



ACADEMIC
PRESS

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

SCIENCE @ DIRECT®

Journal of Research in Personality 37 (2003) 273–283

JOURNAL OF
RESEARCH IN
PERSONALITY

www.elsevier.com/locate/jrp

Five potential principles for understanding cultural differences in relation to individual differences

Paul Rozin*

*Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3815 Walnut Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196, USA*

Abstract

This paper deals with psychological differences between two cultures, with respect to the differences between individuals in those same cultures. Five principles are presented which describe either actual or probable empirical relationships between within- and between-culture differences, and a possible theoretical account is given for each of the presumed differences. (1) The differences between “cultures” seem “bigger” than the actual differences between the individuals in these same cultures. This relation is attributed to the idea that universal human biological predispositions are often opposed by cultural traditions, so the outcome is somewhat of a compromise between the two. (2) Differences between individuals in different cultures are generally larger in behavior than in thoughts or feelings. This is attributed to the fact that it is easier to socialize behavior than mental events. (3) Many cultural differences are expressed in individuals in terms of different *default* responses or interpretations or preferences for the same situation. Dominant responses in one culture are usually a less salient part of the repertoire of individuals in another culture. (4) Much of the effect of culture, and our impression of culture differences, results from the physical/social artifacts (environments, institutions) created by the culture. There is a strong tendency by psychologists to under-rate or ignore the effects of the physical environment. (5) In the contemporary world, differences between individuals in two cultures will be larger in older generations. Cultural differences may be markedly reduced in the most recent generations, on account of globalization. The position put forth is an attempt to integrate the ideas that there are real human predispositions of various sorts and that culture is a powerful force, and to explain why it is surprisingly easy for us to understand the viewpoint of people from other cultures (their “reality” is often a less preferred alternative in our own repertoire).

© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

* Fax: 1-215-898-7632.

E-mail address: rozin@psych.upenn.edu.

In about the last decade, the influence of culture on human beings, particularly in the social domain, has come to be a modest part of psychology. “Cultural psychology” has been forcefully and eloquently promoted by Richard Shweder 1991a, 1991b among others, and has been exemplified in the already classic analysis of the culture of honor by Nisbett and Cohen (1996) and the analysis of social organization by Alan Fiske (1990). The individualist-collectivist distinction (Triandis, 1995) or the independent-interdependent distinction (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) has become a major dimension of social psychological concern, as indicated by the enormous citation rate of the Markus–Kitayama paper. Developmental psychology has also encompassed a more culture perspective in recent decades, as described by Cole (1996). These advances are aptly summarized in a recent review article on cultural psychology (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998).

The entry of “culture” into psychologists’ concerns about understanding the human social animal is something to be applauded; one can only lament that this sustained interest waited for over one hundred years to become part of our discipline, in spite of the fact that it was a major interest of our founder, Wilhelm Wundt (see discussion in Cole, 1996). The powerful role of culture had been referred to at numerous points in the history of psychology, notably by Solomon Asch (1952), in his great book, *Social Psychology*. In the chapter entitled “The transformation of man in society,” Asch notes that “The inclusive context of the processes that occur between men is always a *society*.” (p. 117). He notes that without society, humans (man) “. . . would possess imagination, but not that which produces wit, comedy, or tragedy. He would have a self, but not that which can stand in judgment upon itself” (p. 136). At the same time, in his usual balanced way, Asch recognizes that humans are shaped by forces other than culture: “In short, we start with the assumption that individual men possess authentic properties distinctive of *Homo sapiens* and that their actions in society alter them in authentically distinctive ways” (p. 119).

There is no doubt that cultures differ in substantial ways, and that these differences have substantial psychological effects on the members of the culture, in terms of methods of child rearing, rituals, institutions, and narratives that the child is exposed to, and in terms of the values and artifacts that surround the child. In this paper, I attempt to relate some aspects of culture differences to the individual difference framework that psychologists have generally worked within.

First principle: *The differences between “cultures” seem bigger than the actual differences between the individuals in these same cultures.* In somewhat more detail, cultural differences between cultures A and B, as represented in narratives, rituals, customs, and descriptions by ethnographers, are generally bigger than the actual differences between individuals in the two cultures.

