interacts with God’s infinite and perfect goodness is unclear.

Like the previous two chapters, chapter fifteen also deals with the nature of God and would appear to fall on the philosophical side of the treatise, but the chapter actually may have been misplaced. Here al-Sijistanī expounds on the motives of God, specifically the absurdity of questioning him. Since God is completely incomprehensible, so are his motives. Therefore, to ask why he created the universe would be ridiculous. The only thing that can be asked of him is his existence. The section would have fit better next to section two, which explores the nature of the ‘Originator’ in similar terms. To state again, the organization of the text is rather haphazard, which explains the content of the next wellspring.

Wellspring sixteen brings the conversation back to the intellect, with a discussion of its attributes. These essences, or powers, exist from the creation of the intellect and are coeternal with it. If they did not exist, then the intellect could not function as it does. These powers are temporal eternity, truth, happiness, demonstration, life, perfection and self-subsistence. There is probably a reason that they number seven, likely having to do with the kind of mysticism found in the religious chapters, even though this one leans more towards philosophy. The philosopher also mentions for the first time a being called the ‘acquiring intellect’, which gains knowledge of these essences. This idea is not at all related to Neo-Platonism, which speaks of the intellect as static and self-reflecting. Al-Sijistanī may, in this case, be referring to human understanding even though this is a more Aristotelian view. Taking this into consideration, it would make sense to use this wellspring as a bridge between his discussion of the intellect and the soul, which would be fully achieved, if not for the previous three chapters.

The next series of wellsprings explains the issues of the soul. In wellsprings seventeen and eighteen, al-Sijistanī explains the concept in greater detail. He reaffirms that out of the universal soul, partial human souls proceed, as well as its inverse that human souls

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413 Ibid., 146-148
come from the eternal soul. As she encompasses the material world and lies within, she gets trapped within it and forgets her true nature; it is only when she remembers her true self that she is reunited with the spiritual realm and the world soul. She is also in contact with the intellect on earth, as was previously explained. We are in contact with the intellect through our souls, which are in both the physical and the spiritual worlds. We articulate our connection with the spiritual and eternal through acts of intellect, which are works of art and science.

Wellspring nineteen describes how the spheres, which make up the corporeal world, fit inside the horizon of the soul. This means that the soul is ontologically higher than physical reality. It also means that everything and everyone that that exists physically is inside the soul. This is proven by our ability to transcend our material existence. Chapter twenty spells out how the soul determines the movement of the spheres, which is shown through the path of the planets and stars. The soul determines the order and condition of the physical world, and its trajectory is a conscious choice by her, which, once made, cannot change. While these four wellsprings of the soul seem to be in line with mysticism, they are also very much in line with Neo-Platonic thought.

Throughout the text, philosophical wellsprings dealing with the nature of God are seemingly inserted at random, and chapter twenty-one is no exception. Here al-Sijistani refutes the statement “God is everywhere.” It cannot apply because God is outside of nature, which is the only world where space truly exists. Without any foothold in the physical world, neither God nor the intellect can be anywhere, let alone everywhere. This also would make God’s location comprehensible, which of course is not possible.

The author then moves on to the origin of humanity, attempting to use philosophical logic to explain religious scripture, although arguing against the narrative given in a traditional reading of the Qur’an. To him, Adam could not be the first human because humanity as a species must have come all at once. This is because the concept of humankind cannot have existed as a single person. Humans existed in subsequent generations going back to their origins, unchanged in their humanity. There is no concept of evolution, but also no concept of Adam, other than as the first prophet.414

The next two wellsprings rely heavily on the balance of letters. The first is an attempt to explain how the intellect worships God. This al-Sijistani does through his own devotion to God, which is dependent on the intellect. The entire concept of worship is contained within itself, thus meaning humans would not even be able to pay homage to God without using the intellect. The second argues that angels cannot be counted. Essentially, this involves the idea that if one puts a number on something one limits it. For example, if something is six, it is limited to between five and seven. Since non-corporeal beings cannot be limited, the angels cannot be counted.

