

**Supplemental Appendix for: “No Need to Watch:
How the Effects of Partisan Media Can Spread via Inter-Personal Discussions”**

This Version: October 2016

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Pre-Test Results

We conducted a pre-test with individuals who did not participate in the main experiment. We randomly assigned participants to watch the MSNBC segment or the Fox segment. We asked these individuals to then rate the respective segments' arguments both in terms of effectiveness (on a 1 to 7 scale with 7 indicating "definitely effective") and direction (on a 1 to 7 scale from "definitely opposed" to "definitely supportive" of domestic production of oil). Note that in asking for effectiveness ratings, we requested that respondents view the arguments in an evenhanded way and put the source of the segment aside. We also told them they would have to justify their opinions. We took these steps to ensure a more authentic rating of argument quality, not driven by the source (for discussion, see Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014).¹

We find that respondents viewed the two segments as quite distinct in terms of direction with the Fox segment (average of 5.87; std. dev. = .85; N = 47) being much more supportive of drilling compared to MSNBC (3.02 1.21; 44) ($t_{89} = 13.07$; $p < .01$ for a two-tailed test). In contrast, despite directional differences, respondents reported both the Fox and MSNBC segments as effective (or strong) arguments with respective average scores of 4.98 (1.53; 47) and 5.07 (1.56; 44) ($t_{89} = .28$; $p < .80$ for a two-tailed test).²

We additionally asked pre-test participants to rate the extent to which they trusted various media outlets and how much knowledge they believed each outlet had (both measures on 7-point scales with higher scores reflecting more trust and knowledge). We find substantial partisan effects

¹ We excluded pure Independents from these analyses.

² That said, we note that when broken down by party, the Fox video was marginally significantly less effective among Democrats. This is sensible since, as we suggested in our theoretical discussion, that arguments that cohere with individuals' values will be seen as stronger.

such that Democrats scored Fox's trust at 2.50 (1.18; 54) and knowledge at 2.22 (1.06; 54), while the respective scores for Republicans were 5.19 (1.59; 27) and 3.89 (.93; 27) (all partisan differences are significant at the .01 level). For MSNBC, Democrats rated trust and knowledge at 5.82 (1.03, 54) and 5.41 (1.13; 54) while the respective Republican ratings were 2.44 (1.16; 27) and 2.52 (1.28; 27) (again, partisan differences are significant at the .01 level).

Taken together, our pre-test results confirm that differences in the impact of the media programs largely reflect variations in their partisan reputations (i.e., credibility) and directional messages, and less so the pure effectiveness of their arguments. In short, results are due to partisan reputations and argument direction and less so argument quality *per se*.

Additional Results: What Do Respondents Choose to Watch in the Media Choice Conditions?

As we discussed in the body of the paper, we expect that subjects assigned to the media choice condition will select same-party content (consistent with theories of motivated reasoning). In the media choice condition, respondents were given the option of selecting among seven different media options: two different apolitical entertainment segments (these were the same segments shown to subjects in the control/no partisan media exposure conditions), two different segments from Fox News, two different segments from MSNBC, and a segment from the PBS News Hour. The Fox and MSNBC segments were topical (i.e., they were the treatment stimuli), the PBS News Hour segment was not on topic (it covered genetic testing). Respondents were shown all choices on their computer screen, and were told they would have approximately 12 minutes to watch as many of the segments as they would like. Unfortunately, the computer software we used did not record the options chosen, so we rely on subjects' self-reports on what they chose to watch. While that is a limitation, there is no reason to believe that this self-report is any less reliable than any other in the study.

Looking at the data from the choice subjects, 79 percent chose to watch at least some same-party content, and 19 percent watched only same-party content. The modal viewer in the choice condition watches 2 video segments, and one of them is from a same-party source. In contrast, we find that only 11 percent of subjects opt for opposite-party exposure, against suggesting a preference for same-party materials. This is highly consistent with our argument – and previous scholarship – given the option, most individuals will opt for same-party content (Hart et al. 2009; Stroud 2011; Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012).

That said, we do note that many subjects also express a preference for entertainment options as well (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013): 60 percent report watching at least one entertainment option, with many watching one same-party video and one entertainment video. We defer to future work exactly exploring why subjects report some entertainment preferences and some same-party preferences. For the current discussion, however, it is enough to simply note that most respondents chose same-party content, and as a result, media choice polarizes respondents.

Additional Results: By Media Type and With Controls

In the body of the paper, we presented most of our results pooling across types of partisan media (same-party, opposite-party, and media choice), and we also presented the results without controls. Here, we present the results broken out by media type, and we also present results with controls.

To underline the key point from this section, presenting the results this way (versus the way we present them in the body of the paper) does not change our substantive conclusions. We prefer the method used in the body of the paper since it allows us to communicate our results more succinctly and effectively, but we present these results below to show readers that this method would yield equivalent substantive conclusions.

Table A1 tests for two-stage communication flows, paralleling the first part of Table 3 in the body of the paper.

	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(2)</u>
<u>Media Exposure Only:</u>		
Same-Party Forced	0.649*	0.608*
	(0.193)	(0.192)
Out Party Forced	0.965*	1.072*
	(0.250)	(0.256)
Media Choice	0.990*	1.109*
	(0.295)	(0.295)
<u>No Exposure, Homogeneous Discussion:</u>		
Partner Saw Same-Party	1.578*	1.558*
	(0.248)	(0.250)
Partner Saw Out Party	2.139*	2.198*
	(0.200)	(0.251)
Partner Had Media Choice	1.554*	1.534*
	(0.238)	(0.262)
<u>No Exposure, Heterogeneous Discussion:</u>		
Partner Saw Same Party	0.607*	0.462
	(0.301)	(0.325)
Partner Saw Out Party	0.146	0.238
	(0.276)	(0.335)
Partner Had Media Choice	0.388*	0.529*
	(0.206)	(0.227)

Control Variables:

Jobs vs. the Environment		0.0867*
		(0.0483)
Political Interest		0.203*
		(0.0726)
Political/Oil Knowledge		0.0358
		(0.0454)
Income		-0.0516
		(0.0549)
Racial/Ethnic Minority		0.104
		(0.123)
Student-Aged Respondent		-0.254*
		(0.148)
Female		-0.0955
		(0.116)
Constant	4.146	3.506
	(0.172)	(0.305)
Observations	283	257
R-squared	0.310	0.35

Table A1: Testing for Two-Stage Communication Flows by Media Type

Note: Cell entries give OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors (clustered by discussion group, as in the paper) underneath. Starred entries are statistically significant at the p=0.06 level.

Begin with column 1. The section labeled “Media Exposure Only” shows us the treatment

effect of watching partisan media without any subsequent discussion. This replicates what we have in the body of the paper in column 1 of Table 3.

The remainder of the first column of Table A1 replicate column 2 of Table 3, which tests for two-stage communication flows. The coefficients in the sections “No Exposure, Homogeneous Discussion” and “No Exposure, Heterogeneous Discussion” show the effects of participating in homogeneous or heterogeneous discussion (respectively). The various coefficients reflect what happens when the other people in the discussion watch same-party media, opposite-party media, or have media choice. For example, respondents who engage in homogeneous discussion and are paired with individuals who watch same-party media become 1.578 units more polarized; those who engage in homogeneous discussion and are paired with individuals who watch opposite-party media become 2.139 units more polarized. Clearly, those who engage in homogeneous discussion become markedly more polarized than those in the control group (1.5-2 units more polarized on the 1-7 scale), regardless of the type of media to which those in their discussion group were exposed. In contrast, those who participated in heterogeneous discussion end up far less polarized, regardless of what type of media their discussion partners watched. Just as in the body of the paper, homogeneous discussion and heterogeneous discussion both polarize respondents’ attitudes, but homogeneous discussion does so much more markedly.

But as in the body of the paper, we can also compare those who participated in discussion but did not watch media itself to those who watched media but did not discuss it. This allows us to compare the effects of media exposure alone to the effects of discussion without media. Doing so, we replicate our findings from the body of the paper. Homogeneous discussion without media exposure has a larger effect than media exposure alone. For example, the effect of direct exposure to same-party media is 0.649, whereas the indirect effect – not watching it yourself, but discussing

it with those who watched same-party media – is 1.578, nearly 2.5 times as large (and the difference is highly statistically significant, $p < 0.01$). Making the other comparisons (for out-party media or media choice), we find similar effects. Homogeneous discussion of media without exposure is much more polarizing than simply watching media itself.