The first principle comes from my observation that studies that actually measure differences between people in different cultures (usually by questionnaire or interview) generally report substantial between culture differences, but usually more within culture variance than was expected, even on characteristics selected to be culture specific. Our own unpublished results from a survey given to Hindu Indian college students and American college students illustrate this point (Rozin, Puhon, & Haidt, 1996). In comparisons of college students at the University of Pennsylvania and

Utkal University in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India, significant culture differences appear on questions addressed to basic differences between traditional and modern/developed/Western cultures (Table 1): respect for the elderly and a wider range of moral judgment in traditional cultures (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) (items 1, 2, 3, 7), and greater collectivism in traditional cultures (items 4, 5, 6). Note that on three of these items (2, 6, and 7) more than 50% of the American college students agree with the predicted traditional response, and, and that for two others (3, 4), more than 25% do. On the other hand, on 4 of 7 questions, more than 25% of Indian college students disagree with the predicted traditional answer. So there is surely variance accounted for by culture, but there is great variation within culture, *even on items specifically selected to highlight cultural differences*. Of course, we must recognize that culture differences would appear to be larger, and perhaps the amount of within culture variation would be smaller, if we typically queried mature adults instead of college students (see fifth principle). The extent of within-culture variance on characteristics that are presumed to be major culture differences is yet to be determined; there are relatively few studies that specifically address this point, but see Oyserman, Coon, and Kimmelmeier (2002) and Hofstede (1982) for data analyses and data bases that may provide a beginning for such an evaluation. The point of the empirical first principle is to emphasize something that has been generally ignored, and to encourage the study of within culture variation in features that are presumed to characterize a culture. One of the principles that may be very important in making sense of the empirical relations under discussion is that cultures may adopt different “models” or principles in different

Table 1

Comparison of Hindu Indian and American College Students on basic “cultural” attitudes^a (% agree with each statement: 1 or 2 on a 5 point agree–disagree scale)

Item	Indian females	Indian males	American females	American males
Number of respondents ^a	85	64	140	75
1. It is immoral for adults to disobey their parents	80	72	13	19
2. Even if it goes/went against my own feeling, I often obey/obeyed my parents' judgment on matters of importance to me	78	58	50	53
3. Old people deserve more respect than younger people in society	72	68	37	44
4. The nail that stands up gets hammered down (nonconformity is discouraged)	66	51	24	31
5. Solidarity is more important than individuality	57	67	7	13
6. The individual is the basic unit for understanding action and responsibility	89	86	67	66
7. One's own suffering is usually the result of one's own actions or intentions	88	69	51	51

^a Students come from the University of Pennsylvania in the United States, and Utkal University in Bhubaneswar, Orissa in India. Data collected between 1993 and 1996.

domains (Fiske, 1990), such that there would be more similarities between cultures if we look at the presence or absence of a model than if we do the comparison domain by domain.

Why might the first principle (presumed empirical relation) hold? I believe one cause of this relationship is that there really are trans-human predispositions, and that in many cases, cultural values push us in a direction other than that to which we would naturally tend (for example, to reject meat, or to not steal from strangers). (Of course, there is good reason to believe that one of our “natural” tendencies is to acquire culture!) In some sense, there may be a regression to the *H. sapiens* mean at work. Cultures present us with models and ideals to shape ourselves; perhaps in order to push us from our predisposed target (P in Fig. 1) to a culturally acceptable position (A for actual value), it is necessary to highlight and exaggerate the ideals (in narrative and other public forms), so that the standard, stereotype, or goal on any dimension would be the ideal (I). If this formulation is correct, then it makes sense that cultures seem to be more different than the members of the two cultures are.

It is possible that there is a methodological reason for the presumed greater similarity in individuals than their cultures. As Kitayama (2002) points out, most of the cultural differences that psychologists have explored have been assessed with attitude scales. He notes that there are properties of these scales, themselves an artifact of some modern Western cultures, which may homogenize responses. He also notes that much of what is distinctive about a culture amounts to tacit knowledge, which is precisely what attitude scales do not assess.

Second principle: *Differences between individuals in different cultures are generally larger in behavior than in thoughts or feelings.*

I offer no direct empirical evidence for this claim, and it would be hard to generate convincing evidence from existing sources, and even hard to do so in principle. Nonetheless, I think there is validity in the claim, partly because there is a reasonable theoretical account of why behavior should be more susceptible to cultural influence.

