Supplemental Information

Content Analysis of Speeches

Figure 1: The figure summarizes a content analysis of 95 speeches by Mitt Romney during his 2012 campaign and 348 speeches by Donald Trump during his 2016 campaign. It illustrates the average number of words coded as explicitly or implicitly referring to Blacks or Latinos.



- Word stems coded as explicit references to Blacks: african, african american, black, race
- Word stems coded as implicit references to Blacks: baltimore, carnage, citi, cities, city, convict, crime, crimin, detroit, fraud, gang, harlem, homicid, law, order, officers, police, poverty, poverti, prison, racist, thug, urban, violenc, welfar

- Word stems coded as explicit references to Latinos: cuban, dreamer, hispan, latin, latino, mexico, venezuelan
- Word stems coded as implicit references to Latinos: alien, arizona, border, cartel, ethnic, foreign, illeg, immigr, immigrants, immigration, legal

Details on Panel

Table 1: This table summarizes the panel waves and sample sizes.

Wave	Start Date	End Date	N
Wave 1	October 2nd, 2007	December 31st, 2007	19,190
Wave 2	January 1st, 2008	March 31st, 2008	17,747
Wave 3	April 2nd, 2008	August 28th, 2008	20,052
Wave 4	August 29th, 2008	November 4th, 2008	19,241
Wave 5	November 5th, 2008	January 20th, 2009	19,234
Wave 6	October 19th, 2012	October 29th, 2012	2,606
Wave 7	November 14th, 2012	January 29th, 2013	2,471
Wave 8	October 17th, 2014	October 31st, 2014	1,693
Wave 9	November 19th, 2014	January 14th, 2015	1,493
Wave 10	January 22nd, 2016	February 8th, 2016	1,562
Wave 11	October 14th, 2016	October 24th, 2016	1,227
Wave 12	November 28th, 2016	December 7th, 2016	1,075

Panel Demographics

Here, we detail the demographics of our GfK-based panel. Our respondents are markedly older than the U.S. population, but that is to be expected: they had to be 18 in late 2007 to participate. On a variety of other metrics, however, even the sample which participated in the final wave is a reasonable approximation of the target population of U.S. adults over 25 (see SI Table 2). For example, our sample's mean income in 2008 was $58.4K, which is not far from the 2015 U.S. median household income of $54.9K. Of particular importance is the fact that there is no evidence of heightened attrition rates among those who are less politically engaged. We merged our data with validated vote histories provided by the data vendor Catalist and found that voter turnout was essentially indistinguishable among those who did and did not remain in the panel between 2012 and 2016. Specifically, 2008 turnout was 69.4% among the 2,471 respondents to the post-election 2012 wave and 69.0% among the 1,075 respondents who participated in post-election 2016 wave.

Table 2: Demographics for the (1) 19,241 respondents to panel wave 4 in 2008; (2) 2,471 respondents to panel wave 7 in 2012; (3) 1,075 respondents to panel wave 16 in November-December 2016. "Miss." refers to the share of that variable which is missing for respondents to the designated panel wave. The American Community Survey benchmarks come from July 1, 2015 estimates for the full U.S. population. The asterisk (*) denotes that the U.S. Census reports median household income, not mean income.

	Min 2008	Max 2008	Mean 2008	Miss. 2008	Mean 2012	Miss. 2012	Mean 2016	Miss. 2016	ACS 2015
Income '08*	2.50	250.00	61.38	0.31	57.72	0.07	58.40	0.00	54.89
Years of Ed. '08	4.00	19.00	14.33	0.00	13.76	0.00	13.68	0.00	
HS Degree '08	0.00	1.00	0.96	0.00	0.94	0.00	0.94	0.00	0.87
Has BA '08	0.00	1.00	0.40	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.30
Party ID '08	1.00	7.00	3.78	0.15	3.82	0.17	3.78	0.14	
Union Hsh. '08	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.13	0.00	
Catholic '08	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.20	0.00	
Protestant '08	0.00	1.00	0.27	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.33	0.00	
Female '08	0.00	1.00	0.56	0.00	0.53	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.51
Age '08	18.00	84	50.13	0.00	47.12	0.00	48.84	0.00	
Over 65 '08	0.00	1.00	0.17	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.15
Black '08	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.13
Hispanic '08	0.00	1.00	0.06	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.17
White '08	0.00	1.00	0.80	0.00	0.71	0.00	0.71	0.00	0.77
Voted '12					0.69	.21	0.69	0.21	

Table 3: Demographics for the 769 respondents to the November/December 2016 panel wave who self-identified as white in 2012. To ensure comparability across years, this same sample of respondents is analyzed in the principal models for all years

	Min	Max	Mean	Pct Missing
Income '08	2.50	250.00	55.30	0.00
Education (Years)	8.00	19.00	13.27	0.00
Has HS Degree '08	0.00	1.00	0.92	0.00
Has BA '08	0.00	1.00	0.23	0.00
Party ID '08	1.00	7.00	4.16	0.04
Union Hsh. '07	0.00	1.00	0.12	0.00
Catholic '07	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.00
Protestant '07	0.00	1.00	0.36	0.00
Female '08	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.00
Age '08	18.00	84.00	48.38	0.00
Over 65 '08	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.00

Measuring Prejudice

Here, we provide additional information about our measures of prejudice, which are constructed using assessments of Blacks, Latinos, and Whites on two separate dimensions of stereotypes. To measure inter-group prejudice, we asked respondents who identified as White to rate Blacks and Hispanics/Latinos on two stereotype scales. These scales assessed stereotypes about work ethic (ranging from hardworking to lazy) and trustworthiness (ranging from trustworthy to untrustworthy). Specifically, the questions read: "Next are some questions about various groups in our society. Below are left-right scales on which you can rate characteristics of people in different groups. For the first item below, the far left side of the scale means that you think most of the people in that group are extremely "hard working." Placing the slider on the far right side means that you think most of the people in that group are extremely "lazy." The middle means that you think the people in this group are not particularly towards one end or the other."

As practice, respondents in several waves were first asked, "Where would you rate physicians in general on this scale?" Immediately after, respondents were asked to rate either Whites, Blacks, or Hispanics/Latinos, and later in the survey asked about the other groups (with the order randomized). "Where would you rate Whites in general on these scales?" "Where would you rate Blacks in general on these scales?" "Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos in general on these scales?" Note that in some waves, we did not separately record whether respondents moved the slider, which began at the positive end of the scale. Any individual who leaves all sliders at their starting points will be coded as a zero, meaning that she is no more or less likely to adopt negative stereotypes for different groups in question.

Table 4: This table reports summary statistics for the measures of anti-Black prejudice. Sample: 769 White respondents to the 12th panel wave.