Similarly, we find that heterogeneous discussion changes attitudes relative to media exposure, but in a different way. Here, compared to direct media exposure, discussion without exposure actually *moderates* subjects' attitudes. For example, the direct effect of having a choice of partisan media types is 0.990, whereas the effect of heterogeneous discussion where one's partner had a choice over media types is 0.388, or approximately 40% of the effect (and the difference is statistically significant, $p < 0.05$). The same pattern holds across other media types, where the effect of heterogeneous discussion without exposure is smaller than the effect of media exposure itself. So, as in the body of the paper, heterogeneous discussion polarizes subjects relative to the no exposure, no discussion control condition. But relative to direct exposure itself, it actually moderates attitudes.

Column 2 of table A1 replicates our initial analysis discussed above, but controlling for a variety of different control variables (as a method for controlling for any imbalances in covariates). Note that none of our substantive conclusions change as a result of this. We have also used other techniques (such as inverse probability weighting) and we reach the same substantive conclusions as well (results available from the authors upon request).

We can also present the results of the discussion/exposure interaction as well, separated out by media type. We present these results in Table A2 below, which parallels column 3 of Table 3 in the body of the paper.

	(1)
	Attitude Polarization
Same-Party Media	0.649*
	(0.192)
Homogeneous Discussion	1.743*
	(0.196)
Same-Party Media*Homogeneous Discussion	-0.674*
	(0.263)
Heterogeneous Discussion	0.420*
	(0.212)
Same-Party Media*Heterogeneous Discussion	-0.601*
	(0.251)
Out-Party Media	0.965*
	(0.248)
Out-Party Media*Homogeneous Discussion	-0.608*
	(0.283)
Out-Party Media*Heterogeneous Discussion	-0.672*
	(0.330)
Media Choice	0.990*
	(0.294)
Media Choice*Homogeneous Discussion	-0.979*
	(0.352)

Media Choice*Heterogeneous Discussion	-0.828*
	(0.389)
Constant	4.146
	(0.171)
Observations	481
R-squared	0.301

Table A2: Testing for Exposure/Discussion Interaction, Separated by Media Condition

Note: Cell entries give OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors (clustered by discussion group, as in the paper) underneath. Starred entries are statistically significant at the $p=0.05$ level.

As in the body of the paper, we can make two sets of comparisons to determine if partisan media exposure and discussion have interactive effects. First, we can ask whether there is an effect of watching and discussing media relative to just watching media. That is, does discussion add something above and beyond simply watching media? To do this, we ask whether the sum of the main effect on discussion and the relevant interaction term can be statistically distinguished from 0. For example, take the case of watching same-party media versus watching same-party media and discussing it in a homogeneous group: does discussion increase polarization? The effect of homogeneous discussion is 1.74, and the interaction term is -0.67, for a net effect of 1.07, which is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). So here, homogeneous discussion after media exposure increases polarization by nearly 1 full scale point (or approximately 90% of a standard deviation). So even after watching like-minded media – which itself is polarizing – homogeneous discussion has a polarizing effect. Looking at other combinations of media type and homogeneous discussion, we find that this same pattern holds in every case: no matter what type of partisan media someone watches, homogeneous discussion still has a polarizing effect on attitudes. Media plus homogeneous discussion has a more polarizing effect than simply watching media alone.

What about heterogeneous discussion: does it too have a polarizing effect after media exposure? Take, for example, the case of same-party media exposure versus same-party media exposure combined with heterogeneous discussion: can they be differentiated from one another? The answer is no: the main effect of heterogeneous discussion is 0.42, and the interactive effect is -0.60, for a combined effect of -0.18, which cannot be differentiated from 0 ($p = 0.38$). This same pattern holds across media types. This is the only minor difference from the paper, where we find that (as predicted) heterogeneous discussion post-exposure moderates attitudes relative to exposure alone. This is an artifact of statistical power: because the effect is smaller, we need a larger sample size to find it. Note that all three estimated effects are properly signed, but until we pool, we do not have the power to detect them. But once we pool, we come to the expected conclusion, again, which underlines our substantive point that the effects of discussion hinge critically on the composition of the discussion group.

But of course, this is not only comparison we can make. We can also ask whether media and discussion are different from discussion alone. That is, looking within discussion groups, do those who watch and discuss end up more polarized than those who simply discuss? This is asking whether the sum of the main effect of exposure plus the interactive effect of exposure and discussion can be statistically differentiated from 0. Here, in every case, regardless of discussion type or media exposure, the answer is no. That is, the effects of media and discussion are equivalent to discussion alone.

This is a lot of text and coefficients (and hence why we prefer the more streamlined presentation adopted in the body of the paper). But the key point is that estimating the effects of each partisan media type separately (as we do here) gives the same substantive answer as pooling them (as we do in the paper).

Additional Results, Pure Independents

As we discuss in the body of the paper, because we base our theory (in part) on partisan motivated reasoning, we focus our analyses on partisan respondents, as we lack clear theoretical predictions about what will happen to pure Independent respondents (recall that Independent leaning partisans are treated as partisans in our analysis). That said, because some pure Independent respondents did come to our experimental sessions, and were assigned to treatments, we can analyze the data from them.

To be clear, there are only $N = 91$ total pure Independents in our sample. With such a small sample spread across our conditions, we unfortunately cannot say much with certainty, given that it is (literally) only a handful of pure Independent respondents who were assigned to each condition. That said, we can, and do, analyze this data below. Here, rather than analyzing recoded support (that is, movement in a same-party/opposite-party direction), we analyze the raw scale, where higher values mean more support for drilling for oil, and lower values mean less support. So here, watching liberal media or discussing the issue with Democrats should increase opposition to drilling (negative coefficient values), while conservative media or discussion with Republicans should increase support for drilling (positive coefficient values). Table A3 presents the results.

VARIABLES	(1) Media Exposure Only	(2) Two-Stage Effects	(3) Discussion/ Exposure Interaction
Liberal Media	-0.711 (1.025)		
Conservative Media	-1.600 (1.135)		
Video Choice	-0.822 (1.236)		
Media Exposure		-1.116** (0.443)	-1.002*** (0.351)
Homogeneous Democratic Discussion		-1.458*** (0.409)	-1.458*** (0.409)
Media Exposure*Homogeneous Democratic Discussion			1.088 (0.591)
Homogeneous Republican Discussion		-0.928 (0.563)	-0.928 (0.564)
Media Exposure*Homogeneous Republican Discussion			3.364*** (0.873)
Heterogeneous Discussion		-0.139 (0.613)	-0.139 (0.613)
Media Exposure*Heterogeneous Discussion			--
Constant	4.600*** (0.757)	4.706*** (0.235)	4.706*** (0.235)
Observations	18	66	91
R-squared	0.125	0.098	0.101

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table A3: Effects of Media, Discussion, and their Interaction for Pure Independents

Table A3 shows that the effects for Independents are somewhat weaker than for partisans. None of the media exposure only conditions have a significant effect on attitudes, but note that this only considers N=18 subjects, so we have very little statistical power here to detect any effects that may exist (see column 1). If we pool across media types, as we do in columns 2 and 3, we find that watching any type of media increases opposition to drilling. Why do media make Independents

more opposed to drilling? We cannot answer definitively, but some recent survey evidence suggests that pure Independents, in this case, are closer to Democrats than they are to Republicans. First, when it comes to the “believability” of networks, for Fox News, 67% of Republicans rated it as believable (scores of 3 or 4 on a 4-point scale), while only 37% of Democrats did so and 43% of Independents (Pew 2012). Similarly, on opinions about drilling in U.S waters, 77% of Republicans favor it, but only 41% of Democrats and 55% of Independents support this policy. Moreover, 53% of Republicans favor expanding oil, coal, and natural gas while only 19% and 24% of Democrats and Independents favor it, respectively (Pew 2014). So pure Independents here may be more comparable to Democrats than to Republicans, and hence respond to our treatment more like Democrats.

