Critique of practical reason
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good may be the whole object of a pure practical reason, that is, of a pure
will, it is not on that account to be taken as its determining ground, and the
moral law alone must be viewed as the ground for making the highest
good and its realization or promotion the object. This reminder is impor-
tant in so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, where
even the slightest misinterpretation corrupts dispositions. For, it will have
been seen from the Analytic that if one assumes any object under the
name of a good as a determining ground of the will prior to the moral law
and then derives from it the supreme practical principle, this would always
produce heteronomy and supplant the moral principle.

It is, however, evident that if the moral law is already included as
supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the highest good is
then not merely object: the concept of it and the representation of its
existence as possible by our practical reason are at the same time the
determining ground of the pure will because in that case the moral law,
already included and thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact
determines the will in accordance with the principle of autonomy. This
order of concepts of the determination of the will must not be lost sight of,
since otherwise we misunderstand ourselves and believe that we are con-
tradicting ourselves even where everything stands together in the most
perfect harmony.

Chapter II

On the dialectic of pure reason in determining
the concept of the highest good

The concept of the highest already contains an ambiguity* that, if not
attended to, can occasion needless disputes. The highest can mean either
the supreme (supremum) or the complete (consummatum). The first is that
condition which is itself unconditioned, that is, not subordinate to any
other (originarium); the second is that whole which is not part of a still
greater whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). That virtue (as worthiness
to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever can even seem to us
desirable and hence of all our pursuit of happiness and that it is therefore
the supreme good has been proved in the Analytic. But it is not yet, on that
account, the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire
of rational finite beings; for this, happiness is also required, and that not
merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself an end but even
in the judgment of an impartial reason, which regards a person in the
world generally as an end in itself. For, to need happiness, to be also

* Zweideutigkeit

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worthy of it, and yet not to participate in it cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being that would at the same time have all power, even if we think of such a being only for the sake of the experiment. Now, inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person, and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the highest good of a possible world, the latter means the whole, the complete good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no further condition above it, whereas happiness is something that, though always pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good but always presupposes morally lawful conduct as its condition.

Two determinations necessarily combined in one concept must be connected as ground and consequent, and so connected that this unity is considered either as analytic (logical connection) or as synthetic (real connection), the former in accordance with the law of identity, the latter in accordance with the law of causality. The connection of virtue with happiness can therefore be understood in one of two ways: either the endeavor to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not two different actions but quite identical, in which case no maxim need be made the ground of the former other than that which serves for the latter; or else that connection is found in virtue's producing happiness as something different from the consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect.

Of the ancient Greek schools there were, strictly speaking, only two, which in determining the concept of the highest good followed one and the same method insofar as they did not let virtue and happiness hold as two different elements of the highest good and consequently sought the unity of the principle in accordance with the rule of identity; but they differed, in turn, in their choice of which of the two was to be the fundamental concept. The Epicurean said: to be conscious of one's maxim leading to happiness is virtue; the Stoic said: to be conscious of one's virtue is happiness. For the first, prudence was equivalent to morality; for the second, who chose a higher designation for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom.

One must regret that the acuteness of these men (whom one must, nevertheless, admire for having in such early times already tried all conceivable paths of philosophic conquest) was unfortunately applied in searching out identity between extremely heterogeneous concepts, that of happiness and that of virtue. But it was in keeping with the dialectical spirit of their times, which sometimes misleads subtle minds even now, to suppress essential and irreconcilable differences in principle by trying to change them into disputes about words and so to devise a specious unity of concept under merely different names; and this usually occurs in cases where the unification of heterogeneous grounds lies so deep or so high, or
would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines assumed in
the rest of the philosophic system, that they are afraid to penetrate deeply
into the real difference and prefer to treat it as a diversity merely in
formulae.

While both schools tried to search out the sameness of the practical
principles of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to how they
would force this identity but separated infinitely from each other inasmuch
as one put its principle on the aesthetic side and the other on the
logical side, the former in consciousness of sensible need, the other in the
independence of practical reason from all sensible determining grounds.
According to the Epicurean the concept of virtue was already present in
the maxim of promoting one’s own happiness; according to the Stoic, on
the other hand, the feeling of happiness was already contained in con-
sciousness of one’s virtue. What is contained in another concept, however,
is indeed identical with a part of the concept containing it but not identical
with the whole, and two wholes can, moreover, be specifically different
from each other although they consist of the same material, if, namely,
the two parts are combined into a whole in quite different ways. The Stoic
maintained that virtue is the whole highest good, and happiness only the
consciousness of this possession as belonging to the state of the subject.
The Epicurean maintained that happiness is the whole highest good, and
virtue only the form of the maxim for seeking to obtain it, namely, the
rational use of means to it.

