The University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business
Center for Health Administration Studies (CHAS)
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WORKSHOP IN HEALTH ADMINISTRATION STUDIES

WINTER, 1989

MARK V. PAULY, PH.D.
Executive Director
Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics
University of Pennsylvania

"Demand for Long Term Care Insurance: Why People Don't Buy It"

WORKSHOP PAPER

for
Thursday, February 23, 1989
Social Sciences 401
1:30 to 3:20 p.m.
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1. Introduction

There is very little private insurance protection against the cost of long term care in the United States. Only about 2 percent of nursing home costs were covered by private insurance in 1986 (Division of National Cost Estimates, 1987). This is surprising, since annual LTC costs in a nursing home are estimated to be about $22,000 per year for adequate quality care (Task Force on Long Term Care, 1987), and can be higher, while the annual likelihood that an elderly person will be in a nursing home is relatively low, less than one in ten for all elderly, and still less than one in four above age 85 (Hing, 1987). In contrast, nearly 70 percent of the elderly have purchased Medigap insurance coverage, which provides protection against the deductibles and copayments in the public Medicare policy (Scheffler, 1989). The likelihood that some Medigap claims will be made in any year is high.

We seem to have here a familiar paradox in market insurance purchasing. The elderly fail to buy coverage against high loss, low probability events, and yet do seek coverage against high probability, low loss events—exactly the opposite of rational insurance purchasing. Are there rational reasons for this seeming irrationality?

It is not hard to understand the rationality of purchase of Medigap coverage. Medigap is subsidized, in effect, because its purchase, though triggering higher Medicare benefits, does not add to the Medicare premium the individual pays. Nor is it hard to understand why low income elderly do not purchase nursing home coverage. In all states the public Medicaid program
The Rational Non-Purchase of Long Term Care Insurance

ABSTRACT

Despite the high costs associated with long term care (LTC) (especially prolonged nursing home stays), and despite the uncertain nature of illnesses that prompt demand for such care, only a tiny fraction of the non-poor population currently purchases private insurance coverage against LTC costs. Even among those unlikely to become eligible for the means-tested Medicaid program, private purchase of coverage is rare.

Current studies, by economists and others, generally attribute the failure to purchase private coverage to "unawareness" by potential purchasers of the benefits of coverage, and a misperception that Medicare currently covers long term care. In this paper I explore alternative reasons for failure to purchase coverage by well-informed, expected utility-maximizing risk-averse individuals. I develop a model of lifetime expected utility maximization in which LTC is associated with a large increase in mortality, and in which family members represent an alternative resource of care for an impaired person. Building on the work of Kotlikoff and Spivak [1981] and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985], I show that there may be no demand for LTC insurance even if it is made available at actuarially fair premiums. The individual at risk may have a low demand for coverage for his or her own benefit because the main consequence of coverage is to enhance the expected value of one's estate. In the imperfect annuity model of Kotlikoff and Spivak, there may be no demand for insurance on the value of the estate. I also illustrate a set of intra-family relationships which may exacerbate the moral hazard associated with insurance coverage.

I then modify the model to consider the demand for coverage when a spouse survives, to deal with loading cost and adverse selection. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications.

REFERENCES


provides nursing home coverage once a family's wealth falls below a certain level. Any private insurance benefits must be used before Medicaid will pay. It is easy to see that Medicaid, as a comprehensive insurance policy with a deductible equal to one's wealth, provides a close substitute, at a zero price, for private insurance coverage for low wealth people.

What is most puzzling is why middle class elderly, who typically do have some wealth to protect and who are the most frequent purchasers of Medigap coverage, fail to buy LTC insurance, even when the chance they will spend down to Medicaid eligibility is low. One possible explanation is, of course, the phenomenon Kunreuther (1978) has noted in other insurance markets: a tendency to ignore low probability high loss events that have not occurred recently. However, this sort of behavior has not been so common in health insurance (Hershey, et al., 1984). In the extensive policy discussion of this issue which has occurred, the most common explanation is that the elderly are misinformed. A majority of the elderly, according to surveys, are under the mistaken impression that Medicare already provides long term nursing home coverage (AARP, 1985). And even those knowledgeable about the limitation of Medicare are alleged to lack awareness of the probable need for long term care services. Indeed, the report of the Federal Task Force on Long Term Health policies relies almost entirely on "lack of awareness" to explain what it terms "lack of demand" (Task Force on Long Term Care, 1987, p. 29). The comprehensive treatment by Davis and Rowland (1986), in addition to discussing "underestimation of need" by non-poor elderly, points to pricing problems, moral hazard, and adverse selection, but alleges that "the purchase of private insurance to protect against impoverishment in a nursing home would appeal to most people," though coverage in non-institutional settings is also desired. Finally, the HHS Technical Work Group on long term
care financing (1986) likewise attributes the small size of the current market for private insurance to the high cost of individual insurance and the emphasis on institutional care benefits, despite studies indicating that about a quarter of the elderly could "afford" insurance even at currently feasible premiums.

In this paper, I will argue that there are other potentially important impediments to private demand for LTC insurance, impediments which would exist even if the insurance were offered at fair premiums. Even without loading and adverse selection, these impediments could well lead to very low insurance purchases even in markets in which risk-averse buyers are rational and appropriately informed.

The explanation I offer is one which takes into account the special features of chronic illness insurance, and integrates it into a model of lifetime expected utility maximization. I show that the rational risk-averse individual may well choose to leave most if not all of his LTC expenses uncovered by insurance. Particularly if only conventional insurance which offers benefits based on contemporaneous medical care costs is offered, utility-maximizing behavior may well involve little or no insurance. This explanation does not depend on the existence of transactions costs, adverse selection, or inaccurate beliefs about the extent of Medicare coverage, which others have discussed (e.g., Friedman and Manheim, 1988). I further show that there are some special types of insurance contracts which might be saleable for LTC. But even in this case, I speculate that there are some intra-family interactions which may inhibit the purchase of coverage.

I do not imagine that even these explanations can fully explain why private LTC insurance is virtually nonexistent; they do permit LTC insurance to be rational in some circumstances. In addition to indicating what the
circumstances conducive to coverage are, the discussion shows that the market for LTC insurance for the elderly is likely to remain relatively small, though perhaps not so small as it is at present. I also consider briefly whether there is a rationale for public subsidization of LTC insurance, if the reasons for its current non-purchase are as I have outlined.

2. What Does LTC Insurance Protect?

We begin with a simple model of the illness process associated with chronic care. We assume that there are two types of illness, chronic and acute. Medical care does not itself yield utility. Moral hazard is ruled out, and it is assumed that there is a unique quantity which constitutes appropriate "nursing home" care in the event of chronic illness.

Conventional health insurance does not cover long term care for chronic illness. Instead, it covers medical expenses associated with acute illness. The individual who suffers an acute illness requires costly medical care; if this care is consumed, he has a high probability of recovering to normal functioning. The cost of acute illness can be viewed as a once-and-for-all reduction in the disposable income available for the future consumption the person truly values. Chronic illness, in contrast, is not cured. One way to represent its cost is to imagine that its main effect is to reduce the individual's capacity for normal functioning. In addition, data suggest that elderly people with illnesses who enter a nursing home have much lower life expectancies compared either to those who are not ill or those who have only acute illnesses, other things equal.