Do we find evidence of two-stage effects here? We do, but not in all cases. We find strong evidence that when pure Independents (who did *not* watch any political media) discuss politics in a homogeneous Democratic group, they become more strongly opposed to drilling by 1.5 scale points—a substantively large effect, on par with the effects we found in the paper. This suggests a large persuasive effect of group discussion, and again echoes the aforementioned data on Independents perspectives being closer to those of Democrats. We do not find a similar effect for homogeneous Republican discussion, which is not surprising given the aforementioned statistics. That said, a lack of finding here also may be due to a lack of power given our small sample size.

Perhaps as we would expect, we find no effects of heterogeneous discussion. For partisan respondents, we predicted that heterogeneous discussion would polarize subjects, but to a lesser degree than homogeneous discussion. We made this prediction because heterogeneous discussion exposes subjects to both sides of an issue, but their partisan affiliation would serve as an anchor, biasing them toward the arguments from their side of the aisle (see hypotheses 3 and 5). But here,

pure Independents lack such an anchor—even if their views of media and drilling were closer to Democrats, a party anchoring effect cannot be expected.

In column 3, looking at the interactive effects of media and discussion, we again see that homogeneous Democratic discussion increases opposition to drilling, whether or not the respondent was first exposed to partisan media. We do find an effect for homogeneous Republican discussion, but only for those who are first exposed to partisan media outlets. Here, we find a strong polarizing effect: those individuals who both watch partisan media and participate in homogeneous Republican discussion become much more strongly pro-drilling. This is purely speculation on our part, but perhaps because of the closer affinity of pure Independents to Democrats, they required the “double dose” of the treatment to move in a Republican direction.

Overall, then, we do find some parallels here between these results for pure Independents and the main results for partisans presented in the paper. But because we have such a small sample of pure Independents, and so many conditions, we would strongly caution against interpreting these results too strongly. We present them here in the interest of clarity and disclosure, and because the results confirm many of the dynamics we found with partisans, which we view as even further evidence of the potential impact of partisan media. Even so, pure Independents await a more focused study.

Additional Results, Moderating Effects of Education

In the paper (see footnote 16), we mention that education serves as a potent moderator of the effects of our treatment conditions. Table A4 below presents the results.

VARIABLES	(1) Media Exposure Only	(2) Two-Step Effects	(3) Discussion/ Exposure Interaction
Same-Party Media	0.103 (0.462)		
Same-Party Media*High Education	0.871 (0.551)		
Out-Party Media	0.293 (0.439)		
Out-Party Media*High Education	1.036* (0.526)		
Media Choice	0.158 (0.462)		
Media Choice*High Education	1.213** (0.542)		
Media Exposure		0.190 (0.237)	0.190 (0.237)
High Education (College Graduate)	-0.704** (0.337)	-0.704*** (0.128)	-0.704*** (0.128)
Media Exposure*High Education		1.052*** (0.248)	1.052*** (0.248)
Homogeneous Discussion		1.188*** (0.227)	1.188*** (0.227)
Media Exposure*Homogeneous Discussion			-0.0857 (0.336)
High Education*Homogeneous Discussion		0.907*** (0.256)	0.907*** (0.255)
Media Exposure*Homogeneous Discussion*High Education			-1.051*** (0.380)
Heterogeneous Discussion		-0.100 (0.204)	-0.100 (0.204)
Media Exposure*Heterogeneous Discussion			-0.0318 (0.366)
Heterogeneous Discussion*High Education		0.866*** (0.290)	0.866*** (0.289)
Media Exposure*Heterogeneous Discussion*High Education			-1.060** (0.463)
Constant	4.564*** (0.260)	4.564*** (0.114)	4.564*** (0.114)
Observations	120	283	481
R-squared	0.209	0.299	0.304

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Moderating Effects of Education

Table A4 shows that education does moderate the effects of our treatment, with those who are highly educated (here, those with at least a college degree) showing more responsiveness to the treatment conditions. While we lack the space to explore this fully, this is highly consistent with other studies of public opinion demonstrating that those with more education are more likely to know where their party stands on various issues (e.g., Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2015; Kahan 2015; Lenz 2012). So here, it seems like the highly educated were better able to understand the cues emanating from the partisan media outlets and group discussions, and adjust their opinions to be in line with their party’s position on the issue.

Additional Results, Separated Out by Party

In the body of the paper, we explained how we formed both homogeneous and heterogeneous discussion groups. But readers might want to know the partisan breakdown by condition. We provide that information in table A5 below.

	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Total
No Partisan Media, No Deliberation	19	5	13	37
Partisan Media Exposure Only	63	13	26	102
Homogeneous Discussion Only	72	38	29	139
Heterogeneous Discussion Only	32	10	31	73
Homogeneous Discussion + Exposure	79	24	46	149
Heterogeneous Discussion + Exposure	37	1	37	75

Table A5: Partisan Breakdown, by Condition

By design, there are equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans in the heterogeneous exposure conditions, but somewhat more Democrats in the homogeneous discussion conditions, reflecting that much of our sample identifies as a Democrat.

We can also present the results broken down by party; we do so in Table A6 below.

VARIABLES	(1) Media Exposure Only	(2) Two-Stage Effects	(3) Discussion/ Exposure Interaction
Democrat	-1.784*** (0.275)	-1.784*** (0.350)	-1.784*** (0.349)
Same-Party Media Exposure	0.0373 (0.313)		
Same-Party Media Exposure*Democrat	1.008** (0.409)		
Out-Party Media Exposure	0.587* (0.343)		
Out-Party Media Exposure*Democrat	0.856** (0.418)		
Media Choice	0.700* (0.358)		
Media Choice*Democrat	0.799* (0.427)		
Media Exposure		0.385 (0.351)	0.385 (0.351)
Democrat*Media Exposure		0.985** (0.473)	0.985** (0.472)
Homogeneous Discussion		0.657** (0.319)	0.657** (0.319)
Democrat*Homogeneous Discussion		1.821*** (0.413)	1.821*** (0.412)
Media Exposure*Homogeneous Discussion			-0.138 (0.420)
Democrat*Media Exposure*Homogeneous Discussion			-1.206** (0.545)
Heterogeneous Discussion		0.160 (0.314)	0.160 (0.314)
Democrat*Heterogeneous Discussion		0.210 (0.424)	0.210 (0.424)
Media Exposure*Heterogeneous Discussion			-0.336 (0.413)
Democrat*Media Exposure*Heterogeneous Discussion			-0.834 (0.558)
Constant	5.205*** (0.212)	5.205*** (0.257)	5.205*** (0.256)
Observations	120	283	481
R-squared	0.474	0.475	0.455

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table A6: Effects of Partisan Media, Discussion, and Their Interaction, Broken Out by Party

Table A6 shows that, when we explore effects by party, with one exception, we find larger effects for Democrats than for Republicans. The reason why is not clear, but there are two main potential explanations. First, Republicans were *ex ante* more likely to be polarized, according to

outside data. For example, one study by Pew found that 84% of Republicans approved of the Keystone XL pipeline, but Democrats were much more divided, 38% in favor, 49% opposed (Pew 2014). So if Republicans entered the experiment more polarized than Democrats, they are pre-treated, and will be more difficult to impact (Druckman and Leeper 2012). Second, because there are somewhat more Democrats than Republicans in our sample, it could simply be an issue of statistical power. There is no *ex ante* theoretical reason to suspect that Democrats would respond more fully to the treatment, so we suspect it is some combination of these two features, but leave additional exploration for future work.

How Salient Was The Keystone XL Pipeline?

