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Dear Reader,

I cannot pretend that we create each issue with a theme in mind—quite frankly, we don’t receive nearly enough submissions to give us such a degree of flexibility. At the same time, however, a theme often emerges post hoc from the best papers of the bunch, and as those are usually the ones we publish this can be a godsend for an Editor-in-Chief looking for things to include in their introductory letter for the issue.

The seven papers in this Fall 2018 issue seem to me to share a theme of conversation, response, and reaction. They all investigate questions of how people and institutions interpreted their worlds—through what they read, by their reactions to political events, etc.—and expressed those interpretations. The summaries presented below therefore highlight this feature. But I would like to stress that each is an interesting article in its own right, and deserves a more thorough valuation on its own merits.

Phoebe Colby’s “Burn, Baby, Burn: The Inflammatory Historiography of the Sir George Williams Affair and its Current Rekindling” analyzes the reporting and subsequent historical treatment of a major student occupation of the namesake Montreal university—which, she argues, has served and continues to serve as a microcosm for the larger historical discussion of the composition and role of the black community in Montreal.

Countering the traditional view that the Puritan colonies in New England were essentially ignored by their mother country, Boone Ayala examines transatlantic communications and descriptions of the colonies to show that their viability as societal models and potential as military allies heartened Puritans seeking reform back in England and helped spark the English Civil Wars.

The AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and ’90s elicited an ineffectual and at times rather negative response both from the US government and American society in general. Max Gruber analyzes the artistic effort to draw attention to the epidemic in his “Revealing the Invisible: The Visual Culture of AIDS in the United States (1980-1986),” examining artwork produced by individuals, collaborative works produced by organized effort, and the visual culture of protest during the period.

Public response is also the subject of Jake Harms’s contribution, which uses the records of the Mass Observation Project as a guide to the diversity of popular attitudes towards the monarchy at the time of Edward VIII’s abdication. While the standard account of the monarchy’s popularization largely holds true, Harms argues, it does so at the risk of overlooking the pluralistic nature of public opinion.

Hilary Miller investigates the multilayered reaction of the Israeli government to the assassination of Folke Bernadotte, the U.N.-appointed mediator of the Israel-Palestine dispute, arguing that the government outwardly condemned the attack but also tacitly approved of a terror attack which provided an opportunity to fulfill crucial political goals and shore up the security of the recently-founded state.

Necdet Emre Kurultay looks at the influence of Che Guevara and Daniel Cohn-Bendit on the revolutionary strategy of the Turkish Marxist Mahir Çayan. Although Çayan’s writings only explicitly cite Marx and Lenin as sources of revolutionary inspiration, Kurultay demonstrates that he also drew on the Marxist thought of contemporaries around the world, placing the clashes between the Turkish government and student activists of the 1960s in a global framework.

Holly Bean’s analysis of a Middle English Psalter-Hours in the Lilly Library gives particular attention to its unexplained profusion of numerical and astrological tables which, she argues, ultimately derive from the late fourteenth-century Kalendariu of John Somer. The inclusion of these tables in a primarily devotional book raises a number of questions, chief of which is the relationship between secular and medieval texts in late medieval England.

This issue would not, of course, exist without the efforts of our editorial staff, and I would like to thank them all for their hard work. Special thanks are due to Breck Radulovic, who in addition to her editorial duties designed this issue as well as Spring 2018. I hope you enjoy reading it.

Sam Winikow
January 2019
On January 29th, 1969, over 400 students occupied the computer room at Sir George Williams University (SGWU), now called Concordia University, in a continued protest regarding the academic treatment of six West Indian students. Two weeks later, the city of Montreal’s newly-formed riot squad arrested ninety-seven of these students as the Computer Center went up in flames. A biology professor, Perry Anderson, was accused of discriminating against six black students after giving them lower grades than their white peers without just cause. 1 Those six students filed complaints in April 1968, and over the following eight months the student body witnessed a barrage of cancelled hearing committees, stalled decisions, and failed negotiations. Eventually, the University’s administration suspended professor Perry Anderson and formed a hearing committee consisting of five professors: two white, two black and one of “East Indian descent.” 2 However, after a confrontation with students, administrators later removed the two black professors from the committee on suspicions of bias inhibiting fair judgement. 3

From April 1968 until the events that took place on the morning of February 11th, local news sources referred to the conflict by as the “Anderson Affair.” 4 On January 29th, 1969, a final hearing between the complainants and University faculty lagged and failed to produce solutions. After months of faculty inaction and apparent intransigence, this final failure to heed the complainants’ demands catalysed protest: students rallied to the original complainant Kennedy Fredericks’s cry to occupy the nearby computer center, located on the ninth floor of the newly opened Hall building. 5 Twelve days later, on February 11th, a negotiated settlement between the University administration and faculty fell through and the newly-formed riot squad was dispatched to clear the protestors. Over the next few hours the situation would escalate as students barricaded themselves within the computer centre, threw thousands of computer punched cards out the windows, and finally evacuated as fire mysteriously broke out behind the barricades. While the exact cause of the fire was never determined, the fire destroyed Computer Center and its machinery and total damages were later estimated at two million dollars. As students escaped the blaze, they were met by anxious observers, verbally violent counter-protestors, police and paddy wagons. 6 The months-long “Anderson Affair” became the infamous “Sir George Williams Affair” that morning, and the nation exploded with reports of the events, the damages, and the arrests of ninety-seven of the “student radicals.” Perry Anderson, the accused and suspended professor, was reinstated the following day and court hearings continued for months as many students were refused bail and “foreign” students’ immigration papers were back-checked for error and fraud. 7

The names invoked in definition of the 1969 events at SGWU range from “affair” and “incident” to “protest” and even “riot,” reflecting the copious conflicts in memory, presentation, and representation of events emergent in its historiography over the past 45 years. This paper will encompass the majority of the Sir George Williams Affair’s historiography, focusing on publications with entire sections or chapters devoted to the subject (of which there are relatively few) as well as an examination of its place, or lack thereof, in the popular “Canadian” historiography.
cal canon. The historiography of the Sir George Williams Affair depicts the nexus of activism, both academic and grassroots, which influenced and produced the events of 1969; the historiography becomes presciently reflective of this nexus at a very early stage, applying methodological frameworks beyond “radicalism” and “student protest.” While the historiography of the SGWU Affair is not large, it provides a specific historical axis around which the ideologies and actors of 1960s Montreal swirl, depicting their current ripples into our contemporary context.

A McGill Daily article titled “SGWU hit by Police” was one of the earliest reports to have been published on the events of February 11th, 1969. Released the same day as the breakup of the computer centre occupation, the article details the Sir George Williams Affair in medias res, before it had garnered any historical title or the monikers “affair,” “riot” and “incident.” This article, printed and released before the breakup of the computer room occupation by the police, documents briefly the catalyst for action: “teachers… failed to ratify a proposed agreement between the administration and the occupiers which would have de-escalated the crisis.” Both the placement of blame upon the failed ratification and the categorization of the event as a “crisis” focalize the intensity and damage of the “riot” rather than the preceding events or “the Anderson Affair.” This article also documents the five specific demands made by protesters and the expected opposition from administration, faculty and their respective lawyers. The Daily cites discontent “over the capitulation from students and the Anderson suspension” as the reason for the faculty’s surprising rejection of the proposed agreement.

The article’s byline reads: “Principal Clarke calls police in after students barricade 5 floors of Hall building.” Included above the text is a picture of students, one with their right fist held aloft, and a caption contextualizing the length and location of occupation: “computer centre being held for two weeks and the faculty club for one.” Significantly, the article states “[a]t 6 am today, Station 10 reported no arrests in the Sir George occupation.” Its immediate release appears to have predated any knowledge of over 90 arrests that would eventually take place. However, by February 12th, 1969, the news had shifted drastically to encompass the new developments including the escalation of student and police confrontation with both verbal and physical violence.

A Globe and Mail article published the next day by reporter Clair Balfour states that “[r]acial feelings were not all below the surface. Many of the students outside were indignant at the occupation. Most were white.” Ti- titled “Students Destroy Computer,” the article focuses on the destruction of property and descriptions of the actions taken by police, documenting the arrests on the scene: “... militant students at Sir George Williams University in downtown Montreal yesterday destroyed the university’s $1.4 million main computer and set fire to the data centre before running, choking, through smoke into the arms of waiting police.” The language used to describe the students and the damages wrought depicts the escalation from the previous Daily report. Words like “militant” and “radical” are now attached to the students rather than the Daily’s “occupier” and “protest.” The demands outlined in the Daily are no longer present in Balfour’s account; instead, she lists the criminal charges and their maximum penalties. These two articles, both published within forty-eight hours of the “Sir George Williams Affair” preface the historiography by delineating key elements ascribed to the events and the speed of their escalation from “student protest” and “occupation” to “militancy” and “property destruction.” Placed side by side, the articles depict the explosion of tensions that radiated from February 1969 into the national and international consciousness, through SGWU’s historiography, and into Montreal’s contemporary context.

The previous paragraph shows how quickly reports escalated as the Anderson Affair flamed up into the Sir George Williams Affair. As the change in name sug-
gests, the burning of the computer centre and subsequent arrests caught the eye of the nation and the news travelled through international tracts by way of West Indian participants, other activists, and official news networks. One such publication (now defunct) was Chronicle, a New York based journal on “Politics in the World of Science and Learning.” Written in 1969, several months after the incendiary incident at Sir George Williams, a Chronicle article situates SGWU’s Computer Center occupation in a global schema of student protest documenting riots, insurrections, and demonstrations in Prague, Paris, and Ghana. Alongside SGWU’s computer centre occupation, the “Canada” section includes descriptions of student protests at McGill University and the University of Ottawa that took place that same year. After “Canada” comes a section titled “Czechoslovakia” and then the last and longest section “Ghana: the Siren Affair” which details the progression of a 1968 student protest held at the University of Ghana. In doing so, this article initiated a historiographical shift towards international solidarity at an early stage, bringing the events at SGWU into context with student-led actions across the world. The article even stage, bringing the events at SGWU into context with a transcribed interview, or may in fact be used to reflect the author’s own opinions or observations. Lacking a firm interpretive or methodological framework, Eber’s account reads as just that: Eber’s personal, albeit methodical, rendition and transcription of newspaper articles, courtroom proceedings, and personally observed events.

Dennis Forsythe’s incendiary anthology Let the Niggers Burn! The Sir George Williams Affair and its Caribbean Aftermath marks the first, and perhaps most decisive shift in the historiography of SGWU’s 1969 computer centre occupation - from the reporting and documentation of events to an explicit and intentional mandate of historical interpretation. Three years after the events at Sir George Williams, the book’s contributors engaged in the production of historical narratives of the Affair itself, its causal structure, and global effects. “This book is not meant to be an apology for what happened,” Dennis Forsythe, editor, states in the book’s preface, “[i]t is rather the Black manifesto which focuses on the Sir George Affair, showing its wider relevance both in Canada and the West Indies…” Forsythe is forthright with the “underlying framework” of the book, which places the Sir George Williams Affair in the context of a 400-year-history, tracing various economic and cultural contributions to the events of early 1969. All six contributors (Delisle Worrell, Rawle R. Frederick, Bertram Boldon, Roosevelt Williams, LeRoi Butcher, Carl Lumumba) were West Indian scholars, as was Dennis Forsythe himself. Like the Chronicle article

20 Eber, 208.
22 Forsythe, 4.
before it, Forsythe and contributors placed the events at SGWU in their global context, but rather than the Chronicle’s organizing framework of “student protest,” Let the Niggers Burn! used Black Power and Pan-Africanism. The events at SGWU in 1969 are referred to as the “incident” or “confrontation at Sir George,” although Forsythe also mentions the “Anderson Affair” in relation to preceding events. The events have become historical in conception; the naming of the event, the explicit analytical and methodological approaches stated in the preface render Let the Niggers Burn! as not only a history of the Affair but an early analysis—or intervention—of its historiography. This book is also the first to have made a direct commentary on the documentation (or historiography) of the SGWU Affair, typified in Forsythe’s confrontation of Dorothy Eber’s The Computer Centre Party on the very first page of the preface. Forsythe calls attention to Eber’s “narrow” focus of events: “thus this ‘honest’ attempt at reporting becomes distortion by omission.” The critique of the Affair’s documentation introduces this volume as a near-corrective work and an analysis of the Affair “written by Blacks, to record the case as we see it.” By rooting the Affair in the “Black struggle,” its broader Atlantic context and the history of Blacks in Montreal, this group of Black writers and intellectuals made their own interpretative analysis visible, laying out an alternate explanation and interpretation of the events at SGWU.

Rather than an Atlantic-centred exposition of black ideologies, the scope of Dorothy Williams’s book The Road to Now: A History of Blacks in Montreal instead covers the city’s black population, including major communities and events, from 1628 through the 1970s in incisive detail, enormous scope, and chronological order. Blacks in Montreal 1628-1986: An Urban Demography, Williams’s first book, makes brief mention of the SGWU Affair in relation to West Indian immigration, which increased in 1967, and the social gap between newly immigrated West Indian population and “Black Canadians.” Developed from a research commission documenting Black demographics in Montreal, The Road to Now builds upon this observation, dedicating the entirety of chapter seven to the Affair itself. “The Sir George Williams Affair” recounts the happenings that took place in winter of 1969 and various reactions from communities and community members in the contentious aftermath. This work reflects Williams’s prior research on inter-community relations within the “Black community” of Montreal, which she found to be in the midst of large demographic shifts by the late 1960s. In the first paragraph, Williams posits the Affair as evidence of a “new consciousness of race that emerged in Montreal’s black organizations in the late sixties.”

In her previous chapter “The Domestic Scheme (1955-1965),” Williams traces post-war population shifts and the formation of communities such as the Union United Church and the Negro Community Centre (NCC). Since the turn of the century, community organizations like these had worked to provide affordable education, extracurriculars, as well as financial and interpersonal support for generations of black children and families. New immigration policies led to an increase in the West Indian population of Montreal, especially among student bodies. Williams chronicled groups such as the National Black Coalition of Canada (NBCC), which had emerged in the 1960s to challenge traditional Garveyism and Caribbean-centered “going-home” rhetoric. In 1964, the NBCC held multiple debates at McGill University to discuss other waves of thought and activism such as the “American Black Power Movement.”

For Williams, this influx of West Indian immigration and its new energy of collaborative activism, combined with the fact that Montreal was historically a destination for black “Loyalists, Fugitives, and Refugees,” provided the groundwork for the events at Sir George Williams in 1968 and 1969. The account and analysis

23 Forsythe, 165-191.
24 Forsythe, 3.
25 Forsythe, 107.
28 Williams, The Road to Now, 118-138.
29 Williams, Blacks in Montreal, 66-68.
30 Williams, The Road to Now, 118.
31 Williams, The Road to Now, 101.
32 Williams, The Road to Now, 118-19.
33 Williams, The Road to Now, 13. The word “migrating” is used purposefully here as many of the routes black people came to be in Montreal did not adhere to the restrictive and changeable legal methods.
Colby

Williams provided focused less on reactions and interpretations of specific individuals (as seen with Eber and Forsythe, and later with Mina Shum and David Austin) and more on common responses and opinions of major community organizations described in earlier chapters (UNIA, NCC, and Union United Church). In the final paragraphs of chapter seven, Williams laid out concrete “positives” and “negatives” stemming from the “Sir George Williams Affair.”

The primary negative function (and this term calls to mind Dennis Forsythe’s “negative history,” i.e., a history of racism), Williams stated, was the proliferation of fear within black communities after the Affair and an aggravated sense of being “vulnerable.” On the other hand, according to Williams, the event was causal to the creation of new organizations, such as UHURU, and increased “activity rather than apathy in the community.” This attention to group interactions typifies Williams’s research and acts as a helpful counter-balance to the vast timeline she addresses, situating the Affair as both product of and catalyst for community building across the city. The Road to Now, for Williams, is certainly not a one-way street; her history is a straightforward depiction of communities converging (formally and informally), clashing and dissolving as the idea and meaning of a “Black Montreal” undergoes constant metamorphosis. In closing, Williams writes:

“Blacks in Montreal have struggled to create a dynamic community. It is a continuing journey which began over three hundred years ago, and which was shaped by slavery, emancipation, Quebec’s pioneer economy…the railroad, black student activism, and immigration.”

For Dorothy Williams, the Sir George Williams University Affair was a “watershed” moment of community unity, disunity and activism which “put to test” the values, ideas and ideologies endemic to sixties Montreal.

The next major development of the Affair’s historiography came recently, in 2013, with the publication of David Austin’s Fear of a Black Nation, which situates the Sir George Williams Affair alongside the Congress of Black Writers of 1968 to examine their political context and antecedents. Austin’s work reads as a near combination of Dorothy Williams’s “tracing” and Dennis Forsythe’s “theorizing” methods into a new analytical framework: the “weaving” of both disparate ideologies and their origins with specific personal and communal narratives. Austin charts grass-roots beginnings, leading figures, and intellectual strands at play in the political activity and organization of the Affair and its aftermath. This book truly operates as a index of Black historical, theoretical, and political authorship which either pre-existed 1969’s “social thunderclap” or came to define and interrogate its wake by equal turns. His chapter, “Days to Remember: The Sir George Williams Narratives,” begins not with the facts of the event, but with a quote from Behind the Face of Winter, a fictional novel by H. Nigel Thomas that tackles the Affair from the perspective of a student, Pedro Moore, a West Indian immigrant. By doing this, Austin considers the intellectual, academic, historical sources alongside the fictional, troubling the notion of a purely factual, historical account and pushing memory’s role in historical construction to the fore. This approach ruptures the historiography; what then ensues is a litany of naming, of student participants, leaders, and occupiers of the Affair as well as key participants in the production of its history. From Frantz Fanon to Rocky Jones, from Stokely Carmichael’s 1968 visitation to Irene Kon’s bail expenses, Austin re-constructs the matrix of relationships that undergirded Montreal at the time of the Affair and the network that rose up to commemorate its events.

While other histories such as Sean Mills’s The Empire Within and Athena Palaeologu’s anthology The Sixties in Canada similarly weave together the intricacies of activism in 1960s Montreal, Austin’s Fear of a Black Nation does so specifically through the lens of “Montreal’s historical importance within the Black diaspora.” Austin revives the importance of the SGWU Affair as not only crucial to black Montreal history but to Atlantic and even global historical practice, a fact assumed by many of the historians he cites, such as Forsythe. “Montreal had been

34 Williams, The Road to Now, 122-138.
35 Williams, The Road to Now, 138.
36 Williams, The Road to Now, 138.
37 Williams, The Road to Now, 138.
38 David Austin, Fear of a Black Nation: Race, Sex. and Security in Sixties Montreal (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2013).
39 Williams, The Road to Now, 177.
40 H. Nigel Thomas, Behind the Face of Winter (Toronto: TSAR, 2001).
41 Thomas, 137.
42 Thomas, ix.
home to major developments in the Black diaspora,” Austin writes, “yet oddly very little had been written about it.” A further metric of analysis compounds this revival of information and historical importance: Austin’s examination of surveillance prior, during and after the events at Sir George. Using records recently made available by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Austin tracks the movements of undercover police such as Warren Hart, an FBI agent on loan to the RCMP to monitor Affair participants like Rosie Douglas. Fear of a Black Nation works to uncover the history of the Affair on two levels: the revitalization of names and narratives, and the expression of facts previously without proof (although broadly suspected). David Austin does not so much intervene in the Affair’s historiography as preserve it, indexing historical accounts as well as actors, while giving further access to Forsythe’s “negative” history: the history of state oppression through surveillance and infiltration.

Like David Austin’s Fear of a Black Nation, Mina Shum’s 2014 documentary “Ninth Floor” caused, and continues to cause, a revival of attention to the events of the “computer centre party.” This documentary recounts the occupation of the computer centre at Sir George Williams University through interviews with a variety of persons involved or affected by the 1969 protests, interweaving interviews, news footage and voiceover to piece together the events through the descriptions of those either present or otherwise connected. Much of the visual material found in Dorothy Eber’s The Computer Centre Party is included in the film’s still images, including a map of the ninth floor indicating locations of the barricade, exits, and police arrests.

While David Austin’s historiographic intervention was only an index of Affair participants, Mina Shum’s “Ninth Floor” provides faces to names, voices to transcripts, and a visceral awareness of the living and breathing effects of the Affair today. The events are analyzed in the very words of many of the original participants; this information and narrativization are made accessible via film, for free, on the internet. This accessibility is an unprecedented intervention in the Affair’s historiography; the reach of film as a medium swings the events at SGWU in 1969 back into the mainstream historical consciousness. “Ninth Floor” brings the voices of those present to the fore, and the Affair itself may yet be catapulted from the niches of social history and back into national awareness and into the canon of Canadian history with the narratives of the participants themselves. Interviews with Bukka Rennie, Valerie Belgrave, Anne Cools, and Robert Hubsher speak not only to the context of 1969 Montreal but our contemporary one and the ruptures between. At one point early in the documentary, Bukka Rennie comments: “It would seem Canadians are racist, but they like to apologize for being racist [laughs].” This interplay between past and present conditions runs throughout the documentary. Alongside Mina Shum’s “Ninth Floor,” online resources and historical accounts of the SGWU Affair proliferate post-2014. In 2014, Concordia University’s student news source, The Link, published a short film on the 1969 Affair titled “OK Computer.”

By February 2014, the Affair’s Wikipedia page had garnered four full sections and the page’s citations had more than doubled from four in February of 2011 to eleven (one of which was David Austin’s article “All Roads Lead to Montreal”). Encyclopedia Canada and Black History Canada both feature articles on the Affair, although Black History Canada refers to the event as a “riot.” In this context, “Ninth Floor” is both the culmination of and catalyst for the revitalization of the SGWU Affair’s historiography, along with Austin’s more academic induction with Fear of a Black Nation.

Due to these interventions, the historiography of SGWU’s 1969 Affair is currently in renaissance, and the historiography continues to broaden. “Ninth Floor” reminds us that while the SGWU Affair is a historical catalyst for the study of student protest, Black Power, and race relations in Montreal, the historiography of it exposes its distinctly ahistorical aspect; these events are not so much in the past as they are in the present. Many participants continue to tell their stories of the Affair, and resurgent

43 Thomas, ix.
44 Thomas, 155.
45 Ninth Floor.
47 Ninth Floor.
analysis of the events post-2010 have shown that the Affair is very much alive in the memory of those who participated, in the inherited modes of activism wrought in the aftermath, and in the current context of Montreal. But as Selwyn Jacobs, producer of “Ninth Floor,” comments in his 2015 interview with Vice, “it depends on which side of the racial fence you’re actually sitting on…for people in the black community, they’ve always known that story. So what are the reasons it wasn’t told?”

The events that took place at Sir George Williams University in early 1969 provide a nucleus around which scholarship of a Black Montreal and Black Montreal history converge, emerge, and re-emerge. The Sir George Williams Affair provides an axis for a historical debate over the role, composition, and activism of the black community in Montreal. As many of the above historians illustrate, this event was not a mere product of imported protest; it was rooted firmly in the organizations and experiences of Black Montreal. This prolonged moment of struggle between the administration and student body, between immigrant organization and grass-roots activism, between the court system and the ninety-seven arrested, coalesce the historiographic threads of both local and international forces that structure the course of Montreal history and its documentation today. February 11th, 2019 will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the SGWU Affair. In federal government, Justin Trudeau recapitulates his father’s liberal regime, under which the Affair took place, and in the States, the Trump Presidency shuts down government, and the shouts of the Black Lives Matter movement feel distant. As we commemorate the Affair’s fiftieth anniversary in the midst of these, the SGWU Affair and its historiographic renaissance seems to ripple to the fore of mainstream historical consciousness as “[t]he past reverberates in the present.”


51 Austin, Fear of a Black Nation, 143.
The English Civil Wars are remembered today as some of the most catastrophic moments in English history. From 1642 to 1651, nearly 200,000 people lost their lives to violence, disease, and famine. The Civil Wars occurred as a result of many factors, but one factor of paramount importance was religious conflict between the High Church backed by King Charles I and a group of radical Protestant subjects derogatorily labelled the “Puritans.”

In the years prior to the Civil Wars, over 14,000 of these Puritans fled England with the hope of creating “Bible Commonwealths” in North America. These idyllic colonies were settled in a region they called “New England.” Conventional historical wisdom tells us that these colonists were forgotten during the Civil War era, that amid chaos at home, the people of the Mother Country were unable to pay any attention to their countrymen across the sea. But is this really true? Certainly, the distance was significant. The ships that ferried colonists to New England were hulking, slow-moving vessels, and the trip across the North Atlantic took an average of eight to twelve weeks each way. Yet the historical record seems to indicate that despite this geographic separation, the settlers of New England played an important role in agitating Puritans at home.

How is this possible? These individuals left England, but they also left behind family and friends, colleagues and associates. They wrote and received letters from loved ones across the Atlantic, and eagerly devoured news from home. The Puritans were Englishmen, after all. They left the Old World, but they did not abandon it. They saw themselves as models for their fellow countrymen and reported their good deeds home with an all-encompassing passion and fervor.

By disregarding these interactions between the colonists and their mother country, it becomes easy to claim, as the historian Alan Taylor has, that “New England ultimately failed as a ‘City Upon a Hill’ because the intended audience, the English, failed to pay attention.” I would counter that, at least for a brief time, the city upon a hill succeeded. The colonists of New England, as Puritans and Englishmen, played a pivotal role in the ideological and theological discussion in the years preceding the English Civil Wars. The existence of these “godly commonwealths” in the New World had a profound effect on many English Puritans – an effect which contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1642.

The Nature of Puritanism

To understand the extent of the influence the New England colonies exerted upon the English Puritans, it is necessary to examine who exactly the Puritans were. To begin with, Puritans were not, strictly speaking, a denomination. They rather encompassed many different denominations. There were Presbyterian Puritans, Congregationalist Puritans, and many Puritan members of the Church of England. “Puritan” was a term of abuse and degradation, levied at particularly devout reformers by other Protestants, rather than a clearly defined movement with a self-evident ideology. As such it is exceedingly difficult to get an idea of the movement’s size. It is clear that most of England’s population of five million was not Puritan on the eve of the Civil Wars. It is probable that the actual number was on the order of a few hundred thousand, as for every one of the 14,000 Puritans willing to emigrate there were likely many more who remained in England. Though the members of this movement would not have identified themselves as Puritans, it is possible to get some understanding of what they believed by examining common attributes of their theology, philosophy, and history.

The Puritans followed the Reformed tradition and drew heavily upon the writings of the major Protestant thinker Jean Calvin and his disciples. The essence of

3 Taylor, 168.
4 Taylor, 185.
their theology was that individuals were ultimately justified not by works (i.e. through good deeds), but by Grace; the omnipotence of God was such that He knew, from the moment of Creation, whether an individual would go to Heaven or Hell. As a Reformed church, Puritans argued that the true religion must rid itself of idolatrous sacrament and ritual, and place its trust wholly in the word of God as conveyed in the Bible. They believed, in other words, in the “purification” of their religion, and in particular, the purification of the doctrines and practices of the Church of England, which many continued to believe was tainted by the scourge of “popery.”

At the core of Puritan theology in the years preceding the Civil Wars was the absolute supremacy of God over all things. This manifested itself in the notion of Providence, a doctrine which was given central importance in the Calvinist tradition. The rationale was that just as God knew the ultimate fate of all mankind, so too did He know (and in fact, dictate) everything else. “All things,” wrote the Puritan minister Arthur Dent in 1601, “turn about in God’s merciful Providence…” Further still, it is this Providence “which upholdeth all things, even the whole order of nature.” Because God’s sovereignty and power were unparalleled, everything that transpired must necessarily be a manifestation of His will. It mattered little whether humans on Earth understood the machinations of Heaven – indeed, it was virtually impossible for them to. Yet the fact remained, “His judgements are in all the Earth.” God’s Providence was in every aspect of human affairs, and it was the duty of Puritans to make sense of that Providence as best they could and interpret His will. The necessity of examining one’s own life and the natural world thereby gave every event cosmic significance. For the Puritan, every boon was a blessing, and every pitfall a just punishment.