	Min	Mean	Max	SD	Pct Missing
Anti-Black Prejudice Fall 08	-0.610	0.088	1.000	0.195	0.033
Anti-Black Prejudice Late Fall 08	-0.450	0.082	1.000	0.173	0.033
Anti-Black Prejudice Oct. 12	-0.490	0.072	1.000	0.177	0.000
Anti-Black Prejudice Nov. 12-Jan 13	-0.615	0.081	1.000	0.190	0.000
Anti-Black Prejudice Jan.-Feb. 16	-0.530	0.079	1.000	0.210	0.000
Anti-Black Prejudice Oct. 16	-0.470	0.075	1.000	0.202	0.000
Anti-Black Prejudice Nov.-Dec. 16	-0.575	0.072	1.000	0.203	0.021

Table 5: This table reports summary statistics for the measures of anti-Latino prejudice. Sample: 769 White respondents to the 12th panel wave.

	Min	Mean	Max	SD	Pct Missing
Anti-Latino Prejudice Oct. 12	-0.610	0.033	1.000	0.179	0.000
Anti-Latino Prejudice Nov. 12-Jan 13	-0.495	0.040	1.000	0.175	0.000
Anti-Latino Prejudice Jan.-Feb. 16	-0.580	0.033	1.000	0.194	0.000
Anti-Latino Prejudice Oct. 16	-0.520	0.028	1.000	0.173	0.000

Figure 2: These histograms illustrate the distributions of anti-Black prejudice (left) and anti-Latino prejudice (right) for respondents to the final panel wave in November-December 2016.



Figure 3: The figure illustrates the Pearson's correlations between anti-Black and anti-Latino prejudice within different panel waves. See also SI Table 6.



Table 6: This table reports the Pearson's correlations for Whites' anti-Black (B) and anti-Latino (H) prejudices for the survey waves for which these variables were available.

	4 B	5 B	6 B	7 B	10 B	11 B	12 B	6 H	7 H	10 H	11H
4 B	1.00	0.68	0.56	0.49	0.47	0.51	0.48	0.27	0.31	0.29	0.36
5 B	0.68	1.00	0.57	0.59	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.28	0.38	0.35	0.37
6 B	0.56	0.57	1.00	0.64	0.54	0.51	0.47	0.52	0.45	0.38	0.38
7 B	0.49	0.59	0.64	1.00	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.39	0.57	0.35	0.37
10 B	0.47	0.49	0.54	0.52	1.00	0.52	0.54	0.27	0.36	0.59	0.35
11 B	0.51	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.52	1.00	0.61	0.27	0.41	0.36	0.64
12 B	0.48	0.47	0.47	0.52	0.54	0.61	1.00	0.28	0.41	0.41	0.50
6 H	0.27	0.28	0.52	0.39	0.27	0.27	0.28	1.00	0.62	0.41	0.43
7 H	0.31	0.38	0.45	0.57	0.36	0.41	0.41	0.62	1.00	0.46	0.52
10 H	0.29	0.35	0.38	0.35	0.59	0.36	0.41	0.41	0.46	1.00	0.52
11 H	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.35	0.64	0.50	0.43	0.52	0.52	1.00

Results

Anti-Black Prejudice's Association with Voting: Multinomial Probit Models

Table 7: Multinomial probit coefficients modeling October 2012 preference for Romney, Obama, or neither.

	Obama / Neither		Neither/Romney	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Intercept	-1.598	1.402	-4.677	1.352
Anti-Black Prejudice '12	0.430	0.569	0.753	0.612
Anti-Latino Prejudice '12	-0.788	0.607	-0.244	0.606
Income '08	0.048	1.935	1.915	2.268
Union '08	0.133	0.233	-0.108	0.240
Catholic '08	0.101	0.180	0.017	0.210
Protestant '08	-0.091	0.163	0.072	0.177
Education '08	-0.037	0.039	0.049	0.044
Female '08	0.246	0.176	0.229	0.166
Age '08	-0.007	0.006	0.015	0.007
Lagged GOP Support	0.312	0.253	1.296	0.351
Lagged Support Neither	1.277	0.508	0.063	0.272
Weak Dem. '08	0.754	0.799	1.579	0.669
Lean Dem. '08	1.217	0.907	1.329	0.647
Independent '08	2.160	1.153	1.504	0.768
Lean GOP '08	1.745	0.934	2.852	0.862
Weak GOP '08	1.120	0.840	3.202	0.941
Strong GOP '08	1.711	0.976	4.117	1.078

Table 8: Multinomial probit coefficients modeling November 2012 - January 2013 preference for Romney, Obama, or neither.

	Obama / Neither		Neither/Romney	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Intercept	-8.447	4.932	-2.840	3.884
Anti-Black Prejudice '12	-0.380	0.757	0.209	0.397
Anti-Latino Prejudice '12	-1.450	0.862	-0.308	0.529
Income '08	0.658	2.665	-0.321	1.215
Union '08	0.089	0.318	-0.031	0.135
Catholic '08	0.297	0.294	0.155	0.229
Protestant '08	-0.160	0.228	0.057	0.117
Education '08	-0.087	0.061	0.015	0.025
Female '08	0.140	0.252	0.158	0.161
Age '08	-0.003	0.009	0.003	0.004
Lagged GOP Support	3.157	2.056	0.389	0.476
Lagged Support Neither	4.226	2.010	0.115	0.284
Weak Dem. '08	3.610	2.117	1.719	3.045
Lean Dem. '08	3.671	2.238	1.821	3.103
Independent '08	6.498	2.752	1.916	3.302
Lean GOP '08	5.474	2.792	2.529	3.705
Weak GOP '08	5.137	2.918	2.512	3.676
Strong GOP '08	5.625	2.967	2.814	3.952

Table 9: Multinomial probit coefficients modeling fall 2014 preference for a Democratic congressional candidate, a Republican congressional candidate, or neither.

	Dem. / Neither		Neither/GOP	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Intercept	0.039	0.163	-4.418	1.050
Anti-Black Prejudice '12	-0.007	0.075	0.989	0.632
Anti-Latino Prejudice '12	-0.021	0.096	-0.298	0.631
Income '08	-0.208	0.761	0.738	2.350
Union '08	0.007	0.039	0.222	0.260
Catholic '08	0.004	0.029	0.260	0.244
Protestant '08	-0.008	0.032	-0.149	0.197
Education '08	-0.003	0.011	0.067	0.046
Female '08	0.018	0.066	-0.089	0.171
Age '08	-0.001	0.003	0.006	0.007
Lagged GOP Support	0.006	0.042	1.874	0.308
Lagged Support Neither	0.038	0.138	0.627	0.306
Weak Dem. '08	0.033	0.116	0.374	0.596
Lean Dem. '08	0.020	0.076	1.207	0.547
Independent '08	0.052	0.189	0.393	0.821
Lean GOP '08	0.031	0.116	1.885	0.589
Weak GOP '08	0.030	0.111	2.002	0.604
Strong GOP '08	0.027	0.088	2.777	0.659

Table 10: Multinomial probit coefficients modeling January 2016 preference for Trump, Clinton, or neither.

