

Online Appendix for: “Let the Majority Rule”

June 12, 2020

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Part I

Survey instrument

To begin, we'd like to ask you a few demographic questions for background purposes.

Q2. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1. Did not complete high school
2. High school graduate
3. Some college, no degree
4. Associate's degree
5. Bachelor's degree
6. Post-graduate degree

Q3. In what year were you born?

[Drop down menu showing years provided to respondents]

Q4. I consider myself to be:

1. Male
2. Female

Q5. I consider myself to be:

1. Caucasian (white)
2. African-American
3. Hispanic/Latino
4. Asian American
5. Other

Q6. Which of the following is more important to you?

1. Having my state's governor come from the political party I prefer

2. Having the U.S. president come from the political party I prefer

Q7. Thinking about elected officials at different levels of American government, which decisions do you think have the most impact on your day-to-day life?

1. Decisions made by the President of the United States

2. Decisions made by the governor of your state

3. Decisions made by the Mayor or executive of your city, town, or county

Q8a. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

1. Republican

2. Democrat

3. Independent

Q8b. If Q8a = 1 or 2: Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican/Democrat]?

1. Strong

2. Not very strong

Q8c. If Q8a = 3: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

1. Republican

2. Democratic

3. Neither

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing the United States of America. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

Q9. The first one is having a strong leader who does not have to bother with congress and elections. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States
4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q10. What about having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States
2. Fairly good way of governing the United States
3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States
4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q11. What about having the military rule. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States
2. Fairly good way of governing the United States
3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States
4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q12. What about having a democratic political system. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States
2. Fairly good way of governing the United States
3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States
4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Now we'd like you to read a brief news article about recent political events. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you some questions about it once you're finished. Please click to the next screen to read the article.

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN SUBJECTS TO CONDITION T.A, T.B, or T.C]

T.A: The PARTY¹ governor of a state in the United States wants to determine

¹In conditions T.A-T.C, subjects read about a same-party governor. So Democratic (Republican) or Independents who lean toward the Democratic (Republican) Party read about a Democratic

the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary because gridlock in the legislature has delayed the budget process in recent years, hurting the state's citizens. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

T.B: The PARTY governor of a state in the United States wants to determine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary because the legislature is controlled by lobbyists and special interests that are preventing him from governing in the best interests of the state's citizens. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

T.C: The PARTY governor of a state in the United States wants to determine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

(Republican) governor; pure Independents are randomly assigned a Democratic or Republican governor. PARTY is simply a placeholder for the appropriate party label.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary to prevent the other party's extreme agenda from being enacted. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

Q13. We just asked you to read a brief news story about the governor of a state that who wants to control his state's budget. In the article, what was the governor's reason for wanting more control over the budget?

1. Gridlock in the legislature has delayed the budget in recent years, hurting the state's citizens
2. He needs to prevent the other party's extreme agenda from being enacted
3. Lobbyists and special interests in the legislature are preventing him from acting in the best interest of the state's citizens
4. He did not give a reason

Q14. What party was the governor from in the article you just read?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Didn't specify

Q15. If you had the opportunity to vote in the special election discussed in the article you just read, would you support or oppose the governor's plan to give him control of the budget?

1. Definitely would support the governor's plan
2. Probably would support the governor's plan
3. Probably would oppose the governor's plan
4. Definitely would oppose the governor's plan

Now we'd like you to read another brief news article about recent political events. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you some questions about it once you're finished. Please click to the next screen to read the article.

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO CONDITIONS T, U, V, W, X,

Y, OR Z. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT AND ORTHOGONAL RANDOMIZATION TO THE ONE ABOVE. THE PROBABILITIES ARE:

- T.T1: 1/6
- T.T2: 1/6
- T.U: 1/12
- T.V: 1/12
- T.W: 1/6
- T.X: 1/12
- T.Y: 1/12
- T.Z: 1/6

T.T1: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor immediately appointed a new Democratic justice to replace the retiring justice. The state constitution grants the governor the power to appoint this new justice.

T.T2: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor immediately appointed a new Republican justice to replace the retiring justice. The state constitution grants the governor the power to appoint this new justice.

T.U: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Voters in the state protested the outgoing Democratic governor's judicial appointment, and the governor backed down from the plan. Instead the

incoming Republican governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.V: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Republicans sued and the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court, which ruled that the current governor cannot appoint a new justice. Instead the incoming Republican governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.W: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Despite opposition, the current governor was successful, and his new justice will join the court in March.

T.X: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Voters in the state protested the outgoing Republican governor's judicial appointment, and the governor backed down from the plan. Instead the incoming Democratic governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.Y: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Democrats sued and the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court, which ruled that the current governor cannot appoint a new justice. Instead the incoming Democratic governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.Z: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming gov-

ernor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Despite opposition, the current governor was successful, and his new justice will join the court in March.

Q17. In the article you just read, what did the outgoing governor ACTION²?

1. Appoint a new justice to the state Supreme Court
2. Change the budget process
3. Change the shape of congressional districts
4. Pass a new law
5. None of the above

Q18. Do you approve of the outgoing governor's APPOINTMENT³ a new justice to the state's Supreme Court?

1. Strongly approve
2. Somewhat approve
3. Somewhat disapprove
4. Strongly disapprove

Q19. Is the governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

²In conditions T.T, T.W, and T.Z, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is successful in appointing a new judge. So ACTION is a placeholder for the word "do." In conditions T.U, T.V, T.X, and T.Y, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is unsuccessful in appointing a new judge. So ACTION is a placeholder for the phrase "try to do."

³In conditions T.T, T.W, and T.Z, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is successful in appointing a new judge. So APPOINTMENT is a placeholder for the phrase "appointment of." In conditions T.U, T.V, T.X, and T.Y, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is unsuccessful in appointing a new judge. So APPOINTMENT is a placeholder for the phrase "effort to appoint."

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION U, V, W, X, Y, OR Z:]

Q20. Earlier, we told you about a governor who tried to appoint a new justice to his state's supreme court. Do you remember if he was successful in that effort?

1. Yes, he successfully appointed the judge
2. No, the court blocked his appointment of the judge
3. No, he withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION W OR Z:]

- If Q20 = 1: Yes, that's correct. The governor successfully appointed a new justice.
- If Q20 = 2 or 3: No, that's incorrect. The governor successfully appoint a new justice.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION U OR X:]

- If Q20 = 1: No, that's incorrect. The governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.
- If Q20 = 2: No, that's incorrect. While the judge wasn't seated on the court, it was because the governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.
- If Q20 = 3: Yes, that's correct. The governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION V OR Y:]

- If Q20 = 1: No, that's incorrect. The courts blocked the governor's appointment of the judge.
- If Q20 = 2: Yes, that's correct. The courts blocked the governor's appointment of the judge.
- If Q20 = 3: No, that's incorrect. While the judge wasn't seated on the court, it was because the courts blocked the governor's appointment.

Q21. Earlier, we asked you about the governor in a different state, who has proposed a special election (referendum) that would allow voters to decide whether he should have more power over the state budget. How likely do you think it

is that the voters will approve the governor's plan to give him control of the budget?

1. Extremely likely
2. Very likely
3. Not too likely
4. Not at all likely

Q22. Overall, how democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?

1. Completely democratically
2. Mostly democratically
3. Not too democratically
4. Not at all democratically

In this study, we asked you to read about a governor who tried to appoint a new justice to his state's Supreme Court. This is a combination of something that happened in North Carolina and in Vermont. In neither case did a new justice end up on the court. To find out more about these cases, visit: <http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/government/2017/01/03/vt-supreme-court-weighs-gov-shumlins-authority/95887910/> and <http://www.wsocvtv.com/news/local/republicans-could-retake-nc-supreme-court/466387424>.

Part II

Pre-Analysis Plan

1 Introduction

The rise of right-wing populists in the United States and Europe has revived interest in the idea that stable democracy requires a civic culture. “Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim,” wrote Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their 1963 volume *The Civic Culture* (p. 498). Democracy, they argued, requires more than formal institutions—it requires the public to embrace the legitimacy of the system. Echoing this sentiment, scholars have recently proposed that “civil society’s vigilance and protest” is the “last defense” against the “anti-democratic behavior” of President Donald Trump (Acemoglu, 2017).