In the body of the paper, we suggested that the Keystone XL pipeline was not an especially salient issue during the time of our study (November 2013 – November 2014). To verify this claim, we calculated some simple story counts to see how frequently that story was mentioned relative to other topical political issues during that time period. We use two different sources: Newspaper Library, which searches the full text of over 5,900 newspapers from across the country, and the *New York Times*, the nation’s leading newspaper. This allows us to assess how a wide swath of papers – as well as arguably the key “elite” paper – covered this issue. Table A7 below displays the results:

Issue	Newspaper Library story count	<i>New York Times</i> story count
Keystone XL Pipeline	12,027	77
Tax Cuts	84,191	257
Iraq War	108,542	547
Obamacare	134,687	585
Ebola	85,056	836
GMO/Genetically modified foods	17,727	60

Table A7: Story counts for various politically relevant issues during our study period

The table's story is highly consistent with our claim: the Keystone XL pipeline was not an especially salient topic during the fielding of our study. Looking at the Newspaper Library results, while 12,000 results might seem like a large number of stories, remember that this is searching nearly 6,000 newspapers over a full year. This translates to approximately 2 stories per outlet over a full year, hardly extensive coverage. Further, many of these are wire service stories, likely buried deep in the paper, making them even less salient. Additionally, one-third of these stories occur in the two weeks after the 2014 election when both Houses voted on a bill to authorize the Keystone XL pipeline (we only had 1 small session take place after the 2014 election) – if we truncate to the period before the 2014 election, the number of stories drops to 8,397 (or 1.4 stories per paper per year), suggesting even lower salience. Likewise, in the *New York Times* data, there are only 77 stories that mention the pipeline during the year, or 6 per month. So even in elite media outlets, there was, at most, modest media attention.

Of course, raw story counts for one issue are difficult to interpret; this is why we provide a host of other issues from that year. As the reader will notice, almost all of these other issues are an order of magnitude more salient, with the equivalent of *several stories per day per outlet* over the course of the year. These sorts of issues simply receive far, far greater coverage in the media – both ordinary and elite – than the Keystone XL pipeline. The only exception to this pattern is stories about GMOs or genetically modified foods, which score at a level just slightly higher than the Keystone XL pipeline. To the extent that the Keystone XL pipeline is comparable to another issue, then, it is to genetically modified foods, which is another modestly salient issue.

Further, public opinion data also support our claim that the Keystone XL pipeline is only mildly salient over this period. Nationally-representative survey data collected around the time of our study (April 2013) find that only 18% of Americans were very or somewhat closely following

this story, and fully 50% of Americans had never even heard of the Keystone XL pipeline (Leiserowitz et al. 2013). All of this suggests that this issue is as we suggest in the paper: a modestly salient issue where respondents might have heard of the issue, but not one where they would have developed strong prior opinions that would be difficult to move within the context of the experiment. As we discuss more extensively below, this is exactly the sort of issue one should use to assess the sorts of effects central to our study (Druckman and Leeper 2012).

Experimental Design Choices and Directions for Future Work

Our goal in this paper was to design a study that isolated the potential for interpersonal discussions to influence partisan media effects. In this section of the appendix, we describe some of the design choices we made. We hope this discussion serves as a blueprint for future work aimed at exploring the precise conditions of partisan media direct and indirect effects.

Attitude Strength

We opted for an issue on which prior work suggested people hold opinions that are not so strong that they are difficult to move from partisan communications. Specifically, we chose oil drilling and the debate surrounding the Keystone XL pipeline. Levendusky (2010), Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013), and Klar (2014) all find movement on this fairly partisan issue. If we had used an issue where people hold stronger, value-based opinions, we might have observed no movement due to exposure to partisan media. This is a consequence of pre-treatment effects: subjects come into the experiment with strong, crystallized opinions on these types of issues, so they are very unlikely to be shaped by the treatment (Druckman and Leeper 2012). This pattern may help to explain why some studies of partisan media find weaker effects than others do (Levendusky 2010: 220; Levendusky 2014; also see Arceneaux and Johnson 2013: 88). Our choice of issues also may have increased the likelihood of partisan effects since it is an issue on which

most probably do not directly connect their daily lives because it is not especially salient (Bullock 2011; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014).

Out-Party Partisan Media Exposure

While we find that individuals polarize as a result of exposure to out-party partisan media sources, others find null effects. Such null effects could be consistent with a model where just as individuals likely follow the same-party source due to its perceived credibility and value resonance, they may reject (i.e., not be affected by) the out-party's message in light of no credibility and an incongruent message (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). For example, Levendusky (2013: 76) finds that "on average, cross-cutting media have no effect." While our focus is somewhat similar to Levendusky's, there are two notable differences. First, his media messages included four issues whereas we focus on the presentation of a single issue. The inclusion of more issues could increase task complexity, which makes counter-arguments more difficult, leading people to rely on simpler decision making rules (e.g., a non-credible source means ignore the message entirely, see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993: 34). A second difference is that Levendusky employs a within-subject design, which could induce a consistency effect (whereas we use a between-subject design). Thus, our focus on a single issue and a between-subjects design may have been consequential.

Further, our instructions told individuals to watch their video segments carefully, and that we were interested if they learned anything from the segments.³ In addition, subjects who would later participate in a group discussion were told that as well.⁴ Both of these choices may have also

³ The instructions read: "Please pay attention and when it is over, raise your hand. Remember we are interested in if you learn anything from the segments...."

⁴ Their instructions include the following: "we will place you into small groups to discuss the media segments you had watched for five to six minutes." Then, later, they are told: "Now we will have

induced subjects to carefully process the messages, which would increase the likelihood of partisan motivated reasoning and careful counter-argumentation (and hence a polarization finding, rather than a null finding).

Alternatively, it could be that the out-party messages could be construed as worthwhile information and move opinions in the direction of the information: that is, counter to the individual's same party. Indeed, Guess and Coppock (2015) find that, regardless of prior opinions, individuals largely update their beliefs across three issues (the death penalty, the minimum wage, and climate change) in the direction of the information received (e.g., even those who previously opposed the death penalty became more supportive when provided with pro-death penalty arguments). This is compelling evidence given it includes varying issues that map onto partisan divides. Yet, one particular difference in their focus, compared to ours, is that they relied on "relatively sterile descriptions of academic studies" for the pro and con arguments. They (36) note that in more contentious environments, people may counter-argue contrary evidence. In many ways, the introduction of clear partisan media sources may indeed capture (or at least prime) such a contentious environment. Also, we are looking at the anchoring effect of party whereas they looked at opinions. Thus, we believe our focus on more partisan sources played an important role. Finally, in some situations, an out-party source could be persuasive if it put forth a message discordant with expectations (e.g., if Fox news had argued against drilling; see Hetherington and Kam 2015; Baum

short small group discussions of about 5 OR 6 minutes about the news segments each of you had watched. First we will put in you groups. We will call out the names of people who go in each group and ask that you go and sit with people in your group. For the discussion, we ask that each of you begin by stating in up to a minute what you thought about what you watched and your opinion..."

and Groeling 2010: 123). Our messages were concordant, however, though a discordant message (while rare in the real world) would make for an interesting future test.

Media Selection

Our predictions for the choice/search conditions reflect a number of design choices. First, we provided limited choice: Prior (2013: 118) notes that in the “real world” there an infinite number of choices that could lead to less and less selection of news, much less partisan news. He (118) accurately refers to our type of design as “highly stylized choice in the selection stage.”⁵ Second, prior work suggests a number of factors can vitiate partisan selection, including variation in issue content (e.g., people opt to choose content on issues important to them; Iyengar et al. 2008), alternative source cues (e.g., endorsements that 10,000 Facebook users recommend the story; Messing and Westwood 2014), recommendations from others with whom an individual has strong social ties (Messing and Westwood 2013), and media type (internet searching and social media tend to lead to more balanced exposure; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011; Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015; also see Levendusky 2013: chapter 1 for discussion). Thus, our predictions reflect our focus on cable news coverage of a single issue without additional cues.