	Clinton / Neither		Neither/Trump	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Intercept	-0.441	0.691	-1.371	0.785
Anti-Black Prejudice '12	-0.798	0.373	1.756	0.670
Anti-Latino Prejudice '12	0.099	0.295	-0.463	0.554
Income '08	-0.479	1.020	-0.737	1.994
Union '08	-0.148	0.174	0.348	0.215
Catholic '08	-0.003	0.101	0.140	0.201
Protestant '08	0.034	0.076	-0.277	0.162
Education '08	-0.026	0.024	-0.100	0.055
Female '08	0.041	0.076	-0.227	0.148
Age '08	-0.004	0.003	0.012	0.005
Lagged GOP Support	0.164	0.146	1.322	0.293
Lagged Support Neither	0.448	0.212	0.409	0.232
Weak Dem. '08	0.588	0.601	0.780	0.389
Lean Dem. '08	0.597	0.590	0.973	0.403
Independent '08	13.527	7.382	9.454	5.684
Lean GOP '08	0.750	0.643	1.734	0.541
Weak GOP '08	0.780	0.643	1.778	0.553
Strong GOP '08	0.773	0.646	1.984	0.595

Table 11: Multinomial probit coefficients modeling an October 2016 preference for Trump, Clinton, or neither.

	Clinton / Neither		Neither/Trump	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Intercept	0.123	0.530	0.472	0.866
Anti-Black Prejudice '12	-0.397	0.487	1.905	0.645
Anti-Latino Prejudice '12	0.438	0.448	-0.753	0.613
Income '08	-2.261	1.543	-2.696	2.212
Union '08	0.041	0.173	0.469	0.237
Catholic '08	-0.177	0.151	0.023	0.206
Protestant '08	-0.068	0.117	-0.168	0.179
Education '08	-0.030	0.028	-0.196	0.048
Female '08	-0.112	0.112	-0.215	0.160
Age '08	-0.011	0.005	-0.000	0.006
Lagged GOP Support	0.420	0.209	1.602	0.296
Lagged Support Neither	0.654	0.275	0.344	0.270
Weak Dem. '08	0.167	0.219	0.396	0.382
Lean Dem. '08	0.529	0.264	0.882	0.360
Independent '08	1.127	0.502	1.371	0.579
Lean GOP '08	0.768	0.333	1.998	0.441
Weak GOP '08	1.154	0.440	2.015	0.450
Strong GOP '08	0.627	0.331	2.592	0.516

Table 12: Multinomial probit coefficients modeling a November-December 2016 preference for Trump, Clinton, or neither.

	Clinton / Neither		Neither/Trump	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Intercept	-0.023	0.462	-0.602	0.934
Anti-Black Prejudice '12	-0.455	0.446	1.610	0.636
Anti-Latino Prejudice '12	0.243	0.370	-1.167	0.624
Income '08	-1.608	1.453	0.438	2.215
Union '08	0.078	0.141	0.408	0.243
Catholic '08	-0.226	0.164	0.232	0.224
Protestant '08	0.001	0.100	-0.129	0.188
Education '08	-0.042	0.028	-0.164	0.046
Female '08	-0.143	0.105	-0.193	0.168
Age '08	-0.004	0.004	0.011	0.007
Lagged GOP Support	0.225	0.171	1.847	0.308
Lagged Support Neither	0.514	0.254	0.695	0.265
Weak Dem. '08	0.555	0.331	0.340	0.360
Lean Dem. '08	0.667	0.364	0.604	0.328
Independent '08	1.222	0.601	1.255	0.592
Lean GOP '08	1.016	0.481	1.743	0.380
Weak GOP '08	1.036	0.509	1.536	0.402
Strong GOP '08	0.834	0.407	2.511	0.464

Table 13: This table reports the results of a multi-level model with respondent random effects in which support for the Republican candidate in 2012 and 2016 is modeled as a function of covariates including interaction effects between prejudice and year. Coefficients for gender, union affiliation, income, and religion are suppressed.

	Support for GOP Candidate
(Intercept)	0.090
	(0.111)
Anti-Black Prejudice	0.129
	(0.094)
2016 (vs. 2012)	-0.044^*
	(0.011)
Anti-Latino Prejudice	-0.078
	(0.096)
Years of Ed. '12	-0.013^*
	(0.006)
Age '12	0.002^*
	(0.001)
Lagged GOP Support	-0.039
	(0.024)
Lagged Neither Support	0.000
	(0.024)
Lagged Weak Democrat	0.127^*
	(0.041)
Lagged Lean Democrat	0.150^*
	(0.037)
Lagged Independent	0.195^*
	(0.075)
Lagged Lean GOP	0.627^*
	(0.040)
Lagged Weak GOP	0.696^*
	(0.044)
Lagged Strong GOP	0.857^*
	(0.043)
2016 x Anti-Black Prejudice	0.254^*
	(0.076)
2016 x Anti-Latino Prejudice	-0.065
	(0.079)
N	3612
Number of respondents	763

$^*p < 0.05$

Table 14: This table illustrates a robustness check in which we estimate the full three-wave test detailed in equations 5 and 6 and Lenz (2012). The difference between the two coefficients is 0.26 (SE=0.16), with a one-sided p-value of 0.05.

	2012	2016
Intercept	-0.849^{***}	-0.356
	(0.185)	(0.200)
Prior Support: GOP	0.944^{***}	0.631^{***}
	(0.063)	(0.066)
Prior Support: Neither	0.520^{***}	0.444^{***}
	(0.062)	(0.065)
Anti-Black Prejudice	0.206	0.463^{***}
	(0.108)	(0.121)
Income '08	0.502	-0.409
	(0.506)	(0.478)
Lagged Party ID: Weak Dem.	0.184^{**}	0.253^{***}
	(0.071)	(0.072)
Lagged Party ID: Lean Dem.	0.221^{**}	0.411^{***}
	(0.068)	(0.068)
Lagged Party ID: Ind.	0.196	0.536^{***}
	(0.163)	(0.135)
Lagged Party ID: Lean GOP	0.555^{***}	0.794^{***}
	(0.080)	(0.082)
Lagged Party ID: Weak GOP	0.742^{***}	0.795^{***}
	(0.082)	(0.088)
Lagged Party ID: Strong GOP	0.814^{***}	0.899^{***}
	(0.084)	(0.090)
Union '08	-0.070	0.126^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.057)
Catholic '08	0.001	0.066
	(0.050)	(0.049)
Protestant '08	-0.015	0.012
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education (Yrs.)	-0.012	-0.040^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Female	-0.020	-0.077^{*}
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age	0.003	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
R^2	0.584	0.510
Num. obs.	1011	1098

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 15: This table presents the estimated change in the probability of supporting the GOP candidate when shifting from the 20th percentile of Anti-Black prejudice to the 80th. The results are from multinomial probits for which the outcomes are supporting the Republican candidate, the Democratic candidate, or neither. The outcomes are for the parties' presidential candidates unless otherwise noted. The models with asterisks depart from the standard model in SI Tables 7 - 12 in two respects: they omit a measure of anti-Latino prejudice and rely on measures of 2004 and 2006 candidate support and lagged partisanship that were reported at varying dates.