These beliefs were not isolated to Puritan clergy and intellectuals. The London artisan Nehemiah Wallington (1598 – 1658) provides an indispensable example of how lay adherents perceived their relationship with God. Wallington was a staunch Puritan and a prolific writer in an era when most adult men were still illiterate. In fifty notebooks, Wallington covered issues of great consequence to the godly community; his writings provide insight into the psychology of everyday Puritans during the Civil War period.

In a notebook entitled “A Record of Gods Marcys, or a Thankfull Remembrance,” Wallington catalogues a list of his sins, with the principal aim of displaying how God is merciful even unto such a wretched man as himself. He describes the necessity of such an act, saying “it is [mankind’s] dutie to seek Gods glory and the good of his church.” This gets at the core of what the Puritan felt his relationship with God to be in the mid-17th century. The Puritan was supposed to be a herald who lived and died for the sole purpose of glorifying a greater master. That the Lord could forgive such flawed individuals as Nehemiah, who admitted to “the corruption of my nature, and filthynesse and deceitfulnes of my hart,” simply served to further indict mankind to its creator and further demonstrate God’s benevolent mercy. Respecting God required careful adherence to the Divine Will, which could only be ascertained through close-readings of scripture and the workings of Providence (and not, as the orthodox adherents of the Church of England and Catholics argued, through ritual). The Puritan sought to “live a holy life” – a life entirely in line with the revelation as expressed in the Holy Book. Doing so would give glory to God in every aspect of their daily lives. Through their godliness, these men and women hoped to please their Lord.

This notion, that one’s purpose in life was to give glory to God by following His Will, had a natural corollary: the commission of sin was an offense to God. The Puritans, as God’s chosen, had the primary responsibility for conveying His Will to their fellow men, preaching, converting, and policing the sins of their fellows as necessary. Citing Leviticus 19:17, Wallington chastised a
neighbor for breaking the Sabbath: “thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart, but thou shalt plainly rebuke thy neighbor and suffer him not to sin.” “Suffer” is the operative word; to the Puritanical mind, any sin in the community was liable to bring down the fury of the Lord and likely to cause untold suffering. God, in the enormity of His wrath and justice, would punish the whole of the people for the sins of a few. In serving as “a means whereby God might lead others to salvation,” the Puritans saw themselves as glorifying God whilst simultaneously saving and bettering their community.

It was thus the ultimate Puritan intention to create a godly civilization wherein every member attempted to lead a virtuous life according to scripture, popish sacrament and ceremony did not taint the populace, and the people were not an affront to the eyes of God. Only such a society, where sin was minimized and repentance universal, could truly be a delight to the Lord.

The Grievances of the Puritans

Unfortunately for the Puritans, England was anything but ideal. The outbreak of war in 1642 was the result of numerous factors. Political and constitutional concerns, amplified by economic tensions, pushed many Englishmen to support the roundhead (or Parliamentarian) cause. Yet the Puritans collectively were less interested in these earthly matters. Their main frustrations were rooted in theological and spiritual anxieties. Their grievances were innumerable, but ultimately fell into two categories: frustration with England’s moral decay and suspicious of religious tyranny perpetrated by Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud. These factors formed a vicious circle of frustration for English Puritans, reinforcing and worsening one another and pushing England into chaos.

The Puritan conception of England’s moral decay was discerned in terms of God’s absolute sovereignty over the universe. Providence worked itself in all phenomena, imbued with cosmic meaning that was the duty of His disciples to analyze and comprehend. As such, the various calamities afflicting England were interpreted as divine punishments, prompting reflection and reformation. Among the best examples of this belief system is Nehemiah Wallington’s journal describing “A memorial of God’s Judgements upon Sabbath breakers, Drunkers, and other vile livers.” In this notebook, Wallington described numerous examples of God’s wrath upon London, including fire, plague, explosion, and murder. This grisly volume minced no words about who is at fault: it is the “thieves, drunks, idlers, prostitutes, and blasphemers” who were to blame. London at this time was practically besieged by these sorts of folk, as opportunities for urban employment and hardship in the countryside pulled impoverished masses to the outskirts of the city. According to Wallington, God was not just punishing, He was “pleading with this citie by fi.re.” To an extent, the moral laxity perceived by the Puritans in this period was real – England was changing rapidly in the early 1600s. Yet in the Puritan mind there was a fundamental and profound link between this moral degradation and England’s woes. When Wallington talked about “grieving for the times wherein we live,” he is talking not about the destruction wrought by war, pestilence, and famine but the root cause of these things – namely, the baseness of Englishmen. Listing the reasons for the Puritan migration to New England, the future governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony John Winthrop described how in England man was “more vile and base than the earth we treade upon.” Fellow migrant Edward Johnson elaborated, describing England as filled with a “multitude of irreligious lascivious and popish affected persons.” The wretched and sinful men of England were an affront even to the landscape itself. In the years preceding the Civil Wars, the English Puritans became convinced that moral laxity had become a rampant problem—that sinfulness had cost the English God’s favor and was bringing about “the endes of the world.”

Moral failure was poisoning England, and nobody was doing more to usher in the end than Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud. The English Puritans (follow-
ing in the wake of the Calvinist tradition and the Thirty Years’ War) feared the encroachment of international Catholicism. In the mid-seventeenth century, no English figure was quite so linked with this threat as the Archbishop. Laud’s policy was one of religious uniformity—the combined kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland made forming cohesive ecclesiastical policy difficult, and Laud’s efforts as archbishop were oftentimes aimed at standardization. Yet what Laud considered necessary measures to secure religious harmony, many Puritans viewed as persecution in pursuit of a Catholic agenda. Of particular note were the limitations he imposed on Puritan preachers, in particular by censoring works he believed were controversial or heretical. The godly perceived this as a deliberate attempt to subvert public morality and faith. Samuel Rogers spoke for many when he described Laud as “a cursed traitor to Christ,” for his persecution of Puritans in England. To the godly, the archbishop was “that great enemy of God and his people.” His insistence on sacramental and hierarchical ecclesiastical reforms seemed to threaten Calvinist England. What Laud and others believed was necessary to maintain church orthodoxy and resist schisms became, for the Puritans, hallmarks of religious tyranny and despotism.

In the Puritan mind, these two factors amplified each other – the lack of “good” (i.e., Puritanical) religious instruction (because of the domination of a quasi-papist church) led to decaying morals, and this decay in turn made people more willing to accept a Laudian and borderline papist church. The godly thus saw England going down a spiral of popery and anarchy. The Puritans did not consider themselves blameless in this affair. In fact, some even blamed themselves the most. As God’s Chosen, it was their responsibility to give glory to the Lord and bring others into line with His Will. Their perceived failure was evident in their rhetoric – they often spoke of “the Lord against whom we have sinned.” By allowing the promulgation of papist policies and the decline of virtue, the Puritans had defaulted on their heavenly compact. It was in the midst of this theological chaos that some began to argue that England’s salvation could not feasibly be accomplished by staying in England. Perhaps, they argued, to show England the error of her ways they needed to provide an external example. It was at this point, beleaguered by the sins of the Old World, that some Puritans began to look across the sea.

**Refuting the Myth of Isolation**

It is easy to forget that the early colonists of New England did not consider themselves “Americans.” For the most part, these settlers were mindful of their ancestry and still thought of themselves as Englishmen. In a sermon delivered by William Hooke in 1640 (who upon returning to London in 1656 would become domestic chaplain to Oliver Cromwell), he reminded the colonists to remember their civil, natural, and spiritual relations with England. “There is no Land that claims our name but England,” he wrote, and “no nation that calls us Country-Men but the English.” The colonists would not allow themselves to simply sit in their private Eden and ignore the tribulations of the godly community abroad. These settlers, as has been noted, were not just escaping England – they were saving it.

The Puritans who settled in New England did so for a wide variety of reasons. For some, financial pressures under Charles I, such as the infamous ship money tax, acted as push factors. For others, the opportunities provided by cheap and readily available land caused them to seek their fortunes in the New World (especially as the rise of enclosures reduced the amount of land available in England). Yet for most of the earliest immigrants, this colonial excursion was about more than material betterment. It was an opportunity to show the world the type of prosperity that could be found in a society entirely in line with the Divine Will. New England was to be a grand exhibition, a test and experiment to show the people of England what could be if they would only embrace God. Perhaps the most noteworthy explanation of this intention comes from John Winthrop’s sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity.” Given aboard the Arabella on its way to Massachusetts Bay in 1630, Winthrop spoke for many immigrants when he identified the higher cause the settlers migrated in support of:

... wee shall finde that the God of Israel is among us, ... when hee shall make us a prayse and glory, that men shall say of

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Many of the Puritans who founded the Commonwealth of Massachusetts thus set out, from the beginning, with the intention of creating a model of Christian charity in America; Massachusetts Bay, that “city upon a hill,” was intended by its founding members to serve as inspiration for the creation of future godly societies in Europe.

This rhetoric is not unique to Winthrop, though he is perhaps most famous for it. Many of the colonists believed that they were doing the Lord’s work and expressed as much both in private and public. Among them was Captain Edward Johnson, one of the founders of Woburn, Massachusetts, who wrote that he felt the purpose of the colony was “to be set as lights upon a Hill more obvious than the highest Mountaine in the World,” a literal beacon of spirituality that would frighten away the darkness of episcopal despotism. Yet another claimed New England was a “pregnant demonstration” of the synergetic effect of Congregational Puritanism on Civil Government. Even those who did not travel exclusively for these altruistic reasons were aware that this was intended by many of the leading colonial officials, and all would have been conscious of their role. The colonists had braved the treacherous voyage to the New World. Their cause was just and their goal was set: they would be a city upon a hill, a beacon around which all Protestant nations would rally. With this purpose in mind, they began sending messages home to England. The success of the Puritan experiment in the New World now rested on the willingness of their countrymen to listen.

**The Impact of New England I: Solutions in the Wilderness**

Many Puritans in England hoped that by instituting religious reforms similar to those of New England it would be possible to root out papism and immorality in England and usher in a godly age. Their chief rival was Archbishop Laud, who argued along with other defend-

31 John Norton, quoted in Bremer, *Puritan Experiment*, 44.
eventual “shaking off” of the episcopal yoke. The example of New England’s prosperity and stability following the elimination of bishops was vitally important to English Puritans. Samuel Rogers, a restrained defender of Congregationalism, was suddenly “stirred up” by a bishop who had criticized New England for opening the door to nonconformity and disorder. Similarly, Scottish thinker Robert Baillie argued that it was conceivable that “there are half so many schism[s] in New England where bishops are not, as we see in Old England where bishops are in full force.” In the years preceding the Civil Wars, British Puritans began to use New England to challenge the idea that disorder was the natural consequence of eradicating episcopacy. The Congregational Way gained such a notable following that during the Civil War era, the Independents became the dominant faction in the Rump Parliament. Their model of independent congregations was in many ways inspired by the New England Way. New England thus managed to serve in this respect as a model commonwealth, insofar as it provided English Puritans an example of an effective society overseen by a non-episcopal church. By appearing to have reversed the decline of public virtue, the Puritans gained more support for their new mode of social and religious governance. The fact that Puritan governance in New England was viewed as “effective” is demonstrated by the settlers’ apparent resolution of another issue: the decline of public virtue. Indeed, many English Puritans believed that New England was a paradise on Earth, a land free of immorality and sin, where the godly ruled and all was harmonious. The cause of this harmony was clear: New Englanders had organized their entire society “according to the scriptures,” and so gained the approval of God. This message was relayed to the Old World Puritans incessantly. In a letter to his former congregation in Terling, Essex, the minister Thomas Weld described how in New England,

… all things are done in the form and pattern shewed in the mount: members provided, church officers elected and ordained, Sacraments administered, scandals prevented, censured, Fast days … and all such things by Authority commanded and performed according to the precise rule.

The Puritans here were allowed to live in accordance with the Divine Will, interpreted by the godly through the Bible and direct communication with spiritual forces, otherwise known as revelation. In New England, where “the greater part [are] the better part,” the Puritans had managed to create a society without immorality or sin. Here was a land where “our ears are not beaten, nor the air filled with oaths, swearers and ranters, nor our eyes and eares vexed with the unclean conversations of the wicked.” Some English began to believe that if they could emulate their American cousins and seize God, “lay hold on Him, yea hang on Him, and say thou shalt not goe,” then they could spare England its grisly fate. It seems that the underlying theme of much transatlantic correspondence was the virtues of a government perfectly aligned with the teachings of Christ. The preeminent Massachusetts Bay theologian John Cotton described the character of New England’s government in a pamphlet published in London in 1641. In addition to listing various organizational laws about the operation and structure of the government, Cotton identified the crimes in the colony and the punishments for them. Of the twenty-four crimes that merited either the death penalty or banishment, all but six are directly inspired by commandment (and of those six, two relate to witchcraft, and four to subversion of the government). In the New England colonies, the reigning king was the Lord in Heaven, and His word was the sole basis for law. This was the society that Puritans in England dreamed of. Mistress Warden, in a series of speeches with her husband and chambermaid, declared boldly that it was the “Zion of New England.”

The inhabitants of this land were viewed by some English

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42 Wallington, 162.
as “the Saints,” taken by God to this Land because they were his elect. To these Puritans, who believed in the paradise of America, New England looked like Jerusalem restored. The passion with which some English Puritans described the Bible Commonwealths makes evident the paradisiac awe it held over them: “New England[,] New England[: it] is in my thoughts[;] my heart rejoices to think of it.”

By supposedly solving the issue of public sinfulness and morality, New England became an idealistic vision of what a society ruled by the godly could look like. Puritans in England had no way of knowing that their view was driven in large part by propaganda. In reality, New England was not a perfect Zion. It had its fair share of spousal abuse, violence, murder, and adultery. On one particularly extravagant occasion in 1641, a servant was made to stand on the Boston gallows, noosed, for his “foul and devilish attempt to bugger a cow.” Yet these blemishes were kept largely hidden in the letters sent home. In their quest to use New England as a model for England’s further reformation, the colonists focused instead on the virtues of New England’s laws and social structure. The fact that the New World was not as heavenly as it appeared was not as important to the English Puritans as their belief that it was heavenly. Many of the Puritans who could not participate in the New England experiment were enraptured by the myth of its utopian success and sought to emulate that success in the motherland. In New England, English Puritans saw a vision of what England could become. All they had to do was seize it.

The Impact of New England II: International Protestantism

New England’s paradisiacal nature and lack of episcopacy compounded with one another to increase Old World Puritans’ frustrations with their own turbulent society. Yet arguably even more important than the example of the colonists was the support and unity they provided through international Protestantism – more precisely, international Calvinism. In the wake of the Thirty Years’ War, the ideological descendants of Jean Calvin felt a strong urge to band together to protect against the encroachments of popery. The union was not necessarily born of kinship, so much as of necessity. In a sermon by the prolific John Preston published in 1630, he asked “doe wee not see the whole bodie of those who professse the truth are besieged round about through Christendome? … Are not our allies wasted?” The need for the different reformed Churches to unite, not on matters of doctrine but for matters of mutual defense, pressed heavily on the Puritans. The “union … betwenee us [English Calvinists] and those of our religion beyond the sea” was regarded as the greatest defense against popery and its supporters, “the capital enemy of all Reformed churches in Europe.” In this environment, New English successes became Protestant successes. As the Bible Commonwealths in America grew, their ability to provide spiritual and military reinforcements to the English godly grew as well.

This hints at the first benefit that the English godly derived: New English successes (and indeed prosperity) during the 1630s appeared to indicate God’s favor for the reformed cause. If every minor happenstance was for the Puritan imbued with cosmic significance, then particularly unlikely events or what the New Englanders called “miracles” were even more so. Throughout the 1630s (the era of the “Great Migration”), 198 voyages carried passengers to New England, of which only a single vessel sank. Upon arriving in the New World, colonists had to contend with frigid winters and deadly conflicts with Native Americans, yet despite these hardships the colonial population continued to increase thanks to low rates of disease and starvation and a relatively high female population. The Puritans of New England managed to triumph against incredible odds to form a Christian commonwealth in the harsh and unforgiving wilderness of North America. This was, according to Edward Winslow’s report home, “the good providence of God working … in our preservation.” Many English Puritans did not rebuke Winslow’s claim – indeed, many were thrilled to see the godly prospering abroad. In 1632, Nehemiah Wallington prayed for

46 Rogers, Diary, 47.
47 Rogers, 97.
49 John Preston, Sermons Preached Before His Majestie, (London: Leonard Greene of Cambridge, 1630), 84.
51 Taylor, American Colonies, 168-170.
“[God’s] whole church and each member of the same,” by which he meant reformed churches. The successes of the New World Puritans against tremendous odds were taken as signs of God’s undeniable favor for their cause. They were, after all, God’s chosen, and “all things tend to the good of God’s chosen people.” The growth of the reformed movement was a cause for celebration among the English godly. While English Puritans may have had some degree of theological disputes with their coreligionists in America, they ultimately believed that they benefited from New England’s successes. These benefits came in the form of spiritual and occasional military aid, which fostered a sense of solidarity from which the English Puritans derived considerable benefit.

The Puritans and many other contemporary Christians believed fervently in the power of prayer to bring about practical change in the world. Prayer was more than wishes – in the hands of the godly, prayer was a direct channel to God, and was therefore the most powerful force a human being could muster. The prayers of the godly, in the words of preacher Thomas Cobbett, were “terrible as so many armies with banners, so many thundering legions.” In New England, days of fasting and prayer were organized throughout the Civil War era as Puritans prayed for the success of the godly in the Mother Country. English Puritans moreover solicited and took comfort in these prayers. Nehemiah Wallington, writing to a friend in Massachusetts Bay, wrote that

I think the lord never had more powerfull and earnest prayers and tears [in England] than now … we here in Old England have found the benifet and profit of your prayers in New England, which should incourage us still to go on in praying…

English Puritans thus derived spiritual strength from their coreligionists in America. The knowledge of godly prayers on their behalf gave them the comfort and courage to continue fighting against popery, both before and during the Wars. The existence of Bible Commonwealths, such as New England and the Netherlands, allowed for a feeling of strength-through-solidarity, which allowed the English Puritans to feel that they were not alone in their struggle against episcopacy. This larger spiritual aid was further buttressed (albeit slightly) by military reinforcement during the Civil Wars, the most famous example being at the Siege of Crowland, where Colonel Thomas Rainborowe’s militia of New English volunteers seized the strategically important town. The feeling of unity thus took on two forms – not simply the unity of spiritual brethren, but that of brothers in arms, as “New England Men” became famous throughout England for their daring pursuits in the name of English Puritans.

The English Puritans thus benefitted, spiritually and militarily, from their connections with Puritan America. Days of prayer and Thanksgiving in New England, described in letters and pamphlets in Old England, helped give comfort to the English godly and reminded them that they were not alone. This feeling was almost certainly compounded by the commitment of Massachusetts men to fight on behalf of England’s “Puritan Revolution.” International Calvinism was thus a source of strength and encouragement for the Puritans in the years leading up to and during the English Civil Wars. It not only strengthened English resolve, but also gave them the feeling of being connected to something greater – this idea that even the loss of the Civil Wars would not mean the end of the True Church and that the reach of the godly was constantly expanding. While not the cause of the Civil Wars per se, the mere existence of New England helped give English Puritans the courage to rebel in 1642.

Conclusion

I respectfully disagree with Oliver Cromwell’s assessment of New England as “poore, cold, and useless.” New England proved extremely “useful” in the years preceding the very Wars that put Cromwell into power. It would be overreaching to say that New England and Puritanism caused the English Civil Wars. However, it remains that the English Civil Wars were fought mainly along religious lines. Understanding the unique factors which ap-

53 Wallington, “A Record of God’s Mercies” in Seaver, Wallington’s World, 144.
54 Dent, Plain Man’s Pathway, 90.
56 Wallington, Notebooks, 239.
59 Oliver Cromwell, quoted in Taylor, American Colonies, 175.
pealed to the Puritan element within England is important. The Puritans of England did not live in a theological vacuum. They exchanged ideas and prayers with coreligionists throughout the reformed world and had friends and colleagues throughout the Netherlands and New England. They saw New England as a potential model Christian society, one to be used as inspiration for reform in England. More important, they viewed New England as an ally against papism, and from this partnership derived considerable resolve.

It is unsurprising that the impact of New England on the English Civil Wars tends to be forgotten today. Certainly, many English Puritans of the era considered the region a backwater. Many (like Cromwell) were probably unaware of the subtle influence the region had in pushing the mother country to Civil War. Further, the Restoration of 1660 put an end to England’s experiment with Puritan government, and therefore erased any hope for the lasting success of this “city upon a hill.” To ignore completely the catalyzing and galvanizing effects of the Bible Commonwealth is to erase the colonists as actors from the historical narrative. Taylor’s claim that New England failed to have an impact because the English failed to pay attention ignores the vital part the colonists had in shaping England’s history. In presenting a solution to the woes of their coreligionists and giving them the confidence to pursue that solution in England, the colonists played an important role in agitating the Puritan element at home. To deny the role of the colonies in intensifying this desire for reform is to forget that the colonists of New England were themselves Englishmen. These were their Civil Wars too.
By the 1980s, the prevalence of antibiotics and a soaring faith in biomedicine had assured the American public the last of the great diseases would be eradicated. Then, the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic provided a dramatic challenge to notions of security in health and biomedicine previously taken for granted. Because information concerning AIDS was at first unavailable and later poorly circulated to the public, a wave of paranoia and fear gripped Americans, guiding discussions of AIDS in all spheres of life. From governmental policy to the visual arts, AIDS deeply impacted American culture in a way that no other disease has. First the government ignored the epidemic. Then, as the government and citizens alike struggled to make sense of it, a number of visual artists and activists produced work which spoke to the experiences of those affected by AIDS, portrayed the social attitudes of Americans at the height of the outbreak, and attempted to address both highly individualized concerns as well as those shared by large activist groups. Certainly, the spread of AIDS was not simply limited to the United States, and the visual cultures of each nation would in many cases change to reflect their experience with the disease. However, because of the political and artistic climate of the day, the case of the United States provides several unique facets to be analyzed. This analysis of the American visual culture during the AIDS epidemic shall consider contexts of alienation, paranoia, and government inaction as well as discussing how the artists producing work in this moment dealt with themes of invisibility and silence.

Situated in this moment, the works of artists such as Felix Gonzalez-Torres were produced and displayed, quickly catapulting artwork that dealt with AIDS to the most prestigious museums and artistic institutions. Earlier collective memorial projects such as the NAMES Project Memorial Quilt had courted controversy both as a tremendous artistic statement and its failure to acknowledge the grisly truth of the epidemic. Finally, the activist group known as the AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power (ACT UP) utilized a diverse array of visual strategies ranging from highly symbolic methods of protest to unique iconography to bring attention to social issues related to AIDS and pressure for political action. At times, these visual artistic forces were in harmony with each other, and in others they were in direct conflict. The moment’s breadth of visual culture allowed for a wide range of perspectives and approaches to making a statement about AIDS.

During the 1980s and ‘90s, a number of gay artists attempted to portray their personal perspectives on the epidemic while addressing social and political attitudes toward AIDS. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, Robert Gober, and David Wojnarowicz were among several established artists whose work dealt with themes of paranoia and loss. Through the analysis of their works, there can be a better understanding of the visual culture of AIDS, particularly in how themes of invisibility, silence, and fear present in the artwork reflected and interpreted the lived realities at the height of the epidemic. It is important to consider that AIDS continues to be represented in contemporary art. However, analysis of the art produced specifically during the ‘80s and early ‘90s gives particular insight into how the early stage of the epidemic manifested itself in highly variable and provocative mediums. There were certainly many artists whose work dealt with AIDS outside of the privileged, white, and male example. However, this analysis is primarily concerned with Gonzalez-Torres, Gober, and Wojnarowicz precisely because of their position at the fore of visual cultural production in this moment. In addition, their formal innovations addressed the AIDS crisis in ways which more traditional mediums could not. Ultimately, these works of art would come to embody both a reconsideration of AIDS as well as a necessary recognition of the misconceptions and prejudices of the moment.

Felix Gonzalez-Torres utilized conceptual pieces to challenge contemporary prejudices and biases related to the disease, while portraying the deeply personal loss of his partner Ross. Born in Cuba in 1957, Gonzalez-Torres was a conceptual artist whose pieces emphasize viewer participation, often making them aware of larger truths and injustices. The best examples of Gonzalez-Torres’ use of audience performance are his candy pieces such as *Un-...*
titled (Placebo) (Figure 1). This 1991 piece was added to the MoMA’s collection, and consisted of a display of wrapped candies arranged on the ground in the gallery. Visitors were encouraged to take pieces of the candy, thus involving the viewer in the art itself. Over time, the piece would shrink and slowly decrease into a smaller and smaller pile until it was completely depleted. In creating this piece, Gonzalez-Torres was addressing two separate components of the epidemic and the stigma surrounding it. Gonzalez-Torres would always include the weight (in candy) of his late partner Ross in his pieces. The combined weight of Gonzales-Torres and Ross was 355 pounds, so 355 pounds of candy would be added to the arrangement of each piece. In this way, the slowly shrinking arrangement of sweets was no longer simply candy, but the component pieces of a man and of a relationship. Gonzalez-Torres simulates Ross’s death by slowly, deliberately drawing attention to the way in which patients and victims of AIDS died.

That these types of pieces were recurrent in Gonzalez-Torres’s oeuvre is no accident. By creating pieces which used the same underlying premise of candy, the artist was able to make a statement larger than the scope of his individual loss. Robert Storr, senior curator of painting and sculpture at the MoMA from 1992-2002, described the effect of Gonzalez-Torres’s candy pieces, saying, “instead of being reconfigured and brought back to life, from the outset the body has been abstractly atomized in order that it may die again, and again, ad infinitum, thus slowly, ceaselessly rehearsing not one death or two, not just Ross’s death or Gonzalez-Torres’s own, but many, many more.”

By stubbornly creating permutations of the same piece over and over, Gonzalez-Torres was able to speak to the larger loss of life occurring in the epidemic, not only his personal loss. Works such as Untitled (USA Today) (1990) (Figure 2) and Untitled (Rossmore II) continued the theme of candy supplies. The inclusion of red, white, and blue wrappers in pieces such as Untitled (USA Today) offer a subtle criticism of the US government’s inaction on AIDS policy.

The candy itself, while seemingly secondary to the concept of the piece, actually provides even more insight into the artist’s message as well as the pervasive social attitudes concerning AIDS. After being encouraged to take a piece of candy by gallery attendants, visitors had to suck at the candy to release its flavor. In cases where the artist provided lollipops, this act of sucking was meant to imitate oral sex or fellatio. The center of the candy was thick and sweet, with a viscosity that was meant to simulate that of blood. Images of blood and fellatio were meant to constantly remind viewers of AIDS and society’s association of AIDS with gay men: “ordinary people’.... Take a new democratic form of communion by metaphorically ingesting the ‘other’.” In addition to the artworks’ simulation of sex acts, the same acts of ingestion and simulation of blood were tied to religious Christian acts, specifically the sacrament of communion in which the consumption of the host and wine is believed to be a literal consumption of the blood and body of Christ. This element of Gonzalez-Torres’s work was especially relevant to the church’s unique relationship to the AIDS epidemic, one which would be problematized and confronted more directly by groups such as ACT UP. The candy pieces reveal that much of the artistic visual culture of AIDS in this moment was inextricably tied to the actions and “performances” of gay men. Because of this, Gonzalez-Torres attempted to bridge any gaps between the viewer and the art. By encouraging the candy’s consumption, othering became hypocritical and impossible, as each visitor to the piece would have taken part in the performance of consumption and thus found themselves “infected” by the clotted, bittersweet candy.