Wellspring twenty-five switches ideas entirely and moves back towards philosophy. This wellspring is an attack on dualism, claiming that the concept of evil does not have its origins with creation itself. Because God’s goodness is perfect, then evil could not pre-exist creation unless it was coeternal with him. This is, at its core, the dualism described in

414 Walker, al-Sijistani, The Wellsprings of Wisdom, 165
Zoroastrianism, which al-Sijistani rejects wholeheartedly. To him, evil is relative. For example, the soul is generally good except in comparison to the intellect, which is more perfect.

The next four chapters relate the nature of reward and punishment. The first two are philosophical and the latter two are religious. Wellsprings twenty-six and twenty-seven articulate the rewards of the afterlife. To al-Sijistani, physical powers have no significance among spiritual ones. This reemphasizes the superiority of non-corporeal existence and lays the groundwork for the idea that the reward of the afterlife is knowledge. This is so because pleasure is the highest extent of reward, and therefore the only true pleasure is spiritual because the physical is ontologically lower. This does not mean that one gains total knowledge, however, because then one would become the intellect, which is unattainable.

Wellsprings twenty-eight and twenty-nine explain how the rewards and punishments function. The meanings of paradise and hellfire are therefore metaphorical. Those destined for reward will leave their corporeal bodies behind and join the world soul in pursuit of the intellect. Those destined for punishment are those who do not follow al-Sijistanī’s version of Isma’īl Shiism. These people may use their religion to improve the world around them, but because they do not have a firm grounding in the sciences, they merely corrupt it. It causes these people great pain to learn the truth. Also, the rewards are unequal. As in the physical world where someone may have more wealth than another, the same is true for the afterlife, but there is no jealousy. This is because everyone shares knowledge, and one cannot have it at the expense of another. A person of limited intelligence is not envious of anyone smarter than himself or herself because he cannot even comprehend having any more knowledge.

The final eleven wellsprings do not share a common theme, and there is very little logic to their order. The first three of these wellsprings (thirty, thirty-one, and thirty-two) use the balance of letters to explain the shahada, or profession of faith. Al-Sijistanī corresponds the first four words to the four sources of knowledge: ‘Preceder’, ‘Follower’, ‘Speaking Prophet’ and ‘Founder’. He demonstrates how this is also true in Christianity, showing how the points of the cross also correspond with both the shahada and the four sources. It is important that Christianity makes an appearance because it refers to Jesus’ nature as one of the ‘Speaking Prophets’, as well as describing the similarities between the shahada and the sign of the cross. To the Isma’īlis, there are six of these figures whose teachings make redundant the prophet who came before him. They are Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. There is also a seventh, the Messiah, who will come at the end of time and mark the end of the physical world. It should also be mentioned that the ‘Founder’ is the one who interprets the laws given by the prophets. In this case, Muhammad’s founder is his son-in-law and cousin, Ali ibn Abu Talib, who is followed by imams, adjuncts and wings. These ideas also fit neatly with the thirty-fourth wellspring, which asserts that six is a perfect number. There are six prophets, God created the earth in six days, and so on.

The thirty-third wellspring articulates a philosophical concept similar to the discussion of the intellect, but from the perspective of the ‘Originator’. It explains the idea that there were no forms prior to the creation of the universe. Instead of a proof to show the intellect’s primary status, it demonstrates the power of God. When humans create something they imagine a form they would like to model it after, but when creation happened there were no forms. There was absolutely nothing. If there was a form to base the universe on,
then it would be co-eternal with God and unintelligible through the intellect, an idea al-Sijistani dismisses as absurd. Also, for God to use a form is to limit his abilities and to know something about him, which is impossible because he is unintelligible.

