**EPS Forum: Path Dependence, Feedback Effects, and Sources of Change in the Welfare State**

The comparative study of welfare states represents one of the most dynamic research areas in the study of Europe. But it also one of the key areas in which members of the European Politics and Society Section have come to shape debates far beyond their primary empirical domain. Through its close attention to the study of institutions, the sources of policy variations, and institutional effects on economic performance, work on the European welfare state has come to occupy a central place in many Political Science debates.

In this issue, we asked four leading scholars of the welfare state to examine critically a specific set of concepts that have framed much of the recent debate on the welfare state, including policy feedback, path dependence, and the exogenous or endogenous sources of change. In his contribution Bernhard Ebbinghaus explores three concepts reflecting varied degrees of institutional change, moving from path stability to path departure and finally to path switching. Ellen Immergut follows with an exploration of the dynamic relationships between endogenous and exogenous sources of institutional change, provocatively suggesting that welfare-state scholars need to return to studying the effects of politics on policies, as well as the converse. Julia Lynch focuses in her contribution on the question of to what extent “constituency feedback” effects – i.e., narrow self-interests of voters as beneficiaries – drives welfare state policy reform. Finally, Kimberly Morgan points to further avenues for research into how the design of social programs generates different types of feedback effects, as well as the gendered political consequences of welfare states. Taken together, these authors’ excellent contributions mark yet another important step toward a fuller understanding of the sources of both continuity and change in the modern welfare state.

—The Editors

**From Path Dependence to Path Departure in Welfare Reform Analysis**

By Bernhard Ebbinghaus

Rarely are actors in situations in which they can ignore the past and decide de novo; their decisions are bound by past and current institutions. In welfare state research, the concept of path dependence has gained much popularity in explaining current reform processes. However, the path dependence concept borrowed from economics is rather narrow, even deterministic (cf. critique in Ebbinghaus 2005). It assumes the lasting impact of chance events that occur at the beginning, but not later in the process (Pierson 2004), leading necessarily to claims of institutional inflexibility. But such “lock-in” of a path seems to be a rather unrealistic assumption since it rules out even gradual adaptations to environmental changes that may be

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Letter from the Chairs

Dear Colleagues:

This issue of the EPS Newsletter features an exciting forum on policy feedback and welfare reform with a focus on the state of affairs in Europe. The contributions are by a stellar group of scholars, namely Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Ellen Immergut, Julia Lynch, and Kimberly J. Morgan. In addition, Piero Ignazi is giving us a detailed and in-depth analysis of the Italian election. We thank our esteemed group of editors at Temple University – Mark Pollack, Richard Deeg, and Orfeo Fioretos – for organizing this issue.

We are expecting another great conference in Philadelphia. We have 17 EPS-sponsored panels scheduled and we urge you to attend them as our future panel allocations depend on panel attendance. The EPS section has the unfortunate record of rejecting more panels and paper proposals than just about any other APSA section. Partly, this is due to the fact that we often fail to attend our own panels. As you may know, the allocation of panels to each of APSA’s organized interest section is determined in large part by attendance at panels. Needless to say that it is in our collective interest to go to panels sponsored by EPS and aim to fill up those meeting rooms, so that European Politics and Society can continue to be well represented at future Annual Meetings!

In this issue, you will also find a detailed listing of all panels sponsored by the European Politics and Society Section, and by related country groups as well as the European Consortium for Political Research. In addition to these panels, please make a note of our annual business meeting, which is scheduled for Friday at 6:00 p.m. At the meeting we will announce the winners of the Best 2005 Conference Paper Prize, Best Book Prize, and the Ernst Haas Dissertation Prize. At the last business meeting, we decided to nominate Chris Anderson (Cornell University) Division Chair and the Steering Committee approached Paulette Kurzer to be Program Chair for the 2007 APSA Conference. Immediately after the business meeting, moreover, the EPS Section will host a lavish reception (open bar) co-sponsored by Blackwell Publishers and ECPR.

We are looking forward to seeing you in Philadelphia!

Best wishes to all,
Paulette and Mark

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2006 Program Chairs Judith Goldstein and Rick Valelly have invited participants to address the fundamental question of whether and how the concept of power informs political science. The 2006 APSA Annual Meeting will convene in Philadelphia, PA on August 31 - Sept 3, 2006. The birthplace of our nation is an apt setting to discuss this 2006 theme, “Power Reconsidered.” Hosted by the Philadelphia Marriott, the Loews Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, the 2006 Annual Meeting will feature compelling discussions of this theme as well as current issues in political science and the public sphere.

A preliminary listing of EPS and related group panels can be found in this issue. For the full program and additional information about registration, hotels and more, visit the APSA website at: http://www.apsanet.org.
necessary for an institution’s long-term survival. Indeed, the economic path dependence model is a closed system based on an internal feedback mechanism of increasing returns. According to the deterministic model, an end to such “lock-in” would only be possible through exogenous intervening factors.

By contrast, in institutionalist studies, the concept of path dependence has often been used in a broader, non-deterministic sense to refer to the long-term developmental pathway of complex institutional arrangements shaped by and then further adapted by collective actors. The emphasis here is on the timing and sequence of events. Three features stand out in historical analyses of pathways. First, an institution emerges at a critical juncture at which collective actors establish new rules. The selection of a pathway is the result of political conflicts and power relations during a window of opportunity for action. A second element is the subsequent process of institutionalization through positive feedback that allows for the societal acceptance of a newly established institution, providing legitimacy. The third feature is a wider understanding of path dependence in the sense of the sequence of contingent decisions. Earlier decisions, once institutionalized, “structure the alternatives” of later ones. Three scenarios of institutional transformation can be analytically distinguished and applied to welfare reform.

First, if an institution is severely entrenched, we can expect path stability through marginal adaptation to changing environmental conditions to be the most likely scenario. Long-term stability results not only due to self-reinforcing processes that lead to “lock-in” (according to deterministic path dependence), but also through successful gradual adaptation, often stated under the motto plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. However, it remains an empirical question whether such adaptations are sufficient to stabilize the institution or whether institutional inertia inhibits necessary changes that may facilitate a path departure or even a systemic break.

Second, a path departure becomes increasingly likely when more significant changes in the environment occur and the self-reinforcing mechanism provides sufficient resources for gradual adaptation. Here, the most relevant idea is that earlier decisions narrow the choice set but do not determine the next adaptive step. Path departure lies between locked-in inertia, when nothing effectively changes the basic foundation, and radical system change, when everything is built de novo. Yet between these extremes, path departure also entails various forms and often occurs through a variety of simultaneous processes (cf. Pierson 2004; Thelen 2003): (i) long-term gradual changes that sum up over time to important reorientations; (ii) a functional transformation through which the same institution serves a different purpose than initially intended; (iii) institutional layering occurs through the addition of (new) institutional arrangements with divergent orientation.

The third and least likely possibility is radical transformation – path switching. As in the case of the emergence of institutions, here we would examine the critical juncture at which a change in the opportunity structure led to a freeing-up of societal resources and allowed a switch of paths, not least through the actions of political entrepreneurs. In such cases, it becomes necessary to explain why the self-reinforcing processes have ended and how a new institution could be established in its stead. In addition, we need a theoretical underpinning and empirical tests of the social mechanisms that lead to self-reinforcement or may even lead to deinstitutionalization (cf. Ebbinghaus 2005).