Does the U.S. public support policies that *de facto* erode democratic institutions? If so, why? Past research on attitudes toward democracy largely relies on abstract questions such as “Do you think that democracy is a good, very good, bad, or very bad way of running this country?” (e.g., Foa and Mounk, 2016; Inglehart, 2003). We instead use a survey experiment that poses concrete scenarios inspired by recent events in U.S. states. Experimental variation in these scenarios allows us to assess why respondents might support anti-democratic behavior on the part of elected officials. We also gauge whether reading about anti-democratic behavior leads respondents to lose faith in the resilience of democratic institutions.

Our motivation for moving from abstract questions to concrete scenarios stems in part from the literature on attitudes toward civil rights and civil liberties. For example, Stouffer (1955) finds that, while people might say that they support free speech, they often oppose free speech for specific “nonconformists” (at that time, communists). Later work found a similar pattern: Americans embrace civil liberties in the abstract but willingly deny them in specific, common situations (McClosky and Brill, 1985; Sullivan et al., 1982), especially in times of threat and danger (Davis and Silver, 2004).⁴

In the first part of our study, we show respondents one of four versions of a vignette

⁴Though for an important exception, see Sniderman et al. (1989).

about a state governor attempting to wrest control of the budget from the state legislature; we then ask respondents whether they would support this move in a referendum. In all four variants, the governor hails from each respondent’s own party.⁵ The first group read a version in which the governor does not attempt to justify his power grab; their responses measure baseline support for the move. A second group read a version in which the governor claims to be trying to prevent gridlock; this variant is motivated by arguments about inefficiency as a rationale for limiting democratic procedures (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). A third group read that the governor sought to overcome the power of entrenched special interests (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Grossman and Helpman, 2001), and a fourth group read that the governor’s goal was to “block the extreme agenda of the other party” (Mann and Orenstein, 2012). In measuring how these justifications affect stated support for usurping the legislature, our survey experiment illuminates the rationale behind stated support for actions that erode democratic institutions. We find that [gridlock / capture / polarization] is most likely to drive support for actions that contribute to democratic erosion: [numbers here].

The second part of our study features a vignette in which an outgoing governor attempts to appoint a state supreme court justice to fill a future vacancy; we tell respondents that norms dictate that the incoming governor should fill the vacancy (motivated by events in Vermont, McCullum, 2017). Unlike in the first vignette, we randomly assign the party of this governor. We then ask respondents both whether they support the governor’s appointment and whether they view it as “consistent with democracy.”

Naturally, respondents are much more likely to answer “yes” to both questions when the governor is a co-partisan. We consider whether the co-partisan effect on supporting the governor’s appointment differs from the co-partisan effect on perceiving that the appointment is “consistent with democracy.” In other words, do respondents support anti-democratic behavior on the part of co-partisans because they view it as consistent with democratic norms, or despite acknowledging it as anti-democratic? We find that [...].

We use both vignettes together in order to assess whether respondents update their beliefs about the resilience of democratic institutions. In the second vignette, we randomly assign whether the outgoing governor succeeds or fails in his attempt to

⁵Independents, as well as one-eighth of Democratic and Republican respondents, were assigned to a vignette in which the politician trying to usurp the local legislature was a premier in Canada rather than a state governor in the United States.

appoint a justice for a future vacancy. We then ask respondents whether they expect that the first governor—the one seeking control of the budget in another state—will succeed or fail in usurping the legislature. Do respondents think that the erosion of checks and balances in one place makes it more likely elsewhere? If we find that respondents do update their beliefs in this way, it would suggest that the U.S. public can indeed adjust confidence in democracy in response to current events (as opposed to maintaining blind faith in the strength of democratic institutions). This might imply that attempts to erode democratic institutions and democratic norms would spur public vigilance and protest.

We find that, [contrary to] [in keeping with] the notion that citizens underestimate the possibility of democratic breakdown, survey respondents [update their beliefs] [do not update their beliefs] after confronting a concrete example of institutional frailty. Respondents who read that the outgoing governor succeeded in filling a future judicial vacancy were [y] percentage points more likely to expect voter support for unilateral budget control than were respondents who read that democratic norms prevailed in the judicial appointment controversy.⁶

Overall, we find that, when autocratic institutional features are described not as abstractions (“having a strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with the legislature”) but as actual events (“a state governor who sets the budget without legislative input”), adults in the United States appear [much more supportive] [every bit as skeptical] of democracy as previous studies suggest.

2 Design of the survey experiment

After recording each respondent’s level of education, birth year, gender, and race, our survey experiment proceeded in three parts.

- (1) *World Values Survey questions on attitudes toward democracy.* The first part posed a set of World Values Survey questions meant to capture attitudes toward democracy, asking whether each of four political arrangements would be “a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States.”

⁶In a separate survey, we also find that, asked to rank the probability of democratic breakdown in seven countries, respondents were more pessimistic about democratic prospects in the United States than in Canada or Australia—but much less pessimistic about democracy in the United States than in Russia or Venezuela. Together with the survey experimental results, we interpret this as evidence that people are [indeed overconfident in] [in fact keenly aware of threats to] the democratic system in the United States.

The political arrangements were: “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections,”⁷ “having experts, not government, make decisions according what they think is best for the country,” “having the military rule,” and “having a democratic political system.”

(2) *A governor tries to control the state budget.* The second part of the survey presents respondents with one of three versions of short vignette. The vignette describes a state governor who wants to change the state constitution so that he—rather than the legislature—would control the state budget (see Section A for the complete text). In all versions of the vignette, the governor hails from the respondent’s own party (i.e., Republican respondents read about a Republican governor).⁸

- (i) In the first version, the governor argues that executive power over the budget was necessary to overcome gridlock in the legislature (gridlock treatment).
- (ii) In a second version, he argues that it was necessary because the legislature is controlled by “lobbyists and special interests that prevent him from governing in the best interests of the people” (capture treatment).
- (iii) In the third version, he argues that he should control the budget to block the other party’s “extreme agenda” (polarization treatment).

The motivation for the three justifications for the governor’s actions comes from the theoretical literature on attitudes towards democratic institutions. The first justification—that executive control is needed overcome overcome gridlock—allows us to test the claim that voters are willing to limit democracy to overcome its inefficiencies (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002).⁹ The second rationale—that executive control is needed to overcome the power of special interests—builds on arguments about the influence of money in politics (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Stern, 1988).¹⁰ Finally, the polarization rationale builds on literature arguing that U.S. institutions cannot cope with hyper-polarized parties (Mann and Oren-

⁷While the WVS asks about “parliament,” use “Congress,” given our focus on the United States.

⁸Following convention in the literature, we treat partisan leaners as partisans (Keith et al., 1992). For pure Independents (i.e., those who do not lean toward one party or the other, we randomize whether they read about a Democratic or a Republican governor.

⁹Indeed, some have argued that we should amend the U.S. constitution to strengthen the President at the expense of Congress to overcome gridlock (Howell and Moe, 2016).

¹⁰Such claims are endemic to contemporary politics: for example, Sanders, Clinton, and Trump all made this argument during the 2016 elections.

stein, 2012).¹¹

As a comprehension check, we ask respondents to name the issue discussed in the vignette (allowing them to choose among affirmative action, international trade, control of the budget, reproductive rights, and gun control). We then asked whether, if the respondent could vote in the referendum on giving the governor control of the budget, she would vote in favor.

(3) *A governor tries to shape the state supreme court after he leaves office.* The third part of the survey describes an outgoing state governor who tries to appoint a replacement for a state supreme court judge who plans to retire *after* the incoming governor takes office. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of six treatment conditions or a control condition. The treatments comprised vignettes with one of three endings:

- (i) the governor withdraws his appointment in response to protests,
- (ii) a court blocks the appointment,
- (iii) or the governor prevails

—and with either a Democrat or a Republican as the outgoing governor. The control group read a short newspaper article about the appointment of a state supreme court justice.

As a comprehension check, we asked respondents to report “what the governor tried to do” in the article they had just read. We then asked whether respondents approved of the outgoing governor’s move to appoint a new justice, and whether or not they viewed his effort as “consistent with democracy.”