Cultures operate to shape the environment, behavior, and minds of their members. In all of these respects, there is a move to change the human condition from the way it might have been in a group of unenculturated primates. The environment is modified directly, by removal or rearrangement of natural entities and by the creation of artifacts, as well as changes in behavior that affect the social environment (introduction of rituals, narratives, etc.). Behavior is shaped by these environmental changes, and as well, by specific instruction through direct teaching including exemplary models, punishments and rewards, and less voluntary responses to culture-appropriate and -inappropriate responses. Mental events are changed, but this must



Fig. 1. Relation between human predisposition (P), cultural ideals (I), and actual position (A), the latter being a culturally acceptable position. The line represents a range on some dimension, such as inclination to action or an attitude or belief. For example, P could be a mixed human predisposition to optimize the self and act collectively, I could be a strong cultural ideal for collectivism, and A could be the resultant of these two forces.

be done indirectly, since only the behavior can be observed. Thus, while culture can operate directly on behavior and the environment, it can only act indirectly on mental events. For this reason, we expect that cultural shaping will be less effective in the mental domain, since it is harder to observe, reinforce, or punish mental events. This claim suggests that it will be quite common to observe similar mental states played out differently in behavior in different cultures (as with what Ekman (1973) calls display rules); we know how to socialize behaviors, and we can only approximate how to socialize thoughts. As a result, cultural differences in behavior will be greater than in mental events.

Although it has not been explored systematically, cultures no doubt vary in the importance they attribute to mental events, as opposed to behavior. Along these lines, recent evidence suggests that in the moral domain, Jews attribute less moral significance to mental events (e.g., immoral thoughts) than do Christians (Cohen & Rozin, 2001).

Third principle. *Many cultural differences are expressed in individuals in terms of different default responses to the same situation. Some cultural differences refer more to preferences for responses or framings than to presence or absence of these same alternatives.*

Human languages, themselves an important part of culture, vary substantially around the world. However, it is well established that there are a substantial number of language universals, and that the human brain has evolved to become a language acquisition machine. It is strongly predisposed to learn certain types of syntactic structures, and responds to only some of the regularities present in the stimulus input (for example, although irregular verbs occur more commonly in speech, the language acquirer infers and over generalizes the principles of regular verb conjugation). Any normal human can learn any language as a fluent, native speaker in the first 12 or so years of life, and can acquire languages with a high level of competence after puberty.

Although there are many languages, the number is finite, and there are many types of constructions that could theoretically occur, but never do. This state of affairs resembles the cultural landscape, in general. That is, there are many cultures, but a finite number, and there are major common themes. Although there are surely fascinating and striking differences between cultures, it is surely the case that any human can learn what it takes to be a native of any culture, again at least up to about the time of puberty (Minoura, 1992), and can do a reasonable job of being a member of another culture after puberty, with effort and immersion. The situation here is parallel to language. Most critically, just as other languages are comprehensible to us, with some attention, so are other cultures. That is, it is surprising that we can usually come to understand the viewpoint of another culture in a particular framework.

The situation, parallel to language, may be best described by Shweder (1991b)'s concept of "multiple realities." There are a finite number of them, they may be very different, but they are comprehensible to outsiders. Outsiders may not deeply "feel" important values of another culture, but they can understand them.

This suggests that, at least in many cases, cultures induce preferences for thinking, feeling, or acting in particular ways, choosing among options naturally available to

humans. Thus, if we have conflicting approach and avoid tendencies to a particular type of social situation or a particular animal creature, a culture may encourage one or the other response. I summarize this by suggesting that one aspect of enculturation is to promote the use of default thinking/action in particular frameworks. The default is most likely to occur, to lead to subsequent thinking/actions, and hence to shape a style. But because it is a default among generally comprehensible options, it can be rather easily understood by outsiders.