To take a well-known example from welfare research: Esping-Andersen (1990) assumes long-term political forces that shape welfare regimes, that is, the redistributive principles and institutional mix of social policies. At critical junctures in welfare state formation, new political alliances led to systemic reforms of policies dealing with new social risks. For Esping-Andersen (1996), societal forces and historical legacies have led to entrenched regimes or frozen institutional landscapes from which they can hardly escape, even in the face of perverse effects. Thus, the Continental European welfare states are locked into the “welfare state without work” problem (Esping-Andersen 1996, Scharpf 2001). For example, the increased popularity of early retirement as a socially accepted restructuring strategy used by employers and unions
reinforced further labor cost pressures to shed older workers, in turn leading to an unintended but vicious circle that is difficult though not impossible to reverse (Ebbinghaus 2006).

Although smaller parametric reforms have been implemented in an attempt to shift the costs of social security between different insurance systems, these reforms did not substantially change the status quo. Arguments in favor of path persistence pointed to the difficulties of altering a pay-as-you-go system due to the double-payer problem: the current working generation would simultaneously have to pay for the acquired rights of current pensioners and save for their own future pensions (Myles and Pierson 2001). Because the benefits of a system change would be diffused and can only be received in the future, welfare retrenchment would lead to immediate and concentrated cuts – a change in social policy that is politically difficult to achieve, particularly given the blame avoidance of office-seeking politicians. The pay-as-you-go principle in social insurance is certainly a strong self-reinforcing feedback process.

Nevertheless, several welfare states that were said to be frozen landscapes have been able to adopt substantial reforms (Hinrichs 2000). In some cases, gradual changes can lead to long-term systemic recalibration of a system (i.e. path departure); these may also be more acceptable politically, not least because the changes are at first unobservable or too complicated to fully understand. Grandfathering rules that exempt current pensioners from retrenchment at the expense of cuts for future beneficiaries have been a common device in welfare reforms negotiated by governments with trade unions, as the core union membership is exempted or less affected by changes (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). Hence, there does exist a large variety of intermediate changes (path departure) between the extreme cases of either status quo maintenance (path stabilization) claimed by political scientists or radical system change (path switch) often advocated by economists.

Thus far, the more open developmental approach has served largely as a heuristic device for historical research that is flexible enough to describe institutional persistence and change. Certainly, we need to theoretically specify and empirically confirm the social mechanisms of institutionalization and later changes in historical process analyses. Research on welfare state reform has provided new insights into the openness and variety of path dependent changes. Moreover, if institutional path dependence structures the alternatives of subsequent decisions, then it should be possible to systematically study the varying impact of institutional configurations on institutional change and persistence using cross-national comparative analysis. To do just that in the future, we need to develop middle-range theories of institutional change that go beyond a crude fixation on path dependence as persistence and instead help us to explore the potential for path departure that is institutional change in its proper sense.

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**From Constraints to Change**

**By Ellen Immergut**

Over the last ten years, the fields of comparative European politics and theories of the welfare state have moved from a concern with institutional stability and policy blockages to a focus on institutional change (see for example Streeck and Thelen 2005; Wimmer and Kössler 2006). There are many reasons for this – both theoretical and empirical – but the shift has caused concern at the meta-theoretical level: how can the same theories, models or approaches explain both stability and change? One source of change is some kind of external shock – or exogenous change. But it is often thought to be more challenging to locate internal or endogenous causes for institutional change, as one would have to explain both stability and change using the same model. In this essay, however, I would like to make four rejoinders to this conventional wisdom: 1) in a system of dynamic equilibrium, the transition from stability to change is not difficult to explain; 2) policy legacies do not necessarily make institutions impervious to change; 3) exogenous explanations for institutional change are not inferior to endoge-
nous ones; 4) political scientists should go back to studying the impact of politics on policies and not the reverse!

**Dynamic Equilibria**

In adopting models from the natural sciences and economics, political scientists have had a tendency to neglect the dynamic nature of equilibrium models. The definition of a system at equilibrium is that if the system is disturbed, it returns by some self-regulating process back to the equilibrium point. In chemical reactions, compounds are continually formed and unformed; and if more of one reagent is added, the mixture will return to the original equilibrium distribution. Even in cases of path dependence, equilibrium is reached and then maintained as the result of large numbers of transactions, such as individual VCR and videocassette buying, selling and rental decisions. Thus, when individual political decisions are termed the cause of “path dependency,” this is a misuse of the term: path dependent or other equilibrium outcomes are based on dynamic processes – and indeed on micro-processes. Thelen and Kume (2006) make this point very convincingly in their analysis of changes in industrial relations institutions, which they argue are continually re-negotiated and re-adjusted, such that beneath the impression of continuity, constant movement and change are occurring.

**Policy Legacies and Endogenous Change**

Policy legacies may produce feedbacks that stabilize particular welfare state arrangements, but they may also result in movements for change. Kato and Rothstein (2006) show how welfare state policies produce distinct patterns of institutionally-generated public beliefs, which in turn affect the dynamics of institutional reform—without, however, blocking policy change. Anderson and Meyer (2003) show how policy legacies affect the preferences of unions in pension reforms, and how the erosion of the value of benefits (which may result from inaction on the part of policy-makers rather than on explicit cuts) is important in changing levels of union support for benefits. Indeed, benefit erosion may be the most common endogenous source of change in welfare states. In national health insurance systems, for example, public financing brings more money into the health system, which allows private doctors to raise their fees, and, in turn, either creates cost pressures if public insurance will pay these fees, or devalues public insurance if the public programs refuse to cover the increase. This endogenous dynamic has been the root cause of many instances of health policy change over the last century (Immergut 1992). Benefit erosion may also be caused by a failure of welfare states to meet new social risks (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2005); or even used as a political strategy to reduce political support for welfare states (Hacker 2005; Pierson 1994).

**Exogenous Change**

Although exogenous change sounds like a fancy word for an ad hoc explanation, there are many interesting and systematic exogenous sources of change. Of most obvious relevance to many readers of this newsletter is the European Union itself. European directives, the European Court of Justice, institutional requirements and competitive pressures as well as ideas (and fears) about competitive pressures are setting processes of policy change into motion. At the domestic level, electoral re-alignments, the expansion of electorates and even the simple fact that elections lead to changes in government and changes in parliamentary standings are all ‘endogenous’ sources of policy change. To be sure, there may be some cases in which, say, failed policies lead to electoral re-alignments, and hence an exogenous change may be re-endogenized. But there are certainly many elections that lead to policy changes that are independent of the effects of previous policies on those very electoral outcomes. In our forthcoming work on European pension politics (Anderson and Immergut 2006), Karen Anderson and I argue that political competition is the key to understanding patterns of pension politics. Competition places new political issues onto the agenda; at the same time that overly-heated competition may stymie reform. Thus while policy legacies and changing policy problems may provide the raw material for debates and efforts to change pension programs, the extent to which politicians can obtain political mileage by their policy stances on issues depends upon the nature of political competition, which we define as the strategies used by politicians to compete for votes. These, in turn, depend upon electoral systems, the distri...
Constituency Feedback Theories and the Welfare State in Western Europe