Finally, we asked respondents to think back to the first vignette, about the governor who had scheduled a referendum that would allow voters to grant or deny him control over the budget. We then asked about expectations: How likely did they think it was that voters would approve the governor’s proposal? This allows us to test our arguments about updating. If a subject learns that one governor could pack his state’s supreme court, does that change her assessment of the likelihood that another governor could weaken his state’s legislative powers?

¹¹One concern is that Democrats and Republicans might simply differ in their propensity to support illiberal actions. We can speak to this using additional data we have collected where we pose this scenario in other countries. Additionally, we also tested a “no explanation” condition in our pilot study (i.e., where the governor does not offer *any* explanation for his actions). Consistent with arguments in psychology, offering any justification increases support for the governor’s decision.

The end of the survey returned to World Values Survey questions, asking respondents how democratically they think the United States is governed today, and how democratically they think the United States will be governed in the future.

Note that, while our first experiment includes four treatment conditions and our second experiment includes six treatment conditions, we do *not* conceptualize this as a 4×6 design, because we do not pre-specify (and will not search for ex-post) interactions between treatment assignment in the first experiment and assignment in the second experiment (beyond the updating hypothesis discussed above).

3 Hypotheses and hypothesis tests

3.1 Why do voters support anti-democratic reforms?

We use responses to our first vignette to better understand what drives disaffection with democracy. The outcome of interest is whether a respondent would vote to support the governor’s bid for unilateral budget control in a statewide referendum (Q15). We compare how this support differs when the rationale is to overcome gridlock (T.A), reduce the influence of special interests (T.B), or prevent the other party from enacting their extreme agenda (T.C). We define:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_{Gridlock} &= E(\text{Support} \mid \text{Gridlock justification}) \\ \phi_{Capture} &= E(\text{Support} \mid \text{Special interests justification}) \\ \phi_{Polarization} &= E(\text{Support} \mid \text{“Extreme agenda” justification})\end{aligned}$$

We then test three hypotheses:

$$\begin{array}{llll} H_0^1 : \phi_{Gridlock} = \phi_{Capture} & \text{against} & H_1^1 : \phi_{Gridlock} \neq \phi_{Capture} & (H^1) \\ H_0^2 : \phi_{Gridlock} = \phi_{Polarization} & \text{against} & H_1^2 : \phi_{Gridlock} \neq \phi_{Polarization} & (H^2) \\ H_0^3 : \phi_{Capture} = \phi_{Polarization} & \text{against} & H_1^3 : \phi_{Capture} \neq \phi_{Polarization} & (H^3)\end{array}$$

The coauthors have divergent expectations about the sign of the differences between these parameters (i.e., which justification should elicit most support). To test these hypotheses, we use OLS to estimate an equation of the form:

$$y_i = \phi_{Gridlock}(\text{Gridlock}_i) + \phi_{Polarization}(\text{Polarization}_i) + \phi_{Capture}(\text{Capture}_i) + u_i \quad (1)$$

where y_i denotes responses to Q15 (support for the governor’s bid to control the budget), and Gridlock_i , Polarization_i , and Capture_i are indicators for whether respondent i read each of those three justifications for the governor’s proposal. (Note that in this specification we omit the constant rather than omitting one of the three categories). We then use the OLS estimates $\hat{\phi}_{\text{Gridlock}}$, $\hat{\phi}_{\text{Capture}}$, and $\hat{\phi}_{\text{Polarization}}$ to conduct t -tests of hypotheses H_0^1 , H_0^2 , and H_0^3 , adjusting the p -values to account for multiple testing. Section 4 describes these adjustments and presents power calculations for all relevant hypothesis tests discussed in this document.¹²

3.2 The role of co-partisanship

Our second vignette, in which an outgoing governor attempts to fill a future vacancy on the state supreme court, experimentally varies the party of the governor. This allows us to directly assess how respondents view the actions of a co-partisan governor vs. a governor from the opposing party. A large literature suggests that people will look more favorably on the actions of co-partisan politicians than on the same actions by politicians of the opposing party (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960; Claasen and Ensley, 2016; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015); our interest lies in whether people support anti-democratic behavior in co-partisans *despite* it being anti-democratic or *because they re-cast it as consistent with democracy*.¹³ We define:

$$\begin{aligned}\beta_0 &= E(\text{Support} \mid \text{Own party}) - E(\text{Support} \mid \text{Other party}) \\ \beta_1 &= E(\text{“Consistent with democracy”} \mid \text{Own party}) \\ &\quad - E(\text{“Consistent with democracy”} \mid \text{Other party})\end{aligned}$$

And we then test:

$$H_0^4 : \beta_1 = \beta_0 \text{ against } H_1^4 : \beta_1 \neq \beta_0 \quad (H^4)$$

To do so, we use OLS to estimate:

$$(\text{Support}_i - \text{“Consistent with democracy”}_i) = \xi + \delta(\text{Copartisan}_i) + \eta_i \quad (2)$$

¹²All of the analyses in this section will be performed both on the full sample and the subsample who correctly answer the manipulation check (Q13), the attention check (Q14), and both the manipulation and attention check.

¹³Some observers have already suggested that Republicans being unwilling to critique the excesses of the Trump administration (McMullin, 2017; Gopnik, 2017).

where Support_i denotes respondent i 's stated support for the governor's judicial appointment (Q18), "Consistent" $_i$ denotes her opinion about whether the appointment is "consistent with democracy" (Q19), and Copartisan_i is an indicator for whether the respondent was randomly assigned to the condition in which the governor is a copartisan. We then use $\hat{\delta}$ to conduct a t -test for the null that $\delta = 0$, which is equivalent to H^4 above.

3.3 Updating about democratic resilience

Does the public have blind faith in the resilience of democratic institutions in the United States? Or do people update their views in response to current events?

We test whether reading about the violation of democratic norms in one state—in particular, reading that an outgoing governor succeeded in shaping the state supreme court even *after* he left office—makes respondents more pessimistic about the violation of democratic norms in another state (specifically, whether a governor will succeed in unilaterally controlling the state budget). Conversely, we test whether reading about the triumph of democratic norms in one state—in particular, reading that either protests or the courts stopped the outgoing governor's judicial appointment—makes respondents more optimistic about the continuity of democratic norms in another state (budget control remaining with the legislature). We also consider the effect of the judicial-appointment outcome on respondents' perceptions of how democratically the United States is governed today.

$$\alpha_{\text{success}} = E(\text{Expect budget control} \mid \text{Appointment Succeeds})$$

$$\alpha_{\text{fail}} = E(\text{Expect budget control} \mid \text{Appointment Fails})$$

$$\alpha_{\text{control}} = E(\text{Expect budget control} \mid \text{Control (no information on court-packing)})$$

We then test three hypotheses:

$$H_0^5 : \alpha_{\text{success}} = \alpha_{\text{failure}} \quad \text{against} \quad H_1^5 : \alpha_{\text{success}} \neq \alpha_{\text{failure}} \quad (H^5)$$

$$H_0^6 : \alpha_{\text{success}} = \alpha_{\text{control}} \quad \text{against} \quad H_1^6 : \alpha_{\text{success}} \neq \alpha_{\text{control}} \quad (H^6)$$

$$H_0^7 : \alpha_{\text{control}} = \alpha_{\text{failure}} \quad \text{against} \quad H_1^7 : \alpha_{\text{control}} \neq \alpha_{\text{failure}} \quad (H^7)$$

Our expectation is that $\alpha_{\text{success}} > \alpha_{\text{failure}} > \alpha_{\text{control}}$: that is, reading about democratic erosion in one place makes it seem more likely in another, and that even reading about a *failed* effort to weaken democratic norms raises the probability that other norms will fall (by suggesting that failure is indeed a possibility).

To test these hypotheses, we estimate:

$$y_i = \alpha_{success}(\text{Success}_i) + \alpha_{failure}(\text{Failure}_i) + \alpha_{control}(\text{Control}_i) + \epsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where y_i denotes responses to Q21 (“How likely do you think it is that voters will approve the governor’s plan to give him control of the budget?”), and Success_i , Failure_i , and Control_i are indicators for treatment assignment in the second vignette. (Note that in this specification we omit the constant rather than omitting one of the three categories). We then use the OLS estimates of the α s to test Hypotheses 5–7.