Now, it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of
one’s own happiness are quite heterogeneous with respect to their supreme
practical principle; and, even though they belong to one highest good, so as
to make it possible, yet they are so far from coinciding that they greatly
restrict and infringe upon each other in the same subject. Thus the ques-
tion, how is the highest good practically possible? still remains an unsolved
problem despite all the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made.
The Analytic has, however, shown what it is that makes the problem diffi-
cult to solve, namely that happiness and morality are two specifically quite
different elements of the highest good and that, accordingly, their combina-
tion cannot be cognized analytically (as if someone who seeks his own
happiness should find, by mere resolution of his concepts, that in so acting
he is virtuous, or as if someone who follows virtue should in the conscious-
ness of such conduct find that he is already happy ipso facto); it must instead
be a synthesis of concepts. But because this combination is cognized as a
priori – thus as practically necessary and not as derived from experience –

* ästhetischen . . . Seite, i.e., on the side of feeling. See The Metaphysics of Morals (6:399–
403:471).  
† Stoffe  
‡ Auflösung
and because the possibility of the highest good therefore does not rest on any empirical principles, it follows that the deduction of this concept must be transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary to produce the highest good through the freedom of the will: the condition of its possibility must therefore rest solely on a priori grounds of cognition.

I.

THE ANTINOMY OF PRACTICAL REASON

In the highest good which is practical for us, that is, to be made real through our will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by pure practical reason without the other also belonging to it. Now, this combination is (like every other) either analytic or synthetic. Since, as has already been shown, the given combination cannot be analytic, it must be thought synthetically and, indeed, as the connection of cause and effect, because it concerns a practical good, that is, one that is possible through action. Consequently, either the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is absolutely impossible because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims that put the determining ground of the will in the desire for one’s happiness are not moral at all and can be the ground of no virtue. But the second is also impossible because any practical connection of causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will but upon knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical ability to use them for one’s purposes; consequently, no necessary connection of happiness with virtue in the world, adequate to the highest good, can be expected from the most meticulous observance of moral laws. Now, since the promotion of the highest good, which contains this connection in its concept, is an a priori necessary object of our will and inseparably bound up with the moral law, the impossibility of the first must also prove the falsity of the second. If, therefore, the highest good is impossible in accordance with practical rules, then the moral law, which commands us to promote it, must be fantastic and directed to empty imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false.

II.

CRITICAL RESOLUTION\(^d\) OF THE ANTINOMY OF PRACTICAL REASON

In the antinomy of pure speculative reason there is a similar conflict between natural necessity and freedom in the causality of events in the world. It was resolved by showing that there is no true conflict if the

\(^d\) Aufhebung
events and even the world in which they occur are regarded (and they should also be so regarded) merely as appearances; for, one and the same acting being as appearance (even to his own inner sense) has a causality in the world of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature, but with respect to the same event, insofar as the acting person regards himself at the same time as noumenon (as pure intelligence, in his existence that cannot be temporally determined), he can contain a determining ground of that causality in accordance with laws of nature which is itself free from all laws of nature.

It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical reason. The first of the two propositions, that the endeavor after happiness produces a ground for a virtuous disposition, is absolutely false; but the second, that a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness, is false not absolutely but only insofar as this disposition is regarded as the form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently false only if I assume existence in the sensible world to be the only kind of existence of a rational being; it is thus only conditionally false. But since I am not only warranted in thinking of my existence also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding but even have in the moral law a purely intellectual determining ground of my causality (in the sensible world), it is not possible that morality of disposition should have a connection, and indeed a necessary connection, as cause with happiness as effect in the sensible world, if not immediately yet mediately (by means of an intelligible author of nature), a connection which, in a nature that is merely an object of the senses, can never occur except contingently and cannot suffice for the highest good.

Thus, despite this seeming conflict of a practical reason with itself, the highest good is the necessary highest end of a morally determined will and is a true object of that will; for it is practically possible, and the maxims of such a will, which refer to it as regards their matter, have objective reality, which at first was threatened by that antinomy in the combination of morality with happiness in accordance with a universal law, but only from a misinterpretation, because the relation between appearances was held to be a relation of things in themselves to those appearances.