By Julia Lynch

Policy feedback theories have a natural place in the study of European welfare states, in part because of their already ample application to public policy-making processes in the United States, and in part because of their natural affinity with the path-dependent historical institutionalist analyses that have dominated the study of West European social policy since the early 1990s. Yet not all policy feedback theories are alike: scholars have observed policy feedbacks at the “macro-level” of interest groups and state actors (Skocpol 1992, Pierson 1994, Hacker 2002) as well as at the “micro-level” of mass publics. They have identified feedback effects that operate through ideas – the way that policy institutions affect public anxieties about corruption (Skocpol 1992) or recipients’ beliefs about civic duty (Mettler 2005), their own political efficacy (Soss 1999), or the legitimacy of their claims-making (Schneider and Ingram 1993) – as well as through the more tangible resources of time and money that policies may confer on individuals (see Campbell 2003, Mettler 2005). Given the panoply of feedback mechanisms that might affect the development of public policy, this forum provides an important opportunity to reflect on where particular kinds of policy feedback theories are likely to add value – or not – to the study of European welfare states.

I would like to focus here on the potential pitfalls I see in the use of one type of policy feedback theory that appears particularly frequently in policy work as well as within academia, and within academia not only among historical institutionalists but also among political economists. What I call “constituency feedback theories” direct our attention to the level of the individual-as-beneficiary, and stipulate self-interest in social programs as the driving force behind the (new) politics of the welfare state. Constituency feedback mechanisms, in this view, prompt blame-avoidance by politicians, and underlie the politics of “new social risks.” They also inform, at least implicitly, much of the policy-oriented literature’s discussion of the difficulties attendant upon welfare state reform.

Even richly contextualized studies of the welfare state often assume that the self-interest of welfare state beneficiaries will drive the politics of reform. Esping-Andersen, for example, worries that outmoded social policies will be locked into place by support from the median voter – who is now a welfare state beneficiary (1999, 184). Weaver writes that “Pension cut-backs are especially risky because losses are perceived as particularly salient by the target group and because, in many countries, the elderly are particularly likely to vote” (2003, 25). Policy-oriented works adopt this viewpoint as well. A recent publication of the International Monetary Fund, for example, titles a figure showing the year in which the projected share of voters over age 50 in the electorate will surpass fifty percent in various countries with the witty caption, “The Last Train for Pension Reform Departs in...” (IMF 2004, 165).
The constituency feedback logic is intuitively compelling. The idea that generous public programs create beneficiary groups who try to punish politicians for cuts to their benefits is clearly plausible at the macro-level: not for nothing did US Congressman Tip O'Neill refer to Social Security as the “third rail -- touch it and you die.” And feedback theories based on the self-interested behavior of rational individuals are fine approximations of reality in highly parsimonious public choice models (e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981, Iversen 2005, and much of John Roemer’s oeuvre). But can they really tell us much about the politics of the welfare state in Europe?

In the constituency feedback model, attention focuses on the policy deadweight of self-interested beneficiaries, while the capacity of partisan attachments, political framing, or political mobilization to shape the views and voices of welfare state stakeholders gets shorter shrift. Yet a well-developed literature on public opinion finds only tenuous connections between self-interest and either policy positions or voting behavior. We know that in many areas of social policy “symbolic predispositions” (Sears and Funk 1990) – i.e., political beliefs, ideologies, and partisan commitments -- and not beneficiary status determine public support. Taylor-Gooby (1991) and others have found little support for the idea that opposition to retrenchment is determined mainly by interest in welfare state programs as inferred from age, labor market status, or gender.

Some social groups do seem to engage in more-or-less purely self-interested voting behavior under some circumstances. In the United States, for example, elderly voters and those with no children in public schools tend to be less supportive of public financing of education than those whose interests are directly affected (Rubinfeld 1977, Poterba 1997). Bonoli (2004), Borre and Goul Andersen (1997) and Campbell and Lynch (2000) have found similar asymmetries in public opinion in Denmark, Switzerland, and Italy. Younger citizens, perhaps because they have elderly parents or perhaps because they look forward to their own old age, favor a wide array of social programs, while the elderly are less likely to support programs that do not benefit them directly.

But it is one thing to note that the elderly, for example, support public pension programs, and another thing to say that they do so because they are beneficiaries, and in proportion to the amount that they benefit. Campbell (2003) has convincingly documented a strong constituency policy feedback effect of Social Security in the United States. But Campbell’s work is an opening salvo, and it remains to be shown that benefiting from public programs has the same effect on attitudes or political behavior surrounding the welfare state in other national contexts. Different types of social programs – more or less fragmented, more or less generous, citizenship-based versus occupationalist, means-tested versus universal – are likely to generate different underlying logics of constituency support (Esping-Andersen 1990, Pierson 1994, Mau 2001, Lynch 2006a). And ideological, political, and even demographic specificities may make citizens in other countries less likely to be motivated in their welfare state reform preferences by their status as beneficiaries than by their partisan, union, or family attachments. Even if we assume that political behavior has a universal basis in self-interest, what beneficiaries get out of social programs varies across nations, and thus different kinds of programs might generate constituency-based pressures for reform that differ in their intensity and distribution across the electorate.

I am therefore not surprised when I see the Meltzer-Richard model running into trouble when confronted with empirical realities, as it did recently at a panel on The Welfare State, Inequality, and Public Opinion at the Conference of Europeanists. The policy feedback literature taken as a whole leads us to expect that the downstream effects of institutions on politics are far more complicated than a simple clash between self-interested beneficiary-voters and blame-avoiding politicians. Constituency feedback mechanisms, while perhaps the most intuitively forceful variant of policy feedback theories, may ultimately have the least empirical bite.

Because so many scholars of European welfare states who have worked with policy feedback ideas are macro-oriented (which tends not to be as true of the Americanist policy feedback specialists), there has been relatively little inclination to test these theories empirically on European cases. And it has been difficult for those micro-oriented scholars who are inter-... cont. on page 8
Policy Feedbacks and the European Welfare State

By Kimberly J. Morgan

Policy feedback effects are fundamental to welfare states. Modern systems of social provision are huge, gobbling up a substantial share of economic and budgetary resources and shaping the decisions of individuals, families, firms, and other economic agents. While the term “policy feedbacks” is of relatively recent coinage, scholars have long assumed that welfare states influence a nation’s politics. One of the founding texts in welfare state research, T.H. Marshall’s 1949 lecture “Citizenship and Social Class,” argued that social policies generate a new form of citizenship, building a sense of community by giving people the common experience of receiving benefits and using public services. In Richard Titmuss’s writings in the 1950s and 1960s, he similarly argued that the welfare state is an instrument of “community education” that sustains the social conscience (p. 113), although he believed that different kinds of programs could have varying political effects. Occupation-based benefits, for example, could narrow people’s allegiances rather than broadening them, producing “political quietism” rather than the spread of humanistic values.