We might also expect the success or failure of the court-packing plan to change beliefs about how democratically the United States is governed today. We therefore test a final hypothesis: $H_0^8 : \zeta_{success} = \zeta_{failure} = \zeta_{control} = 0$ —that is, there is no effect of treatment assignment on beliefs about how democratically the United States is being governed today. To test this, we estimate an equation analogous to Equation 3, except with responses to Q22 (“Overall, how democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?”) as the dependent variable.

4 Power

Table 1 presents the minimum effect sizes we will be able to detect with 80% power, assuming a survey sample size of $n = 4,000$ respondents. Panel A presents the effect sizes in terms of units of the dependent variable (i.e., points on scale); Panel B presents these same numbers as a percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. In each panel, the first row presents the effect sizes observed in our MTurk pilot study, for comparison. We used the standard deviations observed in this pilot study in all calculations.

The first row of each panel, labeled “uncorrected,” reports (for reference only) the effect sizes we would be able to detect if we made no adjustment for multiple comparisons. The second row, labeled “List et. al. (Group),” reports the effect sizes we would be able to detect if we were to use the approach described in List et al. (2016) to estimate p -values adjusted for multiple testing. The “Group” part of this label refers to the fact that, using List et al. (2016), we can adjust the p -values for the test statistics for $H_0^1-H_0^3$ (and $H_0^5-H_0^7$) only for those three hypotheses; *not* for all eight hypotheses in our study. Using the Bonferroni corrections, in contrast, we can take into account all hypotheses; these values are reported in the last row of each panel of the table.

Table 1: Minimum detectable effects, compared to effects observed in pilot
The first row of each panel of this table reports the differences (effects) observed in our pilot; the following rows report minimum detectable effects for tests with 80% power, assuming $n = 4,000$.

Panel A: Value (in units of D.V.)							
	H^1	H^2	H^3	H^4	H^5	H^6	H^7
	$\phi_G = \phi_C$	$\phi_G = \phi_P$	$\phi_C = \phi_P$	$\beta_0 = \beta_1$	$\alpha_S = \alpha_F$	$\alpha_S = \alpha_C$	$\alpha_C = \alpha_F$
Observed (pilot)	0.188	0.420	0.232	0.096	0.005	0.153	0.158
Uncorrected	0.194	0.197	0.201	0.046	0.073	0.073	0.073
List et. al. (Group)	0.198	0.245	0.205	.	0.089	0.075	0.099
List et. al. (All)
Bonferroni (Group)	0.225	0.227	0.232	0.046	0.084	0.084	0.084
Bonferroni (All)	0.248	0.251	0.257	0.059	0.093	0.093	0.093

Panel B: As % of S.D. of D.V.							
	$\phi_G = \phi_C$	$\phi_G = \phi_P$	$\phi_C = \phi_P$	$\beta_0 = \beta_1$	$\alpha_S = \alpha_F$	$\alpha_S = \alpha_C$	$\alpha_C = \alpha_F$
Observed (pilot)	0.146	0.326	0.180	0.280	0.011	0.323	0.333
Uncorrected	0.151	0.153	0.156	0.134	0.153	0.154	0.153
List et. al. (Group)	0.153	0.190	0.159	.	0.189	0.157	0.210
List et. al. (All)
Bonferroni (Group)	0.174	0.176	0.180	0.134	0.177	0.178	0.177
Bonferroni (All)	0.193	0.195	0.199	0.170	0.196	0.197	0.196

Overall, $N = 4,000$ respondents allows us to detect differences of 0.2 standard deviations or smaller for each of our seven hypotheses. Given our results in the pilot study, our study should therefore be well-powered to test Hypotheses 1–4 and 6–7. In our pilot, however, we found only very small differences between the views of respondents assigned to the “judicial appointment succeeds” condition and the “judicial appointment fails” condition; we therefore do not expect to be able to reject Hypothesis 5, which is that these two groups have the same views. Likewise, we probably lack sufficient power to test Hypothesis 8, which states that the outcome of the judicial appointment attempt has no effect on respondents’ views of how democratically the United States is being governed today (not shown in the table).

5 Pilot studies

In addition to the studies described above, our survey embeds a number of descriptive questions and pilot studies. These are described in [Appendix 5](#). Should the pilot studies produce interesting results, we will use these results to motivate further surveys.

A Appendix: Questionnaire

Q1. Consent form on a separate page

To begin, we'd like to ask you a few demographic questions for background purposes.

Q2. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1. Did not complete high school
2. High school graduate
3. Some college, no degree
4. Associate's degree
5. Bachelor's degree
6. Post-graduate degree

Q3. In what year were you born?

[Drop down menu showing years provided to respondents]

Q4. I consider myself to be:

1. Male
2. Female

Q5. I consider myself to be:

1. Caucasian (white)
2. African-American
3. Hispanic/Latino
4. Asian American
5. Other

Q6. Which of the following is more important to you?

1. Having my state's governor come from the political party I prefer
2. Having the U.S. president come from the political party I prefer

Q7. Thinking about elected officials at different levels of American government, which decisions do you think have the most impact on your day-to-day life?

1. Decisions made by the President of the United States
2. Decisions made by the governor of your state
3. Decisions made by the Mayor or executive of your city, town, or county

Q8a. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent

Q8b. If Q8a = 1 or 2: Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican/Democrat]?

1. Strong
2. Not very strong

Q8c. If Q8a = 3: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

1. Republican
2. Democratic
3. Neither

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing the United States of America. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

Q9. The first one is having a strong leader who does not have to bother with congress and elections. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States
2. Fairly good way of governing the United States
3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q10. What about having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q11. What about having the military rule. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q12. What about having a democratic political system. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Now we'd like you to read a brief news article about recent political events. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you some questions about it once you're finished. Please click to the next screen to read the article.

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN SUBJECTS TO CONDITION T.A, T.B, or T.C]

T.A: The PARTY¹⁴ governor of a state in the United States wants to deter-

¹⁴In conditions T.A-T.C, subjects read about a same-party governor. So Democratic (Republican) or Independents who lean toward the Democratic (Republican) Party read about a Democratic (Republican) governor; pure Independents are randomly assigned a Democratic or Republican governor. PARTY is simply a placeholder for the appropriate party label.

mine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary because gridlock in the legislature has delayed the budget process in recent years, hurting the state's citizens. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

T.B: The PARTY governor of a state in the United States wants to determine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary because the legislature is controlled by lobbyists and special interests that are preventing him from governing in the best interests of the state's citizens. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

T.C: The PARTY governor of a state in the United States wants to determine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary to prevent the other party's extreme agenda from being enacted. But critics say that

the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

Q13. We just asked you to read a brief news story about the governor of a state that who wants to control his state's budget. In the article, what was the governor's reason for wanting more control over the budget?

1. Gridlock in the legislature has delayed the budget in recent years, hurting the state's citizens
2. He needs to prevent the other party's extreme agenda from being enacted
3. Lobbyists and special interests in the legislature are preventing him from acting in the best interest of the state's citizens
4. He did not give a reason

Q14. What party was the governor from in the article you just read?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Didn't specify

Q15. If you had the opportunity to vote in the special election discussed in the article you just read, would you support or oppose the governor's plan to give him control of the budget?

1. Definitely would support the governor's plan
2. Probably would support the governor's plan
3. Probably would oppose the governor's plan
4. Definitely would oppose the governor's plan

Q16. Is the governor's plan to give him control of the budget consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

Now we'd like you to read another brief news article about recent political events. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you some questions about it once you're finished. Please click to the next screen to read the article.

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO CONDITIONS T, U, V, W, X, Y, OR Z. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT AND ORTHOGONAL RANDOMIZATION TO THE ONE ABOVE. THE PROBABILITIES ARE:

- T.T: 1/3
- T.U: 1/12
- T.V: 1/12
- T.W: 1/6
- T.X: 1/12
- T.Y: 1/12
- T.Z: 1/6

T.T: The Governor's Council on Wednesday unanimously confirmed Judge Elspeth "Ellie" Cypher to the Supreme Judicial Court. She will also be the first supreme court justice from Bristol County in more than a century, according to Governor's Councilor Joseph Ferreira. "The words exceptional, awesome, brilliant, kind and fair come to mind when you talk about Judge Cypher," Ferreira said. Cypher will replace Justice Margot Botsford, who reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 this month.