As an example, Menon and Shweder (1997) asked some Hindu Brahmin and American adults to indicate which of the following three terms does not belong with the other two: anger, happiness, shame (or their Oriya translations). They reported that the Americans chose happiness, and the Brahmins chose anger. We (Rozin et al., 1996, unpublished) have confirmed and extended this by giving this problem to a sample of college students in the United States and in India. The problem was presented in English in both cases, and stated “SHAME is more similar to HAPPINESS than to ANGER” (agree/disagree). In accordance with Menon and Shweder, only 6.5% of the American students agreed with this statement, as opposed to 43.5% of the Indian students. Note that in accord with principle 1, the difference between the cultures is one of degree, as opposed to one of kind. In accordance with Menon and Shweder’s (1997) report, the typical American justification for the choice of “happiness” was that happiness is positive, and anger and shame are negative. The typical Indian response for those choosing “anger” is that happiness and shame are socially constructive (they make the world move along, socially) whereas anger is disruptive of the social order. In both cases, when we explained the alternative framing, it was immediately understood (indeed, a slight majority of the Indians adopted the almost unanimous American framing). But the Americans agreed that they would never have thought in the Indian way; that is, their default is to sort by valence, not by social effect.

Free associations seem to tap default thinking. In abundant data we have collected on free associations to food related terms (food, chocolate, meat) for males and females, from India, France, and the USA, we see clear differences in default thinking (e.g., Rozin, Kurzer, & Cohen, 2002). For example, in response to the word “chocolate,” about 25% of American women report fat, fatty, or fattening as one of their three words, whereas no respondent from India did so (Rozin, Kurzer, Lee, & Cohen, in preparation). We can only infer from this that “fat” is a more salient aspect of chocolate for Americans, not that Indians are unaware of a relation between chocolate and fat.

The idea that different routines or modes of thought may differ in accessibility rather than in an all-or-none way is not new. It was brought forward as an explanation for the evolution of intelligence (via accessing previously domain-limited adaptations) by the author (Rozin, 1976), and more recently has been specifically invoked in terms of frame switching and a dynamic constructivist view of culture (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Recent successes in changing access to different “cultural” systems, such as the individualism/collectivism axis, by use of priming materials specific to one or another culture, have been accomplished by a number of authors (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999;

Haberstroh, Oyserman, Schwarz, Kuhnen, & Ji, 2002; Hong et al., 2000). More generally, the idea that a variety of cultural systems are differentially accessible in any individual has been put forth in a number of contexts, as for example, in a recent review with respect to individualism vs collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002).

Fourth principle: *Much of the effect of culture, and our impression of culture differences, results from the physical/social artifacts (environments, institutions) created by the culture.* The attention that psychologists have paid to culture, in recent decades, has focused, understandably given the thrust of psychology, on different mental worlds in different cultures. The second principle argues that these culture differences may be smaller than cultural differences in behavior. Here, I argue that the mental differences may also be less substantial than the differences in the environments that the cultures have created. Indeed, perhaps the major impetus for travel to other cultures by most tourists is to observe different environments (architecture, costumes, foods, and other products). Perhaps in correspondence to the fundamental attribution error, it may be the case that psychologists underestimate the importance of physical entities, social structure, and institutions in accounting for behavior (the “situation” as formulated in most of the psychological literature refers to an interpersonal situation). The fact is that physical proximity (e.g., living next to) is a major predictor of friendships. I believe that a major determinants of how much exercise one gets are “situational,” whether one owns and walks a dog, how close one parks one’s car to one’s home or workplace, how easy access is to the car and to public transportation, etc. There is considerable evidence that a major, if not the principal, determinant of how much people eat in a meal is how much reasonably palatable food is placed in front of them. We have recently demonstrated that in food stores, restaurants, and cookbooks, food portion sizes are smaller in France than in the USA (Rozin, Kabnick, Pete, Fischler, & Shields, 2003). We propose that this is a major factor in accounting for the fact that French are thinner than Americans. We also suggest that the French environment encourages physical activity more than the American environment, because of the convenient location of small food stores near most homes, the more salient bicycle alternative, the high cost of gasoline, and more difficult access to one’s own car from the home in France than in the United States. None of these influences on food intake or activity need to be directly represented in mental activity, although they surely promote the development of behavioral and mental habits.

In a recent proposal that we consider culture more as a system than an entity, Kitayama (2002) points to the importance of the environment created by cultures, and the dynamic interplay between this environment and the individuals who inhabit it. Kitayama and Markus (1999) use the term “cultural affordances” to include a class of situations, structures, artifacts, and customs in which the individual is interactively embedded, such that the individual and the culture mutually constitute one another. In the principle I am currently discussing, I am referring to the physical environment in which a particular person, a particular member of a particular culture, lives. This is a subset of Kitayama and Markus’ cultural affordances.