Third, various aspects of our design – including our instructions and the nature of our choice environment – may have increased the likelihood of partisan selection. This becomes evident when comparing our design to Arceneaux and Johnson (2013), who also study cable news and the impact of selection on attitudes (also see Arceneaux, Johnson, and Murphy 2012). Arceneaux and Johnson find, in contrast to our results, that “introducing even a modicum of agency in the choice to watch partisan news as opposed to entertainment significantly attenuates the polarizing effects of partisan

⁵ Arceneaux and Johnson (2013: 61-62) explain that with limited choice, one cannot draw inferences about choice in general.

news” (89).⁶ Indeed, in their choice conditions, they find little impact of partisan media, even though subjects did typically tune in to some mix of political content – more than 60% watched some, and many of them watched from both liberal and conservative networks (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013: 82-84).⁷

We suspect our findings differ from theirs due to various design choices. Arceneaux and Johnson described their study as “information processing” (Arceneaux, Johnson, and Murphy 2012: 180), and this may have influenced participants coming in who had no interest in processing/exerting effort. We differed insofar as we informed participants that our study “focused on how people evaluate how different news sources cover issues.” Then in the instructions, we told people they would be watching “news segments” and that they should pay attention as we would later asked what they learned. All of this may have primed participants towards opting for news. We also presented our options in the choice condition as links on a single webpage that listed the

⁶ Arceneaux and Johnson offer two main explanations for their finding that introducing media choice vitiates direct partisan media effects. First, they point to dilution such that some simply opt to not watch the news programming and thus are not affected by it. Second, they demonstrate that much of the effects of partisan news exposure is on individuals who prefer “entertainment seekers” as opposed to “news seekers.” They (84-88) find entertainment seekers are affected, adjusting (polarizing) their attitudes in response to both same-party and out-party programming. In contrast, news seekers are much less influenced. Thus, the very people who opt to watch news when given a choice (news seekers) are not affected (especially by same-party news). In our experiments, we did not probe for individual heterogeneity along these lines.

⁷ Arceneaux and Johnson (2013: 197) do find some partisan media polarizing effects – the effects are just smaller than what we find.

different options (4/7 of which were news). Thus, it was more of a discrete choice that may have led people to watch full segments rather than more varied (mixed) media. In contrast, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013: 61) provided individuals with a remote control, allowing them to flip around as they pleased, second to second. This may, in fact, be one of the key differences insofar as individuals in Arceneaux and Johnson's study could "graze" at different channels whereas participants in our study were likely to watch an entire segment (or at least most of it) once they opted to choose a link.

More broadly, the choice condition provides perhaps the largest number of parameters to vary in future studies. One obvious extension would be to record the exact amount of time spent by each subject watching each video, and then calculate a dosage effect: if respondent A watches 5 minutes of same-party media, but respondent B watches 10 minutes, how much larger is the effect? Further, one could also edit the types of options given to respondents. As we discussed above, one could give hundreds of options (reflecting the realities of cable TV and Internet programming), and make some options more or less prominent. Further, one could also consider the effects of topical neutral news. What would happen if subjects could watch a segment about the Keystone XL pipeline from the PBS News Hour? While we included PBS content in our study, it was on a separate topic, so subjects who wanted to learn about this issue without a partisan perspective were hamstrung in our study.⁸ We designed our study as we did because we wanted to study the effects of partisan media messages, but this is obviously an important future iteration to consider. Indeed, the choice condition gives subjects a wide variety of parameters to tweak, and we can imagine many different iterations of this condition in future research. Overall, then, our results offer an important first step towards testing for two-stage effects, and future scholars can tweak these

⁸ We thank an anonymous referee for making this point to us.

various parameters to determine how this shapes these effects.

Survey Items: Pre-Test Instrument

Generally speaking, which of the options on the scale below best describes your party identification?

strong weak lean Independent lean weak strong
Democrat *Democrat* *Democrat* *Republican* *Republican* *Republican*

Are you male or female?

Male Female

What is your age? (*Student status variable*)

under 18 18-24 over 24

Which of the following do you consider to be your primary racial or ethnic group?

White African American Asian American Hispanic Native American other

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Less than High Some 4 yr college Advanced
High school *school graduate* *college* *degree* *degree*

What is your estimate of your family's annual household income (before taxes)?

< \$30,000 \$30,000 - \$69,999 \$70,000-\$99,999 \$100,000-\$200,000 >\$200,000

In general, how interested are you in politics?

not at all not too somewhat very extremely
interested *interested* *interested* *interested* *interested*

How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a Presidential veto?

Cannot 1/3 1/2 2/3 3/4 Don't know
override

Do you know what country is the world's largest exporter of crude oil?

United States Russia Iran Saudi Arabia Don't know

Which of the following is NOT a renewable energy source?

Hydroelectricity Biomass Coal Solar Hydrogen Don't know

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C.?

Democrats Republicans Tie Don't know

Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional?

President Congress Supreme Court Don't know

Who is the current U.S. Secretary of State? _____

True or False: There currently is a ban on drilling for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico.

True False Don't know

Would you say that one of the major parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? If so, which party is more conservative?

Democrats Republicans Neither Don't know

True or False: Most of the oil imported by the United States comes from the Middle East.

True False Don't know

Survey: Post-Test Instrument

Some people think it is important to protect the environment, even if it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard of living. Other people think that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining jobs and our standard of living. Using the scale below, which of these positions comes closest to your own point of view? (*Environmentalism variable, which was flipped such that favoring the environment denoted higher scores*)

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>Protect the environment, even if it costs jobs</i>						<i>Jobs are more important than the environment</i>

To what extent do you personally oppose or support efforts to increase drilling off the coastal waters of the United States?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>strongly oppose</i>	<i>moderately oppose</i>	<i>slightly oppose</i>	<i>neither oppose nor support</i>	<i>slightly support</i>	<i>moderately support</i>	<i>strongly support</i>

To what extent do you personally oppose or support efforts to increase drilling on federal lands?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>strongly oppose</i>	<i>moderately oppose</i>	<i>slightly oppose</i>	<i>neither oppose nor support</i>	<i>slightly support</i>	<i>moderately support</i>	<i>strongly support</i>

To what extent do you personally oppose or support the proposed Keystone XL pipeline that would carry oil from Canada to the U.S.?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>strongly oppose</i>	<i>moderately oppose</i>	<i>slightly oppose</i>	<i>neither oppose nor support</i>	<i>slightly support</i>	<i>moderately support</i>	<i>strongly support</i>

Based on the conversation you had, how knowledgeable (about drilling and the Keystone XL pipeline) would you say the other study participants are?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>not knowledgeable</i>			<i>moderately knowledgeable</i>			<i>very knowledgeable</i>

Based on the conversation you just had, how trustworthy would you say the other study participants are (about drilling and the Keystone XL pipeline)?

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>not trustworthy</i>			<i>moderately trustworthy</i>			<i>very trustworthy</i>

Instructions Read to Study Participants

Below are the instructions read to study participants explaining the procedures used in the study.

[Distribute consent forms.]

Please read the consent form, which is the first one or two pages, and if you would like to participate in today's study, please sign and date the form. Please *do not look at the pages following the consent form.*

We will ask you to put your name on surveys simply so we can match two different surveys you complete, but it is entirely confidential and we will discard all names once data are entered.

Today's date is **YYY XX**.

[Hand out and then collect the consent forms.]

Today's study is on learning from the media. It has **five (for NO DISCUSSION)/six (FOR DISCUSSION)** parts beyond the consent form you filled out.

First, you will be asked to fill out a brief preliminary questionnaire. Second, you be asked to complete an unrelated activity that takes only a few minutes. Third, you will be asked to watch a few media segments on the computer from different outlets on the flash drive we provide. The source of the segments will be apparent as you watch them. Again, we are interested in seeing if you think you learned anything from the segments. **(DISCUSSION CONDITIONS ONLY – IF NOT, CHANGE NEXT TO “FOURTH” INSTEAD OF “FIFTH” and “FIFTH” INSTEAD OF “SIXTH”)** **Fourth, we will place you into small groups to discuss the media segments you had watched for five to six minutes. We will describe how this works specifically at the time.** **Fifth**, you will be asked to fill out another brief questionnaire. **Sixth**, we will pay you, and you can leave.

Unless instructed otherwise, please do not communicate with any other participant during the study. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and we will assist you.

