

# Political Economy of Development (PSCI-615-301)

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Class Hours: Mondays 9-12

Office Hours: Wednesdays 4-5:15 & by appt.

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Class Room: PCPE 203

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# 1 Expectations

## 1.1 Overview

This graduate seminar provides an introduction to contemporary research on the political economy of developing countries. It focuses (much) less on seminal works, history of ideas about development (broadly defined), and on tracking how some literature evolved overtime. Instead, the seminar is explicitly focused on the current state of the literature of some of the core topics of those studying politics and economics in the developing world. The general idea is to assess where the literature currently stands on topics of interests to international development scholars (e.g., political accountability, clientelism, state capacity), while at the same time identifying gaps in the literature and directions for future work. Please note that the course (deliberately) does not cover all core topics of PE of Dev: specifically, I will hardly be covering topics that are thoroughly taught by other faculty members, such as gender (professor Teele), identity politics (professor O'Leary), conflict (professor Sambanis), democratization (professor Falleti) and welfare (professor Lynch).

The course has three main goals. First, the substantive goal is to familiarize students with foundational theoretical arguments and frontier empirical evidence pertaining to central questions in political economy of development relating (to the most part) to elite-level behavior. Second, the methodological goal is to expose students to a variety of methodological approaches that are used in cutting-edge research and thereby both encourage and empower them to implement research designs that can effectively address the substantive questions driving their research. Finally, the seminar has a professionalization goal: to expose students to the academic processes of writing reviews, replicating other studies, presenting their research, and writing research designs and papers.

## 1.2 Requirement

### 1. Attendance and class discussion (10%):

- You are expected to attend all sessions. Though I naturally understand that students may miss 1-2 classes due to traveling, illness, etc., I will not pass a student who misses 4 sessions, or more.
- The Syllabus lists required reading that we will go over in class (numbered), and suggested readings (bullet points below the line) . You will be expected to have completed all the required readings before class to the point where you can be called on to critique or defend any reading.

- ### 2. Short reports (6X5%):
- Each student will be required to write six short reports (3-4 pages long) over the course of the term. These papers should engage the debates presented in at least one (but preferably more than one) of the readings for the week. The papers should be thought pieces and will be used to help structure class discussions. All reports must be emailed to me by Sunday at 4p, the day before our class meetings. Reports should summarize in an opening paragraph the core arguments and findings of the discussed papers and then critique key aspects of the theoretical argument and/or empirical results. Ideally, a good response note should also identify possible extensions for future work and

how the discussed papers complement each other. Reports are important part of your professionalization, as they mimic journal reviews.

3. **Replication and presentation (2X10%):** Students will work on replication assignments in teams of three students. Replications teams (RTs) will be assigned in week 2; same group throughout the semester. RTs are expected to engage in a replication and extension exercise of two different papers (in two different weeks) during the semester. This exercise involves replicating the results as reported in the most updated version of the manuscript, checking results for robustness, and extending analysis where appropriate. Extension can include, for example, examining subsets of the data (heterogeneous effects), extending time series, using different measures of key variables, adding and dropping control variables, using a different estimation strategy, and so on. RTs are responsible for sharing with all students, by the Sunday before class (8p), a zip file containing a replication report (that naturally includes all tables and figures), a dataset and a replication code, in Stata or R, written so that other students can run analysis without further editing. RT group members will be expected to prepare a 20 minutes presentation and to be able to engage in real time analysis in response to class discussion. This exercise requires preparing early, especially to make sure one has the dataset in hand. More so, while most analyses will be fairly simple, it can sometimes take a while to “get to know” a dataset to the point that you can run a replication analyses efficiently and effectively. Finally, I strongly recommend using R Markdown for writing the replication report.
  - Xie, Y., Allaire, J. j., & Grolemond, G. (2018). R Markdown: The Definitive Guide. Retrieved from <https://bookdown.org/yihui/rmarkdown/> [FREE]
  - See also, “R Markdown Reference Guide” [LINK]
  - This resource can also come in handy <https://ozanj.github.io/rclass/resources/>
4. **Presentation (1X10%):** Each student will be expected to present one of the assigned papers in class. These presentations are also part of your professionalization and thus will be structured similarly to conference presentations. Students should prepare for a 15 minutes talk in which they will discuss the research question(s), theoretical argument, core results, and main contribution(s). Individual presentation cannot be on papers that are replicated as part of a group replication exercise.
5. **Research paper or grant proposal (30%):** You are expected to write an original research paper (15-30 pages long) probing in depth one of a theme relevant to the course’s themes. Research papers are due on May 1st. Research papers will contain (i) a very clear and concise research question engaging with one of the key themes of the course; (ii) a theoretical argument; (ii) an empirical test of that argument; and (iii) a brief discussion of the policy or theoretical prescriptions resulting from the findings. The empirical part does not have to be “quantitative” (though this is encouraged) but it does have to constitute a genuine test of your argument (repeat after me: qualitative work is empirical evidence). Undergraduate students can suggest an alternative term paper assignment.