	Change in GOP Voting	Standard Error
Fall 2006 (U.S. Rep.)*	-0.020	0.027
Fall 2008*	0.021	0.026
Late Fall 2008*	0.036	0.029
Oct. 2012	0.012	0.020
Nov. 2012 - Dec. 2013	0.007	0.026
Oct. 2014 (U.S. Rep.)	0.023	0.024
Jan. 2016	0.057	0.025
Oct. 2016	0.047	0.023
Nov.- Dec. 2016	0.040	0.023

Models without Anti-Black Prejudice

It is plausible that the sizeable correlations between anti-Black and anti-Latino prejudice mean that these two measures are in some sense substitutes. If so, if we omit anti-Black prejudice, anti-Latino prejudice should prove a stronger predictor of GOP vote choice. However, SI Table 16 shows that even when omitting anti-Black prejudice from the models, anti-Latino prejudice is never a statistically significant predictor of party preference. These results hold when using a multinomial probit as well. The comparable estimates indicate that a shift from the 20th percentile to the 80th percentile of anti-Latino prejudice is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in Trump support in January-February 2016 (SE=2.4), with estimates of 0.5 percentage points (SE=2.2) in October 2016 and -0.7 percentage points (SE=2.2) in November-December 2016.

Table 16: This table reports the results when only including anti-Latino prejudice to predict vote choice in OLS models where -1 indicates supporting the Democrat, 0 indicates supporting neither candidate, and 1 indicates supporting the Republican.

	10/12	11/12-1/13	1-2/16	10/16
Intercept	-1.166^*	-1.076^*	-0.305	-0.031
	(0.211)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.215)
Prior: GOP Support	0.658^*	0.500^*	0.652^*	0.710^*
	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.072)
Prior: Neither	0.313^*	0.262^*	0.360^*	0.350^*
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.070)
2012-13 Anti-Latino Prejudice	0.030	-0.158	0.125	0.111
	(0.127)	(0.149)	(0.141)	(0.129)
Income '08	0.476	0.320	-0.174	-0.672
	(0.562)	(0.622)	(0.608)	(0.554)
Lagged: Weak Dem	0.253^*	0.156	0.340^*	0.115
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.081)
Lagged: Ind Dem	0.270^*	0.210^*	0.416^*	0.346^*
	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.074)
Lagged: Ind	0.568^*	0.672^*	0.621^*	0.632^*
	(0.140)	(0.178)	(0.164)	(0.150)
Lagged: Lean GOP	1.044^*	1.320^*	0.832^*	0.839^*
	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.090)
Lagged: Weak GOP	1.169^*	1.314^*	0.847^*	0.798^*
	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.108)	(0.099)
Lagged: Strong GOP	1.297^*	1.475^*	0.917^*	0.977^*
	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.108)	(0.098)
Union Member	-0.026	-0.043	0.107	0.141^*
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.063)
Catholic	0.014	0.125^*	0.064	-0.007
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.056)
Protestant	0.006	0.060	-0.052	-0.024
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.046)
Education	0.001	-0.003	-0.042^*	-0.050^*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Female	0.046	0.057	-0.061	-0.076
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Age	0.002	0.000	0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
N	723	600	763	763

$^*p < 0.05$

Did Other Candidates Activate Prejudice?

The January 2016 wave took place at the outset of the primaries, and so allowed us to ask respondents about hypothetical general-election match-ups featuring Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio. Figure 2 in the main article presents the estimated change in support for the Republican candidate when shifting anti-Black prejudice from its 20th percentile to its 80th while holding other factors constant. When the question pits Donald Trump against Hillary Clinton, the average increase in GOP voting as prejudice rises is 5.7 percentage points (SE=2.5). However, when the Republican is Ted Cruz, the increase in GOP support is just 0.9 (SE=2.2), and for Marco Rubio it is 0.8 (SE=2.3). When testing the difference between the effect for Trump versus Cruz and Rubio, the one-sided p-values are 0.07 in each case, indicating that prejudice appears to have played a greater role when the GOP candidate was Trump. Specific candidates do seem to activate prejudice while others do not.

Our panel also allows us to examine the role of anti-Black prejudice on intra-party preferences in 2008 and 2016. As a benchmark, we estimated a logistic regression model predicting Trump support in the 2016 primary among the 596 White respondents who identified as Republicans in the January 2016 wave.[17] The fitted model indicates that when a respondent with median values on the other variables shifts from the 20th percentile of anti-Black prejudice to the 80th percentile, her probability of backing Trump increases by 9.9 percentage points (SE=2.7). By contrast, as SI Figure 4 illustrates, when using similarly specified logistic regressions to estimate support for leading Republican contenders in 2008 for these same respondents, we find no such effects.[18] In the 2008 GOP primaries, prejudice was not strongly predictive of vote choice.

[17] Given that primary vote preference was asked only of respondents identifying with the party in question at the time of the survey, we respecified these models to include a single, seven-category measure of baseline partisan identification. We also removed the measures of anti-Latino prejudice and lagged general-election vote choice, which were not asked in 2008.

[18] The association between prejudice and Trump support in 2016 is larger than that for Giuliani ($p = 0.08$), Romney ($p < 0.01$), McCain ($p < 0.01$), and Thompson ($p < 0.01$) in 2008.

To be sure, prejudice could have shaped Democratic primaries as well. On SI Figure 4's right side, we illustrate the impact of shifting from the 20th to the 80th percentile of anti-Black prejudice on Democratic primary support. Here, too, the models are fit only to respondents who identified with the party in question at the time of the survey. Given the small number of candidates, we use logistic regression. Prejudice was not strongly predictive of voting for Clinton over Bernie Sanders in 2016, as the effect is -1.2 percentage points (SE=2.3). And while it is predictive of not backing Obama in 2008, even that estimated effect of -3.1 percentage points (SE=1.4) is dwarfed by the Trump effect.