We first consider a simple case in which long term or chronic illness implies a fixed expenditure per year of $X, and from which there is no recovery or improvement. While the assumption of no improvement from a chronic illness is not strictly true, it is the case that less than 25
percent of the elderly admitted to nursing homes are discharged to their homes or families (Sekscenski, 1987). We may also reasonably assume that chronic illness implies a substantial reduction in life expectancy. For example, the annual mortality rate for 80 year-old women is about six percent overall, but was 27 to 30 percent among those who were candidates for formal long term care in a large-scale demonstration project which had the same average age (Applebaum, et al., 1988; U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 1986).

The person is assumed to be without a spouse, and to have some money wealth \( \bar{W} \) at the beginning of the planning period. We represent the expected lifetime utility function \( EU \) by

\[
EU = \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^h U(C_t) + \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^s \bar{U}^s
\]

where \( p_t^h \) is the probability of surviving to period \( t \) in the health state, \( C_t \) is dollars of consumption in period \( t \), \( p_t^s \) is the probability of surviving in the sick state, \( H \) is the maximum length of life, and \( \bar{U}^s \) is the utility level if one is sick with chronic illness and consuming \( \bar{X} \) worth of care per time period. In the sick state, all desired consumption is assumed to be furnished by the payment \( \bar{X} \).

If perfect insurance markets are available, the lifetime expected utility maximization problem (from \( t = 1 \) onwards) is to choose \( C_t \) in order to maximize \( EU \) subject to

\[
\bar{W} = \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^h \cdot C_t + \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^s \cdot X + \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^h \cdot \bar{X}
\]

1 It is estimated that approximately 84 percent of elderly nursing home residents are without spouses (Hing, 1987).
where $\bar{W}$ is initial wealth. The solution to this problem will be to use $\bar{W}$ to purchase an annuity, but an annuity which pays $S_X$ per time period if one is sick and $S C_t$ if one is well.

However, such perfect annuity markets do not exist. It is more realistic to analyze a case in which no annuities are available. Suppose that $\bar{W} \geq S \bar{X}$, where $S$ is the maximum number of periods the person will survive if sick; the individual initially has enough wealth to be able to pay his maximum long term care costs.\(^2\) We capture the notion that the person is unlikely to be eligible for Medicaid by assuming that $S \bar{X}$ is small relative to $\bar{W}$. The maximand remains the same, but the budget constraint then becomes:

$$\bar{W} \geq \sum_{t=1}^{H-S} C_t + S \bar{X}.$$ 

If the person does survive long enough so that his wealth in period $t$ falls to level at which the constraint $W_t > S \bar{X}$ is not satisfied (that is, if there is a possibility that nursing home expenses might exhaust one's wealth) and if the person will still consume $S \bar{X}$ per year when chronic illness strikes, both the bankruptcy laws and the Medicaid program operate to ensure that utility in the illness state does not slip below $U^S$.\(^3\) That is, if the individual will receive $S X$ of care no matter what, and if his estate cannot be negative, then, at worst, it is as if $W - S \bar{X} = 0$.

In this situation there will be no demand for nursing home insurance, even if it is offered on an actuarially fair basis. The reason is obvious: insurance premiums for coverage against $X$ in the initial (or any) period will reduce $C$. Coverage will only add to the bequest that would be left if the

\(^2\) In practice, $S$ would vary with age.

\(^3\) The Medicaid program pays for all nursing home care once the person has "spent down" wealth to approximately zero.
person dies after a chronic illness, if wealth in any period exceeds SX; in this model bequests offer no utility. This is so even if we assume that the person is risk averse and the occurrence of chronic illness is a random event. No insurance is bought because the marginal utility of an additional dollar in the (lifetime) chronic illness state has been defined to be zero. And if the person should survive so long that his wealth falls below the potential cost of nursing home care, any private insurance benefits would just substitute for Medicaid benefits, so there is again no reason to insure privately.

What if the model is modified so that bequests yield utility? If the individual obtains no utility from bequests, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) have shown that, with annuities unavailable, planned consumption declines with age, and the expected bequest is positive. Even with no utility from bequests, the individual's bequest will be relatively large at young ages, and then decline with age, equalling zero at age H.

Adding the possibility of utility from bequests does not necessarily change this conclusion. The simplest case is one in which there is zero marginal utility from bequests at the level of consumption that would be chosen in the absence of a bequest motive. Since bequests are positive in all periods but the last one, there can still be additions to total utility from the existence of such bequests (in the sense that positive bequests are preferred to zero bequests), but no desire to add to these bequests.

Even if the marginal utility of bequests in the "selfish" equilibrium is positive but small, there may be no demand for LTC insurance. The cost of adding $1 to one's estate after a long term illness and death is the

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\(^4\) This is in contrast to the case with perfect annuities available, in which bequests are zero.
sacrifice of $p^s$ in current consumption in the "well" state. Since the marginal utility of current consumption is surely positive, it is quite possible that $p^sU'(C^s)$ is greater than the marginal utility of an extra dollar of bequest at wealth level $\bar{W} - \bar{X}$ (for a one-period illness), or at other wealth levels associated with long nursing home stays.

What is true is that positive marginal utility from bequests will always alter the planned consumption stream out of wealth. The reason is straightforward: deferring a dollar's worth of spending to the next period provides both enhanced consumption opportunities next period if one survives and an increased estate if one does not survive. If the second benefit becomes positive, one will be induced to choose lower levels of current consumption in any time period but the last. However, even at this unselfish consumption pattern, there may still be no demand for LTC insurance since insurance (in contrast to saving) does not enhance future consumption opportunities in the health state.

If, in the absence of chronic illness, the desired bequest does exceed the actual bequest at some point over one's expected life, this point is more likely to occur in the distant future rather than in the near future. Hence, a threat to bequests from chronic illness, for someone who is buying coverage for chronic illness that starts in the next time period, is likely to be in the more distant future. But these are the time periods to which survival with chronic illness is unlikely. At a minimum, then, an optimal chronic insurance policy would carry a large deductible, even in the absence of loading costs, and would provide coverage only against the very rare coincidence of events that (a) the person lives "too long" and (b) he has a chronic illness. With loading costs to selling an insurance policy, there may well be little demand for such insurance. In effect, the gain to a risk-averse
person from buying coverage against long-term-care costs is less than the
gain from insuring an acute care expense of equal amount. Hence, even at a
modest loading, people may not be willing to buy LTC insurance. The greater
the utility from bequests, and the less sharply marginal utility from
bequests declines with age, the greater the demand for LTC insurance.

When will there be expected to be a demand for LTC insurance? If term
life insurance is available, and if individuals choose to buy such term
insurance, we can say that they ought surely also then be willing to buy LTC
insurance. If term insurance is purchased for the next time period, this
means that

\[ (1 - P_t + 1 - P_s t + 1) U_B' (W_t + 1) = U' (C_t) \]

where \( U_B' \) is the marginal utility of bequests. But since the estate following
a long term illness is less than \( W_{t+1} \) (e.g., it would be \( W_{t+1} - X \) for a one-
period illness), it follows that the marginal utility of an additional dollar
in the "costly terminal illness" state is greater than the marginal utility
of a dollar in the sudden death state. So purchase of life insurance ought
to be accompanied by purchase of LTC insurance, and (given equal loading),
that LTC insurance should provide full coverage. (It is, however, somewhat
logically inconsistent to admit life insurance to the model and yet continue
to assume no annuities, since buying term life insurance is really equivalent
to selling annuities [Yaari, 1965]).

In any event, the purchase of term life insurance by people over 65 is
also quite rare; it is estimated that only about two percent of elders
currently buy such insurance (personal communication, Life Insurance Market-
ing and Research Association, Inc.). It is true that death benefits are
available from whole life insurance, and that a larger fraction of the
elderly have such policies, often fully paid up. But it is probably more
reasonable to think of such policies as a way to accumulate savings, rather than as a way to provide death benefits.

