Contested Ground: Disentangling Material and Symbolic Attachment to Disputed Territory

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Abstract

A large literature argues that territorial disputes are prone to conflict because of the value of territory to publics, whether due to its strategic and material worth, or to its intangible, symbolic value. Yet despite the implications of the distinction for both theory and policy, empirically disentangling the material from the symbolic has posed a formidable methodological challenge. We propose a set of tools for assessing the nature of individual territorial attachment, drawing on a series of survey experiments in Israel. Our empirical analysis illustrates how the distribution of territorial preferences in the domestic population can have powerful implications for conflict and its resolution.

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Introduction

One of the most durable findings in the study of international security is the link between territory and political violence. A majority of interstate wars and a large share of intrastate wars are fought over territory (Toft, 2014). Territorial disputes are associated not only with conflict onset but with its escalation (Braithwaite and Lemke, 2011) and duration (Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009), and have been shown to be significantly more difficult to resolve (Fearon, 2004; Miller and Gibler, 2011; Walter, 2003).

Two competing explanations have been offered for this robust empirical association: The first emphasizes territory's tangible value, conferring resources or strategic advantage (Carter, 2010; Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Hensel, 2001). Though a bargaining space should theoretically exist when stakes are material, such bargains often fail in practice due to credible commitment problems – the fear that a rival will defect from an agreement, exploiting concessions to extract heavy costs (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). A second theory attributes the link between land and conflict to the unique hold territory is said to have on individuals, for biological, historical, ideological, or religious reasons. In this view, individuals attach symbolic value to territory that exceeds its tangible worth, leading politicians to highlight intangible dimensions to mobilize support (Huth, 1996; Senese, 2005; Toft, 2006; Tir, 2010). Consequently, any bargaining space that involves tangible tradeoffs is closed, rendering the territory effectively indivisible (Goddard, 2006).

Most studies within these two competing approaches implicitly assume a unitary state concerned either with rival credibility or intangible stakes, depending on the territory involved. We argue that intangibility and tangibility are more fruitfully thought of as characteristics of *political preferences* rather than of *land*, and that analyzing domestic heterogeneity in attitudes is important for understanding barriers to territorial conflict resolution.[1] To illustrate, consider a case in which an overwhelming majority of the population opposes territorial concessions due to concerns about rival credibility. Here, an appropriate policy prescription would be to devise mechanisms that enhance the credibility of commitments, such as mediation (Gent and Shannon, 2010; Kydd, 2006). These mechanisms will have limited utility in the converse situation, where a majority of the population values territory for intangible reasons and is far less concerned with the risks and benefits of compromise.

[1]Thinking of tangibility as a characteristic of *political preferences* does not preclude the possibility that some territories are better candidates for symbolic construction. See, however, Ben Shitrit (2015) who demonstrates how the attitudes of Jewish Israelis towards the Temple Mount have shifted dramatically in recent years from general indifference to strong attachment due to active mobilization in support of rebuilding a Jewish Third Temple. It is thus the change of preferences among Jews that is fueling the recent escalation of violence in Jerusalem, rather than anything intrinsic to some unchanging holy essence of the site.

The assessment of heterogeneity in territorial attitudes poses a thorny empirical challenge, however. Many disputed territories have both tangible and intangible value, making the sources of individual attachment difficult to trace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the West Bank is a paradigmatic example: On the one hand, the West Bank is strategically valuable, providing Israel with some territorial depth. Indeed, a common claim made by individuals who oppose territorial concessions is that Israel's population centers and key strategic sites would be directly threatened should the West Bank be controlled by groups hostile to Israel. On the other hand, the West Bank holds religious and historical significance as part of the biblical land of Israel, giving it symbolic value that extends beyond strategic considerations.[2] Whether obstacles to conflict resolution stem from the absence of credible guarantees to uphold a negotiated settlement or from ideological attachment to the land is ultimately an empirical question that depends on the distribution of preferences in the population and the ways in which these preferences affect the bargaining space of leaders.

This article proposes a set of methodological tools for overcoming this challenge and disentangling the material and symbolic dimensions of territorial attachment. Drawing on a series of original survey experiments in Israel, we first show how sources of territorial attachment—material and symbolic—vary in the population, even among those who support the deepening of Israel's control over the West Bank, and second, we demonstrate how the distribution of preferences among those attached to the contested territory constrains policy makers by affecting the government's bargaining space.

We find that a majority of Jewish-Israelis is willing to pay substantial material costs to deepen territorial control of the West Bank. While some of these individuals are concerned with rival credibility and the resulting (mostly security) risks of territorial compromise, a substantial segment of the Jewish population (approximately 35%-40%, far greater than previously thought) supports Israel's continuous control of the disputed territory for ideological, intangible reasons. We then use our mapping of heterogeneity in the source of territorial attachment, combined with information on individuals' past vote choice, to demonstrate how it crucially shapes the prospects of conflict resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian case. We find that because voters with intangible attachment to territory form a substantial share of the constituents of Israel's current largest political party (Likud), even a coalition with moderate parties would render territorial compromise a rather risky political move.

Our study contributes to the literature on territorial conflict in several ways. First, it makes an important theoretical contribution, arguing that conceptualizing materialism and

[2]This dual value is reflected in the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset, which assigns high tangible and intangible salience to the West Bank as well as to many of the world's other disputed territories.

symbolism as characteristics of preferences (rather than of territory) opens new ways of mapping public opinion toward conflict processes. We then propose a set of methods that allow investigating the nature of territorial attachment, and specifically the distribution of preferences over disputed territory in conflict-zone populations, thereby addressing the longstanding empirical challenge of disentangling material dimension from symbolic ones.

Second, our study demonstrates the utility of using a micro-foundational approach for studying territorial conflict, shedding light on domestic mechanisms that lead to conflict entrenchment. Specifically, by showing how individual preferences in the Israeli case impede peaceful conflict resolution, our study joins a growing body of work that integrates public opinion into IR research, linking individual attitudes to macro-level outcomes (Shelef and Zeira, 2015). While public opinion does not always determine the security policies that leaders adopt, the preferences of domestic audiences, at least in democratic settings, pose a powerful constraint that can be difficult for leaders to overcome (Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2016). Third, this paper contributes to a growing research program that uses experiments to test the domestic micro-foundations of IR theories (see Hyde, 2015, for a recent review).