Gonzalez-Torres addressed American prejudice against gay men during the AIDS epidemic more directly in pieces such as Untitled (Blood) (1992) (Figure 3). An expansive sheet of red beads, Untitled (Blood) formed a crimson barrier in the gallery space. The contradiction of Untitled (Blood) is its attractive beads and the paranoid attitudes of the American public circa 1992. Despite the piece’s simple and benign construction, the pervasive fear of blood and bodily fluids caused the piece to take on a larger meaning. In part, this is achieved by the inclusion of the parenthetical “(Blood)”, which takes what would otherwise be a festive display into a more morbid direction. Untitled (Blood) was meant to taunt viewers by appealing to their desire to touch the beads, but also reminding them of the fear that circulated around images of blood, especially the blood of a gay man. While not all of Gonzalez-Torres’ work addressed themes of AIDS, pieces such as Untitled (1991) (Figure 4) and Untitled (1988) show the fine

2 Storr, 8.
3 Storr, 8.
art world engaging directly with activism which occurred outside prestigious art institutions. Comprised of 161 pages, the pieces reference important historical moments such as the People with AIDS Coalition in 1985 and the march on Washington in 1987. The inclusion of this text was a slight alteration from Gonzalez-Torres’s recurring motif of plain stacks of paper. By presenting the textual events in non-chronological order Gonzalez-Torres places the timeline of AIDS up for debate, situating these events in a history which (in 1991) was still unfolding.5

While pieces such as Untitled (1991) represent a degree of activism on the part of Gonzalez-Torres, this work and many others remained confined to the bastions of high society that were the major museums and gallery shows. By analyzing his public works which made use of billboards, the intersection between private art and public activism can be better explored and understood. Perhaps the most notable example of Gonzalez-Torres’s billboard installations is Untitled (1991) (Figure 5), which initially saw the placement of a photograph of an unmade, vacant bed onto six different billboards around New York City. Visually, the image aims to raise questions concerning absence. Clearly, two people once occupied the bed, but now it is vacant. The image conveys feelings of loss and of absence, which ostensibly relate to Ross’s death. However, the true statement of the work lies in its interjection into the public, commercial space of the billboard. The piece is both highly visible because of its public locale and also highly invisible due its quotidian, understated image. In this way, Gonzalez-Torres played with the invisibility and neglect found in the discourse surrounding the AIDS epidemic. The elevation of a simple yet highly intimate moment represents Gonzalez-Torres’s desire to raise awareness concerning a prevalent issue but also champion the beauty of simplicity.6 By remaining highly conceptual and eschewing blatant iconographic references to the epidemic, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s treatment of AIDS was highly informed by the ideas of invisibility and silence. Ultimately, his treatment of the epidemic emphasized the revealing of social biases, the implication of the entire public (not just “at risk groups”), and efforts to shine a light on these issues in both the high cultural setting of the museum and the comparatively low brow New York City billboard.

Robert Gober is another artist whose work addressed AIDS in the 1980s and early ‘90s, using meticulous sculpture to create subtle, but powerful statements related to the social constructions of AIDS and AIDS-related prejudices. Perhaps the most apt example of Gober’s commentary on these issues are the sinks he meticulously sculpted and constructed, beginning in the early ‘80s. Mounted on the gallery walls, Gober’s sinks were simple to the point where viewers might not know that the sinks were handmade had the exhibition not announced it. Pieces such as Untitled (1985) (Figure 6) present a sink without a faucet. While household appliances were no stranger to the gallery scene by the ‘80s and ‘90s, the impact of Gober’s sinks lay in their reckoning with metaphors of illness, hygiene, and paranoia. Gober’s sinks represented a glistening shrine to hygiene, a device meant to wash away dirt, blood, and all uncleanness. In choosing to recreate sinks, Gober confronts the societal conceptions of the uncleanness of AIDS and associations between uncleanness and the ability to wash it away. The sinks address semen, saliva, and blood as the “gay” fluids of AIDS. Sinks such as Untitled (1994) are caught in the crossroads of these societal conceptions of AIDS. On the one hand, the sinks are a temple to societal “cleanliness”, once described as giving off a sense of cold, clinical hygiene.7 However, the sinks’ lack of a faucet or parts of any utility renders them useless. Just as the sinks are unable to function as intended, society’s paranoia towards AIDS is shown to be similarly useless. The desire to “wash away” the perceived stain of at-risk groups remains, however, only in the husk of Gober’s unmoving and unhelpful sinks.

Gober was not content to limit his contribution to the issue of AIDS simply to the museum setting. Along with numerous other art activists, Gober coordinated the Auction for Action which benefited ACT UP.8 Gober auctioned off works such as Untitled Leg alongside other artists’ work, including that of the recently passed Keith Haring. The art sold exceptionally well, showing the potential impact of art on social activism. The Auction for Action was not the sole example of the overlap between financial, artistic, and political activism. Earlier exam-
ple such as the Art Against AIDS event organized by the American Foundation for AIDS Research were met with great enthusiasm and success. This 1987 event raised over two million dollars in sold artwork which had been donated from a myriad of New York galleries at the behest of art historian Robert Rosenblum, gallerist Leo Castelli, and arts promoter Anne Livet. Other high profile figures involved in AIDS fundraising through visual mediums included famed British painter David Hockney and photographer Annie Leibovitz, who both worked closely with ACT UP in their efforts to generate funds. Art sales were particularly critical in generating funds for groups such as ACT UP, as their bold and perceived brash messaging was often intended to alienate more assimilated members of the gay community, thus exacerbating the difficulty of fundraising through traditional means. In channeling the power of art as a commodity, Gober and others applied their artistic influence across multiple spheres, showing the varying mechanisms through which the visual culture of AIDS united and even funded activist movements.

New York artist David Wojnarowicz perfectly encapsulated the paranoia circulating around AIDS in the 1980s and ’90s when he said: “I was told that I’d contracted this virus, it didn’t take me long to realize that I’d contracted a diseased society as well.” Much of Wojnarowicz’s artwork dealt with the feelings of anger and betrayal contained in this statement. An active member of the ACT UP movement, Wojnarowicz addressed themes of blindness and betrayal in Untitled (Buffalo) (Figure 7). This photograph, which was actually taken at a diorama at the Smithsonian Museum, expresses the feelings of anger and betrayal toward the United States Government held by Wojnarowicz and AIDS activists in general. The falling buffalo certainly called to mind declarations that the government had led citizens “off a cliff” with its inaction and policies towards AIDS. Additionally, the image has been discussed as drawing parallels between the nineteenth-century mass slaughter of buffalo in the United States and the large number of HIV/AIDS related deaths in the 1980s. Many activists felt that just as the buffalo had been systematically eliminated by the government in the 1800s, so too were HIV/AIDS positive persons being isolated and left to die. Wojnarowicz was one of the most personally active and outspoken artists in AIDS activism. In one particularly famous instance he was photographed wearing a leather jacket which read, “IF I DIE OF AIDS- FORGET BURIAL, THROW MY BODY ON THE STEPS OF THE FDA” (Figure 8). Wojnarowicz’s statement conveyed frustration at government inaction on AIDS policy. Dying of AIDS in 1992, Wojnarowicz became a martyr for AIDS activism while the image of his jacket became iconic. While ACT UP was based in provocative activism, another manifestation of the AIDS epidemic took more individualized narratives to a monumental scale.

The NAMES project memorial quilt was a public project composed of hundreds of individual quilts that was especially critical to the visual culture of AIDS in the 1980s and ’90s. The quilt was important both because of how it rendered AIDS visible and diverse in the early years of the epidemic, and because of the controversy that it began. The discussions and critiques surrounding the quilt are themselves caught up in the themes which guided the discourse of AIDS in this time. The first and perhaps most significant impact of the quilt is its visibility.—specifically, the way in which the quilt’s design and breadth of narratives interacted with its display on the National Mall in 1987. The NAMES project was initiated to commemorate the lives of those lost to AIDS. The premise of the quilt is that each panel represents the story of one individual, making the quilt a testimony both to the significant number of AIDS related deaths and also to the individual identities of the departed. The concept of the quilt is particularly important. The ideas that each death should be represented equally and individually and that the significance of the sum total lies in the diversity of its component pieces are directly tied to themes of stigma, silence, and invisibility. In one sense, the stories of those affected by AIDS are made visible by the quilt; however, the sheer number of quilts may encourage for some a mere impression devoid of any engagement with the individuality of each quilt. “The moral point of the NAMES Project,” said scholar Richard D. Mohr, “is the valorizing of the individual life, not necessarily because such a life issues in the honorable, but just because it is unique—the working out, even if stumblingly, of a self-conceived plan of life.” The individual significance of each quilt within

10 Arning, 46.
11 Katz, Art AIDS America, 62.
12 Katz.
13 Richard D Mohr quoted in Carole Blair and Neil Michel, “The AIDS Memorial Quilt and the Contemporary Culture of Public
Gruber

the larger NAMES project is made particularly clear when one examines its naming. Some quilts featured first and last names, while others were simply titled “Daddy”, or “My Brother.” Other quilt-makers made a statement by refusing to add a name in protest of the stigma and oppression faced by those with HIV/AIDS. While the quilt has seen numerous additions and displays over the years, its display on the National Mall in 1987 was particularly significant for a variety of reasons. For an issue such as AIDS to be featured on the most prominent national stage was a statement, especially when considering the relatively hushed and lethargic response of the government during the early years of the epidemic. The quilt’s first display, featuring more than 1,920 panels, came two years after the sitting president’s first public acknowledgement of the epidemic. Delivered four years after the outbreak and after 21,000 Americans had already died, the tardiness of President Reagan’s remarks was a massive source of outrage for activists and those affected by the disease. For many of these people, especially those active in the group ACT UP, AIDS activism necessitated an aggressive condemnation of the politics of apathy exercised by the Reagan administration.

Interestingly, many of these same activists took issue with the quilt. In an ACT UP protest, one member spoke out against the quilt saying, “They [the government] have turned people we love into ashes and bone chips and corpses. That should not be hidden.” At the same event another activist said of the quilt, “This is an angry funeral, not a sad one. The quilt makes our dying look beautiful, but it’s not beautiful, it’s ugly and we have to fight for our lives.” While it is simple to extol the virtue of the quilt in its contemporary, memorializing state, it is critical to consider its reception during the height of the epidemic. Before its contemporary cultural acceptance and enthusiasm, the AIDS quilt proved divisive. The scholars Carol Blair and Neil Michel best characterized the polarizing perspectives on the quilt: “the language of therapy, when the metaphor reaches too far, depoliticizes the AIDS Memorial Quilt, rendering it as comforting and curative rather than as angry and confrontational.” Despite outspoken criticism, the scale and statement of the quilt remain a significant moment in the early visual culture of AIDS. By attempting to place AIDS at the doorstep of the American people, the NAMES project tied together issues of prejudice, loss, and individuality in a dynamic and critical way.

While it was not involved solely or even primarily in the visual arts, ACT UP used visual images to advance its agenda, calling for political action and addressing themes of silence and marginalization. There were many other activist groups fighting to raise awareness about AIDS in the 1980s and ’90s. However, this analysis mainly considers ACT UP because of the breadth of images produced in its protests as well as its close ties to the visual culture and fine artists. ACT UP was notable because of its loud campaigning and willingness to court controversy, if it would mean raising awareness or potentially saving lives. ACT UP contributed to the visual culture of AIDS in several ways, the most common of which were posters. Images held by members of ACT UP at rallies and demonstrations were often contributed to be members who were active in the art world or other visual fields. Through their varied use of images in posters, ACT UP addressed numerous political, social, and discursive issues.

Some posters dealt with highly localized issues, while others spoke to the movement as a whole. A particularly localized issue dealt with in ACT UP posters was that of New York City mayor Ed Koch (in office 1978-1989). Posters carried by members of ACT UP addressed the mayor’s failure to allocate significant funding to the epidemic and speculated that the mayor was gay. Because Ed Koch’s sexuality was commonly scrutinized, the mayor’s subsequent silence was found to be particularly outraging. Members of ACT UP voiced concerns that the mayor had failed to reach out to other at-risk groups such as intravenous drug users and that his inaction on the issue of AIDS deserved more attention divorced from any discussion of the mayor’s sexuality.

Another famous example of an ACT UP poster is the poster reading: “Silence = Death” (Figure 9). This image, notable for its black field and pink triangle, was the opposite of the posters of Ed Koch. Instead of addressing

14 Blair and Michel, 9.
15 Blair and Michel, 9.
the localized issue of New York City policy, “Silence = Death” addressed pervasive silence and discomfort with the discussion of AIDS. By rejecting AIDS’ presentation as an invisible and silent disease, ACT UP represented the concerns of marginalized groups such as gay men and drug users who were being grossly underestimated and underserved by the government and public health. The theme of silence was particularly meaningful, as members of ACT UP would continually mention the suffocating lack of discourse surrounding the disease. In one particular instance, an activist described being a gay man during the AIDS epidemic as, “Fighting in a war where only you could hear the bombs.”

Another group of posters dealt with the marginalization of those with AIDS by the Catholic Church and in most cases depicted the Pope. Many of the posters were made in response to the church’s statements in the 1980s that the gay population was responsible for the proliferation of AIDS as well as the church’s refusal to condone condom usage. ACT UP addressed the church’s actions with other demonstrations as well. In one particularly notable instance, demonstrators entered St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Manhattan in the middle of mass. Remaining in step with the ACT UP policy of boldness and visibility, demonstrators laid in the aisles and chained themselves to the pews. In doing this, ACT UP showed its willingness to create discomfort and disorder to further their cause of visibility and awareness. Other posters created by members of ACT UP attempted to address the loss of mainstream figures, bringing the issue of AIDS closer to home for those who had been previously unaware. One poster read: “Not Appearing: Larry Kert” in reference to the late West Side Story star’s 1991 death of AIDS. In doing this, ACT UP showed that AIDS, having led to the death of members of the American pop culture, was no longer a fringe issue. Many other posters made reference to David Wojnarowicz, presented in a number of banners wearing his famous “IF I DIE…” jacket. Wojnarowicz was a consistently outspoken member of the ACT UP movement.

Despite the success of its posters, ACT UP also engaged in performances and demonstrations which added to the visual culture because of the way in which the protest made visible the invisible pain and loss felt by those affected by the disease. One particularly provocative demonstration saw members of ACT UP scaling the gate of the White House and tossing ashes onto the lawn. The tossing of ashes was done in an effort to generate a tangible consequence for the US government. While the loss and threat of AIDS hadn’t gained enough recognition and visibility in the minds of members of ACT UP, the throwing of ashes functioned as a way to manifest the loss caused by a disease which was perceived to be invisible.

The other more well-known instance of ACT UP’s visual performance were the group’s mass “die-ins”. Die-ins, where members of ACT UP lay on the ground simulating death, were a common tool for dealing with themes of invisibility which were so prevalent in the visual culture. In some cases, die-ins such as the one held in 1988 in front of the Food and Drug Administration (Figure 10) included tombstones with messages such as “Killed by the FDA” or “Dead from Lack of Drugs”. These visual performances addressed the specific failure of the FDA to urgently and effectively test drugs which could be used to treat HIV/AIDS, leaving patients feeling neglected and marginalized. Performances such as the “die-ins” and the St. Patrick’s cathedral protest blurred the lines between political protest and performance art. While these acts were performed outside of an artistic exhibition setting and were enacted with political ends in mind, the symbolic and visual imagination that ACT UP incorporated into their protests were central to the group’s perception and to their deep cultural impact. Other images from the FDA die-in include the classic “Silence = Death,” as well as a number of highly edited images of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. In this way, ACT UP was able to contextualize their highly localized criticisms of the FDA by presenting this visual material alongside more expansive declarations of visibility and awareness.

In 1996 the NAMES project memorial quilt was placed on display again on the National Mall. Unlike the display in 1987, the current president and first lady of the United States made a formal visit to the display, indicating (if only symbolically) that the work of activists and artists in raising awareness and visibility had made an impact. The biomedical battle with AIDS had not been won and the disease had certainly not been eradicated. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, one of the most outspoken and thoughtful artists of the 1980s and ‘90s, died due to AIDS.

19 Fight Back, Fight AIDS: 15 Years of ACT UP, 09:00.
21 Fight Back, Fight AIDS: 15 Years of ACT UP, 56:00.
related illness the same year, five years after the death of his partner Ross. If anything, 1996 showed that despite artistic and activist impact on the visual culture of AIDS and the culture of the United States in general, there was much progress to be made before AIDS could no longer be considered a public health concern. Despite this, the work of artists such as Gonzalez-Torres, Robert Gober, and David Wojnarowicz approached AIDS from a myriad of perspectives, addressing its invisibility, silence, and even policymaking. The NAMES project memorial quilt followed in the tradition of portraying the experience of AIDS, taking an extreme interest in both collective and individual grief and memorial. Finally, ACT UP operated outside of institutional confines, using a variety of posters and visual performative acts to address highly localized as well as more broad concerns relating to the portrayal of AIDS and subsequent actions. The combined action and intersection of these influencing forces on the visual culture of AIDS produced a great degree of material which dealt with themes of invisibility and silence, rendering the invisible visible and the silent audible.
Figure 1a: Felix Gonzalez Torres, Untitled (Placebo), 1991, wrapped candy, Museum of Modern Art, New York, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/80932

Figure 2: Felix Gonzalez Torres, Untitled (USA Today), 1990, wrapped candy, Hammer Museum, Los Angeles, https://hammer.ucla.edu/take-it-or-leave-it/art/untitled-usa-today/
Figure 3: Felix Gonzalez Torres, Untitled (Blood), 1992, beads, Punta della Dogana, Venice, photographed by Adriano D'Angelo, https://www.flickr.com/photos/data_files/43712175492
Figure 4: Felix Gonzalez Torres, Untitled, 1991, stacked sheets of paper, Guggenheim Museum, New York https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/24264
Figure 5: Felix Gonzalez Torres, Untitled, 1991, billboard photograph, Museum of Modern Art, New York: https://www.moma.org/collection/works/79063
Figure 7: David Wojnarowicz, Untitled (Buffalo), 1988, photograph, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, https://www.wnyc.org/story/review-david-wojnarowicz-season-in-hell/
Figure 9: Silence = Death Project, Silence = Death, poster, http://www.actupny.org/reports/silence-death.html
Figure 10: J Scott Applewhite, ACT UP demonstrators…. 1988, photograph, Associated Press: https://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/apr/17/act-up-at-30-reinvigorated-for-trump-fight/
By the early twentieth century the British Monarchy was little more than a politically impotent figurehead. Any vestiges of direct political influence disappeared during the reign of King George V, marking the separation of the royal family from party politics. It is difficult to date the exact end of the monarchy’s direct political power, given its gradual decline throughout the Victorian era. However, the 1911 Parliament Act offers one potential time and place. In response to the House of Lords rejecting a proposed budget for the first time in two centuries, the Parliament Act stripped the House of Lords’ absolute veto power over legislation from the elected House of Commons. The ability of the reigning monarch to appoint peers to the House of Lords correspondingly lost much of its significance, ostensibly marking the end of royal political power and reducing ensuing monarchs to purely ceremonial status.

However, despite the House of Windsor’s muted political role, the Crown still served as an important societal institution after 1911, symbolizing British culture and empire. Beginning in the late 1870s, even as direct political influence slipped from royal hands, the grandeur of the royal family was inversely and carefully enhanced via a series of pageants and ceremonies. Far from being merely aesthetically pleasing pomp, these pageants were specifically designed to elevate the status of the monarchy and the reigning monarch. The efforts to position the royal family as a relevant public institution have been most notably documented by historian David Cannadine who suggests that, by the mid 1930s, the monarchy had indeed become “splendid, public, and popular.” In turn, as the prominent head of the nation, the monarchy – in unison with the British media and political and social elites – was used as a tool to symbolize and correspondingly disseminate certain social values amongst the populace. While the Crown had lost its immediate and obvious political power, it exerted a new form of persuasive soft power: grand royal ceremonies were viewed as opportunities to enhance both the royal image and the social ideals imbued within the contemporary royal family, which purportedly correspondingly shaped national values and embodied what Britishness truly meant.

According to various historical accounts, by the 1930s, the British monarchy was thus exceedingly popular and quite effective at disseminating certain aristocratic ideals. David Cannadine, a prominent historian of modern Britain, has offered the most thorough accounting of this history in works such as History In Our Time (1998) and a chapter in The Invention of Tradition (1983). Other scholars, both before and after Cannadine, have also addressed these themes, such as Edward Owens, whose work focuses specifically on the British monarchy, the British public, and mass media around World War II, to be encapsulated in an upcoming monograph. The royal ideals these accounts describe were intended to enhance conservative stability by promoting concepts such as domestic cohesion, family life, and respect for the upper classes.¹

However, in 1936 and 1937, a rupture occurred within the British monarchy, disturbing its public image and creating a documented public reaction that enables popular perceptions of the interwar British monarchy to be studied in greater detail. In 1936, King Edward VIII, a complicated figure who personally contradicted the image many British elites thought the monarchy should represent, abdicated the throne to his brother, King George VI. This prominent and publicized event—the abdication crisis—and the ensuing aftermath sparked lively reactions. Usefully, and not accidentally, the Mass Observation project was launched in 1936—an endeavour recording everyday social life in Britain via voluntary “Observers”—leaving behind extensive, deliberate, and frequently referenced records of public and private views toward the monarchy. Mass Observation’s founders, Tom Harrisson, Charles Madge, and Humphrey Jennings, three young Cambridge graduates, hoped to document and categorize the public mood and how everyday Britons operated in their sur-

¹ Domestic cohesion referred to both the physical home and the nuclear family, as well as the larger British nation as a grand, national family.
roundings. They collected diaries, interviews, reports, anecdotes, and other daily observances from the hundreds of Observers who eventually joined their project, intending to create a scientific study of British social behavior: the self-declared “Anthropology of ourselves.” The coronation of King George VI following Edward’s abdication, an event that earned the focus of Mass Observation’s first major publication, duly allows a unique exploration of how people actually perceived the British monarchy, the grand ceremonies intended to enhance the monarchy’s reputation, and thus the effectiveness of the ceremonial monarchy at both directing Britain’s national spirit and propagating values favorable to the ruling classes.

Privileging a ground-level perspective of British society, this essay illustrates that public perceptions of the monarchy in the 1930s have not been adequately represented. The work of David Cannadine and others who have explored perceptions of the ceremonial monarchy undeniably reflect and illustrate the numerous contented and adoring contemporary views toward the British royal family. However, additional and often contradictory perceptions existed as well. As some authors, such as Philip Ziegler in *Crown and People* (1978), have briefly noted, there was a portion of the British population who, for various reasons, did not admire or ‘buy in’ to the image of the apparently popular monarchy and what it embodied. Notably, few people critiqued the institution of the monarchy and the inequality it represented, indicating a general acceptance of the royal institution in the national consciousness. However, as this essay argues and highlights, on May 12, 1937, various segments of the population expressed distaste for George VI compared to his brother, voiced widespread and marked disinterest in everything related to the monarchy, and offered careful criticisms of the royal ceremony. These accounts not only highlight immediate perceptions of the monarchy in 1937, but illustrate that the decades-long project to popularize the monarchy had, perhaps from its inception in the 1870s and culminating in this moment in time in 1937, been less successful than some scholarship has portrayed. The dislike and general antipathy prevalent in many of these accounts contradict the image of a wholly popular, seductive monarchy and crucially demonstrate that the conception of the monarchy as Britain’s national head, to be followed and emulated, was not without its dissenters. This paper complicates the reactions of British society toward the monarchy, questions the monarchy’s success at disseminating cultural and societal messages, highlights those Britons who expressed distinct agency in rebuffing their leaders’ desired norms, and illustrates the plurality of perspectives that simultaneously existed during the interwar era.

**Approach and Relevance**

This paper’s primary evidence is founded on the individual voices recorded in the Mass Observation archive. While such an approach might raise concerns about mistaking the voices of just a (relative) handful of people as indicative of broader societal mindsets, this view enables a micro-history, privileging a detailed analysis. Moreover, the Mass Observation project is uniquely special for the breadth of its scope and the numerous individual reactions it recorded, and the accounts highlighted in this paper are a notable portion of all voices in the Mass Observation *May the Twelfth* publication. Additionally, this paper does not suppose that the dissenting voices utilized were those of the majority: as will be further explored, the monarchy was undeniably quite popular in the eyes of many, and a plurality of Mass Observation accounts illustrate a genuine adoration for both the monarchy and royal events. Rather, this paper simply highlights those who lacked a voice in the public sphere. Instead of a top-down analysis tracking and numbering those who stood for or against the monarchy, the focus moves to the micro-level to examine why people were uninterested in the monarchy, how they felt (or did not feel) about royal events and their intertwined values, and where popular imaginations were actually focused. This personalized history—even if it lacks the names of the many people whose accounts will be used—focuses on how individuals felt, lived, and acted at the ground level (pertaining to perceptions of the monarchy) as part of larger and seemingly significant dissenting groups that cannot be specifically quantified in size.

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2 For a good discussion and summary of both the value and drawbacks of Mass Observation as a historical source, and its frequent use and unique value for historians, see Annebella Pollen, “Research Methodology in Mass Observation Past and Present: ‘Scientifically, about as valuable as a chimpanzee’s tea party at a zoo?’”, *Historical Workshop Journal* 75 (April 2013): 213–235. Given the mass of early materials Mass Observation produced, this paper generally limits itself to analyzing voices from the *May the Twelfth* publication. Other authors, such as Helen Busby and James Hinton, have used similar approaches, limiting the scope of Mass Observation materials they covered by using methods such as severely limiting the date-range on the publications they examined, choosing starkly contrasting accounts only, etc., as highlighted by Pollen.

3 The names of the individuals in Mass Observation are not available due to the recording method used by Mass Observation at this time. In
The perspectives highlighted in this paper suggest several things. They highlight the complicated relationship between crown and people, and the continued, conscious presence of the royal family in the public sphere well after its political decline. However, despite the efforts of various British elites to mold national consciousness via a royal presence, individuals nonetheless maintained their own vision of what the monarchy should be and what sort of Britain they wanted the monarchy to represent. Newspapers and various official accounts, inherently linked to the project of propagating the monarchy and its apparently popular image, correspondingly silenced dissenting voices, highlighting the crucial value of ground-level perspectives. Finally, as historian Laura Beers discusses, it is often assumed that in the interwar period the British people were uninterested in “cults of personality” and figures perceived as embodying change. However, Beers contends that changes in interwar Britain’s political culture have been understudied or overlooked, and, as this first section of this paper implicitly demonstrates, a man (Edward VIII) perceived to embody change could clearly capture the imaginations of some Britons, especially when serving as a foil to Britain’s aristocracy and the values it stood for and propagated. In defiance of what many British leaders wanted, independent visions and ideas of what was considered socially valuable, and what actually defined Britishness, were performed and lived out at the street level and via daily actions and words, in community celebrations, parlor rooms, and cinemas, in distinct expressions of individual autonomy.

**Organization**

This paper is divided into four parts, beginning with a review of the manner in which the interwar monarchy was popularized, the purposes British elites hoped the monarchy would serve, and the historiographical work surrounding the perceptions and popularity of the monarchy. Following this contextualization are three sections built primarily off of the Mass Observation archive, highlighting the various ways people expressed their disapproval or ambivalence toward the monarchy, what it stood for, and the ceremonies intended to popularize it.

The first of these sections focuses on perceptions of Edward VIII on the day of King George VI’s coronation, and Edward’s continued popularity. Due to the polarizing effect of Edward’s personality and abdication, his continued popularity on May 12 both demonstrated and fostered resentment toward other members of the royal family and their elitist tone and values. Many people specifically preferred Edward because he stood against the values the monarchy, politicians, and media were attempting to disseminate. In turn, some openly disliked and rejected George VI and the aristocracy behind him precisely because of what they embodied. The monarchy and aristocracy not only failed to capture the imaginations of Edward’s many supporters, but the aristocratic values the monarchy represented and was supposed to popularize were actually an active source of disinterest and hostility toward the royal institution.

The second section explores how, despite the collaborative efforts of the monarchy, politicians, and media to enhance the grandeur of the monarchy, many people were simply apathetic toward the publicized coronation, regardless of the fantastic rituals surrounding it. Though a superficial examination would suggest that the British public had great royal enthusiasm, ground-level explorations show that many listening to the radio or celebrating out on the streets on coronation day were seemingly far removed from the monarchy and the values it was supposed to disseminate. Despite an unstated acceptance of the existence of the monarchy and its ceremonies, marked disinterest prevailed in the minds of many.

Finally, this paper concludes by briefly examining the small portion of the population who were actively turned off by the pageantry and ceremony surrounding the monarchy on coronation day. Intended to enhance the monarchy’s image, influence, and message, the pomp of coronation actually eroded the values and image of the monarchy in the eyes of some individuals, who perceived the ceremonies supposed to popularize the monarchy as undercutting and demeaning the traditional, stable message the monarchy was supposed to embody.