Moreover, recent work by Hurd (1987) suggests that, at least at the margin, consumption of the elderly appears to be unaffected by a bequest motive. Wealth follows the declining life cycle pattern, and the elderly with children do not leave larger bequests than the elderly without children.

3. Variable Nursing Home Quality

Still another case in which there might be private demand for insurance occurs if the "quality" of nursing home care is variable, and if higher quality is demanded by people with higher wealth. Instead of $X$ being a fixed level of annual expenditure for a nursing stay, one might imagine that the desired level would be an increasing function of initial wealth, so that $X = X(W)$. The level of spending provided by Medicaid is fixed at $\bar{X}$.

Formally we can simply substitute $X$ for $\bar{X}$ in the maximand and the constraint of the previous problem, and solve for the optimal pattern of $C_t$ and $X_t$, both conditional on the state of health. In this case, however, as the person ages, there may be demand for insurance to finance the difference between $\bar{X}$ and $X$. Of course, providing insurance coverage which just pays for this amount, as a supplement to Medicaid, is not permitted by the Medicaid program. That program takes prior private insurance coverage into account before paying Medicaid benefits, and will in any case pay no more than $\bar{X}$. Consequently, the person who desires a greater level of $X$ must be prepared to forego any Medicaid benefits.

Insurance will be purchased if the expected utility level with insurance is greater than the expected utility level without insurance. Let us consider the effect on EU of buying insurance which will pay some amount
\[ X_H > \bar{X} \] in the last year of life \((t = H)\). The fair premium for such coverage would be \( p = p^s_H X_H \). The net expected money value of benefits is \( p^s_H (X_H - \bar{X}) \), since Medicaid would have paid \( \bar{X} \) in any case. The net change in EU from buying coverage is therefore \( p^s_H (U(X_H) - U(\bar{X}) - U'(C_H) p) \). Because of the Medicaid offset, the change in EU need not be positive. But it could be positive if \( X_H \) is large relative to \( \bar{X} \), or, more precisely, if the valuation of higher quality is large (relative to its cost). Long term care insurance will therefore be bought to protect against two risks; the risk of only being able to pay for care of low quality when sick, and the risk of consuming too little when healthy in order to save enough for long term care.

4. **Insurable Pre-Recovery Chronic Care Costs**

Almost by definition, recovery from chronic illness is unlikely and, as noted above, data suggest that individuals who receive formal care for such illnesses rarely leave the nursing home. For the one in five long term nursing home patients who does leave, the cause may be a transfer to family care, rather than an improvement in the patient’s condition. But suppose it is possible (though rare) that a long stay in a nursing home will be followed by recovery to the healthy state. How will this affect the demand for insurance coverage of long term care costs?

If insurance is of the conventional sort, paying benefits based on current expense levels, there may well still be no demand for insurance. Suppose that a person has a probability of recovery in period \( t \) of \( p^R_t \). The probability of being sick is, as before, \( p^s_t \). The risk-averse person would prefer paying \( (p^s_t \cdot p^R_t) \) per dollar of coverage to facing the risk of paying one dollar for nursing home costs and then recovering. That is, he would want to insure against cost in the case of the joint event of becoming sick and then recovering. However, the premium for nursing home insurance will be
the larger number $p_t^S$, if insurance is of the conventional type, paying costs as they are incurred, and not making payment conditional on recovery. If the insurance pays benefits conditional only on the occurrence of LTC expense, much of the benefit is wasted by being paid in a situation from which there was no recovery.

Then observations point toward the kind of insurance policy that would increase expected utility. The policy would be one which paid nursing home costs only if the person recovered. Such policies do not currently exist in the United States, so the failure of conventional coverage to be purchased is not surprising.

5. **LTC Insurance and Intra-family Bargaining**

There is another source of demand for chronic care insurance. As noted above, the major function of such insurance is to protect the estate the individual leaves. Even if the individual has no utility for bequests, the heirs presumably do. If the heirs are risk averse, one would expect them to purchase nursing home insurance for the elderly individual. For instance, one way to look at such insurance is as a supplement to life insurance to protect against the event that life insurance proceeds are consumed by paying unpaid nursing home bills; if the heirs expected to rely on life insurance, they might be expected to insure its payment. However, to develop this point further, we need a model of family behavior.

The analysis thus far has viewed the individual purchaser as purchasing insurance with regard only to his own behavior. A more general approach, as suggested by Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985], is to imagine that parents may be able to affect the behavior of their heirs by manipulating future bequests, and may wish to do so. The reason for wanting to affect behavior comes about because individuals are assumed to prefer, other things
equal, that certain actions be performed by family members rather than provided by commercial firms or hired strangers. Less formally, but realistically, parents prefer care from their children to care from others. This motivation might especially be thought to characterize care for chronic illness or increasing frailty. Other things equal, including the subjective or objective cost of care, most people would probably prefer to be cared for by their own family, in their own surroundings, rather than being moved to a nursing home or even to being attended by strangers in their own home. While one would realize that there will be some circumstances in which family-provided care is infeasible, one wishes those circumstances to be made rare.

Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers represent this idea by suggesting (in this context) parental and child (or heir) utility functions of the form

\[ U_P = U_P [C_P, A, M_P, U_K (C, A)] \]

for the parent, and

\[ U_K = U_K (C_K, A) \]

for the child, where

- \( C_P \) = parents' consumption
- \( A \) = "activity" or "attention" from children
- \( M_P \) = medical expenditure on parent
- \( U_K \) = child's utility function
- \( C_K \) = child's consumption

In this general model, parents manipulate bequests for heirs in order to affect the behavior of their children. If the elderly person were to remain

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5 Studies which showed the parents would prefer not to burden their children with caring for them do not contradict this assumption, since in those studies, the choice was always between free care from others and care by one's family with a high subjective cost.
fully able to manipulate potential bequests until death, he would do so in such a way as to bring forth his utility-maximizing level of A. In this model, "A" might represent family help in caring for a person with chronic illness. The unselfish parent would then use the bequest to motivate A, and would potentially buy insurance against at least some of the nursing home costs, costs which will be incurred when A is either too (subjectively) costly or too ineffective. However, there are probable features of chronic illness and LTC insurance which may limit this conclusion, and which call for a modification of the model.

The elderly person probably correctly anticipates that his power to manage or choose both his own consumption and his bequest levels will be limited once illness strikes. That is, a person too feeble to manage any semblance of household production may also be judged incapable of manipulating bequests. While one could write a clause in one's will to the effect that "if my children put me in a nursing home unnecessarily, they are disinherited," such a clause would be impossible to enforce. And second, there will be moral hazard associated with insurance coverage of formal LTC. That is, the presence of LTC coverage will encourage the children to initiate more formal (non-family-provided) LTC than would be the case without insurance. Without insurance, a dollar spent on nursing home care for a parent reduces bequests by a dollar, but if full insurance is available, there will be no user cost to the nursing home. A formal model of LTC insurance with moral hazard would be identical to other such models (Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970), except that the identity of the decisionmaker whose demand is effective will depend on the "state."