Wellspring thirty-five argues what was already touched upon in earlier philosophical chapters, i.e., that no one can attain the rank of intellect. Its status as both perfect and primary precludes anyone or anything from being its equal. Even though the soul’s reward is knowledge, it is not total because that would make her equal to the intellect. This section would have been more aptly placed with the wellsprings about reward and punishment.

The text switches gears again with wellspring thirty-six and its discussion of the doctrine of resurrection. Islam stipulates resurrection of the body, which al-Sijistani denies in favor of a wholly spiritual resurrection, described in Neo-Platonic terms. To him, only souls will be resurrected upon the coming of the messiah. Much like a fetus growing into a newborn, or a seed into a plant, the soul will change and leave the body and the physical world behind to live entirely in the spiritual realm.

Chapter thirty-seven tries to solve the philosophical problem of how a single cause could create a plurality. Because God essentially created everything, then one must create many. To prove this, the author first claims that one can only be the cause of one of many, and since something cannot be the cause of itself, it must cause plurality. This happens throughout nature. For instance, one tree produces many branches.

Wellspring thirty-eight proves the existence of an eternal reward. If there were no such system in place there would be an incentive to do harm. In the physical world, there are wicked people living comfortable lives of wealth and, conversely, there are good people who live in poverty and oppression. Justice dictates that the evil should be punished and the good rewarded. Because God is just, this system exists. This wellspring falls in the religious category because God is more active than in the philosophical ones. Throughout the text, al-Sijistanī refers to God’s attributes, such as his goodness and justice, and also argues that God is beyond all comprehension. These two ideas seem completely at odds. If we know anything about the nature of God, that would put us beyond the scope of the intellect, which al-Sijistanī decries as absurd. This idea is probably a borrowing from his more religious leanings, which do not impose the same limitations on knowing God than does Neo-Platonic philosophy.

The thirty-ninth chapter describes the significance of the word of God, which al-Sijistanī equates with the Aristotelian concept of the first cause. Again he uses the balance of letters to describe the ‘Preceder’, ‘Follower’, ‘Speaking Prophet’ and ‘Founder’. The fortieth, and final, wellspring answers the question of how inspiration reaches the inspired. Inspiration emanates from the intellect in the spiritual world into humanity. We are able to receive it because of our connection to the non-corporeal world through the soul. Only humans have this ability, and this is the source of prophethood.

*The Wellsprings of Wisdom* is actually two books intertwined. There is one that uses philosophy, mainly Neo-Platonism, to describe the universe. The other is a religious text that focuses on Ismaʿili doctrine and the arcane science of balancing letters. To al-Sijistanī, these two concepts are one in the same, but in reality they are quite different. The wellsprings on
their own tend to be quite coherent, but put together there are issues. Certain sections contradict others and the ordering appears quite random. While this work is relatively obscure, it provides important insight into Ismaʿili thought and Neo-Platonism in the Islamic world.
Bibliography

The establishment of the Imam-Hatip schools in Turkey has contributed to the reshaping of the Turkish political and social landscape by introducing more outward expressions and manifestations of Islamic religiosity in the public sphere. The continual sociocultural presence of the Imam-Hatip schools as state-sanctioned educational institutions exemplify Asef Bayat’s notion of post-Islamism, which focuses on individual rights and a more inclusive understanding of the sociopolitical order, in contrast to Islamism, which emphasizes duty-centric and exclusive politics based on the principles and doctrines of Islam. An examination of the historical development of the Imam-Hatip schools also shows the evolution of the Turkish state’s policies and stances on Islam’s role in the public sphere. Furthermore, Imam-Hatip schools reveal the deeper sociopolitical issues currently underlying Turkish society that go beyond the secular-religious dichotomy. The existence of the Imam-Hatip schools in an official capacity, despite the objections and fears of the secular segments of Turkish society, demonstrates the ability of Islam and secularism to coexist, though with some tension, in the public sphere.