Together, these sections illustrate a significant group of people united by their dislike or ambivalence to-

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4 For Beers’ discussion of cults of personality in interwar Britain see Laura Beers, “A Model MP?,” *Cultural and Social History* 10 (June 2013), 231–250. For an example of the existing scholarship surrounding Britain’s interwar political culture and the supposed lack of interest in cults of personality, Beers points us toward the work of Jon Lawrence, “Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence and the Fear of Brutalisation in Post-First World War Britain,” *Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003), 557–589.
ward the monarchy’s image. These individuals complicate conceptions of the institution’s widespread popularity, illustrate that not all “bought in” to what the monarchy represented, and highlight those people who, not aligned with the media or aristocracy yet given voice by Mass Observation, have been somewhat overlooked in the historical record.

**Historiography — The “Traditional” Ceremonial Monarchy**

As David Cannadine expertly catalogues, by the interwar period, the British monarchy had become synonymous with triumphal processions, pompous celebrations, and “traditional” ceremonies. In the 1870s, royal heads of state across Europe began engaging in “ceremonial competitions,” which expressed “national rivalry” and held prestige because of their supposed long-standing traditional nature. For example, in Britain, King Edward VII embraced “full-dress ceremonial occasions,” the grandeur of which was affirmed by the musical works of Viscount Esher. In reality, such gaudy ceremonies and their specific rituals and publicized nature were a relatively modern invention and had little historical backing. They were merely framed and presented as traditional to grant both the ceremonies and their participants ancillary legitimacy, appealing to the authority of the past. Between 1914 and 1953, royal occasions continued to evolve, and pagans expressed “continuity in a period of unprecedented change.” These supposedly traditional events were successfully implemented and accepted as genuine, and by the 1930s, Edward Owens suggests, the monarchy had indeed become fully domesticated and a “truly national symbol.”

Sarah Gristwood, an author and commentator on royal affairs, similarly suggests that the monarchy and royal events had become “valuable crowd pleasers” and a corresponding “focus for national unity.” Even as early as 1955, at an academic debate, Professor Shils, Professor Birnbaum and Dr. Michael Young concluded that royal coronations, such as the one just two years prior, created a “readier acceptance by the Briton of the society in which he lives.”

The popularization of the monarchy was a conscious effort to serve political goals. Amidst continental upheaval, the advent of full adult suffrage in Britain, a hungry working class, and the Great Depression, the grand, ceremonial monarchy comfortably embodied and promoted stability, family values, and national consensus, crucially linking the national family together as its ceremonial head. In this important role the monarchy was socially and politically relevant: via its “restrained, anachronistic ceremonial grandeur” it became a “rallying point of stability” and a bulwark against (perceived) dangerous change. In turn, the monarchy served the purposes of Britain’s aristocracy, who “orchestrated royal family events as nation-building exercises designed to create loyal subjects.” A popular monarchy was supposed to both encourage a durable, unchanging society, since the monarchy itself was supposedly steeped in tradition, and foster a reverent respect of the well-off upper classes in Britain. Such principles appealed strongly to Britain’s leaders, to whom rapid and unpredictable change was dangerous. George VI, for instance, was symbolically presented as the national father—contrasting nicely with his childless...

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6 Cannadine, 136.
7 Cannadine, 133.
8 Cannadine, 139.
11 Philip Ziegler, *Crown and People* (New York: Knopf, 1978), 45. Michael Billig states that Shils’ and Young’s work essentially portrays the 1953 coronation as a “a nation enthralled by the antiquity of the proceedings and collectively reaffirming its sacred values,” much like the 1937 coronation has been framed. Found in Billig, *Talking of the Royal Family*, 4. For a further discussion of the opinions of Shils and Young, and how coronations became a “ceremonial occasion for the affirmation of the moral values by which the society lives,” and an “act of national communion,” see J. G. Blumer et. al., “Attitudes to the Monarchy: Their Structure and Development during a Ceremonial Occasion,” *Political Studies* 19 (June 1971): 151.
13 Cannadine, 141; Owens, “All the World Loves a Lover,” 3–4.
14 Owens, 3–4.
brother—and his coronation purportedly projected and imbued the aforementioned values into the hearts and minds of accepting onlookers, in a united effort to shape the soul of British society.\textsuperscript{15}

The British media were active participants in this endeavour. They covered royal ceremonies in a reverent, awed manner, displayed remarkable reserve in covering royal affairs, and hailed the royal family as an institution of integrity and respect.\textsuperscript{16} The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) even permitted the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Earl Marshall, a royal official, to edit any and all materials produced after the coronation of King George VI to ensure photographs and films met royal standards.\textsuperscript{17} Political and social elites, the media, and the royal family were inherently intertwined and collaborative in their efforts to disseminate a specific message of what the monarchy stood for, and what should thus be emulated. In 1937, a media commentator wrote of the royal coronation that there is “no other spectacle of any kind so impressive, so awe-inspiring, to be witnessed anywhere else in the world.”\textsuperscript{18} This spectacle, and the corresponding importance and role of the monarchy as a propagating tool, was summed up by Prime Minister Baldwin, who, in a speech to Parliament, declared, “The Crown in this country through the centuries has been deprived of many of its prerogatives, but today, while that is true, it stands for far more than it ever has done in its history.”\textsuperscript{19}

Efforts to popularize the monarchy and influence the British populace were not futile, and the monarchy undeniably held great esteem to many. Vast crowds lined the streets of London for George VI’s coronation ceremony, and it is believed some 60,000 people watched it on the television. The radio was particularly significant in bringing people close to the monarchy: it created a “democratic space” in which listeners “affirmed their loyalty to the Crown through joint participation in nationally shared experiences.”\textsuperscript{20} Edward Owens emphasizes that, by this era, the monarchy had become a focal point of emotion-attachment, brought fully into “national public life.”\textsuperscript{21}

At the wedding for Prince George and Princess Marina in 1934, which was broadcasted via the radio, some listeners even expressed a sense of social unification through shared identification with the lovers.\textsuperscript{22} Certain values were indeed successfully disseminated amongst the general populace via royal events, and the works of Cannadine, Owens, and others highlighted above aptly and informatively demonstrate how the popularized monarchy could be wielded as a successful social-modeling tool.

**IMAGES OF THE MONARCHY**

In contrast to the popular image of the monarchy are the significant voices of those who dissented against the monarchy and the values it was supposed to embody. While much of the existing scholarship on the subject focuses on the intended purposes of the monarchy and the successes it did achieve, this essay turns to accounts from the days on and surrounding the 1937 coronation to illustrate the many alternative visions, meanings, and interpretations of the monarchy that also existed at the ground-level of British society. In three sections—organized broadly around the themes of Edward vs. George, perceptions toward royal ceremonies on coronation day, and views toward the monarchy as a traditional institution—this part of the paper illustrates the distinct ground level agency and autonomy Britons expressed via their everyday lives, often in defiance of their social superiors.

**1. Edward VIII, George VI, and the (Un)Popular Monarchy**

The Duke of Windsor, referred to as Edward VIII throughout this paper, was an undeniably captivating figure. Few embodied the image of a contemporary celebrity so well, and his penchant for ignoring royal norms (such as religious observances) and the polarization he fostered demonstrated an implicit rejection of the stable family image that the monarchy was supposed to represent.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{15} Ziegler, *Crown and People*, 46.

\textsuperscript{16} For example, the British press did not report on Edward VIII’s love interest in Ms. Simpson for an extended period of time to protect the monarchy; the news was in the American press well before. The British media also refused to publish certain comics making fun of the monarchy.

\textsuperscript{17} Cannadine, “The Context, Performance, and Meaning of Ritual,” 141–142.

\textsuperscript{18} Quoted in Cannadine, 145.

\textsuperscript{19} Quoted in Patrick Howarth, *George VI: A New Biography* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 64.

\textsuperscript{20} Owens, “All the World Loves a Lover,” 5.

\textsuperscript{21} Owens, 5.

\textsuperscript{22} Owens, 33.

\textsuperscript{23} David Cannadine, *History In Our Time* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 62.
a result, those who supported Edward—and he was undeniably popular amongst many Britons—implicitly or explicitly supported or at least accepted his rejection of tradition. Edward quite prominently turned his back on the “very institution of monarchy,” tossing away customs, tradition, and stability.24 Edward was correspondingly unpopular amongst many of Britain’s elites, and King George VI himself regarded Edward as the “negation” of everything the monarchy and the old British social order stood for.25 Edward was determined to “rebel against a system which he only dimly understood.”26 However, as Susan Williams states, in contrast to and perhaps because of Edward’s unpopularity amongst the elites, many people viewed Edward as their “democratic king.”27 There was an undeniable “star quality” to Edward, and the personality that turned off many aristocrats also encouraged affection.28 Many of those announcing their preference for Edward were thus entering into and declaring their side, even if unconsciously, in a politicized debate between Edward and George, and illuminating more generally where they stood in regards to the aristocrats’ monarchy of choice.

These preferences and divisions were predictably present on King George VI’s coronation day, and many continued to openly prefer Edward to George even after the coronation. As one Mass Observer astutely noted on May 12, there were two camps in contemporary Britain: “die-hard pro-Baldwinites,” who were pleased that the morally unfit Edward would not sit the throne, and “staunch pro-Edwardians.”29 As this section now highlights, Edward’s popularity, the messy circumstances under which he was encouraged to abdicate, and the opposing personality of his successor, George VI, meant that Edward’s popularity transformed into a rejection of Britain’s elites, the monarchy, and the values it was supposed to represent on coronation day.

Perhaps most subtly, if not unconsciously, the rejection of the monarchy on May 12 evinced itself in the imaginaries and actions of select individuals who simply ignored the coronation ceremony entirely. They turned their attentions instead toward Edward, their desired King, who did anything but embrace the values imbued within the royal pageant taking place that day. In a form of quiet protest, the extensive coverage of the coronation ceremony—more thoroughly brought to the public’s doorstep than any prior royal event—was imaginatively, internally marginalized. Indeed, even amongst those who did listen to or watch the ceremony, Edward’s shadow was present: during the broadcasted coronation ceremony one woman listened silently to the BBC with tears streaming down her cheeks. “Oh, it ought to be Edward—it ought to be Edward,” she moaned.30 Another woman, who declared she had consciously ignored the entire coronation in a silent protest, informed an Observer that she would have “went up and cheered” had Edward simply been physically present.31 Meanwhile, friends of an Observer, all “great fans” of Edward, whiled away the coronation by posing questions such as “How is Edward feeling?” or “What is Edward thinking now?” Some, as Susan Williams noted, even wrote letters to Edward personally to express their adoration, and their sentiments spilled over into the Mass Observation archives as well.33 One London resident, apparently too tired to bother with King George VI’s coronation, announced that, for Edward, she would “have gone [to the coronation] and not thought about being tired.”34

The desire to ignore the coronation unless Edward was present was shared by others as well, ranging from a man who intended to name his vehicle Edward to honor him, to an upset individual who thought the whole coronation business was “beastly,” to numerous accounts of tear-shedding.35 These expressions of upset illustrate that Edward’s shadow remained in the minds of many on King George VI’s coronation day, and recollections and fond-

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24 Cannadine, 51.
25 Cannadine, 62.
26 Cannadine, 58.
28 Edward also engaged in a host of actions that enhanced this perception, such as visiting workers’ factories and decrying, or displaying real sympathy for, their conditions; Williams, 51.
29 DS266, Day Survey for March–October 1937.
31 Jennings and Madge, 281.
32 DS194, Day Survey for May 1937.
33 Williams, The People’s King, 242–246.
34 DS164, Day Survey for May 1937.
35 DS090, Day Survey for April 1937; Day Survey Respondent 090, April–July 1937.
ness for Edward actively stole attention away from the ongoing royal pageant. An apparently eager rumor even spread throughout London that Edward was set to return and reclaim his place as King.36 The personal celebrity of Edward meant the hearts and minds of many were focused on anything but the publicized royal coronation and the affirmation of stable aristocratic values that it was supposed to symbolize.

Despite the monarchy holding little real political power, many Mass Observation accounts highlighted that some people felt the monarchy could indeed represent and lead social change. The abdication of Edward—a man who seemed to embody change—thus provoked a sense that the people had been undercut, fostering a more explicit, conscious, and bitter rejection of the values the apparently popularized King George VI and monarchy were supposed to represent and disseminate. One indignant individual, for example, claimed that Edward had been “forced” off the throne due to a “triviality,” and “if Edward VII had been crowned I would have gone.”37 Another individual even outright denounced George VI as a stooge of the church and the clerical order, and, to another outraged gentleman, Edward VIII would have been a different King, since he would have made an “announcement” to the people and “blow[n] the gaff.”38 What hidden truths such individuals suspected were being kept from the public were left unstated, but many nonetheless believed that Edward would have stood against the established order in the interests of the populace.

A sense of betrayal—that the people had lost their King to Britain’s elites—thus emerged. A theatre operator expressed that the whole coronation and publicized ceremony was actually just for “the archbishop of Canterbury and not the King.” He not only felt the whole monarchical pageantry was about the religious order, but believed that Edward contrastingly “wouldn’t [have stood] for this.”39 Another Observer wistfully explained that Edward was “more independent in his outlook” than George, and took interest in the social problems of the people.40 An additional account concluded, “Some people expressed the view that it would have been different if it had been Edward to be crowned, as people really liked him.”41 To many, Edward was imagined as the people’s King and perceived as capable of altering the balance of social power and knowledge in the people’s favor. The change that the British elites feared Edward represented endeared him to others, and Edward’s popularity meant that many expressed outright upset or distrust toward Britain’s established order, even as its elites gathered in Westminster Abbey to crown a man who they hoped would enforce stability.

Given the juxtaposing images of Edward and George, and the aforementioned divided camps in Britain favouring Edward versus George (and vice versa), it is no surprise that those in Edward’s camp also outright denounced George VI on his own coronation date. In turn, they further demonstrated how George’s coronation and what it embodied was soundly rejected as a gaudy, publicized day intended to popularize the monarchy’s image. This rejection was founded around George VI’s own promise, publicly affirmed on May 12, that under his watch there would “be a return to the traditional standards of his father’s day.”42 As Cannadine writes, the Queen was even “successfully packaged and presented as a crinolined, romantic figure straight out of a winterhalter painting.”43 This image fulfilled the hopes and expectations many British aristocrats had for the monarchy, but for those who desired a new royal demeanor representing their common interests, George VI and the surrounding ceremonial pageantry carefully and intentionally contradicted that ambition.

Thus, as the aforementioned gentleman put it, George was perceived as a man who would never “blow the gaff” to and for the people, and the monarchy’s popularity correspondingly suffered. One Observer disparagingly questioned if George was capable of any independence whatsoever, and instead concluded that George would simply do “just as he was told.”44 To some, George VI had committed a double sin: not only did he sit down in “King Edward’s chair” and supersede the man who would have invoked change, but George VI was both personally

36 Jennings and Madge, May the Twelfth, 281.
37 Day Survey Respondent 135, May 1937.
38 Jennings and Madge, May the Twelfth, 287.
39 DS266, Day Survey for March–October 1937.
40 Jennings and Madge, May the Twelfth, 292.
41 Day Survey Respondent 163, March–May 1937.
42 Cannadine, History In Our Time, 63.
43 Cannadine, 63.
44 Jennings and Madge, May the Twelfth, 292.
unexciting and would fail to represent the people’s interests. One Geoffrey Wells, for instance, wrote that he felt the need to leave a cinema on coronation when the “New King” and his “blasted wife” appeared on screen. Wells expressed not only a disgust for the “sheer hypocrisy of the British press & public” for accepting George, but felt that Edward was forced off the throne since he, compared to George, was determined “to be, as King, an individual.”

The happy, stable family image that George VI embodied, which so pleased many British elites, thus fostered bitterness in the minds of others. Many were notably either disinterested or upset with the monarchy on May 12, 1937, explicitly because of the values the day represented. The event affirmed and reminded them of what they had lost in Edward and the triumph of Britain’s leaders over the people, and demonstrated the close ties of the monarchy to religious and political interests. These reminders served to create a polarization in attitudes toward the monarchy and what it stood for, distracting from and undermining the values the aristocracy had hoped such royal events would foster.

2. The Forgotten Monarchy?

While all in Britain may have held an opinion on George and Edward, their individual attributes were still not necessarily enough to capture the attentions of some Britons, even on May 12, a national holiday intended to celebrate the monarchy and royal coronation. The Mass Observation records illustrate a host of people whose imaginations were not entranced by the monarchy and its apparent popularity, even if, in some fashion, they seemed to participate in the day’s events. This section explores the individuals who, within both private and public spaces, ignored or never bought in to the gaudy royal ceremony the British media, elites, event organizers, and monarchy attempted to popularize. Within the domesticated space of the home, tens of thousands of Britons listened in to the coronation on the radio. Yet, Mass Observation records indicate that the attentions of even these listeners were often elsewhere. Moreover, celebrations in the public spaces of the street often had very little to do with the monarchy whatsoever, and were far removed from celebrating or practicing what the monarchy exemplified.

The advent of radio transformed how people participated in public events, supposedly bringing Britons closer to the monarchy than ever before. King George V’s speech at the Empire Exhibition in 1924 was heard by millions, convening people over the radio in the sort of national communion that monarchy was supposed to foster. In 1937, John Reith, Director General of the BBC, wrote, “Poor Edward. But thank god he and his ways have passed and there is a new King and Queen […] It seemed as if old England was back.” In turn, it is no surprise that on May 12, the BBC was an active and loyal participant in the endeavor to propagate the popularity of the monarchy, the importance of the occasion, and the messages people were supposed to draw from the event. The BBC was no stranger to endeavors to influence how common citizenry thought: when the radio had first launched, the BBC had even considered creating guilds to teach listeners how to listen appropriately—an operation in “cultivating good taste to mirror that of the cultural elites.”

Leading up to May 12, 1937, the BBC held “coronation week,” an array of special broadcasts to celebrate the monarchy. The Empire’s Homage broadcast, which preceded the coronation broadcast, “emphasized the Britishness of both the monarchy and the empire.” Britain’s most prominent broadcaster (the BBC), and one that dominated media accounts of King George VI’s coronation, was mindful of aristocratic desires, and did its best to popularize the monarchy in a manner that would favorably influence the general population.

However, listening to the carefully planned radio broadcast did not necessarily mean that people bought into and supported the ongoing royal events. As John Reith himself was acutely aware, the radio also included the “unwilling audience as well as the willing,” and how people listened to public addresses via the radio and interpreted the words of the commentators was “indiscriminate.” Many listened to the coronation, yet the day’s message did not reach or significantly influence the consciousness of some listeners.

45 DS057, Day Survey for February–May 1937.
46 Williams, The People’s King, 248.
47 Thomas Hajkowski, The BBC and national identity in Britain, 1922–53 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010), 87.
48 Hajkowski, 89.
50 Hajkowski, The BBC and national identity, 89; 91.
51 Lacey, Listening Publics, 36.
Various events recorded in Mass Observation on May 12 demonstrate the multiple ways people heard the coronation. Some individuals even became involuntary listeners, as recorded in several accounts, ranging from the radio broadcasting to disinterested audiences in restaurants or pubs, to employers turning on the radio throughout the house for detached servants. On the Isle of Man, a cinema event was interrupted in the middle of a show to broadcast the coronation, creating a roomful of involuntary listeners. Though all dutifully rose for “God Save the King,” a watching Observer noted the pervading sense of obligation in the room. A sense of duty also encouraged a man listening privately within his own home to tune in to the event, warding off feelings of guilt, yet his thoughts became critical: the whole broadcast sounded far too theatrical, and “royal” mother, privately felt the whole thing was “bunkum.” Numerous others in the archives also recorded that they carried out various tasks during the coronation, and the radio was simply a distracting background noise. At one pub a group of soldiers even had to coax and shame disinterested patrons to stand during the King’s speech. A notable number of Mass Observation accounts, although their exact proportion is difficult to quantify, illustrate unenthusiastic listeners who often had little choice but to listen. Their disinterest, and the few cases in which the listeners’ thoughts are recorded, highlight that several radio audience members were figuratively tuned out of the royal event.

Moreover, the auditory spectacle of the event itself distracted the attentions of a handful of individuals away from the royal family supposedly centered by the event. As some socially conservative Britons feared, the visual, theatrical, and auditory appeal of the celebrations that had come to surround the monarchy was overwhelming: spectacle, in and of itself, became the attraction. One Observer even explicitly noted that, during the radio event, they became “interested in the spectacle of the procession” and the commentator’s descriptions, rather than the royal family themselves. The monarchy’s apparent popularity and what it embodied was eclipsed. A young woman, who recorded that she did not particularly care about the whole event, described that the only emotion she felt during the coronation was amusement at the highly poetic commentator enthusiastically describing the visual proceedings. While many did enjoy the broadcasted ceremony, or were at least neutral on the subject, others did not buy in to the public event and the triumphal, heady occasion. Merely listening to the coronation ceremony did not inherently suggest support for or interest in the event, demonstrating that the monarchy’s apparent popularity not only failed to draw listeners’ attentions toward a monumental royal affair, but also that the expressions of national communion and national values imbued within the ceremony were perhaps lost on these distracted individuals.

Similarly, in the public spaces—the alleys and streets of cities and villages around the country—the psyches and imaginations of many people involved in events supposedly celebrating the monarchy did not necessarily involve the royal family whatsoever. Ground-level observations from Observers indicate that many celebrations, particularly those outside of London, were, as Ziegler writes, “little more than […] an excuse for a party or an extra drink.” Many simply enjoyed a holiday and the opportunity to let loose in communal events. These celebrations, supposedly part of fostering a “popular image” of the monarchy, often lacked any focus on the monarchy at all.

The coronation and the celebrations that occurred throughout Britain were undeniably grand. However, it was the grandiose displays of wealth and power that oc-
cupied the attentions of many Britons, both the afore-
mentioned radio listeners and those on the streets. Sum-
marizing such views, the postmaster of one English town
informed an Observer that nobody really cared about the
coronation but were merely waiting for a “gluttonous feast.” As one window cleaner put it, the widespread atti-
tude among many people was that paying attention to the
coronation was “not worth the effort,” but that they—the
people—would instead “party on Coronation day” and see the “decorations” afterwards. In towns around the
country it was “tea and sports”—the tea being “meat and
beer”—and events such as races, sports, and tug of wars
that brought people together.

Observer accounts described how there was lit-
tle royal enthusiasm at some of these spirited coronation
events. One Observer even picked up on visible “irrita-
tion” when “The King” began playing over the radio, and
the dutifully listening crowd quickly dispersed when it
ceased. At a parade—specifically intended to honor the
monarchy, the coronation, and Britishness—the observ-
ing crowd took widespread pleasure in taunting the uni-
formed soldiers passing by. Calls of “oh, the little mites!”
and cries of “Ooo Bert,” intended to confuse those passing
by, were shouted out to general delight. Not only did a
portion of the population care little about the monarchy,
but they consciously mocked the very pomp, glamour,
and formality intended to celebrate and popularize what
it stood for. Undeniably, many did reverently pay respects
to the monarchy on coronation day. However, for others,
the monarchy earned neither their respect nor interest on
May 12.

There were some more chaotic celebrations that
took place on coronation day as well. The unruly mo-
ments that occasionally erupted were perhaps unconscious
protests against the celebratory yet serious and controlled
coronation event. Aristocrats embraced grand ceremonies
to enhance the grandeur of the monarchy and hoped to

60 King George VI’s “coronation business” cost four times more than King George V’s coronation in 1911. Jennings and Madge, May the Twelfth, 22.
61 Jennings and Madge, 51.
62 Jennings and Madge, 53.
63 Jennings and Madge, 51; 184.
64 Jennings and Madge, 197.
65 Jennings and Madge, 203.
66 Jennings and Madge, 169.
67 Jennings and Madge, 235.
68 Jennings and Madge, 285.
69 Jennings and Madge, 327.
70 Ziegler, Crown and People, 76.
“EVERYONE is having a holiday,” but that she would not attend the coronation. Accounts such as these were incredibly common since, as another Observer wrote, “they [people] have no interest in it [the coronation] except that it is to be a holiday.” For many individuals, the coronation—even if they did celebrate on the streets—was not only an afterthought, but something they consciously and openly stated was simply not important to them. The polish and glamour surrounding the monarchy thus did not evince itself in popularity amongst all member of the populace. One female typist said, “I became very bored with the very word *coronation*,” as it was constantly invoked throughout the city. Moreover, the most disinterested voices may not even be in the archives: As Philip Ziegler writes, those most apathetic and disinterested in the entire day might be invisible to us in the present, since the large, bored minority group that Ziegler thinks could feasibly have existed would have not recorded their emotions whatsoever.

Although much of the populace appeared to exhibit attentiveness on coronation day, when these accounts are examined in detail it is clear that many people had little thought of the monarchy in mind. Some individuals and communities simply enjoyed the coronation as a national holiday, a day of freedom and frolicking. Others, both in and outside of the home, simply turned their attentions elsewhere, or even became critical. Despite the best efforts of British leaders and the British media to enthrall all potential watchers and listeners, the day’s revelry did not universally capture the national imagination. People instead expressed their own autonomy and ability for independent thought, and Mass Observers recorded various views, ideas, and reactions at the ground level, revealing a plurality of perspectives that complicate the notion that the monarchy—and what it stood for—had become splendid, public, and popular in the public eye.

3. The Traditional Monarchy

Some individuals openly embraced and liked the monarchy—particularly what they felt it stood for and represented—but also openly denounced the glamour and pageantry intended to popularize the monarchy and promote it as the head of Britain. They instead preferred a return to a less splendid monarchy, disliking grand ceremonies or even believing that they were counterproductive to the role the monarchy should hold.

As Ziegler notes, the frivolity of the royal ceremonies became a source of criticism. Can we really “expect the disabled and unemployed and ex-service men to gather around with their wives and children and throw up their caps in jubilation?” questioned one individual, unsure that glamorous festivities truly embodied and honoured traditional Britain. In many royal courts, doing away with royal ceremonies had once been seen as a sign of both disrespect toward the monarch and symbolic of the fading power of the monarchy. Yet the critiques some now levied in Britain toward royal occasions indicated that the existence of gaudy royal ceremonies was seen as detracting from and disrespecting the monarchy. The contradiction at the heart of the British aristocracy’s attempts to instill certain values via a popularized monarchy was thus revealed: the monarchy was supposed to symbolize concepts of tradition, harmony, and longstanding stoic upper-class values, yet these values were supposed to be communicated to the populace via distinctly modern ideas of celebrity and gaudy public events.

As such, to one Observer, who also made sure to inform readers that he was highly patriotic and could even be moved to tears at the solemnity of royal occasions, the coronation of King George VI had gone too far: the whole “jingo of flag waving” was simply too childish and nonsensical. Another man affirmed that the whole ceremony was “overdone and artificially pumped up.” The idea that a supposedly stable, family-oriented monarchy

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71 Jennings and Madge, *May the Twelfth*, 51; 53. Capitalization original.
72 Jennings and Madge, 53.
73 Jennings and Madge, 303.
75 Ziegler, 47.
76 In a striking example, French republicans had imagined tempering the King’s royal rituals and ceremonies, or refusing to participate in them, as a means of protest. At the opening of the Estates General in 1789 the assembly greeted the king with “grave respect,” rather than loud applause and celebrations, indicating both their disapproval of the monarchy and the stripping of the King’s dignity, as discussed by Antoine de Baecque, “From Royal Dignity to Republican Austerity: The Ritual for the Reception of Louis XVI in the French National Assembly (1789–1792),” *Journal of Modern History* 66 (December 1994): 671–696.
77 Jennings and Madge, *May the Twelfth*, 275.
78 Jennings and Madge, 303.
should be celebrated via wild street parties and colorful ornaments was perceived by at least one small group of individuals as demeaning. Some imagined that the monarchy still had a significant and serious role to play in British society, ranging from showing up “socialist nonsense” to helping breaking down class barriers to giving the ruling class prestige. These were the very values the British aristocracy hoped everyone would believe the monarchy stood for. However, one Observer argued that the gaudy coronation ceremony inhibited the monarchy from seriously performing such duties: “The British monarchy still has a highly important task to perform and the tempo of the publicity which the coronation has received will certainly not help it to overcome its greatest difficulties.”