Cypher has served on the Appeals Court since 2000 after she was nominated by Gov. Paul Cellucci. She is a former Bristol County prosecutor who graduated Emerson College and obtained her law degree from the Suffolk University Law School. A Pittsburgh native, Cypher is married with one son. She has taught at the University of Massachusetts School of Law, formerly the Southern New England School of Law.

T.U: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan

power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Voters in the state protested the outgoing Democratic governor's judicial appointment, and the governor backed down from the plan. Instead the incoming Republican governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.V: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Republicans sued and the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court, which ruled that the current governor cannot appoint a new justice. Instead the incoming Republican governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.W: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Despite opposition, the current governor was successful, and his new justice will join the court in March.

T.X: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Voters in the state protested the outgoing Republican governor's judicial appointment, and the governor backed down from the plan. Instead the incoming Democratic governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.Y: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Democrats sued and the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court, which ruled that the current governor cannot appoint a new justice. Instead the incoming Democratic governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.Z: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down

from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Despite opposition, the current governor was successful, and his new justice will join the court in March.

Q17. In the article you just read, what did the outgoing governor ACTION¹⁵?

1. Appoint a new justice to the state Supreme Court
2. Change the budget process
3. Change the shape of congressional districts
4. Pass a new law
5. None of the above

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN SUBJECTS TO CONDITIONS M OR N. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT AND ORTHOGONAL RANDOMIZATION FROM THE TWO ABOVE]

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION M:]

Q18. Do you approve of the outgoing governor's APPOINTMENT¹⁶ a new justice to the state's Supreme Court?

1. Strongly approve

¹⁵In conditions T.T, T.W, and T.Z, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is successful in appointing a new judge. So ACTION is a placeholder for the word "do." In conditions T.U, T.V, T.X, and T.Y, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is unsuccessful in appointing a new judge. So ACTION is a placeholder for the phrase "try to do."

¹⁶In conditions T.T, T.W, and T.Z, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is successful in appointing a new judge. So APPOINTMENT is a placeholder for the phrase "appointment of." In conditions T.U, T.V, T.X, and T.Y, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is unsuccessful in appointing a new judge. So APPOINTMENT is a placeholder for the phrase "effort to appoint."

2. Somewhat approve
3. Somewhat disapprove
4. Strongly disapprove

Q19. Is the governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION N:]

Q19. Is the governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

Q18. Do you approve of the outgoing governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice to the state's Supreme Court?

1. Strongly approve
2. Somewhat approve
3. Somewhat disapprove
4. Strongly disapprove

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION U, V, W, X, Y, OR Z:]

Q20. Earlier, we told you about a governor who tried to appoint a new justice to his state's supreme court. Do you remember if he was successful in that effort?

1. Yes, he successfully appointed the judge
2. No, the court blocked his appointment of the judge
3. No, he withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION W OR Z:]

- If Q20 = 1: Yes, that’s correct. The governor successfully appointed a new justice.
- If Q20 = 2 or 3: No, that’s incorrect. The governor successfully appoint a new justice.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION U OR X:]

- If Q20 = 1: No, that’s incorrect. The governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.
- If Q20 = 2: No, that’s incorrect. While the judge wasn’t seated on the court, it was because the governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.
- If Q20 = 3: Yes, that’s correct. The governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION V OR Y:]

- If Q20 = 1: No, that’s incorrect. The courts blocked the governor’s appointment of the judge.
- If Q20 = 2: Yes, that’s correct. The courts blocked the governor’s appointment of the judge.
- If Q20 = 3: No, that’s incorrect. While the judge wasn’t seated on the court, it was because the courts blocked the governor’s appointment.

Q21. Earlier, we asked you about the governor in a different state, who has proposed a special election (referendum) that would allow voters to decide whether he should have more power over the state budget. How likely do you think it is that the voters will approve the governor’s plan to give him control of the budget?

1. Extremely likely
2. Very likely
3. Not too likely
4. Not at all likely

Q22. Overall, how democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?

1. Completely democratically
2. Mostly democratically
3. Not too democratically
4. Not at all democratically

In this study, we asked you to read about a governor who tried to appoint a new justice to his state's Supreme Court. This is a combination of something that happened in North Carolina and in Vermont. In neither case did a new justice end up on the court. To find out more about these cases, visit: <http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/government/2017/01/03/vt-supreme-court-weighs-gov-shumlins-authority/95887910/> and <http://www.wsocvtv.com/news/local/republicans-could-retake-nc-supreme-court/466387424>.

B Descriptive and pilot hypotheses

This section previews (a) descriptive analysis we may conduct with the survey data, and (b) pilot studies included in the survey.

B.1 Construct validity

The first part of our analysis replicates and probes findings in the literature about attitudes toward democracy. We begin by estimating the correlation between responses to the World Values Survey (WVS) questions about democracy—such as the desirability of “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”—and reactions to our vignettes. Our interest is two-fold. First, we want to know whether questions about democracy in the abstract help us learn about how citizens might respond to concrete threats to democracy. Second, to the extent that the WVS questions are predictive of how people respond to concrete threats, we want to know whether some of these questions are more predictive than others (c.f. Inglehart, 2003).

We will estimate the correlation matrix presented in Table 2. To test the null that abstract questions about democracy have no predictive power about how citizens might respond to concrete threats, we will test the null that $\rho_{5,6} = \rho_{5,8} = 0$. To test whether some questions are more predictive of how people will respond to concrete threats, we will test the null that $\rho_{1,6} = \rho_{2,6} = \rho_{3,6} = \rho_{4,6}$ and $\rho_{1,8} = \rho_{2,8} = \rho_{3,8} = \rho_{4,8}$. Finally, we will test the null that $\rho_{5,7} = \rho_{5,9} = 0$ to see whether abstract questions about democracy relate to whether people see certain actions as consistent with democracy. Because we do not have a strong prior about which WVS questions will be most predictive of response to a concrete threat, we will apply a correction for multiple comparisons.

Second, we estimate how attitudes toward democracy—as expressed in responses to both the WVS questions and our vignettes—covary with respondent age, education, and gender. Foa and Mounk (2016) find a strong negative relationship between support for democracy and age: those who are younger are less supportive of democracy in the abstract. We’ll begin by plotting (a) the probability of stating that democracy is a “very good” or “fairly good” way of running the United States and (b) the probability of expressing disapproval of the governor’s bid to control the budget against (c) birth year. If the relationship is approximately linear (as it has appeared in previous papers), we will then estimate $y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Age}_i + \epsilon_i$ by OLS, testing the null

Table 2: Correlations between questions about views on democracy

1. Strong leader (Q9)									
2. Expert rule (Q10)	$\rho_{1,2}$								
3. Military rule (Q11)	$\rho_{1,3}$	$\rho_{2,3}$							
4. Democratic political system (Q12)	$\rho_{1,4}$	$\rho_{2,4}$	$\rho_{3,4}$						
5. Factor analysis of Q9-Q12	$\rho_{1,5}$	$\rho_{2,5}$	$\rho_{3,5}$	$\rho_{4,5}$					
6. Support budget plan (Q15)	$\rho_{1,6}$	$\rho_{2,6}$	$\rho_{3,6}$	$\rho_{4,6}$	$\rho_{5,6}$				
7. Budget plan democratic (Q16)	$\rho_{1,7}$	$\rho_{2,7}$	$\rho_{3,7}$	$\rho_{4,7}$	$\rho_{5,7}$	$\rho_{6,7}$			
8. Support court packing (Q18)	$\rho_{1,8}$	$\rho_{2,8}$	$\rho_{3,8}$	$\rho_{4,8}$	$\rho_{5,8}$	$\rho_{6,8}$	$\rho_{7,8}$		
9. Court packing democratic (Q19)	$\rho_{1,9}$	$\rho_{2,9}$	$\rho_{3,9}$	$\rho_{4,9}$	$\rho_{5,9}$	$\rho_{6,9}$	$\rho_{7,9}$	$\rho_{8,9}$	

Table 3: Individual-level Correlates of Support for Democracy

Dep. Variable	Q12	Q15	Q16	Q18	Q19
Age	■	■	■	■	■
Education	■	■	■	■	■
Male	■	■	■	■	■

$H_0 : \beta = 0$ against $H_1 : \beta \neq 0$.¹⁷ Given previous findings on the relationship between education and gender and support for democracy, we also include an indicator for male respondents and a measure of education in the equations below.¹⁸

B.2 Partisanship and support for anti-democratic behavior

We also are interested in learning about whether difference in support for anti-democratic reforms varies with the partisan affiliation of the respondent.¹⁹ While

¹⁷If the relationship appears nonlinear, we will choose and estimate an appropriate polynomial of age.