In an effort to construct a clearer definition of Islamism, Bayat analyzes the historical and political progression of Islamist movements as they alter and sometimes completely change their sociopolitical principles and goals, as well as their organizational approaches and methodologies. Bayat calls such significant transformations of Islamist movements as post-Islamism, that is to say, a means of creating a fundamental distinction between the changing objectives and practices of the Islamist movements and Islamic states. Recognizing the particular and circumstantial paths that both Islamism and post-Islamism have followed and can follow, Bayat aims to create definitions that would encapsulate the broader trends and development of both movements. For Bayat, Islamism represents “those ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an ‘Islamic order’--a religious state, shari’a law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities.” With the objective of establishing an ideological community, Islamists “consider the state the most powerful and efficient institution that is able to enforce ‘good’ and eradicate ‘evil’ in Muslim societies”, prioritizing the individual’s sense of obligation towards the Islamic state rather than his or her rights. However, the movements and organizations that promote Islamic states do not share a monolithic strategy in achieving their ultimate goals. Reformist Islamists pursue an Islamic state within an existing constitutional framework in a gradual and peaceful manner. In contrast, Islamists who adopt a revolutionary or militant

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416 Ibid., 5.
417 Ibid.
approach “resort to violence and terrorism against state agencies, western targets, and non-Muslim civilians” as a means of seizing governmental power and establishing a state program of Islamization of the political and social order. While the sociopolitical movements of the revolutionary and militant Islamists function within the context of their particular nation-state, the jihadi strains of Islamist movements and organizations are more apt to be “transnational in their ideas and operations,” commonly embracing apocalyptic “ethical movements”.

With an emphasis on a duty-centric and rather exclusive form of Islamic politics, various Islamist movements have shifted their sociopolitical trajectories to that of Bayat’s post-Islamism, which endeavors “to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty.” Bayat argues that post-Islamism is a condition and project in which “the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism are exhausted even among its once-ardent supporters.” Post-Islamism emphasizes “rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past.” Instead of mandating the synthesis of an Islamic order in both the private and public sphere, post-Islamism advocates for a pious social order within the context of a civil, perhaps even secular, state in which religion plays an active role in the public sphere. Post-Islamism appears in many different forms, depending on the historical, sociopolitical, economic, and religious contexts of the post-Islamism movement. For instance, Bayat asserts that the post-Islamism project still contends with the boundaries of individual freedom in relation to religion’s role in the public sphere. Turkey has struggled and is currently struggling with the difficult task of reconciling the role of religion, particularly Islam, and its secular public institutions, particularly in terms of Islam’s role in the sociopolitical administration of the Turkish national identity and nation-state.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish War of Independence, Turkey emerged as an internationally recognized state, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist elites. In order to break away from Turkey’s Islamic Ottoman past, Atatürk initiated a number of sweeping reforms, which ranged from the removal of the Ottoman institutions of the sultanate and caliphate to the introduction of new non-Islamic penal laws and civil codes. The Kemalist government also adopted a new Turkish alphabet and incorporated laïcité into Turkey’s constitution. Perhaps the most symbolic example of Turkey’s programmed break from its Ottoman roots was the relocation of its capital from Istanbul to Ankara. The numerous Kemalist reforms emphasized Atatürk’s and his colleagues’ efforts to comprehensively remove any indicators of Ottoman, Arab, Persian, and Islamic cultural influences in order to establish an “authentic” Turkish identity on a national, ethnic, and linguistic basis. The Kemalists saw Islam as Turkey’s biggest obstacle in becoming a modern state modeled on the western European nation-states, which led to the adoption of the laïcité principles of secularism during the construction of the Turkish state and national identity. Nazim Irem, a professor at Dokuz Eylül University, states the “transformative modernist project of the westernist [Kemalist] elites took capitalism as the new economic basis of society; the nation-state and parliamentary democracy as its political