This study also aims to make a broader contribution by linking the study of territorial conflict to a considerable body of research that examines the role of symbolic beliefs in shaping policy preferences.[3] This literature has also contended with the methodological challenges involved in distinguishing between values and interests. As Chong, Citrin and Conley (2001) observe, "The intertwining of interests and values can make it difficult to partition their separate influences on political choices with precision." The tools we propose here can therefore be applied to investigation of political preferences more broadly.

Finally, our study contributes to research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has long recognized that some Israeli Jews are "ideological" and others are "instrumental" (e.g., Pedahzur (2012); Shelef (2010)), but has struggled to establish the distribution of these preferences in the population and consequently to assess its political implications. Recent work by Ginges et al. (2007) has innovatively employed experiments to disentangle the two dimensions, but has focused on a narrow, ideological subset of the population—Israeli settlers—and has not shown how the overall distribution of domestic preferences shapes the bargaining space available to leaders. By doing so, we are able to shed light on an important domestic processes through which public attitudes affect conflict resolution.

[3]This literature has found, for example, that values, or predispositions formed early in life, are better predictors of preferences than self-interest based on cost-benefit calculations (Lau and Heldman, 2009; Sears and Funk, 1991).

Theoretical Framework

Across many contexts, territory has been found to be associated with interstate conflict onset, escalation, and recurrence (Diehl, 1999; Gibler, 2012; Hensel, 2012; Huth, 1996). Territorial disputes also lead to intrastate conflicts (Kahler, 2006), especially ethnic conflicts fought over territorial control (Toft, 2014). Yet while the relationship between territory and conflict has long been established, the factors leading to it are less clear (Goemans and Schultz, 2016). In general, existing explanations are of two varieties: a "rationalist," tangible approach, and an approach focusing on the territory's alleged intangible value, or symbolism.

The starting point of the first approach is that states are utility-maximizing. Territory is particularly valuable in this view, as it is associated with a range of material benefits, from strategic importance (Carter and Goemans, 2011) to economic resources (Caselli, Morelli and Rohner, 2015). In principle, the tangible value of territory should not make it more conflict-prone, since material stakes are divisible, allowing for a bargain to be reached (Fearon, 1995). There are, however, a number of reasons that a bargain may nevertheless fail. Most prominent of these is the commitment problem: since territory is a valuable resource, the initially weaker party cannot credibly commit to not exploit the increased power associated with territorial concessions to extract further concessions (Powell, 2006).[4] This problem applies not just to interstate conflict but to intrastate ones, motivating studies on the mechanisms enhancing commitment credibility, such as third party guarantees, power-sharing institutions, and forced separation (e.g. Walter, 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003).

Arguing that the intrinsic value of territory accounts for only a relatively small number of territorial conflicts (Huth, 1996), the second approach focuses on territory's intangible salience to domestic audiences. One strand of this literature attributes the presumed intangible value of territory to the genetic predisposition of humans to be territorial. In this view, humans, like other animals, are biologically programmed to keep and protect a territory they perceive as theirs, and are thus more likely to go to war over territorial disputes than other issues (Vasquez, 1993; Johnson and Toft, 2014). A different strand highlights ideology and identity, arguing that the roots of collective identity are grounded in particular homelands (Shelef, 2016; Forsberg, 1996; Hensel, 2012). Newman (1999), for example, argues that attachment to territory is primordial, an element in the formation of group identity forged through a historic process that imbues land with mythical or religious meaning. Similarly, Toft (2003, 2006) suggests that ethnic groups are defined by association with a particular territorial homeland, and perceive this association as vital to their group's existence. Hassner

[4] Asymmetric information problems are less relevant in cases of protracted conflict (Powell, 2006).

(2003), on the other hand, traces symbolic attachment to land to the religious sanctity of particular spaces, rather than to a nationalist affinity.

Whether the source of territorial attachment is genetic, primordial or constructed (or some combination of these), the key notion underlying theories of intangibility is that territorial conflicts are not a function of territory's intrinsic worth. Rather, it is symbolic value that renders the territory effectively indivisible. As Toft (2006, 46) argues, "People who live there think of the land—its occupation and control—as a part of themselves. Divide it or share its control and you may as well hack off an arm or leg." This symbolic value, it is argued, is then exploited by leaders to appeal to domestic audiences and mobilize public opinion, thereby reducing their bargaining space over time (Goddard, 2006; Vasquez, 1993).

These two approaches to territorial conflict are typically posited as mutually exclusive. Accordingly, they are usually tested at the cross-national (or cross-conflict) level, employing measures designed to capture the value of territory. The pioneering Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset, for example, which includes proxy measures for tangible and intangible issue salience, is designed to allow researchers to examine which issue is more likely to be associated with conflict (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). More recently, Shelef (2016) developed a different measure of intangibility, in which territories are coded as homelands if they were referred to as such in the discourse of domestic actors.

In practice, however, many of the world's most disputed territories hold both tangible and intangible value. Tangible territorial stakes are often infused with intangible value over time (Vasquez and Valeriano, 2008), and the very same political leaders may refer to strategic value on one occasion and to symbolic value on the other. This makes it difficult, and potentially misleading, to treat territorial stakes as either tangible or intangible. We argue that much can be gained by examining these dimensions as characteristics of preferences rather than of territories. This shift to the micro-level allows identifying which segments of the population are driven more by tangible considerations and which are motivated by symbolic concerns.

As a first step in mapping the distribution of the source of preferences over disputed land, we outline the micro-level implications of the two core territorial conflict explanations. The rationalist (interest-based) approach does not invoke domestic mechanisms directly but has straightforward implications for public opinion, at least in democratic settings where the public's policy preferences pose an important constraint on the the bargaining space of leaders. Here, individuals' valuation of the territory is derived from comparing the expected net benefits of territorial control to the expected net benefits of territorial concessions. When evaluating the relative costs and benefits of territorial control versus territorial concessions,

voters incorporate concerns about the ability of the rival to credibly commit to an agreement.[5]

The symbolic approach, in contrast, views territorial attachment as intangible. Intangibility, i.e., the appeal to emotive, ideological, or symbolic value, can be considered a useful theoretical construct *only to the extent that political preferences cannot be explained by reference to material or security gains.* Thus, the core implication of this approach is that publics are willing to bear substantial material costs to retain territorial control. In other words, intangible attachment to land would be reflected in public support for territorial control even when such control adversely affects various aspects of individuals' lives, such as their material welfare or security.