Figure 4: This figure presents the results from logistic regressions estimating the change in support for various presidential candidates associated with increased prejudice during the 2008 and 2016 primaries.



Differential Effects by Media Consumption

Table 17: On the left, this table summarizes a series of measures of media consumption. On the right, it reports results from separate multi-level models in which we interact those measures with anti-Black prejudice in models of respondents' November-December 2016 vote choice. The fifth column presents the interaction effect between the specific media measure in question and 2012 anti-Black prejudice while the 6th and 7th present the standard error and t-statistic, respectively. The numbers after the variable names indicate waves.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	β	SE	t	N
Fox News Viewer 2-6	0.464	0.499	0	1	-0.095	0.220	-0.429	763
# of Fox Shows 4	0.999	1.455	0	6	-0.121	0.082	-1.471	679
# of Total Shows 4	4.151	2.846	0	20	0.034	0.051	0.657	679
Media Index 6	2.797	1.509	0	6	0.027	0.066	0.412	763
# of Total Shows 6	3.453	2.897	0	19	0.055	0.047	1.177	663
# of Fox Shows 6	0.463	1.131	0	4	-0.148	0.096	-1.540	663
TV News Viewer 6	0.840	0.367	0	1	0.397	0.269	1.475	763
Radio Listener 6	0.395	0.489	0	1	-0.157	0.223	-0.707	763
Newspaper Reader 6	0.544	0.498	0	1	0.259	0.223	1.159	763
TV Talk Shows 6	0.534	0.499	0	1	0.134	0.221	0.608	763
Magazine Reader 6	0.124	0.329	0	1	-0.369	0.361	-1.023	763
Internet User 6	0.360	0.480	0	1	-0.085	0.236	-0.359	763
Media Index 10	2.463	1.400	0	6	-0.010	0.071	-0.146	763
TV News Viewer 10	0.804	0.398	0	1	0.245	0.297	0.826	763
Radio Listener 10	0.320	0.467	0	1	-0.226	0.229	-0.985	763
Newspaper Reader 10	0.449	0.498	0	1	0.037	0.223	0.165	763
TV Talk Shows 10	0.442	0.497	0	1	0.053	0.220	0.241	763
Magazine Reader 10	0.083	0.276	0	1	-0.144	0.408	-0.353	763
Internet User 10	0.365	0.482	0	1	-0.062	0.234	-0.267	763

Table 18: This table presents the results when the core model is fit to January 2016 data estimated either using the weights (first column) or for sub-groups defined in terms of age, education, or income.

	Weights	High Ed	Low Ed	Older	Younger	High Inc.	Low Inc.
Intercept	−0.35	0.09	−0.51	−0.92*	0.15	0.06	−0.44
	(0.21)	(0.56)	(0.42)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.51)	(0.23)
Prior: GOP Support	0.53*	0.69*	0.60*	0.71*	0.52*	0.35*	0.67*
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.07)
Prior: Neither	0.27*	0.55*	0.39*	0.52*	0.33*	0.32	0.47*
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.07)
2012-3 Anti-Black	0.74*	0.89*	0.44*	0.50*	0.64*	0.60	0.51*
Prejudice	(0.16)	(0.33)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.16)
2012-13 Anti-Latino	−0.26	−0.31	−0.02	−0.14	−0.14	−0.34	−0.10
Prejudice	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.40)	(0.16)
Income '08	0.03	−1.09	0.27	0.40	−0.82	−2.53*	0.09
	(0.58)	(0.71)	(0.66)	(0.69)	(0.69)	(1.20)	(1.01)
Lagged: Weak Dem	0.23*	0.15	0.31*	0.33*	0.15	0.02	0.32*
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.08)
Lagged: Ind Dem	0.47*	0.21	0.52*	0.49*	0.30*	0.27	0.45*
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.08)
Lagged: Ind	0.69*	0.60*	0.56*	0.60*	0.41	0.19	0.61*
	(0.15)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.15)
Lagged: Lean GOP	0.83*	0.41*	0.94*	0.86*	0.63*	0.97*	0.78*
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.09)
Lagged: Weak GOP	0.82*	0.62*	0.89*	0.89*	0.68*	0.93*	0.80*
	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.10)
Lagged: Strong GOP	0.92*	0.91*	0.93*	0.84*	1.00*	1.10*	0.88*
	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.10)
Union Member	0.19*	0.27*	0.06	0.02	0.30*	0.05	0.13*
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.06)
Catholic	0.03	−0.01	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.19	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.06)
Protestant	−0.03	0.01	0.03	−0.02	0.10	0.09	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.05)
Education	−0.04*	−0.07*	−0.03	−0.00	−0.06*	−0.05*	−0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Female	−0.02	−0.02	−0.11*	−0.11*	−0.03	0.05	−0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.48	0.55	0.49	0.53	0.49	0.58	0.50
N	874	310	788	636	462	194	904

*$p < 0.05$

Contemporaneous Prejudice

To test whether the patterns reported in the main manuscript hinge on the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, we here present the results of models which simply include prejudice measured at the same time as the vote preference in question. These models are thus comparable to those commonly estimated to study activation using observational, cross-sectional data. The outcome is Republican presidential vote choice, measured as a 1 if the respondent backs the Republican candidate, -1 if she backs the Democratic candidate, and 0 if she supports a third party candidate, does not plan to vote, or refuses to answer.

We first examine the conditional correlations between Whites' prejudice toward Blacks and Hispanics and their support for Republican candidates at four different moments: October 2012 (at the height of the Obama-Romney campaign), November 2012 - January 2013 (after the 2012 election had concluded), January - February 2016 (as the first caucuses and primaries took place), and October 2016 (at the height of the Clinton-Trump campaign). These are the four panel waves for which we observe both anti-Black and anti-Latino prejudice. In these models, we include contemporaneous measures of prejudice, meaning that our measures of prejudice were taken at the same time as our assessments of candidate support. These models conflate several processes, including learning as well as activation, and so potentially provide an upper bound on the extent to which prejudice was activated. However, the do provide a benchmark against which to compare cross-sectional results from other research.

SI Table 19 displays the results of these OLS models. As it illustrates, after we account for respondents' prior vote choice and their contemporary party identification, anti-Latino prejudice is never a strong, positive predictor of GOP support. In fact, its coefficient is never much larger in absolute terms than its standard error—and in three of the four survey waves, the sign is negative. These estimates employ contemporaneous measures of prejudice, so they should be bolstered by either activation or learning. The

weakness of the anti-Latino prejudice coefficients in 2016 provides another indication that neither process is at work.

