

## A Online Appendix

Variable	Hold Debt Exclusion		Pass Debt Exclusion	
	$\beta$	SE	$\beta$	SE
Intercept	-2.970	2.642	-2.346	2.715
% White 90	1.168	1.841	0.640	1.667
$\Delta$ % White 90-00	7.658*	3.604	5.808	3.697
Open Town Mtg	0.325	0.231	-0.003	0.248
Med. Hsh. Inc. 90	0.043*	0.010	0.045*	0.011
$\Delta$ Lg. Pop. 90-00	2.567*	0.851	1.809*	0.859
Lg. Pop. 90	0.171	0.153	0.272	0.167
Levy Limit	-0.021*	0.010	-0.040*	0.012
Additional \$ Avail	3.242	1.674	2.442	1.758
Override Capacity/Levy	-0.497*	0.238	-0.482	0.254
Excess Override Capacity	-0.010*	0.003	-0.010*	0.003
Tax Rate	-0.146*	0.051	-0.154*	0.054
Avg. Commute 90	-0.039	0.024	-0.020	0.026
% Rep. Registrants	0.990	1.967	1.583	2.002
% for Proposition 2.5	-1.549	1.136	-1.541	1.193
% Hsh. 35K-50K Inc	-6.055*	2.703	-7.766*	2.736
Degrees of Freedom	1230		1230	

Table 1: The table above provides the results from logistic regressions that predict the probability of holding or passing a debt exclusion vote to pay for capital projects. The data set here is the matched and weighted data set of 253 Massachusetts towns that are the most similar in terms of key covariates. Here too, increasing homogeneity in the 1990s is a powerful and positive predictor of holding a debt exclusion vote. The asterisk denotes significance at the  $p < .05$  level. The models include four year-specific indicator variables and 15 Beck et al.-style (1998) indicator variables for the number of years since the last vote was held. The AIC for the left model is 1,059 and it is 978.6 for the right model.

Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Held Vote	0.061	0.239	0.000	1.000
Success	0.051	0.220	0.000	1.000
% White 90	0.676	0.254	0.000	0.998
% White 00	0.636	0.260	0.000	0.998
$\Delta$ % White 90-00	-0.041	0.061	-0.359	0.403
% Hisp. 90	0.231	0.263	0.000	1.000
% Hisp. 00	0.274	0.265	0.002	0.999
% Black 90	0.087	0.119	0.000	0.804
% Black 00	0.082	0.118	0.000	0.859
Total Students 90	1230.738	1051.180	57.000	5287.000
Lg. $\Delta$ Tot. Stud. 90-00	0.132	0.252	-0.451	1.873
Med. Family Inc. 00*	40.597	11.297	18.132	156.886
Tot. Rev. per Stud. 99*	7.968	2.254	3.699	39.246
State Rev. per Stud. 99*	4.203	1.487	0.301	8.988
$\Delta$ Rev. per Stud. 99-02*	1.195	1.747	-25.803	11.716
% Free/Reduced Lunch 90	0.455	0.173	0.000	0.925
$\Delta$ Free/Red. Lunch 90-00	0.034	0.182	-3.251	0.353
% Under 18 00	0.275	0.045	0.043	0.660

Table 2: This table summarizes the data set of 744 middle-sized Texas school districts used to corroborate certain findings. The asterisk denotes variables in the thousands.

	$\beta$	SE
Intercept	1.290	3.773
% White 90	-1.194	1.243
$\Delta$ % White 90-00	11.128*	3.997
Med. Family Income 90	1.227	2.806
Lg. Tot. Students 90	-0.540	0.297
$\Delta$ Lg. Tot. Stud. 90	-1.866	1.926
Tot. Revenue per Stud. 99	-2.017	7.560
Tot. St. Rev. per Stud. 99	-57.522*	13.762
Tot. $\Delta$ Rev. 99-02	-0.006	0.006
% Free/Reduced Lunch 90	-0.567	2.003
$\Delta$ % Free/Red. Lunch 90-00	1.433	4.220
% Under 18 00	10.641*	4.742

Table 3: This table presents the results of a logistic regression predicting which of 744 Texas school districts considered a tax increase in excess of the “rollback” rate. For this model, the AIC is 226.2