Both of these approaches may in principle account for individual preference for maintaining control of a disputed territory. To assess the distribution of the root of preferences over territorial control, we implement a set of original survey experiments designed to disentangle the material from the symbolic and then examine how this distribution of affects conflict entrenchment in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

Data and Method

We fielded surveys online to a sample of 4,525 Jewish Israeli adults.[6] The surveys were administered in three waves: the first, conducted in April 2014, included a sample of 1,963 adult Israelis. The second wave was administered in January 2015 to a sample of 1,217 respondents. The third wave was administered in August 2017 to a sample of 1,345 respondents. Summary statistics of all three samples, which were stratified by gender, age, religiosity and residence, are reported in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3.[7]

The three survey waves took place in different contextual environments. The first wave was conducted in the relatively peaceful months of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by United States Secretary of State John Kerry. The second wave was fielded a few months after the collapse of the negotiations, and in the wake of the bloody conflict in Gaza 2014, which killed more than 2,100 Palestinians and 72 Israelis.[8] The third wave was conducted in the summer of 2017, a time of relative political stability, punctured by bouts of violence

[5]This process is at least partially endogenous, as it is likely that leaders themselves contribute to public concerns through messages on the risks of rival defection.

[6]The surveys were administered by iPanel, Israel's largest opt-in Internet survey firm, which uses quota sampling to generate samples that conform to the demographics of the Israeli Jewish population.

[7]The distribution of age, gender, income, education, religiosity, and area of residence of our sample is equivalent to the their distribution among the Israeli Jewish population; see SI section 1.3.

[8]See "Gaza crisis: Toll of operations in Gaza," BBC News, September 1, 2014.

over Palestinians' concern that Israel may seek to alter the delicate status quo of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Despite the difference in time periods, we were able to replicate our main results in each of the three waves. We present the findings from our most recent wave here, and report the results from the first two waves in the online appendix.

Our research design has two related objectives: First, we establish the distribution of territorial preferences in the population, identifying the respondents for whom tangible concerns drive territorial attachment, and those who are motivated by intangible concerns. To do so, we employ three strategies that place respondents in choice settings where they must trade off territorial control with material and security benefits: a conjoint experiment, a "credibility exercise," and a "valuation exercise," detailed in the following sections. Second, we illustrate the utility of mapping this distribution of preferences by showing how it constrains the bargaining space of Israeli leaders.

Trading off Material Benefits and Symbolic Attachment

We begin our analysis with a conjoint experiment.[9] Conjoint experiments allow researchers to estimate the causal effects of many determinants of preferences simultaneously, and most importantly, to evaluate the relative influence of each attribute on policy choice (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Consequently, they are increasingly being used by political scientists to disentangle the influence of various policy attributes or likely outcomes on support for that policy (Shamir and Shamir, 1995). Our conjoint experiment asks participants to consider a hypothetical scenario in which, following various international developments, the Israeli government decided to enact a policy in the Israeli-Palestinian arena that could have substantial economic, security, and social implications. We then showed participants four possible attributes of two generic policies ("A" and "B"). See example of respondents' choice set in Table 1.

The four attributes varied along the domains that are central to policy debates in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the policy's effect on *security*, *the economy*, *budget allocation to social services versus defense*, and Israel's control over the disputed *territory*. Each likely outcome (attribute) took one of several values, as described in Table 2. For example, the policy's impact on security was operationalized as its effect on terrorist and rocket attacks,

[9]In earlier survey waves we also asked respondents directly about their preferences regarding territorial control of the West Bank, and whether they believe maintaining such control will yield material costs or benefits. We find that a majority of Israeli Jews prefers maintaining territorial control of the West Bank even while believing that this would be more costly than loosening control. We present these results in the SI, section 4.2 (second wave) and section 5 (first wave).

since this has been perceived by Israel as the primary threat to its security since the decline of the conventional military threat posed to it by its neighbors after the end of the Cold War. Values on this item ranged from a substantial decrease in rockets and terrorist attacks to a substantial increase in such attacks. In the territorial domain, values varied between strengthening territorial control of the West Bank, withdrawing from the West Bank, and withdrawing from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. We distinguish between the West Bank and Jerusalem to capture the different in symbolic value attached to these two territories. However, it is important to emphasize that all two-state plans have included some loss of Israeli sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem, and withdrawal solely from the West Bank has never been on the negotiation table. We randomized the order of the attributes to prevent order effects, and restricted the experiment to exclude random combinations that were so unrealistic as to be non-credible to respondents.[10]

To emphasize that these attributes were assured, respondents were asked to imagine they could travel forward 10-15 years in time and know for certain what the future consequences of each policy would be. Given that information, which policy would they choose today, if they had full authority? To capture the fact that respondents were constrained in their choices, and therefore may not have been enthusiastic about the choice they ultimately made, we then asked them to rank their support for the policy they had chosen (and the policy they had not chosen) on a scale of 1-7.

This approach has several unique features: First, the random assignment of policy attributes enables identification of the causal effect of each attribute on the probability of policy support.[11] This allows disentangling policy attributes that are naturally correlated, such as security and territorial control. Second, we measure the effect of all attributes on the same scale, which allows assessing the relative importance of each attribute. Finally, by asking not just about policy choice but about policy rankings we are able to measure the intensity of support for each attribute. Together these features make it possible to estimate whether or not respondents value territory above a variety of strategic and material benefits.

[10]These included: 1) a significant decrease in rocket and terrorist attacks together with significant harm to the Israeli economy, 2) a significant decrease in rocket and terrorist attacks together with an increase in the security budget and decrease in the health and education budgets, 3) a significant increase in rocket and terrorist attacks together with significant growth to the Israeli economy, and 4) a significant increase in rocket and terrorist attacks together with a decrease in the security budget and increase in the health and education budgets.