What this means is that the elderly individual who is still capable of deciding on his insurance coverage but whose children will control the level
of care should he become ill may have a higher expected utility with no
insurance on his LTC costs than with insurance. Figure 1 illustrates. Let
D_p be the parent's own demand for formal care (as a substitute for family-
provided care), and D_k the demand by the child for care for the parent. If
chronic debilitating illness of the parent does occur, the child's demand
curve fixes the level of M_p (and, by inference, the level of A), since the
child then controls the decision on type of care to be provided to the
parent. With no insurance, the child chooses the level of formal care Q_N^K
for the parent. Were there to be insurance coverage at, say, I^*, the parent
will receive instead formal care in the larger amount Q^*_K. Suppose that the
elderly person would prefer insurance coverage I^* if he could control the
level of care and receive Q^*_P. But since he will be forced to "overconsume"
formal care at Q^*_K, receive less child attention A than at Q^*_K, and pay the
additional premium for the insurance as well, he may well prefer no insur-
ance. That is, because he prefers to consume at Q_N^K than at Q^*_K, he is willing
to forego the risk reduction benefits of insurance coverage. This is so even
if the parent is risk-averse, and would buy insurance could he control the
levels of A and M_p. It could also happen even if the parent internalized any
risk aversion the child might have. Since the parent loses control when he
becomes ill, he may prefer that his children at least recognize that putting
him in a nursing home reduces their potential estate dollar-for-dollar.

These arguments explain why the elderly may not even permit their
children to buy insurance on their behalf. They also provide another
explanation as to why elderly with some concern for the children's welfare
may nevertheless be unwilling to buy coverage themselves. While they would
like to assure themselves that their children will have an adequate estate,
or that their children will not be subject to risk, they do not want to
MANIPULATING MORAL HAZARD

Figure 1
distort the incentives their children will face. Since we imagine that the
decision to purchase LTC insurance is made before the elderly person becomes
enfeebled, we imagine that strategic manipulation of bequests can be used to
prevent insurance purchasing by one’s children. Once chronic illness has
occurred, no insurer will sell insurance. In effect, the model is one in
which an elderly person can choose the incentives which confront his family
members, but not their actions.

A more complex case concerns the elderly person whose spouse survives.
In such a case, a nursing home stay is likely to reduce the real lifetime
consumption available out of a given income for the spouse if the total cost
of nursing home care exceeds the discounted value of the future reduction in
household expense associated with the death of the ill spouse. Impoverishing
one’s spouse, rather than one’s children, seems to be the major fear of many
married elderly.

The appropriate level of LTC insurance in the case in which one spouse
survives is much more difficult to specify, for two reasons.

First, the death of one spouse will affect both the income and the
consumption of the household. Income is affected because pension income is
often lost on the death of the spouse receiving the pension. Consumption is
affected as long as all household consumption is not fully joint. As
Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] have noted, the net effect of the death of a
spouse on the survivor’s consumption opportunities depends on a comparison of
the income that would have been received by the decedent with the consumption
the decedent would have experienced. At one extreme, if the death of the
spouse does not affect income at all (because all provision for retirement
consumption comes from wealth), then the death of one spouse will increase
the consumption opportunities for the survivor. Adding LTC costs makes death
more costly, but the net effect of a death, even one accompanied by LTC costs, can be to increase the consumable wealth expected by the survivor if the LTC costs are less than the present value of the future consumption had the person survived. In such a setting, neither life insurance nor LTC insurance would be worthwhile unless and until LTC costs mount so high as to reduce the survivor’s wealth. At the other extreme, if a sizeable portion of income stops on the death of a spouse, but if most consumption is joint, there will be a sizeable demand for LTC insurance.

These arguments nevertheless suggest in general a large deductible in any LTC policy. Suppose, for simplicity, that there are no joint costs ("local public goods") in the household, and that consumption expense is divided equally. Then the deductible in a LTC policy which maintained the consumption opportunities of the surviving spouse would be a deductible equal to half of wealth. If, in contrast, the income of the household came from a pension which ceases on the death of one spouse, coverage should be greater.

The second complexity arises because care for a chronically ill person can also be furnished by the spouse rather than in a nursing home. Provision of such care surely represents a reduction in the real consumption the spouse experiences. But it may be the case that the implicit cost of quality-adjusted spouse-provided care is less than the cost of market-purchased nursing home care. Moral hazard may nevertheless lead to a substitution of the latter for the former; the ideal arrangement would be to make a cash payment equal to the subjective opportunity cost of spouse provided services conditional upon the occurrence of chronic illness, and regardless of which type of care is actually used. (This assumes that the marginal utility of money for the healthy spouse is not reduced by the occurrence of illness for the partner.) However, such a strategy may not be feasible for an insurer.
Desired bequests will be nevertheless more likely to exceed actual "selfish" bequests when a spouse is present than when no spouse is present, so one would expect a stronger demand for LTC insurance in such cases.

6. Public Policy Toward LTC in the United States

From this viewpoint we can also examine in a preliminary way the proposals that have been made to alter long term care financing in the U.S. Otis Bowen and Thomas Burke [1985], for example, proposed that a tax-shielded "Individual Medical Account" (IMA) should be created. In one version, part of the funds deposited in this account would be available (with interest) for one's own nursing home costs, and part would be pooled with the contributions of others in a kind of LTC insurance. The model is that of the Individual Retirement Account (IRA), but with funds earmarked for long term medical care.

The fundamental question is whether a private decision to avoid LTC insurance because the value of the dollars in the "sick state" is low, or because of intra-family moral hazard, ought to be overridden by a tax subsidy. If the market for annuities remains imperfect, such a subsidy does not necessarily improve welfare. Of course, if the tax subsidy (or any other intervention) could reduce the administrative cost of insurance, it could be worthwhile. Indeed, improving the market for annuities might be the most important first step in encouraging a market for LTC insurance. But in the current situation, subsidies to the non-poor may well not be justified. In a similar vein, improving the ability to define and measure the circumstances which can trigger nursing home benefits, and thus avoid intrafamily moral hazard, is likely to be more efficient than subsidizing current insurance products.
These conclusions must be tentative because, as in virtually any other second best situation, unequivocal theoretical conclusions are difficult to obtain. If LTC insurance can be structured as an annuity-substitute, provision of such coverage can improve welfare, in part by reducing the need for unintended bequests. This rationale would apply more strongly to the (relatively unlikely) "recovery from chronic illness" situation. A subsidized or tax-funded pay-as-you-go LTC insurance might, in such a case, have depressing effects on savings just as may pay-as-you-go Social Security. The main benefit of more extensive LTC insurance, public or private, would be the benefit obtained by risk-averse heirs from reducing the risk attached to the inheritance they will receive. This gain has not been identified in the LTC insurance debate as a matter of serious public concern. There is a case for subsidizing coverage which reduces the likelihood of Medicaid spending, which I have discussed elsewhere (Pauly, 1988). But for the non-poor elderly this paper discusses, who are exactly the elderly whose behavior would be most affected by tax subsidies, the Medicaid savings are probably small.

The demand for LTC insurance will be greatest among those who already purchase (term) life insurance. The non-elderly (who are nevertheless at some risk for nursing home care), and those whose death would deprive a surviving spouse of significant income, would seem to be the major candidates for coverage. Widows and widowers, even those who can "afford" coverage (in the sense of having income sufficient to cover premiums) will probably remain reluctant to purchase.

7. Conclusion

The models in this paper help to explain why a rational person who is not poor might, nevertheless, choose not to buy conventional insurance against nursing home care costs. Such coverage serves primarily to protect bequests.
which, with imperfect annuities, are likely to be excessive in any case. And coverage makes it too easy for children to substitute formal care provided by others for the informal care rendered by the children which the parent prefers.