### 1.3 Etiquette

You are not alone in the class, so please be considerate of your fellow students: arrive on time, take notes of what has been discussed, and do not leave early unless absolutely necessary. Turn off cell phones during lectures.

### 1.4 Accommodation for religiously observing students and for students with disabilities

The University of Pennsylvania encourages the full participation of students with disabilities. Students with disabilities are invited to meet with me to discuss special accommodations that may be needed for successful participation in this course. Specifically, the University accommodates students with disabilities who have registered with the [Office of Student Disabilities Service](#). Students must register with the Student Disabilities Services (SDS) to be granted special accommodations for any on-going conditions. For more information on the services that you are entitled to, please refer to the following [guide](#). As for religious accommodation, the University accommodates students whose religious obligations conflict with attendance, submitting assignments, or completing scheduled tests and examinations. However, you must notify me in the first week of class if you will require any accommodation on these grounds. For more information, please refer to the Penn's Policy on Religious Holidays.

### 1.5 Policy on Academic Misconduct

Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. As outlined in the Student Handbook, "cheating" and "plagiarism" will result in severe disciplinary action on the part of the instructor. Either offense will be grounds for receiving a failing grade (zero points) on the assignment and possibly an "F" for the course, depending on the severity of the offense.

### 1.6 Policy on Children in Class (adopted from Dr. Melissa Cheyney's Syllabus)

Currently, the university does not have a formal policy on children in the classroom. The policy described here is thus, a reflection of my own beliefs and commitments to students who happen to also be parents.

1. All exclusively breastfeeding babies are welcome in class as often as is necessary to support the breastfeeding relationship. Because not all women can pump sufficient milk, and not all babies will take a bottle reliably, I never want students to feel like they have to choose between feeding their baby and continuing their education. You and your nursing baby are welcome in class anytime.
2. For older children and babies, I understand that minor illnesses and unforeseen disruptions in childcare often put parents in the position of having to choose between missing class to stay home with a child and leaving him or her with someone you or the child does not feel comfortable with. While this is not meant to be a long-term childcare solution, occasionally bringing a child to class in order to cover gaps in care is perfectly acceptable.
3. I ask that all students work with me to create a welcoming environment that is respectful of all forms of diversity, including diversity in parenting status.

4. In all cases where babies and children come to class, I ask that you sit close to the door so that if your little one needs special attention and is disrupting learning for other students, you may step outside until their need has been met. Non-parents in the class, please reserve seats near the door for your parenting classmates.
5. Finally, I understand that often the largest barrier to completing your coursework once you become a parent is the tiredness many parents feel in the evening once children have finally gone to sleep. The struggles of balancing school and childcare are exhausting! I hope that you will feel comfortable disclosing your student-parent status to me. This is the first step in my being able to accommodate any special needs that arise. While I maintain the same high expectations for all student in my classes regardless of parenting status, I am happy to problem solve with you in a way that makes you feel supported as you strive for school-parenting balance.

### 1.7 To do now

- Please fill-in this short survey ([link](#)).
- Get a Twitter account and start following academics, NGOs, donors, etc. operating in the international development space.
- Start following world events. Reading the “Economist,” for example, is a start start. Penn students have a free access to the Economist: <https://faq.library.upenn.edu/business/faq/45306>
- Sign up to professional mailing list of APSA, EPSA, and PolMeth.