¹⁸We can either include education as a categorical variable or we can include an indicator for those at the top of the education scale (college-graduates).

¹⁹One way we can assess this is by comparing the magnitude of $|\beta_1|$ and $|\beta_1 + \beta_5|$ in Table ?? below. But even if we do observe a difference in magnitude, we cannot necessarily ascribe this to

we do not attempt to isolate causal effect of partisanship, we consider the partial correlation between partisanship and response to the budget reform, controlling for factors associated with both support for anti-democratic reforms and partisanship. Table 4 describes our proposed regressions.²⁰

If we were to observe partisan differences in support for anti-democratic reforms, we might conclude that they derive from the current state of American politics: because the Republican party controls the presidency, both branches of Congress, and a majority of governorships, Democrats may be unusually worried about incumbent politicians consolidating power. We therefore explore whether the partisan differences that we observe in the United States are also present when the vignette is situated in Canada. Doing so also allows us to incorporate Independent respondents into our study (omitted category in Table 5). Table 5 describes our proposed regressions, using *only the sub-sample assigned to Canada treatment group* (fifth version of the first vignette).

B.3 Priming democratic legitimacy

Results from an M-Turk pilot suggest that some people who *instrumentally support anti-democratic reforms* (e.g., because it advances partisan interests) also acknowledge that these reforms are inconsistent with democracy. We thus hypothesize that priming people to think about democratic legitimacy may weaken support for anti-democratic moves. To test this, we experimentally vary whether we ask respondents about their support for the governor’s behavior before or after we ask them whether they view the behavior as consistent with democracy. We expect that respondents’ support for the court-packing attempt of a co-partisan governor will weaken when they are first asked whether his behavior is consistent with democracy.

After restricting the sample to people who read about a co-partisan governor in the second vignette, we estimate how support for the governor’s behavior changes with the proposed regressions. Table 6 describes our proposed regressions. We will test the null hypothesis that $H_0 : \beta_8 = 0$ (our expectation is that it will be positive).

partisanship, as we are not experimentally manipulating respondents’ party identification.

²⁰For the second vignette, for the analysis in this table, we will restrict our sample to Democrats and Republicans who read about a co-partisan governor. (For the first vignette, all Democrats and Republicans read about a co-partisan governor.)

Table 4: Comparing Democratic and Republican support for anti-democratic reforms

Dep. Variable	1st vignette		2nd vignette					
	Q15	Q16	Q18	Q19				
Respondent Republican	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Reduce Gridlock	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Disempower Lobbyists	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Prevent Extreme Agenda	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Failed: Public Opinion	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Failed: Judicial Review	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Support Asked First	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
College Graduate	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Age	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Male	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
White	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Strong Partisan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Table 5: Comparing Democratic, Republican, and Independent support for anti-democratic reforms in Canada

Dep. Variable	1st vignette	
	Q15	Q16
Republican Respondent	■ ■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■ ■
Democratic Respondent	■ ■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■ ■
College Graduate		■ ■ ■ ■
Age		■ ■ ■ ■
Male		■ ■ ■ ■
White		■ ■ ■ ■
Strong Partisan		■ ■ ■ ■

B.4 Do courts or public pressure defeat the governor’s judicial appointment?

Finally, we note that in experiment 2, we offered two different rationales for why the court-packing plan failed: either the courts stopped it, or public pressure lead the governor to withdraw his proposal. We are under-powered to test for this sort of effect, and we think it may well be too subtle for respondents to draw differences between these scenarios. But we include it here as an exploratory test that might form the basis of future studies.

C Deviations from the Pre-Analysis Plan

We made a number of deviations from our pre-analysis plan, all of which were to do accomplish two goals. First, the project was over-budget, and several less essential items were cut. Second, the vendor could not deliver the survey as outlined above,

Table 6: Question ordering and support for court packing (Q18)

Exclude Attention Check Failures (Q17)	No	Yes
Support Asked First	■	■
Failed: Public Opinion	■	■
Failed: Judicial Review	■	■
Republican Respondent		■
College Graduate		■
Age		■
Male		■
White		■
Strong Partisan		■
Authoritarianism Index		■

so simplifications were needed. The changes made are as follows:

- We dropped Q16 from the original survey (whether the governor’s action in vignette 1 was consistent with democracy).
- We initially had intended to include a scale of the standard authoritarianism items (child rearing) to use as a covariate, but these items were dropped.
- We dropped the order randomization of Q18 and Q19 (the dependent variables for vignette 2). All subjects were first asked about approval and then asked whether the governor’s action. This means we cannot conduct the analysis discussed in section B3 of the PAP appendix.
- We had initially intended to include a condition in the first experiment where

subjects were shown the same situation, but set in Canada instead of another U.S. state. This was dropped. This means we cannot conduct the analysis discussed in section B2 of the PAP appendix.

- We changed the control condition for vignette 2 to make it more directly comparable with the other scenarios.

Part III

Additional Analyses

5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics Table (Full Sample)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
gender_pre==Female	0.527	0.499	0	1	3398
gender_pre==Male	0.473	0.499	0	1	3398
Year of birth	1969.844	16.545	1900	2000	3390
race==Caucasian	0.817	0.387	0	1	3396
race==African-American	0.056	0.229	0	1	3396
race==Hispanic	0.058	0.233	0	1	3396
race==Asian	0.028	0.164	0	1	3396
race==Other	0.042	0.2	0	1	3396
education==No high school degree	0.021	0.142	0	1	3393
education==High school degree	0.095	0.294	0	1	3393
education==Some college	0.224	0.417	0	1	3393
education==Associate's degree	0.112	0.315	0	1	3393
education==Bachelor's degree	0.308	0.462	0	1	3393
education==Post-graduate degree	0.24	0.427	0	1	3393
hh_income==\$0-\$9,999	0.064	0.244	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$10,000-\$24,999	0.088	0.283	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$25,000-\$49,999	0.186	0.389	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$50,000-\$74,999	0.154	0.361	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$75,000-\$99,999	0.124	0.33	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$100,000-\$124,999	0.093	0.29	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$125,000-\$149,999	0.049	0.216	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$150,000-\$174,999	0.04	0.196	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$175,000-\$199,999	0.021	0.144	0	1	3341
hh_income==\$200,000+	0.054	0.226	0	1	3341
hh_income==Prefer not to answer	0.126	0.332	0	1	3341
party7==Strong democrat	0.284	0.451	0	1	3407
party7==Not very strong democrat	0.144	0.351	0	1	3407
party7==Lean democrat	0.163	0.37	0	1	3407
party7==Pure independent	0	0	0	0	3407
party7==Lean republican	0.108	0.311	0	1	3407
party7==Not very strong republican	0.117	0.321	0	1	3407
party7==Strong republican	0.183	0.387	0	1	3407