There may therefore be good reasons why people, especially non-poor people, do not buy LTC insurance. The mere absence of coverage does not necessarily imply the existence of a problem of market failure requiring government intervention.
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ECONOMIC & LEGAL ORGANIZATION WORKSHOP
WORKSHOP IN HEALTH ADMINISTRATION STUDIES

THE RATIONAL NON-PURCHASE OF LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE

Mark V. Pauly
University of Pennsylvania

Thursday, February 23, 1989
1:30-3:20 p.m.
Social Science 401
THE RATIONAL NON-PURCHASE
OF LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE

Mark V. Pauly

1. Introduction

There is very little private insurance protection against the cost of long term care in the United States. Only about 2 percent of nursing home costs were covered by private insurance in 1986 (Division of National Cost Estimates, 1987). This is surprising, since annual LTC costs in a nursing home are estimated to be about $22,000 per year for adequate quality care (Task Force on Long Term Care, 1987), and can be higher, while the annual likelihood that an elderly person will be in a nursing home is relatively low, less than one in ten for all elderly, and still less than one in four above age 85 (Hing, 1987). In contrast, nearly 70 percent of the elderly have purchased Medigap insurance coverage, which provides protection against the deductibles and copayments in the public Medicare policy (Scheffler, 1989). The likelihood that some Medigap claims will be made in any year is high.

We seem to have here a familiar paradox in market insurance purchasing. The elderly fail to buy coverage against high loss, low probability events, and yet do seek coverage against high probability, low loss events--exactly the opposite of rational insurance purchasing. Are there rational reasons for this seeming irrationality?

It is not hard to understand the rationality of purchase of Medigap coverage. Medigap is subsidized, in effect, because its purchase, though triggering higher Medicare benefits, does not add to the Medicare premium the individual pays. Nor is it hard to understand why low income elderly do not purchase nursing home coverage. In all states the public Medicaid program
The Rational Non-Purchase of Long Term Care Insurance

ABSTRACT

Despite the high costs associated with long term care (LTC) (especially prolonged nursing home stays), and despite the uncertain nature of illnesses that prompt demand for such care, only a tiny fraction of the non-poor population currently purchases private insurance coverage against LTC costs. Even among those unlikely to become eligible for the means-tested Medicaid program, private purchase of coverage is rare.

Current studies, by economists and others, generally attribute the failure to purchase private coverage to "unawareness" by potential purchasers of the benefits of coverage, and a misperception that Medicare currently covers long term care. In this paper I explore alternative reasons for failure to purchase coverage by well-informed, expected utility-maximizing risk-averse individuals. I develop a model of lifetime expected utility maximization in which LTC is associated with a large increase in mortality, and in which family members represent an alternative resource of care for an impaired person. Building on the work of Kotlikoff and Spivak [1981] and Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers [1985], I show that there may be no demand for LTC insurance even if it is made available at actuarially fair premiums. The individual at risk may have a low demand for coverage for his or her own benefit because the main consequence of coverage is to enhance the expected value of one's estate. In the imperfect annuity model of Kotlikoff and Spivak, there may be no demand for insurance on the value of the estate. I also illustrate a set of intra-family relationships which may exacerbate the moral hazard associated with insurance coverage.

I then modify the model to consider the demand for coverage when a spouse survives, to deal with loading cost and adverse selection. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications.

REFERENCES


provides nursing home coverage once a family's wealth falls below a certain level. Any private insurance benefits must be used before Medicaid will pay. It is easy to see that Medicaid, as a comprehensive insurance policy with a deductible equal to one's wealth, provides a close substitute, at a zero price, for private insurance coverage for low wealth people.

What is most puzzling is why middle class elderly, who typically do have some wealth to protect and who are the most frequent purchasers of Medigap coverage, fail to buy LTC insurance, even when the chance they will spend down to Medicaid eligibility is low. One possible explanation is, of course, the phenomenon Kunreuther (1978) has noted in other insurance markets: a tendency to ignore low probability high loss events that have not occurred recently. However, this sort of behavior has not been so common in health insurance (Hershey, et al., 1984). In the extensive policy discussion of this issue which has occurred, the most common explanation is that the elderly are misinformed. A majority of the elderly, according to surveys, are under the mistaken impression that Medicare already provides long term nursing home coverage (AARP, 1985). And even those knowledgeable about the limitation of Medicare are alleged to lack awareness of the probable need for long term care services. Indeed, the report of the Federal Task Force on Long Term Health policies relies almost entirely on "lack of awareness" to explain what it terms "lack of demand" (Task Force on Long Term Care, 1987, p. 29). The comprehensive treatment by Davis and Rowland (1986), in addition to discussing "underestimation of need" by non-poor elderly, points to pricing problems, moral hazard, and adverse selection, but alleges that "the purchase of private insurance to protect against impoverishment in a nursing home would appeal to most people," though coverage in non-institutional settings is also desired. Finally, the HHS Technical Work Group on long term
care financing (1986) likewise attributes the small size of the current
market for private insurance to the high cost of individual insurance and the
emphasis on institutional care benefits, despite studies indicating that
about a quarter of the elderly could "afford" insurance even at currently
feasible premiums.

In this paper, I will argue that there are other potentially important
impediments to private demand for LTC insurance, impediments which would
exist even if the insurance were offered at fair premiums. Even without
loading and adverse selection, these impediments could well lead to very low
insurance purchases even in markets in which risk-averse buyers are rational
and appropriately informed.

The explanation I offer is one which takes into account the special
features of chronic illness insurance, and integrates it into a model of
lifetime expected utility maximization. I show that the rational risk-averse
individual may well choose to leave most if not all of his LTC expenses
uncovered by insurance. Particularly if only conventional insurance which
offers benefits based on contemporaneous medical care costs is offered,
utility-maximizing behavior may well involve little or no insurance. This
explanation does not depend on the existence of transactions costs, adverse
selection, or inaccurate beliefs about the extent of Medicare coverage, which
others have discussed (e.g., Friedman and Manheim, 1988). I further show
that there are some special types of insurance contracts which might be
saleable for LTC. But even in this case, I speculate that there are some
intra-family interactions which may inhibit the purchase of coverage.

I do not imagine that even these explanations can fully explain why
private LTC insurance is virtually nonexistent; they do permit LTC insurance
to be rational in some circumstances. In addition to indicating what the
circumstances conducive to coverage are, the discussion shows that the market for LTC insurance for the elderly is likely to remain relatively small, though perhaps not so small as it is at present. I also consider briefly whether there is a rationale for public subsidization of LTC insurance, if the reasons for its current non-purchase are as I have outlined.

2. What Does LTC Insurance Protect?

We begin with a simple model of the illness process associated with chronic care. We assume that there are two types of illness, chronic and acute. Medical care does not itself yield utility. Moral hazard is ruled out, and it is assumed that there is a unique quantity which constitutes appropriate "nursing home" care in the event of chronic illness.

Conventional health insurance does not cover long term care for chronic illness. Instead, it covers medical expenses associated with acute illness. The individual who suffers an acute illness requires costly medical care; if this care is consumed, he has a high probability of recovering to normal functioning. The cost of acute illness can be viewed as a once-and-for-all reduction in the disposable income available for the future consumption the person truly values. Chronic illness, in contrast, is not cured. One way to represent its cost is to imagine that its main effect is to reduce the individual's capacity for normal functioning. In addition, data suggest that elderly people with illnesses who enter a nursing home have much lower life expectancies compared either to those who are not ill or those who have only acute illnesses, other things equal.