Harkening to the cult of modern celebrity that surrounded the monarchy, one man critically observed, “it seems to me like [the coronation is] dragging the Queen down to the level of a film star.”

Such perceptions indicate that, even amongst those who did agree with the messages the monarchy intended to embody and disseminate, there were objections to the mode of delivery. The contradiction of a supposedly traditional monarchy being treated as modern celebrities was perhaps too much for some people to reconcile, and indicated that the monarchy’s popularity and ability to influence the populace was criticized from all sides.

**Conclusion**

The national consciousness of Britain on May 12 was clearly scattered, diluted, and contradictory, with the nation turning its attentions in many different directions. Undoubtedly many genuinely loved the monarchy and the ceremonies that popularized it, and embraced what the royal family symbolized. The works of David Cannadine, Edward Owens, and others who have discussed how the popularized British monarchy served to successfully influence the populace are not contradicted: they do illustrate a highly credible and realistic vision of the monarchy’s role in the early to mid-twentieth century. However, the reactions of society are always complicated and never monolithic, and other contemporary perspectives toward the monarchy and what it stood for existed as well. Britain’s elites may have wanted the monarchy to be splendidly popular and involved in nation-shaping projects, but their efforts did not inherently mean all people shared their vision.

While alternative views usefully highlight the voices and agency of common individuals, the personal adoration of Edward VIII, and the corresponding repudiation of Britain’s elites, some of the perspectives illustrated in this paper may not have held sway for long. World War II affirmed the importance of the British monarchy as an institution, and King George VI became a national icon in the eyes of the majority. Additionally, the 1937 coronation and the circumstances surrounding it could be considered somewhat exceptional: the abdication crisis sparked excellent conversations that make for ideal study, but the controversial event may have also encouraged societal partitions that were somewhat more drastic than they normally would have been.

Moreover, the reasons people disliked the monarchy and what it stood for in this era are fascinating and deserving of a more detailed study: people critiqued the monarchy and did not buy in to its popularity because they disliked the individual monarch, imagined the monarchy was the puppet of the aristocracy, or were simply disinterested in the monarchy. However, very few voices in the Mass Observation archives critiqued the monarchy because of what the institution stood for. The inequalities the monarchy represented, its unearned wealth, and its undemocratic nature were ignored. The institution seemed entrenched in the national consciousness. Most of the voices highlighted in this essay were apathetic to the monarchy—and thus antithetical to the popular image of the monarchy and its ability to ‘sell’ values via its popularity—but their dislike or indifference was limited to this moment in time, and few, if any, called for the royal family to be dissolved, indicating a broad social acceptance of its existence.

Despite these caveats, in pre–World War II Britain, ideas of monarchy, tradition, celebrity, and ceremonies clearly had important and varying meanings and influences. While Britain’s political and social elites and media may have seemed domineering, people objected to, ignored, and even quietly protested against the aristocratic vision of what Britain should be, and how the monarchy should be approached. While the many reactions highlighted in this paper may seem uncoordinated, the announced preferences for Edward, criticisms of the monarchy, and general indifference jointly emphasize a portion of the populace that

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79 Jennings and Madge, 283.
80 DS277, Day Survey for April–November 1937.
81 DS277, Day Survey for April–November 1937.
contradicted what the monarchy was supposed to achieve and symbolize. Despite the prominent auditory and visual reminders of the monarchy’s popularity—broadcasted over the radio and acted out in the crowds following the royal procession to the coronation—the voices of upset dissenters are brought forward by the Mass Observation archives, illustrating a plurality of distinct and unique accounts and ground-level agencies.
When Terror Took Out the Count

Evaluating Israel’s Response to the Assassination of U.N. Mediator Folke Bernadotte

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The world looked with a woeful eye to Jerusalem in the Fall of 1948. For centuries the holy city was a distinguished haven for spirituality and faith, but on one afternoon it became the site of a nefarious international calamity: the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte. As the first United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Bernadotte was appointed to bring peace to a region marred by the vehement struggle between Israel and her Arab neighbors. The Count knew that ending the vendetta was a task “of enormous size and might possibly prove completely insoluble.”1 In the weeks leading to his abrupt death, the revered Swedish diplomat was absorbed in the cause to reconcile leaders from the Jewish State and the Arab League. Preoccupied by the mission to bring regional peace, Bernadotte and his team of U.N. personnel overlooked another inimical conflict within Israel; Jews struggling against Jews over which vision of Zionism would prevail to dictate the future of their national home. It was this civil acrimony that brought Bernadotte to his ultimate fate.

Israel was teeming with radical Zionists long before the Bernadotte tragedy. These Jewish extremists vowed to defend their embryonic homeland from any person or power that threatened its existence. Among their network of ideological adherents were the men and women of Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi)—the “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel”—who deemed Bernadotte an enemy from the outset of his U.N. appointment.2 To Lehi’s indignation, the Mediator embodied an agent of imperialism who sought to whittle down Israel’s borders and curb its political muscle as a gambit to placate the Arabs.3 As the Mediator inched closer to actualizing a plan that would partition the Jewish State, Lehi ultranationalists grew increasingly alarmed and resorted to a preemptive, fatal attack to thwart his efforts. In the late hours of September 17th, 1948, Lehi dispatched a four-man team to kill the Count in his travels to the U.N. truce headquarters outside Jerusalem.4 In a mere instant, a cascade of bullets not only claimed Bernadotte’s life but also left his plans for peace in suspense.

It was a senseless act of violence, predicated on the volition of only a few hundred radicals who gambled with Israel’s reputation before an international audience. The Count’s death warranted a global outcry “comparable to the murder of Gandhi” and signaled a “new decline of humanity’s moral values.”5 This lamentation was especially pronounced in the Count’s home country, where the Swedish morning newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen addressed the diplomatic and moral dilemmas facing the months-old State of Israel:

Nobody believes that the Tel-Aviv government shares responsibility for the crime, but the assassination might prove the biggest obstacle to the cause of Zionism even among those who would never sink so low as to join the filthy anti-Semitic agitation…Israel is now open to the charge that it has not achieved the internal stability which is a prerequisite for recognition.6

Even though this Swedish recount of the affair dissociates Israel’s Provisional Government from Lehi’s terror regime, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion feared that others would conflate them and, as a dismal consequence, turn against the new Jewish State for good. The Bernadotte affair, compounded with the ensuing Arab war, problematized Israel’s fragile reputation and global position. In the aftermath of the tragic episode outside Jerusalem, a disgruntled international community looked to Israel for answers, and eagerly anticipated how its government

1 Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), 3.
6 Zuckerman.
would address and adjudicate the crime in Jerusalem.

Lehi’s assassination of U.N. Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte wrought a confluence of social, moral and political dilemmas for Israel. Under these pressures, the Provisional Government responded by staunchly condemning the attack with rhetoric and legislation. While resentful of Lehi and humiliated by the group’s act of terror, Israel also responded in ways that fulfilled its national interests. The affair provided the young Jewish State with an appropriate circumstance to realize certain political goals that were set to protect Israel and ensure its continued existence while fighting both a civil conflict and regional war. After the Count’s murder, the government consolidated military power by eliminating Lehi terrorists who competed with the Israel Defense Force for supremacy. However, Israeli leaders gave Lehi criminals reprieve from harsh punishment in order to allay civil tensions and foster national unity. Finally, Bernadotte’s absence afforded the Provisional Government an opportunity to renege on the Count’s peace plan that limited Israel’s territory, and veer toward a new geopolitical settlement that bolstered its national security.

**A Problem in Palestine**

A new world order emanated from the turmoil of the Second World War. Political leaders and civilians alike looked to the United Nations as the premier arbiter of peace and conflict resolution, hoping never again to repeat the global calamity that had demolished Europe and left its people in disarray. Despite all that still remained to be fixed in the West, the U.N. directed its diplomatic energy towards the Middle East, where chaos ensued between Jews and Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine. This intergroup struggle was not unique to the postwar years, but had begun in the late 19th century when scores of Jews took refuge in Palestine after fleeing the anti-Semitism that corrupted their towns and shetels in Europe. The amalgam of historical memory, rife persecution and pervasive exclusion gave rise to a current of Jewish nationalism that took conceptual form in Zionism—the movement to build, establish and protect a state for the Jewish people in their biblical homeland of Palestine. Finally, the oppressed Jew of Europe could relinquish his enfeebled identity and transform into the empowered and productive Jew of Zion. In their construction of a new sociopolitical order, Jewish settlers cultivated the land and exercised great social, political and economic mobility. After decades of progress, the yishuv—Palestine’s Jewish community before the establishment of Israel—evolved into an autonomous society with the capacity to absorb hundreds of thousands of Jews from abroad by the early 20th century.

The Jews’ euphoric Zionist dream of statehood was met with a harsh reality after 1945. As immigration to the yishuv burgeoned in the years after the Holocaust, local Palestinians and neighboring Arab states believed that “the remnants of Jewish Europe” were overtaking their land. Disputes over territorial and property rights underpinned the outpour of civil violence between Jews and Arabs. Despite Britain’s long-standing military presence and governing mandate in Palestine, they were unable to quell the Arab-Jewish acrimony. “The only neutralizing force” in the coveted and contentious region thus prepared to surrender control and consign Palestine’s fate to the United Nations.

As the new global order tried brokering a settlement that appeased both Jewish and Arab demands, the recalcitrant feud between them grew more acute. Their animus took on a new dimension after May 14th, 1948—the day that Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, declared the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel. The pure elation of Jewish civilians coursed the streets of Jerusalem through the ports of Haifa and along the beaches of Tel Aviv, while local Palestinians and the Arab League brooded over a collective feeling of dispossession. Just hours after Israel declared independence, the armies of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt invaded the new Jewish State. The multilateral attack commenced the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, transforming the previous years of spontaneous civil discord into a coordinated, bru-

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tal battle in which an outnumbered Israel seemed doomed to collapse.\(^\text{15}\)

At such a critical moment, the U.N. was pressured to reconcile the Jewish State and the Arab League. As an expeditious response to the ensuing war, the Security Council passed a resolution to deploy a U.N. Mediator to the region.\(^\text{16}\) Their chosen emissary was Count Folke Bernadotte, the nephew of King Gustav VI and heir to the Swedish throne. Given his expertise in conflict mediation and history of humanitarianism, Bernadotte was thought to be a felicitous candidate who could fulfill the responsibilities of the first U.N. Mediator in Palestine by abating the Arab-Israeli crisis and bringing a modicum of security and order to the region. His notable vocational background suggested that he was prepared to succeed in the mission.\(^\text{17}\)

Bernadotte’s diplomatic work began in the 1930s, and he gained international recognition during World War II as chairman of the Swedish Red Cross. In this position, the Count negotiated for the exchange of 10,000 German political prisoners and saved hundreds of Jewish refugees.\(^\text{18}\) Alongside his proven ability to arbitrate, Bernadotte impressed the U.N. with his commitment to helping others. It was his conviction “that all activities founded on love and charity have great possibilities for bridging the gap caused by hatred.”\(^\text{19}\) The newly appointed Mediator used the composite of his altruism and remarkable pedigree during his short-lived effort to realize “a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine.”\(^\text{20}\) Though qualified and keenly aware of the challenge before him, Bernadotte’s credentials would not be enough to protect him from the dodgy milieu for which he set out to bring peace. His proposal to partition Palestine and cede Israeli territory became the center of harsh polemical debate, and a primary motive for Lehi’s terror attack that killed the Count.

**Bernadotte’s Plan for Peace**

Bernadotte began his diplomatic task to resolve the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict on the Greek island of Rhodes—the Palestine mediation headquarters—where he was greeted by a staff of well-informed aides, senior advisors, and U.N. personnel.\(^\text{21}\) After imposing a cease-fire that temporarily allayed the regional warfare, the Swedish statesman tailored the “First Bernadotte Plan.” It proposed the creation of a unified polity that would comprise of two members, one Jewish and the other Arab. Each would have full control over its own domestic affairs and foreign policies. Although this initial pitch for peace included unifying economic and geopolitical strategies to reconcile Israel and the Arab League, it was rejected by both sides. Neither believed that the Count’s goal to institute some form of political union would resolve their already onerous feud and bring lasting peace.\(^\text{22}\) Sensitive to their proclivities, Bernadotte drafted another plan that “envisioned the creation of an Arab State, and a Jewish State, and the city of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a special international regime administered by the U.N.”\(^\text{23}\)

The Count’s colleagues in the U.N. saw the “Second Bernadotte Plan” as a promising resolution to the conflict, while Ben-Gurion chagrined over its mandate that Israel detach from the Negev—Israel’s southern region—and the northern Galilee. Furthermore, it nullified the prospect for total Israeli authority over Jerusalem.\(^\text{24}\) The Provisional Government believed that making these concessions would compromise Israel’s national security during the Arab war, and would also be anathema to Israel’s broader political interests. The Plan not only unsettled the Prime Minister, but also those on Israel’s political fringe—in particular the radicals of Lohamei Herut Yisrael. Because of their unfettered ideothological ambition for complete Jewish control over Palestine, Lehi derided the Count from the outset of his appointment and frenzied

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\(^\text{17}\) Ben-Dror, *Ralph Bunche and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, 5.


\(^\text{24}\) Ben-Dror, *Ralph Bunche and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, 87.
over his perceived cavalier approach to Israel’s welfare and protection. Bernadotte’s Plan thus intensified Lehi’s hatred for foreign interlopers and accelerated its terrorist plot to end the mediation process and the Mediator—indefinitely.\textsuperscript{25}

**“Stockholm is Yours, Jerusalem Ours”: Lehi’s Fight for the Freedom of Israel**

Lehi derived from an offshoot of Zionism that took root in the late 1920s from a small but forceful faction in Eastern Europe. Because of their unrelenting psychosis of fear from persecution in the diaspora, a select group of Jews came to admire the ideological predicate of Europe’s radical right, which they used to form a movement for Jewish self-determination and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{27} Jewish ultraconservatism would eventually foment in the British Mandate of Palestine, where transplants from Europe censured the administrative authority for hampering the Jews’ endeavor to achieve statehood. With a penchant for protection, these Zionists set out to construct a state—only for and by the Jewish people—built on “monism, militarism, discipline, order and bitter defiance” of any invasive force or figure.\textsuperscript{28} This robust anti-establishment culture encouraged future radical Zionists to reject all foreign powers perceived to meddle in Palestine’s budding Jewish enterprise.\textsuperscript{29}

Avraham (Yair) Stern applied these core tenets of radical Zionism when he founded Lehi—coined the “Stern Gang” by the British—in the dark wartime year of 1940.\textsuperscript{30} Akin to their extremist counterparts, Lehi Zionists upheld “deceit and murder as a means of driving off danger” posed by foreign enemies.\textsuperscript{31} Lehi’s preference for using terror earned them a reputation as the foremost “extreme Jewish nationalist group”—a notoriety they relished in public despite the group’s clandestine operation in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{32} In He-Hazit, Lehi’s news publication, Sternists noted themselves as “clear-cut terrorists,” four of whom would elect to ambush Bernadotte on the outskirts of the holy city, armed with guns and a skewed moral persuasion to claim the Count’s life on that fateful Friday in September 1948.\textsuperscript{33}

Lehi’s Barbaric act of terror was of little surprise to those familiar with the preexisting hatred Stern and his following had for the Mediator. The “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel” had an uncompromising vision for the Jewish State: a biblically ordained land, extending from the Nile to the Euphrates, with Jerusalem at its core.\textsuperscript{34} The Stern Gang reviled any person who challenged its yearning for Jewish maximalism in Palestine, and the U.N. Mediator, with his mandate that Israel cede so much of its precious and biblically ordained land, was among the group’s greatest foes. Lehi deemed Bernadotte’s plan to reconfigure Israel’s borders as an affront to their unalloyed vision for the Jewish State.\textsuperscript{35}

Because the Count was believed not to have “the interests of the Hebrew people at heart,” he became the focal point of the Stern Gang’s brutal calumny.\textsuperscript{36} The group recurrently issued statements that articulated its contempt for the Count’s unwelcome interference in Israeli affairs:

> It is high time that we should end the Bernadotte affair. It has already cost us dearly and will cost even more if we allow it to go on... [we] cannot prohibit him from speaking to the Arabs... As for us we must not negotiate with an enemy: an agent masked as Mediator. It is up to us to disqualify him for negotiation...\textsuperscript{37}

This scathing reproach shows how Lehi’s unbridled motivation to kill the Count was rooted in Bernadotte’s effort to reconcile Israel and the Arabs. In order to preserve the young Jewish State, the Stern Gang saw it necessary to end the Mediator and his mission. In late July, weeks before
the attack, a few radicals disclosed Lehi’s intention “to kill Bernadotte and any other uniformed United Nations observers who come to Jerusalem.”

38 To the Mediator’s misfortune, the streets of Jerusalem in September 1948 flooded with incensed Lehi rebels who were eager to stave off any force or figure that sought to delimit Israel—the Jews’ long-awaited and newly independent national home.

While the strategy to murder the Count developed over months, it was executed in a fleeting moment. Dressed in what appeared to be Israeli army uniforms, the assassins awaited their target to pass through Jerusalem’s Katamon neighborhood in his U.N. motorcade. Upon its arrival, Yehoshua Zetler, Natan Yalin-Mor and Stanley Goldfoot distracted the first two cars while Yehoshua Cohen approached the Count’s Chrysler, only to unleash a torrent of bullets that resonated throughout the periphery of the holy city.

39 The attack left Bernadotte, along with U.N. observer Colonel André Sèrot, dead and Israel’s future in question.40 The young country’s nascent global position mandated a robust response to the terror in Jerusalem—and this it did. Without hesitation, Ben-Gurion denounced Lehi’s “gang of rogues, cowards and low-schemers” for killing the Count.41 Such condemnation flowed from a genuine horror of and defense against Lehi’s malign act of terror.

An “Act of Treachery”: Condemning Lehi’s Assassination of Bernadotte

Ben-Gurion was perturbed by the news of Bernadotte’s murder. In the late afternoon of September 17th, he sat in his Tel-Aviv home, vexed by the Stern Gang’s recklessness and its corrosive effect on the young Jewish State. He contemplated the moral and political consequences of Lehi’s act of terror, and how to properly address an international audience that was more attentive to Israel’s conduct than ever before. Pages of Ben-Gurion’s diary reveal expressions of remorse and frustration, along with his torment over how to raise the issue before the Provisional Government.42 On September 23rd—six days after the attack—the Prime Minister positioned himself before an equally disturbed assembly of Israel’s political elite:

I deeply regret that I have to begin with a tragic deed...horrible and shameful, that a gang of rogues, cowards, and low schemers murdered the UN envoy and his assistant Sèrot...This despicable crime is all the more horrible because it is aimed at the supreme human institution of our time, the UN...While the crime wore the mask of so-called patriotism, which is false, corrupt, and despicable, it assaults the honor of Young Israel as an independent state still struggling for its existence and it stains Jerusalem, the Holy City, with the blood of innocents.

Ben-Gurion’s lamentation reverberated in the plenary room and throughout the world. Soon after the address, Israeli leaders continued to promulgate a series of carefully phrased public statements that derided the violent episode as an “insane attempt by gunmen to wreck Israel’s relations with the United Nations” and other foreign allies.43 Israel’s Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok, continued the anti-extremist campaign by renouncing Lehi as a cohort of “criminal outlaws who are execrated by the entire Jewish community.”44

To be sure, Ben-Gurion admitted that there was an indelible tension between Israel’s political establishment and Bernadotte.45 Both were under significant pressure

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39 “Count Bernadotte’s Killers Revealed,” 146.
40 André Sèrot was a Jewish French military officer who was serving with U.N. forces in Israel just before his death in 1948. Sèrot’s wife, Berthe Grünfelder, was among the few Jewish refugees who Bernadotte rescued from a Nazi concentration camp in 1945. As a show of gratitude to the Count, Sèrot decided to ride with the Mediator in his U.N. Chrysler that was ultimately assailed by Yehoshua Cohen on September 17th. Sèrot’s murder points to an ironic truth of the Bernadotte tragedy: that a group of Jewish radicals readily killed a fellow Jew for the sake of preserving and protecting the Jewish State. Further, Sèrot’s death could explain why the Israeli government so decisively condemned Lehi’s act of terror and moved to eradicate the group from Jerusalem. Stanger, “A Haunting Legacy,” 262.
43 Marton, *A Death in Jerusalem*, 231.
47 Marton, *A Death in Jerusalem*, 231.
to respond to the demands of their disparate audiences, which explains why Israeli leaders were reluctant to fully endorse the policies drafted by Bernadotte. In the wake of the interminable Arab war, the Provisional Government was in no position to comply with the Mediator’s plan that significantly reshaped Israel’s borders. The Count’s call to limit critical buffer territory between the invading Arab states provoked an endemic uproar, not only from Jews within Israel but also from those throughout the diaspora with a vested interest in the Jewish State. Despite the constellation of pressures at home and abroad, Ben-Gurion respected the Count for his proven skill in conflict mediation, along with his good judgment and procedure. Even though the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister challenged Bernadotte on his handling of the Israeli-Arab acrimony, they “always wound up as friends.” Ben-Gurion noted that the government’s history of disagreement with Bernadotte never diminished “the deep respect we felt for his personality and his mission.” The deference between Israel’s political establishment and the Mediator helps to explain why the Provisional Government responded to his death by vociferously rebuking the Stern Gang.

Israel’s condemnation of Lehi’s “act of treachery” was not only rhetorical. The government took parliamentary measures to end the group and to deter future incidents of terror like the one that claimed Bernadotte. Just six days after the assassination, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (PTO). The multiparty emergency resolution acknowledged the danger of organized terror and outlined Israel’s new legal protocol for responding to domestic terrorism, specifically for apprehending terrorists. Article II specified that any Israeli found guilty of “performing a function in the management or instruction of a terrorist organization” would be convicted of an offence and subject to imprisonment. On September 23rd, Israel’s Minister of Justice brought an extension of the Ordinance to the legislature where it was formally made into law. Instituting a legal procedure to delineate and adjudicate terrorism was a decisive way that the Israeli government condemned Lehi’s assault on the Mediator and terror more broadly.

The Ordinance not only marked a significant legal effort to counteract and denounce terror, but also gave the Provisional Government jurisdiction to carry out a chief national priority: consolidating the Israeli Defense Force by disbanding Lehi from its underground network in Jerusalem. This desire to centralize military power, and to fulfill other national interests, reveals the duality of Israel’s reaction to the Bernadotte affair. Condemning Lehi was only part of the Provisional Government’s response to the assassination. After September 17th, 1948, the Israelis were given an opportune moment to realize certain political goals that were central to the continuity and protection of the Jewish State—besieged by forces both within and around its borders.

Consolidating Military Power: Terminating Lehi to Strengthen the Israel Defense Forces

Just hours following the assassination, the government called for the liquidation of all Lehi’s “hidden apostles of terror” from Jerusalem. This course of action could be indicative of how the government condemned Lehi for the assassination. However, its implementation was more so a political strategy to avoid an existential crisis rather than a demonstration of good moral character. Israel’s dual response to the tragedy is redolent of how its leaders were mitigating a larger political predicament that, if handled poorly, could have grave repercussions for the Jewish State. The Provisional Government used Bernadotte’s murder as a pretext to centralize military power in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) by eliminating Lehi. The young Jewish State was under no circumstance to negate the political advantages attached to the tragedy; Israel not only faced the ordinary struggles of a new nation, but also the travails of a nation at war. A cohort of Arab nations attacked “from the north and south, shelled from the east

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48 Marton, 231-232.
51 Telegram from Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett to Countess Bernadotte, Israel State Archives (Bernadotte), 17 September 1948, File 9, quoted in Stanger, “A Haunting Legacy,” 263.
53 Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 228.
and bombed and machine-gunned from the air” while the Provisional Government worked endlessly to develop and sustain its institutional blueprint. As a jingoist paramilitary force, Lehi amplified these pressures by competing with the establishment for military supremacy. Because Israel had a responsibility to protect its people, stabilize its regime, and secure its borders, the Provisional Government used Bernadotte’s murder for their political gain, first by arresting 266 Lehi members to solidify military power in the IDF.

Lehi threatened Israel’s military unity years before the country was formally established. After proclaiming independence in May 1948, Israel began to formalize its state army by disbANDING Lehi and all other militant Zionist groups in order to effectively combat the Arabs. The Provisional Government extended amnesty for those Lehi dissidents who joined the IDF. However, a small yet significant number of Lehi operatives rejected the offer and continued to organize by retaining their arms, officers, and underground networks. With their staunch “independence of spirit,” Lehi denigrated the authority of Israel’s military, specifically by purporting Ben-Gurion as an inept leader who had no ability to defeat the Arabs. They dubbed him “Ben-Mugion”—a jargon for “Son of Fear”—which had significant repercussions in how the world perceived Israel’s military capacity. This rhetorical taunt, along with others, undermined Israel’s fight against the Arab Liberation Army, which mandated a unified military force able to resist intimidation from any adversary—foreign or domestic. These incidents explain Ben-Gurion’s ambition to dissolve the Stern Gang in the Fall of 1948.

The Count’s murder provided Israeli leaders with a rationale to finally act on the position that there was “no need for a Hebrew underground,” and order Lehi’s total liquidation from Jerusalem. “The police hunt for terrorists” was staunch and swift, continuing well into November of 1948. Ben-Gurion solicited help from the general public, offering a reward of $20,000 for civilians who gave information about Lehi’s secret compounds or turned in criminals to the police. Israeli officials disbanded scores of Lehi dissidents, and captured members from every level of the group’s organizational strata. Days after civil police swept Jerusalem, they accomplished a major “national victory” by arresting the notorious Lehi leader, Nathan Friedman Yellin. The New York Times reported that the government’s seizure and arrest of Lehi radicals was not difficult; most emerged boldly from their clandestine niches with full knowledge of their collective fate in the Jaffa jail. Even though most submitted to Israeli police, Lehi radicals were especially “defiant, abusive, and imbued with a strong gang spirit” in the prison compound. When a British reporter sought access to the Jaffa holding center, he was denied entry by Israeli military guards who struggled to control the prisoners and were “obviously afraid of them.” This rancor behind bars and deliberate torment of the IDF not only reveals the tension between Lehi and the state military, but also reinforces why the Provisional Government wanted to disband the Stern Gang. Although these two groups shared the same patriotic goal of protecting Israel, their civil strife had an antithetical effect. Ben-Gurion, compelled to take action in the already hos-

56 Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 228.
57 Eliminating Lehi was a longstanding political goal of the Israeli government, especially after the Altalena affair. At the outset of the Arab-Israeli War, the IDF seized a shipment of military equipment ordered by radical extremists in the Irgun—another dissident group—which incurred a brutal confrontation and multiple deaths. This civil feud not only risked Israel’s national unity but diverted the IDF’s energy and utility in its existential fight against the Arab Liberation Army. Altalena, along with later episodes that relegated the IDF, signifies an important event in Israel’s early history that made dissolving Lehi and their counterparts a political priority; the Count’s death created a reason for the Israeli government to finally resolve the Stern Gang’s competition with the IDF. Ehud Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York: Free Press, 1999) 45-50.
59 Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 318.
60 Lehi broadcasts of 5 and 8 May 1948, quoted in Heller, The Stern Gang, 215.
61 Menachem Begin radio broadcast, 15 May 1948, quoted in Bell, Terror out of Zion, 319.
64 “Stern Gang Leader Caught: Arrest in Haifa,” The Times, 30 September 1948.
65 Meltzer, “Israelis are Attempting to Root out Terrorists.”
66 “Stern Gang Leader Caught: Arrest in Haifa,” pg. 4.
tile milieu with the Arab states and Palestinian locals, resolved the Lehi-IDF rivalry not only by liquidating the group but also by undercutting them before the legislature.

The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, passed days after the assassination, augmented the IDF’s authority by directly stating its role in thwarting terrorism:

The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance No. 33 of 5708-1948, Article 6.

By including the military’s procedure for responding to terror in the PTO, the Provisional Government legitimized IDF authority and simultaneously subverted Lehi under the law. This legal measure was part of Israeli leaders’ politically tinged response to Bernadotte’s death and furthered their effort to bolster the military while diminishing Lehi.