## 2 Topics

### 2.1 Defining and Measuring Development (1/16)

1. Todaro, Michael P. and Stephen C. Smith "Economic Development (12th edition)," chapters 1-2, and 5.
  2. Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018 ([link](#))
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- Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2011. "Rethinking Development Economics." *The World Bank Research Observer* 26(2): 230-236.
- Deaton, Angus. 2013. The Great Escape: health, wealth and the origins of inequality.
- Collier, Paul. 2008. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done about it.

### 2.2 Institutional Legacies (1/28)

1. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson & James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.
  2. Banerjee, Abhijit & Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review* 95(4): 1190-1213
  3. Michalopoulos, Stelios & Elias Papaioannou. 2013. "Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development." *Econometrica* 81(1): 113-152.
  4. Dell, Melissa. 2010. "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita." *Econometrica* 78(6): 1863-1903.
  5. Hibbs, Douglas A. & Ola Olsson. 2004. "Geography, biogeography, and why some countries are rich and others are poor." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 101(10): 3715-3720.
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#### **Institutions: what do we mean?**

- North, Douglass C. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(1): 97-112.

#### **Pre-colonial institutions**

- Michalopoulos, Stelios & Elias Papaioannou. 2014. "National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(1): 151-213.

- Nunn, Nathan. 2008. "The Long-term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 (1): 139-176.
- Hariri, Jacob Gerner. 2012. "The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 471-494.
- Koran, Timur. 2003. "The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East." *Journal of Economic History* 63(2): 414-446

### **Colonial origin of "good" and "bad" institutions**

- Iyer, Lakshmi 2010. "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693-713.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, & James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1231-1294.
- Lee, Alexander & Jack Pine. 2017. "Did British Colonialism Promote Democracy? Divergent Inheritances and Diminishing Legacies"
- Lee, Alexander & Kenneth Schultz. 2012. "Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7: 1-46.
- Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff . 1997. "Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies." In Stephen H. Haber, editor, *How Latin America Fell Behind*.

### **Colonial-era investments**

- Huillery, Elise. 2009. "History matters: The long-term impact of colonial public investments in French West Africa." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1(2): 176-215.

### **Colonial legal system**

- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny. 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance." *The Journal of Finance* 52(3): 1131-1150.
- Berkowitz, Daniel, Katharina Pistor, & Jean-Francois Richard 2003. "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect." *European Economic Review* 47(1): 165-195.

### 2.3 State Structure (2/4)

1. Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16(4):185-205.
2. Kosec, Katrina & Tewodaj Mogues. 2018. "Decentralization Without Democracy."
3. Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra & Peter Van der Windt. 2018. "Exporting Democratic Practices: Evidence from a Village Governance Intervention in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Development Economics*
4. Gottlieb, Jessica, Guy Grossman, Horacio A. Larreguy, & Benjamin Marx. 2018. "A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice: Evidence From Senegal." *Journal of Politics*.
5. Bazzi, Samuel & Matthew Gudgeon. 2018. "The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions." *National Bureau of Economic Research*, No. w24625.

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#### Decentralization & Federalism

- Oates, Wallace E. 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism." *Journal of Economic Literature* 37(3): 1120-1149.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2007. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*, Cambridge University Press.
- Myerson, Roger. 2006. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1: 3-23.
- Xu, Chenggang. 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development." *Journal of Economic Literature* 49(4): 1076-1151.
- Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2014. "Decentralization and Governance." *World Development* 53: 2-13.

#### "Radical" Decentralization

- Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster & Edward Miguel. 2012. "Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127(4): 1755-1812.

#### Government fragmentation

- Grossman, Guy & Janet I. Lewis. 2014. "Administrative Unit Proliferation." *American Political Science Review* 108(1):196-217.
- Grossman, Guy, Jan H. Pierskalla & Emma B. Dean. 2017. "Government Fragmentation and Public Goods Provision." *Journal of Politics* 79(3): 823-840.
- Blom-Hansen, Jens, Kurt Houlberg, Søren Serritzlew & Daniel Treisman. 2016. "Jurisdiction size and local government policy expenditure: Assessing the effect of municipal amalgamation." *American Political Science Review* 110(4): 812-831.