We first consider a simple case in which long term or chronic illness implies a fixed expenditure per year of $X, and from which there is no recovery or improvement. While the assumption of no improvement from a chronic illness is not strictly true, it is the case that less than 25
percent of the elderly admitted to nursing homes are discharged to their homes or families (Sekscenski, 1987). We may also reasonably assume that chronic illness implies a substantial reduction in life expectancy. For example, the annual mortality rate for 80 year-old women is about six percent overall, but was 27 to 30 percent among those who were candidates for formal long term care in a large-scale demonstration project which had the same average age (Applebaum, et al., 1988; U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 1986).

The person is assumed to be without a spouse, and to have some money wealth $\bar{W}$ at the beginning of the planning period. We represent the expected lifetime utility function $EU$ by

$$EU = \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^h U(C_t) + \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^s \bar{U}^s$$

where $p_t^h$ is the probability of surviving to period $t$ in the health state, $C_t$ is dollars of consumption in period $t$, $p_t^s$ is the probability of surviving in the sick state, $H$ is the maximum length of life, and $\bar{U}^s$ is the utility level if one is sick with chronic illness and consuming $\bar{X}$ worth of care per time period. In the sick state, all desired consumption is assumed to be furnished by the payment $\bar{X}$.

If perfect insurance markets are available, the lifetime expected utility maximization problem (from $t = 1$ onwards) is to choose $C_t$ in order to maximize $EU$ subject to

$$\bar{W} = \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^h \cdot C_t + \sum_{t=1}^{H} p_t^s \cdot \bar{X}$$

1 It is estimated that approximately 84 percent of elderly nursing home residents are without spouses (Hing, 1987).
where $\bar{W}$ is initial wealth. The solution to this problem will be to use $\bar{W}$ to purchase an annuity, but an annuity which pays $SX$ per time period if one is sick and $SC_t$ if one is well.

However, such perfect annuity markets do not exist. It is more realistic to analyze a case in which no annuities are available. Suppose that $\bar{W} \geq S \bar{X}$, where $S$ is the maximum number of periods the person will survive if sick; the individual initially has enough wealth to be able to pay his maximum long term care costs. We capture the notion that the person is unlikely to be eligible for Medicaid by assuming that $S\bar{X}$ is small relative to $\bar{W}$. The maximand remains the same, but the budget constraint then becomes:

$$\bar{W} \geq \sum_{t=1}^{H-S} C_t + S\bar{X}.$$ 

If the person does survive long enough so that his wealth in period $t$ falls to level at which the constraint $\bar{W}_t > S\bar{X}$ is not satisfied (that is, if there is a possibility that nursing home expenses might exhaust one's wealth) and if the person will still consume $S\bar{X}$ per year when chronic illness strikes, both the bankruptcy laws and the Medicaid program operate to ensure that utility in the illness state does not slip below $U^S$. That is, if the individual will receive $S\bar{X}$ of care no matter what, and if his estate cannot be negative, then, at worst, it is as if $W - S\bar{X} = 0$.

In this situation there will be no demand for nursing home insurance, even if it is offered on an actuarially fair basis. The reason is obvious: insurance premiums for coverage against $X$ in the initial (or any) period will reduce $C$. Coverage will only add to the bequest that would be left if the

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2 In practice, $S$ would vary with age.

3 The Medicaid program pays for all nursing home care once the person has "spent down" wealth to approximately zero.
person dies after a chronic illness, if wealth in any period exceeds SX; in this model bequests offer no utility. This is so even if we assume that the person is risk averse and the occurrence of chronic illness is a random event. No insurance is bought because the marginal utility of an additional dollar in the (lifetime) chronic illness state has been defined to be zero. And if the person should survive so long that his wealth falls below the potential cost of nursing home care, any private insurance benefits would just substitute for Medicaid benefits, so there is again no reason to insure privately.

What if the model is modified so that bequests yield utility? If the individual obtains no utility from bequests, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) have shown that, with annuities unavailable, planned consumption declines with age, and the expected bequest is positive. Even with no utility from bequests, the individual's bequest will be relatively large at young ages, and then decline with age, equalling zero at age H.

Adding the possibility of utility from bequests does not necessarily change this conclusion. The simplest case is one in which there is zero marginal utility from bequests at the level of consumption that would be chosen in the absence of a bequest motive. Since bequests are positive in all periods but the last one, there can still be additions to total utility from the existence of such bequests (in the sense that positive bequests are preferred to zero bequests), but no desire to add to these bequests.

Even if the marginal utility of bequests in the "selfish" equilibrium is positive but small, there may be no demand for LTC insurance. The cost of adding $1 to one's estate after a long term illness and death is the

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4 This is in contrast to the case with perfect annuities available, in which bequests are zero.
sacrifice of $p^s$ in current consumption in the "well" state. Since the marginal utility of current consumption is surely positive, it is quite possible that $p^sU'(c_t)$ is greater than the marginal utility of an extra dollar of bequest at wealth level $\bar{W} - \bar{X}$ (for a one-period illness), or at other wealth levels associated with long nursing home stays.

What is true is that positive marginal utility from bequests will always alter the planned consumption stream out of wealth. The reason is straightforward: deferring a dollar's worth of spending to the next period provides both enhanced consumption opportunities next period if one survives and an increased estate if one does not survive. If the second benefit becomes positive, one will be induced to choose lower levels of current consumption in any time period but the last. However, even at this unselfish consumption pattern, there may still be no demand for LTC insurance since insurance (in contrast to saving) does not enhance future consumption opportunities in the health state.

If, in the absence of chronic illness, the desired bequest does exceed the actual bequest at some point over one's expected life, this point is more likely to occur in the distant future rather than in the near future. Hence, a threat to bequests from chronic illness, for someone who is buying coverage for chronic illness that starts in the next time period, is likely to be in the more distant future. But these are the time periods to which survival with chronic illness is unlikely. At a minimum, then, an optimal chronic insurance policy would carry a large deductible, even in the absence of loading costs, and would provide coverage only against the very rare coincidence of events that (a) the person lives "too long" and (b) he has a chronic illness. With loading costs to selling an insurance policy, there may well be little demand for such insurance. In effect, the gain to a risk-averse
person from buying coverage against long-term-care costs is less than the

gain from insuring an acute care expense of equal amount. Hence, even at a
modest loading, people may not be willing to buy LTC insurance. The greater
the utility from bequests, and the less sharply marginal utility from
bequests declines with age, the greater the demand for LTC insurance.

When will there be expected to be a demand for LTC insurance? If term
life insurance is available, and if individuals choose to buy such term
insurance, we can say that they ought surely also then be willing to buy LTC
insurance. If term insurance is purchased for the next time period, this
means that

\[(1-P^{h}_{t+1} - P^{s}_{t+1}) U'_B (W_{t+1}) = U'_t (C_t)\]

where \(U'_B\) is the marginal utility of bequests. But since the estate following
a long term illness is less than \(W_{t+1}\) (e.g., it would be \(W_{t+1} - X\) for a one-
period illness), it follows that the marginal utility of an additional dollar
in the "costly terminal illness" state is greater than the marginal utility
of a dollar in the sudden death state. So purchase of life insurance ought
to be accompanied by purchase of LTC insurance, and (given equal loading),
that LTC insurance should provide full coverage. (It is, however, somewhat
logically inconsistent to admit life insurance to the model and yet continue
to assume no annuities, since buying term life insurance is really equivalent
to selling annuities [Yaari, 1965]).

In any event, the purchase of term life insurance by people over 65 is
also quite rare; it is estimated that only about two percent of elders
currently buy such insurance (personal communication, Life Insurance Market-
ing and Research Association, Inc.). It is true that death benefits are
available from whole life insurance, and that a larger fraction of the
elderly have such policies, often fully paid up. But it is probably more
reasonable to think of such policies as a way to accumulate savings, rather than as a way to provide death benefits.