Let us begin. We will now hand out the first survey to complete. **[HAND OUT.]** Please answer every question you can, but if you'd rather not you may leave it blank. Please take your time. When you are complete please raise your hand so we know you are finished and we will collect your survey. **[WAIT UNTIL EVERYONE APPEARS DONE AND THEN COLLECT.]**

We are now taking a small break to do a very brief unrelated task that we will now pass out. This is completely unrelated to this study and there is no need to write your name on it. **[PASS OUT FILLER TASK. [WAIT UNTIL EVERYONE APPEARS DONE THEN COLLECT AND MOVE ON AND MAKE SURE GROUPS READING TO GO IN THOSE CONDITIONS.]**

Next we will ask you to watch the news segments we mentioned. **[MAKE SURE ALL**

SUBJECTS HAVE CORRECT VIDEO CORRESPONDING TO CONDITION]. Please pay attention and when it is over, raise your hand. Remember we are interested in if you learn anything from the segments. **(IF A CHOICE CONDITION SAY: Notice you get to choose from multiple videos and will have 12 minutes to do so – choose what you prefer and watch as many or as few as you would like.) [WAIT UNTIL EVERYONE APPEARS DONE AND MAKE SURE PEOPLE GET CHOICE.]**

(FOR DISCUSSION CONDITIONS ONLY): Now we will have short small group discussions of about 5 OR 6 minutes about the news segments each of you had watched. First we will put in you groups. We will call out the names of people who go in each group and ask that you go and sit with people in your group.

For the discussion, we ask that each of you begin by stating in up to a minute what you thought about what you watched and your opinion – you may opt to say nothing but everyone gets a turn. Then after everyone has a turn, please spend up to 3 minutes of open discussion about the segments and your opinions. We will bring it to an end after five or six minutes.

Let's start with the person on the far left.

[MAKE SURE EVERYONE GETS A CHANCE – MONITOR GROUPS AND THEN END AFTER SIX MINUTES IF NOT DONE; ONCE EVERYONE HAS A CHANCE, MAKE SURE SOME OPEN DISCUSSION; TIME AND GIVE ONE MINUTE WARNING.]

Finally, we ask you complete a brief questionnaire. **[DISTRIBUTE SURVEY.]**

[WAIT 15 minutes or until everyone appears done.]

I will now collect your questionnaire.

Thank you for your participation; I will now pay you for your participation.

[Pay each subject. Give each subject a receipt SIGNED AND KEEP IT – if they want a copy give them another copy. WE NEED ALL RECEIPTS BACK.]

Transcripts of Partisan Media Segments Used:

ALL IN WITH CHRIS HAYES for April 1, 2013

BYLINE: Chris Hayes, Rachel Maddow, Goldie Taylor

GUESTS: Glen Hooks, Dan Dicker, Bernie Sanders, May Boeve, Derrell Bradford, Pedro Noguera

CHRIS HAYES, HOST:

That is oil. More precisely, that is heavy crude oil from the tar sands of Canada spewing out onto the lawns and sidewalks and the streets and past the basketball hoops of the Northwoods subdivision.

The amount of fossil fuel extraction we're doing now on and the amount we're set to do particularly at the 1,200-mile Keystone XL Pipeline is ultimately approved, means that whether it's fracking in your backyard or a pipeline that's going to run underneath your subdivision, this is the future of fossil fuel America unless we decide collectively to choose another future.

Joining me at the tables tonight, my great pleasure to welcome, Senator Bernie Sanders, independent from Vermont, May Boeve, executive director and co-founder of 350.org, a grassroots climate change campaign, and Dan Dicker, a veteran oil trader and president of MercBloc, and CNBC contributor.

And, from Mayflower, Arkansas, we're joined by Glen Hooks, executive director of the Serra Club of Arkansas.

No one from ExxonMobil or the American petroleum institute was available to join us tonight.

HAYES: My producers and I were going through local news accounts of the spill. It was so startling. No one knew -- almost no one seemed to know that they were atop this oil pipeline.

HOOKS: No, they don't know that. And actually, what Exxon has been telling folks, the story seems to be that this is just regular old west Texas crude, when in fact it is tar sands thick Canadian oil that's coming from Alberta, as you mentioned.

This is a much bigger mess than just a simple crude spill. This is something if it gets in the water is going to sink. We're talking about dredging.

This is a big deal. You're right, not a lot of people knew that this pipeline existed, and certainly didn't know it was carrying this really dirty Canadian tar sands.

HAYES: Yes, will you explain why it's harder to clean up this stuff than your normal crude?

HOOKS: Yes. Well, you know, a lot of times when you have an oil spill, you can use skimmers and skim it off the water because the oil will float. This is not your typical crude oil. This is much heavier, it's much thicker, it's much dirtier, therefore a lot more dangerous. So, if it gets in the waterways, it's going to sink, it's not going to float. And, so, you're talking about a potentially disastrous dredging process in an area that is right here in the natural state. Not where you would expect to find Canadian tar sands oil.

HAYES: This -- a few years ago, there was an oil spill in Kalamazoo, Michigan, which was also this heavy oil. And it's fascinating, EPA staff that worked on this, they had responded to oil spills over many, many years, had never encountered a spill of this type of material and this unprecedented volume under these kinds of conditions.

It -- what you get a sense of this is stuff that is different than what people are used to being able to clean up.

MAY BOEVE, EXEC. DIRECTOR, 350.ORG: Right, so tar sands oil has the highest carbon content of any oil we know of. And right now, the spill we're seeing in Arkansas is a devastating problem. And the real shocker about it, as you alluded to, is that this pipeline carries one tenth of what the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline would carry.

And so, imagine the photos we're seeing from Arkansas times 10, and that overlaid over the Ogallala aquifer in Nebraska, our nation's largest source of freshwater.

As a senator for the Energy Committee and someone who's talked a lot about the Keystone, when you see these images, Senator Sanders, what's your response?

SEN. BERNIE SANDERS (I), VERMONT: My response is it reminds me of what happened in the Gulf Coast. It reminds me of Exxon Valdez, which are even a hell of a lot worse than we're seeing there in Arkansas.

But I'll tell you what, Chris? It really raises the border question, and that is whether we continue to be a carbon based economy, whether we finally recognize that if we don't get a handle on greenhouse gas emissions, that this planet is going to be facing some disastrous problems in years to come.

As a member of the Energy Committee and the Environmental Committee, we have talked to scientists. And you know what these scientists tell us? They say, you know, the projections that we made about the damage for global warming, we were wrong. We understated the problem.

What they're now saying is that if we don't get our act together and start cutting in a very significant way, greenhouse gas emissions, we're talking about this planet heating up by eight degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century. And that is calamitous for this planet.

BOEVE: And you know what? Here's the thing. There are alternatives, and you never hear about a solar spill. When you hear about a solar spill, we call it a beautiful day.

(LAUGHTER)

HAYES: OK, but Keystone has become this kind of flash point for the environmental movement. And, obviously, this being in the news is useful. It's a catalyzing moment, right?

As we all think about building this massive new pipeline, there's already -- part of that pipeline is already built, part of it is being built, the last part which crosses the border in the north is the one that's awaiting approval. And the idea here is that the reason this is so important isn't just because you're going to get oil spills and that's part of it, and I want to talk about the rest from that, it's that this will push us over into some new territory.

But, Dan, I mean, the argument that gets made by the State Department and their draft environmental impact study, the argument that gets made by a lot of people is that oil is coming out no matter what. And when you look at how much money there is to be made from it and the amount

of capital investment that firms are willing to do to extract it, that seems like there`s something to do that argument.

DICKER: It is an economic equation. And, in fact, this spill proves to you, for example, that Keystone is just one pipeline. And in fact, Canadian sands are coming down to this country. And even if the president were to disallow Keystone from being built, it would not stop Canadian oil sands from coming to this country.

We already, if you talk to oil schedulers, they will tell you that they don`t particularly need Keystone XL in order to move the amount of Canadian sands that they, in fact, want to move. It just makes things a whole heck of a lot easier if they get this extension (ph).

Remember, Keystone already exists.

HAYES: Right.

DICKER: The reason they call it XL is because it`s made bigger, not because it`s not there already.

So, one of the issues that you have to deal with is -- and I think this is an important point that you have to take on Keystone because it`s a symbol, an important one. That shouldn`t be lost.

But what should be remembered are the truths about Canadian oil sands. They are coming into this country already. They will continue to come into the country whether or not Keystone is stopped.

SANDERS: Well, I think very simply, here`s what the truth is: the truth is the president of the United States, the Congress and the American people have got to say this is it. Not only do we not want a Keystone XL pipeline, but we have got to fundamentally transform our energy system away from coal, away from oil, and into sustainable energy and energy efficiency.