When we find ourselves compelled to go so far, namely to the connection with an intelligible world, to seek the possibility of the highest good which reason points out to all rational beings as the goal of all their moral wishes, it must seem strange that philosophers both of ancient and modern times could nevertheless have found happiness in precise proportion to virtue already in this life (in the sensible world), or persuaded themselves that they were conscious of it. For, Epicurus as well as the Stoics extolled above all the happiness that arises from consciousness of living

*einen . . . Zusammenhang . . . habe
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virtuously; and the former was not so base in his practical precepts as one might infer from the principles of his theory, which he used for explanation and not for action, or as they were interpreted by many who were misled by his use of the expression “pleasure” for “contentment”; on the contrary, he reckoned the most disinterested practice of the good among the ways of enjoying the most intimate delight and included in his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant a constantly cheerful heart) such moderation and control of the inclinations as the strictest moral philosopher might require; his chief divergence from the Stoics consisted only in his placing the motive in this pleasure, which they quite rightly refused to do. For, on the one hand, the virtuous Epicurus – like many morally well-disposed men of this day who nevertheless do not reflect deeply enough on their principles – fell into the error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons for whom he wanted first of all to provide the incentive to virtue (and in fact an upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his uprightness; for, with such a disposition, the censure that his own cast of mind would force him to bring against himself in case of a transgression, and his moral self-condemnation would deprive him of all enjoyment of the agreeableness that his state might otherwise contain). But the question is, how is such a disposition and cast of mind in estimating the worth of one’s existence possible in the first place, since prior to this no feeling at all for moral worth as such would be found in the subject? If a human being is virtuous he will certainly not enjoy life unless he is conscious of his uprightness in every action, however fortune may favor him in the physical state of life; but in order to make him virtuous in the first place, and so before he esteems the moral worth of his existence so highly, can one commend to him the peace of mind that would arise from consciousness of an uprightness for which he as yet has no sense?

But on the other hand, there is always present here the ground of an error of subreption (vitium subreptionis) and, as it were, of an optical illusion in the self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one feels – an illusion that even the most practiced cannot altogether avoid. The moral disposition is necessarily connected with consciousness of the determination of the will directly by the law. Now, consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always the ground of a satisfaction in the action produced by it; but this pleasure, this satisfaction with oneself, is not the determining ground of the action: instead, the determi-

\textsuperscript{1} Wollust
\textsuperscript{2} Vorfriedenheit. See Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (4:393 note v) and The Metaphysics of Morals (6:375).
\textsuperscript{3} mit zu den Genüßarten der innigste Freude
\textsuperscript{4} Vergnügen
\textsuperscript{5} Compare The Metaphysics of Morals (6:485)
\textsuperscript{6} Wohlgefällens
nation of the will directly by reason alone is the ground of the feeling of
pleasure, and this remains a pure practical, not aesthetic, determination of
the faculty of desire. Now, since this determination has exactly the same
inward effect, that of an impulse to activity, as a feeling of the agreeableness
expected from the desired action would have produced, we easily
look upon what we ourselves do as something that we merely passively feel
and take the moral incentive for a sensible impulse, just as always happens
in so-called illusion of the senses (in this case, inner sense). It is some-
thing very sublime in human nature to be determined to actions directly
by a pure rational law, and even the illusion that takes the subjective side
of this intellectual determinability of the will as something aesthetic and
the effect of a special sensible feeling (for an intellectual feeling would be
a contradiction) is sublime. It is also of great importance to take notice of
this property of our personality and to cultivate as much as possible the
effect of reason on this feeling. But one must also be on guard against
demeaning and deforming the real and genuine incentive, the law itself—
as it were, by means of a false foil—by such spurious praise of the moral
determining ground as incentive as would base it on feelings of particular
joys (which are nevertheless only results). Respect, and not the gratifica-
tion or enjoyment of happiness, is thus something for which there can be
no feeling antecedent to reason and underlying it (for this would always be
aesthetic and pathological): respect as consciousness of direct necessita-
tion of the will by the law is hardly an analogue of the feeling of pleasure,
although in relation to the faculty of desire it does the same thing but from
different sources; only by this way of representing things, however, can
one attain what one seeks, namely that actions be done not merely in
conformity with duty (as a result of pleasant feelings) but from duty, which
must be the true end of all moral cultivation.