## 2.4 State Capacity (2/11)

1. de la Sierra, Raul. 2018. "On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Political Economy*.
2. Queralt, Didac. 2018. "The Legacy of War on Fiscal capacity."
3. Dincecco, Mark, James E. Fenske, & Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato. 2018. "Is Africa Different? Historical Conflict and State Development."
4. Beramendi, Pablo, Mark Dincecco, & Melissa Rogers. 2018. "Intra-elite competition and long-run fiscal development." *Journal of Politics*.
5. Fergusson, Leopoldo, Horacio Larreguy, & Juan Felipe Riaño. 2018. "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico."

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### Capacity as input variable

- Johnson, Noel D. & Mark Koyama. 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints." *Explorations in Economic History* 64: 1-20.
- Lu, Yi, Mona Luan, & Tuan-Hwee Sng. 2016. "The Effect of State Capacity Under Different Economic Systems."

### Colonial investment in state capacity

- Mattingly, Daniel C. 2017. "Colonial Legacies and State Institutions in China: Evidence From a Natural Experiment." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(4): 434-463.
- Lee, Alexander. 2018. "Land, State Capacity, and Colonialism: Evidence From India." *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane & Pablo Querubin. 2018. "The Historical State, Local Collective Action and Economic Development in Vietnam." *Econometrica*.

### Responding to internal conflicts

- North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast. 2013. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. CUP

### War, taxation and capacity nexus

- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.
- Besley, Timothy & Torsten Persson 2009. "The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics." *American Economic Review* 99(4): 1218-44.

### Review (short book)

- Dincecco, Mark. 2017. *State Capacity and Economic Development: Present and Past*. Cambridge University Press.

## 2.5 Effective Bureaucracies (2/18)

1. Raffler, Pia. 2018. "Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from an Electoral Autocracy."
2. Gulzar, Saad & Pasquale, Benjamin J. 2017. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 162-183.
3. Bhavnani, Rikhil R. & Alexander Lee. 2017. "Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India." *The Journal of Politics* 80(1): 71-87.
4. Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja & Benjamin A. Olken. 2019. "Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings." *American Economic Review* 109(1): 237-270.
5. Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera & Scott S. Lee. 2018. "Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services."

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### Autonomy

- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press.
- Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rasul, Imran & Daniel Rogger. 2017. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service." *The Economic Journal* 128(608): 413-446.

### Delegation

- Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, Nicholas Y. Li, & Laura Schechter. 2018. "Government Decentralization Under Changing State Capacity: Experimental Evidence From Paraguay."

### Incentives

- Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, & Martín A. Rossi. 2013. "Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(3): 1169-1218.
- Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja, & Benjamin A. Olken. 2015. "Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131(1): 219-271.
- Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, & B. Kelsey Jack 2014. "No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery." *Journal of Public Economics* 120: 1-17.

### Review

- Pepinsky, Thomas B., Jan H. Pierskalla, & Audrey Sacks. 2017. "Bureaucracy and Service Delivery." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 249-268.

## 2.6 Political Selection: Who runs for office and why? (2/25)

1. Besley, Timothy. 2005. "Political Selection." *Journal of Economic perspectives* 19(3): 43-60.
2. Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan & Carlos Varjão. 2018. "Money and politics: The effects of campaign spending limits on political competition and incumbency advantage."
3. Bhalotra, Sonia, Irma Clots-Figueras & Lakshmi Iyer. 2018. "Pathbreakers? Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Participation." *The Economic Journal* 128(613): 1844-1878.
4. Clayton, Amanda & Belinda Tang. 2018. "How women's incumbency affects future elections: Evidence from a policy experiment in Lesotho." *World Development* 110: 385-393.
5. Gulzar, Saad, & Muhammad Yasir Khan. 2018. "Motivating Political Candidacy and Performance: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan."

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### Seminal models of political selection

- Besley, Timothy. 2006. *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford University Press.
- Caselli, Francesco & Massimo Morelli. 2004. "Bad Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 88(3-4): 759-782.

### Political selection in small groups

- Grossman, Guy & W. Walker Hanlon. 2014. "Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3): 669-686

### Remuneration

- Gagliarducci, Stefano & Tommaso Nannicini. 2013. "Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(2): 369-398.
- Messner, Matthias & Matthias K. Polborn "Paying Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 88(12): 2423-2445.

### Quotas

- Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. "Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India." *American Political Science Review* 103(1): 23-35.