Contemporary research has more explicitly traced the political consequences of policy design. Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s Politics Against Markets explored how different forms of social provision affected the political trajectories of social democratic parties in Scandinavia. Where these parties added income-based programs to universal, flat-rate benefits systems, this kept middle- and upper-income people within a public system of social provision, thereby ensuring middle class support for both the welfare state and its social democratic architects. The concept of policy feedback gained greater theoretical elaboration in the work of Theda Skocpol (1992) and Paul Pierson (1994). Their research showed how welfare states influence forms of political mobilization, transform state capacities, and affect both elite and mass learning and knowledge. As a result, the new politics of the welfare state differ from the old, as welfare states are not only an effect of political dynamics but also a cause (Pierson 1993).

Although there are now numerous studies of the welfare state that employ the concept of policy feedback, there remain several avenues that researchers could fruitfully explore. One is to study more explicitly how the design of social programs generates different feedback effects. This has particular relevance for debates about retrenchment and reform of welfare states in Europe. One empirically supported assumption is that means-tested programs are more politically vulnerable than universal programs, but there are more nuances in policy design than whether they are means-tested or universal. Are flat-rate, universal programs more or less vulnerable to retrenchment than income-replacing benefits? Because flat-rate benefits make only a small contribution to the incomes of better-off citizens, these programs may be easier to cut than income-based benefits. What about the occupationally divided Bismarckian social programs? As labor unions often participate in the administration of these programs, they may be well placed to defend the status quo. However, involvement in benefit administration may also make these actors aware of the cost pressures on these programs and thus more willing to countenance system-saving reform.

Several scholars are now engaged in a...
wide-ranging study of Bismarckian welfare states that investigates how policy design influences the politics of reform. For example, Bonoli and Palier (1998) have argued that the French welfare state has resisted retrenchment pressures owing to the fragmentation of its benefits system, the place and stake of unions in defending the status quo, and the way that contributory finance generates popular attachments to benefits programs. This does not mean the welfare state has been frozen in place, however, and existing structures of social provision have shaped the course of reform (Palier 2005; Hemerijck 2005). Scholars could fruitfully follow their lead in probing the politics of reform in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian welfare states. Do the encompassing social programs of the Scandinavian countries make large-scale reform more likely, as everyone has a stake in these systems and understands the need for sustainability-enhancing reform? Are the Anglo-Saxon welfare states condemned to “policy drift” (Hacker 2005), being unable to either muster the political support for systemic reform or raise taxes to pay for the rising costs of benefit systems?

Another avenue of research could explore the gendered political consequences of welfare states. Many feminist welfare state scholars have implicitly used the concept of policy feedbacks by drawing on T.H. Marshall’s idea of social citizenship. Whereas mainstream scholars had conceptualized this in class-economic terms, feminists highlighted how social provision affects women’s social citizenship rights. Out of this work emerged the notion of the two-track welfare state that is bifurcated by gender (Nelson 1990). Means-tested programs for solo mothers have proven particularly vulnerable to retrenchment in a number of countries, whereas work-based or marriage-based entitlements are more politically secure.

Welfare regimes may also shape gender politics through their effects on women’s employment. Social programs influence patterns of female workforce participation, which may in turn shape political consciousness, ideology, and participation. As Andersen and Cook showed (1985), employed women in the United States developed a stronger feminist consciousness than those at home. In addition, welfare state programs that universalize mothers’ employment can mitigate the potential division between stay-at-home-mothers and those in paid work, creating widespread support for public child care and generous parental leave. For example, the virtual elimination of the full-time housewife from Danish or Swedish society created a strong constituency around public child care programs, propelling continued expansion of these programs in times of fiscal difficulty or conservative governments. In the US, by contrast, Americans rely largely on private markets for assistance with work and family issues, fragmenting the constituency for an expanded government role in this area. There also is a strong division between mothers in paid work and mothers at home, which further divides public sentiment on questions of work and family (Morgan forthcoming).

The mobilization of women into paid work may also channel them into particular forms of political participation. In the Nordic countries, high proportions of women work for the public sector, which has a very high unionization rate. This has changed the orientation of the union movement, generating tensions with traditional blue collar (and often male-dominated) unions (Curtin and Higgins 1998). It also has connected women to social democratic political parties and given them a stake in the continued expansion of the welfare state. The power of women to influence political outcomes has been displayed in failed campaigns to adopt the euro in Denmark and Sweden, as women have disproportionately rejected the adoption of the common currency as a threat to the Nordic welfare state model. This gendered connection to the welfare state is less evident in other European countries, although women generally are more supportive of social spending programs than men, contributing to the gender gap in voting.

Finally, more research can be done on how political actors themselves think about feedback effects and whether this shapes their decision-making. Politicians often seem aware that the design of social programs has political consequences. FDR claimed that he favored payroll tax finance over general revenues for the Social Security program because when people pay “contributions” to a program it creates a stronger base of support. As a result, he claimed, “no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program” (Campbell and Morgan...cont. on page 10
2005). More recently, Republicans added a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program in the hope of luring senior voters away from the Democratic Party, although they may instead face a political backlash due to the poor design of the reform.

Despite such tantalizing evidence, few studies of either American or European social politics tie mass and elite politics together by examining how political leaders perceive and use public opinion (Jacobs 1992 is as one important exception). In the study of European welfare states, this may reflect the assumption that decision-making is largely an elite process, shaped at most by organized interests, such as labor or capital. Yet, European politicians also face electoral imperatives, and unpopular attacks on the welfare state can lead to a political leader’s demise (Pierson 1994). Yet, we know little about how politicians themselves think about feedback effects. When creating social programs, do political elites ponder how these programs might shape constituencies of support? Are some reforms designed to reduce the influence of vested interests, thereby freeing the hand of reformers in the future? Beyond studying how policy feedbacks actually work, it may be just as important to know how policy-makers think they work.

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**The Italian General Elections of 2006**

By Piero Ignazi

The 2006 general elections confirmed the division of the country into two equal and opposite camps: the two coalitions led respectively by Romano Prodi (center-left) and Silvio Berlusconi (center-right) collected almost the same amount of votes. The center-left won in the Chamber of Deputies (*Camera dei Deputati*) by a handful of votes, 19,002,598 against 18,977,843 (less than 25,000 votes!); while in the Senate (*Senato della Repubblica*) – where minimum voting age is 25 years old – the center-right prevailed by around 250,000 votes.

The impression of stalemate, however, would be misleading. Thanks to the new electoral law the winning coalition (in this occasion the center-left) could avail itself of a very large majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The law, which was passed by the former center-right government amidst a very hot confrontation with the opposition at the end of 2005, reintroduced a party-list PR system with bonuses for the winning coalition in both chambers (although with minor but relevant differences between Chamber and Senate).

In the Chamber the bonus, granting 54% of the seats, is allotted to the coalition with the relative majority provided that it reaches a minimum of 10% of the votes and that one of the parties of the coalition reaches a minimum of 2% of the votes. The narrow advantage of 25,000 votes was enough to provide the center-left with 340 seats out of 630. The parties in the coalition gain representation only if they get more than 2% (plus the largest one below 2%). Parties which do not join any coalition and stand on their own must get at least 4% to obtain representation.

The same rules apply to the Senate with two variations: first, the quotas to get representation are 20% for the coalition, 3% minimum for parties in the coalition parties, and 8% for parties outside the coalition; second, and much more important, the bonus (assuring 55% of the seats) is not calculated on the total votes cast nationally but region by region: therefore, the bonus is calculated on the basis of the number of seats which each region elects. This implies that winning in large regions such as Lombardy, Campania, Latium, or Sicily offers an important...