What we are fighting for -- you know, people talk about economics -- we are fighting for the future of the planet. We are talking about more and more Sandys and Irenes, which cost huge amounts of money in terms of rebuilding those communities, not to mention the future disasters that we`ll see.

THE RACHEL MADDOW SHOW for March 15, 2013

BYLINE: Chris Hayes

HAYES: On the occasion of being sworn in as president for the second time, when he likely commanded about as much attention of the country as he ever will, President Obama put climate change front and center. It`s one of the first issues he talked about in detail in his inaugural address after first addressing the economic issues that are obviously at the front of everyone`s minds. He went right to climate change, came before immigration before he talked about detail in war even.

He did the same thing during his State of the Union Address less than a month later, after first tackling the economy. He went directly to climate change.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: I urge this congress to get together, pursue a bipartisan market-based solution to climate change, like the one John McCain and Joe Lieberman worked on together a few years ago. But, if Congress won`t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct -- I will direct my cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take now and in the future to reduce pollution, prepare

our communities for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable sources of energy.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HAYES: It's provoked both bouts of hope and angst preemptive disappointment among the ranks of people fighting to save the planet from burning to a crisp, because there are two very important things a president can do alone without having to go through Congress. Without having to overcome a certain filibuster in the Senate or go through the House.

One has gotten a lot of attention. Chances are, you have already heard about it. It is the approval of the Keystone XL pipeline designed to bring the tar sands of Canada all the way down to the Gulf of Mexico. Tar sands, of course, are dirtier, more carbon intensive form of oil. And creating this pipeline would be in the words of NASA climate scientist James Hansen, would be like creating the fuse to the biggest carbon bomb on the planet.

The people in the know had supposed all along that Keystone was a done deal. But a remarkable movement of activist have mobilized to delay it at every turn and are continuing to mobilize and delay it, which in turn has made it a top tier issue for Republicans who simply cannot understand why we are still not pumping Canadian oil sand into Texas already.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SEN. MITCH MCCONNELL (R-KY), MINORITY LEADER: You know there's one major shovel-ready project ready to go, and that's the Keystone pipeline.

REP. JOHN BOEHNER (R-OH), SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: It's called the Keystone XL pipeline. And it's a no-brainer. But it's been blocked by the Obama administration now for four years.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We are absolutely committed as the Republican team to keep the Keystone pipeline on the front burner.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Approving this pipeline seems like a no-brainer.

MCCONNELL: Keystone was an obvious choice.

BOEHNER: There is no reason for the Keystone pipeline to be blocked another day.

HAYES: In case you are curious, that third to last clip there was a Republican jeans caucus coming up in favor of the Keystone pipeline.

That is the Keystone XL pipeline that is one piece of climate change policy the president can affect on his own. The other thing the president can do on his own, without going through Congress, which in the grand scheme of things might even more significant to Keystone, is that thanks to the Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts versus EPA in 2007, a decision little noticed outside of energy circles, it was determined that the EPA could under its existing authority, under the Clean Air Act, regulate carbon as a pollutant, which means the EPA could promulgate rules, binding rules that would make it very difficult for dirty power plants, like coal- power plans, to continue operating as they are now.

This was the crucial freighted subtext when the president said in his State of the Union Address that he'd prefer a cap and trade plan like John McCain and Joe Lieberman had proposed, but that if

Congress didn't act, he would. That was the subtext that hung in the air when he said he would act on climate change if Congress did not.

That was the subtext when the president nominated Gina McCarthy to be the new head of the EPA, because Gina McCarthy, aside from having been one of Mitt Romney's top environmental officials during his tenure as governor of Massachusetts, back when he accepted the science on climate change, aside from that, Gina McCarthy is also the person who is most recently running the division that oversees clean air at the EPA and proposed rules, quite good stringent ones, on new power plants, which brings us to today's news, which is really important but also completely and totally buried.

As part of this on-going battle that's happening outside the view of the public, we got notice today that those regulations, the one that Gina McCarthy oversaw of new power plants, which could dramatically reduce carbon emissions, they are going to be delayed. They're going to be reviewed further, and likely revised. This is, of course, occasion for the wailing and gnashing of teeth by the perpetually, preemptively disappointed environmentalist with whom I personally cast my lot.

But if there's one thing we have learned from watching the Keystone pipe is that public attention matters. And in the absence of public attention, the White House will only hear from one side, the dirty energy companies. Your government right now, as you sit and watch this, has the power without Congress to take what would be the most significant step in our country's history to curtail carbon emissions through the EPA process. And there are people around the country and swarming around Capitol Hill and in Washington, D.C., and in Texas, and in West Virginia, and everywhere that fossil fuels are produced and extracted who will stop at nothing to make sure that does not happen.

Right now, the White House is more or less only hearing from those people. If you don't like how that sounds, they should probably hear from you, too.

FOX NEWS SEGMENTS

How the Administration's Policies have Affected the Economy

BYLINE: Sean Hannity

April 6, 2012

SEAN HANNITY, HOST, "HANNITY": And tonight for the hour, we have assembled some of the brightest minds of business industry and beyond as we focus how the [Obama administration's](#) agenda has shaped our economy over the past three years. In particular, this special edition of HANNITY will focus on the issue of gas prices and how rising costs have and will continue to hurt your family. Now, as frustrating as it has been to fill up your tanks in recent months it has been more frustrating watching [Barack Obama](#) both as a candidate and as President as he has tried to downplay the severity of this energy crisis. For example, on this program, we have been reminding viewers about some of the so called quick solutions that the President has offered for reducing pain at the pump. You might remember these.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: There are things that you can do individually, though, to save energy. Making sure your tires are properly inflated. Simple things but we could save all of the oil that they are talking about getting off drilling if everybody was just inflating their tires and getting regular tune-ups you could actually save just as much. We are making new investments in the development of gasoline and diesel and jet fuel that is actually made from a plant-like substance. Algae. You got a bunch of algae out here, right? If we can figure out how to make energy out of that we will be doing all right.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: And President Algae, inflate your tires, get tune-ups. Now, some of those suggestions were made before the President took the oath of office in January of 2009 and if you remember back to that time, you may recall that the average price of a gallon of gasoline was approximately \$1.85. Now, fast forward only a few years under this President and Americans are paying more than \$4 a gallon just a few steps from the White House.

Joining me tonight to explain how we got where we are today is a very special audience, it is comprised of energy executives, business leaders, small business owners experts alike and many of the faces you will recognize and some of the best brightest smartest, richest in America. The top one percent is right here.

Good to see you all. Thanks for being with us. **Herman Cain.**

HERMAN CAIN, FORMER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: Yes, sir.

HANNITY: Nine-nine-nine. I'm afraid that might be the price of a gallon of gasoline, soon.

CAIN: That is the Obama 999 plan, \$9.99 cents a gallon.

HANNITY: You just scared all of America, Herman.

CAIN: You know, that's right. But it could be capital formation that we need for energy independence. Let's face it. This administration has done nothing but increase the barriers, regulatory barriers as well as barriers relative to exploration of our resources right here in United States.

HANNITY: Well, Steve Forbes, good to see you. The President says that wait a minute, if you hear anybody says drill, baby, drill, he says, we've been doing that. But yet, leases the ability to drill. Ninety six percent of the increases come from private lands where they haven't been able to control it.

STEVE FORBES, FORBES MEDIA CEO: Yes, it is an election year and he wants you to forget what he has been doing in the last three years which blocking or hindering the development, whether it is offshore and not having sensible regulations and doing it in an expedited manner, Alaska, Anwar, Arctic National Refuge been on the table for 20 years. We know, there are globs of oil and gas there. He won't allow that to be open, to be explored. So, if he could do something or come up with sensible, encouraging rules on fracking instead of dragging his feet, I mean, there is a revolution going on. We could be an energy exporter.

STEPHEN MOORE, "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL": Why should you be surprised about

these high oil and gas prices? This is what [Barack Obama](#) told us would happen with his energy policy. Remember when ran for president, he said my energy policies will necessarily mean higher energy costs.