### Party decides

- Galasso, Vincenzo & Tommaso Nannicini. 2011. "Competing on Good Politicians." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 79-99.
- Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph & Mingxing Liu. 2012. "Getting ahead in the communist party: explaining the advancement of central committee members in China." *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 166-187.

**2.7 TBD (3/11)****2.8 Who wins elections and why? (3/18)**

1. Lucardi, Adrián. 2017. "The Effect of District Magnitude on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments in Argentina." *British Journal of Political Science*.
2. Klalnja, Marko & Rocio Titiunik. 2017. "The incumbency curse: Weak parties, term limits, and unfulfilled accountability." *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 129-148.
3. Labonne, Julien, Sahar Parsa & Pablo Querubin. 2017. "Political dynasties, term limits and female political empowerment: evidence from the Philippines."
4. Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne & Pablo Querubin. 2017. "Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines." *American Economic Review* 107(10): 3006-37.
5. Larreguy, Horacio A., John Marshall, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2018. "Leveling the playing field: How campaign advertising can help non-dominant parties." *Journal of the European Economic Association*. 16 (6): 1812-1849.

**Incumbency advantage**

- Klalnja, Marko. 2015. "Corruption and the Incumbency Disadvantage: Theory and Evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 77(4): 928-942.
- De Magalhaes, Leandro. 2015. "Incumbency effects in a comparative perspective: evidence from Brazilian mayoral elections." *Political Analysis* 23(1): 113-126.
- Opalo, K. Ochieng'. 2017. Legislative Independence and Incumbent Electoral Advantage: Evidence from Parliamentary Elections in Kenya.
- Eggers, Andrew C. 2017. "Quality-based explanations of incumbency effects." *The Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1315-1328.

**Media control**

- Boas, Taylor C. & F. Daniel Hidalgo. 2011. "Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(4): 869-885.

**Political Advertising**

- Da Silveira, Bernardo S. & Joao MP De Mello. 2011. "Campaign advertising and election outcomes: Quasi-natural experiment evidence from gubernatorial elections in Brazil." *The Review of Economic Studies* 78(2): 590-612.
- Spenkuch, Jörg L. & David Toniatti. 2016. "Political Advertising and Election Outcomes."

**Power sharing**

- Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer & Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "How is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica* 83(2): 465-503.

## 2.9 Distributive Politics and Substantive Representation (3/25)

1. Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. "Voting technology, political responsiveness, and infant health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica* 83(2): 423-464.
2. Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria & Gerard Padró i Miquel. 2015. "The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya." *American Economic Review* 105(6): 1817-51.
3. Harris, J. Andrew, and Daniel N. Posner. 2018. "(Under what conditions) Do politicians reward their supporters? Evidence from Kenya's Constituency Development Fund." *American Political Science Review*.
4. Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Carlos Velasco Rivera. 2018. "Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large Scale Experiments." *Journal of Politics*.
5. Bhalotra, Sonia & Irma Clots-Figueras (2014). "Health and the political agency of women." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6(2): 164-97.

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### Macro: democracy and redistribution toward the poor

- Kudamatsu, Masayuki. 2012. "Has democratization reduced infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from micro data." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10(6): 1294-1317.
- Ross, Michael. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 860-874.

### The Core vs. Swing Voter Debate

- Lindbeck, Assar & Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition." *Public choice* 52(3): 273-297.
- Dixit, Avinash & John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58(4): 1132-1155.

### Political Business Cycles

- Brender, Adi & Allan Drazen. 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(7): 1271-1295.
- Shi, Min & Jakob Svensson. 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?" *Journal of Public Economics* 90(8-9): 1367-1389.

### Ethnic favoritism

- Franck, Raphael & Ilia Rainer. 2012. "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa." *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 294-325.

- Kramon, Eric & Daniel N. Posner. 2013. "Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcome One Studies Affects the Answer One Gets." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2): 461-474.

### **Political Returns of Allocations**

- Pop-Eleches, Cristian & Grigore Pop-Eleches 2012. "Targeted Government Spending and Political Preferences." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7(3): 285-320.
- Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel & Andrea Vigorito. 2011. "Government Transfers and Political Support." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3(3): 1-28.
- De La O, Ana L. 2013. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 1-14.
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