[11]See SI, Section 2.1, for balance tests for each domain in the conjoint experiment.

Table 1: Experimental Design: Example

After the recent military operation in Gaza, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it needs to take an action that may have a strong impact on Israel's economy, security, and social arenas. Below are the consequences of two possible policies:

	Policy A	**Policy B**
Territory	Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
Security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged
Economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	Israel's economy will grow significantly
Budget	The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form	The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase

Imagine that you had the opportunity to time travel 10-15 years into the future, and to know with certainty what the future consequences of choosing Policy A or Policy B would be. Given the certain consequences of the consequences of each policy in 10-15 years, which policy would you support, if the decision was in your complete authority?

1. *Policy A*
2. *Policy B*

On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates full opposition and 7 indicates full support, how would you rate Policy A?

On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates full opposition and 7 indicates full support, how would you rate Policy B?

Table 2: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

Attribute	**Levels**
Territory (T)	1. Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank. 2. Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem. 3. Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
Security (S)	1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged. 2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly. 3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly.
Economy (E)	1. The economy will remain unchanged. 2. Israel's economy will be severely harmed. 3. Israel's economy will grow significantly.
Budget (B)	1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged. 2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease. 3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.

Following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), we first calculate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which estimate the average difference in the probability that a policy with a given outcome—say, a reduction in rocket attacks—is preferred over a policy with a baseline outcome—such as no change in the level of rocket attacks. Since the attributes (i.e., the outcomes) of a policy are randomly assigned, each outcome in a given domain is combined with the same distribution of outcomes in the other domains on average, which allows for a simple comparison of mean values. We estimate the AMCEs using a regression of the outcome variables: *Policy chosen* and *Policy ranking* on a set of factor variables for each outcome in each domain. Since each respondent chooses between and ranks two policies, there are two possible policy profiles for each respondent. To obtain accurate standard errors, we cluster standard errors by respondent ID.

$$\textit{Policy chosen/ranking}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{i,2} + \beta_2 S_{i,2} + \beta_3 S_{i,3} + \beta_4 E_{i,2} + \beta_5 E_{i,3} + \beta_6 B_{i,2} + \beta_7 B_{i,3} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Results

Figure 1 shows results for the conjoint experiment for four separate samples, plotting the AMCEs along with 95% confidence intervals (see SI, Section 2.2, for results in tabular form). The top left panel presents results for the full sample; because territorial attachment is conditioned on political ideology, the other three panels present the results disaggregated by the three key political blocs in Israel.[12] The point estimate on each attribute represents its average effect on the probability that participants choose a policy containing this attribute over a policy with the baseline attribute.

Beginning with the pooled, unconditional sample, Figure 1 shows that a policy that results in withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem is 19 percentage points less likely to be chosen, all else equal, representing the largest effect on policy choice. A policy leading to an increase in rocket and terror attacks is 12 percentage points less likely to be selected, and a policy that reduces terrorist violence increases the probability of policy choice by 14 percentage points. In the economic domain, economic harm decreases the likelihood of a policy being chosen by 10 percentage points. The results further show, as expected, that in the pooled sample, it is control over Jerusalem that is valued over material benefits, rather than control over the West Bank alone.

[12]We code respondents as "left" if they voted in the past elections to parties that are considered left of center (Labor, Meretz, HaMaaneh HaTziyoni (Zionist Union), and Eretz Hadasha); "right" if they voted to right parties (Likud, HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beiteinu, Yachad, Yahadut HaTora, Otzma Yehudit, and Zehut); and center if they voted to centrist parties (Kulanu and Yesh Atid).

Since preferences over territorial control are clearly moderated by political leaning, we turn to analysis by bloc, shown in the remaining panels of Figure 1. Least surprising, perhaps, are the preferences of the left bloc, which does not exhibit any attachment to the disputed territory. On the contrary, a policy that involves territorial withdrawal is 21 percentage points *more* likely to be selected if it does not include East Jerusalem, and 11 percentage points more likely to be selected if it does. The driving motivation for policy choice among the left is security: a policy that involves increased terrorist and rocket attacks is 36 percentage points less likely to be selected.

Our primary interest, however, lies in understanding the preferences of those who *are* attached to territory, and identifying whether this attachment is tangibly or intangibly motivated. Our results indicate that both the center and the right blocs attach the highest priority to territorial control, though there are important differences between the two. For the center, it is control over Jerusalem that is prioritized over security, the economy, and social welfare. The center is 19 percentage points less likely to choose a policy that involves withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Next in importance is improved security and the economy: a policy that reduces rocket and terrorist attacks is 15 percentage points more likely to be selected, while a policy that harms the economy is 13 percentage points less likely to be selected. Attachment to the West Bank is relatively weak – the effect of territorial withdrawal from the West Bank on policy choice, though negative, is small and statistically insignificant. These results provide initial evidence that even among Israeli centrists, East Jerusalem is highly valued for intangible symbolic reasons.

Finally, we turn to the right bloc, which is the largest in our sample and in the Israeli-Jewish public at large. Figure 1 (bottom-right) shows that control over land plays an absolutely decisive role in the policy considerations of right-wing voters, dwarfing security and material considerations, which hardly factor into right-wing voters' preference formation. A policy that involves withdrawing from the West Bank and East Jerusalem is 36 percentage points less likely to be chosen. However, it is not just Jerusalem that is driving the right's preferences. A policy that involves withdrawal from the West Bank only is 25 percentage points less likely to be chosen, all else being equal, with no material dimension coming close in importance. Security and economy considerations have a far more modest effect on policy choice: a policy that significantly decreases rocket and terrorist attacks increases the probability of policy selection by 10 percentage points, while severe harm to the economy reduces the probably of policy selection by 10 percentage points.

These results are underscored by our analysis of how respondents rank their support for the policy they chose, presented in Figure 2. Beginning with the pooled sample (top-left),

Figure 1: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice



Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by survey participants, broken down by ideology. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

we find that withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem have the largest effect on level of policy support, reducing the level of support by 0.79 points. Second in impact is improved security, with policies that involve a significant decrease in rocket and terrorist attacks increasing the level of policy support by 0.60. Perhaps surprisingly, the next most salient feature is withdrawal from the West Bank only, which reduces the level of policy support by 0.44.