Have we not, however, a word that does not denote enjoyment, as the
word happiness does, but that nevertheless indicates a satisfaction with
one’s existence, an analogue of happiness that must necessarily accom-
pany consciousness of virtue? Yes! This word is contentment with oneself,\(^1\)
which in its strict meaning always designates only a negative satisfaction
with one’s existence, in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Free-
don, and the consciousness of freedom as an ability to follow the moral
law with an unyielding disposition, is independence from the inclinations, at
least as motives determining (even if not as affecting) our desire, and so far
as I am conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the
sole source of an unchangeable contentment, necessarily combined with it
and resting on no special feeling, and this can be called intellectual con-
tentment. Aesthetic contentment (improperly so called), which rests on
satisfaction of the inclinations, however refined they may be made out to

\(^1\) Selbtszufriedenheit
be, can never be adequate to what is thought about contentment. For the inclinations change, grow with the indulgence one allows them, and always leave behind a still greater void than one had thought to fill. Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them. Even an inclination to what conforms with duty (e.g., to beneficence) can indeed greatly facilitate the effectiveness of moral maxims but cannot produce any. For in these everything must be directed to the representation of the law as determining ground if the action is to contain not merely legality but also morality. Inclination is blind and servile, whether it is kindly or not; and when morality is in question, reason must not play the part of mere guardian to inclination but, disregarding it altogether, must attend solely to its own interest as pure practical reason. Even this feeling of compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes consideration of what is duty and becomes the determining ground, is itself burdensome to right-thinking persons, brings their considered maxims into confusion, and produces the wish to be freed from them and subject to lawgiving reason alone.

From this we can understand how consciousness of this ability of a pure practical reason (virtue) can in fact produce consciousness of mastery over one’s inclinations, hence of independence from them and so too from the discontent that always accompanies them, and thus can produce a negative satisfaction with one’s state, that is, contentment, which in its source is contentment with one’s person. Freedom itself becomes in this way (namely indirectly) capable of an enjoyment, which cannot be called happiness because it does not depend upon the positive concurrence of a feeling; nor is it, strictly speaking, beatitude, since it does not include complete independence from inclinations and needs; but it nevertheless resembles the latter, at least insofar as one’s determination of one’s will can be held free from their influence and so, at least in its origin, it is analogous to the self-sufficiency that can be ascribed only to the supreme being.

From this resolution of the antinomy of practical pure reason it follows that in practical principles a natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and the expectation of a happiness proportionate to it as its result can at least be thought as possible (though certainly not, on this account, cognized and understood); that, on the other hand, principles of the pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce morality;

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\* wie das Bewußtsein dieses Vermögens . . . durch Tat (die Tugend); perhaps “how consciousness of this ability of a pure practical reason through a deed (virtue).” According to The Metaphysics of Morals (6:394), virtue is a Vermögen. Although it would be inaccurate to call virtue a deed (see 6:224), this sentence allows that construal. Compare AK 5:3 note b, and 5:98, note b.
\* einsehen
that, accordingly, the *supreme* good (as the first condition of the highest good) is morality, whereas happiness constitutes its second element but in such a way that it is only the morally conditioned yet necessary result of the former. Only with this subordination is the *highest good* the whole object of pure practical reason, which must necessarily represent it as possible since it commands us to contribute everything possible to its production. But since the possibility of such a connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to the supersensible relation of things and cannot be given in accordance with the laws of the sensible world, although the practical results of this idea — namely actions that aim at realizing the highest good — belong to the sensible world, we shall try to set forth the grounds of that possibility, first with respect to what is immediately within our power and then, secondly, in that which is not in our power but which reason presents to us, as the supplement to our inability, for the possibility of the highest good (which is necessary in accordance with practical principles).

III.

**ON THE PRIMACY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON IN ITS CONNECTION WITH SPECULATIVE REASON**

By primacy among two or more things connected by reason I understand the prerogative of one to be the first determining ground of the connection with all the rest. In a narrower practical sense it signifies the prerogative of the interest of one insofar as the interest of the others is subordinated to it (and it cannot be inferior to any other). To every faculty of the mind one can attribute an *interest*, that is, a principle that contains the condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own. The interest of its speculative use consists in the *cognition* of the object up to the highest a priori principles; that of its practical use consists in the determination of the *will* with respect to the final and complete end. That which is required for the possibility of any use of reason as such, namely, that its principles and affirmations must not contradict one another, constitutes no part of its interest but is instead the condition of having reason at all; only its extension, not mere consistency with itself, is reckoned as its interest.

If practical reason may not assume and think as given anything further than what *speculative* reason of itself could offer it from its insight, the latter has primacy. Supposing, however, that practical reason has of itself original a priori principles with which certain theoretical positions are inseparably connected, while these are withdrawn from any possible insight of speculative reason (although they must not contradict it): then the