Ben-Gurion’s campaign to consolidate power in the IDF was a marked success that did “expunge the stain of terrorism” from the holy city.68 By the year’s end, virtually every Lehi (and non-Lehi) practitioner of Zionist terror had been either arrested, or surrendered their arms to join the Israel Defense Forces. Sylvia Neulander, an American representative of Palestine’s Jewish Agency, verified at a December fundraiser that the Stern Gang was “near collapsing” at the hands of Israeli police.69 Bernadotte’s murder enabled this political feat, because it pushed the eradication of Lehi and the consolidation of military power to the fore of Israel’s litany of national priorities. Even though Israeli leaders remained contrite over the international tragedy, they still set out to not only strengthen the military but also to unify a deeply divided Jewish civil society. To do so, they continued to exploit the political moment afforded to them after September 17th.

Generating Unity: Giving the Stern Gang Reprieve from Harsh Punishment

After the Bernadotte assassination, Israeli leaders not only consolidated power in the military but also endeavored to unify their nation, still benighted by the rift between Lehi and Israel’s political establishment. Menaced by the invading Arab Liberation Army, the Provisional Government resolved that ending its recalcitrant feud with Lehi was necessary to defeat the Arabs. After their near total liquidation from Jerusalem, the Stern Gang was well aware of its inevitable collapse. However, those who evaded capture refused to surrender without first prodding the political elite. Using Israel’s dire geopolitical situation and bifurcated social order to its advantage, the Stern Gang mandated that Israeli leaders release all Lehi prisoners and give any Lehi members reprieve from harsh punishment in the legal proceedings after Bernadotte’s murder. In exchange, Lehi would agree to concede indefinitely and provide the young state with a chance to end the fratricidal conflict that was pitting Jews against one another. The ultimatum gave cause for the Provisional Government’s to sparingly apprehend Lehi dissidents for the assassination, which shows how—for the sake of civil unity—Israel made use of the opportune political circumstance afforded to them after Bernadotte’s murder.

Ben-Gurion capitulated to Lehi’s biting requests, but only after Sternists barnstormed the nation with vicious threats against the Provisional Government. Although most of their members were in prison, hiding, or totally withdrawn, Lehi had enough leverage to torment the government months after killing the Mediator. Lehi threatened a “last warning” to Ben-Gurion and the government if they chose to negate its outstanding requests in exchange for the group’s willful self-destruction.70 Posters plastered throughout Tel-Aviv touted their ultimatum, declaring that “we shall not tolerate court cases against us, nor shall we tolerate or suffer prisoners.”71 Furthermore, Lehi conveyed intentions to attack Israeli cabinet members as a reminder of the group’s persistent quest and ability to divide the nation.72 As their campaign became more disruptive, Ben-Gurion wrote that the government “must compromise with Lehi” in order to mend the exacerbating

67 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance No. 33 of 5708-1948, Article 6.
68 “Palestine Tragedy.”
71 “Stern Band Threatens.”
gulf between political moderates and radical extremists.73

Particular encounters reveal how the Provisional Government reconciled with their domestic foes by meeting the Stern Gang’s terms for dissolution. A correspondence between Yehoshua Zetler, Lehi’s zealous military commander, and Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s Minister of the Interior, unveils the government’s plan to pardon the jailed Sternists to achieve peace with Lehi. After Zetler demanded unmitigated freedom for the detainees in Jaffa, the Minister assured him of their quick release, and that if they were to receive any legal punishment, it would be limited to a short sentence.74 Aware of the national reward, Ben-Gurion issued a sweeping amnesty under which the entire lot of Lehi criminals were discharged from prison. The Prime Minister pronounced that their liberation marked a “clean slate” in the relationship between Israel’s political fringe and its governing authority.75

To further the cause for civil unity, the Provisional Government imposed a weak punishment on Lehi members who were put on trial for Bernadotte’s murder. In an exchange between Shaul Avigur, Israel’s Deputy Defense Minister, and Yitzhak Shamir76, among Lehi’s triumvirate of leaders and the eventual Prime Minister of Israel, they parleyed over the government’s intention to meagerly prosecute the accused. When Avigur asked Shamir for the names of Bernadotte’s killers, he promised that doing so was only a formality and that “nothing would happen to them” before an Israeli court of law.77 The Deputy Minister’s indication that those culpable in Shamir’s terror regime would be exempt from strenuous penalty not only shows the government’s propensity to square with Lehi; it also foreshadowed the actual result of the trial against Nathan Yalin-Mor, one of Bernadotte’s assassins, and Mattiyahu Shmuel евitch, a Lehi operative.

The outcome of their prosecution reveals how Ben-Gurion chose to indecorously adjudicate the attack on Bernadotte—and Lehi’s terror network more generally—for the political profit of achieving domestic unity. After September 1948, Yalín-Mor and Shmuelevitch were the only members of Lehi indicted by Israel’s Special Military Court. With few corroborating testimonies and only futile evidence, the Court struggled to verify any direct connection the accused had to Bernadotte’s murder; only years later it was confirmed that Yalín-Mor was among the four men who killed the Count.78 Despite the juridical shortcoming, the two men were found guilty of “terrorist activities” according to statutes of the novel Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, and ordered to serve eight and five-year prison terms respectively. In a profound move to finally end the fratricidal feud with Lehi and render “peace with the underground,” the Prime Minister seized the political moment of the trial to acquit the two criminals on February 24th, 1949—only two weeks after their sentencing.79

Ben-Gurion justified that exonerating Yalin-Mor and Shmuelevitch, along with every other Lehi prisoner, encouraged “the new nation to begin to heal its self-inflicted wounds” that came from Bernadotte’s death.80 A close aide to the Prime Minister affirmed that the government’s chief goal was “to educate Lehi, rather than punish them” for their reign of terror and schismatic effect on Israel’s social order. Giving Sternists a short and trivial penalty for the assassination helped to create a more unified Jewish State. Ultimately, Lehi fulfilled their end of the bargain by abandoning what remained of its terror apparatus. Those in hiding gradually emerged from the underground or returned from abroad, hoping to assimilate into Israeli public life as ordinary civilians with a reticent but proud history as “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel.” However stalwart Lehi’s vision for Israel, it was not potent enough to defy the Prime Minister’s ambition to realize a unified nation of Jewish civilians. The aftermath of Bernadotte’s

73 Palestine Post, 19 September 1948, quoted in Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 231.
74 Kurzman, Genesis 1948, 567.
75 Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, 235.
76 Yitzhak Shamir was among Lehi’s upper echelon of leaders and was eventually elected the 7th Prime Minister of Israel. He joined the Knesset, Israel’s legislature, in the late 1960s—nearly two decades after the Bernadotte affair. Despite his transparency for being involved in the pre-state Zionist terror group, Shamir had potent influence and longstanding participation in Israel’s political mainstream. This shows how the Israeli government, in the aftermath of Bernadotte’s murder, reduced Lehi to a distant memory in order to promote national unity. Shamir’s inclusion in the political establishment reveals how the government used the circumstance after Bernadotte’s affair to foster and maintain unity. Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 196.
77 Conversation between Shaul Avigur and Yitzhak Shamir, quoted in Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, 239.
79 Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, 239.
80 Interview with Israel Eldad, 1994, quoted in Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, 239.
military blowup provided the government with an opportunity to liaise with Lehi, placate the group’s threat, and generate a morsel of civil accord. Fulfilling this acute political interest augmented Israel’s fight to defend its borders when the Provisional Government decided to forgo the late Mediator’s peace policy.

**Bolstering National Security: Forgoing Bernadotte’s Plan for Peace**

Count Bernadotte’s mission to end the Arab-Israeli War died with him on September 17th. Despite U.N. efforts to enact the Second Bernadotte Plan following the burial of its chief architect and lobbyist, Israeli leaders expressed the same reservations they held when it was first proposed. They snubbed the idea of forfeiting the Negev in the south, the Galilee in the north, and losing the prospect of Israeli control over Jerusalem. Given Israel’s sparse territorial landscape, these regions were a vital buffer between the Jewish State and its attacking Arab neighbors. In the purview of the Provisional Government, keeping them was imperative to Israel’s defense and national security. As the their adversaries vowed “to fight to the last bullet,” the political establishment decisively reneged on Bernadotte’s peace policy after he died in order to secure their borders. Before Lehi assassinated the Mediator, Israel had neither formally accepted nor rejected his suggested list of Israeli territorial concessions. To Ben-Gurion’s relief, the Mediator’s absence provided the Provisional Government with a diplomatic vacuum to forgo his Plan without subjecting themselves to total fallout with the U.N. This calculated decision reveals another way in which the government’s response to the murder was tainted by political interest.

In the “psychological moment” that followed the assassination, the U.N. pushed for Israel and the Arabs to agree upon Bernadotte’s territorial resolution. Dr. Ralph Bunche, Bernadotte’s “invaluable copartner” and ultimate successor as Acting Mediator, predicted renewed peace talks on the Second Bernadotte Plan. Given the raging war, the Provisional Government opposed its re-entry into negotiations, but did so faintly; they were cognizant that a harsh, incipient rejection of the Plan would be ill-received and exacerbate Israel’s already impaired reputation within the United Nations. It was not until after the Arabs’ rebuffed the Plan when Israel jettisoned its moderate position, and deviated towards another that was more akin to its political interests. With the charismatic and dogged Bernadotte no longer in Rhodes or Jerusalem to endorse his territorial design and dictate events, the Israelis enacted a strategic military course of action to boost their geopolitical position in the hostile region.

The Provisional Government first moved to secure the Negev, a piece of land that provided an indispensable barrier between Israeli-Jewish communities and the Egyptian border. Bunche argued that detaching the Negev from Israel was “the core of the Bernadotte Plan” and therefore the Israelis had no choice but to forfeit the region. His unwavering stance provoked Israel to respond militarily. On October 6th, 1948, Ben-Gurion deployed the IDF to the Negev to stake a geopolitical claim along the Egyptian front. The months-long operation resulted in a decisive Israeli victory, and as the fighting endured, the Prime Minister stridently argued that “any of that land” now under the IDF authority should belong to Israel. In a matter of months, Israel’s military offensive in the south, along with another operation to conquer the Galilee in the north, had successfully eclipsed Bernadotte’s Plan. The government’s manipulation of borders, and larger contravention of Bernadotte’s original policy, impelled Bunche and the U.N. to craft a new territorial design that bolstered rather than burdened Israel’s national security. To be sure, myriad political pressures drove the U.N.’s eventual desertion of the Plan and approval of Israel’s preferred geopolitical terms. However, the IDF’s concerted military efforts—made possible by the Provisional Government exploiting the Count’s absence—contributed greatly to enhancing Israel’s national security during its existential fight against the Arab Liberation Army.

By the time the U.N. General Assembly convened in December of 1948, Israel had successfully recalibrated the global order’s position on borders insomuch that the approved policy was a meager semblance of Bernadotte’s Plan. The Armistice Agreements—a set of treaties that

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81 Ben-Dror, *Ralph Bunche and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 114.
82 Ben-Dror, 114.
85 Correspondence between Reuven Shiloah and Moshe Sharett, 2 December 1948, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, vol. 2, 254-255, quoted in Ben-Dror, 132.
86 Ben-Dror, 124.
formally resolved Israel’s territorial disputes with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to end the Arab-Israeli War—reify the extent to which the Jewish State welshe[d] on the Count’s Plan in order to ascertain its desired national landscape.87 In the final days of the General Assembly meeting, Ben-Gurion proclaimed that Israel “entered the U.N. with the Bernadotte Plan—we left without Bernadotte and with the Negev and the Galilee in our hands. Our military activities in the Negev shine in everyone’s eyes.”88 Even though many believed the Count’s murder would adopt symbolic meaning as his “final act of mediation” that encouraged reconciliation between Israeli and Arab leaders, Israel’s political establishment thought otherwise.89 After Lehi’s episode of terror in Jerusalem, the political establishment redirected its diplomatic focus to securing Israel’s national security, which was only part of a catalog of political ambitions it sought to fulfill after the assassination.

Conclusion

Jerusalem in the Fall of 1948 was certainly a complex milieu. It was a place where Jews congregated to revel in their national redemption, and one from which the Palestinians departed in despair. It remained an epicenter of good faith and moral principle, but soon became a “scene of carnage” that tremored the core of humanity when terror took out Sweden’s beloved Folke Bernadotte.90 While the Israeli government condemned Lehi for killing the Count, its response was also tinged with political motivation. The affair provided a pretext for the Provisional Government to actualize goals that were imperative to Israel’s continued existence while fighting both a fratricidal feud and a regional war. Given its already hostile relationship with the Stern Gang, the government was relieved to use Bernadotte’s death as a motive to liquidate Lehi and consolidate power in the IDF. Ben-Gurion also saw a need to unify the nation while Lehi dissidents who managed to escape arrest wreaked havoc on Israeli civil society. By offering amnesty to arrested Lehi members, the Prime Minister answered the groups’ ultimatum for peace with reprieve from harsh punishment. Finally, in order to bolster its national security while fighting the Arabs, the government reneged on the Second Bernadotte Plan and initiated a military course of action that successfully established Israel’s desired borders.

Fulfilling these national interests drastically shaped how Israel responded to Lehi’s act of terror. Despite the Provisional Government’s pursuit of political ambitions in the midst of Bernadotte’s death, it would be rash to construe Israel’s leadership as either opportunistic or morally bankrupt without giving full consideration to the unpropitious challenges put before them in 1948. Israel was fighting for its life, not only against a league of Arab nations that vowed to end the Jewish State, but also against a baleful lot of Jewish radicals who regarded the political establishment a loathed enemy. Further, Israel was trying to locate its institutional and diplomatic place as a new nation in the post-war international order. This synergy of pressures, even more pronounced as the Jewish people sought to recoup from the Shoah, forced Ben-Gurion to make critical and highly controversial decisions for the sake of Israel’s continuity. Perhaps the confluence of social, moral and political dilemmas confronted by the Prime Minister led him to tacitly approve of Bernadotte’s assassination. Regardless, the government was in no position to ignore the political opportunities that it provided. The extent to which Israel used Bernadotte’s murder for profit may have evaded norms of ethical diplomacy. However, the government’s response to the Bernadotte tragedy helped the Jewish State endure the exigent circumstances that followed the terror of September 17th.

Like all forms of terror, Lehi’s assassination was a strategic means to carry out a political end: to stave off Bernadotte from limiting the sovereignty and size of the Jewish State. The Stern Gang not only meant to end the “one-man-institution” of imperialism but also to signal an ineffaceable warning to all foreign meddlers in Israeli affairs.91 Despite this latter objective, Lehi’s terror attack was met by an unintended consequence that came from an Israeli-Swedish altercation after the assassination. In Stockholm, King Gustav VI agonized over his heir’s death and faulted Israel for not persisting to find those who carried

87 Even though Iraq was among the five Arab states that participated in the Arab-Israeli War, they did not sign an armistice agreement with Israel like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Instead, Iraq’s terms for withdrawal were detailed in the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement. Shapiro, Israel: A History, 171. For [subject of Note 88], see Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, 134-135.
88 David Ben-Gurion diary entry, 9 December 1948, quoted in Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, 243.
90 “Jerusalem.”
91 “Count Bernadotte’s Killers Revealed,” 146.
out the “deliberate and planned assassination.””92 Vexed by Israel’s “obvious and serious shortcomings” in handling the murder, the Swedes undertook their own project to determine the truth of what happened on September 17th. In 1950, they issued a scathing report on Israel’s investigative procedure: witnesses had not been questioned, the crime scene had not been sealed off, and clues had been neglected.93 Their findings, compounded with Sweden’s refusal to recognize Israel, put the King in an uncomfortable position; following the recent devastation of the Holocaust, it was deplorable for any European nation to reprimand or shun the new Jewish State. Despite the King’s valid grievance, the backlash for criticizing Israel proved too great to hold firm to Sweden’s call for justice. Ultimately, Sweden agreed to forgive Israel and forget the whole affair on the condition that the Provisional Government admit to its oversights.94 Ben-Gurion followed suit, and after producing an acceptable apology there was “no more talk or research on the affair.”95 Any records or documentation of the murder were filed away as classified materials in the Swedish National Archive until 2000.96 Despite their accessibility today, Bernadotte remains a mostly forgotten character, with Lehi’s warning against foreign intervention also lost in the Israeli-Swedish cover-up.

The faded memory of Bernadotte underlines a significant point on the broader issue of terror: while terror can be extremely powerful it can also be powerfully curbed. Lehi’s intention for killing the Count was manifold; they sought to instill fear, provoke chaos, and isolate Israel. The Stern Gang may have found short-term success, but its objectives were ultimately foiled by heads of state who refused to let Lehi’s terrorist regime reign supreme. Israel’s response to the assassination, along with the subsequent Israeli-Swedish exchange, reveal how terrorism can be overpowered when leaders take action to neutralize its intended purpose; the Prime Minister barred the assassination from damaging Israeli society and diplomacy while the King chose to bury the affair in order to maintain international accord. Their actions reinforce the notion that the effect of terror is only as great as people in power permit it to be.

92 Statement by General Aage Lündsrom, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision and Personal Representative of the Mediator, Jerusalem 17 September 1948 quoted in Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, 266.
95 Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 238.
Strategies without Borders: Transnational Methodologies of Revolution in the Sixties

How did two highly distinct methods of revolution, pursued by Ernesto Che Guevara and Daniel Cohn-Bendit respectively, influence the Turkish revolutionary Mahir Çayan’s strategy of revolution?

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The Turkish experience of the global and revolutionary 1960’s came to an end on March 30th, 1972, in the small village of Kızıldere. That day, Kızıldere was besieged by the Turkish Armed Forces—helicopters, armored vehicles, heavy machine gun and mortar crews, and soldiers—swarmed the village.1 The objectives of the military operation, led by major general Tevfik Turun, were “to find and rescue the three NATO technicians abducted by the terrorist organization Turkish People’s Liberation Army-Front (THKP-C) and to capture, dead or alive, the leadership of the THKP-C.”2 Only the latter part of this mission statement was achieved during the siege in Kızıldere. THKP-C founder Mahir Çayan, along with 13 additional members of the THKP-C and other affiliated groups such as the Turkish Revolutionary Youth Organization, were cornered in the house of the county governor. Ertuğrul Kürkçü, the founder of DEVGENC, recalls the horrible incident as follows: “The pins were pulled out of the grenades. Mahir called out to the soldiers: ‘Withdraw the privates, let the ranking officers come face us!’ As soon as he finished his sentence, machine gun fire started. Soon after, they launched rockets and fired mortars at our position, and one of these proved to be a direct hit. Because of the impact, one of us

1 A photograph taken by one of the reporters of the Vatan newspaper dating back to the spring of 1968 shows a small company of Turkish soldiers, who were ordered to quell the student uprising in the Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara, gazing upon the gigantic word carved by the students into the University’s stadium: “DEVRİM” (Revolution). Among the students involved were two leading revolutionaries of the period: Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan. The contrast in the photograph between the sizes of the word ‘revolution’ and the company of soldiers should be noted as misleading. The events at Kızıldere that would later occur in 1972. REVOLUTION, 1968, photograph, in Çınar Özer, “Binlerce öğrenci ayakta!”, Vatan Gazetesi, December 31, 2012, http://www.gazetevatan.com/binlerce-ogrenci-ayakta--502342-gundem/. 12 Mart: İhtilalin Pençesinde Demokrasi, directed by Can Dündar, (1994; Istanbul: İmge Yayınları, 2002), DVD.

2 12 Mart.
dropped his grenade, and that was it.” Indeed, with the sole exception of Kürkçü, neither the young revolutionaries, nor their hostages, survived the shelling of mortars and rocket launchers—there were no military casualties. Except for the hostages, none of those who lost their lives in the ordeal were older than 26; the youngest victim was 19 years old.

One could perceive this clash between the Turkish army and these young revolutionaries as an isolated event, strictly as a product of Turkish national politics; indeed, this is the way that many historians have interpreted the massacre at Kızıldere. However, this incident may also be understood within the global framework of revolutions in the 1960s. Turkey’s place within this framework becomes especially clear when analyzing the revolutionary strategy of Mahir Çayan. His writings show—Çayan himself acknowledges this—that his revolutionary philosophy was “deeply influenced by the theories of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin”; the methods that Çayan had adopted as a student and guerilla leader, on the other hand, reveal the influence of contemporary revolutionaries from other countries. Of these, Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Che Guevara arguably had the most significant impact on Çayan’s strategy of revolution; therefore, one of Turkey’s clearest connections to the global and revolutionary 1960s can be observed in the relationship between the methodologies of these iconic revolutionaries, whose revolutions were transcending national borders, and those of Çayan.

It must be noted that it is difficult to discern the extent to which Cohn-Bendit and Guevara truly had an impact on Çayan, or whether his methods were merely similar to those of Cohn-Bendit and Guevara. Çayan himself, however, acknowledges that he had studied the tactics of both revolutionaries. Considered together with his occasional references to Cohn-Bendit and Guevara, this insight suggests, at the very least, the implicit influence of these revolutionaries on Çayan. Such an impact would also explain the uncanny, yet coherent, parallels between Çayan’s strategies and the highly distinct—almost contradictory—strategies of Cohn-Bendit and Guevara. Before this impact can be discussed in depth, however, some of the possible explanations for the disregard of this impact by the scholarship on radical politics in modern Turkey must be explored first. Following this discussion, to elucidate the relative ease with which Çayan was able to synthesize elements of both Cohn-Bendit’s and Guevara’s strategies in his own methods, the similarities between the theoretical assumptions of each of these revolutionaries will be analyzed. After their common theoretical background is established, the methodologies that these revolutionaries employed in their efforts to bring about their revolutions will be scrutinized in terms of their solutions to the following questions: who will bring about the revolution, where will the revolution begin, and how will it happen? At the end of this inquiry, I will conclude that the solutions to these questions, as proposed by Mahir Çayan’s methodology of revolution, constituted a synthesis of the solutions put forward by Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s and Che Guevara’s revolutionary strategies.

If Çayan did engage with the methods of his contemporary revolutionaries, why does the existing scholarship on Mahir Çayan and his THKP-C fail to adequately explore the full extent of this engagement? While this question can be answered in numerous ways, an analysis of the major works on the history of the radical leftist movements in Turkey suggests two significant and common reasons for this shortcoming: an overemphasis on his nationalism and a misinterpretation of his assessments of Turkey’s readiness for revolution. The exaggeration of Çayan’s nationalism is most evident in one of the most prominent works on the subject, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution, and Kemalism by Özgür Mutlu Ulus. Diverging from the mainstream history of Turkish radical socialist movements, Ulus contextualizes Mahir Çayan’s thought almost exclusively within his native Turkish culture. Specifically, Ulus refers to the “modern Turkish culture” that was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s regime during the very infancy of the Turkish Republic; Mahir Çayan was “born into the Kemalist-nationalist culture.”

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3 12 Mart.
4 12 Mart.
While she acknowledges that “international influence and imitation” were factors that drove students like Çayan to radical politics, Ulus claims that they were nevertheless “not the major factors in the active participation of university students in politics.” The most important factor that contributed to student protests was, according to Ulus, the Kemalist youth culture. Referring to the work of historian Jacob M. Landau, she demonstrates how pervasive this youth culture was by claiming that “As Landau had pointed out, Atatürk had called on the youth to watch over the Republic and its independence in a speech that every Turkish child learnt in school.”

For Ulus, the widespread student protests thus became a symbol of the “Kemalist Youth and the Turkish spirit of 1968.” In such a narrative, there can be no room for an exploration of the influences of foreign revolutionaries like Cohn-Bendit or Guevara on Çayan: the story of Mahir Çayan, according to Ulus, was the story of a Kemalist revolutionary, not an internationalist one. Indeed, in the chapters devoted to Çayan in Ulus’ work, Ulus mentions his Marxism and Leninism only once. Such emphasis on Mahir Çayan’s nationalism rather than his radical leftism thus caused scholars to overlook his engagement with foreign contemporary revolutionaries.

In addition to the exaggeration of his nationalism, scholars’ oversight of Çayan’s internationalism may be explained by a common misinterpretation of his assessments of Turkey’s readiness for revolution. Jacob M. Landau, who is frequently cited in Ulus’ work, presents such a misreading of Çayan in his Radical Politics in Modern Turkey. In his work, Landau paints a significantly different picture of Çayan than the one in Ulus’ work. In fact, he directly challenges the argument that Çayan was a Kemalist-nationalist, which indicates that Ulus’ depiction of Çayan as such is an exaggeration. He claims that Necati Sağır, one of Çayan’s oldest comrades and his classmate from Ankara University, denied that Çayan and his THKP-C were Kemalists. He cites Sağır as stating in his trial that “Atatürkism cannot be reconciled with our goals. We are socialists.”

According to Landau, Çayan’s anti-imperialism stemmed from his unique form of socialism, not his Kemalism; this was the radical aspect of Çayan’s philosophy, since “this is a turning point, in which, for the first time, Atatürkism formally ceases to be of relevance to organized political groups, albeit outside organized political life.” Nevertheless, just like Ulus, Landau overlooks Mahir Çayan’s connection with the global 1960’s. According to Landau, Mahir Çayan’s effort to develop “a strategy for revolution specifically suited for Turkey’s unique condition” isolated him and his movement from revolutionaries across the globe. Since, according to Çayan, Turkey was in a unique “semi-feudal and semi-colonial” state, Landau argues that Çayan was opposed to importing revolutionary strategies from different countries. This assumption is inherently fallacious primarily because of Landau’s depiction of Çayan as a socialist; why would Çayan be open to the foreign ideas of socialism when he himself thought that Turkey had not yet developed into a fully capitalist state? Since it is well established by prominent scholars like Ahmet Samim that Çayan was “a radical socialist,” and given Çayan’s unequivocal endorsement of the “heroic” tactics utilized by the M-26-7 during the Cuban Revolution, Landau’s assumption that Çayan “rejected foreign methods of revolution” becomes significantly less persuasive. This implicit problem within Landau’s framing of Çayan represents a broader misinterpretation of Çayan’s assessment of Turkey’s readiness for a proletarian revolution by scholars, which has naturally led into the oversight of the international influences on Çayan’s methods. Regardless of their shortcomings, the significance of the contributions that works like Ulus’s and Landau’s for the understanding of Mahir Çayan’s revolutionary thought cannot be denied. Rather, these shortcomings only suggest the need for a different and more global framework for analyzing Çayan’s methodology of revolution.

To establish this global historical framework, one must look for sources originating from around the globe that can be found either explicitly or implicitly in Mahir

9 Ulus, 109.
10 Ulus, 109.
11 Ulus, 111.
12 Ulus, 114.
14 Landau, 47.
15 Landau, 48.
16 Landau, 53-55.
17 Samim, “The Tragedy of the Turkish Left”, 71; Çayan, Bütün Yazılar, 117; Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, 56.
Çayan’s Bütün Yazılar, the complete collection of his theoretical and methodological writings as well as his personal correspondences. Based on these criteria, Ernesto Che Guevara’s Guerilla Warfare and Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative, supplemented by several of their other collected writings, can provide crucial insights regarding Mahir Çayan’s strategy of revolution. Traces of both works can be found in Çayan’s Bütün Yazılar either as explicitly cited or as implicitly embedded. Indeed, Çayan synthesized elements of Cohn-Bendit’s and Guevara’s methods, about which he had read in these works, in his own strategy of revolution. Perhaps the fundamental factor that allowed Çayan to accomplish this feat was their common ideological background. With a few nuances, all three revolutionaries are widely regarded as having envisioned and fought for a Marxist revolution that would ultimately end the exploitative and oppressive class structures; however, to simply limit the analysis of these revolutionaries’ theoretical background to discerning whether they were Marxist oriented or not is to neglect the remarkably similar ways in which these revolutionaries have not only endorsed but also criticized Marxist theories.