Moreover, recent work by Hurd (1987) suggests that, at least at the margin, consumption of the elderly appears to be unaffected by a bequest motive. Wealth follows the declining life cycle pattern, and the elderly with children do not leave larger bequests than the elderly without children.

3. **Variable Nursing Home Quality**

Still another case in which there might be private demand for insurance occurs if the "quality" of nursing home care is variable, and if higher quality is demanded by people with higher wealth. Instead of $X$ being a fixed level of annual expenditure for a nursing stay, one might imagine that the desired level would be an increasing function of initial wealth, so that $X = X(W)$. The level of spending provided by Medicaid is fixed at $\bar{X}$.

Formally we can simply substitute $X$ for $\bar{X}$ in the maximand and the constraint of the previous problem, and solve for the optimal pattern of $C_t$ and $X_t$, both conditional on the state of health. In this case, however, as the person ages, there may be demand for insurance to finance the difference between $\bar{X}$ and $X$. Of course, providing insurance coverage which just pays for this amount, as a supplement to Medicaid, is not permitted by the Medicaid program. That program takes prior private insurance coverage into account before paying Medicaid benefits, and will in any case pay no more than $\bar{X}$. Consequently, the person who desires a greater level of $X$ must be prepared to forego any Medicaid benefits.

Insurance will be purchased if the expected utility level with insurance is greater than the expected utility level without insurance. Let us consider the effect on $EU$ of buying insurance which will pay some amount
$X_H > \bar{X}$ in the last year of life ($t = H$). The fair premium for such coverage would be $P = p_{H}^s X_H$. The net expected money value of benefits is $p_{H}^s (X_H - \bar{X})$, since Medicaid would have paid $\bar{X}$ in any case. The net change in EU from buying coverage is therefore $p_{H}^s (U(X_H) - U(\bar{X}) - U'(C_H) P)$. Because of the Medicaid offset, the change in EU need not be positive. But it could be positive if $X_H$ is large relative to $\bar{X}$, or, more precisely, if the valuation of higher quality is large (relative to its cost). Long term care insurance will therefore be bought to protect against two risks; the risk of only being able to pay for care of low quality when sick, and the risk of consuming too little when healthy in order to save enough for long term care.

4. **Insurable Pre-Recovery Chronic Care Costs**

Almost by definition, recovery from chronic illness is unlikely and, as noted above, data suggest that individuals who receive formal care for such illnesses rarely leave the nursing home. For the one in five long term nursing home patients who does leave, the cause may be a transfer to family care, rather than an improvement in the patient’s condition. But suppose it is possible (though rare) that a long stay in a nursing home will be followed by recovery to the healthy state. How will this affect the demand for insurance coverage of long term care costs?

If insurance is of the conventional sort, paying benefits based on current expense levels, there may well still be no demand for insurance. Suppose that a person has a probability of recovery in period $t$ of $p_t^R$. The probability of being sick is, as before, $p_t^s$. The risk-averse person would prefer paying $(p_t^s \cdot p_t^R)$ per dollar of coverage to facing the risk of paying one dollar for nursing home costs and then recovering. That is, he would want to insure against cost in the case of the joint event of becoming sick and then recovering. However, the premium for nursing home insurance will be
the larger number $p_t^S$, if insurance is of the conventional type, paying costs as they are incurred, and not making payment conditional on recovery. If the insurance pays benefits conditional only on the occurrence of LTC expense, much of the benefit is wasted by being paid in a situation from which there was no recovery.

Then observations point toward the kind of insurance policy that would increase expected utility. The policy would be one which paid nursing home costs only if the person recovered. Such policies do not currently exist in the United States, so the failure of conventional coverage to be purchased is not surprising.

5. **LTC Insurance and Intra-family Bargaining**

There is another source of demand for chronic care insurance. As noted above, the major function of such insurance is to protect the estate the individual leaves. Even if the individual has no utility for bequests, the heirs presumably do. If the heirs are risk averse, one would expect them to purchase nursing home insurance for the elderly individual. For instance, one way to look at such insurance is as a supplement to life insurance to protect against the event that life insurance proceeds are consumed by paying unpaid nursing home bills; if the heirs expected to rely on life insurance, they might be expected to insure its payment. However, to develop this point further, we need a model of family behavior.

The analysis thus far has viewed the individual purchaser as purchasing insurance with regard only to his own behavior. A more general approach, as suggested by Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985], is to imagine that parents may be able to affect the behavior of their heirs by manipulating future bequests, and may wish to do so. The reason for wanting to affect behavior comes about because individuals are assumed to prefer, other things
equal, that certain actions be performed by family members rather than provided by commercial firms or hired strangers. Less formally, but realistically, parents prefer care from their children to care from others. This motivation might especially be thought to characterize care for chronic illness or increasing frailty. Other things equal, including the subjective or objective cost of care, most people would probably prefer to be cared for by their own family, in their own surroundings, rather than being moved to a nursing home or even to being attended by strangers in their own home.  

While one would realize that there will be some circumstances in which family-provided care is infeasible, one wishes those circumstances to be made rare.

Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers represent this idea by suggesting (in this context) parental and child (or heir) utility functions of the form

\[ U_P = U_P [C_P, A, M_P, U_K (C, A)] \]

for the parent, and

\[ U_K = U_K (C_K, A) \]

for the child, where

- \( C_P \) = parents’ consumption
- \( A \) = "activity" or "attention" from children
- \( M_P \) = medical expenditure on parent
- \( U_K \) = child’s utility function
- \( C_K \) = child’s consumption

In this general model, parents manipulate bequests for heirs in order to affect the behavior of their children. If the elderly person were to remain

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5Studies which showed the parents would prefer not to burden their children with caring for them do not contradict this assumption, since in those studies, the choice was always between free care from others and care by one’s family with a high subjective cost.
fully able to manipulate potential bequests until death, he would do so in such a way as to bring forth his utility-maximizing level of A. In this model, "A" might represent family help in caring for a person with chronic illness. The unselfish parent would then use the bequest to motivate A, and would potentially buy insurance against at least some of the nursing home costs, costs which will be incurred when A is either too (subjectively) costly or too ineffective. However, there are probable features of chronic illness and LTC insurance which may limit this conclusion, and which call for a modification of the model.

The elderly person probably correctly anticipates that his power to manage or choose both his own consumption and his bequest levels will be limited once illness strikes. That is, a person too feeble to manage any semblance of household production may also be judged incapable of manipulating bequests. While one could write a clause in one's will to the effect that "if my children put me in a nursing home unnecessarily, they are disinherited," such a clause would be impossible to enforce. And second, there will be moral hazard associated with insurance coverage of formal LTC. That is, the presence of LTC coverage will encourage the children to initiate more formal (non-family-provided) LTC than would be the case without insurance. Without insurance, a dollar spent on nursing home care for a parent reduces bequests by a dollar, but if full insurance is available, there will be no user cost to the nursing home. A formal model of LTC insurance with moral hazard would be identical to other such models (Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970), except that the identity of the decisionmaker whose demand is effective will depend on the "state."