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asset for the final victory in the Senate. And in fact the success of the center-right in some of the larger regions gave this coalition an advantage in votes and in seats.

At the end of the long and troublesome electoral night, during which pollsters made their final wreck by offering an array of inaccurate estimates (the most appalling being the first exit-poll where the center-left was given at 54-50% and the center-right at 49-45%), the final, albeit provisional, outcome was a large majority in the Chamber for the center-left (340 against 277), thanks to the bonus, and a one-seat majority for the center-right in the Senate.

The stalemate, however, was to be resolved in the following 24 hours thanks to two further elements. The first one is related to the presence in the Senate of seven life-senators in addition to the 315 “regular” members. These life-senators are freely and independently nominated by the President of the Republic up to a maximum of nine; moreover the former Presidents of the Republic get the status of life-senators too. At present there are seven life-senators. Even if their presence and their activity are more symbolic than actually political, their votes “count” like those of the elected senators. Four of these are clearly skewed towards the center-left, while three are less predictable, even if two of them might be somewhat in favor of the center-right. Having said that, it is considered quite unfair to enroll the life-senators to one or the other coalition and therefore their votes have not been taken into consideration for assessing the majority of one camp over the other.

The second element that should be introduced to clarify the scene regards the seats allotted to Italians living abroad. For the first time, thanks to a recent bill firmly promoted by the center-right, and especially by Gianfranco Fini’s Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance), Italians living abroad had the right to vote for 12 deputies and 6 senators. With much surprise, given enduring stereotypes which rated Italians abroad as nationalistic and even nostalgic and therefore supportive of the center-right, the center-left largely prevailed, winning five senators out of six. Thanks to this outcome the balance in the Senate reverted in favor of the center-left, allowing to it a majority of three senators. The end of this long story is a very large majority in the Chamber and a tight one in the Senate.

This result was universally unpredicted. Last year the center-left had won a landslide victory in the regional elections, winning thirteen out of fifteen regions; and opinion polls had consistently granted it a large advantage over the center-right. The last published polls (15 days before the election date) gave an average of 3.5 points in favor of Mr. Prodi’s coalition. Only one (rather marginal) institute forecasted a neck-and-neck outcome.

What happened in the electoral campaign to change the mood? On one side Mr. Prodi and his allies made a series of impressive faux pas. They themselves introduced into the campaign the fiscal question with a series of confusing and alarming proposals of raising taxation on state treasury bonds (which are widespread among the population), donations, and the family house (which would affect more than 80% of Italians). The U-turn precipitously made on these topics was unconvincing, while the center-right hammered out very efficaciously on it.

The real dominus of the campaign, however, was Mr. Berlusconi, whose protean capacity to play the statesman and the opponent, the conservative-bourgeois and the populist, the moderate and the extremist gave him the opportunity to set the agenda day by day. His presence in the media was overwhelming up to the point of marginalizing all of his allies. His highly provocative statements, while inconceivable for any other European prime minister, did not raise particular concern or outrage; on the contrary they were functional in raising attention and interest in the most politically alienated constituencies which are traditionally either abstentionists or inclined toward the center-right. And actually he succeeded in re-mobilizing that constituency, since the turnout increased compared to the 2005 regional elections and equaled the level of the previous general elections of 2001.

The precise comparison in terms of turnout should also consider the change in the electoral law which granted the right to vote to Italians abroad. In fact, the “Italian electors abroad,” who up to 2001 were registered in an
ad hoc file (2,284,613 in 2001) but could vote only while in Italy, were cancelled from the “metropolitan” file of electors in 2006 precisely because they could (and had to) vote abroad. Only if one makes this necessary distinction (which was discounted in the first comments), the turnout in 2006 compared to 2001 indicates an almost perfect stability (81.43% against 81.44%).

As far as the results are concerned, the party system proved once more very fragmented and bipolar: more than ten parties gained parliamentary representation and no party outside the two coalitions got any seat since their share of votes was negligible, 0.4% in total. Forza Italia maintained the position of the largest Italian party, with 24.0% in the Senate and 23.7% in the Chamber. Even if it lost almost six percentage points when compared to 2001, the result was still quite remarkable because the previous performances had been very bad and the opinion polls never did grant it more than 20%. Moreover the direct competitor, Fassino and D’Alema’s DS (Democratici di Sinistra – Left Democrats), quite surprisingly, got only 17.5% in the Senate. No comparison is possible for the Chamber because the two larger parties of the center-left – the DS and Rutelli’s Margherita (Daisy) – presented a joint list under the name of Ulivo (Olive tree) scoring 31.5%. All the other center-right parties (AN, Lega and UDC) increased their share of votes; in particular the small centrist Catholic UDC doubled its size, reaching 6.8%. In the center-left the poor performance by the DS was accompanied by an even poorer performance by the Daisy which lost 4 points, descending to 10.7%. On the other hand, the other more radical components of the center-left coalition (Greens, communists and above all Bertinotti’s Rifondazione Comunista – Communist Refoundation) scored quite well.

The center-left did not achieve the forecasted clear success it longed for. It performed quite well (as usual) in the red belt and conquered three regions in the center–south, but it failed to make its breakthrough in the most developed northern regions. In the north it scored quite well in the urban areas (except Milan), but not in the densely industrialized areas outside the metropolitan areas, north to the Po River. In Piedmont, for example, the center-left won in Turin, defeating the center-right by 11 points, but lost in the other areas of the region. The first, general interpretation leads one to conclude that the tax-raising image of the center-left moved the wealthier non-urban northern constituency to the right. All this without discounting the tight control over the media by the former Prime Minister.

Piero Ignazi is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Bologna.
APSA 2006 Conference Program of EPS and Related Group Panels

2006 APSA Meeting Program: European Politics and Society and Related Group Panels

The 2006 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association will once again feature a strong European-politics component, including 17 panels sponsored or co-sponsored by the Organized Section on European Politics and Society, as well as a number of related group panels. This preview of the 2006 program includes all scheduled EPS-sponsored panels, as well as closely related panels sponsored by the British Studies Group, the Conference Group on German Politics, the Conference Group on Italian Politics and Literature, the European Consortium for Political Research, the French Politics Group, the Iberian Politics Group and the Society for Romanian Studies. All times tentative, taken from the APSA provisional program of 18 May 2006. Please consult the final APSA program for definitive times, dates, and locations.