418 Ibid., 5-6.
419 Ibid., 8.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid., 27.
structure; and secularization as its cultural process.” Calling for the restraint of religion in the public sphere, the Kemalists thought it was necessary to “inhibit [Islam’s] potential capacity for challenging the state and its efforts at modernization.” As a part of this endeavor, the Kemalist government disassembled Islam as the institutional basis of everyday life and established a national and secular public education system as a means of not only cementing an unified Turkish identity, but also to control all of Turkey’s religious discourses and confine Islam to the private sphere. The Ministry of Education supervised all matters concerning education, ranging from the administration of religious schools to the centralization and development of a single curriculum. The expansion of the Turkish government’s authority over the state’s education exemplifies Turkey’s unique interpretation of laïcité, which strives to bring religion, particularly Islam, under the state control, rather than a strict separation of politics and religion.

Atatürk sought to create a collective identity and national consciousness by instituting the Unification of Education Law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) in 1924, which placed all of the educational institutions under the purview of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education was now able to open secular public schools with a particular state-approved curriculum that would focus on educating its students as “rationalist, scientific-minded, and anti-traditional.” The establishment of the Imam-Hatip schools illustrates the Kemalist government’s intentions to diminish any influence of Islam on Turkish social and political life while also bringing Islam under the direct control and monopoly of the secular state. Utilizing religion for “nationalizing and secularizing goals”, the Kemalist government “intended to train prayer leaders and preachers who would disseminate Islamic knowledge that did not challenge the secular principles of the republic.” The Imam-Hatip school system experienced a gradual expansion from 1951 to 1973 as the Turkish government relinquished some aspects of its hardline secular position in acknowledgement of the Islamic sentiment in the country. However, with the introduction of the Basic Law on National Education in 1973, the Imam-Hatip schools were implemented with a preparatory curriculum that incorporated both vocational training and the opportunity for higher education. Although the Imam-Hatip schools remained officially categorized as vocational secondary schools, the Basic Law on National Educational allowed the Imam-Hatip schools to become more mainstream educational institutions. The growing prestige and popularity of the Imam-Hatip schools was also a result of the application of Türk-İslam sentezi, or Turkish-Islamic synthesis by the military in an effort to halt the radicalization of the Turkish youth. Türk-İslam sentezi was

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426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid., 31.
429 Ibid., 33.
430 Ibid., 39.
431 Ibid., 45.
432 Ibid., 48.
designed to reduce the ethnic and ideological division in Turkish society by utilizing Islam as a sociopolitical unifying force, which included the building of mosques, the establishment of additional Qur’an courses and Imam-Hatip schools, and the employment of religiously conservative ministry officials.\textsuperscript{433} The military even endorsed the inclusion of religious classes into the curriculum of public primary and secondary schools in the 1982 constitution with the hopes of portraying “Islam as a progressive and modern religion with no concerns to superstition.”\textsuperscript{434} By assuming greater control over Turkey’s religious discourse, the Turkish government began to propagate a particular interpretation of Sunni-Hanafi Islam the state deemed to be modern as well as beneficial in strengthening the sociopolitical unification of Turkey.