Results become clearer upon disaggregation by political bloc. Consistent with our earlier findings, the left exhibits no attachment to territory, with withdrawal from the West Bank and from East Jerusalem *increasing* its support for its chosen policy by 0.92 and 0.89, respectively (bottom-left). Results for the center (top-right) are more ambiguous: A significant improvement in security is the factor most affecting policy support, raising support by 0.83. Next in importance are withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and severe harm to the economy, which reduce support for the policy by 0.49 and 0.47, respectively. Results for the right, the largest group in our sample (and the population) are most instructive: The effects of territorial withdrawal on policy support are extremely high, with withdrawal from East Jerusalem reducing policy support by nearly 2 full points, and withdrawal from the

West Bank only reducing support by 1.51. No other factor exercises a significant effect on policy support, with the exception of significantly improved security, which increases support by a far more modest 0.46 points. Right-wing voters thus clearly value territorial control over the central material outcomes laid out in our conjoint experiment.

Figure 2: Effects of Policy Attributes on Policy Rankings



Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the ranking of policies by survey participants, broken down by ideology. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The ranking ranged from 1 to 7 with a mean of 3.615.

Results from the conjoint experiment provide initial evidence that territorial control is a key driver of policy attitudes of voters in the center and especially the right, as compared to important material considerations. Intangible territorial attachment, in our definition, entails willingness to bear substantial material costs to retain territorial control. To further investigate the distribution of tangible and intangible preferences, we assess the share of respondents that express preference to deepen Israel's control over the West Bank, even when it entails significant costs. We focus on centrist and right-wing voters, which our results indicate exhibit some degree of territorial attachment, and estimate the proportion of voters that would support territorial concessions given substantial material benefits, by calculating the predicted values of respondents' policy choice from the conjoint experiment, while holding the four policy attributes at specific values. We report the results in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control (By Ideology)



Note: The figure plots predicted values, by ideology, of policy choice while holding the attributes reported in Table 2 at specific values. For "Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)," we set the Territory indicator to "Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank"; the Security indicator to "Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly"; The Economy indicator to "Israel's economy will grow significantly"; and the Budget indicator to "The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase." For "Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)" we changed the Territory indicator to "Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem." For "Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)" we set the territory indicator to territorial control and the other indicators to "Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly", "Israel's economy will be severely harmed," and "The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease."

Focusing on the results for right-wing voters, reported in the top panel of Figure 3, we find that about 50 percent of right-wing voters are willing to support a policy that results in territorial compromise ("give territory including East Jerusalem") if the policy is expected to reduce terror and rocket attacks, improve the economy and allocate greater resources towards social services ("all else good"). This finding suggests that approximately half of right-wing constituents are highly attached to territory but for tangible reasons. If benefits of concessions are high (and guaranteed), they would be willing to support a policy that results in territorial withdrawal. For this group of right-wing voters, a bargaining space can thus be said to exist. On the other hand, we find that 51 percent of right-wing voters explicitly prefer deepening Israel's control over the West Bank and east Jerusalem *even when terrorist violence increases substantially, the economy is severely harmed, and the budget allocation to health and education is reduced* ("all else bad").

Among the center results are more attenuated but still rather striking: Around 64 percent of centrists are willing to support a policy that results in territorial compromise when all material outcomes are positive. However, about 23 percent of centrists prefer deepening control over the West Bank and east Jerusalem even when security, the economy, and social welfare are substantially harmed. This group of centrists and right-wing voters, representing almost a quarter of respondents, can be said to hold intangible territorial attachment. For them, no bargaining space exists, rendering the territory effectively indivisible.[13]

Though clearly informative, the conjoint experiment has two limitations. First, it does not allow us to easily address the credible commitment problem; i.e., the idea that voters might fear that Palestinians would exploit concessions to impose greater costs, or that a chain of events—such as a Hamas takeover of the West Bank—would undermine any agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Put differently, analysis of the conjoint cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents classified as holding "intangible" preferences would support territorial concessions if they could be fully assured of an agreement's credibility. Second, the conjoint experiment is limited to the material outcomes listed therein. And while these are certainly key material aspects on which a policy would be judged, it may be that respondents attach tangible value to the territory, but their valuation is higher than the three attributes listed in the conjoint. We address each of these issues in experiments implemented in the second and third wave, respectively, and detailed in the next section.

[13]By randomizing attributes of an object, conjoint experiments intend to manipulate beliefs about specific attributes and only those beliefs. In any conjoint experiment, however, subjects may consider prior beliefs, not explicitly stated in the conjoint, when selecting among alternatives. For example, respondents may consider other material attributes when choosing policies that affect Israel's control over the West Bank. The fact that more than 50% of right-wing respondents reject policies that entail territorial compromise even when "all is bad" suggests that this possible confounding is unlikely to be driving the conjoint results.

Credibility and Valuation Experiments

One promising way to address the credible commitment problem, discussed above, is to measure the levels of economic and security-related *risk* that respondents are willing to assume in order to support territorial compromise. If individuals reject compromise even when there is no risk involved and the guarantee of benefits is completely credible, risk aversion and fear of rival defection cannot be driving policy positions. Our "credibility exercise," implemented in wave two of our survey, consists of two related questions. The first of these questions posed the following scenario to respondents:

"Imagine that the Israeli government is considering a number of far-reaching gestures to strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA). These measures have an advantage and a disadvantage: On the one hand, they could lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism, of about 100 attacks a year, due to improved security cooperation with the Palestinians. On the other hand, should the gestures fail, they could strengthen Hamas and increase terrorism by about 30 attacks a year."

Respondents were then asked to state when they would support the political gestures based solely on the information given in the question. Response categories ranged from "I will support the gestures in any case" through "I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 5%," and continued in intervals of 10% until they reached "I will support the gestures only if their likelihood of success is 100%" and finally "I will not support the gestures under any circumstances." Notably, this question did not explicitly reference territorial withdrawal but a "series of political gestures," which in Israel implies increased PA control in the West Bank.