Thursday, 31 August 2006

Panel 15-5. Reforming the European Social Model
(Thursday, 8:00 a.m.)
Chair: John D. Stephens (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
"Friends, Not Foes: But What Kind of Friendship?"
Maurizio Ferrera (Milan University)
"Bypasses to a Social Europe? Lessons From the Federal Experience"
Stephan Leibfried (University of Bremen)
"Challenges Facing the EU: Scope for a Coherent Response"
Graham Room (University of Bath)
"Is There a Social Route to Welfare Reforms in Europe?"
Bruno Palier (Sciences-Po)
Discussant: John D. Stephens (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

Panel 15-7. Europe and Elections
(Thursday, 10:15 a.m.)
Chair: Jacques J. Thomassen (University of Twente)
Sara Binzer Hobolt (Oxford University)
Jae-Jae Spoon (University of Iowa)
"A Survey of MEPs in the 2004-09 European Parliament"
Roger M. Scully (University of Wales)
Simon Hix (London School of Economics and Political Science)
"Campaigns and European Parliamentary Elections: Support for Eurosceptic Parties"
Susan A. Banducci (Texas Tech University)
Catia Chierici (University of Twente)
"European Integration and National Elections: Introducing a Model of EU Issue Voting"
Catherine Eunice Netjes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Discussant: Cliff Carrubba (Emory University)

French Politics Group, Panel 4. French Feminists and the Republic
(Thursday, 10:15 a.m.)
Chair: Amy G. Mazur (Washington State University)
"Is the French Republic Familialist or Feminist? The Dilemmas of French State Feminists"
Anne Revillard (ENS-Cachan)
"The Case of Gender Parity Reform"
Laure Bereni (Université Paris 4)
"Feminist and Republican Networks between 1918 and 1939: the Human Rights League"
Alban Jacquemart (EHESS Paris)
"Women's Movement and French Secularism: When Feminism Confronts the Republican Ideal"
Liane Henneron (EHESS Paris)
Discussant: Claudie Baudino (Free University Brussels)

Panel 15-9 Parties and Immigration in Europe
(Thursday, 2:00 p.m.)
Chair: Anthony M. Messina (University of Notre Dame)
"The Politics of Immigration: Why Most Anti-immigrant Parties Failed in Western Europe"
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (Oxford University)
"Responding to Populism Without Succumbing to it? Social Democratic Responses to Immigration Challenges in Europe"
William M. Downs (Georgia State University)  
Vanja Petricevic (Georgia State University)  
“Public Reactions to Immigration in Western Europe: The Local Story”  
Jennifer Fitzgerald (University of Colorado, Boulder)  
Sara Claro da Fonseca (Social Science Research Center Berlin – WZB)  
Discussant: Leonard Ray (Louisana State University)  

(Thursday, 2:00 p.m.)  
Chair: Cees van der Eijk (University of Nottingham)  
“Moving Beyond Opinions: EU Accession and Political Representation in Poland”  
Joshua A. Tucker (Princeton University)  
Radoslaw Markowski (Polish Academy of Sciences)  
“Media Use and Political Engagement in a New Democracy: The Case of Poland’s 2005 Parliamentary and Presidential Campaigns”  
Hubert Tworzecki (Emory University)  
Holli A. Semetko (Emory University)  
“Sources of Influence on Political Discontent and Voting”  
Kees Aarts (University of Twente)  
“Euroscepticism as a Pan-European Mobilizer”  
Susan A. Banducci (Texas Tech University)  
Discussant: Cees van der Eijk (University of Nottingham)  

Iberian Studies Group Panel: Terror, Violence and Democratization  
(Thursday, 2:00 p.m.)  
Chair: Andrew Richards (Juan March Institute)  
“Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain”  
Omar G. Encarnacion (Bard College)  
“Party Competition, Violence, and the Prospects for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa”  
Adrienne LeBas (Michigan State University)  
Alan Keenan (Bryn Mawr College)  
Guillermina Sofia Seri (Colgate University)  
Discussants: Nancy Bermeo (Princeton University) and Larry Diamond (Stanford University)  

Panel 15-4. Roundtable: Can There Be Democracy Without Community in the EU?  
(Thursday, 4:15 p.m.)  
Chair: David R. Cameron (Yale University)  
Panelists:  
Gary Marks (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)  
Amitai Etzioni (George Washington University)  
James A. Caporaso (University of Washington)  
Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton University)  

Friday, 1 September 2006  

Panel 15-6. Roundtable: Constitutional Crisis or Constitutional Compromise in the European Union? (Co-Sponsored with French Politics Group, Panel 1)  
(Friday, 8:00 a.m.)  
Chair: Mark A. Pollack (Temple University)  
Panelists:  
Martin Shapiro (University of California-Berkeley)  
Alberta M. Sbragia (University of Pittsburgh)  
Liesbet Hooghe (University of North Carolina)  
Anand Menon (University of Birmingham)  
R. Daniel Kelemen (Oxford University)  

Panel 15-14 Comparative Economic Voting  
(Friday, 8:00 a.m.)  
Chair: Helmut Norpoth (Stony Brook University)  
“Responsibility Attributions, Accountability and Economic Voting: The effect of European Multi-level Governance in Britain”  
Cameron Anderson (Queen’s University)  
“Economic Voting and Democratic Consolidation”  
Byong-Kuen Jhee (University of Missouri)  
“How Globalization Affects Vote Choice in Europe”  
Hyeok Yong Kwon (Korea University)  
“A Micro-Level Study of the Effects of Clarity of Responsibility on Economic Voting”  
Erik R. Tillman (Emory University)  
Discussant: Helmut Norpoth (Stony Brook University)
(Friday, 10:15 a.m.)
Chair: Nancy Bermeo (Princeton University)
“Political Repression in Western Europe. Data and Methodology for the Comparative and Longitudinal Study of Militant Democracies”
Giovanni Capoccia (University of Oxford)
“New Theoretical Approaches for Analyzing Counter-Terrorism Policies in Democratic Regimes”
Ami Pedahzur (University of Texas, Austin)
Arie Perliger (Haifa University)
“Responses to the Radical Right in Scandinavia”
David Art (Holy Cross College)
“Responses to Regional Violence in Basque Country and Northern Ireland”
Pieter Van Houten (University of Cambridge)
Discussant: Leonard B. Weinberg (University of Nevada-Reno)

French Politics Group, Panel 5. Mapping French Political Science: The State of the Field
(Saturday, 12:00 p.m.)
Chairs: Andrew Appleton (Washington State University) and Robert Elgie (Dublin City University)
Participants:
Nonna Mayer-Cohen (CEVIPOF)
Patrick LeGales (Sciences Po)
Gerard Grunberg (Sciences Po)
Michael S. Lewis-Beck (University of Iowa)
John T.S. Keeler (University of Washington)
Frank R. Baumgartner (Pennsylvania State University)

Panel 15-11. Representation, Contestation, and the Political Space in Europe
(Friday, 2:00 p.m.)
Chair: Michael D. McDonald (Binghamton University, SUNY)

Daniel J. Finke (German University of Administrative Science)
JeongHun Han (University of Rochester)
“Elections, Policy Representation, and System Legitimacy in Contemporary Democracies”
Aida Paskevičiute (Bilkent University)
“Party Competition and Policy Convergence in Europe”
Thilo Bodenstein (Freie Universität Berlin)
“Coalition Agreements, Conflict Management, and Cabinet Stability in Western Europe”
Christine S. Lipsmeyer (University of Missouri, Columbia)
Heather Nicole Pierce (University of Missouri, Columbia)
“United We Stand? Examining Dissent within Political Parties on Issues of European Integration”
Erica Elizabeth Edwards (University of North Carolina)

British Politics Group, Panel 1. The Year in Review (and Business Meeting)
(Friday, 2:00 p.m.)
Chair: Wyn P. Grant (University of Warwick)
Participants:
Andrew Gamble (University of Sheffield)
James Mitchell (University of Strathclyde)