The increasing success of Imam-Hatip graduates in non-religious fields, which included business, law, and politics, further contributed to the growing attraction and prominence of the Imam-Hatip schools in the eyes of the religious conservative communities. However, with the growing political influence of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), “the role of Imam-Hatip schools within the national education system deepened the rifts in Turkish society.”\textsuperscript{435} The rising political tensions between the Islamic Welfare Party and the secular factions provoked a political crisis in 1997, leading to the implementation of several educational reforms that hampered the growth of the Imam-Hatip schools as well as restricted the opportunities for Imam-Hatip graduates.\textsuperscript{436,437} One of the educational reforms that applied to the Imam-Hatip schools required all Turkish students to remain in primary schools through the eighth grade in an effort to impede the Islamic inculcation of the youth by keeping them within the secular education system longer.\textsuperscript{438} The other educational reform that pertained to the Imam-Hatip schools introduced the coefficient factor (\textit{katsayı faktörü}), “a numerical penalty applied to scores that Imam-Hatip school graduates receive on their university entrance exams.”\textsuperscript{439} The coefficient factor reduced the prospect of Imam-Hatip graduates being admitted into non-religious university programs, which in turn reduced the possibility of securing non-religious positions in the Turkish political, social, and economic sectors. Iren Ozgur, a postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University, asserts that the coefficient factor “implied that the Imam-Hatip school graduates were best suited for the study of religion and less likely to be fit for other professions.”\textsuperscript{440} The coefficient factor ultimately diminished the prestige of the Imam-Hatip schools as religious alternatives to the public schools, as well as triggered the drop in the enrollment of students in Imam-Hatip schools. Perhaps an unforeseen long term consequence of the 1997 educational reforms was the emergence of new forms and methods of Islamic education that were difficult for the Turkish state to monitor and therefore control, breaking the government’s monopoly on Turkey’s religious rhetoric and trajectory. However, with the emergence of the AKP as Turkey’s principal political power, the enrollment at Imam-Hatip schools has greatly

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{433} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{434} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{435} Ibid., 51.
\item \textsuperscript{436} Ibid., 53.
\item \textsuperscript{437} Ibid., 54.
\item \textsuperscript{438} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{440} Ozgur, \textit{Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey}, 56.
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increased, growing from 71,100 in 2003 to 143,637 in 2009. The resurgence in the enrollment and popularity of the Imam-Hatip schools is largely due to the political and social efforts of the AKP. The political prominence of the AKP has made it more acceptable, if not desirable, for Turkish students to attend Imam-Hatip schools. Many past and current leading politicians were graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, including Nazım Ekren, a previous Deputy Prime Minister, Mehmet Müezzinoğlu, the current Minister of Health, and most predominately, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President.

The controversies surrounding the Imam-Hatip schools encapsulate the sociopolitical tensions between the Turkish secular establishment and the growing presence of both Islamic and post-Islamism sentiments in Turkey. At the core of this conflict is the issue of balancing and reconciling Turkey’s Kemalist and secular principles with its Islamic cultural identity, as well as contending with the questions of national identity. Diren Çakmak, a professor at Gazi University, argues that “Turkish secularism has not been a genuine expression of the separation of religious and political spheres. Rather, the principle of secularism as served as a means of state control over the religious field”, which “has been the core element of the founding philosophy of the Turkish state.” By controlling the behavior of religion in the public sphere, the Turkish government is able to develop a particular interpretation of Islam that it deems authentic and proper in which “Islam can be separated out from other types of social activities, including politics, to create a neutral, non-religious public space and institutions.” The application of religious doctrines and principles of Islam by the secular Turkish state as a source of unification reveals the various dichotomies and tensions underlying Turkey’s current sociopolitical environment. The social and political frictions in Turkish society can be identified as divisions between the secular and religious, the urban and rural, and the lower and middle classes and upper class. Also underlying these dichotomies are the issues of individual understanding of religiosity in the face of a state-mandated Islam as well as the complexity and confusion surrounding the notion of a Turkish national identity.

In an effort to go beyond the secularism and religious dichotomy, Seda Demiralp, a professor at Işık University, asserts that the divisions between secularism and Islamism are derived from and exacerbated by class and geographical-based conflicts. Demiralp argues that the secular and Islamist identities “have been functioning as proxies for major status groups in society--the urban elite and the rural non-elites” and that “these cleavages are structural and deeper than the surface debate over religious ideology would make them seem.” Although the urban elite, which consists of members from the military, media, bureaucracy, and bourgeoisie, constitutes a small minority in Turkish society, they are able to incorporate their lifestyles, values, and tastes into the national standard of what is civilized and good for the Turkish nation and thus are able to define the national Turkish identity. The transmission of the lifestyles and values of the urban elite into the foundation of Turkish society has led to the “othering” of the rural non-elite as domestic enemies and