Our second question followed a similar format but highlighted material rather than security considerations:

"Currently, Israel earns approximately a billion dollars a year from international trade. Recently, the U.N. Security Council has begun to discuss international sanctions against Israel due to continued military rule in the Territories. A team of senior experts estimated that if the sanctions are approved, the Israeli economy will lose approximately 300 million dollars a year. The Israeli government can avoid sanctions only if it ends the current political situation by an agreement with the Palestinians. Given the risk of sanctions, at what point would you support such an agreement?"

Again, response categories ranged from "I will support such an agreement in any case" through "I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 5%," and continued in

intervals of 10% until they reached "I will support the agreement only if the risk of sanctions is 100%" and finally "I will not support the agreement under any circumstances."

The conjoint experiment pointed to important variation among right-wing voters in the extent to which material and security considerations factor into policy preferences over the disputed territory. Similarly, the top panel of Figure 4 demonstrates that among those identifying as right-wing there is a large variability with respect to risk tolerance. On the one hand, about a half would support concessions if the likelihood of success in reducing terrorism is greater than fifty percent. This is consistent with results from our conjoint experiment, which indicate that around 50% of right-wing voters would concede territory if all other material outcomes were positive. On the other hand, a plurality of right-wing voters (40%) would never support concessions, regardless of the level of credibility.[14] Similarly, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4, when economic issues are at stake, around 51% of right-wing respondents would refuse to end the military occupation even with the certainty of severe economic sanctions. In sum, across both domains – security and the economy – we find that a large minority (around 30-40%) of our sample is insensitive to important costs and benefits when territorial control is at stake.

[14]See Table 8 and Figure 16 in SI, for results for the entire sample.

Figure 4: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking among Right-Wing Voters



Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of risk survey participants are willing to take when supporting potentially beneficial Israeli concessions.

To assess whether apparently intangible preferences are simply an artifact of the specific costs and benefits listed in our conjoint experiment, the third wave of our survey also included the following question ("valuation exercise"), which quantifies the costs which respondents are willing to bear for maintaining control over territory:

"The European Union is Israel's chief trading partner: Israeli exports to the EU are estimated at around 14 billion dollars a year. In 2015, the EU decided to label products from Israeli settlements, a decision whose damage to the country is estimated at around $50 million a year. Following the lack of progress in peace negotiations, the EU has begun discussing imposing additional sanctions on Israel. A senior and non-partisan team of experts from the Israel Central Bank estimated that if the sanctions are approved, the Israeli economy could be severely harmed, even if Israel increases its presence in alternative markets in Asia, Africa, and America. The Netanyahu government can avoid sanctions only if it agrees to substantial withdrawal from the territories of the West Bank as part of a peace agreement.

Respondents were then asked at what point they would support territorial withdrawal. Response categories ranged from "I will support withdrawal in any case" through "I will support withdrawal if sanctions will cause damage of at least 140 million dollars a year (around 1% of exports), and continued in regular increments until reaching "I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage of at least 14 billion dollars a year (100% of exports)" and finally "I will not support withdrawal under any circumstances."

Figure 5 shows that 46% of the entire sample would not support territorial withdrawal *at any level of economic cost.* Among centrists, 35% state they would not withdraw regardless of economic costs. Among the right, this figure rises to a full 74% (disaggregated results reported in Figure 7 in SI). These results are highly consistent with our conjoint findings: voters with intangible preferences comprise more than half of the Jewish-Israeli right, and approximately a quarter of its centrists.

Though on their own, results from each experiment could perhaps have been interpreted not as symbolic preferences but as the result of myopia or cognitive biases, the fact that three different experiments, in different survey waves, all produce substantively similar results increases our confidence that our findings reflect a deliberate tradeoff between tangible and intangible values. Simply put, the cumulative evidence indicates that a large share of Israeli respondents is willing to escalate conflict, risk economic sanctions and forgo welfare benefits in order to retain control of the West Bank. This distribution of preferences renders the bargaining space of leaders exceedingly limited. We turn to examine this dynamic more rigorously below.

Figure 5: Support for Concessions by Cost



Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of economic cost resulting from EU sanctions that respondents are willing to endure when opposing territorial withdrawal.

Why The Distribution Of Territorial Preferences Matters: From Public Opinion To Policy Making

One advantage of our "valuation exercise" is that it allows measuring the sensitivity of respondents' willingness to support territorial concessions to changes in the costs of maintaining the status quo (i.e., Israel's continuous control of the disputed territory). With these measures at hand, we then use demand curves (of this elasticity) to provide a graphical representation of the bargaining space of leaders. Figure 6 plots the share of respondents that support territorial concessions for different levels of damage to Israel's exports that respondents agree to assume.

In the left panel we present results for left-wing voters; the graph is relatively elastic and generally linear, showing that, for every 25% increase in the value of the damage to the economy, there is approximately a 10% increase in the proportion of people supporting significant territorial concessions. Importantly, a majority of left-wing voters (about 60%, represented by horizontal red line) support concessions at all damage levels. In contrast, the

right panel shows that right-wing voters have fairly inelastic demand curves: the share of right-wing voters supporting territorial concessions will exceed 20% only when the damage to the economy from sanction would be extremely high — 75%. Even when faced with the prospect of eliminating all (i.e., 100%) future exports to the EU to the economy, the share of right-wing respondents supporting concessions never reaches 30%. The vast majority of right-wing voters state that they will never support territorial withdrawal. As expected, centrist voters lie between these two extremes, with 53% of voters supporting territorial concessions when the cost of sanctions is 50% of Israel's exports to Europe.[15]

Figure 6: Support for Substantial Withdrawal by Political Block



Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the size of the damage to Israel's export with the EU; its single largest export market. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each bloc (left, center, right) who are willing to support substantial withdrawal from the West Bank at different costs.

How does intangible public attachment to land shape leaders' bargaining space? Existing theoretical accounts argue that by mobilizing public support around territorial issues, elites become locked into hardline positions that effectively narrow their bargaining range, limiting their ability to negotiate. Since the stakes are framed as intangible, any concessions will be too politically costly for elites to attempt. Our data do not allow us to test this proposition directly, as they focus on the public rather than elites. Nonetheless, we are able to shed light on the political effects of domestic territorial attachment by examining how the distribution of attachment to land among respondents relates to their vote choice in national elections.