It would perhaps be a good idea for psychologists, culturally oriented or otherwise, to do more analysis of environments. And this should include the institutional/social

environment. It is very likely, in accordance with the second principle, that the effects of the environment are stronger on behavior than on mental events. In the laudable rush to include “culture” among our causes of behavior, hence bowing to our sister discipline of anthropology, we may have neglected to attend to another sister discipline, sociology, and to include social class and social structure in our accounts.

Fifth principle: *In the contemporary world, differences between cultures will generally be larger in older generations.* This point is illustrated in Table 2, which displays agreement with various statements of traditional (principally Hindu Indian) and modern values by three groups of respondents: college students in the USA and India, and the grandparents of the American college students (Rozin et al., 1996). Note that the American college parents fall quite squarely between the scores of their children, and those of the Indian college students. We presume that the parents of the Indian college students would show more traditional scores than their children, as well. Results from Haidt et al. (1993), comparing middle and lower class Brazilians and Americans also testify to this point. I do not claim that there is convincing data on the generation differences, but offer a few examples of illustrative data. There have been times in the past when one might have expected greater similarity between older generations across cultures. Again, as with the second principle, the claim made in this fifth principle is in accord with my own observations, is in accord with many observations by others, and has a convincing theoretical account. It is a striking feature of traditional cultures in recent decades that the young adults wear modern Western clothing, while the grandparents still wear traditional clothing.

That account has to do with the widespread availability of television and other aspects of globalization. Younger people grow up more aware of alternative life styles, and in particular, this sets up the possibility of admiring certain more “advanced” cultures, along with the information about the practices of the admired culture. The spread of jeans and American modes of dress, food (e.g., McDonalds) and

Table 2

Comparison of Indian and American college students, and grandparents of the American college students, on the importance of tradition^a (% agree with each statement: 1 or 2 on a 5 point agree–disagree scale)

Item	Indian students	American students	American grandparents
Number of respondents ^a	149	215	155
1. MARRIAGE has more to do with TRADITION than with ROMANCE	63	17	35
2. SATISFACTION is more often derived from HAVING FUN than from FULFILLING DUTY	26	26	31
3. Do your DUTY above all else	86	46	62
4. Whether or not an outcome of an action will be PLEASANT or unpleasant for me is not an important consideration	35	12	23

^a Students come from the University of Pennsylvania in the United States, and Utkal University in Bhubaneswar, Orissa in India. Grandparents are the grandparents of the American college students. Data collected between 1993 and 1996.

popular music exemplify this trend. Note that this greater homogenization of younger generations suggests that the practice of Western psychologists of using college students for subjects increases the chances for cultural generality within the studied generation; that is, college students are more likely to be similar around the world than are their parents or grandparents. The current generation of American college students is substantially different from prior generations, and from all other older human beings, in terms of traditional values. The Internet, computers, decline of the family, greater penetration of principles such as optimization, rationality, and the importance of economic factors, have resulted in a major departure from American traditional values. These include matters of morality and lifestyle, relative importance of families, etc.

In accordance with the fifth principle, participant selection in the American psychological research tradition is likely to produce substantial biases in results as representative of individuals within a culture (USA or other). In particular, since most of the data represent college students, there is a bias toward youth, and middle and upper classes, and hence away from traditional American values. For the same understandable reasons of convenience that motivate selection of undergraduate participants in American studies, much of the cross-cultural research generated by psychologists samples individuals in other cultures from college campuses.

Conclusion

I am a strong supporter of cultural and evolutionary psychology, at the same time as I raise concerns which may displease some of the practitioners of both fields. I am a strong supporter of evolutionary psychology because I think it apparent that we are human primates, and that our long evolutionary history still has a substantial influence on us. I am a strong supporter of cultural psychology, because I believe “culture” is a major force in shaping human beings, and that it has been almost completely ignored in psychology. I am also a major supporter because I think the cultural approach raises issues and distinctions that, while present within American culture, have not come to the attention of psychologists. Most obvious among these are the individualism/collectivism distinction, the relative roles of tradition and free choice, and the wider range of the domain of morality. If these differences are exaggerated in cultural descriptions, this has the benefit of calling our attention to important matters. My point is that we must embrace culture in our study of psychology, conceptually, empirically, and methodologically, but this does not mean that we must surrender all of the variance among human beings to the workings of culture (or of biological evolution). I am a *Homo sapiens*, I am an American, I am a male, and I am upper middle class. I live in the world created by Americans, with its fast food, rapid access to the Internet, cell phones, easy access to automobile transportation, and wide variety of sports events. It is hard to believe that each of these attributes and influences do not contribute substantially to how I think, how I feel, and how I behave.