Table 8: Balance

Variable	(1) Polarization		(2) Gridlock		(3) Special Interests		T-test Difference		
	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
gender_pre==Female	1546	0.535 (0.013)	1618	0.541 (0.012)	1598	0.534 (0.012)	-0.006	0.001	0.006
gender_pre==Male	1546	0.465 (0.013)	1618	0.459 (0.012)	1598	0.466 (0.012)	0.006	-0.001	-0.006
Year of birth	1547	1970.468 (0.424)	1610	1971.202 (0.410)	1596	1970.531 (0.413)	-0.734	-0.063	0.671
race==Caucasian	1547	0.793 (0.010)	1613	0.768 (0.011)	1604	0.785 (0.010)	0.025*	0.008	-0.017
race==African-American	1547	0.067 (0.006)	1613	0.063 (0.006)	1604	0.073 (0.006)	0.004	-0.006	-0.010
race==Hispanic	1547	0.063 (0.006)	1613	0.078 (0.007)	1604	0.062 (0.006)	-0.015*	0.001	0.016*
race==Asian	1547	0.027 (0.004)	1613	0.032 (0.004)	1604	0.022 (0.004)	-0.005	0.005	0.010*
race==Other	1547	0.050 (0.006)	1613	0.059 (0.006)	1604	0.058 (0.006)	-0.008	-0.008	0.001
education==No high school degree	1548	0.024 (0.004)	1610	0.029 (0.004)	1601	0.028 (0.004)	-0.005	-0.004	0.001
education==High school degree	1548	0.121 (0.008)	1610	0.117 (0.008)	1601	0.126 (0.008)	0.003	-0.005	-0.008
education==Some college	1548	0.231 (0.011)	1610	0.245 (0.011)	1601	0.225 (0.010)	-0.014	0.006	0.020
education==Associate's degree	1548	0.114 (0.008)	1610	0.107 (0.008)	1601	0.116 (0.008)	0.008	-0.002	-0.009
education==Bachelor's degree	1548	0.279 (0.011)	1610	0.294 (0.011)	1601	0.291 (0.011)	-0.015	-0.012	0.003
education==Post-graduate degree	1548	0.231 (0.011)	1610	0.207 (0.010)	1601	0.214 (0.010)	0.024	0.016	-0.007
hh_income==0-9,999	1298	0.073 (0.007)	1377	0.078 (0.007)	1350	0.076 (0.007)	-0.005	-0.002	0.003
hh_income==10,000-24,999	1298	0.097 (0.008)	1377	0.099 (0.008)	1350	0.089 (0.008)	-0.002	0.008	0.011
hh_income==25,000-49,999	1298	0.187 (0.011)	1377	0.193 (0.011)	1350	0.170 (0.010)	-0.006	0.017	0.023
hh_income==50,000-74,999	1298	0.146 (0.010)	1377	0.150 (0.010)	1350	0.169 (0.010)	-0.005	-0.023	-0.019
hh_income==75,000-99,999	1298	0.124 (0.009)	1377	0.124 (0.009)	1350	0.113 (0.009)	-0.000	0.011	0.012
hh_income==100,000-124,999	1298	0.084 (0.008)	1377	0.081 (0.007)	1350	0.093 (0.008)	0.003	-0.009	-0.013
hh_income==125,000-149,999	1298	0.043 (0.006)	1377	0.048 (0.006)	1350	0.049 (0.006)	-0.005	-0.006	-0.001
hh_income==150,000-174,999	1298	0.033 (0.005)	1377	0.036 (0.005)	1350	0.043 (0.006)	-0.003	-0.010	-0.007
hh_income==175,000-199,999	1298	0.020 (0.004)	1377	0.021 (0.004)	1350	0.020 (0.004)	-0.001	0.000	0.001
hh_income==200,000+	1298	0.061 (0.007)	1377	0.044 (0.006)	1350	0.044 (0.006)	0.017**	0.016*	-0.001
hh_income==Prefer not to answer	1298	0.132 (0.009)	1377	0.125 (0.009)	1350	0.134 (0.009)	0.007	-0.002	-0.009
party7==Strong democrat	1553	0.218 (0.010)	1620	0.234 (0.011)	1608	0.254 (0.011)	-0.016	-0.035**	-0.020
party7==Not very strong democrat	1553	0.124 (0.008)	1620	0.135 (0.008)	1608	0.115 (0.008)	-0.010	0.009	0.020*
party7==Lean democrat	1553	0.131 (0.009)	1620	0.125 (0.008)	1608	0.140 (0.009)	0.006	-0.009	-0.015
party7==Pure independent	1553	0.165 (0.009)	1620	0.162 (0.009)	1608	0.168 (0.009)	0.003	-0.003	-0.006
party7==Lean republican	1553	0.090 (0.007)	1620	0.084 (0.007)	1608	0.092 (0.007)	0.006	-0.003	-0.008
party7==Not very strong republican	1553	0.101 (0.008)	1620 ¹⁴	0.103 (0.008)	1608	0.092 (0.007)	-0.002	0.009	0.011
party7==Strong republican	1553	0.171 (0.010)	1620	0.157 (0.009)	1608	0.139 (0.009)	0.013	0.031**	0.018

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

5.2 Construct Validity & Correlates of Support for Democracy

As discussed in Appendix B1 of the PAP, we included the four World Values Survey items used to measure support for democracy in our study, so we can produce a correlation matrix of these items, which we present in Table 9:

Table 9: Correlations between questions about views on democracy. The blank entries for Q16 indicate that it was not included in our survey.

1. Strong leader (Q9)									
2. Expert rule (Q10)	0.35								
3. Military rule (Q11)	0.55	0.33							
4. Democratic political system (Q12; Reverse Coded)	0.16	0.01	0.16						
5. Average of Q9-Q12	0.78	0.66	0.75	0.47					
6. Support budget plan (Q15)	0.43	0.25	0.38	0.10	0.44				
7. Budget plan democratic (Q16)	■	■	■	■	■	■			
8. Support court packing (Q18)	0.13	0.06	0.12	-0.02	0.11	0.16	■		
9. Court packing democratic (Q19)	0.12	0.05	0.11	-0.03	0.09	0.12	■	0.72	

It turns out that abstract views of democracy are, at best, weakly correlated with responses to specific examples of anti-democratic behavior. The only real exception to this pattern is that there is a modestly high correlation between belief that a country should have a strong leader and responses to experiment 1 ($\rho = 0.43$), which is unsurprising because experiment 1 is describing exactly that phenomenon (there is also a reasonably high correlation between experiment 1 and support for a military ruler, $\rho = 0.38$). The World Value Survey items do not seem to even correlate all that highly with one another (again, except for stronger leaders and military ruler, which respondents may interpret as being effectively the same thing). This suggests that our strategy of using specific examples of anti-democratic behavior is a more effective gauge of the public’s support for democratic institutions.

We can also consider the individual-level correlates of democracy. In particular, given the findings in Foa and Mounk (2016), we are particularly interested in whether younger voters have lower support for democracy. Table 10 gives the results:

Here, we see that there is a very weak relationship with age, with the coefficient on age (measured in years) is effectively 0. If we binned age, we would find a weak relationship, but it is that, *contra* Foa and Mounk (2016), older voters are somewhat more skeptical of democracy (though the relationship is quite modest). But overall, the key result is that all of these correlations are quite modest. These individual-level characteristics are, at best, weakly correlated with democracy.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Q12	Q12	Q15	Q15	Q18	Q18	Q19	Q19
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education		-0.12*** (0.01)		-0.13*** (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
Male		-0.05** (0.02)		0.04 (0.03)		0.09*** (0.03)		0.16*** (0.03)
Constant	0.36 (1.30)	1.29 (1.28)	3.38** (1.44)	4.15*** (1.41)	2.26 (1.75)	2.45 (1.75)	3.05* (1.69)	2.88* (1.69)
Observations	4,830	4,795	4,329	4,297	4,051	4,023	4,037	4,009
R-squared	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Individual-level correlates of support for democracy. Note that in these analyses Q12 (WVS Support for Democracy) is reverse-coded to aid in interpretation.

5.3 Effects Conditioned by Partisanship

Readers might wonder—given the current political climate—if there are partisan differences to our scenario. While we investigate co-partisan effects in the body of the paper, we pool Democrats and Republicans together.

The results in Table 11 show no heterogeneous treatment effects. While we show intercept differences in experiment 1 (across conditions, Republicans are somewhat more supportive of the governor’s actions), but there is no pattern of significantly different slopes (i.e., the treatment effects do not differ by party).