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442 Çakmak, 840.
445 Ibid., 514.
allowed for the use of Islam “to describe the ‘primitive’ rural other” while also using secularism to define “the way to Western modernity and [civilization].” The “othering” of the rural non-elite segments of Turkish society has also been institutionalized in the curriculum of the public school system. The Turkish state utilizes its education system to uphold a particular brand of national identity and citizenship and in promoting secularism by disparaging Islam, the Turkish educational system perpetuates “binary distinctions, such as civilized/primitive, modern/reactionary, or patriotic/traitor”. The emergence of Imam-Hatip graduates such as President Erdoğan into the public political realm “discomforts secularist groups, not only because of secularist sensitivities, but also because it challenges prevailing class relations.” However, the use of the overlaying dichotomy between secularism and Islam has also been exercised by the rising rural non-elite as a means uniting against the urban elites while also employing with the same rhetoric that was used against them.

The prominence of the AKP in Turkish politics and the growing popularity of the Imam-Hatip schools represent the continuing reconciliation of Turkey’s secularist establishments and Islamic characteristics. Contrary to the fears of some secularist circles, the Imam-Hatip are not sites for the indoctrination of radical Islamism, but rather the development of “religious sensibilities [that]...raise generations that can challenge the Turkish state’s historically secular ideology.” The state-approved curriculum does not strive to instill the Imam-Hatip school students with the notion that the Turkish government and society should be administered according to Islamic law and dogmas. Criticizing the expansion of enrollment in Imam-Hatip schools, secularist groups accuse the AKP of having ulterior motives, as manifested in the formation of “exclusive eliques of Imam-Hatip school graduates in the government and administration.” Many secularists also criticized the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu) of complying with the AKP-dominated government when the Council of Higher Education revised its bylaws to modify the Imam-Hatip schools’ status as vocational schools to “secondary schools that provided a four-year education and trained students for their vocations as well as for higher education.” The change in the Imam-Hatip schools’ official institutional status caused many secularists to charge the AKP and the Council of Higher Education of favoring Imam-Hatip schools and their students. Additionally, the sense of community that the Imam-Hatip schools fosters and perpetuates in turn establishes social networks that can be tapped by Islamist civil organizations and political parties, which is why the secular segments of the Turkish government have passed legislation that have hampered the success of the Imam-Hatip schools and their graduates, such as the requirement of Turkish students to remain in the secular public school system through the eighth grade and the enforcement of the coefficient factor. However, the Council of Higher Education removed the bylaws that implemented the coefficient factor in 2011, meaning that the admission scores of Imam-Hatip school graduates no longer automatically deduct points when applying to non-

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446 Ibid.
447 Ibid., 518.
448 Ibid., 520.
449 Ibid., 521.
450 Ozgur, Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey, 66.
452 Ozgur, Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey, 138.
religious university programs.453

For some secularists, the recent Imam-Hatip schools-related legislative amendments are indicative of the AKP’s hidden agenda for the Islamization of the Turkish government and society. This suspicion is further bolstered with recruitment of over 1,100 Imam-Hatip school graduates from the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) to other governmental ministry positions, including Interior, Health, Justice, and Education.454 In response to the transfer of Imam-Hatip school graduates into secular civil ministry positions, a prominent secular journalist, Özdemir İnce, wrote that the AKP was using “Imam-Hatip schools to Islamize all professions.”455 The more moderate secularists perceive the appointment of Imam-Hatip school graduates as “the formation of Islamist cadres within various ranks of government”, alleging that the “Imam-Hatip school graduates are hired not because of their merits, but because of their religious schooling.”456