Conference Group on German Politics, Panel 1. Germany after the 2005 Election: How Much Change, How Much Continuity?
(Friday, 4:15 p.m.)
Chair: Michaela W. Richter (CUNY-Staten Island)
“Germany: Does it Still Have a European Avocation?”
William E. Paterson (University of Birmingham)
“German Defense Policy: Force Projection as Normalization?”
Gale A. Mattox (United States Naval Academy)
“Domestic Policy under the Grand Coalition: Initial Steps”
Richard Lehne (Rutgers University-New Brunswick)
“German Non-proliferation Policy: New Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation?”
Sebastian Harnisch (University of Trier)
Discussant: James C. Sperling (University of Akron)

European Consortium for Political Research, Panel 3. The Bush Doctrine, the War on Ter-
ror and International Relations Theory: A Study in Failure?
(Friday, 4:15 p.m.)
Chair: Michael Cox (London School of Economics)
“What is a Pole and Do We Live in a Unipolar World?”
Joseph M. Grieco (Duke University)
“Realism and the Bush Doctrine: Crisis – What Crisis?”
William C. Wohlforth (Dartmouth College)
“American State Strengthening from World War II to the War on Terror”
Daniel Deudney (Johns Hopkins University)
“Going it Alone’ and the Changing Narratives of Self-Interest in the United States”
Richard Ned Lebow (Dartmouth College)
David Lebow (Yale University)
“Liberal Theory and the Bush Experience”
G. John Ikenberry (Princeton University)
“Neo-Conservatism, Realism and the Bush Doctrine”
Michael C. Williams (University of Wales, Aberystwyth)
Brian C. Schmidt (Carleton University)
Discussant: Michael Cox (London School of Economics)

APSA Organized Interest Section on European Politics and Society, Annual Business Meeting
(Friday, 6:00 p.m.)

APSA Organized Interest Section on European Politics and Society, Reception (Co-Sponsored with ECPR and Blackwell Publications)
(Friday, 7:00 p.m.)

French Politics Group Evening Reception
(Friday, 10:30 p.m.)

Saturday, 2 September 2006

Panel 15-2. Power and Politics in Corporate Governance Reform
(Saturday, 8:00 a.m.)
Chair: John W. Cioffi (University of California, Riverside)
“An Institutional Analysis of Systemic Change in European Finance and Corporate Governance”
Richard E. Deeg (Temple University)

“Corporate Governance and Welfare: How the Politics of Welfare is Shaping the Regulation of Financial Markets in Europe”
Sofia A. Perez (Boston University)
Jonathan Westrup (Boston University)
“Defensive Institutional Engineering and Global Convergence: Corporate Governance Reforms in Russia”
Stanislaw Markus (Harvard University)
“From National Diversity Towards Transnational Homogenization? Corporate Governance Regulation Between Market and Multi-Level Governance”
Susanne Luetz (Open University in Hagen)
Dagmar Eberle (Open University in Hagen)
Discussant: John W. Cioffi (University of California, Riverside)

(Saturday, 8:00 a.m.)
Chair: Richard P. Haesly (California State University, Long Beach)
“Poachers Turned Gamekeepers: British and American Legislators with Previous Professional Lobbying Experience”
Conor McGrath (University of Ulster)
Clive S. Thomas (University of Alaska)
“What Makes for an Effective Prime Minister?”
Kevin Theakston (University of Leeds)
“Making the Best of a Bad Job: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition in Britain”
Peter Paul Catterall (Queen Mary, University of London)
“Michael Howard's Effectiveness as Leader of the Opposition”
Ray C. Barker (Erie Community College)
Discussants: Richard P. Haesly (California State University, Long Beach) and Elin Royles (University of Wales, Aberystwyth)

(Saturday, 10:15 a.m.)
Chair: Amy G. Mazur (Washington State University)
Panelists:
Daniel Sabbagh (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales)

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Eleonore Lepinard (University of Montreal)
Sylvain Brouard (CEVIPOF-FNSP)
Vincent Tiberj (CEVIPOF-FNSP)
Jacqueline S. Gehring (University of California, Berkeley)
Olivier Ruchet (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris)

Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society, Panel 1. Italy in the International Arena
(Saturday, 10:15 a.m.)
Chair: Maurizio Carbone (University of Glasgow)
“Italy and EU High Politics”
Federiga M. Bindi (University of Rome Tor Vergata)
“Italy and the Reform of the UN Security Council”
Palma D’Ambrosio (University of Rome Tor Vergata)
“Italy and the South of the World: A Laggard in International Development”
Maurizio Carbone (University of Glasgow)
“Italy and EU Enlargement: A Comparative Analysis of Left and Right Governments”
Fabio Fossati (University of Trieste)
Discussants: Joseph LaPalombara (Yale University), and Paul Furlong (Cardiff University)

Society for Romanian Studies Panel. The Influence of Romanian Institutions on the State and Foreign Relations
(Saturday, 10:15 a.m.)
Chair: F. Peter Wagner (North Carolina State University)
“Church-State Relations in Romania: In Search of a Paradigm”
Lavinia Stan (St. Francis Xavier University)
“Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Post-Communist and Pre-EU Romania: Developing a Democratic Public Service”
Roxana Malina Toma (North Carolina State University)
“Patterns of Civil Service Reform in Romania: The Impact of the EU monitoring Process”
Katja Michalak (Ohio State University)
“Anomalies in the Romanian Electoral System”

Patrick Vander Weyden (Catholic University of Brussels)
Discussant: F. Peter Wagner (North Carolina State University)

Panel 15-8. Income Inequality and European Welfare States
(Saturday, 2:00 p.m.)
Chair: David Rueda (University of Oxford)
“Income Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis of European Public Opinion”
Henning Finseraas (NOVA – Norwegian Social Research)
“Reference Points and the Lines that Divide: Understanding Differing Developments in Inequality across Advanced Industrial Democracies”
Rebecca J. Oliver (Miami University)
“Are Parliaments Better for the Poor? An Institutional Approach to Explaining Income Inequality”
Gregory Love (University of California, Davis)
Daniel Y. Kono (University of California at Davis)
“Party System, Political Representation and Social Insurance in the OECD Countries”
Despina Alexiadou (University of Warwick)
Discussant: Pablo Beramendi (Syracuse University)

Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society, Panel 2. Italy in the International Arena, 2nd Session
(Saturday, 2:00 p.m.)
Chair: Maurizio Carbone (University of Glasgow)
“Italy and Africa: New Stakes and New Tasks; How to Forget Colonialism”
Giampaolo Calchi Novati (University of Pavia)
“Italy and Russia Since the End of the Cold War”
Osvaldo Croci (Memorial University)
Bill McGrath (Memorial University)
“Italy and Asia: China as a Threat or as an Opportunity?”
Francesco Stolfi (University of Pittsburgh)
Franco Algieri (Ludwig Maximilians University Munich)
“A Wolf in Sheepskin? Italy’s Policies Toward International Organizations”
Giovanna Antonia Fois (University of Siena)
Fabrizio Pagani (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
Discussants: Joseph LaPalombara (Yale University), and Paul Furlong (Cardiff University)
European Consortium for Political Research,
Panel 2. The Americanization of European Politics I: Should Europe Adopt American-Style Judicial Review?
(Saturday, 2:00 p.m.)
Chair: Robert A. Kagan (University of California)
“The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”
Jeremy Waldron (Columbia University)
“Political Constitutionalism”
Richard Bellamy (University College London)
“Is There a Commonwealth Alternative?”
Janet Hiebert (Queen’s University)
Discussant: Larry Alexander (University of San Diego)