It is not difficult to demonstrate these revolutionaries’ adherence to Marxist theories; in their writings, they all rely on fundamental Marxist notions of historical materialism and class analysis. For Che, the revolution involved the creation of “a new human consciousness, a new Communist consciousness as an integral component of the new revolutionary society” that fulfilled the Marxist expectation by overcoming “the legacy of capitalist alienation.”18 Indeed, if there is any unifying theme of Cohn-Bendit’s and Guevara’s methods, about which he had read in these works, in his own strategy of revolution. Perhaps the fundamental factor that allowed Çayan to accomplish this feat was their common ideological background. With a few nuances, all three revolutionaries are widely regarded as having envisioned and fought for a Marxist revolution that would ultimately end the exploitative and oppressive class structures; however, to simply limit the analysis of these revolutionaries’ theoretical background to discerning whether they were Marxist oriented or not is to neglect the remarkably similar ways in which these revolutionaries have not only endorsed but also criticized Marxist theories.

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Cohn-Bendit regularly criticizes the Gaullist government for not having learned anything from Marx’s writings.21 One such example in his work is his criticism of the decisions that the French Ministry of Education had taken concerning Nanterre; he writes that “the Ministry suffers from a basic lack of historical understanding, or else they would have learned from Karl Marx that ‘men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.’”22

Mahir Çayan was no different than Cohn-Bendit or Guevara in his adherence to Marxism; his writings in Bütün Yazılar are as much an outline of his revolutionary strategy as they are, in his words, a “defense of Marxism.”23 This character of his writings is clearly manifested in his Marxist study of the Turkish War of Independence. For many, regardless of their political orientation, such a study was “unprecedented.”24 Furthermore, his correspondences with the board of editors of Aydinlik entail lengthy arguments against the so-called “revisionists…those right-wing fascists masquerading as Marxists” who were corrupting the left; to show the extent to which Aydinlik had deviated from the Marxist path and to defend Aydinlik, “the voice of the Turkish left,” from falling completely into the hands of these revisionists, Çayan even attached a copy of Marx’s German Ideology to his letter.25 It is thus evident that the praises these revolutionaries gave to Marxism overlap with each other. However, the revolutionaries’ shared adherence to Marxism arguably comprises the less remarkable similarity in their theoretical backgrounds.

What is more extraordinary about these revolutionaries’ theoretical backgrounds is the similarity of the grounds on which they had based their critiques of Marxism and Leninism. These three revolutionaries were not

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20 Guevara, 51.
22 Cohn-Bendit and Cohn-Bendit, 87.
23 Çayan, Bütün Yazılar, 102.
25 Çayan, Bütün Yazılar, 102-103.
merely passive consumers of Marxist ideology; in their written works, they made their own positive contributions to radical leftist thought through their unique critiques of Marxism. They all argue that Marxism was written in a highly sophisticated language that was simply unintelligible to the proletarian readers. Guevara maintains that “the masses understood [Marxist] values, but not sufficiently.”26 He asserts in Guerrilla Warfare that “the [masses] see only a part of the picture and must be subject to incentives and pressures of a certain intensity.” Guevara designates Marx’s language to be the main cause of this problem: “Fidel [Castro] would always talk about how hard it was to truly understand Marxism. I agree with him.”27 Cohn-Bendit likewise highlighted the difficulty of understanding Marx’s writings, especially for workers who had little access to education. As he is explaining why universities are “factories of privilege,” Cohn-Bendit writes that “I…regret that the writings of Marx are, at least in part, hard-going even for scholars and, in their present form, a closed book to most of the working class.”28 Since Marx’s writings were “accessible only to the bourgeois intellectual,” Cohn-Bendit argues that “cultural inequality is no accident, but part and parcel of the oppressive structure of both capitalist and ‘communist’ societies.”29 Çayan observed this cultural inequality in Turkey, and assessed it to be “chronic.”30 Although, Çayan had a unique interest in discussing this phenomenon in Bütün Yazılar; he was desperate to explain why the rural population of Turkey, who, according to Çayan, were supposed to be a part of the revolutionary vanguard, consistently sided with the government forces when conflicts arose in the countryside.31 In a letter written around 1969 to the editorial board of the Turkish socialist magazine Aydınlık, Çayan listed “the thorough education of the noble Turkish villagers in Marxist ways” as the second objective of his THKP-C; he added that “what we observe in the behaviour of peasantry is intellectual imperialism manifest…the members of our party are involved extensively in finding a cure to this sickness.”32 In terms of designating the true cause of this disease, Çayan half-heartedly wrote that “the intricate language of Marx…has made things difficult for our party thus far.”33 Therefore, Guevara’s, Cohn-Bendit’s and Çayan’s praises, as well as criticisms, of Marxism reveal significant parallels in their ideological backgrounds. This similarity not only indicates a truly global character of the revolutionary 1960’s, but also explains the relative ease with which Çayan was able to synthesize Cohn-Bendit’s and Guevara’s methodologies in his own strategy of revolution.

Mahir Çayan’s synthesis of Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s and Che Guevara’s methods of revolution must be analyzed in terms of its three fundamental components: the who, where and how of the revolution. The three revolutionaries’ similar critiques of Marxism necessarily lead to this question: who will be the principal actor in bringing about the revolution? In Guerrilla Warfare, Che argues that while the masses would constitute the manpower of the revolution, their insufficient understanding of Marxism “necessitates a vanguard party [that will act as] the catalyzing agent that creates the subjective conditions necessary for victory.” According to Che, “This is the mission of our revolutionary parties…their analysis [of Marxism] must be profound and exhaustive so that there will be no mistakes.”34 Naturally, therefore, “The vanguard group, consisting of the party of advanced individuals, is ideologically more advanced than the masses”; in Latin America, according to Guevara, this party of advanced individuals should be the guerilla fighters.35 He explicitly argues that “…the still sleeping mass had to be mobilized…[the revolutionary] vanguard, who are the guerrillas, act as the motor force of this mobilization, the generator of revolutionary consciousness and militant enthusiasm.”36

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, on the other hand, held a significantly different, and perhaps more incoherent,
view than Guevara’s regarding the principle agents of revolution. He wrote in *Obsolete Communism* that “our movement does not need leaders to direct it; that it can perfectly well express itself without the help of a ‘vanguard.’” Cohn-Bendit even argued that a vanguard was detrimental for the revolutionary cause: “…the workers’ self-confidence is enormously increased once they act without delegating any of their power to political parties or trade unions.” In Cohn-Bendit’s view, “the workers need no teachers; they will learn the correct tactics from…not an abstract conflict of ideas…[but from] people fighting in the street.” However, he also argues that since “the monopoly of capital invariably goes hand in hand with a monopoly of power and knowledge…this is precisely where the students can show the way.”

According to Cohn-Bendit, by attacking “the self-styled custodians of authority and of wisdom…those who, on the pretext of dispensing knowledge, preach obedience and conformism…students [had to] proclaim that the same repressive structures are weighing down on them and the workers alike.” Since it was in the universities that this mentality was sustained, students were indispensable for revolution. To reconcile these two contradictory views, in his interview with Jean-Paul Sartre, Cohn-Bendit proposes to abandon the concept of a leading vanguard and turn to a “much simpler and more honest one of the active minority functioning as a permanent leaven, pushing for action without ever leading it.”

In Cohn-Bendit’s view, then, students were to be the principal agents of revolution, but not its leaders.

Before moving on to the discussion of Mahir Çayan’s response to the issue of determining who would be the principal actor of the Marxist revolution in *Büttün Yazılar*, it is important to note that Çayan had been a student revolutionary as well as a guerilla fighter; Çayan was a third-year student at the Faculty of Political Science in Ankara University when he co-organized the anti-imperialist protests of 1967, and he was the founding leader of Turkey’s most successful communist guerilla organization THKP-C when he was killed by the Turkish Armed Forces. Indeed, it may well be argued that Çayan was Turkey’s Guevara as well as its Cohn-Bendit. Çayan’s fusion of these revolutionaries was not limited to his identity, however, but also extended to his methodological engagement with these revolutionaries. Çayan indicates that he had read both *Guerrilla Warfare* and *Obsolete Communism* in his private letters. In light of what he had read, he writes that “We, the Marxists of semi-colonial countries, have a lot to learn from the glorious proletarian leaders of the Cuban Revolution, especially Guevara”; he also states that “the movement ignited by Cohn-Bendit must be studied for its noteworthy success in establishing the subjective conditions for revolution.”

The first level of Çayan’s methodological synthesis of Guevara’s and Cohn-Bendit’s strategies is observed on his approach to determining the principal agent of revolution. Like Che, Çayan argued for a militant vanguard to lead the revolution: “the enlightened among our people have realized that pacifism should not be the way; they have realized the need for an armed organization to materialize the revolution, which explains the prestige of our own guerillas, the fighters of the THKP-C.” Çayan continues: “…if revolutionary propaganda is to be effective in waking the masses and drawing people to our cause, it must take the form of an armed, guerilla propaganda like in Latin American countries.” However, being a student himself, Çayan was aware of “the intellectual imperialism that dominated the lecture halls of universities in Istanbul and Ankara.” Just as Cohn-Bendit argues for attacking the repressive structures of universities, Çayan calls for a strict “reconstruction of university hierarchies led by students.” In his call, Çayan shows signs of Cohn-Bendit’s impact on him when he proposes that “professors who belong to the
left must unite with their students in this effort,” just as Cohn-Bendit stated in his interview with Sartre that “we shall call on the extreme and leftist teachers who are prepared to work with us…in establishing institutions of ‘parallel education’”\textsuperscript{49}. It must be acknowledged, however, that Çayan was against Cohn-Bendit’s opposition to a vanguard; he tied “the waning of the French Student Revolution with…the failure of the Communist Party in owning up the movement.”\textsuperscript{50} Regardless, Mahir Çayan thus synthesized the positions of Che Guevara and Daniel Cohn-Bendit on the issue of determining the principal agents of revolution by assigning both his guerillas and the university students the leading roles in his revolutionary strategy.

After determining who should lead the revolution, the revolutionaries turned their attention to where it would take place. Çayan’s synthesis of Guevara’s and Cohn-Bendit’s methods of revolution is as apparent in his answer to the ‘who’ question as it is in his answer to the ‘where’ question. Regarding the location of the revolution, Guevara is quite clear in \textit{Guerilla Warfare}: “in the underdeveloped parts of America, the battleground for armed struggle should in the main be the countryside.”\textsuperscript{51} Che explains this by the dominant “agrarian system of feudal character” in Latin America, which ensured that “no matter how hard the living conditions of the urban workers are, the rural population, comprising more than 70 percent of the Latin American populations, lives under even worse conditions of oppression and exploitation.”\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, for Che, the revolution could not happen anywhere other than the countryside, at least in Latin America: “These circumstances determine in Latin America that the poor rural population constitutes a tremendous potential revolutionary force.”\textsuperscript{53} The logistics and tactics of guerilla warfare also necessitated the revolution’s emergence in rural areas. Che not only claimed that “a group of men in contact with the soil must live from the products of this soil,” but also that “The armies in Latin America are set up and equipped for conventional warfare…when they are confronted with the irregular warfare of peasants based on their home ground, they become absolutely powerless.”\textsuperscript{54} It may be argued that Cohn-Bendit, on the other hand, did not take such things into account, as he argues in \textit{Obsolete Communism} that “the revolution will arise spontaneously in the university campuses, the streets, and the factories.”\textsuperscript{55} Cohn-Bendit recognizes the potential importance of a revolution in rural parts of France, but argues nevertheless that “the revolution…must primarily take place at the heart of oppression: universities and factories, not in the countryside; a stab at the heart is deadlier than a stab in the leg.”\textsuperscript{56} It must be noted that he does not adequately explain why the revolution had to be also taken to the streets in \textit{Obsolete Communism}. In fact, compared to Guevara’s \textit{Guerilla Warfare}, Cohn-Bendit offers a very limited discussion of the spatial aspects of his conception of the revolution.

Recognizing the benefit in both rural and urban guerilla warfare, Çayan combines elements from both Guevara’s and Cohn-Bendit’s revolutionary strategies in his own. He argued for combining rural and urban warfare because of, among other reasons, the unique socio-political condition of Turkey, which was mentioned in the discussion of Landau’s work on Çayan: “Turkey was simultaneously a feudal and colonial country.”\textsuperscript{57} In this sense, Çayan adhered to Cohn-Bendit’s tactics of striking at the heart of the enemy: since “the countryside [was] the center of feudal power, the big cities, especially Istanbul, [were] the center of colonial power,” the revolution had to take place in both a rural and an urban setting. Çayan adds that “this organization [THKP-C], has been active in a region that spans from the rural farms to the urban factories, from the universities to \textit{Halkevleri} [People’s Community Centers].”\textsuperscript{58} However, Çayan also incorporated Guevara’s tactical argument into his strategy; since the Turkish military had a weak presence in the countryside, it was safer and more rational for the THKP-C guerillas to be active there. In a confident tone, he writes: “they [the army] lose 10 men for every revo-

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\item Çayan, 224; Bourges, \textit{The French Student Revolt: The Leaders Speak}, 80.
\item Çayan, \textit{Bütün Yazılar}, 224.
\item Guevara, \textit{Guerilla Warfare}, 98.
\item Guevara, 98–99.
\item Guevara, 100.
\item Guevara, 100.
\item Cohn-Bendit and Cohn-Bendit, \textit{Obsolete Communism: Left-Wing Alternative}, 80.
\item Cohn-Bendit and Cohn-Bendit, 81.
\item Çayan, \textit{Bütün Yazılar}, 256.
\item Çayan, \textit{Bütün Yazılar}, 257.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The landscape provides them with no opportunities to display the elite academy tactics that they use to repress the workers and the students in Istanbul.”59 In his own solution to the question of where the revolution will happen, then, Mahir Çayan integrates elements of both Che Guevara’s and Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s responses to the same question.

The final question about the revolution, however, remains: how did these revolutionaries expect their revolution would happen? For Guevara, all that the guerilla fighters needed to do was “their job…[which] is to engage the imperialists through irregular warfare.”60 It was through this irregular warfare that Guevara expected the peasants to rise up with the guerilla forces; this could only be accomplished with “an authoritative guerilla vanguard, to steer the action in such a way that would ensure peasant support.”61 Unlike Guevara, Cohn-Bendit emphasized the “spontaneity” of revolution.62 He maintains that during the revolution in 1968, the workers “had asked themselves a crucial question that would spark the revolution: ‘The factory is ours, so do we need to start working for the bosses again?’” Cohn-Bendit argues that “This idea arose quite spontaneously, not by command, or under the aegis of the so-called vanguard of the proletariat, but simply as a natural response to a concrete situation,” and models his entire conception of revolution in Obsolete Communism according to this phenomenon of spontaneity.63

In his own formulation of a methodology of revolution, Çayan borrowed the terms ‘irregular warfare’ and ‘spontaneity’ from Guevara and Cohn-Bendit, and thus synthesized these two revolutionaries’ strategies in his own. While he believed that his THKP-C had to engage in irregular warfare in the countryside, the bulk of the revolutionary force would rise spontaneously.64 Çayan’s synthesis becomes clearer in the rough course of action that he suggests for the revolution. First, “The peasant masses, led by a proletarian party, would strike at the local feudal elements.”65 After the imperialists reacted to this strike, “a popular war would then spontaneously start, led by a Front for National Liberation…the enemy will, in the rural parts, be repulsed into the sea, while urban guerillas will clean up the towns.”66 Therefore, one could clearly see a fusion of Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s and Che Guevara’s revolutionary methodology in the way that Mahir Çayan had conceived of his own strategy of revolution.

All in all, Mahir Çayan’s methodology of revolution was a synthesis of Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s and Che Guevara’s revolutionary strategies. As demonstrated in this study, one of the clearest ways to study this synthesis is to consider each revolutionary’s methods in terms of three fundamental questions regarding the revolution: who will bring about the revolution, where will the revolution begin, and how will it happen? Çayan’s synthesis of Cohn-Bendit’s and Guevara’s answers to these problems was facilitated by the similarity in all three revolutionary’s theoretical backgrounds. Once the true extent of his global links to other foreign revolutionaries like Guevara and Cohn-Bendit is examined thoroughly, Çayan’s incorporation of their strategies shows one of the clearest ways in which Turkey was connected to the global and revolutionary 1960’s.

Mahir Çayan’s legacy is still very much alive in Turkey. Protesters shouted his name, along with the names of his friends, as they occupied Gezi Park in 2013. Ertuğrul Kürkçü, the sole survivor of the massacre at Kızıldere, is one of the co-presidents of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which advocates for the vision of the Turkish people’s peaceful coexistence with Kurdish people, a vision that Çayan himself had adhered to throughout his life. The global framework in which his methods have been analyzed in this paper suggests that he belongs to the legacy of the global 1960s. These words of Çayan may be regarded as a testimony to this fact: “We do not study Marxism to make idle intellectual conversation; we study Marxism because we want to change the world, because we want to change the Turkey of this world.”67
The Lilly Library Ricketts MS 30
A Fifteenth-Century Oddity or Heresy?

By HOLLY BEAN, INDIANA UNIVERSITY

PART 1—INTRODUCTION OF CONTEXT:
Coella Lindsay Ricketts, a calligrapher from Chicago, donated three hundred and thirty-two various texts to the Lilly Library at Indiana University in 1961. These objects include manuscripts dating from the ninth to the nineteenth century. Ricketts MS 30, “The Illegal Scriptures,” a Middle English Psalter-Hours from this collection, has escaped scholarly interest. But the manuscript may be worth closer inspection. Kathleen Kennedy’s article, “Reintroducing the English Book of Hours, or ‘English Primers,’” describes seventeen other Books of Hours and Psalters that use Middle English, and only two combined Psalter-Hours, neither of which include MS 30. Ricketts MS 30 dates to the first quarter of the fifteenth century as a Psalter-Hours and is written in the period’s Middle English vernacular, but this is only one of the manuscript’s abnormalities; the first folia contain astronomical-astrological calendars unusual for such a text, as none of Kennedy’s studied manuscripts contain such tables. While it may seem that neither subject correlates with each other, in this essay I argue that Ricketts MS 30’s vernacular language and astrological tables come out of a common cultural origin. There are connections between religious texts in Medieval England and primarily secular astronomical and medicinal texts which, through the analysis of the contents of Ricketts MS 30 and the cultural context surrounding its plausible commission, make these connections less obscure.

Breaking down some of the abnormal parts of Ricketts MS 30 will answer some of the larger questions, but first, it is prudent to recognize what Ricketts MS 30 is and where it came from. As described by the Lilly Library’s vertical file on MS 30, Ricketts MS 30 is a vellum 11x8 cm manuscript, containing 246 leaves out of a supposed original 253. It is constructed in accordance with the Use of Sarum, a variant of the Roman Rite popular in Salisbury and more widely throughout the British Isles. It was most recently (c. 1900) bound by Riviere and Son in Moroccan leather. The manuscript has relatively simple decoration. There are sixteen illuminated initials, signifying that it is less likely to be an extremely ornate or expensive text. The script is in the Gothic style and the text is mostly in Middle English with Latin key words in red. The quality of the pages varies—some have signs of wear and text can be illegible. There are instances where ink has bled through and there are signs of patchwork visible in the last folia. The question of provenance is important to address because the earliest recorded known owner was a banker and collector named George C. Thomas, who bought the manuscript in 1924. The Lilly Library acquired it from C.L. Ricketts in 1961. The only visible sign of a previous owner is seen on fol. 84r:

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influences. Each individual section 

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4  Christopher de Hamel, et al. Gilding the Lilly: a Hundred Medieval and Illuminated Manuscripts in the Lilly Library (Bloomington: Lilly Library, Indiana University, 2010), 128.

to Somer’s elusive Kalendarium, I use Linne Mooney’s 

Kalendarium of John Somer, even though there are deviations between the two works. These mismatches on their own would be intriguing, but together create a platform from which to analyze and discuss larger historical issues such as ownership, the extent of religious heresy, and the cultural significance of astronomy. Still to be explored is why the owner commission such a text — which by that time was out of style — and why a Psalter-Hours combo was created in 1425, when Book of Hours overcame the production of combos in the thirteenth century and the invention of Gutenberg’s printing press was around the corner. Yet, as seen in Kathleen Kennedy’s article, two other Psalter-Hours in the Wy-

Private Devotional Books: Psalters, Books of Hours, and Composites

Before the abnormal contents of Ricketts MS 30 can be dissected, it is necessary to understand the purpose of Books of Hours and Psalters, as Ricketts MS 30 is primarily a religious text existing outside of the popularity of Psalter-Hours composites. Psalters were the most common orthodox manuscript for private devotions until

the name “Ann Money” written in what may be eighteenth century marginal script.4

The original patron of the manuscript is unknown and even the plausible publication date is uncertain because it is unlikely that the complete manuscript is the commissioned original. At the beginning of Ricketts MS 30, there are thirteen consecutive folia that were likely added at a time distinct from the manuscript’s initial commission. This assumption is drawn from a blank page on 13v and the abrupt beginning of the Psalter which lacks an introduction or any indication of the beginning. This may be because the beginning of the Psalter was lost or that the four sections most similar to Somer’s Kalendarium — including an Arabic-Roman conversion table, Table of Leap Years, Table of Regulars, and a Saint’s Day calendar — were added later. It is possible that these sections were removed from another source or were intentionally commissioned at a different time. In these sections the date “1425” is visible, though whether or not it was the year the manuscript was commissioned is uncertain. It may be impossible to know for certain, but the analysis of these potential added sections contributes to the argument that Ricketts MS 30 is an abnormal manuscript which should be researched further.

Drawn to this manuscript’s discrepancies — given the presence of the date of c. 1425 — I decided to deconstruct and identify the specific abnormalities to research this particular manuscript and its larger cultural influences. Each individual section within the manuscript aligns with known manuscript styles or traditions, specifically with respect to the work of 15th-century astronomer John Somer. In order to compare the Ricketts MS to Somer’s elusive Kalendarium, I use Linne Mooney’s reproduction, The Kalendarium of John Somer, even though there are deviations between the two works. These mismatches on their own would be intriguing, but together create a platform from which to analyze and discuss larger historical issues such as ownership, the extent of religious heresy, and the cultural significance of astronomy. Still to be explored is why the owner commission such a text — which by that time was out of style — and why a Psalter-Hours combo was created in 1425, when Book of Hours overcame the production of combos in the thirteenth century and the invention of Gutenberg’s printing press was around the corner. Yet, as seen in Kathleen Kennedy’s article, two other Psalter-Hours in the Wy-

cliff e translation were commissioned around the fifteenth century, so a Psalter-Hours may not have been as out of the ordinary as believed by many scholars. These discrepancies may address the question of ownership, but there is only so much which analysis can address without making baseless assumptions. For example, while the manuscript may have the general Psalter-Hours structure, it is written in Middle English, the heretical language (as declared by Archbishop Arundel in the early fifteenth century) and not Latin, the orthodox language. This difference reflects the ideology and background of the commissioner of the manuscript and situates the Ricketts MS 30 in the highly debated topic of the vernacular, Middle English’s relationship with religious texts, and private devotion.

Similarly, the presence of astrological/astronomical tables in the front of a highly established religious text is noteworthy given that these tables do not fit in the traditions of their respective genres. And while it is probable that the patron of Ricketts MS 30 did not commission the manuscript, as it exists today, there is the question of the date of when the Psalter-Hours section was written. It is possible that the Psalter-Hours portion was an older text, perhaps passed down between family members and the astrological/astronomical calendars were added later due to changing cultural interests. However, it is more likely that the religious textual sections date to the late fourteenth century around the Wycliff e translations, instead of following the Psalter-Hour tradition of the thirteenth century, as will be discussed. The 1425 date on the astrological/astronomical tables does indicate a specific choice on the part of the commissioner, but not necessarily for the original Ricketts MS 30 manuscript. A paleographical study on the type of Wycliff e translation and handwriting would quickly resolve the dating issue. This essay is a cultural introduction into a few abnormal components seen in Ricketts MS 30, which will become a lengthier analysis of this manuscript in the future.
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, when the popular Book of Hours replaced Psalters.\textsuperscript{5} Psalters, the Psalms, had different functions dependent on their specific patron. The Psalter, according to the Fitzwilliam Museum’s Keeper of Manuscripts, Stella Panayotova, in her chapter, “The Illustrated Psalter: Luxury and Practical Use,” “dominated the life of the religious.”\textsuperscript{6} The specific divisions of the Psalms meant that they were strictly read at particular times of day and on specific days of the week. The order of the Psalms within the Psalter was mostly standardized but, overall, deviances were often a result of geographical differences and audience preferences. According to Calkins, the German and Irish early psalters were simple in their organization, dividing the fifty psalms into three parts. On the other hand, Roman psalters were divided into eight parts while the English psalter varied. Even so, Panayotova argues that geography was not the most important distinction in which to categorize psalters, because the organization was dependent on the differences of audience, such as the monastic and the clergy of secular cathedrals. The monastic psalters grouped the Psalms based on illustrations to “reflect the focal points of monastic devotion, learning, and daily routine.” Secular psalters grouped theirs similar to the Roman “liturgical or eightfold division” which Panayotova argues was the most common and systematic decoration.\textsuperscript{7}

The function of psalters had non-clerical functions as well as religious functions. Primers, another term for psalters, were used to teach Latin to children and were also the first introduction into the Bible. Beyond childhood, psalters functioned throughout a lifetime and changing needs, so the Psalters typically stayed with a single patron or family over generations.\textsuperscript{8} The function did not end there, as illiterate religious patrons also used the Psalms as weekly readings based on the system of Matins, Primes and Vespers, and used the manuscript as a guide which they had already memorized through their education in the church. The Psalters’ most significant contribution to daily devotion was not just through the memorization and repetition of the Psalms, but the practical moral guidance.\textsuperscript{9} The popularity and seemingly universality of medieval psalters were the beginning of a wider individual devotion leading to the explosion of Books of Hours in the fourteenth century.

As private religious devotion began to deviate regionally and with a larger focus on the individual, Books of Hours began to circulate in the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Books of Hours were personal prayer books meant for daily devotion outside of the Psalms, and they were symbols of status. John Harthan, author of \textit{Book of Hours and Their Owners}, argues that Books of Hours were vehicles for the elite Christian intellectual and for the masses.\textsuperscript{10} According to Harthan, Books of Hours transitioned and expanded from Psalters and their monastic audience to an even more secularized and general audience as anyone who was wealthy enough was able to commission an individualized Book of Hours for private devotion. Quickly, by the thirteenth century, Books of Hours were the most popular devotional manuscript and were highly individualized in their conception. The amount of illustration in a manuscript depended on the patron’s wealth and intent. Many times people would own relatively simple Books of Hours as a symbol of their humility and piety, while to others an elaborate Book of Hours was a social symbol of wealth and status, such as the popularized and ornate \textit{Tres Riches Heures du Duc de Berry} (c. 1411-1416).\textsuperscript{11,12}

Books of Hours were individualized by their decoration, but also through the range of individual and geographically specific devotional content. The principal text in Books of Hours was the Office of the Virgin, according to Calkins. Other typical texts included were a calendar for feast days, the Seven Penitential Psalms, and a Litany of Saints. Finally, most Books of Hours closed with the Office of the Dead.\textsuperscript{13} Other inclusions

\textsuperscript{7} Panayotova, 250.
\textsuperscript{8} Panayotova, 248.
\textsuperscript{9} Panayotova, 247.
\textsuperscript{10} Linne Mooney, \textit{The Kalendarium of John Somer} (Athens: University of Georgia. 1998), 31.
\textsuperscript{11} John Harthan, \textit{Books of Hours and Their Owners} (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 32.
\textsuperscript{12} “Labors of the Months from the Très Riches Heures,” \textit{The Public Domain Review}, August 1, 2018, publicdomainreview.org/collections/labors-of-the-months-from-the-tres-riches-heures/.
\textsuperscript{13} Calkins, \textit{Illuminated}, 244.
or exclusions of texts may provide clues to the patron’s individuality. The calendar is a major clue for any religious text because it lists the regional saints’ days, which may provide clues to the manuscript’s original location. Books of Hours held multiple individualized functions within society; they were not just daily prayer books, but also record keepers and albums meant for safekeeping. In general, Books of Hours were expensive until the late fifteenth century, when the printing press replaced handmade editions and the use of paper became popular, thus increasing the size of the both literate and illiterate audiences and decreasing in price.