5.4 Did The Type of Resistance to the Governor Matter?

In section B4 of the PAP, we discussed conducting an exploratory analysis of the whether the type of resistance to the governor’s plan (voter protest versus court action) would change updating vis-a-vis experiment 1. We call this an exploratory analysis for two reasons: first, we are under-powered to detect such an effect, and

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Q15	Q15	Q18	Q18	Q19	Q19
Republican	0.17*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)
Other-Party Extremism	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)				
Gridlock	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)				
Rep×Other-Party Extremism		-0.06 (0.07)				
Rep×Gridlock		-0.00 (0.07)				
Co-partisan			0.65*** (0.03)	0.61*** (0.04)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.04)
Blocked, Voter Protest			-0.82*** (0.05)	-0.83*** (0.05)	-0.62*** (0.05)	-0.62*** (0.05)
Blocked, Court Action			-1.01*** (0.05)	-1.02*** (0.05)	-0.84*** (0.05)	-0.84*** (0.05)
Succeeded			-0.71*** (0.04)	-0.71*** (0.04)	-0.49*** (0.04)	-0.49*** (0.04)
Republican × Co-partisan				0.10 (0.06)		0.11 (0.07)
Constant	1.86*** (0.02)	1.85*** (0.03)	2.46*** (0.04)	2.48*** (0.04)	2.57*** (0.04)	2.59*** (0.04)
Observations	4,349	4,349	3,429	3,429	3,414	3,414
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.24	0.24	0.14	0.14

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: Investigating for heterogeneous treatment effects by party, experiments 1 and 2.

second, we lack a clear theoretical rationale for why voters would react differently in these scenarios. Table 12 gives the effects.

There seems to be no difference in effects on updating: seeing the governor's plan in experiment 2 fail for any reason makes subjects think the governor in experiment

	Will Governor’s Plan Pass		How Democratic is US	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Blocked, Voter Protest	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.079* (0.032)	0.024 (0.037)	0.013 (0.039)
Blocked, Court Action	-0.064+ (0.033)	-0.064+ (0.033)	-0.050 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.039)
Succeeded	0.058* (0.027)	0.050+ (0.027)	0.027 (0.031)	0.013 (0.033)
No pushback	2.044*** (0.019)	1.997*** (0.020)	2.249*** (0.021)	2.243*** (0.023)
Observations	3991	3410	3991	3410
R^2	0.004	0.006	0.001	0.001
Pass Attention Check?	N	Y	N	Y
Sig. Diff. btwn Blocked Conditions?	N	N	N	N

Standard errors in parentheses

$\dagger < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 12: Does the reason why the governor’s plan failed matter? The row labeled “Sig. Diff btwn Blocked Conditions?” states whether or not the effects of the two different reasons the governor’s plan failed (voter protests versus court action) affect the outcome variable at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level. The row “Pass Attention Check?” indicates whether or not we include only subjects who passed the attention check.

1 will be less likely to get his way. That said, there is a borderline significant effect ($p = 0.09$) for all subjects on the assessment of how democratically the U.S. is being governed. Here, seeing the voter protest block the governor’s appointment makes subjects think the U.S. is being governed more democratically, seeing the governor’s plan blocked by the courts makes them think it is being governed *less* democratically. This is fascinating, and seems to reflect a belief that the courts are a less democratic way of governing (possibly since they are unelected). We note, however, that the difference falls short of statistical significance for the more attentive subjects, so this is an interesting possibility worthy of future study rather than a definitive result.

5.5 Experiment 2 result using a binary scale

To ensure that our experimental results are not driven by differences in scale across the two outcomes of interest, we bin both outcomes. Results reported in table 13 conform that our finding is robust to using outcomes on the same scale.

Table 13: Robustness of experiment 2: binary dependent variables

	Difference		Support Act		Consistent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Own-party governor	0.079*** (0.014)	0.094*** (0.014)	0.266*** (0.016)	0.292*** (0.017)	0.186*** (0.017)	0.198*** (0.018)
Constant (Out-party mean)	-0.063*** (0.010)	-0.065*** (0.010)	0.293*** (0.011)	0.271*** (0.012)	0.355*** (0.012)	0.336*** (0.012)
Observations	3407	2957	3407	2957	3407	2957
R^2	0.009	0.014	0.072	0.087	0.035	0.040

Standard errors in parentheses. ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Part IV

A Typology of Voters

In the body of the paper, we introduced a typology of voters. While we cannot estimate whether a given voter is of a particular type, we can use our data to estimate the fraction of each type in our sample. To see how, consider the following formalization. Let T_i be a treatment that is equals one if respondent i receives a vignette in which the governor is a co-partisan and zero if respondent i receives a vignette in which the governor is from the other party. Define potential outcome $S_i(T_i)$ as respondent i 's support of the governor's plan when receiving treatment T_i . Define potential outcome $C_i(T_i)$ as respondent i 's beliefs about whether the governor's plan is consistent with democracy. Assume that $S_i(0) \leq S_i(1)$ and $C_i(0) \leq C_i(1)$ (e.g. people cannot support a policy more, or think a policy is more democratic, when the policy is being proposed by a governor from the other party than a governor from their party). This restriction leads to existence of nine possible types:

1. $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$ (i.e., "Rationalizers"),
2. $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 0$ (i.e., "Militants"),
3. $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 0, C_i(1) = 1$ (i.e., "Enablers"),
4. $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 0, C_i(1) = 0$ (i.e., "Liberal Democrats"),
5. $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 1, S_i(1) = 0, C_i(1) = 1$ (i.e., "Anti-Majoritarian"),

6. $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 1, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$ (i.e., “Partisans”)
7. $S_i(0) = 1, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 0$ (i.e., “Autocrats”)
8. $S_i(0) = 1, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$ (i.e., “Advertisers”)
9. $S_i(0) = 1, C_i(0) = 1, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$ (i.e., “Majoritarians”)

The data from our experiment can be summarized as follows:

	Other Party		Own Party	
	<i>Democracy</i>		<i>Democracy</i>	
<i>Support</i>	<i>Inconsistent</i>	<i>Consistent</i>	<i>Inconsistent</i>	<i>Consistent</i>
<i>No</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>
<i>Yes</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>

Each letter in this table represents the share of the respondents receiving that treatment that gives that a given combination of response. Consequentially, $a+b+c+d = 1$ and $e+f+g+h = 1$. We would like to use these data to estimate s_1, s_2, \dots, s_9 , where s_j is the share of the population who has the j th type (meaning that $\sum_{i=1}^9 s_i = 1$). Based on our setup we know that:

1. $E[a] = s_1 + s_2 + s_3 + s_4$,
2. $E[b] = s_5 + s_6$,
3. $E[c] = s_7 + s_8$,
4. $E[d] = s_9$,
5. $E[e] = s_4$,
6. $E[f] = s_3 + s_5$,
7. $E[g] = s_2 + s_7$,
8. $E[h] = s_1 + s_6 + s_8 + s_9$.

From this formulation, it immediately follows that $\hat{s}_9 = d$ and $\hat{s}_4 = e$, and so we can rewrite this problem as:

1. $E[a'] = E[a - d] = s_1 + s_2 + s_3$,
2. $E[b] = s_5 + s_6$,
3. $E[c] = s_7 + s_8$,

4. $E[f] = s_3 + s_5,$
5. $E[g] = s_2 + s_7,$
6. $E[h'] = E[h - d] = s_1 + s_6 + s_8.$

What remains are six data points to solve for seven unknowns, so restrictions are needed to be able to solve this system of equations. To solve this, we further assume that $C_i(1) - C_i(0) \leq S_i(1) - S_i(0)$ (i.e., partisanship only affect consistency if it also affects support). An implication is that $s_3 = s_8 = 0$. This assumption allows us to rewrite the problem as:

1. $E[a] = s_1 + s_2 + s_4,$
2. $E[b] = s_5 + s_6,$
3. $E[c] = s_7,$
4. $E[d] = s_9,$
5. $E[e] = s_4,$
6. $E[f] = s_5,$
7. $E[g] = s_2 + s_7,$
8. $E[h] = s_1 + s_6 + s_9.$

Our system is now overdetermined because it has eight equations and seven unknowns. One way to solve is with maximum likelihood. We can define a likelihood function as follows:

$$L(s_1, s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7, s_9 \mid T_i, S_i, C_i, s_1 + s_2 + s_4 + s_5 + s_6 + s_7 + s_9 = 1) = \prod_{i=1}^n [(s_1 + s_2 + s_4)^{(1-S_i)(1-C_i)} (s_5 + s_6)^{(1-S_i)C_i} s_7^{S_i(1-C_i)} s_9^{S_i C_i}]^{(1-T_i)} [s_4^{(1-S_i)(1-C_i)} s_5^{(1-S_i)C_i} (s_2 + s_7)^{S_i(1-C_i)} (s_1 + s_6 + s_9)^{S_i C_i}]^{T_i}.$$

The results in the body of the paper come from maximizing this likelihood in our data.

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