What this means is that the elderly individual who is still capable of deciding on his insurance coverage but whose children will control the level
of care should he become ill may have a higher expected utility with no insurance on his LTC costs than with insurance. Figure 1 illustrates. Let $D_p$ be the parent’s own demand for formal care (as a substitute for family-provided care), and $D_K$ the demand by the child for care for the parent. If chronic debilitating illness of the parent does occur, the child’s demand curve fixes the level of $M_p$ (and, by inference, the level of $A$), since the child then controls the decision on type of care to be provided to the parent. With no insurance, the child chooses the level of formal care $Q^K_N$ for the parent. Were there to be insurance coverage at, say, $I^*$, the parent will receive instead formal care in the larger amount $Q^K_\star$. Suppose that the elderly person would prefer insurance coverage $I^*$ if he could control the level of care and receive $Q^P_\star$. But since he will be forced to "overconsume" formal care at $Q^K_\star$, receive less child attention $A$ than at $Q^P_\star$, and pay the additional premium for the insurance as well, he may well prefer no insurance. That is, because he prefers to consume at $Q^K_N$ than at $Q^K_\star$, he is willing to forego the risk reduction benefits of insurance coverage. This is so even if the parent is risk-averse, and would buy insurance could he control the levels of $A$ and $M_p$. It could also happen even if the parent internalized any risk aversion the child might have. Since the parent loses control when he becomes ill, he may prefer that his children at least recognize that putting him in a nursing home reduces their potential estate dollar-for-dollar.

These arguments explain why the elderly may not even permit their children to buy insurance on their behalf. They also provide another explanation as to why elderly with some concern for the children’s welfare may nevertheless be unwilling to buy coverage themselves. While they would like to assure themselves that their children will have an adequate estate, or that their children will not be subject to risk, they do not want to
MANIPULATING MORAL HAZARD
distort the incentives their children will face. Since we imagine that the
decision to purchase LTC insurance is made before the elderly person becomes
enfeebled, we imagine that strategic manipulation of bequests can be used to
prevent insurance purchasing by one's children. Once chronic illness has
occurred, no insurer will sell insurance. In effect, the model is one in
which an elderly person can choose the incentives which confront his family
members, but not their actions.

A more complex case concerns the elderly person whose spouse survives.
In such a case, a nursing home stay is likely to reduce the real lifetime
consumption available out of a given income for the spouse if the total cost
of nursing home care exceeds the discounted value of the future reduction in
household expense associated with the death of the ill spouse. Impoverishing
one's spouse, rather than one's children, seems to be the major fear of many
married elderly.

The appropriate level of LTC insurance in the case in which one spouse
survives is much more difficult to specify, for two reasons.

First, the death of one spouse will affect both the income and the
consumption of the household. Income is affected because pension income is
often lost on the death of the spouse receiving the pension. Consumption is
affected as long as all household consumption is not fully joint. As
Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] have noted, the net effect of the death of a
spouse on the survivor's consumption opportunities depends on a comparison of
the income that would have been received by the decedent with the consumption
the decedent would have experienced. At one extreme, if the death of the
spouse does not affect income at all (because all provision for retirement
consumption comes from wealth), then the death of one spouse will increase
the consumption opportunities for the survivor. Adding LTC costs makes death
more costly, but the net effect of a death, even one accompanied by LTC costs, can be to increase the consumable wealth expected by the survivor if the LTC costs are less than the present value of the future consumption had the person survived. In such a setting, neither life insurance nor LTC insurance would be worthwhile unless and until LTC costs mount so high as to reduce the survivor's wealth. At the other extreme, if a sizeable portion of income stops on the death of a spouse, but if most consumption is joint, there will be a sizeable demand for LTC insurance.

These arguments nevertheless suggest in general a large deductible in any LTC policy. Suppose, for simplicity, that there are no joint costs ("local public goods") in the household, and that consumption expense is divided equally. Then the deductible in a LTC policy which maintained the consumption opportunities of the surviving spouse would be a deductible equal to half of wealth. If, in contrast, the income of the household came from a pension which ceases on the death of one spouse, coverage should be greater.

The second complexity arises because care for a chronically ill person can also be furnished by the spouse rather than in a nursing home. Provision of such care surely represents a reduction in the real consumption the spouse experiences. But it may be the case that the implicit cost of quality-adjusted spouse-provided care is less than the cost of market-purchased nursing home care. Moral hazard may nevertheless lead to a substitution of the latter for the former; the ideal arrangement would be to make a cash payment equal to the subjective opportunity cost of spouse provided services conditional upon the occurrence of chronic illness, and regardless of which type of care is actually used. (This assumes that the marginal utility of money for the healthy spouse is not reduced by the occurrence of illness for the partner.) However, such a strategy may not be feasible for an insurer.
Desired bequests will be nevertheless more likely to exceed actual "selfish" bequests when a spouse is present than when no spouse is present, so one would expect a stronger demand for LTC insurance in such cases.

6. **Public Policy Toward LTC in the United States**

From this viewpoint we can also examine in a preliminary way the proposals that have been made to alter long term care financing in the U.S. Otis Bowen and Thomas Burke [1985], for example, proposed that a tax-shielded "Individual Medical Account" (IMA) should be created. In one version, part of the funds deposited in this account would be available (with interest) for one’s own nursing home costs, and part would be pooled with the contributions of others in a kind of LTC insurance. The model is that of the Individual Retirement Account (IRA), but with funds earmarked for long term medical care.

The fundamental question is whether a private decision to avoid LTC insurance because the value of the dollars in the "sick state" is low, or because of intra-family moral hazard, ought to be overridden by a tax subsidy. If the market for annuities remains imperfect, such a subsidy does not necessarily improve welfare. Of course, if the tax subsidy (or any other intervention) could reduce the administrative cost of insurance, it could be worthwhile. Indeed, improving the market for annuities might be the most important first step in encouraging a market for LTC insurance. But in the current situation, subsidies to the non-poor may well not be justified. In a similar vein, improving the ability to define and measure the circumstances which can trigger nursing home benefits, and thus avoid intrafamily moral hazard, is likely to be more efficient than subsidizing current insurance products.
These conclusions must be tentative because, as in virtually any other second best situation, unequivocal theoretical conclusions are difficult to obtain. If LTC insurance can be structured as an annuity-substitute, provision of such coverage can improve welfare, in part by reducing the need for unintended bequests. This rationale would apply more strongly to the (relatively unlikely) "recovery from chronic illness" situation. A subsidized or tax-funded pay-as-you-go LTC insurance might, in such a case, have depressing effects on savings just as may pay-as-you-go Social Security. The main benefit of more extensive LTC insurance, public or private, would be the benefit obtained by risk-averse heirs from reducing the risk attached to the inheritance they will receive. This gain has not been identified in the LTC insurance debate as a matter of serious public concern. There is a case for subsidizing coverage which reduces the likelihood of Medicaid spending, which I have discussed elsewhere (Pauly, 1988). But for the non-poor elderly this paper discusses, who are exactly the elderly whose behavior would be most affected by tax subsidies, the Medicaid savings are probably small.

The demand for LTC insurance will be greatest among those who already purchase (term) life insurance. The non-elderly (who are nevertheless at some risk for nursing home care), and those whose death would deprive a surviving spouse of significant income, would seem to be the major candidates for coverage. Widows and widowers, even those who can "afford" coverage (in the sense of having income sufficient to cover premiums) will probably remain reluctant to purchase.

7. Conclusion

The models in this paper help to explain why a rational person who is not poor might, nevertheless, choose not to buy conventional insurance against nursing home care costs. Such coverage serves primarily to protect bequests.
which, with imperfect annuities, are likely to be excessive in any case. And coverage makes it too easy for children to substitute formal care provided by others for the informal care rendered by the children which the parent prefers.

There may therefore be good reasons why people, especially non-poor people, do not buy LTC insurance. The mere absence of coverage does not necessarily imply the existence of a problem of market failure requiring government intervention.
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