We consider two alternative accounts: first, that ideological voters, insensitive to material

[15]The pattern is similar when we examine the sensitivity of voters to the level of security and economic risk associated with territorial withdrawal, based on our credibility exercise, see Figures 17 and 18 in SI.

costs, are primarily concentrated among the constituents of Israel's most far right parties. Here, leaders are constrained by coalition politics. If the Prime Minister forms a coalition with these parties (as Netanyahu has done, in the most recent elections held in 2015), he becomes constrained by his coalition partners, polarizing his positions and rendering the disputed territory effectively indivisible. He nevertheless, in theory, has the option of forming a coalition with parties at the center-left, thereby opening a bargaining space for a possible resolution of the conflict. Alternatively, it may be that ideological voters are not concentrated at the far right but are distributed across the right-wing spectrum. If this is the case, a prime minister from the right is constrained not by his coalition partners but by his own base, the core voters of his party.

To investigate this question we rerun the conjoint analysis on the subset of right-wing voters. In this iteration of the model we add an interaction between the four treatment variables (i.e., the four randomized policy attributes) and a covariate capturing vote choice.[16] We dichotomize the variable such that voters for the more centrist Likud party form one category, and voters for more right-wing parties form the second category.[17] We then calculate the predicted probability that respondents with these covariates hold "effectively indivisible" policy positions; i.e., that they select the generic policy that maintains territorial control even when all other outcomes (terror and rocket attacks, the economy and budget allocation to social services) "are bad."

The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows that as expected, a majority of voters for far right parties (54%) would prefer to keep the land even if security, the economy, and social welfare were reduced. However, the top panel shows that such ideological voters are common among Likud voters as well: nearly half (48%) would prefer maintaining territorial control when all other outcomes were bad. This finding indicates that a right-wing leader such as Netanyahu must contend not only with his coalition partners but with his own political base, severely constraining his bargaining space and making negotiations highly challenging from a public opinion perspective.

As a final illustration of how public attachment to territory affects the bargaining space of leaders, we once again use data on respondent vote choice to examine the demand curve for concessions among two potential government coalitions: A narrow right-wing government (operationalized as the Likud and all parties to its right),[18] and a moderate right government

[16]Vote choice is measured using respondents' vote choice in the 2015 general elections and their vote if the elections were held today.

[17]These include voters for HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beiteinu, Yachad, Yahadut HaTora, Otzma Yehudit, and Zehut.

[18]These include voters for Likud, HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beiteinu, Yachad, Yahadut HaTora, Otzma

Figure 7: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control (Right-Wing Bloc)



Note: The figure plots the predicted values of policy choice, divided between Likud supporters (top panel) and farther right-wing parties (bottom panel), while holding the policy attributes reported in Table 2 at specific values. See Figure 1 for details on the category definitions. The dots indicate point estimates, and the horizontal bars 95% confidence intervals.

(that excludes Ultra-Orthodox parties and includes centrist parties.)[19] Here, we once again use data from our "valuation exercise," which asked respondents for the level of cost that would be required for them to agree to support territorial compromise.

Figure 8 plots the demand curve for concessions by the size of the damage to the export

Yehudit, and Zehut.

[19]These include voters for Likud, HaMaaneh HaTziyoni, Yes Atid, and Kulanu.

sector in each coalition, as measured by voters for the parties included in the coalition. It shows that the curve for a narrow right-wing government is not only highly inelastic (right-panel), but also that *at no sanction level a majority of constituents would support significant territorial concessions*. This can go a long way in explaining why all negotiations with Palestinians have been frozen under Prime Minister Netanyahu's current administration. Turning to the center-right government (left-panel), on one hand, the government is clearly less constrained than a right-wing coalition. On the other hand, a majority of such government's constituents would agree to substantial territorial withdrawal only when the value of the cost to the economy exceeded 35% of its largest export sector. This result is due to the simple reason that—as shown above—voters holding intangible preferences over the disputed territory are not necessarily concentrated in the far-right, but form a core constituency of the Likud party. In understanding "effective indivisibility" as demand inelasticity, this figure provides a graphic illustration of what a narrow bargaining space means in practice.

Figure 8: Bargaining Space by Government Coalition



Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the size of the damage to Israel's export with the EU; the cost increases with the damage to the share of Israel's export to EU. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each coalition (right-center, narrow right) who are willing to support territorial concessions at different costs to the export economy.

Conclusion

The long-observed link between territorial disputes and conflict onset, escalation, duration, and termination has been attributed, on the one hand, to the tangible value of territory combined with the credibility problem, and on the other hand to intangible value. We have argued that tangibility and intangibility are better thought of as characteristics of preferences rather than of land, since territories often possess both material and symbolic worth. In addition, we proposed a set of methodological tools that can be used in diverse empirical contexts to disentangle tangible preferences from intangible ones, and to understand the implications of the nature of public attachment for the likelihood of conflict resolution.

Our empirical analysis reveals that in the Israeli case, a significant minority (40-45%) of our sample, identifying as center or left, does not appear to be particularly attached to the disputed territory, prioritizing other issues such as security and economic well-being. Among right-wing voters, who view territory as highly salient, there is an important variation as well: while over 50% of right-wing voters (approximately one third of our sample) are willing to bear substantial material costs to retain control over the the disputed West Bank territory, other right-wing voters reject concessions, arguably due to risk aversion: concerns about the rival's credibility and the likelihood of defection.

By systematically studying the heterogeneity of preferences within one case, we are able to identify patterns that may explain the persistence and recurrence of territorial conflicts on the domestic level. When the distribution of public preferences around territory favors certain political parties, there is a reduced likelihood of territorial bargaining, even in cases where many individuals within a country are still open to negotiations. Our results therefore show that for "effective indivisibly" to take place, there is no need for a majority to hold intangible preferences over the disputed territory. Instead, we argue, the distribution of public preferences should favor political parties that are able to constrain political leaders' bargaining space. As such, our study contributes to the large literature on territorial conflict by revealing how heterogeneity in territorial preferences shapes domestic political processes, which in turn lead to greater political intransigence.