Panel 15-1. Electoral Institutions and Varieties of Capitalism
(Saturday, 4:15 p.m.)
Chair: Peter A. Gourevitch (University of California, San Diego)
“Does Globalization Affect Electoral Systems? Three Conflicting Theories”
Ronald L. Rogowski (University of California, Los Angeles)
“Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century”
Torben Iversen (Harvard University)
David Soskice (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin)
“Political Parties and the Origins of Employer Organizations”
Cathie Jo Martin (Boston University)
Duane H. Swank (Marquette University)
“Federalism, Decentralization, and the Coordination of Social Policies”
Erik M. Wibbels (University of Washington)
Eric M. Jepsen (University of South Dakota)
Discussant: Peter A. Gourevitch (University of California, San Diego)

British Politics Group, Panel 2. Elections and Party Competition in the UK: Issues, Candidates and Identities
(Saturday, 4:15 p.m.)
Chair: Florence Faucher-King (CEVIPOF- Sciences Po/ Vanderbilt)
Participant: Chip Hauss (Search for Common Ground)
“Protestant Zealotry or Unionist Apathy? The Impact of Election Turnout upon the Peace and Political Processes in Northern Ireland”
Jonathan Tonge (University of Liverpool)
“Candidate and Voter Gender in the UK: Stereotypes, Evaluations and Voting Impact”
Mark P. Shephard (University of Strathclyde)
Robert Johns (University of Strathclyde)
“Politics in a Vacuum: Electoral Contest and Communal Dominance in Northern Ireland”
William A. Hazleton (Miami University)
Discussants: Florence Faucher-King (CEVIPOF- Sciences Po/ Vanderbilt) and Terry J. Royed (University of Alabama)

Sunday, 3 September 2006

(Sunday, 8:00 a.m.)
Chair: G. Bingham Powell (University of Rochester)
“Inequality, Median Voters and Partisanship in Industrialized Democracies”
Jonas Pontusson (Princeton University)
David Rueda (University of Oxford)
“Policy Dynamics of Conferring the Median Mandate”
Michael D. McDonald (Binghamton University, SUNY)
“Responsive Government and the Two Faces of Policy Reform”
Christian W. Martin (University of Konstanz)
Thomas Pluemper (University of Essex)
“A Strategy Tournament for Party Competition”
Michael J. Laver (New York University)
James H. Fowler (University of California, Davis)
Discussant: G. Bingham Powell (University of Rochester)

Panel 15-10. The Politics of the European Constitution
(Sunday, 8:00 a.m.)
Chair: Paulette Kurzer (University of Arizona)
“Comparative Federalism and the European Constitution”
Jan Erk (Leiden University)
“The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Constitutional Convention”
Sven-Oliver Proksch (University of California, Los Angeles)
George Tsebelis (University of California, Los Angeles)
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“Staying behind: Threats of Negative Consequences in Case of Ratification Failure in the EU Constitutional Treaty”

Hartmut Lenz (University of Essex)
“The Importance of a Unified Public in Negotiating the European Constitution”

Christine Arnold (Universiteit Maastricht)
Han Dorussen (University of Essex)
Madeleine O. Hosli (Leiden University)
Hartmut Lenz (University of Essex)

Discussant: Alexandra Hennessy (Boston University)

Panel 15-13. EU Expansion and Domestic Change
(Sunday, 10:15 a.m.)

Chair: Mitchell A. Orenstein (Syracuse University)

“International Pressures and Domestic Policy Change: Gender Equality Policies in EU Enlargement Countries”

Olga A. Avdeyeva (Purdue University)
“When Clubs Have Too Many Joiners: The Effect of EU Expansion in Core Members”

Julia Gray (University of California, Los Angeles)
“The Impact of European Integration on Domestic Political Competition”

Hande Mutlu (New York University)
“Predicting Administrative Adaptation to European Integration”

Christian B. Jensen (University of Iowa)

Discussants: Mitchell A. Orenstein (Syracuse University) and Gunther M. Hega (Western Michigan University)

Panel 15-17. What is Troubling the French? Current Assessments (Co-Sponsored by the French Politics Group, Panel 3)
(Sunday, 10:15 a.m.)

Chair: Andrew M. Appleton (Washington State University)

Panelists:
Kay Lawson (San Francisco State University)
Ben Clift (University of Warwick)
Michael J. Bosia (Saint Michael's College)
Vincent Tiberj (CEVIPOF-FNSP)
Eric Kerrouche (Sciences Po- Bordeaux)

European Consortium for Political Research, Comparative Political Studies, European Journal of Political Research, European Political Science, and French Politics. For a full list of Scholar Saver journals and prices, logon to MyAPSA at http://www.apsanet.org/member/ and click on the “Scholar Saver” link.

Call for EPS Syllabi
One of the EPS Section’s most popular features has long been the syllabus bank collected by the section and made available on the Section’s website. During the coming months,
we will seek to augment the thirteen syllabi already in that bank with selected syllabi for courses on European politics (East and West), the European Union, and specific European countries at the undergraduate and graduate level. We invite members to submit syllabi for possible inclusion in the section’s on-line collection.

In keeping with the broad scope of the EPS Section, we welcome syllabi on any geographic area within Europe, including general European courses; courses focusing on Western or Eastern Europe or the European Union, respectively; country-specific courses (existing examples include Germany, France, and Russia); and thematic courses on topics such as citizenship, the welfare state, political economy, parties and elections, and democratic transitions.

The selection committee consists of Paulette Kurzer (University of Arizona; kurzer@arizona.edu), Anna Grzymala-Busse (Yale University; anna.busse@yale.edu), and Leonard Ray (Louisiana State University; lray2@lsu.edu). All syllabi may be sent as attachments (ideally in Word or rtf format) to the members of the committee.

APSA Centennial Center for Political Science & Public Affairs Visiting Scholars Program

The American Political Science Association recently opened the Centennial Center for Political Science & Public Affairs in its headquarters building in Washington. As part of its programs, the Centennial Center assists scholars from the United States and abroad whose research and teaching would benefit from a stay in and access to the incomparable resources available in the nation’s capital. The Center provides Visiting Scholars the infrastructure needed to conduct their work, including furnished work space with computer, phone, fax, conference space, and library access.

The Center has space to host 10 scholars for extended periods of time, ranging from weeks to months. Space for shorter "drop-in" stays is also available. Scholars are expected to pursue their own research and teaching projects and contribute to the intellectual life of the residential community by sharing their work with Center colleagues in occasional informal seminars.

Eligibility is limited to APSA members. Senior or junior faculty members, post-doctoral fellows, and advanced graduate students are strongly encouraged to apply. A short application form is required and submissions will be reviewed on a rolling basis. Positions are awarded based on space availability and relevant Center programming.

For more information and an application please visit the Centennial Center web site <www.apsanet.org/centennialcenter> or call Sean Twombly at 202.483.2512.
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