However, Ozgur states that it “would be an overstatement to assert that this trend has undermined the country’s secularity”, while also acknowledging that growing role of Imam-Hatip school graduates in politics has “certainly enabled notions of Islamic morality to guide everyday life and politics and has made outward displays of religiosity more commonplace in public spheres.”457 There is a misconception held by some secular groups that by attending an Imam-Hatip school students graduate a monolithic class, ingrained with Islamist goals of establishing an Islamic Turkish state. As with any educational institution, regardless of religious or political affiliations, there is wide range of diverse religious, social, and political inclinations that the institution's students hold upon graduating. Although some educational institutions are recognized to carry particular sociopolitical ideologies, their students graduate with divergent understandings and ideas of the world. In practice, “Imam-Hatip school students and graduates have a wealth of opinions and perspectives on their life, religion, and what role they should play in society and politics.”458 Imam-Hatip schools simply provide a more religiously-oriented education for Turkish families that wish to consciously adhere to Islamic practices and principles. The majority of students who attend Imam-Hatip schools are “simply going about their daily lives, in a manner characteristic of youth who are either not aware of or not interested in politics.”459 However, since the Turkish state claims sole authority over the definition and boundaries of religion, any practice or expression of religion in the public sphere becomes inherently political, which explains the political controversies surrounding the Imam-Hatip schools.

The continued existence of the Imam-Hatip schools in the Turkish educational system reflects Bayat’s concept of post-Islamism as part of a greater effort to reconcile the various political, religious, economic, and geographical issues present in Turkish society. Bayat identifies post-Islamism as “a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islam in social, political, and intellectual domains...in this sense, post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular.”460

453 Ibid., 139.
454 Ibid., 147.
455 Ibid.
456 Ibid.
457 Ibid., 148.
458 Ibid., 105.
459 Ibid., 103.
460 Bayat, 8.
The strict secular environment that the Turkish state upholds compelled the Islamist political parties to continuously and deliberately moderate their political and religious policies, leading to the emergence of the AKP as a conservative democratic party as well as “an Islamic middle class with entrepreneurs and intellectuals who demanded their share of power and benefits from the system and who did not want to challenge but, rather, accommodate the Kemalist/secularist establishment.” Nonetheless, the post-Islamism movements aim to appropriate a greater space and role for Islam in the public sphere instead of simply relegating religion into the private sphere, which could even mean a bigger growth of Imam-Hatip school enrollment or the ability to wear headscarves in public institutions. An aspect of the post-Islamism movement in Turkey advocates for an Anglo-Saxon interpretation of secularism, separating the state from religious norms while also permitting religion full liberty in the public sphere, in place of the established Turkish laïcité. Ayla Göl, a professor at Aberystwyth University, suggests that “the real issue at stake is not the clash of Islamist and secularist but the complex interdependency between secularism and democratization in a Muslim context.” The current trajectory of post-Islamism displays that secularism and religion are not necessarily at odds with one another but rather secularism and Islam are able to exist simultaneously, emphasizing that being secular implies irreligiosity or being religious indicate immorality.

The establishment of the Imam-Hatip schools began with the intention of restraining and regulating the purview of religion in the public sphere by the Kemalist government, while also utilizing Islam as an unifying principle as a counterforce against segregating sociopolitical forces and ideologies. The growing popularity and prestige of the Imam-Hatip schools among the more conservative and religious-minded communities illustrates the expansion of the Islamic and post-Islamism movements into Turkey’s public sphere. In an effort to contend with its multifaceted societal tensions and the nature of its national identity, the Turkish state and society are trying to reconcile the divisions between the urban secular elite and Islamic conservatives by integrating the two sides more effectively and locating a state of equilibrium. However, identifying a comfortable level of separation of religion from an individual’s private and public life that suits a large majority of the Turkish population is not necessarily an easy or quick task; “there is a wide chasm between a student being able to wear a veil for her bus-pass photo, and imam-hatipli AKP mayors in various municipalities publishing and distributing materials that propagate Islamist views.” There needs to be a continuous practice of national communication and regular reflections of Turkey’s values, principles, and identity, as well as some trial and error as the Turkish state encounters its shifting sociopolitical realities.

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463 Ozgur, Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey, 151.
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