Psalter-Hours, the same category to which Ricketts MS 30 belongs, are an interesting category within the private devotional manuscript because Psalter-Hours were most popular in the thirteenth century, functioning as a transition between Psalters and Books of Hours. A manuscript of this type usually included the Hours of the Virgin, other Hours, and the Psalms. One of the best-known sections of Psalter-Hours was the Office of the Dead, meant for private mourning. The short period that Psalter-Hours were popular was a century before Ricketts MS 30’s commission during the height of the Books of Hours popularity. As mentioned, while Ricketts MS 30 is a Psalter-Hours that seemingly dates to this tradition, more likely the manuscript dates to the late fourteenth century around the Wycliffite translations.

**Middle English in Devotional Books**

Ricketts MS 30 text is mostly in Middle English. This is unusual because the use of the vernacular language was officially declared heretical by Thomas Arundel, the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the early fifteenth century. The place of Middle English within the scholarly discussion of heresy during the Middle Ages often centers around the Wycliffe Bible, a popular and seemingly heretical Middle English translation of the Bible by theologian and professor John Wyclif (c. 1330-1384). Arundel’s *De Heretico Comburendo* (1401) recognizes specific attributes of illegal action of sects, such as Lollards, but also the creation of books, possibly one such as Ricketts MS 30, “of such sect and wicked doctrine and opinions they make unlawful conventicles and confederacies, they hold and exercise schools, they make and write books, they do wickedly instruct and inform people, and as such they may excite and stir them to sedition.”

John Wyclif’s vernacular translation of the Bible was founded on an ideal of achievable faith formed from the scripture in its most “naked” form, rather than a “political-ecclesiastical authority” process of achieving faith. This was controversial to the authoritative power of the Catholic Church, as it questioned the methods in which scripture was presented to its subjects and thus the authority of the Church. It was presented in a manner in which ordinary people, if they could afford the translation and were literate, could read the Bible themselves — almost as a precursor to the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. Even so, the scholarly discourse surrounding Middle English, heresy, and the Lollards, a controversial religious group, debatably, tied closely to the spread of the Wycliffite Bible since its translation, c. 1382, with the Wycliffite Bible is more nuanced than previously noted. The Wycliffite manuscript is most popularly connected with heresy, but is it a viable claim to deem all Middle English texts as heretical during the early fourteenth century? The centuries-long controversy surrounding the use of vernacular language in religious texts is based on the mostly agreed upon foundation that groups, specifically the well-known Lollards, used the Wycliffite Bible, a Middle English translation, as an outward declaration of

17 Panayotova, “Illustrated,” 249.
heresy.

Much of the contemporary scholarship around the heterodoxy debate, specifically centered on Lollards and the use of the vernacular is based off of one of the main recorders written in the 16th century, John Foxe. Due to the quantity of reports, Foxe’s argument that there was a direct correlation between Lollards and the use of the English vernacular. He stated that “until the Reformation all religion expressed in vernacular terms was automatically considered suspect.”21 This has been the main source of evidence for the contemporary debate assuming that anything related with the concept of heresy relates directly to the Lollards. Yet, more recently other accounts and debates, in both contemporary and historical contexts, have to come to light. Some of the alternative arguments include evidence for a European-wide trend for vernacular scripture in the 15th century, evidence of other groups spreading English translations such as the ‘Brethren of the Common Life” that did not receive legal repercussions from clerical authorities. Recently, seen in Eamon Duffy’s 1990’s research, is that instead of viewing the vernacular as heretical, instead of the Wycliffite Bible and thus a more individualized approach to transmitting theological teachings, but the transition to the vernacular may not have been an intentional act of rebellion. Instead, the use of the vernacular points to more prominent, changing attitudes towards class, gender, and national identity—and, to some degree, individual agency. These changing understandings of the relationship between the use of the vernacular and the Church results in new methods for the study of texts like Ricketts MS 30.

Kennedy’s article interprets the other known seventeen English Psalters and Books of Hours as evidence of a “more nuanced understanding of vernacular religion in fifteenth century England” beyond theological arguments.26 The most well-known evidence for the heresy of vernacular manuscripts is the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Arundel’s (1353-1414) De heretico comburendo (Of the burning of heretics) in 1401 and the Constitutions of 1407 and 1409 which condemned the vernacular transcription of and use of religious texts, most specifically the Wycliffite Bible: “no such wicked doctrine and heretical and erroneous opinions, nor their authors and fators, in the said realm and dominions, against the Catholic faith, Christian law, and determination of the holy church, which God prohibit, be sustained or in any way suffered.”27 These texts became the foundation for the modern debate over the role of Lollards and the use of the vernacular, now known as Middle English, as heresy against the Catholic Church. In reality, the doctrine was not enforced as a way to criminalize further vernacular texts even though his declarations are continually

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24 McSheffrey, 47.
25 McSheffrey, 49.
26 Kennedy, “Reintroducing,” 693.
used as evidence in support of the argument that there is a direct and automatic link between Middle English and heresy. According to Kantik Ghosh, even around 1400, there were still debates over vernacular texts and their levels of heterodoxy. Instead of a direct correlation between text and heresy, many are now arguing that heresy was seen through the eyes of the authorities, and that the arguments only existed in the elite sphere with little trickle-down effect. This led to discrimination against the holders of the seemingly heretical texts.

The heretical controversy may have targeted class differences during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. According to McSheffrey, “social status also conditioned how the act of reading in English was interpreted by authorities who prosecuted Lollards and by Lollards themselves.” Despite their activities against lower-class heretics, clerical authorities viewed the reading of vernacular scriptures among the elites as a “pious and laudable practice,” thus already establishing a leniency to the privileged. Lollards, on the other hand, with the most heretical reputation, were “mostly poor and ill-instructed men,” and the most public targets of the vernacular controversy. The Lollards, who wanted direct authority and knowledge over their own scriptures, were seen as “consciously choosing to disobey the authority of the church.” Again, this rebellion was against the politicized and nonstandardized religious authority who chose the path to faith and not from an universal understanding of the scripture. The fact that after Archbishop Arundel’s Constitutions the publications or spread of the vernacular texts did not slacken is also evidence that heresy may not have been as widely contested, and the narrative was still controlled by the elite authorities. Middle English texts, existed in all aspects of life, such as the popular lay devotional Books of Hours, and the more orthodox Psalter, but they did not receive the same heretical attention as did the Wycliffite Bible.

The historiography surrounding the Middle English vernacular and heresy has mostly focused on the Wycliffite translations, thus has limited the attention given to other texts like, as defined by Kathleen Kennedy’s “English Hours,” and Hamel’s “primers” that complicate the controversy due to their contradictory nature of heterodoxy and orthodoxy. While the Wycliffite Bible was a direct affront to the Church in its content and transmission, “English Hours” were a combination of heresy (Middle English text) but also orthodoxy in the content of the text. As a Middle English Psalter-Hour, Ricketts MS 30 is one of these texts difficult to place in the discourse of heresy. These texts original functions were a part of the increasing “literacy of the laity.” By the 14th century, the popularity of Books of Hours as a genre was established strongly enough in a wide audience of differing classes that even in a vernacular translation, it may not have been targeted as heresy because if an authority attacked a lower class owner, then a wealthier owner would also have to be targeted, thus possibly eliminating class discriminations. The middle ground was the Psalter, already a more orthodox text and part of the Bible. Since the majority of the Psalter is direct scripture, the text encroached upon the territory of the Wycliffite Bible and due to this, psalters might have been flagged as a heretical text.

However, psalters also had another function. They were originally used to teach Latin, and I wonder how much may have changed with the increasing acceptance of Middle English in multiple classes and gendered realms. Gender influenced the short-spanned transitions between French, Latin and Anglo-Saxon languages. Susan Crane argued that after 1200 French was no longer the “primary language for even a majority of the elite in England” and by 1240 Latin and Anglo-Norman split into a hierarchy. Latin was the learned elite male language, with the female “inferior” Anglo-Norman as secondary with the vernacular English as last on the hierarchy, but by this time Middle English quickly became
the main language of multiple classes making its literary instruction necessary, probably through Psalters. With the appearance of Middle English in multiple religious texts and also other mediums such as medicinal and astrological/astronomical texts, Sand argues, there was a new respect for the language that correlated with “the growth of national identity” seen by the declining use of Latin, Hebrew and Greek in elite circles and the increasing use of Middle English.36

Ricketts MS 30’s probable commission date around the mid-15th century complicates the question of ownership and heresy. When introduced to Ricketts MS 30, the first thing that grabbed my attention was the Lilly Library’s subtitle, “Illegal Scriptures.” The assumption of legality was made solely on its cultural context, due to the Archbishop’s Constitutions, and by the fact that it is in Middle English. It many seem like an obvious connection to the Lollard population, but there is not any specific indication of heresy and, by 1425, heretical texts seemed to be a category only applied by and useful by the higher authorities and not necessarily by the public. Hence, the original patron, if the manuscript was commissioned around 1425, may not have been a Lollard, nor an active rebel against the higher religious authority. The plural existence of heresy and orthodoxy complicates the question of ownership. It may have been a member of the possibly heretical Lollards, but those were typically poor men, and commissioning such a text as the expensive Psalter-Hours complicates things even further.

PART TWO—ANALYSIS & COMPARISON

The major function of Ricketts MS 30 is as a religious text containing both a Psalter and a Book of Hours. However, the most abnormal sections of Ricketts MS 30 are the astrological-astronomical tables in the beginning of the manuscript. As mentioned above, these tables may have been added later, but each table has a characteristic that is out of place with its typical genre. The questions surrounding these tables include their origin, purpose, and questionable cultural context. The totality of these tables can seemingly be traced back to one of the greatest known astronomers-astrologers of the fourteenth century, John Somer. Born in the 1340s, Somer studied at the Merton school of astronomy at Oxford University where his Kalendarium contributed to the field of study had an impact lasting for over a century. An exact date for Somer’s Kalendarium is not known. One of the earliest versions found is dated c. 1380, but his calendars changed as he continued to work until his death c. 1409. Somer, a Franciscan monk, was highly revered for his scientific work and Joan the Princess of Wales was one of several royal patrons.38 Somer’s Kalendarium contained astronomical and medical information chronicling from 1001 to 1532, specifically detailing the Metonic cycles, eclipses, astrological signs, medical information connected to lunar and solar cycles, etc.39 It was also not uncommon for Somer’s Kalendarium to be owned by lay people even though it was first made popular by the medical profession. Around 1430 Somer’s calendar was translated from Latin to Middle English. Somer was not the only expert in astronomy/astrology given royal patronage at the time. Nicholas of Lynn wrote within six years of Somer, but included different information in his Kalendar.40

Somer’s Kalendarium had a larger medical foundation and less astronomical information, but in conversation with the Ricketts MS 30’s abnormal astronomical calendars, there seems to be more similarity between Ricketts MS 30 and Somer’s Kalendarium than with Nicholas of Lynn’s manuscript. The Ricketts MS 30 does not contain any of the medical prologues or additional medically specific texts such as the famed “Zodiac Man.” Another aspect which argues for Somer’s similarities to Ricketts is the language, because if it is a partial Somer calendar, it would be historically accurate that Ricketts MS 30’s similarities are also in Middle English, as will be discussed. According to Cornelius O’Boyle, the translation of Somer’s calendar into Middle English was for “instructing the sons of a northern noble family.” The calendar, owned by religiously minded people, used it to “plot the course of the church calendar for the current year and for many years ahead.”41 This reason seems to

36  Sand, 198.
37  Sand, 144.
38  Mooney, “Reintroducing,” 5.
39  Mooney, 6.
40  Mooney, 12.
follow more reliably with the Rickets MS 30 additions and may provide clues about the possible owner or commissioner of the manuscript.

Arabic–Roman Numeral Conversion Table
The first addition to Rickets MS 30 is an Arabic–Roman numeral conversion table that does exemplify similarities to Somer’s Kalendarium, yet is still an abnormality due to its seemingly out-of-date cultural context. Whether or not this page was added at a different time rather than c. 1425, it still remains at the front and is in poor quality. It is much darker and has a glossier finish due to exposure than any other folio within the manuscript. There is no other prologue or introduction to the manuscript as both Psalters and Somer’s Kalendarium traditionally followed. The Hindu-Arabic numeral system is now the most common system in the world, but it was not always so. Though titled as Hindu-Arabic, the system has morphed from regional areas in India, Persia, and Southeast Asia and was introduced to Europe during the High Middle Ages, c. 1000-1250. Latin script may have influenced the glyphs once the system reached its height of popularity in the fifteenth century, eventually replacing Roman numerals.42 In John Somer’s Kalendarium an Arabic-Roman numeral conversion table was customary because in the late 14th and early 15th centuries, it was still uncommon for all people to be familiar with the Arabic system. Thus, the table listed numerals one to sixty for practical purposes. According to Mooney, knowing beyond the number sixty was impractical because most frequent measurements did not exceed sixty, “there being 60 seconds and 60 degrees in a minute and 60 minutes in an hour.”43 While Somer may have intentionally used sixty for mathematical purposes, the inclusion of the conversion chart in a religious text may have been just as useful as the numbers did not pass sixty often either, although the Psalms go to one hundred and fifty. There are many different arguments as to why so-called “Arabic” numerals replaced Roman numerals, but one of the most practical reasons may have been the economic advantage. Arabic numerals took up less space than Roman numerals and saved money during the manuscript commission.

By the early fifteenth century, and as the spread of the new system went beyond the academic realm, both John Somer’s Kalendarium and religious texts such as Books of Hours or Psalters omitted these tables because people understood the system, thus making them irrelevant.44 For this reason it is odd that an Arabic/Roman numeral conversion table would be included in Rickets MS 30. The chart is the first part of the manuscript as mentioned. There is no earlier prologue, as seen in Somer’s Kalendarium, so if this section was a part of a calendar it has been isolated and the only introduction is at the top of the first page stating that the black inked numerals are Roman and the red is Arabic/Latin script. The inclusion of the chart is uncommon and suggests that the chart may have been added at another point, because not only does the timing not correlate with the system’s spread, by this point most literate people could understand the Arabic system, but also because the table exceeds the typical one to sixty. This chart converts numerals one to ten million over folia 1r, 1v, and 2r. These differences have raised questions about the continuity of the manuscript’s production, use and ownership. Why did someone intentionally commission such a table in the mid-15th century and why exceed the typical chart to list up to ten million? So far, there is no special purpose or significance for the number ten million scientifically or religiously.

Table of Bisextiles
Another element of John Somer’s Kalendarium seen in Rickets MS 30 is the Leap Year Table, also known as a Table of Bisextiles.45 The table typically seen within Somer’s manuscript includes a timeline beginning with the year 1367, the birth year of King Richard II, one of Somer’s Royal Patrons) until 1507, spanning 140 years. The main purpose of this calendar was to calculate the day of Easter for each year. Each table included a “dominical letter, the indiction, prime or golden number.”46 Starting on January 1, a letter was assigned to that day listing from A to G, and the list would begin again each year starting on a different day. The dominical letter was the letter that fell on the first Sunday. Leap years, due to the extra day, have two dominical letters and red

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43 Mooney, Kalendarium, 35.
44 Mooney, 35.
45 Mooney, 35.
46 Mooney, 35.
or black ink distinguishing those years. The indication, as described by Mooney, based on a fifteen-year cycle used by Imperial Rome, was used until the fourteenth century. The prime or golden number was shown in a column next to the dominical letters of the year. This number, based on the well-known Ancient Greek Metonic cycle, is a nineteen-year lunar cycle dating back to the fifth century that dictated when a new moon would fall on the same day. The golden number was that year’s place in the Metonic cycle. This cycle was the foundation of astronomical/astrological studies for centuries. The cycle fluctuates based on what calendar system is applied such as the Babylonian calendar, Hebrew calendar, and the Gregorian calendars.

The cycle’s most well-known function is to compute the date of Easter as shown in this table in conjunction with a Table of Moveable Feasts as seen in John Somer’s Kalendarium. A Table of Moveable Feasts was a chart of religious feast days including Ash Wednesday, Easter, Ascension, and Pentecost among others dependent on regional and personal preferences that applied the Table of Bisextiles information to calculate each year’s date. While this was common in Somer’s popular Kalendarium, in Ricketts MS 30, there is only the Table of Bisextiles and not a list of feasts. At first look may seem as if the table is then useless, but due to differences of the tables this is not so. For starters, the dates do not match. Even though Somer’s spans from 1367 to 1507, MS 30’s Table of Bisextiles begins at 1425, even though the manuscript may have been commissioned at an earlier date because one would not need this kind of table for the past, only for the future. It runs until 1488 and while these numbers may seem arbitrary, this span actually can be split into three Metonic cycles included within Somer’s larger range of information. This table is interesting because by only using the dates over a sixty-three year period instead of a 140-year period like Somer’s Kalendarium could represent a more general life span for the patron’s personal use. One person, not necessarily in a scientific or medical field, would not need all of that information, and more specifically, not want to pay for the extra folia needed for it. This table in Ricketts MS 30 takes up two folia without any excess space, which would have been economically beneficial.

The Ricketts MS 30’s Table of Bisextiles should be broken down in order to analyze the similarities and differences from Somer’s own Table of Bisextiles. The table covers two folia and each page splits in half with five columns on either side. Each column begins with a vertical column of dates, sixteen rows down with every fourth year, leap years, in red ink. The next column is titled (in Middle English) ‘lepe yer’ and has an extra dominical number. The next column, fully in red ink, is titled as ‘sundais’ with a dominical letter listing from A to G, but because the chart does not begin with the beginning of time the letter at 1425 is G. These letters are not in alphabetical order and each year has a different number. The next column is prime/golden numbers starting at one in 1425, as it is the start of a new Metonic cycle. A wide ink border around a new cycle year, after nineteen years, also shows the Metonic cycle. The final column in each part is “Marche,” possibly March. These numbers range from one to thirty, each for a day in March. This is an interesting addition because this does not exist in Somer’s Kalendarium. These numbers calculate the full moon after the spring Equinox, first used to find the date for Easter. These discrepancies, the lack of the Table of Moveable Feasts, and the inclusion of the March column may imply that the patron wanted to only compute Easter’s date and none of the other feasts. This may be a personal attitude towards Easter or an economic decision to save money. Finally, a larger question is why would a person need this type of table in the 15th century? According to Reginald Poole, the date of Easter was decided by religious and academic authorities and disseminated centuries earlier.

Table of Regulars

The next section present in Ricketts MS 30 is an astrological Table of Regulars, also known as a Pagina regularis. A Table of Regulars is a method by which to follow the moon’s placement within the Zodiac cycle, first recorded by the Venerable Bede, one of the most prominent scholars in the eighth century over many disciplines, in his The Reckoning of Time, written in 725. The Table of Regulars, or, “The Signs of the Moone,” as ti-

47 Mooney, 36.
48 Mooney, 33.
50 Reginald Lane Poole, The Beginning of the Year in the Middle Ages (London: British Academy, 1926).
tled in Ricketts MS 30, allowed for most anyone who had these two tables to calculate the moon’s location within the Zodiac, which was useful because zodiac signs had multiple functions that continued to be added to with the passing of time and continual interest in astrology. Bede argues that his Table, in the eighth century, was actually for a wider audience. Wallis translates, “Should someone rather less skilled in calculation nonetheless be curious about the course of the Moon, we have also for his sake devised a formula [argumentum] adapted to the capacity of his intelligence, so he might find what he seeks.”

Even in 725AD there was already an interest in astrology and accommodations were made to ensure that a wider audience could participate for the purpose of computing Easter and other religiously-oriented dates. Of course, this does not mean that Bede was writing for the common person, but acknowledging a wider purpose and audience makes the case that there was a cultural interest in the moon and the Zodiac.

Originally, Bede’s table covered nineteen years, another example of the Metonic cycle, which corresponds with twenty-seven rows of seemingly random letters, but this is not random. In Bede’s table the letters only ranged from ‘A’ to ‘O’ because each letter represented two of the twenty-seven rows. It is important to remember that in the Latin alphabet ’J’ was not its own letter, but was used in correlation with the letter ‘I’. With this method, by ‘O’ only one number is attached to it because of the unequal lunar, solar, and Zodiac cycles leaves space for the extra, inconsistent hours to fall from each cycle. The Zodiac signs were listed in the yearly cycle chronological order during a year. On the table each sign had multiple rows, typically two or three, yet it is only assumed that this may have been to break down the sign’s individual cycle to have a more precise location of the moon, such as in the first or second half of the cycle. The Zodiac signs were listed in the yearly cycle chronological order during a year. On the table each sign had multiple rows, typically two or three, yet it is only assumed that this may have been to break down the sign’s individual cycle to have a more precise location of the moon, such as in the first or second half of the cycle. This information was only useful if there was also a calendar-codex, as described in The Reckoning of Time, but there is no other information about Bede’s Calendar-Codex, so I have used the possible context in Ricketts MS 30 as a practical example of what may have been included in Bede’s. In Ricketts, the codex is a relatively simple chart of the months on the x-axis and 1-30, the days of the month, on the y-axis. On each day of the month, there is a letter, starting from ‘A’ on January 1 to ‘O’. The codex is a necessary reference because in order to calculate the moon’s position within the Zodiac, one needed the corresponding letter and Metonic year to find the position of the moon. The Table of Regulars in Wallis’s translation of Bede is not the original one, but is a combination of a typical Pagina regularis and an ‘Old Welsh Computus.’

In general, there is very little is known about Old Welsh modes of computus, except that it was a variation on calculation the date of Easter by the equinox and not through astronomical calculations. This method, due to the lack of standardized time keeping, based on the differences in the Julian and Gregorian calendars across Europe, had different dates of Easter. The standard Old Welsh computus follows more closely to the Table of Bisextiles meant to calculate the date of Easter than Bede’s Table of Regulars based on the Zodiac and Lunar cycles. There are many differences between Bede’s Table and the one detailed in Ricketts MS 30, titled the “Table of Signes of the Moone.” The first major difference is the language. Bede’s is in Latin and the Ricketts’s codex and table are in Middle English, but follow the Latin alphabet structure. The codex goes to the number thirty-one instead of twenty-seven. Unfortunately, the information for February, March, and April either were not completed or were erased. The letters and months alternate between red and black. There are smaller variations on the table because in Bede’s the Zodiac signs take up different numbers of rows. There does not seem to be a reason for why one Zodiac has three rows and another has two, thus there will be some inaccuracies or variations to this formula if used in comparison to another table. Ricketts MS 30 has the Metonic cycle at the top and the Zodiac signs on the y-axis. The largest difference between the two is the lettering system. While there are still twenty-seven rows, one letter does not account for numbers as seen in Bede. Instead, in Ricketts MS 30 one letter correlates with one number. At first, this seemed to be an issue because there are twenty-three letters in the Latin alphabet, but twenty-seven are needed. In order to complete the table four additional letters were included, such as another

52 Bede, Reckoning, 58.
53 Bede, Reckoning, 65.
‘Z’, a possible ‘con’ symbol which looks like the number ‘9’, a possible thorn symbol which looks like a ‘y’, but is pronounced as ‘th’, and finally, a possible ‘yogh’ symbol similar to a long ‘Z’ or the letter ‘3’ and sounds like a ‘g’, or ‘gh’ or ‘zh’. 55 With the addition of these symbols, the alphabet, without ‘J’, ‘V’, or ‘W’, is twenty-seven exactly before the cycle begins again.

In order to exemplify how such a chart worked, I will do a demonstration. If one wanted to know the Zodiac location of the moon on July 2 in the 12th year of the Metonic cycle, the actual year was unnecessary with the Metonic information so widely available. One would then reference the codex on folio 3v that dictates the letter ‘T’, and then one would turn to 4v. to the 12th year and find the letter ‘T’ and see it is in the middle third of Aquarius. As a last step, in attempts to most accurately calculate the moon’s position to the Zodiac, Bede’s and Ricketts’ tables should be cross referenced because the letter ‘T’ corresponds with the letter ‘K’ in Bede’s. Thus, one would find the twelfth year on Bede’s table and find the ‘K’. On this table, ‘K’ corresponds with the second half of Capricorn. This may seem like a mistake, but it is necessary to remember that neither of these charts are standard. Bede’s Table Capricorn has two rows and Aquarius has two rows, but in Ricketts MS 30 Aquarius has three rows which may cause shift differences between the charts. It is not an exact science due how time was measured in different parts of Europe and their corresponding local calendars.

While Table of Regulars in Ricketts MS 30 follows more closely with Bede’s Pagina regularis and may thus seem anachronistic (because, as mentioned, Bede was writing seven hundred years before Ricketts was commissioned), John Somer’s Kalendarium does have an interesting variation on the Zodiac. Somer’s Tables to Know the Sign of the Moon, with the Angle of the Moon table, demonstrates how important zodiac signs were centuries after Bede. According to Bede, Zodiac signs functioned to know the general location of the moon, but Somer expands on Bede to a more practical and immersive function. 56 Somer’s use of zodiac tables extended beyond Bede and in one way functioned as seasonal time markers. According to Mooney, “The fixed signs, Taurus, Leo, Scorpio and Aquarius, are in the middle of the seasons and so are associated with stability.” 57 The others are moveable, also known as “cardinal” because they are associated with seasonal change. Somer’s signs function on a more individualistic manner than Bede does. This is most probably in Somer’s because of his best-known use of Zodiac signs in his Kalendarium, the Zodiac Man, which “was a common illustrated figure in medical manuscripts, almanacs, and even books of hours, both in England and on the continent.” 58 Though not directly related to Ricketts MS 30, it is useful to understand how widely used zodiac signs were in daily life activities for a wide audience. The Zodiac man connected the signs with specific body parts such as Aries and the head, and Taurus as connected with the neck and was meant for medical purposes; for example, instruction on bloodletting. 59 The relationship between astrology and medicine was closely related during the fourteenth century because while the Zodiac Man demonstrated how far spread culture was interacting with astrology scientifically, medically, and religiously, thus increasing the probable audience, it is not included in Ricketts MS 30. The commissioner, who probably knew of the Zodiac Man, did not include it in MS 30, but instead chose to follow Bede’s Table of Regulars in the midst of other Somer parts. Additionally, the inclusion of the Table of Regulars was not just as a showpiece either. In order to demonstrate that the table was still in use, there are marginal notes in Ricketts MS 30 that possibly date to the seventeenth century. This inconsistency raises the question if the beginning few folia were, indeed, commissioned with the rest of the Psalter-Hours and were thus an intentional choice of the owner, or were added later. If added later, where did this table come from and why was it included with materials most similar to John Somer’s Kalendarium?

Overall, it is still impossible to know the original owner, but some preliminary conclusions may be made about the patron’s personal decisions about the manuscript. As discussed, the religious portion of the manuscript may be older than the astrological/astronomical tables at the beginning, but even then probably only

56 Mooney, Kalendarium, 41.
57 Mooney, 43.
58 Mooney, 45.
59 Mooney, 45.
dating back to the late 1380s. A person made the specific choice of having the religious text in a contentious, but rising in popularity, vernacular language. Additionally, a patron chose to include tables from John Somer’s *Kalendarium*, but not his most well known medical tables, and Bede’s Table of Regulars. Though there are other Middle English Psalter-Hours from the same time as Ricketts MS 30, the additional tables make the manuscript unique. If other tables exist in manuscripts like Ricketts MS 30, Kathleen Kennedy’s article does not include which leaves the question of if other manuscripts followed the trend of astronomical/astrological tables within a contentious religious manuscript. This essay was a cultural introduction into a few abnormal components seen in Ricketts MS 30, which will become a lengthier analysis of this manuscript in the future. Some aspects that could be researched in more depth are: the exact Wycliffe translation, an artistic survey of the initials, differences in handwriting, use of specific ink, the condition of the pages and broader the specific order of the content, and geographic breakdown of the Calendar of the Saint Days. While there are elements of seemingly rebellious nature due to the Middle English and by calculating the information typically disseminated by the Church, it is very possible that the Ricketts MS 30 patron was the product of the cultural influences and trends of the early fifteenth century in a hodgepodge of a manuscript. This manuscript is important to future manuscript research because it complicates the historical assumption of authority in the perception of history and culture. Ricketts MS 30’s abnormalities should be included in the scholarly research of Middle English religious texts because by challenging the established conventions surrounding known religious manuscripts, manuscripts such as Ricketts MS 30, provide an opportunity to delve into the individuality and relatively unstudied cultural trends that existed as an undercurrent of the fifteenth century.
Back Cover Photo: “On a Bridge, Michigan Avenue, in a Snow Storm”

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