HANNITY: He did say. And he did say, he would have preferred a more gradual increase in energy. Well, it's interesting, I paid \$5.09 in Armonk, New York and I tweeted it out and I have by the way for those that are green energy oriented, this is a hybrid, an escalade hybrid but it is a hybrid. And \$5.09 cents a gallon. That is a lot of money. And who is getting hurt the most here?

MARCUS: It's the people that he talks about. The low income, the medium income. They are getting killed.

MOORE: Look, the point here is, remember, the President thinks that oil and natural gas and coal are evil fuels, so those are the fuels that we have the most of. We have so much oil and natural gas and we, as you said it is a revolution going on and the President is opposed to those where he is spending billions and billions of dollars on things like Solyndra and things like the wind mills. We get two percent of our electricity from those. So, he is not serious about a real pro-America energy policy.

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: There is two debates here, there's debate about oil production, there's also debate about inflating the economy which obviously the President supports and that comes down to the fed. If we didn't have zero about percent interest rates, I guarantee oil prices would be lower.

Hannity, August 2nd, 2012

HANNITY: It is a project that would create thousands of jobs and generate much needed revenue in towns that stretch from Alberta, Canada all the way down to the oil refineries in Texas. But dreams of work and prosperity remain just that, dreams because the Keystone pipeline XL oil pipeline remains stonewalled by the President and staunch environmentalists. Now, we traveled to Nebraska to investigate.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: We can't afford to just wait for Congress. You can't afford to wait. So, where Congress won't act, I will.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY (voice-over): But there is one issue where President Obama does want to wait and that is the proposed 1,700-mile Keystone XL oil pipeline. That would be a stretch from Alberta, Canada to refineries in Texas and his opponents say, time is up.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

ROMNEY: I'm going to make sure we build the pipeline in from Canada, that Keystone Pipeline.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: Now, there have already been over 10,000-pages of environmental reports and review on this project, the Obama administration has postponed approvals until after more studies are done

and that is not sitting well with many in Congress.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

REP. ED WHITFIELD (R), KENTUCKY: It's time to decide, President Obama and his administration have made a decision not to decide.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: At the center of this battle is farmlands in Nebraska. On the one side, environmentalists.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PROTESTERS: The people united will never be defeated.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: On the other side, workers.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: What do we want?

PROTESTERS: Jobs!

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: When do we want them?

PROTESTERS: Now.

RON KAMINSKI, LABORERS UNION LOCAL 1140: Hearing the state of Nebraska, we are talking up to 2,000 jobs for up to two years. We are talking about tax revenue for the State of Nebraska and the local communities that this pipeline is going to go through. And I think the private capital issue is a major part of this. We are not looking for taxpayer dollars. We are working with the company that is investing the money to provide jobs and I think it is beneficial for everybody including the country as a whole.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: Now, the environmentalists have big money and celebrity endorsements on their side.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: It's called the Keystone XL and it is such a terrible idea that every clear headed environmental organization you can think of is against it. So, who can stop this mega stupid mega pipeline? You can, President Obama.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: Now, the project's environmental impact study finds the pipeline would not threaten the environment and local lawmakers argue that most critics don't know the facts.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SEN. KEN HAAR (R), NEBRASKA: With all due respect, you don't give a damn about Nebraska.

(CHEERS AND APPLAUSE)

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: The project owner TransCanada has agreed to reroute the pipeline away from the Nebraska sand hills, it's a fragile ecosystem that lies over a huge underground water source which supplies much of the water to the center of America.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

ALEX POURBAIX, TRANSCANADA PRESIDENT: I can't tell you how many times people came up to me and said, we support this pipeline, we support the jobs and we support the energy security that it is bringing to our country. We just wish you could move it out of the sand hills. And so, I'm hoping by doing what was agreed to today, we are going to make the vast majority of Nebraskans happy.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: But some activists and farmers are still not buying it.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

RANDALL THOMPSON, NEBRASKA RANCHER: I have never witness any project that has stirred the emotions in my fellow Nebraskans like the Keystone XL has. Even with their voluntary agreement to move the pipeline out of the sand hills, we remain very skeptical.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: Yet to see the impact a pipeline can have, they only have to look a few miles away where TransCanada came through and built their first Keystone Pipeline just a few years ago.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DENNIS HOUSTON, NORFOLK AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: We had, you know, 750 construction workers that came into our community that had an economic impact of more than \$10 million. And this happened to our community at the height of the recession which was summer of 2009.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: Tony Miles owns Tony's Steakhouse just outside of Norfolk, Nebraska.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

TONY MILES, TONY'S STEAKHOUSE OWNER: It was just a total boon for the entire area. You know, they had to buy diesel fuel, grass, food, RV parks.

JOE FERGUSON, NORTHEAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE: It was a tremendous boost in our sales tax revenues throughout the region. Not just in the Norfolk area but surrounding communities.

MILES: From my point of view and the business people's point of view in this area, they were nothing but a boon for us, they were great. And for that reason, we would like to have them come back through.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: And it's not just a temporary boost to the economy to support the pipeline.

TransCanada will be upgrading the power grid which benefits all residents and pushing their power rates lower.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

JOHN KUEHN, SOUTHERN POWER DISTRICT: When a company such as TransCanada comes in and puts in a large electrical facility like these multiple pumping stations along the route, they actually pay for the construction of those very expensive substations which enhances the capabilities of our grid. So, it is much more than just a pipeline. It is a utility and that puts downward pressure on the rates for even our residential customers. You are struggling and, you know, with some tough economic times in a heat wave, just simply pay utility votes.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: So, those who have lived through the pipeline construction dismiss concerns and say that not only is it a huge economic boost but it's safe and virtually invisible.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

LEE KLEIN, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS: They did an immaculate job. If you -- the Norfolk today, and if you can find that pipeline, the only reason you can find is if you know where the pumping station is. They've been a tremendously good neighbor and we anticipate them being a good neighbor in the next pipeline just as well. I think it is probably one of the most monitored pipelines ever to be created in the United States.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: Now, Nebraska Congressman Lee Terry says that enough is enough. With thousands of jobs being jeopardize by the delays, he is now introducing legislation to start construction of all of the pipeline other than the Nebraska portion while the new route is being studied.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

REP. LEE TERRY (R), NEBRASKA: We want the environmental studies done. But the question is why do you want to shut down the northern route when construction should be approved and starting?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: As for the President, the people of Nebraska have a message. We can't wait.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KAMINSKI: There is a huge project with a lot of private capital that is not going rely on taxpayer dollars. And it is going to put thousands of folks to work. Especially where we have such high unemployment.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

(END VIDEOTAPE)

HANNITY: And joining me now, two of the people featured in that piece, Nebraska Congressman Lee Terry and Norfolk Area Chamber of Commerce, President and CEO, Dennis Houston.

Guys, thank you for being here. All right. So, let me see if I understand this. Thousands of jobs would be created. We are helping to limit our dependency on foreign oil. We can lower gas prices at the pump. Creating jobs, increasing revenue. Where is the downside?

TERRY: I haven't found the downside. You would think that creating tens of thousands of jobs having the third largest pool of oil in the world 200 miles from your northern border with the greatest trading partner and friend we can have in Canada would be enough. But I'm even concerned now with the President inaction here because China is taking up all of the oil sands. They've reached a significant -- created a significant beachhead on those oil sands in North America now.

HANNITY: All right. So, what has it been like from this area? You have got all of this oil available, you've got all of these jobs waiting but then you see the environmentalists that are protesting. How bad has it been in your area?

HOUSTON: Well, in our example, Sean, we are a real life experience of how good it can do for a community. I mean when the original pipeline came through our community three years ago, you know, it brought all those new jobs to our community. It created the third largest employer in the rural community. And I think this is the time when main street and rural America, you know, needs

to reach out and say, how can we get those jobs in our communities?

HANNITY: If [Barack Obama](#) is president for the next four years, will this ever get completed?

TERRY: I really don't have the confidence in our President to allow the permit which is why I wrote the bill and gave that power to Congress if we can get that bill passed. He is so tied into the environmental groups and this is their number one issue. They said, killing the keystone pipeline is their number one issue. So, if it is their number one issue where is it on the President's agenda?

HANNITY: All right, guys, thank you very much for coming in and talking about this.

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