However, even accounting for partisanship and prior vote choice, contemporaneous anti-Black prejudice is correlated with GOP support in the later waves. In January 2016, the relationship peaks at 0.293 (SE=0.128, p=0.02). This coefficient means that if a respondent went from being a -1 (rating the out-group much more favorably) to 1 (rating the in-group much more favorably), she moves 0.299 on a scale from -1 (Democrat) to 1 (Republican). A more plausible shift of one standard deviation in anti-Black prejudice is associated with a change of 0.05 in the dependent variable, which is 2.5% of the distance from backing the Democrat to backing the Republican.

While the effect of anti-Black prejudice declines somewhat by October 2016, the coefficient remains 0.221 (SE=0.125, p=0.08), meaning that there is still a positive, substantively meaningful relationship. Moreover, in the October 2016 wave, the coefficient for anti-Black prejudice is larger than that for anti-Latino prejudice (two-sided p-value 0.06). Anti-Black prejudice, not anti-Latino prejudice, was a positive predictor of GOP voting in two 2016 survey waves. From these models, there is little evidence that anti-Latino prejudice is strongly related to GOP vote choice even when the two are measured contemporaneously.

Table 19: This table reports OLS models predicting GOP candidate support for four survey waves.

	10/12	11/12-1/13	1-2/16	10/16
Intercept	-1.169^*	-1.121^*	-0.452^*	-0.341
	(0.210)	(0.237)	(0.229)	(0.204)
Prior: GOP Support	0.657^*	0.502^*	0.529^*	0.533^*
	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.066)
Prior: Neither	0.312^*	0.265^*	0.299^*	0.239^*
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.064)
Contemp. Anti-Black Prejudice	0.045	0.171	0.293^*	0.221
	(0.136)	(0.148)	(0.128)	(0.125)
Contemp. Anti-Latino Prejudice	0.008	-0.165	-0.008	-0.147
	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.138)	(0.143)
Income '08	0.474	0.338	-0.540	-0.865
	(0.562)	(0.622)	(0.587)	(0.522)
Lagged: Weak Dem	0.253^*	0.158	0.285^*	0.308^*
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.075)
Lagged: Ind Dem	0.271^*	0.212^*	0.263^*	0.302^*
	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.072)
Lagged: Ind	0.568^*	0.681^*	0.589^*	0.769^*
	(0.140)	(0.178)	(0.123)	(0.105)
Lagged: Lean GOP	1.043^*	1.311^*	0.899^*	1.052^*
	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.082)
Lagged: Weak GOP	1.170^*	1.311^*	0.843^*	1.028^*
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.090)
Lagged: Strong GOP	1.295^*	1.461^*	1.060^*	1.270^*
	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.088)
Union Member	-0.025	-0.042	0.115	0.141^*
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Catholic	0.012	0.112	0.064	-0.000
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.052)
Protestant	0.006	0.060	-0.067	0.004
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.043)
Education	0.001	-0.001	-0.031^*	-0.038^*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Female	0.047	0.059	-0.056	-0.064
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.039)
Age	0.002	0.001	0.003	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
R^2	0.669	0.711	0.534	0.645
N	723	600	766	767

$^*p < 0.05$

Table 20: Models of support for Donald Trump vs. Hillary Clinton in January 2016. Partisanship is measured in the October 2012 wave. Lagged candidate support refers to the 2012 presidential election. Coefficients for union members, Catholics, and Protestants included but suppressed.

	A	B	C	D	E	F
Intercept	−0.382	−0.402	−0.510*	0.296	0.299	−0.299
	(0.235)	(0.240)	(0.255)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.293)
Prior Election: GOP Support	0.638*	0.640*	0.647*			0.307*
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)			(0.099)
Prior Election: Neither	0.350*	0.349*	0.361*			0.142
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)			(0.096)
2012 White-Black Prejudice	0.419*			0.283*	0.307*	0.269
	(0.138)			(0.105)	(0.123)	(0.156)
2008 Income	−0.137	−0.204	−0.174	−0.028	−0.020	−0.091
	(0.603)	(0.604)	(0.604)	(0.459)	(0.460)	(0.668)
Lagged: Weak Democrat	0.343*	0.334*	0.336*	0.002	0.002	0.254*
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.098)
Lagged: Lean Democrat	0.424*	0.410*	0.412*	0.077	0.077	0.335*
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.090)
Lagged: Independent	0.624*	0.614*	0.621*	−0.063	−0.064	0.584*
	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.234)
Lagged: Lean GOP	0.828*	0.821*	0.821*	−0.079	−0.078	0.645*
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.114)
Lagged: Weak GOP	0.854*	0.841*	0.841*	−0.207*	−0.207*	0.713*
	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.122)
Lagged: Strong GOP	0.902*	0.911*	0.903*	−0.239*	−0.239*	0.714*
	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.123)
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.056)
Education	−0.039*	−0.042*	−0.040*	−0.021*	−0.021*	−0.039*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Female	−0.049	−0.050	−0.054	−0.053	−0.054	−0.080
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.050)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Anti-Black Stereotyping		0.263*				
		(0.122)				
2012 Anti-Black Prejudice			0.040*			
			(0.018)			
Δ Anti-Black Prejudice					−0.000	
					(0.001)	
2012 ACA Attitudes						0.096*
						(0.020)
2012 Gov't Spending Attitudes						−0.061*
						(0.023)
R^2	0.505	0.502	0.502	0.091	0.091	0.582
N	763	763	763	763	763	573

* $p < 0.05$

Additional Models and Robustness Checks

Social desirability biases make the measurement of prejudice or other racially or ethnically charged attitudes difficult. In this case, a particular concern is that because the default responses were to give each group a maximally positive rating, respondents may have chosen not to move the sliders to record their opinions, inducing measurement error. Researchers have also raised concerns that the measurement of racial resentment confounds race-related attitudes with political ideology and policy-specific attitudes. Accordingly, this section provides a series of robustness checks which focus on the measurement of prejudice and model specification.

Given how we measure prejudice, people who moved none of the four slides will be identified as believing each group to be perfectly trustworthy and hard-working. As a result, those individuals will be classified as a 0, meaning that they have neither in-group nor out-group prejudices. In the 2016 survey waves, we recorded respondents who did not move the sliders, and so can re-estimate our core models removing these individuals. There are many of them: in January 2016, for example, 29% of respondents failed to move at least one of the four sliders when registering their stereotypes. In Table 21, we report results for the 2016 waves both with and without these respondents. As the Table shows, their exclusion does not change our core conclusion at all: in 2016, Whites' anti-Black prejudice was a potent predictor of their support for Republican candidate Donald Trump.[19]

An additional concern is that the distribution of our prejudice measure has long tails, meaning that a small number of respondents place themselves as either very prejudiced against Whites or else very prejudiced against Blacks. For instance, while

[19] As a separate robustness check, we also re-estimated the contemporaneous prejudice models after multiply imputing levels of prejudice for any respondent who did not move any of the four slides using chained equations. Doing so, we find that the January 2016 coefficient for contemporary prejudice is 0.235 (SE=0.119), an estimate which is similar but somewhat lower than the 0.289 (SE=0.104) we recover when coding those who do not move the sliders as reporting a highly positive attitude toward the group in question.