Acknowledgments

Preparation of this paper was supported by funds from the Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn chair in psychology. The paper was completed while the author was a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation.

References

- Asch, S. E. (1952). *Social psychology*. New York: Prentice–Hall.
- Brewer, M., & Gardner, W. L. (1996). Who is this “we?” Levels of collective identity and self representations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *71*, 83–93.
- Cohen, A. B., & Rozin, P. (2001). Religion and the morality of mentality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 697–710.
- Cole, M. (1996). *Cultural psychology. A once and future discipline*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Ekman, P. (1973). Cross cultural studies of facial expressions. In P. Ekman (Ed.), *Darwin and facial expression*. New York: Academic Press.
- Fiske, A. P. (1990). *Structures of social life*. New York: The Free Press.
- Fiske, A. P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). The cultural matrix of social psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindsey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 915–981). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Gardner, W., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. (1999). “I” value freedom but “we” value relationship: Self construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgment. *Psychological Science*, *10*, 321–326.
- Haberstroh, S., Oyserman, D., Schwarz, N., Kuhn, U., & Ji, L.-J. (2002). Is the interdependent self more sensitive to question context than the independent self. Self-construal and the observation of conversational norms. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *38*, 323–329.
- Haidt, J., Koller, S., & Dias, M. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *65*, 613–628.
- Hofstede, G. (1982). Dimensions of national cultures. In R. Rath, H. S. Asthana, D. Sinha, & J. B. P. Sinha (Eds.), *Diversity and unity in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 173–187). Lisse, Netherlands: Swets and Zeitlinger, BV.
- Hong, Y.-Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C.-Y., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2000). Multicultural minds: A dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. *American Psychologist*, *55*, 709–720.
- Kitayama, S. (2002). Culture and basic psychological processes—Toward a system view of culture: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). *Psychological Bulletin*, *128*, 89–96.
- Kitayama, S., & Markus, H. (1999). Yin and yang of the Japanese self: The cultural psychology of personality coherence. In D. Cervone & Y. Shoda (Eds.), *The coherence of personality: Social cognitive bases of of personality consistency, variability, and organization* (pp. 242–302). New York: Guilford Press.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation. *Psychological Review*, *98*, 224–253.
- Menon, U., & Shweder, R. A. (1997). Kali’s tongue: Cultural psychology and the power of shame in Orissa, India. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence* (pp. 241–282). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Minoura, Y. (1992). A sensitive period for the incorporation of a cultural meaning system: A study of Japanese children growing up in the United States. *Ethos*, *20*, 304–339.
- Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (1996). *Culture of honor. The psychology of violence in the South*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kummelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and metaanalysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *128*, 3–72.
- Rozin, P. (1976). The evolution of intelligence and access to the cognitive unconscious. In J. A. Sprague & A. N. Epstein (Eds.), *Progress in psychobiology and physiological psychology* (Vol. 6, pp. 245–280). New York: Academic Press.

- Rozin, P., Kurzer, N., & Cohen, A. (2002). Free associations to “food”: The effects of gender, generation, and culture. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 36, 419–441.
- Rozin, P., Kurzer, N., Lee, D., & Cohen, A. (in preparation). Free associations to “chocolate”: The effects of gender, generation, and culture.
- Rozin, P., Kabnick, K., Pete, E., Fishchler, C., & Shields, C. (2003). The ecology of eating. Part of the French paradox results from lower food intake in French than Americans, because of smaller portion sizes. *Psychological Science* (in press).
- Rozin, P., Puhon, B., & Haidt, J. (1996). Unpublished observations.
- Shweder, R. A. (1991a). Cultural psychology: What is it?. In R. A. Shweder (Ed.), *Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology* (pp. 73–97). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shweder, R. A. (1991b). *Thinking through cultures*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The “big three” of morality (autonomy, community, divinity), and the “big three” explanations of suffering. In A. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), *Morality and health* (pp. 119–169). New York: Routledge.
- Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.