In addition, our study provides a better understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a territorial conflict that has long consumed the interest of policy makers. The literature on that conflict has been divided on the sources of attachment to territory: while some scholars have argued that, with the exception of an ideological minority, the majority of Israeli society views the control of the West Bank in instrumental terms as a strategic and material asset (Newman, 1999; Rynhold and Waxman, 2008), others have argued that Israeli attachment to

the West Bank is ideological and symbolic (Lustick, 1993; Ginges et al., 2007). Our findings provide evidence that adjudicates among these claims, pointing to the limitations of a policy approach that focuses solely on increasing the material benefits of peace.

Our analysis suggests a number of avenues for future research. First, our findings regarding voter heterogeneity raise the question of who values territory and why. Second, as public opinion is not static but rather is subject to changes over time, an important question is whether and how attitudes towards territory can shift. Potential factors include, for example, elite cues and framing efforts (Zellman, 2015) and exogenous shocks. If, for example, the costs of territorial control were to rise significantly (due to such factors as increased violence or external pressure), then policy preferences among those who hold more rationalist views would likely change. Similar research, conducted at different points in time, could shed further light on this question. Finally, that our study finds evidence for preference heterogeneity *among those favoring territorial control*, suggests that territorial preferences vary across contexts. Indeed, we believe that such heterogeneity underpins the importance of in-depth analysis of specific cases. Future research could replicate this paper's procedure in different conflict areas, such as the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir or Eastern Ukraine.

In addition to the contribution to the theoretical debate on conflict and territory, our findings have important policy implications for the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution. First, they suggest that framing a peace agreement solely in instrumental terms—by highlighting security and material benefits—is unlikely to win over a substantial share of the Israeli population. At least in this context, peace-building efforts should take ideological dimensions seriously, in the discourse they employ and in the stakeholders they involve (see also Ginges et al., 2007). Additionally, our findings point to the important role of leadership in advocating non-violent means to resolve conflict. When public opinion attaches strong value to control over territory, leaders will need substantial individual and political clout to promote negotiations in the face of widespread public opposition.

Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: First Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Demographic variables					
Age	40.58	14.50	18	70	1963
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1	1963
Income					
Much less than avg.	0.14	0.35	0	1	1962
Little less than avg.	0.29	0.46	0	1	1963
Like avg.	0.17	0.37	0	1	1962
Little more than avg.	0.32	0.47	0	1	1963
Much more than avg.	0.07	0.26	0	1	1963
Education					
No matriculation	0.00	0.06	0	1	1963
High school	0.19	0.39	0	1	1962
Vocational	0.17	0.38	0	1	1962
Academic	0.62	0.49	0	1	1963
Area of residence					
West Bank or Jerusalem	0.11	0.32	0	1	1963
Outside West bank or Jerusalem	0.89	0.32	0	1	1963
Religiosity					
Secular	0.52	0.50	0	1	1963
Traditional	0.31	0.46	0	1	1963
Religious	0.14	0.35	0	1	1963
Haredi	0.03	0.17	0	1	1963
Ethnicity					
Mizrachi	0.33	0.47	0	1	1963
Ashkenazi	0.46	0.50	0	1	1963
Political ideology					
Right-left self placement	3.44	1.44	1	7	1963
Voting in 2013					
Voted for right-wing parties	0.43	0.49	0	1	1795
Voted for centrist parties	0.35	0.48	0	1	1795
Voted for left-wing parties	0.23	0.42	0	1	1795

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics: Second Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Demographic variables					
Age	41.01	14.29	18	70	1217
Female	0.54	0.50	0	1	1217
Income					
Much less than avg.	0.26	0.44	0	1	1217
Little less than avg.	0.19	0.39	0	1	1217
Like avg.	0.20	0.40	0	1	1217
Little more than avg.	0.18	0.38	0	1	1217
Much more than avg.	0.10	0.29	0	1	1217
Education					
No matriculation	0.26	0.44	0	1	1217
High school	0.22	0.42	0	1	1217
Vocational	0.22	0.42	0	1	1217
Academic	0.30	0.46	0	1	1217
Area of residence					
West Bank or Jerusalem	0.14	0.34	0	1	1217
Outside the West bank or Jerusalem	0.86	0.34	0	1	1217
Religiosity					
Secular	0.55	0.50	0	1	1217
Traditional	0.21	0.41	0	1	1217
Religious	0.13	0.34	0	1	1217
Haredi	0.10	0.30	0	1	1217
Ethnicity					
Mizrachi	0.34	0.47	0	1	1217
Ashkenazi	0.44	0.50	0	1	1217
Political ideology					
Right-left self placement	3.25	1.62	1	7	1217
Voting in 2013					
Voted for right-wing parties	0.51	0.50	0	1	1098
Voted for centrist parties	0.32	0.47	0	1	1098
Voted for left-wing parties	0.17	0.38	0	1	1098

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics: Third Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Demographic variables					
Age					
18-29	0.26	0.44	0	1	1342
30-39	0.21	0.41	0	1	1342
40-49	0.19	0.39	0	1	1342
50-59	0.17	0.38	0	1	1342
60+	0.16	0.37	0	1	1342
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	1339
Income					
Much less than avg.	0.20	0.40	0	1	1222
Little less than avg.	0.20	0.40	0	1	1222
Like avg.	0.24	0.43	0	1	1222
Little more than avg.	0.25	0.43	0	1	1222
Much more than avg.	0.10	0.31	0	1	1222
Education					
No matriculation	0.08	0.28	0	1	1232
High school	0.19	0.39	0	1	1232
Vocational	0.22	0.41	0	1	1232
Academic	0.51	0.50	0	1	1232
Area of residence					
Resident in West Bank or Jerusalem	0.15	0.36	0	1	1345
Resides outside the West bank or Jerusalem	0.85	0.36	0	1	1345
Religiosity					
Secular	0.49	0.50	0	1	1345
Traditional	0.31	0.46	0	1	1345
Religious	0.13	0.34	0	1	1345
Haredi	0.07	0.25	0	1	1345
Ethnicity					
Mizrachi	0.33	0.47	0	1	1222
Ashkenazi	0.42	0.49	0	1	1222
Political ideology					
Voting in 2015					
Voted for right-wing parties	0.34	0.48	0	1	1345
Voted for centrist parties	0.25	0.43	0	1	1345
Voted for left-wing parties	0.21	0.41	0	1	1345

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