Table 21: This table presents the coefficients for Whites' contemporaneous anti-Black prejudice from models of Republican vote choice. These coefficients are extracted from models including all of other independent variables listed in Table 19.

	Jan 16	Jan 16	Oct 16	Oct 16	Nov-Dec 16	Nov-Dec 16
Anti-Black Prejudice	0.2893*					
	(0.1040)					
Anti-Black Prejudice		0.4169*				
(No Possible Non-response)		(0.1252)				
Anti-Black Prejudice			0.1386			
			(0.0963)			
Anti-Black Prejudice				0.1385		
(No Possible Non-response)				(0.1172)		
Anti-Black Prejudice					0.1995*	
					(0.0950)	
Anti-Black Prejudice						0.2592*
(No Possible Non-response)						(0.1218)
R^2	0.5336	0.5596	0.6443	0.6691	0.6485	0.6545
N	766	545	767	538	751	546

*$p < 0.05$

the mean anti-Black prejudice score in October 2012 was 0.072, the maximum was 1, which is more than 5 standard deviations above the mean. When using linear models, such outliers have the potential to exert significant influence on our estimates. As one robustness check, we coarsen our prejudice measure into eight categories, coding those who fall between -1 and -0.5 as 1; -0.5 and -0.1 as 2; -0.1 and -0.05 as 3; -0.05 and 0 as 4, and so on. Doing so, we find similar patterns, though coarsened White-Black prejudice is not quite as strongly predictive of Republican support in January 2016 as was the original measure. Specifically, the coefficient for this new measure is 0.023 (SE=0.016, two-sided p-value=0.15). In another noteworthy robustness check, we confirmed that the results were quite similar when only using the trust-based out-group stereotypes, which are more affective and likely to be applied to both groups.[20]

[20]When modeling January 2016 candidate support, we recover a coefficient of 0.23 (SE=0.13) for viewing Blacks as untrustworthy in 2012 and -0.07 (SE=0.13) for viewing Latinos as untrustworthy that year.

Table 22: This table reports the results of OLS models in which we employ measures of stereotype adherence separately. The outcome is coded as -1 for supporting the Democratic candidate, 0 for supporting a third-party candidate or being undecided, and 1 for supporting the Republican candidate.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	−0.2875	−0.3041	−0.3101
	(0.2008)	(0.1998)	(0.2017)
Prior Support: GOP	0.6390***	0.6313***	0.6451***
	(0.0663)	(0.0662)	(0.0662)
Prior Support: Neither	0.4478***	0.4468***	0.4541***
	(0.0650)	(0.0648)	(0.0649)
White-Black Stereotypes: Trust	−0.2862*		
	(0.1235)		
White-Latino/a Stereotypes: Trust	0.0939		
	(0.1209)		
White-Black Stereotypes: Work		−0.3489**	
		(0.1092)	
White-Latino/a Stereotypes: Work		0.0707	
		(0.1039)	
White-Black Stereotypes: Intell.			−0.2339
			(0.1421)
White-Latino/a Stereotypes: Intell.			−0.0189
			(0.1329)
Income '08	−0.4374	−0.4026	−0.4239
	(0.4811)	(0.4802)	(0.4809)
Lagged Party ID: Weak Dem.	0.2537***	0.2484***	0.2574***
	(0.0727)	(0.0724)	(0.0725)
Lagged Party ID: Lean Dem.	0.4116***	0.4059***	0.4087***
	(0.0688)	(0.0686)	(0.0688)
Lagged Party ID: Ind.	0.5249***	0.5299***	0.5313***
	(0.1353)	(0.1349)	(0.1353)
Lagged Party ID: Lean GOP	0.7957***	0.7927***	0.7964***
	(0.0827)	(0.0826)	(0.0828)
Lagged Party ID: Weak GOP	0.7957***	0.7902***	0.7913***
	(0.0884)	(0.0882)	(0.0884)
Lagged Party ID: Strong GOP	0.9154***	0.8981***	0.9104***
	(0.0905)	(0.0906)	(0.0907)
Union '08	0.1257*	0.1249*	0.1255*
	(0.0569)	(0.0567)	(0.0569)
Catholic '08	0.0813	0.0746	0.0822
	(0.0492)	(0.0492)	(0.0492)
Protestant '08	0.0129	0.0124	0.0161
	(0.0430)	(0.0428)	(0.0429)
Education (Yrs.)	−0.0430***	−0.0426***	−0.0420***
	(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)
Female	−0.0845*	−0.0815*	−0.0831*
	(0.0382)	(0.0381)	(0.0384)

Table 23: This figure presents an OLS model of the change in presidential support between 2012 and 2016, with support in each year measured between -1 (back Democrat) and 1 (back Republican). Coefficients for age, religion, and union affiliation are suppressed.

	Change in GOP-Dem Support
Intercept	0.7417*
	(0.2664)
Δ Anti-Black	0.0047*
Prejudice '16-'12	(0.0020)
Δ Anti-Latino	0.0008
Prejudice '16-'12	(0.0020)
Δ Party ID	0.1285*
'16 - '12	(0.0304)
Δ Ideology	−0.0375
'16 - '12	(0.0306)
Media Consumption Index	−0.0024
'16 - '12	(0.0185)
Income, '08	−0.3434
	(0.7011)
Ed. Years, '12	−0.0366*
	(0.0135)
Female, '12	−0.1566*
	(0.0503)
Backed McCain '08	−0.2627*
	(0.0796)
Backed Neither '08	−0.1893*
	(0.0830)
Weak Democrat '12	0.0873
	(0.0942)
Independent Democrat '12	0.1565
	(0.0884)
Independent '12	0.2265
	(0.2288)
Lean GOP '12	−0.0586
	(0.1027)
Weak GOP '12	−0.0895
	(0.1089)
Strong GOP '12	−0.0404
	(0.1075)
R^2	0.1643
N	579

*$p < 0.05$

Policy Attitudes

Question Wordings for Issue Attitudes

- *Immigration 1-2*: Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each of the following proposals addressing immigration: 1) Increase border security by building a fence along part of the US border with Mexico; 2) Provide a path to citizenship for some illegal aliens who agree to return to their home country for a period of time and pay substantial fines.

- *Immigration 3*: On immigration, some people argue that U.S. policy should focus on returning illegal immigrants to their native countries. Other people argue that U.S. policy should focus on creating a pathway to U.S. citizenship for illegal immigrants. Still others are somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

- *Government Spending*: Some people think the government should provide fewer services in order to reduce government spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

- *Gov't Helping Blacks*: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?

- *Affordable Care Act*: Some people think the health care reform law should be kept as it is. Others want to repeal the entire health care law. Still others are somewhere in between.

- *NAFTA*: Do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA?

- *Trade*: Some people think that the United States should have more trade agreements with other countries. Others believe that the U.S. should have fewer trade agreements. Of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

- *Gay Marriage*: There has been much talk recently about whether gays and lesbians should have the legal right to marry someone of the same sex. Which of the following options comes closest to your position on this issue? I support full marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples; I support civil unions or domestic partnerships, but not gay marriage; I do not support any form of legal recognition of the relationships of gay and lesbian couples.

- *Abortion*: Which of the following options comes closest to your view on abortion? Abortion should be available to anyone who wants it; Abortion should be available, but with stricter limits than it is now; Abortion should not be permitted except in cases of rape, incest, or when the life of the woman is at risk; Abortion should not be permitted under any circumstances.

- *Hawk*: Do you mainly consider yourself: A hawk who believes military force should be used frequently to promote U.S. policy; A dove who believes the U.S. should rarely or never use military force.

- *Iraq*: Which of the following plans for United States policy in Iraq comes closest

to your own position? The US should withdraw all troops from Iraq as soon as possible, regardless of conditions in Iraq; The US should set a deadline for withdrawing its troops if the Iraqi government doesn't show definite progress in training Iraqi forces and controlling violence on its own; The US should keep its troops in Iraq as long as is needed until a stable democratic government is established there.

Factor Analysis

To measure attitudes on immigration and other issues, we first identified 19 survey items which tap respondents' issue preferences and were asked during the 2007, 2008, or 2012 panel waves. These items include three questions about immigration which focus on elements on the contemporary immigration debate: building a fence on the U.S.-Mexico border; providing a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants; and deporting unauthorized immigrants. We then use factor analysis on the 1,259 fully observed panelists to simplify our analysis by providing a low-dimensional representation of their attitudes.[21] As SI Table 24 illustrates, several coherent factors emerge, including those defined by attitudes toward: government spending and the Affordable Care Act (factor 1); immigration (factor 2); social issues such as abortion and gay marriage (factor 3); trade and NAFTA (factor 4);and foreign policy (factor 5).

Policy Attitudes

Here, we focus on one particularly relevant robustness check—how do our estimates change when included alongside policy attitudes? As detailed above, one ongoing challenge with measuring racial activation is knowing precisely which attitudes or predispositions are being activated. Political rhetoric may activate racial predispositions, but given how closely integrated those predispositions are with political partisanship, they may instead activate policy attitudes or partisan identities. As one way to address that concern, we used anti-Black and anti-Latino prejudices—rather than a group-related measure with more policy content—as our baseline predispositions of interest. In an additional robustness check, we consider whether even these prejudice-based estimates of activation may be confounded by the activation of related attitudes.

Specifically, we begin with our baseline model of January 2016 GOP support. As

[21] Note that to improve precision in estimating the factors, our factor analysis includes all fully observed respondents who remained in the panel through the 2012 wave.

Table 24: This table reports the results of a factor analysis with 5 factors performed on 19 survey items from 1,259 fully observed panelists. Loadings with an absolute value above 0.50 are bolded. The final row reports the share of variance explained by each factor.

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Gov't Spending, Wave 6	**0.865**	0.230	0.161	0.011	-0.026
Gov't Spending, Wave 7	**0.779**	0.272	0.198	0.026	-0.107
Affordable Care Act, Wave 6	**-0.567**	-0.331	-0.276	-0.045	0.544
Affordable Care Act, Wave 7	**-0.573**	-0.343	-0.265	-0.037	0.596
Gov't Helping Blacks, Wave 7	-0.476	-0.389	-0.099	-0.033	0.075
Taxes, Wave 4	0.287	0.242	0.179	0.039	-0.111
Pathway to Citiz., Wave 4	0.049	0.199	-0.029	0.125	-0.044
Build Fence, Wave 4	-0.271	**-0.506**	-0.134	-0.092	0.067
Deport or Pathway, Wave 6	0.272	**0.825**	0.128	0.094	-0.065
Deport or Pathway, Wave 7	0.262	**0.810**	0.132	0.112	-0.111
Abortion, Wave 4	0.172	0.024	**0.916**	0.023	-0.065
Abortion, Wave 5	0.177	0.050	**0.905**	0.029	-0.056
Gay Marriage, Wave 4	0.200	0.242	**0.521**	0.072	-0.104
NAFTA, Wave 4	-0.048	0.018	0.015	**0.728**	0.026
NAFTA, Wave 6	0.023	0.121	-0.006	**0.762**	-0.037
NAFTA, Wave 7	0.040	0.112	0.047	**0.812**	-0.031
Pro Trade, Wave 1	-0.020	-0.098	-0.043	**-0.697**	-0.021
Hawk (vs. Dove), Wave 5	-0.299	-0.288	-0.234	0.019	0.229
Stay in Iraq, Wave 4	-0.352	-0.165	-0.291	0.095	0.214
Var.	0.150	0.127	0.125	0.122	0.043

illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 5, we then compare the coefficient for anti-Black affect in that baseline model (left) to the same coefficient when also conditioning on two policy attitudes measured in late 2012 and January 2013: attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act and general government spending.[22] If the coefficient for 2012/13 prejudice declines substantially in magnitude, that would suggest that it may not be prejudice specifically—but instead a series of correlated policy attitudes—that is being activated. And in fact, that is precisely what we see on the right-hand side of Figure 5 and SI Table 20's final column. When we control for attitudes on two salient policies,

[22] As with our primary measure of prejudice, we average attitudes reported in waves 6 (October 2012) and 7 (November 2012 - January 2013).

Figure 5: The figure illustrates the coefficients for 2012-2013 prejudice or correlated measures when predicting January 2016 Trump support. See the full, fitted OLS models in SI Table 20.



measured at the same time as anti-Black prejudice, we find that its January 2016 coefficient drops by 36%, from 0.419 (SE=0.138) to 0.269 (SE=0.156). To be sure, the difference between the two estimates does not approach statistical significance (p=0.40). Moreover, this reduction is not itself evidence against a role for racial attitudes, as it is plausible that the inclusion of those policy attitudes reduces the anti-Black prejudice coefficient precisely because they grounded in racial attitudes (see also Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Tesler, 2012). Still, these findings do suggest that there is a series of correlated policy- and group-related attitudes likely to be activated by political events, and that disentangling them with observational data remains challenging.